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The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence 

has the honour to table its

EIGHT REPORT

Your Committee, which was authorized to examine matters relating to the need for a national security policy for Canada, and to present its final report no later than October 30, 2003, has in obedience to its Order of Reference of April 16, 2002 proceeded to that inquiry and now tables its interim report entitled, Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility.

Respectfully submitted,

COLIN KENNY
Chair


DEFENCE OF NORTH AMERICA: A CANADIAN RESPONSIBILITY

The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence

Chair: The Honourable Colin Kenny
Deputy Chair: The Honourable J. Michael Forrestall

September 2002


MEMBERSHIP

37th Parliament - 1st Session

THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE

The Honourable Colin Kenny, Chair
The Honourable J. Michael Forrestall, Deputy Chair 

And

The Honourable Senators:

Atkins
Banks
*Carstairs, P.C. (or Robichaud, P.C.)
Cordy
Day
LaPierre
*Lynch-Staunton (or Kinsella)
Meighen
Wiebe                       

The following Senators also served on the Committee during its study:  The Honourable Senators Baker and Taylor.


TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION
        NORAD Stands Alone
        National Policy Needed
        Canada's Self-Interest
        Efficient Use of Resources


PART I 
DEFENDING CANADA'S COASTS

        Coastal Challenges
        Ad Hoc Policing
        Improving Both Planning and Operational Capacity

RECOMMENDATIONS:
        Defence of Canada's Territorial Waters

PART II 
DEFENCE OF THE CANADIAN AND NORTH AMERICAN LAND MASS

        The Need for Greater U.S.-Canadian Cooperation in the Training and Use of Land Forces
        How Our Brigade and Battle Group Training Vanished
        The Need for Joint Training in the Context of Northern Command

RECOMMENDATIONS: 
        Defence of Canada and North America

PART III 
THE IMPERATIVES FOR CHANGE
       
A. The Threat to Canada
        B. The NORAD Example
        C. The Intelligent Use of America In the Defence of Canada Security Implications
        D. Defending Two Big Countries, One Huge Economy


APPENDICES

APPENDIX I
NORAD

APPENDIX II
THE UNIFIED COMMAND STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARY

APPENDIX III
CANADA - UNITED STATES DEFENCE RELATIONS

APPENDIX IV
ORDER OF REFERENCE

APPENDIX V
WHO THE COMMITTEE HEARD FROM

APPENDIX VI
ORGANIZATIONS APPEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE

APPENDIX VII
EXHIBITS

APPENDIX VIII
STATISTICS ON COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES

APPENDIX IX
MEDIA ACTIVITIES

APPENDIX X
BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

APPENDIX XI
BIOGRAPHIES OF THE COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT


INTRODUCTION

In February, 2002, the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence brought down a report that documented the severe underfunding of Canada's Armed forces that is leading to a lack of military preparedness. The report also detailed the lack of adequate security at Canadian air and sea ports. Since then the Committee has continued to conduct examinations and hear witnesses, and at this juncture has decided to release this report, which focuses on two current issues we deem worthy of more specific focus: 

The need for the Government of Canada to act quickly to improve the tracking of ships approaching Canadian territorial waters and moving within those waters.

The need for the Government of Canada to act quickly to better prepare Canadian soldiers to act collectively with U.S. or NATO troops in the defence of North America.



NORAD Stands Alone

The Committee notes that the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), the Canada-U.S. military partnership designed primarily for defence of North America's air space, has successfully filled the need for quick joint reactions to threats to North America from the air (for instance, NORAD was quick to respond to the events of September 11, 2001, with a Canadian officer in command that day at Colorado Springs). 
The Committee further notes that no satisfactory joint mechanisms exist between the two countries in the areas of maritime and land defence. Whether a mechanism as deeply integrated as the one provided by NORAD for air defence is necessary in the fields of maritime and land defence remains a matter of debate. 

National Policy Needed

It is clear to the Committee, however, that Canada needs to move with some urgency to upgrade the defence of its territorial waters, and that upgrading should include cooperative planning and cooperation with the United States, with the ability to conduct joint operations in cases of emergency. 

It is also conceivable that joint operations could be required on land. Canada and the United States should be engaged in joint training of land troops up to and including the brigade level, a practice that has been abandoned during the last decade for a variety of unsatisfactory reasons. Such training is imperative given the dimension of the common threat to the two countries, amply demonstrated by the events of September 11.


Canada's Self-Interest

The Committee's recommendations are based on Canada's self-interest. Canada's military vision must be focused on optimizing the safety and security of 31 million Canadians. However those Canadians, in turn, recognize that their own security depends to a large extent on world security, and particularly the security of North America. Canadians cannot be safe on a globe in disarray, and most certainly would not be safe on a continent in disarray. 

While some of the Committee's recommendations apply strictly to Canada's own capacity to defend Canadian territory, other recommendations advocate the enhancement of Canada's current level of military cooperation with the United States. While such cooperation within Canada's overall commitment to collective security has constituted one of the primary pillars of Canadian defence strategy for many decades now, any suggestion that military bonds be strengthened invariably raises questions as to whether Canada's political integrity might somehow be weakened because of this.

It should therefore be emphasized that the recommendations of this Report were predicated on a narrow focus on Canada's national interests, not the wishes of decision-makers in Washington or anywhere else. As members of the Parliament of Canada, it is our primary mandate to promote the well being of Canadians, and the capacity of the Government of Canada to sustain Canadians within a strong and independent nation.


Efficient Use of Resources

It is the view of the members of our Committee that in order to maximize that national capacity, the Government must make intelligent and calculated use of all resources available to it. This includes making prudent use of Canada's proximity to the military strength of the world's one remaining superpower - a nation with which we share both a continent and common enemies. 

Lieutenant-General George Macdonald, Vice Chief of Defence Staff, Canadian Forces, told the Committee that Canada and the United States need at least to consider the expansion of the kind of cooperation the two countries engage in the realm of air defence under NORAD to operations at sea and on land.

In later testimony, both LGen Macdonald and Jill Sinclair, Acting Assistant Deputy Minister for Security and Policy at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, testified that the federal government is not planning any kind of NORAD mechanism for maritime or land operations. In fact, Ms. Sinclair told the Committee that the government is restricting its vision to planning and coordination in these areas and might not make any improvements at all. She said that, at most, interested government departments were looking at "modest, practical measures that may - or may not - be required to enhance existing capacities and capabilities." 

The Committee believes that tighter coordination of Canadian and U.S. resources is required. Certainly Committee members strongly disagree with the notion that greater continental coordination of coastal policing and/or use of land troops "may not" be needed. It is needed, and our recommendations reflect that fact.

On the broader issue of greater Canadian-American cooperation in defence of the North American continent, Committee members are convinced that measured expansion of Canada's military partnership with the United States is likely to improve the consultative process between the two countries. It is also likely to make unilateral American military action in defence of the North American continent less probable than it might otherwise be.


PART I

DEFENDING CANADA’S COASTS

Canada’s thousands of kilometers of ocean coastline and hundreds of ports combine to make it difficult for Canadian authorities to prevent unauthorized landings. Traditionally, the problem has been countering the smuggling of goods. The additional problem of the smuggling of illegal aliens has become more significant in recent years.

Since September 11, it has become evident that Canada is also faced with the possible incursion of terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. There should be, and must be, a new dimension to protecting Canada’s coastlines and waterways.

The technology now exists to allow Canadian authorities to be more prepared for any unwanted vessel approaching Canadian waters. Canada’s capacity to interdict these vessels should be upgraded immediately through improved coordination and more stringent reporting regulations.


Coastal Challenges

It is clear that there cannot be an official representing the Government of Canada at every port or cove. The Committee heard testimony that an honour system of customs reporting applies at most remote parts of Canada’s coastline. Of course, it is unlikely that smugglers and would-be terrorists would choose to report.

Effective monitoring of Canada’s long and jagged coastlines against untoward behaviour depends upon acquiring as much intelligence as possible concerning “vessels of interest” before these ships enter Canadian waters, and while they are moving through them.

In principle, Canadian authorities are supposed to be informed of major sea shipments destined to arrive at Canadian ports from foreign ports of departure. The system in place is voluntary, however. While it appears to work relatively well with regard to major shipping companies, even then it is not always reliable. It becomes ineffective, for instance, if the captain of a particular ship decides not to follow his declared route.

Ships from smaller organizations often do not follow the departure port reporting procedure, and their arrival in Canadian waters often comes as a surprise. And of course, vessels involved in smuggling or terrorism are unlikely to be any more interested in report procedures than they are in voluntary customs declarations.


Ad Hoc
Policing

Canada does, of course, police its coastlines at some spots. In both Halifax and Victoria, a Canadian Forces ship is kept in high readiness, prepared to react as necessary. But these are exceptions. Vice Admiral Ron Buck, Commander of the Canadian Navy, testified that while patrols “provide the physical units to take action,” they are expensive within the context of Canada’s tight military budget.

Canadian Forces Aurora aircraft conduct airborne patrols over logical avenues of approach to Canada on a regular basis, but not on a daily basis.

From time to time, in areas that straddle U.S. and Canadian waters, Canadian ships and aircraft act jointly with U.S. planes and vessels if there is uncertainty as to exactly where approaching vessels are headed. Since Sept. 11, 2001, the U.S. Coast Guard has been tasked to monitor out to its 200-mile territorial limit, with the U.S. Navy responsible for interdiction beyond that range. U.S. military authorities will often inform Canadian counterparts when it appears that a “target of interest” is headed for Canadian waters.

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Immigration Canada, Fisheries Canada and the Canadian Customs and Revenue Agency all possess at least limited capacity to interdict incoming and outgoing vessels. Light aircraft occasionally patrol coasts in search of illegal activity. There is some coordination among the departments of the Government of Canada, but no master plan or policy for liaison between various operations centres exists. Pursuit of suspect vessels is done on risk analysis based on available intelligence. When more than one agency or country is involved, coordination takes place on an ad hoc basis.

 

Improving Both Planning and Operational Capacity

Vice-Admiral Buck testified that he is pleased with improved coastal cooperation between Canadian and American authorities since Sept. 11 – as well as among Canadian government departments and agencies – in policing North American coastlines.  However, he supports LGen Macdonald who told the Committee that “we have envisaged the establishment of a binational planning and monitoring group to address land and maritime threats.” The Committee’s recommendations reflect the Committee’s belief that there should indeed be both more cooperation on the planning and coordination front, but also on the operational front.

LGen Macdonald did indicate to the Committee that planning and coordination could be followed by joint operations in an emergency. He told us that:

One of the benefits from the planning and monitoring group that we have discussed is to hopefully identify scenarios where that sort of [operational] cooperation would be required and to facilitate the protocols or the process or the plan to enable it to occur on a relatively quick basis so that if there was a requirement for armed forces to cross a border, one way or the other, there would be a mechanism in place to allow them to decide “this is scenario No. 9.  This is the contingency.  This is what we thought we might do.  Do we agree that is what we will do?  Fine, let us put that in place.”

The Committee agrees with LGen Macdonald that contingencies should be anticipated in which joint Canadian-U.S. operations are required. 

The Committee cannot overemphasize its conviction that live joint Canadian - U.S. training should be conducted in advance of any such deployment to assure familiarity with each nation’s equipment, procedures, and procedures for command and control. This would minimize the risks of both failure and casualties.

 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Defence of Canada’s Territorial Waters  

The Committee believes that the Government of Canada has a responsibility to end the fragmented and largely ad hoc defence of Canada’s coastlines. The Committee recommends that the Government formulate a National Policy designed to better secure our Atlantic, Pacific and Great Lakes coastlines. Such a Policy would include joint Canada-U.S. planning and coordination units for the continent’s East and West coasts, and more stringent monitoring and reporting requirements for vessels planning to enter Canadian waters.

 

WITH REGARD TO IMPROVED DEFENCE OF CANADA’S TERRITORIAL WATERS, THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDS:

1.         Adoption of a layered approach of reporting and monitoring to provide timely warning of vessels approaching Canadian waters;

2.         The Coordination of all Canadian resources – including Navy, Coast Guard, Air Force, Army, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, police forces and agencies responsible for intelligence and satellite surveillance – to improve defence of Canada’s coastlines;

3.                 Greater cooperation and coordination with U.S. counterparts.

THE COMMITTEE SPECIFICALLY RECOMMENDS:

1.         The establishment of a Canadian-U.S. joint operational planning group that would include representatives of the Canadian Navy, the Canadian Coast Guard, the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard. This unit of approximately 50 people should be located at Colorado Springs, in proximity to NORAD planning staff;  

2.         Effective coordination and utililization of the numerous monitoring resources such as: Shipping position reporting system, Canadian Navy assets to include the Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels and Canadian Patrol Frigates, satellite tracking resources, routine Aurora flights, Department of Fisheries and Oceans patrols and intelligence, the Canadian Coast Guard patrols and intelligence and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police patrols and intelligence;

3.         Establishment of multi-departmental operations centres at Halifax and Esquimalt capable of collecting and analyzing shipping intelligence to provide a combined operational picture for all government agencies that deal with incoming vessels; to address coastal threats to North America, while designing procedures to deal with all anticipated threats;

4.         That Canada negotiate reciprocal arrangements with other Maritime nations to provide notice to one another when vessels are departing for each other’s territorial waters;

5.         Mandatory reporting procedures whereby all vessels (of a displacement to be determined by Canadian regulators) planning to enter Canadian waters be required to report from their departure harbour as to their Canadian destination and estimated time of arrival, with periodic updates during their voyage and upon arrival;

6.         A requirement that all vessels (of a displacement to be determined by Canadian regulators) planning to enter a Canadian port notify Canadian port authorities 48 hours prior to arrival;

7.         A requirement that vessels (of a displacement to be determined by Canadian regulators) intending to enter Canadian waters be equipped with transponders to permit electronic tracking of all approaching vessels;


8.          New security measures on the Great Lakes including:

i.          Mandatory reporting for all vessels (of a displacement to be determined by Canadian regulators) to Canadian authorities 24 hours prior to anticipated entry into Canadian Great Lakes ports;

ii.         All vessels (of a displacement to be determined by Canadian regulators) intending to operate in the Great Lakes region be equipped with transponders to permit electronic tracking by Canadian authorities. This requirement would have the added benefit of greatly improving the precision of search and rescue;

iii.        Mandatory daily reporting to Canadian authorities for all vessels (of a displacement to be determined by Canadian regulators) operating in Canadian national waters;

iv.        Canada’s Great Lakes reporting stations will be responsible for receipt and coordination of these reports and for communication with policing agencies.



PART II

Defence of the Canadian And North American Land Mass

Canada does not have large standing armed forces, nor are its forces well-equipped. Despite its responsibility to defend the second-largest land mass in the world, Canada ranks 17th out of 19 NATO countries in defence spending as a percentage of GDP, putting it ahead of only Luxembourg (18th), and Iceland (19th).

To sustain the level of national tasking it has been assigned over the past eight years, the Canadian forces should have been operating with 75,000 trained personnel. The present trained effective strength of the Canadian Forces – about 54,000– is well below even the government’s mandated level of 60,000.  

The Need for Greater U.S.-Canadian Cooperation in the Training and Use of Land Forces

Lieutenant-General Michael Jeffery, Chief of Land Staff, Canadian Forces, told the Committee that if Canadian ground troops are going to be adequately prepared for large-scale combat in conjunction with the forces of other nations, there is a desperate need for collective training at the battle group and brigade level of operations.

LGen Jeffery laid much of the blame for the lack of such training in recent years to the frantic tempo at which Canadian Forces troops have been deployed on missions abroad:

It is my firm belief that we must do more battle group and brigade level training.  It is only by undertaking training at that level that you practice all the skills and develop the expertise to maintain the type of quality we have had . . . in places like Afghanistan in the past. It has been in the order of ten years since the Canadian army has done any significant training at the brigade level. Over time you lose that skill, that expertise. One of the major challenges for us, given our tempo and resources, is to get a regular training regime that ensures that, over time, all parts of the army achieve training at both the battle group and, ultimately, the brigade level to maintain that expertise over the long term.  That is an extremely important part of what we do.  Without it, all that human and equipment investment is, in my view, largely for naught.  Without that training you do not have capability, you just have organizations.

British troops continue to train at the battle group level, and occasionally at the brigade level, at the training site they sponsor at Suffield, AB. LGen Jeffery testified that because the Canadian Forces have been so heavily tasked within the confines of their current budget, they have not been able to join the British in these live exercises.

If Canadians are going to play a major role in the defence of both Canada, specifically, and North America, generally, they should be training at this high level with U.S. Army troops. But LGen Jeffery said that his U.S. counterpart has been forced to turn down large-scale Canadian participation in joint training exercises at U.S. locations, indeed with all of its allies, because the Americans feel they do not even have the capacity to give their own troops all the training they require at this level.

LGen Jeffery said that the Americans have left open the possibility of quid pro quo large-scale joint training exercises on either U.S. or Canadian soil when the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre is opened at Wainwright, Alberta.  In further discussion with high-level U.S. authorities the possibility of reciprocal training was confirmed.

The training centre, which will use laser technology on all weapons, coupled with state of the art recording and data analysis equipment to conduct force on force engagements, is scheduled to open in 2004. While the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre is currently listed as a funded Canadian Forces budget item, its construction has not yet been contracted. It remains vulnerable to the kind of belt-tightening that has been endemic to Canadian military spending in recent years.

One of the advantages of operating within the NATO security cooperative used to be that troops from NATO countries were regularly involved in joint training exercises, particularly while U.S. and Canadian troops were stationed in Western Europe from 1953 to 1993. Canadian troops became interoperable with all NATO allies, particularly with the armies located in southern Germany, which included U.S., German and French land forces. At least one major multinational exercise with land and air forces took place each year.  

How Our Brigade and Battle Group Training Vanished

All this presented excellent cohesion among NATO forces, and Canadian troops were well prepared for the kind of coalition operations that make a relatively small army much more effective working within a team than it would be standing on its own. The withdrawal of forces from Germany in 1993 ended this joint training opportunity for the Canadian land forces.

Before the decline in DND’s budget, the Canadian Forces conducted their own national collective training on a regular basis. Training with U.S. forces was conducted at the unit and occasionally at the brigade level. Budget cuts, coupled with the assignment of onerous peacekeeping duties abroad, resulted in postponement/cancellation of most collective training, even among branches of the Canadian Forces themselves.

Although the value of collective training is still recognized in principle, Canadian land forces have not mounted any live collective training at the battle group level and beyond since 1993.

To enhance overall interoperability to conduct coalition and/or joint operations. there is a now a clear need for Canadian troops to train with U.S. forces. Improvements in U.S. military technology continues to outstrip that of its allies.

The Need for Joint Training in the Context of Northern Command

Northern Command, scheduled to come on stream on October 1, 2002, will be a U.S. command unit designed to coordinate American military resources in the defence of North America. Designated for “homeland” defence, NORTHCOM will be one of five global geographic commands designed to coordinate and deploy whatever American air, sea and land operational capabilities are deemed to be required in any given emergency. As described by U.S. authorities, this command will extend “from Alaska and includes all of the territory of North America including support to Canada, extending across the U.S. homeland, and south to northern Caribbean and Northern Mexico.” (For more details on the Unified Command Structure of the U.S. Military, see appendix II.)

Northern Command will be a strictly U.S. organization.  However, it will have the same Commander-in-Chief responsible for joint Canadian-U.S. aerospace defence under NORAD, headquartered in Colorado Springs.

The U.S. Government has made it clear that it intends to make the continent more secure, and that it will undertake this mission on its own, if need be.

The Committee heard commentary from numerous witnesses on the issue of how best to defend Canada. Among the most compelling was offered up by historian Jack Granatstein, Chair of the Council for Canadian Defence and Security in the 21st Century. Said Mr. Granatstein:

The question [of Canadian defence] . . . must be approached with realism. The U.S. is determined to improve its homeland defence and is certain to approach this subject, as it must, from a continental perspective. The news release announcing Northern Command declared its area of responsibility to be all of North America, including Canada and Mexico, and gave its commander in chief the task of “security cooperation and military coordination” with other nations. Canada thus can choose to either stand back and allow the Americans to plan for the protection of Canadian territory, or to participate in the decisions.


RECOMMENDATIONS:

Defence of Canada and North America  

WITH REGARD TO LAND FORCES, The Committee Recommends:

That Canada and the U.S. upgrade their joint capacity to defend North America through the use of land forces in three specific ways:

1.                 Battalion or battle group Canadian Forces training exercises – particularly those permitting Canadian and America troops to function effectively in warfare – be re-instituted as quickly as possible to permit Canada’s army to work in harmony with the armies of its allies, particularly the army of the United States.

2.                 The construction of the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre at Wainwright, not yet contracted and behind schedule, be expedited and that the facility be prepared for large-scale training exercises for Canadian Forces troops no later than the summer of 2004.

3.                 A joint Canada-U.S. land force planning unit be established to allow the armies of the two neighbouring countries to plan for potential disasters, natural or otherwise, that jointly threaten both countries. This unit of approximately 25 people should also be located at Colorado Springs, in proximity to NORAD facilities and the recommended Maritime planning staff.


PART III

The Imperatives for Change

The balance of this report will provide some of the background and analysis that led the Committee to making the recommendations listed above.  

A. The Threat to Canada

Canadians are, in the main, not a bellicose people, and for many Canadians one of Canada’s greatest attributes is that it has traditionally served as a haven from the tumult and troubles of the outside world. Our relative tranquility has been one of the greatest attractions to the immigrants who have helped build Canada over the years, many of whom came to Canada because of the relative calm with which most Canadians have been privileged to live their lives.

Our great blessing is also a great danger. Peaceful thinking can become passive thinking. It has been nearly 60 years since Adolph Hitler forced Canadians to recognize that one cannot always appease those committed to the downfall of one’s way of life. Even after the events of September 11, there remained a sense among many Canadians that “it can’t happen here,” just as there was a sense among many Canadians (and Canadian political leaders) that World War I had ended all wars, and that there would never be a World War II.

They were wrong, and it would be wrong to think that Canada will never be a target for terrorists. Our lifestyle – so loathed by extremists in the Bin Laden mould – is similar to the lifestyle of Americans. Our economies are intertwined. In little over a decade these two countries have fought twice in a common cause – in the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan. Canada may not be the bull’s eye in the sights of most extremists – the United States undoubtedly is. But Canada is clearly positioned as one of the inner rings on the target, and if our country is perceived to be much easier to penetrate than the United States, we will move closer to the centre.

Passivity creates two great risks to the survival and sovereignty of Canadians. The first risk is that terrorists will treat us as the soft underbelly of North America and come at all of North America through us.

The second risk is that the United States will unilaterally move to defend its security perimeter – which it primarily defines as North America – without Canadian knowledge or consent.

The Defence of North America must be as important to Canadians as it is to Americans.


B. The NORAD Example

The success of NORAD is clear evidence that Canadian sovereignty has not been and need not be compromised within the context of continental cooperation.

In the words of Dr. Kenneth J. Calder, Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy), Department of National Defence, who testified before the Commitee:

. . . it seems to us that an arrangement with the United States or any other country that allows us to work together with them but does not in fact force us to work with them in any particular crisis … and which does not inhibit us from acting independently, does not in fact impact on Canadian sovereignty.  We would argue that is the case with NORAD.  NORAD gives us a mechanism where the two countries, when they agree, can act together.  It does not stop either country from acting individually and separately in the same area, the area of aerospace defence. In fact, for NORAD to function, it must have the agreement of both governments.  Therefore, we would say that in fact NORAD is not any sort of diminution of our sovereignty.  It is actually an exercise of our sovereignty to be involved in that operation.

NORAD is responsible for aerospace warning and control for North America. It was originally established to detect and defend against the threat of Soviet manned bombers flying over the North Pole to attack North America, but its role has evolved considerably since it was established in 1958.

Prior to September 11, NORAD was mainly responsible for targets entering North American air space and for monitoring internal special interest flights – such as those of the Prime Minister of Canada and the President of the United States. It also provides ballistic missile detection and warning for the North American continent and during the Gulf War, it provided SCUD and other short-range missile detection and warning to coalition forces in the field.

Since September 11 NORAD has taken a more active role in working with the Federal Aviation Administration in the U.S. and Transport Canada, in monitoring and intercepting suspicious flights in the North American continent. NORAD’s Commander is an American, and its  Deputy Commander is Canadian. Both must be approved by the National Command authorities of each country: the Prime Minister of Canada and the President of the United States. The Commander and Deputy Commander must be from different nations.

Each NORAD region across North America is set up with a similar command structure – the Commander is from the nation responsible for the region while the Deputy Commander is from the other nation.

The NORAD agreement directs continuous contact with the National Command authorities of both Canada and the United States. If a threat arises, the national command centres of both nations are contacted simultaneously. It is the responsibility of the National Command Centre to ensure that the National Command Authority is available to make decisions affecting that nation as a whole. Under normal circumstances, authority to change alert status requires the approval of each national authority.  Both nations have designated predetermined scenarios where time is of the essence, for which national authority to increase alert status has been “preauthorized” to ensure that a quick response can be generated.

Canada contributes approximately 20 per cent of NORAD’s total personnel while retaining its status as an equal partner in the relationship.

Canadian benefits include access to American resources such as the U.S. satellite system, as well as American command-and-control networks, intelligence systems, and the resources of the U.S. Space command, located adjacent to NORAD at Colorado Springs. [For more details on NORAD, please see Appendix I].  

C. The Intelligent Use of America In the Defence of Canada

With respect to our political and military relationship with the United States, Canadians must, of course, act with great care. Canadians do not wish to march in blind support of U.S.  political and/or military policy.

The trick for Canadians is – and always has been – to be savvy enough to use America without being submerged by America. Canadian leaders have generally been clever enough over the years to take clear advantage of America’s powerful economy and military strength without ceding our political independence or cultural identity. There is no alternative to this prudent approach to dealing with the United States if Canadians wish to remain (a) themselves; (b) secure; and (c) prosperous. And there is no indication that they wish to abandon any of these three components of their lives.  

Security Implications

Canada and the United States currently share 80 treaties and 250 memoranda of understanding on defence issues. In none of those documents does Canada agree to relinquish the right to decline to participate in any military operation that U.S. authorities might insist is in the interests of one or both countries. Nor should there ever be such an agreement. Canadians must and do guard their sovereignty with great care.

But we must also guard our sovereignty responsibly. Canada cannot abrogate its responsibility to defend itself, and to share in the defence of North America. If we are not willing to be part of the solution, American decision-makers are likely to start thinking of us as part of the problem. And, in fairness, they would be right. In simple moral terms, Canada must become more committed to the defence of North America. In simple practical terms, if we do not signal a willingness to defend the continent, its defence will be taken out of our hands.

The fact is that a weakening of the link between Canadian and U.S. forces on the ground, plus a failure to join forces to coordinate intelligence operations on serious threats to our coastlines, constitute threats to Canadian sovereignty, and to the security of Canadians.

There is a real danger of Canada’s armed forces being dismissed as useless in the U.S. administration’s mission to defend the continent. A decline in relevance in Washington is not in Canada’s best interests. Nor is an increasing inability of Canada’s armed forces to act in concert with its allies, particularly its most powerful ally and economic partner.

It is vital to the well-being of both Canadians and Americans that they understand each other’s importance to the other, which extends far beyond friendship and overrides occasional mutual antagonisms. There are clear economic benefits to our relationship, and it is in the interests of both nations to be prepared for joint defence of the continent in the case of terrorist attack or other types of emergencies. As LGen Macdonald pointed out to the Committee:

. . . there are many types of terrorist attacks that might be on the United States but would have a similarly great effect on Canada.  A radiological or nuclear attack on Detroit would have an effect on Windsor. Spreading of small pox or some other biological weapons in United States would not know borders. 

The Committee believes that it is in the interest of all Canadians that Canada be prepared to act in joint defence of the North American continent in the air, on land, and at sea.  

D. Defending Two Big Countries, One Huge Economy

Latest figures compiled from Statistics Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and Industry Canada present a clear picture of interdependent Canadian-U.S. economies. Canada is the world’s sixth largest exporter of goods with a 4 per cent share of the world’s exports, and the sixth largest importer. Canada and the United States share the largest and most comprehensive trading relationship in the world. Approximately $2 billion in goods and services cross the border each day. The two countries are each other’s largest customers and biggest suppliers. 86 per cent of Canadian goods exports go to the United States, while 23 per cent of the goods imported by the United States come from Canada.

In the year 2000 Canadians bought more U.S. goods than Mexico and Japan combined.  In fact, Canada is a larger market for U.S. goods than all of the countries of the European Union combined and a larger market than all of Latin America.  Canada is the primary trading partner of 38 States – for example, Ohio’s trade with Canada exceeds the total trade between the U.S. and China and the state of Georgia sells more to Canada than the whole of the U.S. sells to either Italy or France.

Exports to the United States are key to Canada’s job creation. Two-way trade has doubled since 1993, at an average rate of about 12 per cent. Exports of Canadian goods and services represented 39 per cent of Canada’s Gross Domestic Product in 2000, while U.S. exports of goods and services to Canada account for 2 per cent of U.S. economic output. Although the latter is not a large percentage, the success of many U.S.-based companies depends on their interlocked relationship with suppliers in Canada.

This economic relationship is extremely beneficial to both sides. It depends on the ease of movement of goods across that famous longest undefended border that increasingly requires defending.

As LGen George Macdonald reminded the Committee:

We cannot assume that what happens south of the border is of no concern or interest to us. The impact can easily come across the border as was shown on September 11. Canada was not specifically attacked on September 11, but we certainly saw the impact on the Canadian economy and everything going across the border.

It is essential that two countries that are so economically compatible also be militarily compatible, in the defence of two societies dependent on what has, for the most part, become one functioning economy. The fact that the armies responsible for defending that economy  – and these two very open, democratic societies – have ceased to conduct joint operations in the face of a clear mutual threat is almost unfathomable.  


APPENDIX I

NORAD

The North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD)

Background

The North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) is a binational military organization formally established in 1958 by Canada and the United States to monitor and defend North American airspace. NORAD monitors and tracks man-made objects in space and detects, validates and warns of attack against North America by aircraft, missiles or space vehicles. NORAD also provides surveillance and control of the airspace of Canada and the United States.

The NORAD Agreement was first signed by the governments of Canada and the United States on May 12, 1958, and has been renewed for varying periods since that time. Although there have been eight NORAD renewals since 1958, the basic text of the Agreement has been revised substantially only three times -- in 1975, 1981 and 1996.

The Commander-in-Chief of NORAD is appointed by, and is responsible to, both the Prime Minister of Canada and the President of the United States. Headquarters NORAD is located at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado. NORAD command and control is exercised through the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center, located a short distance away. Cheyenne Mountain serves as a central collection and coordination facility for a worldwide system of sensors designed to provide NORAD with an accurate picture of any aerospace threat.


Operations

NORAD uses a network of ground-based radars, sensors and fighter jets to detect, intercept and, if necessary, engage any threats to the continent. These fighters consist of Canadian CF-18s and U.S. F-15s and F-16s. NORAD also receives surveillance data from the U.S. Space Command on potential threats from outer space.

 

Canadian NORAD Region

NORAD's surveillance and control responsibility for North American airspace is divided among three NORAD Regions -- one in Canada, one in the continental United States and one in Alaska. Data from radars and sensors based in Canada are compiled and analyzed at an underground complex located at Canadian Forces Base North Bay, Ontario, then forwarded to Canadian NORAD Region Headquarters at CFB Winnipeg, and the NORAD command and control centre in Colorado, as necessary.


North Warning System

The North Warning System (NWS) provides surveillance of potential attack routes via Arctic airspace. The NWS consists of 15 long-range radars (11 in Canada, four in Alaska) and 39 short-range radars (36 in Canada, three in Alaska) along the northern edge of North America. The state-of-the-art radars form a 4,800 km-long and 320 km-wide "tripwire" stretching from Alaska to Newfoundland.


E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)

Airborne radar coverage is provided by the E-3 AWACS aircraft when necessary. Canada contributes military personnel to AWACS operations. The United States Air Force AWACS provides a significant improvement over ground-based radar stations, and extends the perimeter radar system in times of increased alert. AWACS aircraft can detect targets from about 580 km, then guide Canadian or U.S. aircraft to visually identify unknown aircraft.

Two Canadian bases provide designated support to AWACS operations when required: CFB Cold Lake, Alberta, and CFB Bagotville, Quebec.


Air Defence

1 Canadian Air Division is the military organization responsible for providing combat-ready air forces to meet Canada's commitments to the defence of North America and to maintain the sovereignty of Canadian airspace.

Canadian air defence forces assigned to NORAD include 441 and 416 Tactical Fighter Squadrons at CFB Cold Lake, Alberta, and 425 and 433 Tactical Fighter Squadrons at CFB Bagotville, Quebec. All four squadrons fly the CF-18 Hornet fighter aircraft.


Counter Drug Mission

Since 1991, NORAD has assisted in the detection and monitoring of aircraft suspected of illegal drug trafficking. In cooperation with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and U.S. drug law enforcement agencies, the Canadian NORAD Region monitors all air traffic approaching the coast of Canada. Any aircraft that has not filed a flight plan may be directed to land and be inspected by the RCMP and Customs Canada.


Canadians Assigned To U.S. Bases

There are currently 283 Canadian personnel based at various locations in the U.S. However, the actual number of Canadians assigned to designated NORAD positions constantly changes to reflect the current needs of Canadian defence policies.


On Alert

NORAD has served the citizens of Canada and the United States as the first line of defence against an air attack on their homelands since 1958. NORAD has also acted as a clear deterrent to any aggressor through its space warning capabilities. Through outstanding cooperation and cohesiveness, NORAD has proven itself effective in its roles of watching, warning and responding. By adapting to the changing world, NORAD will continue to play an important role in the defence of Canada and the United States.

*Source – Department of National Defence Backgrounder


APPENDIX II

THE UNIFIED COMMAND STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARY

Background

As the world’s only remaining superpower, the United States, by default, ends up becoming involved in activities all over the world.

This task was recognized by the United States Congress who felt the need for a military capability responsible for individual areas of the world; commanders who understood the area, with U.S. military forces conducting periodic, joint operations with nations of that area.  This global concept would permit the United States to respond to an incident anywhere in the world.

Consequently, the United States set up their Unified Command Structure which basically partitioned the world into a number of areas of responsibility for U.S. commanders. No forces from the countries in the specific area of responsibility report to the American Commander; the Commander only has U.S. forces under his command authority.

Prior to the review in 2002, the entire world, except for Russia, Canada and Mexico was “assigned” to a geographic commander whose forces were located in their area of responsibility.  Canada, Russia and Mexico were assigned to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  Thus, Canadian contact with the U.S. military was normally through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and his staff.

Congress also recognized that the world is a dynamic arena and things change on a continuing basis. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is required to review, not less than every two years, the missions and responsibilities (including geographic boundaries), of each combatant command and recommend to the President, through the Secretary of Defence, any necessary changes. This process is called a review of the Unified Command Structure.

The events of September 11, 2001, led to a rethink by the U.S. Defence department and it was determined that a Homeland Defence Command was required to complement Governor Ridge’s Office of Homeland Defence. Consequently, in April 2002, U.S. Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld announced a number of changes to the UCP one of which was the creation of a “Northern Command” (to stand up on 1 October 2002) with geographic responsibility for areas of the Caribbean, Mexico, the U.S. and Canada. (A detailed listing of U.S. UCP Commands is provided at the end of this Appendix ).

Northern Command is no different from the other U.S. geographic commands and does not “command” any forces other than national United States forces.  No Canadian Forces personnel will be assigned to Northern Command.


Commander in Chief (CINC) 

Each of the U.S. Commands is commanded by a Commander in Chief who reports directly to the President of the United States through the Secretary of Defence (Mr. Rumsfeld).  In some cases, a Commander in Chief actually commands two different organizations; this function is known as “ double-hatting a CINC”.

The Commander of Northern Command is General Eberhart who is also doublehatted as the Commander of NORAD.  He commands two separate staffs at two different headquarters in Colorado Springs:

-         one made up of strictly American forces (NORTHCOM) and

-         one comprised of both Canadian and American forces (NORAD)

As Commander Northern Command, he will report directly to the President of the United States, while as Commander of NORAD, he will report directly to the Prime Minister of Canada and the President of the United States.

 

U.S. Military Command Structure - October 2002

Effective 1 October 2002, the U.S. Military Command Structure under the Secretary of Defense and his civilian officials will consist of ten Unified Commands, five geographic commands that combine air, sea and land operational capabilities and five function commands with specialties that are implicit in their names. The Unified Command Plan provides guidance to all combatant commanders, establishes their missions and responsibilities and delineates the general geographic area of responsibility for combatant commanders.  The table below summarizes the ten Commands.

U.S. Command Plan (UCP)

Full Name

AOR (Area of Responsibility)

HQ

Central Command

The Arabian Peninsula, Iraq and Northern Red Sea; the Horn of Africa (down to Kenya to the South); and South and Central Asia (including the “-stans”).

McDill AFB,
Florida

U.S.A.

European Command  

 

 

All of Europe including (as of October 1, 2002) Russia; all of Africa except the Horn of Africa and Madagascar; the Middle East countries on the coast of the Mediterranean Sea;  and the Eastern region of the Caspian Sea. Responsible for waters off the Western Coast of Africa and Europe including the Mediterranean Sea, Caspian Sea, and Atlantic Ocean (assumed responsibility for the former Atlantic Commands waters in 1999).

Stuttgart-Vaihingen
Germany

Northern Command  

 

Extends from Alaska and includes all of the territory of North America including support to Canada, extending across the U.S. homeland, the Gulf of Mexico and Mexico. Standup to occur on 10/01/2002.  

Peterson AFB,
Colorado U.S.A.

Pacific Command  

 

 

 Responsible for the entire Pacific Ocean from 500 miles off the U.S. West Coast including Hawaii and Guam, to the Eastern Coast of Africa and the Asia Major (Russia/China) coastline. As of October 1, 2002, there will be a coordination element interfacing to EUCOM for Russian military to U.S. military support efforts. Includes Asia including as far West as India, Japan, Korea, and China. The AOR also covers all the Polynesian islands as well as Australia and New Zealand. The neutral territory of Antarctica is in the AOR of PACOM as well.

Honolulu, Hawaii
U.S.A.  

 

Southern Command

Responsible for Central and South America and the Caribbean Sea.

Miami, Florida
U.S.A.

Joint Forces Command  

As of October 1, will relinquish all homeland security responsibility to NORTHCOM and will become a functional command tasked to continue joint weapons and doctrine development especially that of military transformation, focused on personnel and technology issues.

Norfolk, Virginia
U.S.A.  

Space Command

 All space borne and ground control elements for military use. Also given responsibility for cyber warfare and computer security and computer development for the services

Peterson AFB, Colorado
U.S.A.

Special Operations Command

 All U.S. special operations including air, ground and sea based elite units for spec ops. Includes training and operational doctrine, giving one command the responsibility for creating, maintaining force strength and capability for immediate deployment of special warfare as directed by the National Command Authority in some cases within 24 hours. Assumed assets of the Ready Response Force

MacDill AFB, Florida
U.S.A.  

Strategic Command

All strategic and combat elements related

Offutt AFB, Nebraska
U.S.A.

Transporta

tion Command

Assumed the duties of all air and sealift capabilities for U.S. military. Operates transport aircraft and ships

Scott AFB, Illinois
U.S.A.



APPENDIX III

CANADA - UNITED STATES DEFENCE RELATIONS

Canada-United States defence relations are based on an extensive web of treaties, memoranda of understanding, and bilateral committees which together govern military cooperation.  A Department of National Defence background paper currently posted on the Internet refers to:

a.                  80+ treaty-level defence agreements;

b.                 more than 250 memoranda of understanding between the two defence departments; and

c.                 approximately 145 bilateral fora in which defence matters are discussed.

Approximately 600 Canadian Forces’ personnel serve in the U.S., mostly in NORAD related assignments.  In addition, Canadian government and industry representatives visit the U.S. 20,000 times on defence related matters each year.

The instruments which define the Canadian-U.S. defence and military relations cover, among other things, joint planning and operations, combined exercises, defence production, logistics, communications, research and development and intelligence sharing.  Outlines of a few of the most important follow.  

Permanent Joint Board on Defence

Established by the Ogdensburg Agreement of 1940, the Permanent Joint Board on Defence is the highest level bilateral defence forum and is composed of two national sections made up of diplomatic and military representatives.  The Canadian and U.S. Co-chairmen act in an advisory capacity, reporting directly to the Prime Minister and President.  The Board has examined virtually every important joint defence measure since the end of World War II, including construction of the Distant Early Warning Line of radars, the creation of the North American Air (later Aerospace) Defence Command in 1958, the bi-national operation of the underwater acoustic surveillance system and high-frequency direction finding network, the North American Air Defence Modernization program (1958), etc.  The Board has proven able to help resolve difficult issues and find imaginative solutions for problems.  

Military Cooperation Committee

The Military Cooperation Committee was formed in 1946 and manages cooperation at the military planning level. Its subcommittee responsibilities include mapping and charting, meteorology, oceanography, communications and electronics, and logistics planning. More recently, the Military Cooperation Committee was called upon to revise the NORAD Terms of Reference, develop a new Canada-U.S. Basic Security Document and to form a binational Space Cooperation Working Group.  

Canada-United States Regional Planning Group

The Canada-U.S. Regional Planning Group was formed in 1949 to oversee one of the five area structures designated by NATO as commands. While detailed planning for the North American theatre takes place in the Military Cooperation Committee, the CUSRPG provides the interface to the NATO Headquarters structure.  

Defence Production Sharing Arrangement

Signed in 1956, the Defence Production Sharing Arrangement has allowed Canadian firms to compete on an equal footing with their American counterparts in the U.S. market.  Since 1963 it has also helped Canadian firms develop goods for use by the U.S. military and to stay abreast of developing technologies.  The Arrangement recognizes that, given the interdependent nature of North American Defence, both countries should benefit from the economies of scale arising from specialization.  

North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD)

Formed in 1958, NORAD has undergone several changes in response to the changing threat to North America. The 8th NORAD Agreement renewal of March 1996 redefined the mission in terms of Aerospace Warning and Control. Additionally, provisions were incorporated into the Agreement permitting expansion of roles and missions should both nations agree.  

Canada-United States Test and Evaluation Program

Initially established in 1983 as an umbrella agreement allowing the U.S. military access to Canadian test facilities, on re-negotiation in 1993 the Canada-United States Test and Evaluation Program gave Canada reciprocal access to U.S. testing facilities.  Under the Program each country has agreed to charge only the costs related to the conduct of a specific test.  Each country has the right to approve the tests on a case-by-case basis.


APPENDIX IV

ORDER OF REFERENCE

Extract from the Journals of the Senate of Tuesday, April 16, 2002:

Resuming debate on the motion, as amended, of the Honourable Senator Cordy, seconded by the Honourable Senator Milne,

That the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence be authorized to examine and report on the need for a national security policy for Canada. In particular, the Committee shall be authorized to examine:

(a) the capability of the Department of National Defence to defend and protect the interests, people and territory of Canada and its ability to respond to or prevent a national emergency or attack;

(b) the working relationships between the various agencies involved in intelligence gathering, and how they collect, coordinate, analyze and disseminate information and how these functions might be enhanced;

(c) the mechanisms to review the performance and activities of the various agencies involved in intelligence gathering; and

(d) the security of our borders.

That the Committee report to the Senate no later than October 30, 2003, and that the Committee retain all powers necessary to publicize the findings of the Committee until November 30, 2003; and

That the Committee be permitted, notwithstanding usual practices, to deposit any report with the Clerk of the Senate, if the Senate is not then sitting; and that the report be deemed to have been tabled in the Chamber.

After debate,

The question being put on the motion, it was adopted.

Paul C. Bélisle  
Clerk of the Senate


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