Canada's Coastlines:
The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World
Government and Private Assets Involved in Maritime Surveillance and Search and Rescue
–
Part 1 –
Maritime Surveillance
The first part of this appendix
lists Canadian maritime surveillance assets. It starts by discussing the
Department of National Defence’s (DND) standing commitments and listing the
Canadian Forces (CF) patrol aircraft and its entire fleet. It then reviews the
Canadian Coast Guard’s (CCG) plans for ship replacement and enforcement, and
lists its helicopters and contracted aircraft. The last section lists the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s (RCMP) vessels, and Provincial Airlines
Limited’s (a private company) maritime surveillance aircraft.
DND
Maritime Surveillance Commitments:
The CF and the Department of
Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) have signed a memorandum of understanding
concerning maritime surveillance. It states that the CF and DFO will negotiate
on an annual basis the number of sea days and flying hours that the military
will provide for coastal patrolling. The CF flew 720 hours in 2001-02, but
operational demands resulted in a cut to 580 hours in 2002-03. The CF supplied
DFO with 155 sea days free of cost in 2003-04 (125 for the east coast, 30 for
the west coast).
It is not CF
policy to always have a ship patrolling Canada’s territorial waters.
However, every CF ship at sea must report any sightings to its headquarters
on the Atlantic or Pacific coast. This data is integrated into the
Recognized Maritime Picture which the navy maintains and which is accessible
by other federal departments and Canada’s allies. The Maritime Forces
headquarters on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts also maintain a Ready Duty
Ship. This vessel is on 8 hours notice to respond to unforeseen situations.
Given the circumstances, it could be underway in 30 minutes.
The Navy Fleet:
Iroquois Class Destroyer:
these are helicopter-carrying ships. In the early 1990s, the destroyers were
re-fitted for an area defence role. They were given the self-defence,
communications and sensor capabilities that they needed to serve as
"command and control ships."
The destroyers can reach speeds of
27-9 knots. The main air-defence weapons on this class of ships are 29
vertically-launched surface to air missiles, a 76mm Super Rapid gun, and a
20mm Phalanx close-in weapons system. They are also equipped with 12.7mm
machine guns. The anti-submarine warfare weapons include two torpedo-carrying
helicopters and 6 ship-launched torpedos. Defensive armaments include
tube-launched shield decoys, chaff, flares, off-board decoys, torpedo decoys
and radar.
The
ships in this class are:
HMCS
IROQUOIS
HMCS
ATHABASKAN
HMCS
ALGONQUIN
HMCS
HURON
Halifax Class Frigate:
In the late-1980s, after decades of anti-submarine warfare, the Halifax class
was re-fitted for a broader multi-purpose purpose role. The changes enabled
the ships to deploy singly or as part of a task group anywhere in the world.
Halifax class vessels can reach
speeds of 29-30 knots. Their main armaments are the long-range Harpoon
surface-to-surface missiles, Sea Sparrow surface-to-air missiles, a Bofors
57mm rapid-fire gun, a 20mm Phalanx anti-missile close-in weapons system,
anti-submarine homing torpedoes, and machine guns. Defensive armament includes
infra-red suppression, shield decoys, chaff, flares, a towed acoustic decoy,
and radar and sonar jamming devices. The ship's torpedo-carrying helicopter
extends its range of operational effectiveness.
However, not all Halifax class
vessels are available throughout the year. The 2001 Report of the Auditor
General noted that “Halifax class vessels are supposed to have a total
of 12 weeks scheduled each year for corrective and preventive maintenance. But
they averaged only 6.1 weeks in 1997, 7.8 weeks in 1998, and 8.7 weeks in
1999.”
The
ships in this class are:
HMCS
CALGARY
HMCS
CHARLOTTETOWN
HMCS
FREDERICTON
HMCS
HALIFAX
HMCS
MONTRÉAL
HMCS
OTTAWA
HMCS
REGINA
HMCS
ST-JOHNS
HMCS
TORONTO
HMCS
VANCOUVER
HMCS
VILLE DE QUÉBEC
HMCS
WINNIPEG
Protecteur Class (Auxiliary Oil
/ Replenishment Ship):
These ships replenish Canadian Naval Task Groups at sea with food, munitions,
fuel, spare parts and other supplies. They also have larger medical and dental
facilities than the frigates and destroyers. Protecteur class ships have
limited capacities as troop carriers, but can embark vehicles, landing craft
and up to three medium / heavy helicopters. They can carry 14, 590 tons of
fuel, 400 tons of aviation fuel, 1, 000 tons of dry cargo and 1, 250 tons of
ammunition.
Protecteur Class ships are capable
of 21 knots. They are armed with two 20mm Phalanx anti-missile
close-in-weapons systems, and six 12.7mm machine guns. They have self-defence
systems like chaff and radar.
The ships in this class are:
HMCS
Protecteur
HMCS Preserver
Kingston Class:
The Navy has 12 Kingston Class coastal defence vessels. These ships can be
fitted for route survey, bottom object inspection and minesweeping. Kingston
class ships are crewed primarily by Naval Reservists and, according to the DND
Internet site, are intended as a coastal surveillance and patrol platform.
Kingston class ships are capable
of 15 knots. They are armed with one Bofors 40mm gun and two machine guns. Six
are stationed on each coast; two are on extended readiness on a rotational
basis.
But while they do a lot of
patrolling and fulfill a valuable presence function, the vessels’s
enforcement capabilities are limited. Navy Captain (retired) John Dewar
testified to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence
that the vessels are “turning in yeoman service at this time,” but in
“high sea states, they do not get there very fast and it is not a
particularly comfortable ride.” He added that “You would not necessarily
want to deploy boarding parties from those ships, but you make do with what
you have.”
The
ships in this class are:
HMCS
KINGSTON
HMCS
GLACE BAY
HMCS
NANAIMO
HMCS
EDMONTON
HMCS
SHAWINIGAN
HMCS
WHITEHORSE
HMCS
YELLOWKNIFE
HMCS
GOOSE BAY
HMCS
MONCTON
HMCS
SASKATOON
HMCS
BRANDON
HMCS
SUMMERSIDE
Victoria Class Submarine: Canada
acquired four Royal Navy submarines in 1998. The boats are
conventionally-powered and have sophisticated hydrodynamic and marine
engineering systems. Victoria class submarines are well suited to coastal
security tasks like law enforcement, immigration, fisheries, and environmental
patrols.
The submarines are capable of 12
knots on the surface, 20 knots submerged, and 12 knots while ‘snorting’
(through an extendable air breather). They can dive below 200 meters. The
submarines have 6 torpedo tubes and can carry 18 anti-ship / anti-submarine
homing torpedoes. They are also equipped with acoustic ‘bubble’ decoys
that can confuse ships using radar.
The
ships in this class are:
HMCS
VICTORIA
HMCS
WINDSOR
HMCS
CHICOUTIMI
HMCS
CORNERBROOK
However, none the submarines were
operational as of Fall 2003. The VICTORIA has arrived at CFB Esquimalt. It is
not expected to be materially ready to fire weapons until the end of 2004. The
CORNER BROOK is now conducting qualification training near Halifax and is
scheduled to begin Canadianization in Halifax early 2004. The WINDSOR is
finishing Canadianization, and is expected to commence sea trials in January
2004. It will be operational later that year. The CHICOUTIMI is still
officially known as the HMS UPHOLDER. It is in the final stages of
reactivation in Britain, and will be accepted and moved to Canada in the
Spring of 2004.
Air Force Maritime Patrol
Aircraft:
CP-140 Aurora Long-Range Patrol
Aircraft: The Navy uses
the CP-140 Aurora as a multi-mission reconnaissance and anti-submarine
platform. The CF received 18 Auroras commencing in 1980. The Aurora is capable
of 750 km / hour and has a range of 9, 266 km at 648 km / hour. It carries
sophisticated avionics to conduct low and high altitude patrols. This includes
a forward-looking infrared camera (FLIR), sonobuoy, magnetic anomaly detector,
fixed 70mm camera, gyrostabilized binoculars, hand-held camera and night
vision goggles.
This aircraft is presently in the
midst of the comprehensive, multi-phase Aurora Incremental Modernization
Project. The first contract was awarded in August 2000, and the project is due
to be complete in 2008. The upgrade will enable the Aurora to serve as an
interoperable intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft.
However, it is not clear what impact this program will have on Canadian Forces
operations.
CP-140A Arcturus Long-Range
Patrol Aircraft: the CF
purchased 3 of this aircraft in order to augment its CP-140 Aurora fleet. The
Arcturus is capable of surface marine surveillance, search and rescue, drug
interdiction and serving as a training platform. The Arcturus is essentially
the same aircraft as the Aurora, but it has significantly different mission
avionics and is not configured for anti-submarine warfare.
For budgetary reasons, the three
Arcturus (and two Auroras) will not be a part of the Aurora Incremental
Modernization Project and will eventually be phased out.
CH-124 Sea King:
The Sea King is a ship-borne maritime helicopter with day and night vision
capabilities. The CF possesses 29 Sea Kings, which have a range of 648 km and
a top speed of 211 km / hour. Its maximum flying time is 3h 45 minutes. Since
the end of the Cold War, the Sea King has become increasingly responsible for
disaster relief, search and rescue, and helping other federal government
departments conduct counter-narcotic operations and fisheries and pollution
patrols.
However, the Sea King, which was
procured during 1963-69, has developed serious serviceability problems. For
example, the Report of the Auditor General for 2001 “reviewed 61
post-deployment reports on the use of the Sea King aboard ships from 1 April
1995 to 31 March 2000. We found that 54 of the reports mention at least one of
the following problems: scheduled mission that was cancelled for aircraft
maintenance; mission degraded by aircraft's lack of serviceability; poor
serviceability that had a negative impact on training; major snags that caused
significant downtime; and aircraft that were grounded.”
CCG Assets:
DFO is going through a
re-assessment and re-alignment process. A
capital plan for ship replacement will flow from this exercise. But as of July 2003, this plan was still several months from
completion.
DFO has established an
inter-sectional working group of Senior Regional and Headquarters staff to
review its enforcement functions. The CCG is included in this review. But as
of April 2003, a decision regarding the CCG and enforcement had not been made.
The CCG has 108 active and 24
vessels inactive vessels in its fleet at about 60 stations. For the complete
list of vessels (including vessel names, type, length and home station), see
the appendix to this document.
CCG Helicopters –
The CCG
owns fifteen BO-105 light twin-engine helicopters, five Bell 212 medium lift
twin-engine helicopters, and five Bell 206 single-engine seven-seat
helicopters. They are based throughout the country. The CCG also owns a
Sikorsky S-61N heavy lift helicopter, which is based in Prince Rupert, British
Columbia. These helicopters conduct conservation and fisheries patrols and
monitor ice flows. They can be embarked on ships that have the required
facilities.
The CCG operates two Transport
Canada aircraft under contract:
an
Ottawa-based de Havilland Dash 8, which does pollution control patrols over
the Great Lakes, St. Lawrence Seaway, and parts of the east coast; and
a
Vancouver-based de Havilland Twin Otter, which flies fisheries and pollution
control missions along the east coast.
Royal Canadian Mounted Police
(RCMP) Vessels:
The RCMP has five commissioned
patrol vessels. These catamarans have a crew of four and a top speed of 36
knots. They are floating detachments, and are not meant for regular patrolling
far from the coastline. The vessel names, sizes and home ports are:
The
Inkster is 19.75 meters long and is based in Prince Rupert, British Columbia;
The Nadon
is 17.7 meters long and is based in Nanaimo, British Columbia;
The Higgitt is 17.7 meters long and
is based in Nanaimo, British Columbia;
The
Lindsay is 17.7 meters long and is based in Nanaimo, British Columbia; and
The
Simmonds is 17.7 meters long and is based out of Burin, Newfoundland &
Labrador.
In addition, the RCMP will
construct a 6th commissioner class vessel, to be based in Port
Hawkesbury, Nova Scotia.
Private
Maritime Surveillance Assets:
Provincial Airlines Limited (PAL)
–
PAL
utilizes three King Air 200 aircraft. Each of the aircraft possesses radar,
forward-looking infrared, data management, night vision, and satellite
communication capabilities. Two of the PAL aircraft are capable of flying for
6.5 hours, while one has longer-range fuel tanks and can fly missions lasting
7.5 hours.
Government
and Private Assets Involved
in
Maritime Surveillance and Search and Rescue
–
Part 2 –
Search and Rescue
The second part of this appendix
lists Canadian search and rescue (SAR) assets. It runs through the Canadian
Forces (CF) SAR aircraft and the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) SAR vessels. The
CCG vessels are grouped by region.
CF
SAR Assets:
CC-115 Buffalo:
is a transport aircraft with a short take-off and landing capability. It is
used primarily for SAR. There are 6 Buffalos in the CF. They have a range of
2, 727 km and a top speed of 416 km / hour.
CC-130 Hercules:
is a versatile long-range transport plane. It is used in SAR operations, to
airlift troops, equipment and cargo, and to refuel fighters in the air. There
are 32 Hercules on strength in the CF. They have a top speed of 556 km / hour
and a range of 3, 960 km to 9, 790 km.
CC-138 Twin Otter:
is a highly manoeuvrable light transport aircraft with a short take-off and
landing capability on floats, skies or wheels. The CF’s 4 Twin Otters fly
SAR missions throughout the north. They have a range of 1, 427 km and a top
speed of 337 km / hour.
CP-140 Aurora:
is a very capable SAR platform. It can fly an impressive 9, 260 km without
refuelling, and can achieve speeds of 750 km / hour. The Aurora has
sophisticated surveillance equipment, such as a forward looking infrared
camera and night vision goggles. The Aurora’s versatility was demonstrated
in 1996, when it dropped survival gear to the crew a sinking vessel, all of
whom were saved.
CP-140A Arcturus:
is a coastal patrol aircraft that is essentially the same as the Aurora, but
with different mission avionics. The CF’s 3 Arcturuses are capable of
undertaking SAR missions.
CH-113 Labrador:
is a twin-engined helicopter. It is the workhorse of the CF SAR effort. It has
a watertight hull for marine landings, a rescue hoist, emergency medical
equipment, and a 5, 000 kg cargo hook. There are 12 Labradors in the CF. They
have a top speed of 275 km / hour and a range of 1, 110 km.
CH-124 Sea King:
is a ship-borne helicopter that was initially procured for anti-submarine
warfare. However, domestic roles such as SAR have become increasingly central.
The CF’s 29 Sea Kings are equipped with forward looking infrared radar. The
Sea King can go as fast as 280 km / hour, and has a range of 648 km.
CH-146 Griffon:
is a utility transport tactical helicopter. It performs a variety of roles,
including SAR. The CF has 99 Griffons. The Griffon has a cruising speed of 220
km / hour, a top speed of 260 km / hour, and a range of up to 500 km.
CH-149
Cormorant: is a new SAR
helicopter that came into service in 2002. Ample cabin space enables the
Cormorant to carry 12 stretchers or a 5, 000 kg load. The Cormorant is
equipped with two 273 kg rescue hoists, a 4536 kg cargo hook and frame,
storage racks for SAR equipment, and 12 stretchers. Its top speed is 278 km /
hour and its range is 1, 018 km. The CF has acquired 15 Cormorants.
Coast
Guard SAR Assets:
Vessels Names and Home Stations in the Newfoundland and Labrador Region:
Harp - St. Anthony, Nfld &
Labrador
W. G. George - Burgeo, Nfld &
Labrador
W. Jackman - Burin, Nfld &
Labrador
Cape
Norman - Port-aux-Choix, Nfld & Labrador
Cape Fox - Allan's Cove, Nfld
& Labrador
Vessels Names and Home Stations in
the Maritimes Region:
Bickerton - Bickerton East, N.S.
Sambro -
Sambro, N.S.
Clark’s
Harbour – Clark’s Harbour, N.S.
Spindrift - Louisbourg, N.S.
Spray - Shippagan, N.B.
Courtenay - Saint John, N.B.
Westport - Westport, N.S.
Souris - Souris, PEI
Vessels Names and Home Stations in
the Québec (i.e., Gulf of St. Lawrence) Region:
George R. Pearkes - Québec City,
Québec
Martha L. Black - Québec City, Québec
Cape
Rozier - Québec City, Québec
Sterne -
Québec City, Québec
Tracy -
Sorel, Québec
Cap-aux-Meules
- Cap-aux-Meules, Québec
Waban-Aki
(hovercraft) - Trois-Rivières, Québec
Vessels Names and Home Stations in
the Central (i.e., Great Lakes) and Arctic Region:
Eckaloo - Hay River, NWT
Dumit - Hay River, NWT
Tembah - Hay River, NWT
Traverse (Lake of the Woods) -
Kenora, Ontario
Bittern - Kingston, Ontario
Griffon - Prescott, Ontario
CCG 119 - Prescott, Ontario
Simcoe - Prescott, Ontario
Samual Risley - Parry Sound,
Ontario
Cove Isle - Parry Sound, Ontario
Tobermory - Tobermory, Ontario
Cape Storm - Tobermory, Ontario
Caribou
Isle - Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario
Gull Isle - Amherstburg, Ontario
Advent - Cobourg, Ontario
Cape Hurd - Goderich, Ontario
Thunder Cape - Meaford, Ontario
Cape Mercy - Port Dover, Ontario
Cape Lambton - Thunder Bay,
Ontario
CGR 100 - Port Weller, Ontario
Sora - Amherstburg, Ontario
Vessels Names and Home Stations in
the Pacific Region:
Sir Wilfrid Laurier - Victoria,
B.C.
Bartlett - Victoria, B.C.
Point Race - Campbell River, B.C.
Point Henry - Prince Rupert, B.C.
Cape Sutil - Port Hardy, B.C.
Cape Calvert - Tofino, B.C.
Cape St-James - Bamfield, B.C.
Kestrel - French Creek, B.C.
Mallard - Powell River, B.C.
Osprey - Kitsilano, B.C.
Skua -
Ganges, B.C.
The
Cutter Recommended by John Dewar and
the United States Coast Guard Option
This appendix discusses the specifications of a new cutter that would enable the Canadian navy to police and protect Canada’s coasts.
Dewar’s Vessel:
On 2 June 2003, Mr. John Dewar
testified to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence
that Canada should purchase a corvette-sized ship, also called a ‘cutter,’
for use by the navy in the performance of law enforcement functions.
He recommended a vessel measuring
75 meters that was able to operate in a high sea-state, move quickly (25 knots
minimum using diesel propulsion), and remain at sea for 30 days. He said that
a landing deck or hanger for a large maritime helicopter like the Sea King is
essential. A helicopter would assist in the identification of ships and extend
the visible range from the vessel. Typically, sailors can see 6-10 nautical
miles from their ship, but most maritime helicopters have a range of 150
nautical miles.
Comparison with Canadian Coast
Guard (CCG) Cutters:
CCG cutters do not meet the
criteria outlined by Dewar. The Gordon Reid and Tanu are not as fast or large.
The Gordon Reid is 50 meters long and has a top speed of 16.5 knots, and the
Tanu is 50.1 meters long and has a top speed of 13.5 knots.
The Sir Wilfred Grenfell, Leonard
J. Cowley, and Cape Roger are large enough, but are too slow. The Sir Wilfred
Grenfell is 68.5 meters long and has a maximum speed of 16 knots, the Leonard
J. Cowley is 72 meters long and has a maximum speed of 15 knots, and the Cape
Roger is 62.5 meters long and has a top speed of 17 knots.
In addition, of the CCG’s five
multi-task cutters larger than 50 meters, two (the Cape Roger and Tanu) are at
least 25 years old and should therefore be replaced.
Dewar’s Vessel – Cost:
Dewar estimates that the vessel
would cost CDN $ 55-100 million per unit. Since it would be used for law
enforcement, commercial construction and procurement practices could be
adopted to lower the per unit price. Civilian sources could be relied upon for
service support throughout the life of the vessel, further reducing the cost.
The main factor in the vessel’s
cost would be the sophistication and density of its radar, sensors,
communications equipment and weapon systems. There is a wide variation in the
types of sensors and radars. A working group should be convened to determine
the specific requirements so that the right balance between affordability and
capability can be found. A consultancy process is necessary because of the
number of government and departmental jurisdictions involved.
Keeping the size of the cutter
roughly as specified is important because the vessel needs good sea-keeping
ability. The size of a ship is not directly proportional to its cost. The
ship’s physical dimensions are a small part of its total cost, but they have
a significant impact on performance. Dewar testified before the Committee that
the cutter should be around 75 metres long in order to conduct boardings and
have the desired sea-keeping capability.
Dewar’s Vessel –
Specifications:
Dewar believes the capabilities
needed for the law enforcement function are:
· The ability to operate in high
sea states
· A high maximum speed for
positioning and pursuit
· High endurance to maximize
deployment time
· The ability to operate a large
helicopter (e.g. CH124)
· The ability to transport and
deploy boarding parties
· Ice tolerance (first year ice)
· Sophisticated sensors (e.g.,
radar, ESM, electro-optic, sonar)
· The ability to participate in
network-centric command and control regimes
· Sophisticated communications
capability
· Armament commensurate with
enforcement functions (e.g., small arms,
machine guns (e.g., 50 Cal), medium calibre weapon (e.g., 57mm or
Dewar recommends that the vessel
have these specifications:
· Length (waterline): minimum 75m
·
Beam:
minimum 12m
·
Displacement:
minimum 1600T, desirable 2000T
· Propulsion:
Twin Shaft, 2 x Medium Speed Diesel
· Maximum Speed: minimum 25 knots
· Time on Station: 30 Days
· Complement:
maximum 40 (mixed gender)
·
Accommodation:
for 40 more personnel (boarding teams, etc.)
·
Helicopter:
Large helicopter (e.g., CH124) - minimum landing deck, hangar desirable
·Estimate cost:
$55M - $100M per unit (ROM)
United States Coast Guard
(USCG) Alternative:
The USCG is implementing an Integrated Deepwater System Program. Under this major multi-year fleet upgrade and recapitalization program, an Offshore Patrol Corvette (OPC) with specifications and capabilities similar to the vessel recommended by Mr. Dewar will be constructed. The OPC will join the USCG fleet in 2013.
The price of the ship has not been determined. The USCG and the defence contractor (which is Integrated Coast Guard Systems, a joint venture established by Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman) do not know the cost at this time. The per-unit cost could be decreased and the construction timetable advanced if countries like Canada decided to purchase the vessel (Israel already has).
Canada could buy into the OPC
production line as a straightforward military purchase. It could also enter
into a co-operative agreement with the US to acquire a Canadianized version.
It would not be difficult to equip the OPC with less sophisticated systems
than the US model in order to reduce cost.
Canada would pay for the
Canadianized features it wanted, and the US would do the same. The cost for
the standard elements would be shared.
The
Rationale Behind the 12, 24 nautical miles zones and Exclusive Economic Zone
This appendix lists Canada’s
maritime zones and discusses what rights and jurisdiction Canada has in each of
them.
Background:
The 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) established the 12 mile territorial sea, the 24
mile contiguous zone and the 200 mile exclusive economic zone. These represent
the compromises reached between the interests of maritime powers in maintaining
the freedoms of the seas (notably for navigation) and the interests of coastal
states in increasing their jurisdiction. (Note that while “mile” is being
used, these distances are actually in “nautical miles” which are slightly
larger than regular miles.)
12-mile Zone:
As agreed upon in UNCLOS, this zone
encompasses the sea within 12 miles of baselines (usually the low water mark
along the coastline). This is known as the territorial sea, over which a state
has sovereignty. Foreign vessels retain the right of innocent passage through
this zone.
Prior to UNCLOS, common claims for
the territorial sea were three, four or six miles in breadth. A few states
claimed territorial seas of 200 miles. By the early twentieth century, state
sovereignty over a narrow strip of coastal water was widely accepted under
customary international law. Coastal state interest in a territorial sea derived
in part from security concerns, though considerations such as exclusive access
to resources were also important. The narrow breadth of the territorial sea was
dictated by the limited ability of coastal states to control waters further from
shore, and by the interest of the maritime powers in unrestricted marine
navigation.
24-mile Zone:
According to UNCLOS, the contiguous
zone is measured from the baselines to 24 miles. However, contiguous zone
provisions essentially apply to the area 12 to 24 miles from shore that extends
beyond the territorial sea. Within the contiguous zone, states can prevent or
take action with respect to offences within its territory or territorial sea
related to fiscal, immigration, sanitary and customs law.
The antecedents of the contiguous
zone are found in the “Hovering Acts” of the early 1900s. These were
intended to address smuggling activities by vessels that would “hover” just
outside the territorial sea. The contiguous zone has since developed as an area
where states can “take [the] steps necessary…to protect themselves and their
territory (including their territorial sea) from certain activities that would
be prejudicial to them.”[1]
Exclusive
Economic Zone:
UNCLOS provides for a 200-mile
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in which the interests of coastal states and
maritime powers are balanced. Coastal states have sovereign rights over the
exploration, exploitation, conservation and management of the living and
non-living resources in their EEZ. A coastal state also has jurisdiction over
certain matters, such as marine scientific research and environmental
protection. States other than the coastal state enjoy freedoms, notably of
navigation and overflight, in the 200-mile zone.
EEZs began to emerge after the
Second World War. They reflect how technology has brought the high seas within
the reach of states and exposed the finite nature of ocean resources.
Comparison of the Cost of Satellite
Surveillance,
Aerial Surveillance,
This
appendix briefly reviews the cost, according to Department of National Defence
(DND) estimates, associated with some of the main types surveillance
technology that could be used to monitor Canada’s coasts.
It should be noted that cost is only one of the factors that should be
considered when choosing an appropriate platform.
SURVEILLANCE
AREAS
Maritime surveillance is most
crucial with respect to the high-traffic ‘choke points’ on both coasts.
Essentially, these areas comprise 200‑nautical mile square zones
(102,400 square kilometres) around the entrance to the Straits of Juan de Fuca
(west coast), the entrance to Halifax Harbour (east coast), and the Cabot
Strait entrance to the Gulf of St. Lawrence.
DND notes that within these areas the “surveillance revisit
requirement is 6 hours.” In
that time, “a potential target
traveling at 20 knots the vessel could travel 80 nautical miles between
visits,” meaning that it could be spotted before it was halfway through the
zone.
SATELLITES
Obtaining
the desired coverage with a commercial imaging satellite would cost about
$140,000 CDN per day, per surveillance area ($51,100,000 a year).
A satellite has the advantage of being able to see a large area with
different levels of resolution. Generally,
it cannot identify the contact. However,
DND notes that satellites typically only visit an area once every 24 hours, and
it might not be possible to reacquire the target on the next pass over the area. Depending on the satellite, there could be a 3-20 day delay
in revisiting coverage areas. Another
DND concern is that the country controlling the satellite could decide to limit
access to the information.
AERIAL
SURVEILLANCE
Aircraft
would cost $12,000 CDN per day, per surveillance area ($4,380,000 a year).
They can travel to and cover an area relatively quickly, and have the
added benefit of being able to conduct a more intensive surveillance than radar
stations or satellites. However,
the endurance of aircraft is limited, and it is possible for a large object to
be missed during a pass.
HIGH-FREQUENCY
SURFACE WAVE RADAR
Air
Canada Pilots Association
Air
Canada Pilots Association
Association
des pilotes d’Air Canada
Via Fax
(613-995-1686
September
25, 2003
The
Honourable David M.
Collenette, P.C., M.P.
Minister of Transport
House of Commons
Room 104, East Block
OTTAWA, Ontario
K1A 0A6
Dear
Minister Collenette:
The Air Canada
Pilots Association (ACPA) has long held the belief that the ongoing terrorist
threat is attracted to the “weakest link”.
We are not surprised that this assessment, central in the development of
our own in-house security analyses and plans on the heels of 911, has been
affirmed by a recent United States Department of Homeland Security advisory. This advisory, from 03 September, highlighted the threat
presented to the continental United States through “hijacking airliners
transiting near or flying over the continental United States – but not
destined to land at U.S. airports”.
This threat
assessment was based on the real and growing differences between a tightening
American security environment and the less restrictive arrangements found within
neighbouring
nations such as Canada.
For our own
part, we have witnessed the divergence of American and Canadian aviation
security measures on a first-hand basis. We
are particularly concerned with the glaring imbalances being generated within
the areas of the command and
control of security resources and personnel, protection of the airborne cockpit
environment and screening of airside personnel and vehicles at major airports. These deficiencies need to be addressed on an urgent basis,
if we are to close the widening gap between the Canadian and American security
environments and reverse our “weak link” status.
In the
area of command and control, our Association has been consistent in highlighting
the requirement for one federal government agency, subject to public oversight,
to oversee all aspects of the aviation security network. This type of arrangement is resident within the United States
Department of Homeland Security and permits the direction of resources, in
conjunction with intelligence-based plans.
Unfortunately, the Canadian Aviation Transportation Security Authority
(CATSA) is not capable of such coordinated activities, as it is removed from
intelligence gathering agencies and a host of vital inputs – including those
resident within the airborne environment in the form of pilots.
It is understood that changing the organisational
structure of CATSA to
accommodate these very real requirements would be a lengthy process.
We see, however, a very real need to begin this change process and kick
it off with the immediate establishment of a direct working link that
encompasses Transport Canada, CATSA and national pilot communities.
National security concerns need to be expanded beyond the current CATSA
mandate to incorporate the airborne environment - and pilot participation is key
in fulfilling this requirement.
In the
area of protecting the airborne cockpit environment, American aviation has
generated an increasingly large gap relative to its Canadian counterpart.
This divergence has been brought about by the introduction of both the
“armed pilot” and the enhanced air marshal programs.
The former provides for a positive deterrent, while the latter includes
an expanding air marshal presence on both domestic and international operations.
For our own part, we have been advocating a “double-door” system to
properly fortify the cockpit environment, along with the expansion of the
Canadian Air Carrier Protection Program (CACPP) beyond current limits.
The “double-door” concept has been endorsed by the January 2003
report of the Senate Committee for National Security and Defence and we have
attempted to open discussions on this topic with your department.
These efforts, however, were sidelined because of “higher
priorities”. We suggest, in light
of the assessed threat to Canadian aircraft, that it is time to open these
discussions. We also suggest that
it is time to expand the operational mandate of the CACPP, which pales in
comparison to many other countries.
In the area of
airport security, American authorities have moved aggressively to vet the
backgrounds of all those having access to the secure areas of the nation’s
airports. This one measure has resulted in the replacement of hundreds
of workers with unsuitable credentials and, undoubtedly, greatly enhanced the
security of ramped aircraft. As a
member of the Transport Canada Airport Security Working Group, we supported a
Group recommendation to institute a similar background check requirement in
Canada that has yet to be implemented. This
is a grave concern to our Association, as our members question the security
status of the aircraft which they take airborne – particularly from high
threat airports such as Pearson International.
We
believe that Pearson International, representing the fourth largest Port of
Entry to the United States – after New York, Los Angeles and Miami –
represents a special Canadian case that demands special attention.
This fact is borne out by its proximity – both to the American border
and sensitive Canadian installations – and is reflected in the enhanced
screening procedures that it affords Air Canada flight crews.
Given the nature of the current threat, Toronto’s proximity to
lucrative targets and the uncertain nature of Pearson’s workforce, it would be
prudent to implement the Working Group recommendation regarding background
checks. In the interim, it is also
critically important to initiate a screening policy at Pearson that scrutinizes
all personnel and vehicles proceeding airside.
These “side-door” gaps have long been recognized as weak links by
blue ribbon panels – such as the Senate Committee for National Security and
Defence – and need to be addressed immediately.
The Air
Canada Pilots Association is compelled to engage these serious security concerns
at the earliest opportunity. We
sincerely hope that this is effected through a dedicated exchange with officials
in your department.
Sincerely,
Captain Don Johnson
President
DJ:vj
cc
Senator Colin Kenny, Chair – The Standing Senate Committee on National
Security and Defense (by fax)
M. Jacques Duchesneau, President and CEO – Canadian Air Transport Security
Authority (by fax)
M. Gerry Frappier, Director
General – Security & Emergency Procedures – Transport Canada (by fax)
M. Jean Barrette, Director – Security Operations, Transport Canada (by
fax)
Mr. Louis A. Turpen, President
and CEO – Greater Toronto Airports Authority (by fax)
Superintendent Ed Toye, Peel Regional Police – Airport Division (by fax)
Captain Rob Giguere, Vice-President – Operations, Air Canada (by fax)
Captain Kent Hardisty, President – Air Line Pilots Association – Canada
Board (by fax)
Captain David Lynch, Chair – TSD, ACPA (by e-mail)
Captain Matt Sheehy, Chair – Security Committee, ACPA (by e-mail)
MEC (by e-mail)
[1] John H. Currie, Public International Law, (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001) chapter 7, part C-2-C. Available at: www.quicklaw.com/en/home.html.