EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
BORDERLINE INSECURE
An Interim Report of the Senate Committee on National Security and Defence
Canada-U.S. border crossings are essential to Canada’s security and prosperity. Why, then, the lack of urgency to fix them? And what problems face us if we don’t?
Serious damage to major land border crossings between Canada and the United States would have a profound impact on the Canadian economy, over and beyond the physical casualties such an incident would be likely to produce.
Is a takeout of a major crossing likely? No. If a disaster were to occur at a land border crossing, would it throw a large wrench into Canada-U.S. trade that has grown so rapidly under NAFTA? Yes. Can we afford to ignore such a potential catastrophe? No, no, and no.
Of course, major catastrophes represent worst-case scenarios. But even if you didn’t throw such scenarios into the mix (which you must), the fact would remain that Canada has glaring weaknesses at its crossings that must be fixed and fixed quickly. If they aren’t, they will continue to jeopardize two crucial elements of our nationhood: our economic future, and our national security.
Despite what should have been the wakeup call of September 11, 2001, there has been an unsettling lack of progress on both sides of the border to improve efficiency and strengthen security at land border crossings. These crossings represent each country’s last, best chance to scrutinize persons and cargo that should not be entering each other’s territory.
What do we need to do to make these border crossings effective chokepoints for cutting off wrongful entry, while still enabling minimal passage times for cars and trucks on innocent voyages?
Beyond the obvious need for upgrades to infrastructure and systems, the Committee believes that the only way to twin good security with good commerce is to change the entire culture at border crossings. This culture has already begun to evolve toward a greater emphasis on security, but there is a long way to go.
Here are just three concerns addressed by this report, out of the dozens covered by the committee’s 26 recommendations:
1. EMPHASISE SECURITY, NOT MINOR ECONOMICS. Canada needs a system within which personnel on the crossings are border officers first and clerks second – the reverse of the current situation. There should be far less emphasis on the collection of duties and taxes at our border crossings. In modern times these duties and taxes represent only a tiny percentage of government revenues in Canada and the United States. The emphasis placed on collecting them steals valuable time from inspectors, who should be provided with an improved opportunity to focus on their security responsibilities. Raising personal exemptions for travelers will help border officers better direct their attention to border security rather than revenue collection.
2. GIVE INSPECTORS THE TOOLS TO DO THE JOB. If border inspectors are going to play a more useful role in the nation’s security, they must have the infrastructure, systems and tools to do the job. These inspectors currently work with inadequate access to data systems designed to tell them which persons or vehicles may be dangerous and/or involved in illegal activities. Furthermore, while inspectors routinely encounter persons in possession of firearms, they themselves are armed with only batons and pepper spray.
Inspectors at Canada’s land border crossings are currently instructed to phone either the RCMP or local police for support when situations involving violent and/or illegal behaviour arise, but our evidence showed that such backup is often either slow or non-existent. The committee has reluctantly come to the conclusion that if the federal government is not willing or able to provide a constant police presence at Canada’s border crossings, current border inspectors must be given the option of carrying firearms after successfully completing rigorous training in the use of such firearms. For inspectors hired in the future, this option would be a mandatory requirement.
3. NEW BORDER INFRASTRUCTURE SHOULD BE A NATIONAL PRIORITY.
Current land border crossings need to be redesigned to make them more efficient, and to provide for reverse inspection. Reverse inspection would essentially allow Canadian and U.S. inspectors to trade places and operate on the other country’s soil. This would allow them to scrutinize persons and cargo before they enter a crossing, the way U.S. immigration and customs officers currently operate at many Canadian airports. The idea: protect both national security and border infrastructure by stopping threats before they have moved into vulnerable territory.
Vital land border crossings also need backup, in case one goes down. Disabling a border crossing like the Ambassador Bridge in Windsor, Ontario would have a devastating and long-lasting effect on Canada’s economy. Expanding crossing facilities is not sufficient. New structures need to be built to assure adequate redundancy in case of a disaster.
Readers will find recommendations on these, as well as several other major issues, in the report, with explanations of how and why the committee came to the conclusions that fostered the recommendations.
The following recommendations are contained in the report Borderline Insecure:
1. Restructure the personal exemption limits to allow the Canada Border Services Agency to better focus on security. The restructuring should include harmonization with U.S. levels by 2007 and incremental bilateral increases to $2000 per visit by 2010.
2. The government should implement a system of periodic effectiveness testing that assesses the effectiveness of each of the components of Canada's national security programs at our borders.
3. The government should release the results of periodic effectiveness testing of border security programs, after a delay sufficient to remedy problems.
4. The Canada Border Services Agency deploy only inspectors fully-trained to the level of indeterminate employees to perform primary duties on inspection lines.
5. The number of personnel employed by the Canada Border Services Agency be sufficient to provide security commensurate with increased security threat associated with the increased traffic and threat at Canada-U.S. land border crossings in recent years.
6. The Canada Border Services Agency ensure that at least half of all shifts at land border crossings be staffed by at least two persons by Dec. 31, 2006; and that all shifts at all land border crossings be staffed by at least two persons by Dec. 31, 2007.
7. The Canada Border Services Agency significantly increase its capacity to move extra personnel to posts during surge/emergency conditions, and that it document such an increase in capacity by Dec. 31, 2006.
8. The Canada Border Services Agency investigate the possibility of pairing students with full-time inspectors at land border crossings so that students could earn both summer wages and credits toward community college diplomas associated with policing and security.
9. The Canada Border Services Agency expand its training programs in line with its newly focused mission on security as opposed to tax collection.
10. The Canada Border Services Agency improve its training programs for border agency personnel, with a special focus on components that increase skill sets for questioning techniques and cultural sensitivity.
11. The Canada Border Services Agency make mandatory the timely reporting and cataloguing of critical incidents faced by personnel.
12. The Canada Border Services Agency include a tally of those incidents in the Agency’s annual report to Parliament.
13. The federal government arm border officers if it is not prepared to station and maintain an RCMP presence at all border crossings.
14. If the government does go ahead with arming border officers, it create a firearm qualification and recertification program that meets or exceeds the Firearms Course Training Standards of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.
15. The Canada Border Services Agency connect all 62 unconnected border posts with real-time access to the customs mainframe by January 1st, 2006.
16. The Canada Border Services Agency upgrade the quality and fuse the data that is available to officers on the primary and secondary inspection lines.
17. The federal government develop and publicize an implementation plan for pre-clearance, with clearly understood timeframes.
18. The government move, with U.S. cooperation, to expand pre-clearance into continent-wide reverse inspection at all bridge and tunnel crossings.
19. By 2007, the government require documentation of all people entering Canada (including Canadians) that is:
a) Tamper-proof;
b) Machine-readable;
c) Biometrically enhanced; and,
d) Known to have been issued on the basis of reliable documentation.
20. Only those proposals for new crossing infrastructure at Windsor-Detroit which provide separate and secure infrastructure redundancy be considered.
21. Any new crossing constructed at Windsor-Detroit include facilities for reverse inspection.
22. The federal government move in 2005 to fund an awareness campaign that will outline to Canadians and Americans the security and economic benefits that would result from reinforcing Canada-U.S. border crossings quickly and the potential cost of not doing so.
23. The federal government, in the interests of national security, introduce legislation that would grant the Governor-in-Council, upon the recommendation of the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, the authority to expedite border infrastructure construction.
24. The federal government ensure viable crossing designs are completed before 2008.
25. The federal government work with the United States government to complete a new crossing at Windsor-Detroit before 2011.
26. The federal government immediately undertake a study of the feasibility of crossings outside of the Windsor-Detroit metropolitan area.
For more information :
Leslie Dauncey
(613) 995-7966