Second Session
Thirty-ninth Parliament, 2007-08

SENATE OF CANADA

Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on

National Security and Defence

Chair:
The Honourable COLIN KENNY

Monday, June 16, 2008 (in camera)
Wednesday, June 18, 2008
Thursday, June 26, 2008 (in camera)
Monday, July 28, 2008

Issue No. 10
Volume 1 of 3

Sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth meetings on:

Canada's national security policy

INCLUDING:
THE SIXTH REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
(Budget 2008-2009 — Special study on the national security policy for Canada)
THE EIGHTH REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
(Budget 2008-2009 — Special study on the services and benefits provided to veterans in recognition of their services to Canada)
THE TENTH REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
(Report entitled *Report on Reductions of Services Income Security Insurance Plan Long Term Disability Benefits*)
THE ELEVENTH REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
(Report entitled *Four Generals and an Admiral — The View from the Top*)
THE TWELFTH REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
(Report entitled *Bringing Our Wounded Home Safely*)
THE THIRTEENTH REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
(Report entitled *Emergency Preparedness in Canada*)

Deuxième session de la
trente-neuvième législature, 2007-2008

SÉNAT DU CANADA

Délibérations du Comité sénatorial permanent de la

Sécurité nationale et de la défense

Président :
L'honorable COLIN KENNY

Le lundi 16 juin 2008 (à huis clos)
Le mercredi 18 juin 2008
Le jeudi 26 juin 2008 (à huis clos)
Le lundi 28 juillet 2008

Fascicule n° 10
Volume 1 de 3

Seizième, dix-septième, dix-huitième et dix-neuvième réunions concernant :

La politique de sécurité nationale du Canada

Y COMPRIS :
LE SIXIÈME RAPPORT DU COMITÉ
(Budget 2008-2009 — Étude spéciale concernant la politique de sécurité nationale du Canada)
LE HUITIÈME RAPPORT DU COMITÉ
(Budget 2008-2009 — Étude spéciale sur les services et les avantages sociaux offerts aux anciens combattants en reconnaissance des services rendus au Canada)
LE DIXIÈME RAPPORT DU COMITÉ
(rapport intitulé *Rapport sur la réductions des prestation d'invalidité à long terme du Régime d'assurance-revenue militaire*)
LE ONZIÈME RAPPORT DU COMITÉ
(rapport intitulé *Quatre généraux et un amiral — La situation vue d'en haut*)
LE DOUZIÈME RAPPORT DU COMITÉ
(rapport intitulé *Le rapatriement des soldats blessés*)
LE TREIZIÈME RAPPORT DU COMITÉ
(rapport intitulé *La protection civile au Canada*)

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THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE

The Honourable Colin Kenny, *Chair*

The Honourable David Tkachuk, *Deputy Chair*

and

The Honourable Senators:

Banks	Meighen
Day	Mitchell
* Hervieux-Payette, P.C. (or Tardif)	Moore
	Nancy Ruth
* LeBreton, P.C. (or Comeau)	Zimmer

*Ex officio members

(Quorum 4)

LE COMITÉ SÉNATORIAL PERMANENT DE LA SÉCURITÉ NATIONALE ET DE LA DÉFENSE

Président : L'honorable Colin Kenny

Vice-président : L'honorable David Tkachuk

et

Les honorables sénateurs :

Banks	Meighen
Day	Mitchell
* Hervieux-Payette, C.P. (ou Tardif)	Moore
	Nancy Ruth
* LeBreton, C.P. (ou Comeau)	Zimmer

* Membres d'office

(Quorum 4)

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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

OTTAWA, Monday, June 16, 2008
(20)

[*English*]

The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met this day in camera, at 4:03 p.m. in room 256-S, Centre Block, the chair, the Honourable Colin Kenny, presiding.

Members of the committee present: The Honourable Senators Banks, Day, Kenny, Mitchell, Moore, Nancy Ruth, and Tkachuk (7).

In attendance: Gaëtane Lemay, Co-clerk of the Committee, Committees Directorate; Melissa Radford, Maureen Shields and Jason Yung, Analysts, Parliamentary Information and Research Services, Library of Parliament; Barry Denofsky, National Security Advisor; Major-General (ret) Keith McDonald, Senior Military Advisor; Superintendant Lindsey Brine, RCMP Liaison Officer; Captain (N) John Gardam, DND Liaison Officer and Sergeant Patrick Walsh, Ottawa Police Liaison Officer.

Pursuant to rule 92(2)(e), the committee commenced in camera to consider a draft report.

It was agreed that the committee allow transcripts to be kept of this in camera meeting.

At 5:18 p.m., the Honourable Senator Tkachuk took the chair.

At 5:20 p.m., the Honourable Senator Kenny took the chair.

At 6:06 p.m., the Honourable Senator Tkachuk took the chair.

At 6:18 p.m., the Honourable Senator Kenny took the chair.

It was moved:

> That the draft report on the evacuation of wounded soldiers be adopted; and
>
> That the chair table this report in the Senate.

The question being put on the motion, it was adopted.

It was moved:

> That the draft report on Canadian military leadership be adopted; and
>
> That the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure be authorized to make the changes that were discussed and approved today, as well as the minor typographical and grammatical corrections deemed necessary, without however modifying the substance of the report; and
>
> That the chair table this report in the Senate.

The question being put on the motion, it was adopted, on division.

PROCÈS-VERBAUX

OTTAWA, le lundi 16 juin 2008
(20)

[*Traduction*]

Le Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense se réunit aujourd'hui à huis clos, à 16 h 3 dans la pièce 256-S de l'édifice du Centre sous la présidence de l'honorable Colin Kenny (*président*).

Membres du comité présents : Les honorables sénateurs Banks, Day, Kenny, Mitchell, Moore, Nancy Ruth et Tkachuk (7).

Également présents : Gaëtane Lemay, cogreffière du comité, Direction des comités; Mélissa Radford, Maureen Shields et Jason Yung, analystes, Service d'information et de recherche parlementaires, Bibliothèque du Parlement; Barry Denofsky, conseiller à la sécurité nationale; major général (à la retraite) Keith McDonald, conseiller militaire principal; surintendante Lindsey Brine, agente de liaison de la GRC; capitaine de vaisseau John Gardam, agent de liaison du MDN et le sergent Patrick Walsh, agent de liaison du service de la police d'Ottawa.

Conformément à l'article 92(2)e) du Règlement, le comité commence la réunion à huis clos pour examiner une ébauche de rapport.

Il est convenu que le comité autorise que la transcription de la réunion à huis clos soit conservée.

À 17 h 18, l'honorable sénateur Tkachuk occupe le fauteuil.

À 17 h 20, l'honorable sénateur Kenny occupe le fauteuil.

À 18 h 6, l'honorable sénateur Tkachuk occupe le fauteuil.

À 18 h 18, l'honorable sénateur Kenny occupe le fauteuil.

Il est proposé :

> Que l'ébauche de rapport sur l'évacuation des soldats blessés soit adoptée; et
>
> Que le président dépose le rapport au Sénat.

La motion, mise aux voix, est adoptée.

Il est proposé :

> Que l'ébauche de rapport sur la direction militaire du Canada soit adoptée; et
>
> Que le Sous-comité du programme et de la procédure soit autorisé à apporter les changements dont il a été discuté et qui ont été approuvés aujourd'hui, ainsi qu'à apporter les petites corrections d'ordre typographique et grammatical jugées nécessaires, sans toutefois modifier la teneur du rapport; et
>
> Que le président dépose le rapport au Sénat.

La motion, mise aux voix, est adoptée avec dissidence.

At 7:03 p.m., the committee adjourned to the call of the chair.

ATTEST:

À 19 h 3, le comité suspend ses travaux jusqu'à nouvelle convocation de la présidence.

ATTESTÉ :

La greffière du comité,

Shaila Anwar

Clerk of the Committee

OTTAWA, Wednesday, June 18, 2008
(21)

[*English*]

The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met this day, at 1:02 p.m. in room 172-E, Centre Block, the chair, the Honourable Colin Kenny, presiding.

Members of the committee present: The Honourable Senators Banks, Comeau, Day, Kenny, Meighen, Mitchell, Moore, Nancy Ruth and Tkachuk (9).

In attendance: Shaila Anwar, Co-clerk of the Committee, Committees Directorate; Melissa Radford, and Jason Yung, Analysts, Parliamentary Information and Research Services, Library of Parliament; Barry Denofsky, National Security Advisor and Captain (N) John Gardam, DND Liaison Officer.

The Honourable Senator Meighen moved:

> That the draft report of the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs on SISIP payments be adopted;
>
> That the chair and deputy chair of the subcommittee be authorized to make the changes that were discussed and approved today, as well as the minor typographical and grammatical corrections deemed necessary, without however modifying the substance of the report; and
>
> That the chair or the deputy chair of the subcommittee table this report in the Senate.

The question being put on the motion, it was adopted.

The Honourable Senator Moore moved:

> That the committee authorize Senator Kenny and Senator Day to travel on its behalf to attend the ICT's 8th International Conference, "Terrorism's Global Impact," to he held in Herezliya, Israel, from September 8-11, 2008;
>
> That they be authorized to visit the Tel Aviv airport to review their security system;
>
> That they both be considered on official business for the purposes of the Senators Attendance Policy; and
>
> That the cost of the expenses incurred be applied to the "Conferences" budget activity.

OTTAWA, le mercredi 18 juin 2008
(21)

[*Traduction*]

Le Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense se réunit aujourd'hui à 13 h 2 dans la pièce 172-E de l'édifice du Centre sous la présidence de l'honorable Colin Kenny (*président*).

Membres du comité présents : Les honorables sénateurs Banks, Comeau, Day, Kenny, Meighen, Mitchell, Moore, Nancy Ruth et Tkachuk (9).

Également présents : Shaila Anwar, cogreffière du comité, Direction des comités; Mélissa Radford et Jason Yung, analystes, Service d'information et de recherche parlementaires, Bibliothèque du Parlement; Barry Denofsky, conseiller à la sécurité nationale et le capitaine de vaisseau John Gardam, agent de liaison du MDN.

L'honorable sénateur Meighen propose :

> Que soit adoptée l'ébauche de rapport du Sous-comité des affaires des anciens combattants concernant les paiements du RARM;
>
> Que le président et le vice-président du sous-comité soient autorisés à apporter les changements dont il a été discuté et qui ont été approuvés aujourd'hui, ainsi qu'à apporter les petites corrections d'ordre typographique et grammatical jugées nécessaires, sans toutefois modifier la teneur du rapport; et
>
> Que le président et le vice-président du sous-comité déposent le rapport au Sénat.

La question, mise aux voix, est adoptée.

L'honorable sénateur Moore propose :

> Que le comité autorise les sénateurs Kenny et Day à se rendre en son nom à Herezliya, en Israël, pour participer à la 8e conférence internationale d'ICT qui s'y tiendra du 8 au 11 septembre 2008.
>
> Qu'ils soient autorisés à visiter l'aéroport de Tel-Aviv pour examiner le système de sécurité de cet aéroport;
>
> Que les activités des deux sénateurs soient considérées comme des engagements officiels aux fins de la Politique relative à la présence des sénateurs; et
>
> Que le coût des dépenses engagées soit inscrit au poste « conférences » du budget du comité.

The question being put on the motion, it was adopted, on division.

The Honourable Senator Tkachuk moved:

That the committee authorize the deputy chair to travel on its behalf to Montreal, on a date to be determined later to meet with representatives of *The Gazette*, in order to promote committee reports and to discuss the work of the committee;

That the deputy chair be considered on official business for the purposes of the Senators Attendance Policy; and

That the cost of the expenses incurred be applied to the "Promotion of reports, meetings and other matters related to committee business" budget activity.

The question being put on the motion, it was adopted, on division.

The Honourable Senator Tkachuk moved:

That the committee authorize the deputy chair to travel on its behalf to Vancouver and Calgary, on a date to be determined later to meet with representatives of *The Vancouver Sun*, *The Province,* the *Calgary Sun,* and the *Calgary Herald*, in order to promote committee reports and to discuss the work of the committee;

That the deputy chair be considered on official business for the purposes of the Senators Attendance Policy; and

That the cost of the expenses incurred be applied to the "Promotion of reports, meetings and other matters related to committee business" budget activity.

The question being put on the motion, it was adopted, on division.

At 1:29 p.m., the committee adjourned to the call of the chair.

ATTEST:

La question, mise aux voix, est adoptée avec dissidence.

L'honorable sénateur Tkachuk propose :

Que le comité autorise le vice-président à se rendre en son nom à Montréal, à une date qui sera déterminée ultérieurement, pour rencontrer des représentants de la *Gazette* pour faire la promotion des rapports du comité et discuter des travaux du comité.

Que le vice-président soit considéré comme étant en voyage aux fins de la Politique relative à la présence des sénateurs;

Et que les frais engagés soient imputés à l'activité « Promotion de rapports, réunions et autres questions liées aux activités du comité ».

La question, mise aux voix, est adoptée avec dissidence.

L'honorable sénateur Tkachuk propose :

Que le comité autorise le vice-président à se rendre en son nom à Vancouver et à Calgary, à une date qui sera déterminée ultérieurement, pour rencontrer des représentants du *Vancouver Sun* , du *Province*, du *Calgary Sun* et du *Calgary Herald*, pour faire la promotion des rapports du comité et discuter des travaux du comité.

Que le vice-président soit considéré comme étant en voyage aux fins de la Politique relative à la présence des sénateurs;

Et que les frais engagés soient imputés à l'activité « Promotion de rapports, réunions et autres questions liées aux activités du comité ».

La question, mise aux voix, est adoptée avec dissidence.

À 13 h 29, le comité suspend ses travaux jusqu'à nouvelle convocation de la présidence.

ATTESTÉ :

La greffière du comité,

Gaëtane Lemay

Clerk of the Committee

OTTAWA, Thursday, June 26, 2008
(22)

[*English*]

The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met this day in camera, at 1:34 p.m. in room 160-S, Centre Block, the chair, the Honourable Colin Kenny, presiding.

Members of the committee present: The Honourable Senators Banks, Day, Kenny, Meighen, Mitchell, Tkachuk and Zimmer (7).

OTTAWA, le jeudi 26 juin 2008
(22)

[*Traduction*]

Le Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense se réunit aujourd'hui à huis clos, à 13 h 34 dans la pièce 160-S de l'édifice du Centre sous la présidence de l'honorable Colin Kenny (*président*).

Membres du comité présents : Les honorables sénateurs Banks, Day, Kenny, Meighen, Mitchell, Tkachuk et Zimmer (7).

In attendance: Gaëtane Lemay, Co-clerk of the Committee, Committees Directorate; Melissa Radford, Maureen Shields and Jason Yung, Analysts, Parliamentary Information and Research Services, Library of Parliament; Barry Denofsky, National Security Advisor; Major-General (ret) Keith McDonald, Senior Military Advisor and Lieutenant-Colonel Chris Kilford, DND Liaison Officer.

Pursuant to rule 92(2)(f), the committee commenced in camera to consider a draft report.

It was agreed that senators' staff be authorized to remain in the room during the in camera portion of this meeting.

It was agreed that the following material be filed as exhibits with the Clerk of the Committee:

- Response to a request for information at the February 4, 2008 appearance of Health Canada and Public Health Agency of Canada officials regarding the safety of nuclear materials and facilities. (Exhibit 5900-2.39/N2-SS-1-8, 11,"17")
- Five documents entitled a) *Non-Binding Declaration on Mutual Aid*, b) *Draft Federal/Provincial/Territorial MOU on the Sharing of Information During a Public Health Emergency*, c) *Draft MOU on Health Emergency Management — Health Canada and the Public Health Agency of Canada: Building Effective Working Relations*, d) *The Public Health Agency of Canada's Strategic Plan*, and e) *National Emergency Stockpile System Catalogue of Supplies*, submitted by Public Health Agency of Canada in response to the committee's request for additional information at the February 4, 2008 meeting (Exhibit 5900-2.39/N2-SS-1-8, 11,"18")

It was agreed that the committee allow the transcription of this in camera meeting and that the transcript be destroyed by the clerk at the end of this parliamentary session.

It was agreed that a letter and all related in camera documents be circulated to all members of the committee and any senators who were present on May 26, 2008, in order to consider the request made by the Standing Senate Committee on Rules, Procedures and the Rights of Parliament for in camera committee documents.

At 4:00 p.m., the committee adjourned to the call of the chair.

ATTEST:

Également présents : Gaëtane Lemay, cogreffière du comité, Direction des comités; Mélissa Radford, Maureen Shields et Jason Yung, analystes, Service d'information et de recherche parlementaires, Bibliothèque du Parlement; Barry Denofsky, conseiller à la sécurité nationale; major général (à la retraite) Keith McDonald, conseiller militaire principal et le lieutenant-colonel Chris Kilford, agent de liaison du MDN.

Conformément à l'article 92(2)f) du Règlement, le comité commence la réunion à huis clos pour examiner une ébauche de rapport.

Il est convenu que le personnel des sénateurs soit autorisé à demeurer dans la salle durant la partie de la réunion qui se déroule à huis clos.

Il est convenu que les documents suivants soient déposés auprès de la greffière du comité pour être versés au dossier :

- La réponse à une demande de renseignements faite lors de la comparution des fonctionnaires de Santé Canada et de l'Agence publique du Canada concernant la sûreté des matières et des installations nucléaires. (Pièce 5900-2.39/N2-SS-1-8, 11, « 17 »)
- Cinq documents intitulés : a) *Non-binding Declaration on Mutual Aid* (déclaration non contraignante sur l'aide mutuelle), b) *Draft Federal/provincial/Territorial MOU on the Sharing of Information During a Public Health Emergency* (projet d'entente fédérale-provinciale-territoriale sur le partage de l'information pendant une urgence sanitaire), c) *Draft MOU on Health Emergency Management — Health Canada and the Public Health Agency of Canada : building effective Working Relations* (projet d'entente sur la gestion des interventions sanitaires d'urgence — Santé Canada et Agence de la santé publique du Canada : établissement de relations de travail efficaces), d) Plan stratégique de l'Agence de la santé publique du Canada et e) *National Emergency Stockpile system Catalogue of Supplies* (catalogue des fournitures de la Réserve nationale de secours) soumis par l'Agence de la santé publique du Canada en réponse à une demande d'information additionnelle faite par le comité lors de la réunion du 4 février 2008. (Pièce 5900-2.39/N2-SS-1-8, 11, « 18 »)

Il est convenu que le comité autorise la transcription de la réunion à huis clos et que le document soit détruit par la greffière à la fin de la présente session parlementaire.

Il est convenu qu'une lettre et que tous les documents portant sur la partie de la réunion qui s'est déroulée à huis clos soient distribués à tous les membres du comité et à tous les sénateurs présents le 26 mai 2008 afin d'examiner la demande par le Comité sénatorial permanent du Règlement, de la procédure des droits du Parlement concernant des documents portant sur la partie de la réunion du comité qui s'est déroulé à huis clos.

À 16 heures, le comité suspend ses travaux jusqu'à nouvelle convocation de la présidence.

ATTESTÉ :

OTTAWA, Monday, July 28, 2008
(23)

[*English*]

The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met this day, at 9:06 a.m. in room 2, Victoria Building, the chair, the Honourable Colin Kenny, presiding.

Members of the committee present: The Honourable Senators Banks, Day, Kenny, Moore, Tkachuk and Zimmer (6).

In attendance: Maureen Shields, Analyst, Parliamentary Information and Research Services, Library of Parliament; Barry Denofsky, National Security Advisor; Major-General (ret) Keith McDonald, Senior Military Advisor; Lieutenant-Colonel Chris Kilford, DND Liaison Officer; Superintendant Lindsey Brine, RCMP Liaison Officer; and Sergeant Patrick Walsh, Ottawa Police Liaison Officer.

It was agreed that the committee commence in camera, pursuant to rule 92(2)(f), to consider a draft report.

It was agreed that the committee allow the transcription of the in camera portions of today's meeting, that one copy be kept in the office of the clerk of the committee for consultation by committee members and that the transcript be destroyed by the clerk at the end of this parliamentary session.

It was agreed, on division, that senators' staff be excluded from the meeting room during the in camera portions of today's meeting.

It was agreed, on division, that the decision to adopt a draft report on the evacuation of wounded soldiers, made on June 16, 2008, be reviewed for the purposes of discussing a revised draft report on the evacuation of wounded Canadian soldiers.

It was agreed that, with the exception of the clerk, all electronic devices be excluded from the meeting room during the in camera portions of today's meeting.

At 9:37 a.m., the committee suspended.

At 10:06 a.m., the committee resumed.

It was agreed that the committee continue in camera in order to discuss draft reports and that the committee proceed in public at a later time in order to consider the adoption of those draft reports.

It was agreed that correspondence and notes from honourable senators be circulated in their original language for the purposes of today's discussion only and that the clerk have these documents translated as soon as possible for further reference.

At 11:32 a.m., the committee suspended.

At 11:35 a.m., the committee resumed its consideration of a draft report.

At 1:28 p.m., the committee suspended.

OTTAWA, le lundi 28 juillet 2008
(23)

[*Traduction*]

Le Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense se réunit aujourd'hui à 9 h 6 dans la pièce 2 de l'édifice Victoria sous la présidence de l'honorable Colin Kenny (*président*).

Membres du comité présents : Les honorables sénateurs Banks, Day, Kenny, Moore, Tkachuk et Zimmer (6).

Également présents : Maureen Shields, analyste, Service d'information et de recherche parlementaires, Bibliothèque du Parlement; Barry Denofsky, conseiller à la sécurité nationale; major-général (à la retraite) Keith McDonald, conseiller militaire principal; lieutenant colonel Chris Kilford, agent de liaison du MDN et le sergent Patrick Walsh, agent de liaison du service de la police d'Ottawa.

Conformément à l'article 92(2)f) du Règlement, le comité commence la réunion à huis clos pour examiner une ébauche de rapport.

Il est convenu que le comité autorise la transcription des parties de la réunion qui se déroulent à huis clos, qu'une copie seulement soit conservée pour consultation par les membres du comité dans le bureau de la greffière du comité et que le document soit détruit par la greffière à la fin de la présente session parlementaire.

Il est convenu, avec dissidence, que le personnel des sénateurs demeure pas dans la salle durant les parties de la réunion qui se déroulent à huis clos.

Il est convenu, avec dissidence, que la décision prise le 16 juin 2008 d'adopter une ébauche de rapport sur l'évacuation des soldats blessés, soit réexaminée dans le but de discuter une ébauche de rapport révisée sur l'évacuation des soldats canadiens blessés.

Il est convenu que tous les appareils électroniques, à l'exception de ceux de la greffière, soient interdits dans la salle durant les parties de la réunion qui se déroulent à huis clos.

À 9 h 37, le comité suspend ses travaux.

À 10 h 6, le comité reprend ses travaux.

Il est convenu que le comité poursuive ses discussions à huis clos pour examiner des ébauches de rapport et qu'il poursuive plus tard ses travaux en séance publique afin d'examiner l'adoption de ces ébauches de rapport.

Il est convenu que la correspondance et les notes des honorables sénateurs soient distribuées dans leur langue originale aux seules fins de la discussion d'aujourd'hui et que la greffière fasse traduire ces documents le plus tôt possible pour consultation ultérieure.

À 11 h 32, le comité suspend ses travaux.

À 11 h 35, le comité reprend son étude d'une ébauche de rapport.

À 13 h 28, le comité suspend ses travaux.

At 1:52 p.m., the committee resumed its consideration of a draft report.

At 2:38 p.m., it was agreed that the committee proceed in public.

The Honourable Senator Banks moved:

> That in light of events and information which have overtaken it, the committee's approval of the draft report on the evacuation of wounded soldiers, previously adopted on June 16, 2008, be rescinded.

After debate, the question being put on the motion, it was adopted, on division.

At 2:47 p.m., it was agreed that the committee proceed in camera, pursuant to rule 92(2)(f), to consider a draft report.

It was agreed, on division, that senators' staff be excluded from the meeting room during the in camera portions of today's meeting.

At 3:58 p.m., the committee suspended.

At 4:08 p.m., the committee resumed in public.

The Honourable Senator Banks moved:

> That the committee's approval of the draft report on Canadian military leadership, entitled *Four Generals and an Admiral,* previously adopted on June 16, 2008, be rescinded.

With leave, it was agreed that the Honourable Senator Banks withdraw his motion.

The Honourable Senator Banks moved:

> That the authority granted, on June 16, 2008, to the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure to make changes without modifying the substance of the report entitled *Four Generals and an Admiral* be rescinded; and
>
> That the authority to make changes without modifying the substance of the report be returned to the full committee.

After debate, with leave, it was agreed that the Honourable Senator Banks withdraw his motion.

The Honourable Senator Banks moved:

> That the committee's approval of the draft report on Canadian military leadership, entitled *Four Generals and an Admiral,* previously adopted on June 16, 2008, be rescinded.

After debate, the question being put on the motion, it was adopted on the following recorded division:

YEAS: The Honourable Senators Banks, Day and Moore — 3

NAYS: The Honourable Senator Tkachuk — 1

At 4:27 p.m., it was agreed that the committee proceed in camera, pursuant to rule 92(2)(f), to consider a draft report.

At 7:15 p.m., it was agreed that the committee proceed in public.

À 13 h 52, le comité reprend son étude d'une ébauche de rapport.

À 14 h 38, il est convenu que le comité poursuive ses travaux en séance publique.

L'honorable sénateur Banks propose :

> Que, à la lumière des événements et de l'information qui l'ont rendue caduque, je propose que soit annulée l'approbation par le comité de l'ébauche de rapport sur l'évacuation des soldats blessés adoptée le 16 juin 2008.

Après discussion, la question, mise aux voix, est adoptée avec dissidence.

À 14 h 47, conformément à l'article 92(2)f) du Règlement, il est convenu que le comité poursuive ses travaux à huis clos pour examiner une ébauche de rapport.

Il est convenu, avec dissidence, que le personnel des sénateurs ne demeure pas dans la salle durant les parties de la réunion qui se déroulent à huis clos.

À 15 h 58, le comité suspend ses travaux.

À 16 h 8, le comité reprend ses travaux en séance publique.

L'honorable sénateur Banks propose :

> Que soit annulée l'approbation par le comité de l'ébauche de rapport sur la direction militaire du Canada intitulée *Quatre généraux et un amiral* et adoptée le 16 juin 2008.

Avec autorisation, il est convenu que l'honorable sénateur Banks retire sa motion.

L'honorable sénateur Banks propose :

> Que soit annulée l'autorisation donnée le 16 juin 2008 au Sous-comité du programme de la procédure d'apporter des changements sans modifier la teneur du rapport intitulé *Quatre généraux et un amiral,* et
>
> Que soit annulée l'autorisation d'apporter des changements sans modifier la teneur du rapport revienne au comité.

Après discussion et avec autorisation, il est convenu que l'honorable sénateur Banks retire sa motion.

L'honorable sénateur Banks propose :

> Que soit annulée l'approbation par le comité de l'ébauche de rapport sur la direction militaire du Canada intitulée *Quatre généraux et un amiral* et adoptée le 16 juin 2008.

Après discussion, la question, mise aux voix, est adoptée par le vote inscrit suivant :

POUR : Les honorables sénateurs Banks, Day et Moore — 3

CONTRE : L'honorable sénateur Tkachuk — 1

À 16 h 27, conformément à l'article 92(2)f) du Règlement, il est convenu que le comité poursuive ses travaux à huis clos pour examiner une ébauche de rapport.

À 19 h 15, il est convenu que le comité reprenne ses travaux en séance publique.

The Honourable Senator Banks moved:

That the draft report on national emergencies in Canada be adopted, as amended; and

That the chair table this report in the Senate or file it with the Clerk of the Senate pursuant to the authority granted by the Senate on June 18, 2008.

The question being put on the motion, it was adopted.

The Honourable Senator Day moved:

That the draft report on Canadian military leadership, entitled *Four Generals and an Admiral: The View from the Top,* be adopted, as amended; and

That the chair table this report in the Senate or file it with the Clerk of the Senate pursuant to the authority granted by the Senate on June 18, 2008.

The question being put on the motion, it was adopted.

The Honourable Senator Moore moved:

That the draft report on the evacuation of wounded Canadian soldiers, entitled *Canadians Wounded in Afghanistan: How Well Does Canada Rescue, Treat and Rehabilitate?* be adopted, as amended; and

That the chair table this report in the Senate or file it with the Clerk of the Senate pursuant to the authority granted by the Senate on June 18, 2008.

The question being put on the motion, it was adopted.

The committee discussed matters related to committee business.

The Honourable Senator Moore moved:

That the committee authorize the chair to certify as payable an invoice for Jessica Post, dated June 30, 2008, in the amount of $937, from the committee's budget.

The question being put on the motion, it was adopted.

The Honourable Senator Banks moved:

That the following material be filed as exhibits with the Clerk of the Committee:

- Notes and letters from the Honourable Senator Tkachuk addressed to the Honourable Senator Kenny, dated July 2 and July 17, 2008, regarding the draft report on national emergencies in Canada. (Exhibit 5900-2.39/N2-SS-1-8, 10,"17")
- Notes and emails from the Honourable Senator Banks addressed to the Honourable Senator Kenny, dated July 25, 2008, regarding the draft reports on National Emergencies in Canada. (Exhibit 5900-2.39/N2-SS-1-8, 10,"18")

L'honorable sénateur Banks propose :

Que l'ébauche de rapport modifiée sur les urgences nationales au Canada soit adoptée; et

Que le président dépose le rapport au Sénat ou le remette au greffier du Sénat conformément à l'autorisation accordée par le Sénat le 18 juin 2008.

La motion, mise aux voix, est adoptée.

L'honorable sénateur Day propose :

Que soit adoptée l'ébauche de rapport modifiée sur la direction militaire du Canada intitulée *Quatre généraux et un amiral — La situation vue d'en haut*; et

Que le président dépose le rapport au Sénat où le remette au greffier du Sénat conformément à l'autorisation accordée par le Sénat le 18 juin 2008.

La motion, mise aux voix, est adoptée.

L'honorable sénateur Moore propose :

Que soit adoptée une ébauche de rapport modifiée sur l'évacuation des soldats canadiens blessés intitulée *Les Canadiens blessés en Afghanistan : Quelle est la qualité des services de sauvetage, de traitement et de réadaptation offerts par le Canada*?

Et que le président dépose le rapport au Sénat où le remette au greffier du Sénat conformément à l'autorisation accordée par le Sénat le 18 juin 2008.

La motion, mise aux voix, est adoptée.

Le comité discute de questions liées à ces travaux.

L'honorable sénateur Moore propose :

Que le comité autorise le président à attester le paiement, à partir du budget du comité, de la facture de Jessica Post datée du 30 juin 2008 et d'un montant de 937 $.

La motion, mise aux voix, est adoptée.

L'honorable sénateur Banks propose :

Que les documents suivants soient déposés auprès de la greffière du comité :

- Les notes et les lettres en date du 2 et du 17 juillet 2008 adressées par l'honorable sénateur Tkachuk à l'honorable sénateur Kenny concernant l'ébauche de rapport sur les urgences nationales au Canada. (Pièce 5900-2.39/N2-SS-1-8, 10, « 17 »)
- Les notes et les courriels datés du 25 juillet 2008 adressés par l'honorable sénateur Banks à l'honorable sénateur Kenny concernant les ébauches de rapport sur les urgences nationales au Canada. (Pièce 5900-2.39/N2-SS-1-8, 10, « 18 »)

- Response to a question taken on notice at the June 2, 2008 appearance of LGen Natynczyk, regarding Canadian Forces Recruitment at Pride Events. (Exhibit 5900-2.39/N2-SS-1-8, 10,"19")

- Responses from Public Health Agency of Canada to follow up questions from the Library of Parliament on August 14, 2006. (Exhibit 5900-2.39/N2-SS-1-8, 10,"20")

- Responses from Public Safety Canada to follow up questions from the Library of Parliament on August 30, 2006. (Exhibit 5900-2.39/N2-SS-1-8, 10,"21")

- Response from Brian MacDonald to Senator Colin Kenny regarding the future ratio of military spending to gross domestic product. (Exhibit 5900-2.39/N2-SS-1-8, 10,"22")

The question being put on the motion, it was adopted, on division.

The Honourable Senator Day moved:

That the expenses incurred for framing of photographs of committee members from their trip to Afghanistan in March/April, 2008, in the estimated amount of $1,300, be applied to the line item for "office supplies" and "miscellaneous" from the "General Expenses" section of the committee's budget.

The question being put on the motion, it was adopted.

The Honourable Senator Banks moved:

That pursuant to the motion adopted by the committee on June 18, 2008, authorizing the Honourable Senators Kenny and Day to travel to a conference in Herezliya, Israel, the committee also authorizes Senator Kenny and Senator Day to attend additional meetings with Israeli police representatives, airport security officials at Ben Gurion International Airport, as well as site visits to the counter-terrorism school of the IDF and Israeli SWAT school, the port of Ashdod, the passenger terminal at the port of Haifa, to Northern Israel for a demonstration of advanced security technologies, to the Command and Control Centre of the IDF Home-front, to the Western Galilee medical centre and to a land border crossing;

That they both be considered on official business for the purposes of the Senators Attendance Policy; and

That the additional costs, up to $5,000 of expenses incurred, be applied to the "Promotion of reports, meetings and other matters related to committee business" budget activity.

The question being put on the motion, it was adopted, on the following recorded division:

YEAS: The Honourable Senators Banks, Day and Moore — 3

NAYS: The Honourable Senator Tkachuk — 1

- La réponse à un préavis de question posée lors de la comparution du lgén Natynczyk et concernant le recrutement des Forces canadiennes à l'occasion d'événements célébrant la fierté gaie. (Pièce 5900-2.39/N2-SS-1-8, 10, « 19 »)

- Les réponses provenant de l'Agence de la santé publique du Canada faisant suite à des questions que la Bibliothèque du Parlement a posé le 14 août 2006. (Pièce 5900-2.39/N2-SS-1-8, 10, « 20 »)

- Les réponses de Sécurité publique Canada faisant suite à des questions posées par la Bibliothèque du Parlement le 30 août 2006. (Pièce 5900-2.39/N2-SS-1-8, 10, « 21 »)

- La réponse de Brian MacDonald, adressée au sénateur Kenny, concernant le futur ratio de dépenses militaires par rapport au produit national brut. (Pièce 5900-2.39/N2-SS-1-8, 10, « 22 »)

La motion, mise aux voix, est adoptée avec dissidence.

L'honorable sénateur Day propose :

Que les dépenses engagées pour l'encadrement des photographies des membres du comité prises à l'occasion de leur voyage en Afghanistan en mars/avril 2008, d'un montant approximatif de 1 300 $, soit inscrit au poste de « papeteries et fournitures » et « divers » de l'enveloppe des « dépenses générales » du budget du comité.

La motion, mise aux voix, est adoptée.

L'honorable sénateur Banks propose :

Que conformément à la motion adoptée par le comité le 18 juin 2008, pour autoriser les sénateurs Kenny et Day à se déplacer pour assister à une conférence à Herezlivam, en Israël, le comité autorise aussi les sénateurs Kenny et Day à participer à d'autres rencontres avec les représentants de la police israélienne, des responsables de la sécurité aéroportuaire à l'aéroport international Ben Gourion et à effectuer des visites sur place à l'école de contre-terrorisme de l'IDF et à l'école israélienne SWAT, au port d'Ashdod, à la gare pour passagers du port d'Haïfa, dans le nord d'Israël pour assister à une démonstration de technologie de pointe en matière de sécurité, au centre de commandement et de contrôle des IDF sur le front intérieur, au Centre médical de Galilée occidentale et à un poste-frontière terrestre;

Que les activités des deux sénateurs soient considérées comme des engagements officiels aux fins de la Politique relative à la présence des sénateurs; et

Que le coût additionnel des dépenses engagées, s'élevant jusqu'à 5 000 $, soit inscrit au poste « promotion des rapports, réunions et autres questions liées aux affaires du Comité ».

La motion, mise aux voix, est adoptée par le vote inscrit suivant :

POUR : Les honorables sénateurs Banks, Day et Moore — 3

CONTRE : L'honorable sénateur Tkachuk — 1

At 8:14 p.m., it was agreed that the committee continue in camera, pursuant to rule 92(2)(e), to consider a draft agenda.

At 8:25 p.m., the committee adjourned to the call of the chair.

ATTEST:

À 20 h 14, il est convenu que le comité poursuive ses travaux à huis clos conformément à l'article 92(2)e) du Règlement pour examiner un projet d'ordre du jour.

À 20 h 25, le comité suspend ses travaux jusqu'à nouvelle convocation de la présidence.

ATTESTÉ :

La greffière du comité,

Shaila Anwar

Clerk of the Committee

REPORTS OF THE COMMITTEE

Thursday, May 29, 2008

The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence has the honour to present its

SIXTH REPORT

Your Committee, which was authorized by the Senate on Tuesday, November 20, 2007, to examine and report on the national security policy for Canada, respectfully requests funds for the fiscal year ending March 31, 2009.

Pursuant to Chapter 3:06, section 2(1)(c) of the Senate Administrative Rules, the budget application submitted was printed in the Journals of the Senate on March 6, 2008. On March 12, 2008, the Senate approved the release of $165,000 to the Committee. The report of the Standing Committee on Internal Economy, Budgets and Administration recommending the release of additional funds is appended to this report.

Respectfully submitted,

RAPPORTS DU COMITÉ

Le jeudi 29 mai 2008

Le Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense a l'honneur de présenter son

SIXIÈME RAPPORT

Votre Comité qui a été autorisé par le Sénat le mardi 20 novembre 2007 à étudier, afin d'en faire rapport, la politique nationale sur la sécurité pour le Canada, demande respectueusement des fonds pour l'exercice financier se terminant le 31 mars 2009.

Conformément au Chapitre 3:06, section 2(1)c) du Règlement administratif du Sénat, le budget présenté a été imprimé dans les Journaux du Sénat le 6 mars 2008. Le 12 mars 2008, le Sénat a approuvé un déblocage de fonds de 165 000 $ au comité. Le rapport du Comité permanent de la régie interne, des budgets et de l'administration recommandant un déblocage additionnel de fonds est annexé au présent rapport.

Respectueusement soumis,

Le président du comité,

COLIN KENNY

Chair of the Committee

APPENDIX (B) TO THE REPORT

Thursday, May 29, 2008

The Standing Committee on Internal Economy, Budgets and Administration has examined the budget presented to it by the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence for the proposed expenditures of the said Committee for the fiscal year ending March 31, 2009 for the purpose of its special study on the national security policy, as authorized by the Senate on Tuesday, November 20, 2007. The approved budget is as follows:

National Security and Defence (National Security Policy — supplementary release)

Professional and Other Services	$138,600
Transportation and Communications	163,480
All Other Expenditures	18,500
Total	**$320,580**

The recommended supplementary allocation is for:

GENERAL EXPENSES

Professional and Other Services

Contracts through March 31, 2009 *(does not include funds for research/administrative assistance)*	$ 95,000
Working meals	9,000
Hospitality	2,000
Indexing services (French)	5,000

ANNEXE (B) AU RAPPORT

Le jeudi 29 mai 2008

Le Comité permanent de la régie interne, des budgets et de l'administration a examiné le budget qui lui a été présenté par le Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense concernant les dépenses projetées dudit Comité pour l'exercice se terminant le 31 mars 2009 aux fins de leur étude spéciale sur la politique sur la sécurité nationale, tel qu'autorisé par le Sénat le mardi 20 novembre 2007. Le budget approuvé se lit comme suit:

Sécurité nationale et défense (politique sur la sécurité nationale — fonds supplémentaires)

Services professionnels et autres	138 600 $
Transports et communications	163 480
Autres dépenses	18 500
Total	**320 580 $**

Recommandation pour une provision budgétaire supplémentaire de :

DÉPENSES GÉNÉRALES

Services professionnels et autres

Contrats jusqu'au 31 mars 2009 (*n'inclut pas les fonds pour un soutien de recherche/administratif*)	95 000 $
Repas de travail	9 000
Frais d'accueil	2 000
Services d'indexation (français)	5 000

All Other Expenditures

Books, periodicals and subscriptions	1,000
Stationary and supplies	1,000
Miscellaneous expenses	2,000
Total of General Expenses	**$115,000**

ACTIVITY 1: Promotion of Reports, Meetings and Other Matters related to Committee Business

Transportation and Communications	$ 20,000
All Other Expenditures	1,000
Total for Activity 1	**$ 21,000**

ACTIVITY 2: East Coast Military Bases Trip (fact-finding and public hearings)

Professional and Other Services	$ 17,900
Transportation and Communications	83,000
All Other Expenditures	4,500
Total for Activity 2	**$105,400**

ACTIVITY 3: Fact-Finding Mission to Washington, D.C

Fully funded in initial release

ACTIVITY 4: Ontario Bases Trip (fact-finding)

Professional and Other Services	$ 4,050
Transportation and Communications	28,040
All Other Expenditures	2,800
Total for Activity 4	**$ 34,890**

ACTIVITY 5: Ontario Kingston Base Trip (fact-finding)

Professional and Other Services	$ 4,050
Transportation and Communications	17,440
All Other Expenditures	2,800
Total for Activity 5	**$ 24,290**

ACTIVITY 6: Conferences

Professional and Other Services	$ 1,600
Transportation and Communications	15,000
All Other Expenditures	3,400
Total for Activity 6	**$ 20,000**

Respectfully submitted,

Autres dépenses

Livres, périodiques et abonnements	1 000
Papeterie et fournitures	1 000
Divers	2 000
Total des dépenses générales	**115 000 $**

ACTIVITÉ 1: Promotion des rapports, réunions et autres matières liées au travail du comité

Transports et communications	20 000 $
Autres dépenses	1 000
Total de l'Activité 1	**21 000 $**

ACTIVITÉ 2: Visites de bases militaires sur la côte est (mission d'étude et audiences publiques)

Services professionnels et autres	17 900 $
Transports et communications	83 000
Autres dépenses	4 500
Total de l'Activité 2	**105 400 $**

ACTIVITÉ 3: Mission d'étude à Washington, D.C.

Fonds requis obtenus en totalité à la première provision budgétaire

ACTIVITÉ 4: Voyage aux bases militaires d'Ontario (mission d'étude)

Services professionnels et autres	4 050 $
Transports et communications	28 040
Autres dépenses	2 800
Total de l'Activité 4	**34 890 $**

ACTIVITÉ 5: Voyage à la base militaire de Kingston, Ontario (mission d'étude)

Services professionnels et autres	4 050 $
Transports et communications	17 440
Autres dépenses	2 800
Total de l'Activité 5	**24 290 $**

ACTIVITÉ 6: Conférences

Services professionnels et autres	1 600 $
Transports et communications	15 000
Autres dépenses	3 400
Total de l'Activité 6	**20 000 $**

Respectueusement soumis,

Le président,

GEORGE J. FUREY

Chair

Tuesday, June 10, 2008

The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence has the honour to present its

EIGHTH REPORT

Your committee, which was authorized by the Senate on November 20, 2007, to examine and report on the services and benefits provided to veterans in recognition of their services to Canada, respectfully requests funds for the fiscal year ending March 31, 2009.

Pursuant to Chapter 3:06, section 2(1)(c) of the *Senate Administrative Rules*, the budget submitted to the Standing Committee on Internal Economy, Budgets and Administration and the report thereon of that committee are appended to this report.

Respectfully submitted,

Le mardi 10 juin 2008

Le Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense a l'honneur de présenter son

HUITIÈME RAPPORT

Votre comité, qui a été autorisé par le Sénat le mardi 20 novembre 2007, à étudier, afin d'en faire rapport, les services et les avantages sociaux offerts aux anciens combattants en reconnaissance des services rendus au Canada, demande respectueusement des fonds pour l'exercice financier se terminant le 31 mars 2009.

Conformément au Chapitre 3 :06, section 2(1)c) du *Règlement administratif du Sénat,* le budget présenté au Comité permanent de la régie interne, des budgets et de l'administration ainsi que le rapport s'y rapportant, sont annexés au présent rapport.

Respectueusement soumis,

Au nom du président du comité, Colin Kenny,

MICHAEL A. MEIGHEN

For Colin Kenny, chair of the committee

SUBCOMMITTEE ON VETERANS AFFAIRS OF THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE

SPECIAL STUDY ON VETERANS AFFAIRS

APPLICATION FOR BUDGET AUTHORIZATION FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING MARCH 31, 2009

Extract from the *Journals of the Senate* of Tuesday, November 20, 2007:

The Honourable Senator Kenny moved, seconded by the Honourable Senator Banks:

That the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence be authorized to undertake a study on:

(*a*) the services and benefits provided to members of the Canadian Forces, veterans of war and peacekeeping missions and members of their families in recognition of their services to Canada;

(*b*) the commemorative activities undertaken by the Department of Veterans Affairs to keep alive for all Canadians the memory of the veterans achievements and sacrifices;

(*c*) the implementation of the recently enacted Veterans Charter;

That the Committee report to the Senate from time to time, no later than March 31, 2009.

The question being put on the motion, it was adopted.

SOUS-COMITÉ DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS DU COMITÉ SÉNATORIAL PERMANENT DE LA SÉCURITÉ NATIONALE ET DE LA DÉFENSE

ÉTUDE SPÉCIALE SUR LES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

DEMANDE D'AUTORISATION DE BUDGET POUR L'EXERCICE FINANCIER SE TERMINANT LE 31 MARS 2009

Extrait des *Journaux du Sénat* du mardi 20 novembre 2007 :

L'honorable sénateur Kenny propose, appuyé par l'honorable sénateur Banks,

Que le Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense soit autorisé à entreprendre une étude sur:

a) les services et les avantages sociaux offerts aux membres des Forces canadiennes, aux anciens combattants, aux membres des missions de maintien de la paix et à leurs familles en reconnaissance des services rendus au Canada;

b) les activités commémoratives organisées par le ministère des Anciens combattants pour rappeler à tous les Canadiens les réalisations et les sacrifices des anciens combattants;

c) la mise en œuvre de la Charte des anciens combattants adoptée récemment;

Que le comité fasse périodiquement rapport au Sénat, au plus tard le 31 mars 2009.

La motion, mise aux voix, est adoptée.

Le greffier du Sénat,

Paul C. Bélisle

Clerk of the Senate

SUMMARY OF EXPENDITURES

Professional and Other Services	$ 19,600
Transportation and Communications	20,251
All Other Expenditures	12,000
TOTAL	$ 51,851

The above budget was approved by the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence on Monday, April 28, 2008.

The undersigned or an alternate will be in attendance on the date that this budget is considered.

Date

COLIN KENNY
Chair, Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence

Date

GEORGE J. FUREY
Chair, Standing Committee on Internal Economy, Budgets and Administration

SOMMAIRE DES DÉPENSES

Services professionnels et autres	19 600 $
Transports et communications	20 251
Autres dépenses	12 000
TOTAL	51 851 $

Le budget ci-dessus a été approuvé par le Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense le lundi 28 avril 2008.

Le soussigné ou son remplaçant assistera à la séance au cours de laquelle le présent budget sera étudié.

Date

COLIN KENNY
Président du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense

Date

GEORGE J. FUREY
Président du Comité permanent de la régie interne, des budgets et de l'administration

SUBCOMMITTEE ON VETERANS AFFAIRS OF THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE

SPECIAL STUDY ON VETERANS AFFAIRS

APPLICATION FOR BUDGET AUTHORIZATION FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING MARCH 31, 2009

GENERAL EXPENSES

PROFESSIONAL AND OTHER SERVICES			
Hospitality — general (0410)	4,000		
Working meals (0415)	12,000		
(30 meals, $400/meal)			
Sub-total		$ 16,000	
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS			
Courier Charges (0261)	10,000		
Sub-total		$ 10,000	
ALL OTHER EXPENDITURES			
Stationary and supplies (0707)	1,500		
Miscellaneous expenses	6,000		
Sub-total		$ 7,500	
Total of General Expenses			**$ 33,500**

ACTIVITY 1 : Sainte-Anne-de-Bellevue Hospital (Montreal)

ONE-DAY FACT-FINDING MISSION

7 participants: 5 Senators, 2 staff

PROFESSIONAL AND OTHER SERVICES			
Working lunches (0415)	450		
(1 lunch, $450/lunch)			
Working dinners (0415)	450		
(1 dinner, $450/dinner)			
Hospitality — general (0410)	500		
Sub-total		$ 1,400	
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS			
TRAVEL			
Per diem (0221) & (0225)	567		
(7 participants, $81/day, 1 day)			
Ground transportation — taxis (0228)	350		
(7 participants x $50)			
Ground transportation - bus rental (0228)	1,500		
(1 day, $1,500/day)			
Sub-total		$ 2,417	

ALL OTHER EXPENDITURES			
OTHER			
Miscellaneous costs on travel (0229)	1,000		
RENTALS			
Rental office space (meeting rooms) (0540)	500		
(1 day x $500/day)			
Sub-total		$ 1,500	
Total of Activity 1			**$ 5,317**

ACTIVITY 2 : Sunnybrook Hospital (Toronto)
ONE-DAY FACT-FINDING MISSION
7 participants: 5 Senators, 2 staff

PROFESSIONAL AND OTHER SERVICES			
Hospitality — general (0410)	500		
Working lunches (0415)	400		
(1 lunch, $400/lunch)			
Working dinners (0415)	400		
(1 dinner, $400/dinner)			
Sub-total		$ 1,300	
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS			
TRAVEL			
Per diem (0221) & (0225)	567		
(7 participants, $81/day, 1 day)			
Ground transportation — taxis (0228)	350		
(7 participants x $50)			
Ground transportation — bus rental (0228)	3,000		
(1 day, $3000/day)			
Sub-total		$ 3,917	
ALL OTHER EXPENDITURES			
OTHER			
Miscellaneous costs on travel (0229)	1,000		
RENTALS			
Rental office space (meeting rooms) (0540)	500		
(1 day x $500/day)			
Sub-total		$ 1,500	
Total of Activity 2			**$ 6,717**

ACTIVITY 3 : Walter Reed Army Medical Centre (Washington DC)

ONE-DAY FACT-FINDING MISSION

7 participants: 5 Senators, 2 staff

PROFESSIONAL AND OTHER SERVICES			
Hospitality — general (0410)	500		
Working lunches (0415)	400		
(1 lunch, $400/lunch)			
Sub-total		$ 900	
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS			
TRAVEL			
Per diem (0221) & (0225)	567		
(7 participants, $81/day, 1 day)			
Ground transportation — taxis (0228)	350		
(7 participants x $50)			
Ground transportation — bus rental (0228)	3,000		
(1 day, $3000/day)			
Sub-total		$ 3,917	
ALL OTHER EXPENDITURES			
OTHER			
Miscellaneous costs on travel (0229)	1,000		
RENTALS			
Rental office space (meeting rooms) (0540)	500		
(1 day x $500/day)			
Sub-total		$ 1,500	
Total of Activity 3			**$ 6,317**
GRAND TOTAL			**$ 51,851**

The Senate administration has reviewed this budget application.

Heather Lank, Principal Clerk, Committees Directorate — Date

Nicole Proulx, Director of Finance — Date

SOUS-COMITÉ DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS DU COMITÉ SÉNATORIAL PERMANENT DE LA SÉCURITÉ NATIONALE ET DE LA DÉFENSE

ÉTUDE SPÉCIALE SUR LES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

EXPLICATION DES ITEMS BUDGÉTAIRES DEMANDE D'AUTORISATION DE BUDGET POUR L'EXERCICE FINANCIER SE TERMINANT LE 31 MARS 2009

DÉPENSES GÉNÉRALES

SERVICES PROFESSIONNELS ET AUTRES			
Frais d'accueil — divers (0410)	4 000		
Repas de travail (0415)	12 000		
(30 repas, 400 $/repas)			
Sous-total		16 000 $	
TRANSPORTS ET COMMUNICATIONS			
Frais de messagerie (0261)	10 000		
Sous-total		10 000 $	
AUTRES DÉPENSES			
Papeterie et fournitures (0707)	1 500		
Frais divers	6 000		
Sous-total		7 500 $	
Total des dépenses générales			**33 500 $**

ACTIVITÉ 1 : Hôpital Sainte-Anne-de-Bellevue (Montréal)
MISSION D'ÉTUDE D'UNE JOURNÉE
7 participants : 5 sénateurs, 2 employés

SERVICES PROFESSIONNELS ET AUTRES			
Lunches de travail (0415)	450		
(1 lunch, 450 $/lunch)			
Dîners de travail (0415)	450		
(1 dîner, 450 $/dîner)			
Frais d'accueil — divers (0410)	500		
Sous-total		1 400 $	
TRANSPORTS ET COMMUNICATIONS			
DÉPLACEMENTS			
Indemnité journalière (0221) & (0225)	567		
(7 participants, 81 $/jour, 1 jour)			
Transport terrestre — taxis (0228)	350		
(7 participants x 50 $)			
Transport terrestre — location d'autobus (0228)	1 500		
(1 jour, 1 500 $/jour)			
Sous-total		2 417 $	

AUTRES DÉPENSES

AUTRES			
Divers coûts liés aux déplacements (0229)	1 000		
LOCATIONS			
Location d'espace (salles de réunion) (0540)	500		
(1 jour x 500 $/jour)			
Sous-total		1 500 $	
Total de l'Activité 1			**5 317 $**

ACTIVITÉ 2 : Hôpital Sunnybrook (Toronto)
MISSION D'ÉTUDE D'UNE JOURNÉE
7 participants: 5 sénateurs, 2 employés

SERVICES PROFESSIONNELS ET AUTRES

Frais d'accueil — divers (0410)	500		
Lunches de travail (0415)	400		
(1 lunch, 400 $/lunch)			
Dîners de travail (0415)	400		
(1 dîner, 400 $/dîner)			
Sous-total		1 300 $	

TRANSPORTS ET COMMUNICATIONS

DÉPLACEMENTS			
Indemnité journalière (0221) & (0225)	567		
(7 participants, 81 $/jour, 1 jour)			
Transport terrestre — taxis (0228)	350		
(7 participants x 50 $)			
Transport terrestre — location d'autobus (0228)	3 000		
(1 jour, 3000 $/jour)			
Sous-total		3 917 $	

AUTRES DÉPENSES

AUTRES			
Divers coûts liés aux déplacements (0229)	1 000		
LOCATIONS			
Location d'espace (salles de réunion) (0540)	500		
(1 jour x 500 $/jour)			
Sous-total		1 500 $	
Total de l'Activité 2			**6 717 $**

ACTIVITÉ 3 : Walter Reed Army Medical Centre (Washington DC)
MISSION D'ÉTUDE D'UNE JOURNÉE
7 participants: 5 sénateurs, 2 employés

SERVICES PROFESSIONNELS ET AUTRES			
Frais d'accueil — divers (0410)	500		
Lunches de travail (0415)	400		
(1 lunch, 400 $/lunch)			
Sous-total		900 $	
TRANSPORTS ET COMMUNICATIONS			
DÉPLACEMENTS			
Indemnité journalière (0221) & (0225)	567		
(7 participants, 81 $/jour, 1 jour)			
Transport terrestre — taxis (0228)	350		
(7 participants x 50 $)			
Transport terrestre — location d'autobus (0228)	3 000		
(1 jour, 3 000 $/jour)			
Sous-total		3 917 $	
AUTRES DÉPENSES			
AUTRES			
Divers coûts liés aux déplacements (0229)	1 000		
LOCATIONS			
Location d'espace (salles de réunion) (0540)	500		
(1 jour x 500 $/jour)			
Sous-total		1 500 $	
Total de l'Activité 2			**6 317 $**
TOTAL			**51 851 $**

L'administration du Sénat a examiné la présente demande d'autorisation budgétaire.

Heather Lank, greffière principale, Direction des comités — Date

Nicole Proulx, directrice des Finances — Date

APPENDIX (B) TO THE REPORT

Thursday, May 29, 2008

The Standing Committee on Internal Economy, Budgets and Administration has examined the budget presented to it by the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence for the proposed expenditures of the said Committee for the fiscal year ending March 31, 2009 for the purpose of its special study on the veterans affairs, as authorized by the Senate on Tuesday, November 20, 2007. The approved budget is as follows:

National Security and Defence (Veterans' Affairs)

Professional and Other Services	$ 16,100
Transportation and Communications	11,251
All Other Expenditures	7,250
Total	$ 34,601

The recommended allocation is for:

GENERAL EXPENSES

Professional and Other Services

Hospitality	$ 500
Working meals	12,000

Transportation and Communications

Courier charges	1,000

All Other Expenditures

Stationary and supplies	750
Miscellaneous expenses	2,000
Total of General Expenses	**$ 16,250**

ACTIVITY 1: Sainte-Anne-de-Bellevue Hospital (Montreal) (fact-finding)

Professional and Other Services	$ 1,400
Transportation and Communications	2,417
All Other Expenditures	1,500
Total for Activity 1	**5,317**

ACTIVTY 2: Sunnybrook Hospital (Toronto) (fact-finding)

Professional and Other Services	$ 1,300
Transportation and Communications	3,917
All Other Expenditures	1,500
Total for Activity 2	**$ 6,717**

ACTIVITY 3: Walter Reed Army Medical Centre (Washington, DC) (fact-finding)

Professional and Other Services	$ 900
Transportation and Communications	3,917
All Other Expenditures	1,500
Total for Activity 3	**$ 6,317**

Respectfully submitted,

ANNEXE (B) AU RAPPORT

Le jeudi 29 mai 2008

Le Comité permanent de la régie interne, des budgets et de l'administration a examiné le budget qui lui a été présenté par le Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense concernant les dépenses projetées dudit Comité pour l'exercice se terminant le 31 mars 2009 aux fins de leur étude spéciale sur les anciens combattants, tel qu'autorisé par le Sénat le mardi 20 novembre 2007. Le budget approuvé se lit comme suit:

Sécurité nationale et défense (Anciens combattants)

Services professionnels et autres	16 100 $
Transports et communications	11 251
Autres dépenses	7 250
Total	34 601 $

Recommandation pour une provision budgétaire de :

DÉPENSES GÉNÉRALES

Services professionnels et autres

Frais d'accueil	500 $
Repas de travail	12 000

Transports et communications

Frais de messagerie	1 000

Autres dépenses

Papeterie et fournitures	750
Divers	2 000
Total des dépenses générales	**16 250 $**

ACTIVTÉ 1 : Hôpital Sainte-Anne-de-Bellevue (Montréal) (mission d'étude)

Services professionnels et autres	1 400 $
Transports et communications	2 417
Autres dépenses	1 500
Total de l'Activité 1	**5 317 $**

ACTIVITÉ 2 : Hôpital Sunnybrook (Toronto) (mission d'étude)

Services professionnels et autres	1 300 $
Transports et communications	3 917
Autres dépenses	1 500
Total de l'Activité 2	**6 717 $**

ACTIVITÉ 3 : Walter Reed Army Medical Centre (Washington, DC) (mission d'étude)

Services professionnels et autres	900 $
Transports et communications	3 917
Autres dépenses	1 500
Total de l'Activité 3	**6 317 $**

Respectueusement soumis,

Le président,

GEORGE J. FUREY

Chair

Wednesday, June 18, 2008

The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence has the honour to table its

TENTH REPORT

Your committee, which was authorized by the Senate on November 20, 2007, to examine and report on the services and benefits provided to veterans in recognition of their services to Canada, now tables its tenth report, an interim report entitled *Report on Reductions of Services Income Security Insurance Plan Long Term Disability Benefits*.

Respectfully submitted,

Le mercredi 18 juin 2008

Le Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense a l'honneur de déposer son

DIXIÈME RAPPORT

Votre comité, qui a été autorisé par le Sénat le mardi 20 novembre 2007, à étudier, afin d'en faire rapport, les services et les avantages sociaux offerts aux anciens combattants en reconnaissance des services rendus au Canada, dépose maintenant son dixième rapport, un rapport provisoire intitulé Rapport sur la réduction des prestations d'invalidité à long terme du régime d'assurance-revenu militaire.

Respectueusement soumis,

Au nom du président du comité, Colin Kenny,

JOSEPH A. DAY

For Colin Kenny, chair of the committee

(*Text of the report appears following the evidence*)

(*Le texte du rapport paraît après les témoignages*)

Tuesday, August 5, 2008

The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence has the honour to table its

ELEVENTH REPORT

Your committee, which was authorized by the Senate on Tuesday, November 20, 2007, to examine and report on the national security policy of Canada, now tables its eleventh report, an interim report entitled: *Four Generals and an Admiral: The View from the Top*.

Respectfully submitted,

Le mardi 5 août 2008

Le Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense a l'honneur de déposer son

ONZIÈME RAPPORT

Votre comité, qui a été autorisé par le Sénat le mardi 20 novembre 2007 à examiner, en vue d'en faire rapport, la politique de sécurité nationale du Canada, dépose maintenant son onzième rapport, un rapport provisoire intitulé *Quatre généraux et un amiral : La situation vue d'en haut*.

Respectueusement soumis,

Le président du comité,

COLIN KENNY

Chair of the committee

(*Text of the report appears following the evidence*)

(*Le texte du rapport paraît après les témoignages*)

Monday, August 11, 2008

The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence has the honour to table its

Le lundi 11 août 2008

Le Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense a l'honneur de déposer son

TWELFTH REPORT

Your committee, which was authorized by the Senate on Tuesday, November 20, 2007, to examine and report on the national security policy of Canada, now tables its twelfth report, an interim report entitled: *Bringing Our Wounded Home Safely*.

Respectfully submitted,

DOUZIÈME RAPPORT

Votre comité, qui a été autorisé par le Sénat le mardi 20 novembre 2007 à examiner, en vue d'en faire rapport, la politique de sécurité nationale du Canada, dépose maintenant son douzième rapport, un rapport provisoire intitulé *Le rapatriement des soldats blessés*.

Respectueusement soumis,

Le président du comité,

COLIN KENNY

Chair of the Committee

(*Text of the report appears following the evidence*)

(*Le texte du rapport paraît après les témoignages*)

Friday, August 29, 2008

The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence has the honour to table its

THIRTEENTH REPORT

Your committee, which was authorized by the Senate on Tuesday, November 20, 2007, to examine and report on the national security policy of Canada, now tables its thirteenth report, an interim report entitled: *Emergency Preparedness in Canada*.

Respectfully submitted,

Le vendredi 29 août 2008

Le Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense a l'honneur de déposer son

TREIZIÈME RAPPORT

Votre comité, qui a été autorisé par le Sénat le mardi 20 novembre 2007 à examiner, en vue d'en faire rapport, la politique de sécurité nationale du Canada, dépose maintenant son treizième rapport, un rapport provisoire intitulé *La protection civile au Canada*.

Respectueusement soumis,

Le président du comité,

COLIN KENNY

Chair of the Committee

(*The Emergency Preparedness in Canada report appears in volumes 2 and 3 of this issue.*)

The report *Emergency Preparedness in Canada* is composed of four volumes.

The first volume contains the committee's findings, observations and recommendations.

Volumes 2, 3 and 4 of the report contain the responses to an emergency preparedness questionnaire received from 92 of the 100 municipalities surveyed by the committee.

All four volumes are available online at www.sen-sec.ca.

Hard copies are available upon request.

(*Le rapport La protection civile au Canada paraît dans les volumes 2 et 3 de ce fascicule.*)

Le rapport *La protection civile au Canada* comprend quatre volumes.

Le premier volume contient les observations et recommandations du comité.

Les volumes 2, 3 et 4 de ce rapport regroupent les réponses fournies par 92 des 100 municipalités sondées par le comité.

Les quatre volumes sont disponibles en ligne à www.sen-sec.ca.

Des copies papier sont disponibles sur demande.

EVIDENCE

OTTAWA, Wednesday, June 18, 2008

The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met this day at 1:02 p.m. to examine and report on the national security policy of Canada.

Senator Colin Kenny (*Chair*) in the chair.

[*English*]

The Chair: Honourable senators, I would like to first recognize Senator Meighen.

Senator Meighen: Mr. Chair, I move:

> That the draft report of the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence on SISIP long-term disability payments be adopted; and
>
> That the chair and deputy chair of the subcommittee be authorized to make the changes that were discussed and approved today, as well as minor typographical and grammatical corrections deemed necessary without, however, modifying the substance of the report; and
>
> That the chair or deputy chair of the subcommittee table this report in the Senate.

The Chair: Comments or questions?

Those in favour? Opposed? The motion is carried.

Colleagues, the second item we have to deal with has to do with the eighth international conference of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism.

Senator Banks: Chair, I move that we go in camera.

The Chair: Okay.

Senator Banks: Is that your wish?

The Chair: I am fine doing it either way.

Senator Banks: Well, then, public is better.

The Chair: The item is the eighth international conference of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism to be held September 8 to 11. I have canvassed everyone in the room about it, with the exception of Senator Moore and Senator Nancy Ruth.

Senator Tkachuk wanted some time to think about it. Senator Mitchell expressed an interest in going, as did Senator Day.

Senator Mitchell: I would withdraw.

The Chair: I have an interest in going.

Senator Moore: I cannot.

The Chair: Senator Moore cannot. Senator Nancy Ruth? You cannot?

TÉMOIGNAGES

OTTAWA, le mercredi 18 juin 2008

Le Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense se réunit aujourd'hui 13 h 2 pour étudier et faire rapport sur la politique de sécurité nationale du Canada.

Le sénateur Colin Kenny (*président*) occupe le fauteuil.

[*Traduction*]

Le président : Honorables sénateurs, j'aimerais d'abord donner la parole au sénateur Meighen.

Le sénateur Meighen : Monsieur le président, je propose :

> Que l'ébauche de rapport du Sous-comité des anciens combattants sur les prestations d'assurance invalidité prolongée du RARM soit adoptée;
>
> Que le président et le vice-président du sous-comité soient autorisés à y apporter les changements discutés et approuvés aujourd'hui, ainsi que les corrections typographiques et grammaticales jugées nécessaires sans toutefois modifier la teneur du rapport; et
>
> Que le président ou le vice-président du sous-comité dépose ce rapport au Sénat.

Le président : Des observations ou des questions?

Ceux qui sont pour? Ceux qui sont contre? La motion est adoptée.

Chers collègues, la seconde question que nous avons à traiter concerne la huitième conférence internationale de l'International Institute for Counter-Terrorism.

Le sénateur Banks : Monsieur le président, je propose que nous poursuivions la réunion à huis clos.

Le président : Très bien.

Le sénateur Banks : Est-ce votre désir?

Le président : D'une façon ou de l'autre, cela m'importe peu.

Le sénateur Banks : Alors, la séance publique est préférable.

Le président : La question est la huitième conférence internationale de l'International Institute for Counter-Terrorism qui aura lieu du 8 au 11 septembre. J'ai sondé tout le monde dans la salle à ce sujet, à l'exception du sénateur Moore et du sénateur Nancy Ruth.

Le sénateur Tkachuk voulait du temps pour réfléchir. Le sénateur Mitchell a manifesté son intérêt pour assister à la conférence, tout comme le sénateur Day.

Le sénateur Mitchell : Je me retire.

Le président : Je suis intéressé à y aller.

Le sénateur Moore : Je ne peux pas y aller.

Le président : Le sénateur Moore ne peut y aller. Sénateur Nancy Ruth? Vous ne pouvez pas?

Senator Tkachuk, have you had a chance to think about it further?

Senator Tkachuk: Yes, I cannot go on those days.

The Chair: That leaves Senator Day and myself. Are we comfortable with authorizing that?

Senator Moore: Agreed. So moved.

The Chair: The wording I would also like to include is that there be a day set aside to visit Tel Aviv airport, and we are in negotiations to take a look at the security system there. We need a motion authorizing the chair, myself, and Senator Day to attend the conference.

Senator Tkachuk: Do we have costs for this trip?

The Chair: Yes, we do. The costs were in the budget, Senator Tkachuk.

Senator Tkachuk: Okay.

Senator Banks: I did not bring my copy of the new budget numbers today. What are the proportions of this? I guess this is from the conference and travel budget. Is this within our budget?

The Chair: It is 100 per cent of our travel budget for conferences until the end of the fiscal year.

Senator Banks: Until March 31, 2009?

The Chair: Correct.

I have been directed to go back to the Internal Economy Committee to obtain more funds on this. We also have determined that the Internal Economy Committee has more funds but has not yet distributed them.

Is there anyone here who has not received a copy of the analysis we did on the funding left in the committee's budget?

Senator Comeau: Mr. Chairman, may I make a point of order here? We have a document in one official language only. I was wondering if there was any kind of document that would be in the other official language. Could we get a copy in the other language? This is the eighth international conference.

The Chair: This is what came to us when we asked them for it.

Senator Comeau: Is that the subject we are on now, the ICT?

The Chair: Yes.

Senator Comeau: I was wondering if I could have the document in French.

The Chair: We do not have a copy of it. We just received this. This is the first time I have seen it, and I do not know when it came.

Sénateur Tkachuk, avez-vous eu l'occasion d'y réfléchir davantage?

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Oui, je ne peux y aller ces jours-là.

Le président : Il reste donc le sénateur Day et moi-même. Sommes-nous d'accord pour autoriser cela?

Le sénateur Moore : D'accord. J'en fais la proposition.

Le président : J'aimerais également inclure dans le libellé qu'un jour sera prévu pour visiter l'aéroport de Tel-Aviv; nous sommes en train de négocier la possibilité d'examiner le système de sécurité qu'il y a là-bas. Nous avons besoin d'une motion autorisant le président, moi-même, et le sénateur Day à participer à la conférence.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Savons-nous combien coûtera ce voyage?

Le président : Oui, nous le savons. Les coûts figurent dans le budget, sénateur Tkachuk.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Très bien.

Le sénateur Banks : Je n'ai pas apporté ma copie du nouveau budget aujourd'hui. Quelles sont les proportions? Je suppose que cela concerne le budget pour la conférence et le voyage. Est-ce que cela figure dans notre budget?

Le président : Cela représente 100 p. 100 de notre budget de voyage pour les conférences jusqu'à la fin de l'exercice financier.

Le sénateur Banks : Jusqu'au 31 mars 2009?

Le président : C'est exact.

On m'a dit de retourner devant le Comité de régie interne pour obtenir plus de fonds à cet égard. Nous avons également déterminé que le Comité de régie interne dispose de fonds additionnels mais qu'il ne les a pas encore distribués.

Y a-t-il quelqu'un ici qui n'a pas reçu une copie de l'analyse que nous avons faite des fonds qui restent dans le budget du comité?

Le sénateur Comeau : Monsieur le président, puis-je faire un rappel au Règlement? Nous avons un document dans une seule des deux langues officielles. Je me demandais s'il y aurait un document quelconque dans l'autre langue officielle. Pourrions-nous en avoir une copie dans l'autre langue? Il s'agit de la huitième conférence internationale.

Le président : C'est ce que nous avons reçu lorsque nous leur avons demandé ce document.

Le sénateur Comeau : Est-ce le sujet dont nous parlons maintenant, l'ICT?

Le président : Oui.

Le sénateur Comeau : Je me demandais si je pouvais avoir le document en français.

Le président : Nous n'avons pas d'exemplaire de ce document. Nous venons juste de le recevoir. C'est la première fois que je le vois et j'ignore quand il est arrivé.

Senator Comeau: Mr. Chairman, on the same point of order, there has been a long-standing tradition in committees that when documents such as these are distributed, they should be distributed in both official languages.

The Chair: I am happy to take it back. I apologize. It was circulated in both languages when it was put in our budget initially. I will recall this.

Senator Comeau: As a member of the committee, I am asking if I could get a copy of it in French.

The Chair: I would be happy to provide that to you when we get it.

Senator Comeau: Is the decision going to be made now and I will get it eventually? I would like to get that on the record.

The Chair: My point is simply that when it was put in the committee's budget, it was added in both English and French.

Senator Comeau: Fine.

The Chair: This was something that I obtained for further information, and I apologize for passing it out. I should not have done that.

Senator Comeau: Yes, that is my point.

The Chair: I am conceding that. It was my error. I should not have passed this out.

Senator Comeau: Will a decision be made eventually? I have to make my decision based on the English copy.

The Chair: Frankly, the decision could have been made without this document because we had put it in our budget.

Senator Comeau: It would leave me to accept that I am working with information on the conference —

The Chair: I am withdrawing that.

Senator Comeau: But you will still make the decision on it even though all the anglophone members of this committee have a copy of it in their first language but the francophones do not.

The Chair: I am asking for it back from everybody.

Senator Comeau: But you will still make the decision. They have had a chance to review it in their mother language, one of the two official languages.

The Chair: I do —

Senator Comeau: Do as you please. I am making a point.

Le sénateur Comeau : Monsieur le président, dans le même rappel au Règlement, il y a une tradition de longue date dans les comités voulant que lorsqu'on distribue des documents comme celui-là, ils devraient être distribués dans les deux langues officielles.

Le président : Je suis heureux de le reprendre. Veuillez m'excuser. Il a été distribué dans les deux langues officielles lorsqu'il a été incorporé dans notre budget initialement. Je vais le reprendre.

Le sénateur Comeau : En tant que membre du comité, je demande si je peux obtenir une copie du document en français.

Le président : Je serai heureux de le faire lorsque nous le recevrons.

Le sénateur Comeau : Est-ce que la décision sera prise maintenant et que je l'obtiendrai plus tard? Je veux que cela figure au compte rendu.

Le président : Je veux simplement dire que lorsqu'il a été incorporé dans le budget du comité, il a été ajouté en anglais et en français.

Le sénateur Comeau : Très bien.

Le président : J'ai reçu ce document comme information additionnelle et je m'excuse de l'avoir distribué. Je n'aurais pas dû le faire.

Le sénateur Comeau : Oui, c'est le point que je voulais faire valoir.

Le président : Je le concède. C'est mon erreur. Je n'aurais pas dû le distribuer.

Le sénateur Comeau : Est-ce qu'une décision sera prise à un moment donné? Je dois prendre ma décision en fonction du document anglais.

Le président : À vrai dire, la décision aurait pu avoir été prise sans ce document parce que nous avions prévu cette conférence dans notre budget.

Le sénateur Comeau : Cela m'obligerait à accepter que je travaille avec de l'information sur la conférence...

Le président : Je retire ce document.

Le sénateur Comeau : Mais vous allez quand même prendre une décision sur la question même si les membres anglophones du comité ont une copie du document dans leur première langue, mais pas les francophones.

Le président : Je demande à tout le monde de me remettre le document.

Le sénateur Comeau : Mais vous allez tout de même prendre la décision. Ils ont l'occasion de le lire dans leur langue maternelle, une des deux langues officielles.

Le président : Je...

Le sénateur Comeau : Faites comme vous voulez. Mais je veux faire valoir un point.

The Chair: I am accepting your point and saying that you are correct.

Senator Comeau: But you will go ahead and make the decision anyway.

Senator Banks: Mr. Chair, I do not think the decision is based on any document that we are looking at now. The decision is based on the concept of whether we are going to send a delegation to an event in Israel, which we have discussed previously.

Senator Meighen: Senator Banks, the issue is also whether it is appropriate — and it may well be — to use up all of our travel budget on one conference.

The Chair: The issue was that when the budget was prepared three months ago and the committee chose to put this in the budget three months ago —

Senator Comeau: The issue, Mr. Chairman, is that you are now in the process of making a decision on an international conference, the ICT, and a document has been distributed to members of this committee. I asked for a copy of this document in the other official language.

The Chair: When you drew it to my attention, I asked for the document to be withdrawn.

Senator Comeau: That is the issue I have raised. I have raised the issue.

The Chair: Have you given us back the piece of paper?

Senator Comeau: No, I intend to keep it.

Senator Moore: You cannot have it both ways.

Senator Comeau: I intend to keep it. Make your point.

Senator Moore: You cannot have it both ways. If you like it and you are reading it and you are counting on it, that is fine. Maybe you want us all to pick up the English one, too, and do the same thing. Is that your point?

Senator Comeau: I have made my point, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Moore: Not much of one.

Senator Tkachuk: We still have a decision to make, Senator Moore. It is almost the whole budget for conferences. There will be no other opportunity for anyone —

Senator Moore: We can go back and ask for more funds.

Senator Tkachuk: That is not the way it is supposed to work, Senator Moore. We have our budget for the year.

The Chair: No, we do not. This is the way it is supposed to work, I am sorry.

Le président : J'accepte votre point et je dis que vous avez raison.

Le sénateur Comeau : Mais vous allez tout de même prendre la décision.

Le sénateur Banks : Monsieur le président, je ne pense pas que la décision soit fondée sur quelque document que ce soit que nous examinons en ce moment. La décision est fondée sur l'idée de savoir si nous allons envoyer une délégation à un événement en Israël, question dont nous avons discuté auparavant.

Le sénateur Meighen : Sénateur Banks, la question est également de savoir s'il est approprié — et il se pourrait très bien que ce soit le cas — de dépenser tout notre budget de voyage sur une conférence.

Le président : La question était que lorsque le budget a été préparé il y a trois mois et que le comité a choisi de mettre cela dans le budget il y a trois mois...

Le sénateur Comeau : La question, monsieur le président, c'est que vous êtes en ce moment en train de prendre une décision sur une conférence internationale, l'ICT, et qu'un document a été distribué aux membres du présent comité. J'ai demandé d'avoir une copie de ce document dans l'autre langue officielle.

Le président : Lorsque vous avez attiré mon attention sur cette question, j'ai demandé que le document soit retiré.

Le sénateur Comeau : Voilà la question que j'ai soulevée. J'ai soulevé la question.

Le président : Nous avez-vous rendu le bout de papier?

Le sénateur Comeau : Non, j'ai l'intention de le garder.

Le sénateur Moore : Vous ne pouvez pas gagner sur les deux tableaux.

Le sénateur Comeau : J'ai l'intention de le garder. Faites valoir votre point.

Le sénateur Moore : Vous ne pouvez pas gagner sur les deux tableaux. Si vous aimez le document et si vous le lisez et si vous compter sur lui, c'est bien. Peut-être voulez-vous que nous prenions tous également le document anglais pour en faire autant. Est-ce là votre point?

Le sénateur Comeau : J'ai déjà fait valoir mon point, monsieur le président.

Le sénateur Moore : Ce n'est pas grand-chose.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Nous devons tout de même prendre une décision, sénateur Moore. C'est presque la totalité du budget pour les conférences. Et il n'y aura pas d'autre occasion pour quiconque...

Le sénateur Moore : Nous pouvons demander des fonds additionnels.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Ce n'est pas comme cela que les choses sont censées fonctionner, sénateur Moore. Nous avons notre budget pour l'année.

Le président : Non, ce n'est pas le cas. Je suis désolé, mais c'est comme cela que les choses sont censées fonctionner.

Senator Meighen: It never worked that way before.

The Chair: The Chair of the Internal Economy Committee made it clear that if people had requirements for more funds, they should come back. We have determined that there is additional funding available for all committees, that all the committee needs have been met. I gave you a copy of the document.

Senator Tkachuk: I understand that. All I am saying is that if they decide not to give you more funds, then that is it. Then there are no more conferences for other members to go to. Normally we would have booked two conferences for that amount of money. Now we are spending it all on one conference. To me, that does not seem like the right thing to do.

Senator Moore: Mr. Chair, we put ourselves in this position. When we first had the go-around with regard to budgeting, we wanted to put more money in for conferences and we were told, no, you have to itemize them now. You were insisting on that, senator, and we went along with it. Now you say, "Now we are going to use up all you have in it." Well, of course.

Senator Tkachuk: Senator Moore, you do what you want. I have a right to make my point.

Senator Moore: You can make your point, but you are also the guy who wanted to cut, so we cut and here we are.

Senator Tkachuk: Good. I understand how you are taking this. You are taking this really well.

Senator Moore: I am taking it factually.

Senator Tkachuk: Yes, you are. Exactly. Well, it is a fact. I did want you to cut.

Senator Nancy Ruth: Could I clarify something with the clerks and the chair? We have budget in this committee until the end of October; is that not correct?

Gaëtane Lemay, Co-Clerk of the Committee: Until March 31, 2009.

Senator Nancy Ruth: We have been given it all now?

Ms. Lemay: Yes.

Senator Mitchell: I would like to say in defence of this particular conference that it is internationally known. It is in a general area of the world — not Israel directly — that has tremendous experience with terrorist attacks. This committee has demonstrated that it plays a very significant role in the debate, review, assessment and the progress that we make on dealing with terrorism and other security matters in Canada. People would argue that we have some vulnerability. When we were in

Le sénateur Meighen : Cela n'a jamais fonctionné comme cela auparavant.

Le président : Le président du Comité de régie interne a clairement indiqué que si des gens avaient besoin de plus de fonds, ils devraient en faire la demande. Nous avons déterminé qu'il y avait des fonds additionnels disponibles pour tous les comités, que les besoins des comités avaient été comblés. Je vous ai remis une copie du document.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Je comprends cela. Tout ce que je dis, c'est que si ces gens décident de ne pas vous accorder plus de fonds, alors c'est fini. Il n'y aura alors plus d'autres conférences auxquelles les autres membres pourront assister. Normalement, nous aurions pu assister à deux conférences pour cette somme d'argent. Maintenant, nous dépensons tout le budget sur une seule conférence. Cela ne me semble pas être la bonne chose à faire.

Le sénateur Moore : Monsieur le président, nous nous sommes nous-mêmes mis dans cette situation. Lorsque nous avons eu les premières discussions sur le budget, nous voulions réserver plus d'argent pour les conférences et on nous a dit qu'on ne pouvait pas le faire, qu'il fallait les préciser immédiatement. Vous avez insisté là-dessus, sénateur, et nous avons accepté. Maintenant vous dites : « Maintenant, nous allons utiliser tous que vous avez dans le budget ». Alors, évidemment.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Sénateur Moore, vous faites ce que vous voulez. J'ai le droit de faire entendre mon point de vue.

Le sénateur Moore : Vous pouvez faire valoir votre point de vue, mais vous êtes également celui qui voulait que l'on coupe, alors, nous avons coupé et voilà où nous en sommes.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Bien. Je comprends comment vous le prenez. Vous le prenez vraiment bien.

Le sénateur Moore : Je le prends de manière factuelle.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Oui, c'est ce que vous faites. Exactement. Eh bien, c'est un fait. Je voulais effectivement que vous coupiez.

Le sénateur Nancy Ruth : Pourrais-je clarifier quelque chose auprès des greffières et du président? Nous avons un budget qui va jusqu'à la fin octobre, n'est-ce pas?

Gaëtane Lemay, cogreffière du comité : Jusqu'au 31 mars 2009.

Le sénateur Nancy Ruth : On nous l'a tout donné maintenant?

Mme Lemay : Oui.

Le sénateur Mitchell : J'aimerais dire à la défense de cette conférence particulière qu'elle est reconnue internationalement et qu'elle a lieu dans une région du globe — pas Israël directement — qui a une très grande expérience des attaques terroristes. Le présent comité a démontré qu'il joue un rôle très important dans le débat que nous avons et dans l'examen, l'évaluation et les progrès que nous faisons face au terrorisme et à d'autres questions de sécurité au Canada. Les gens pourraient dire que nous avons

Afghanistan, we found that to be the case. It was underlined many times.

This is not an unreasonable conference. I think we would be getting value for money, but to cut it out strictly on the basis of its cost? There are other conferences that you are suggesting we might also go to. The process was laid out by the Internal Economy Committee that we could go back in the fall for additional funds. It was made clear that committees are not spending all of their money.

Sorry to always be at loggerheads with Senator Tkachuk. I would just like him to appreciate that anyone can cut, but you need to consider value for money.

I have seen in a government — and we will see it in this government too — the damage that is done when people cut without managing. Anyone can cut. It was done in Alberta and tremendous damage was done. The health care system now is very damaged.

Senator Tkachuk: I do not want a lecture. We are talking about a conference here, so let us talk about this conference.

Senator Mitchell: Yes, and I am —

Senator Tkachuk: Senator Mitchell, if the Liberal Party wants to take all of the money —

The Chair: Order.

Senator Tkachuk: — out of the budget in one motion, then go ahead and make the motion and have the vote.

The Chair: Order, please.

Senator Tkachuk: Do not give me a lecture about health care.

Senator Mitchell: I am entitled to say —

The Chair: If you want the floor, Senator Tkachuk —

Senator Mitchell: Why are you so sensitive —

The Chair: Order! Order!

Senator Mitchell: — about this?

Senator Tkachuk: Don't get ridiculous.

Senator Mitchell: You know you cannot get your own way.

The Chair: There is a motion on the floor.

Senator Moore: Are you calling for the question?

The Chair: Question. Those in favour?

Some Hon. Senators: Yes.

The Chair: Opposed?

Senator Tkachuk: Here.

une certaine vulnérabilité. Nous avons constaté que c'était effectivement le cas lorsque nous étions en Afghanistan. Cela a été souligné à maintes reprises.

Il ne s'agit pas d'un choix déraisonnable comme conférence. Je pense que nous en aurions pour notre argent, mais y renoncer strictement pour une question de coût? Vous avez laissé entendre qu'il y avait d'autres conférences auxquelles nous pourrions assister. Le Comité de la régie interne a indiqué que nous pourrions demander des fonds additionnels à l'automne. Il a été clairement indiqué que les comités ne dépensaient pas tout l'argent à leur disposition.

Désolé d'être toujours à couteaux tirés avec le sénateur Tkachuk. J'aimerais simplement qu'il comprenne que tout le monde peut couper, mais vous devez considérer ce que vous obtenez pour votre argent.

J'ai vu dans un gouvernement — et nous allons le voir sous ce gouvernement aussi — les dommages qui sont causés lorsque les gens coupent sans faire de gestion. Tout le monde peut couper. Cela a été fait en Alberta et des dommages épouvantables ont été causés. Le système de soins de santé est maintenant en très mauvais état.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Je ne veux pas que l'on me fasse la leçon. Nous parlons d'une conférence ici, alors parlons de cette conférence.

Le sénateur Mitchell : Oui, et je...

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Sénateur Mitchell, si le Parti libéral veut utiliser tout l'argent...

Le président : Silence, s'il vous plaît.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : ... dans le budget au moyen d'une seule motion, alors, allez-y, présentez votre motion et votez.

Le président : Silence, s'il vous plaît.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Ne me faites pas la leçon au sujet des soins de santé.

Le sénateur Mitchell : J'ai le droit de dire...

Le président : Si vous voulez la parole, sénateur Tkachuk...

Le sénateur Mitchell : Pourquoi êtes-vous aussi chatouilleux...

Le président : Silence! Silence!

Le sénateur Mitchell : ... à ce sujet?

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Ne soyez pas ridicule.

Le sénateur Mitchell : Vous savez que vous ne pouvez pas gagner.

Le président : Nous sommes saisis d'une motion.

Le sénateur Moore : Est-ce que vous la mettez aux voix?

Le président : Votons. Ceux qui sont pour?

Des voix : Oui.

Le président : Ceux qui sont contre?

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Ici.

The Chair: The motion is carried.

Does anyone have other business they would like to bring before the committee?

Senator Tkachuk: Yes, I do. With respect to the budget to promote committee reports, I had put together a number of motions that I had distributed at previous meetings. I was told to put them after the budget was passed. The budget has passed, and so now I am bringing them forward, if I could.

Senator Day: I do not have a copy.

Senator Tkachuk: Yes, the budget has passed. It passed on Monday night.

The Chair: The budget was passed on Monday night.

Senator Banks: With respect to this question and other questions that might have to do with travel, in the budget that was passed on Monday night, what was the original amount for this travel and promotion of reports, et cetera? What is the approved amount of the reports, et cetera?

The Chair: It is a good question, and I will give you the answer.

Senator Day: I am glad you asked because I do not have any material here.

The Chair: Originally we had budgeted $61,570 for promotion of reports. That amount has been cut to $36,000, and the total cut was $25,570.

Senator Meighen: Does that include courier charges?

The Chair: No, it does not.

Senator Meighen: Subcommittees' courier charges have been cut from ten to one.

The Chair: Courier charges for the whole committee were cut by a very large amount as well.

Senator Banks: Senator Tkachuk, I have to say that I think your remark about the Liberals taking all of the conference money for themselves is out of order because the chair, very clearly, at the beginning of this meeting circularized the entire committee and asked who could go. He asked you, he asked Senator Nancy Ruth and he asked Senator Meighen.

Senator Meighen: No, he did not. I asked.

Senator Banks: Well, the chair asked Senator Nancy Ruth in this meeting, so it is not correct or reasonable or right to say that the Liberals are taking this for themselves. Every member of this committee who is present was circularized about that, so I do not think that is appropriate.

I am concerned about cutting nearly half of the budget. Senator Tkachuk, I want you to know that I have been objecting to this process for a long time now. In my view, the Internal

Le président : La motion est adoptée.

Quelqu'un a-t-il d'autres questions dont il voudrait saisir le comité?

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Oui. En ce qui concerne le budget pour promouvoir les rapports du comité, j'avais présenté un certain nombre de motions qui ont été distribuées au cours de réunions antérieures. On m'a dit de les présenter après l'adoption du budget. Le budget a été adopté, alors, j'aimerais présenter les motions, si je le peux.

Le sénateur Day : Je n'ai pas de copie.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Oui, le budget a été adopté. Il a été adopté lundi soir.

Le président : Le budget a été adopté lundi soir.

Le sénateur Banks : En ce qui concerne cette question et d'autres questions qui pourraient être liées au voyage, dans le budget qui a été adopté lundi soir, quel était le montant initial prévu pour ce voyage et la promotion des rapports, « et cetera »? Quel est le montant approuvé pour les rapports, « et cetera »?

Le président : C'est une bonne question et je vais vous donner la réponse.

Le sénateur Day : Je suis content que vous posiez la question, parce que je n'ai pas de documentation ici.

Le président : Initialement, nous avions un budget de 61 570 $ pour la promotion des rapports. Cette somme a été réduite à 36 000 $ et la réduction totale est de 25 570 $.

Le sénateur Meighen : Est-ce que cela comprend les frais de messagerie?

Le président : Non.

Le sénateur Meighen : Les frais de messagerie du sous-comité ont été réduits dans un rapport de 10 à 1.

Le président : Les frais de messagerie du comité entier ont été réduits de beaucoup également.

Le sénateur Banks : Sénateur Tkachuk, je dois dire que je pense que vos observations au sujet du fait que les libéraux font main basse sur tout l'argent des conférences ne sont pas acceptables, parce qu'au début de la présente réunion, le président a très clairement fait le tour de tout le monde pour savoir qui voulait y aller. Il vous l'a demandé et il l'a demandé au sénateur Nancy Ruth et au sénateur Meighen.

Le sénateur Meighen : Non, il ne l'a pas demandé. Je l'ai demandé.

Le sénateur Banks : Mais le président l'a demandé au sénateur Nancy Ruth pendant la présente réunion, alors, il n'est pas correct, ou raisonnable, ou bien de dire que les libéraux prennent tout l'argent pour eux-mêmes. Tous les membres du comité qui sont présents ont été sondés sur cette question, alors, je ne pense pas que ce soit appropriée.

Je suis inquiet que le budget ait été amputé d'environ la moitié. Sénateur Tkachuk, je veux que vous sachiez que je m'oppose à ce processus depuis longtemps maintenant. À mon avis, le Comité de

Economy Committee does not serve well or wisely, as it should, the Senate or Senate committees in respect of these kinds of budgets when it does what it has done in this case, which is to say, "Here is some money for now that may have to last you until March 31, 2009, and if you need some more, come and see us later."

For all the reasons we have heard before, when this committee, or the committee that I happen to chair, goes back to the Internal Economy Committee and money is clawed back from committee expenditures that have been budgeted for but not made, year in and year out it is always too late for this or any other committee to make plans to do anything before the session ends, which is why last year we sent back more than $2 million from budgeted amounts for committee business.

Senator Tkachuk: Chair, I have a motion.

Senator Banks: I thought you made a motion.

Senator Tkachuk: I have not made the motion yet.

I have three motions. I would like to make one motion on authorizing the deputy chair to travel to Montreal on behalf of the committee. You all have copies in front of you. I do not think you need me to read it.

The Chair: Are they in both languages?

Senator Tkachuk: Yes, they are.

The Chair: On the back?

Senator Tkachuk: No. You have two sheets, one in English and one in French.

Senator Day: It is on the back.

The Chair: I am getting sensitive to this.

Senator Tkachuk: Sorry. On yours, it is; on mine, it is not. I have separate sheets.

That is my first motion. It has to do with the promotion of reports, meetings and other matters related to committee business. These were made at the invitation of members of the committee, when we discussed the initial travel motions for the chair, that I could, as a deputy chair, apply for these trips as well so that we could both play a part in promoting the reports. I am doing just that. I am not doing anything unusual here.

The Chair: Do you have a question you want to ask, Senator Day?

Senator Day: I have a question.

The Chair: You have about two minutes.

Senator Day: It says: pro forma, two nights. This is a trip to Montreal and back. Two nights to go to one meeting? I assume it is an error.

la régie interne ne sert pas bien ni sagement, comme il devrait le faire, le sénat ou les comités sénatoriaux en ce qui concerne ces budgets lorsqu'il fait ce qu'il a fait dans ce cas, à savoir dire : « Voici maintenant de l'argent qui devra peut-être vous durer jusqu'au 31 mars 2009 et si vous avez besoin de plus d'argent, revenez nous voir plus tard. »

Pour toutes les raisons que nous avons entendues auparavant, lorsque le présent comité, ou le comité que je préside, retourne devant le Comité de régie interne et que de l'argent est repris des dépenses des comités qui avaient été prévues au budget, mais qui n'ont pas été engagées, année après année, il est toujours trop tard pour que les comités puissent faire des plans pour faire quoi que ce soit avant la fin de la session, ce qui explique pourquoi l'an dernier, nous avons retourné plus de 2 millions de dollars de l'argent qui était prévu dans budget des affaires des comités.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Monsieur le président, je voudrais présenter une motion.

Le sénateur Banks : Je pensais que vous l'aviez déjà fait.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Non, je ne l'ai pas encore fait.

J'ai ici trois motions, dont une qui autoriserait le vice-président à se rendre à Montréal au nom du comité. Vous en avez tous des copies. Il n'est pas nécessaire que je la lise.

Le président : Est-ce que les motions sont rédigées dans les deux langues?

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Oui.

Le président : La traduction se trouve à l'endos?

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Non. Il y a deux feuilles, une en anglais, et une en français.

Le sénateur Day : La traduction se trouve à l'endos.

Le président : Je commence à m'impatienter.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Je vous demande pardon. Elle se trouve à l'endos sur la copie que vous avez en main, mais pas sur la mienne. J'ai deux feuilles.

Donc, la première motion porte sur la promotion des rapports, les réunions et autres questions liées aux travaux du comité. Ce sont les membres du comité qui ont suggéré, quand nous avons discuté des motions initiales autorisant le président à voyager, que je me déplace moi aussi en tant que vice-président pour que nous puissions tous les deux jouer un rôle dans la promotion des rapports. C'est ce que je suis en train de faire. Il n'y a rien ici d'inusité.

Le président : Souhaitez-vous poser une question, sénateur Day?

Le sénateur Day : Oui.

Le président : Vous avez deux minutes environ.

Le sénateur Day : Le texte dit : pro forma, deux nuits. Il s'agit d'un aller-retour Montréal. Vous devez passer deux nuits à Montréal pour assister à une réunion? Je présume que c'est une erreur.

Senator Tkachuk: I put down two nights. I have to travel from Saskatoon, so I will probably come in the night before. I do not know if I will be there longer than one day or not, and I do not know how many days it might take.

Senator Day: I assumed it was an error.

Senator Tkachuk: No, it is not.

Senator Banks: Mr. Chair, we have a new budget number that none of us had seen before until Monday night. We will be meeting again sometime over the summer, in the next little while. I do not think we should commit to any travel by anyone.

Senator Tkachuk: Except the chair.

Senator Banks: Including the chair.

Senator Tkachuk: No, no, no. The chair's minutes are all passed in advance.

Senator Banks: I think we should revisit this question and rescind all previous motions having to do with the promotion of reports. When we made those commitments, those motions, we had $61,000 in the budget. We do not have $61,000 in the budget now, and I would have thought differently about those commitments for travelling to promote reports by you, chair, or by you, deputy chair.

Senator Tkachuk: He has already made a bunch.

Senator Banks: I do not think he has made a bunch.

Senator Tkachuk: I am sure he has.

Senator Banks: I am uncomfortable with whatever commitments we have made or might now make until we have had a chance to look at spreading this money until March 2009, which we might have to do, including your travel and the chair's travel.

Senator Tkachuk: Senator Banks, if he has made three trips, why should I not have three trips?

Senator Banks: I do not know that he has made three trips.

Senator Tkachuk: I am just asking. I think he has, but I will ask him.

The Chair: I have.

Senator Tkachuk: Has he made four?

The Chair: No, I have made three trips for the committee.

Senator Tkachuk: There you go.

Senator Banks: They were authorized when we thought we had $61,000. We do not have $61,000. We made a mistake.

An Hon. Senator: We did not make a mistake.

Senator Nancy Ruth: I do not think so. The first budget was until the fall and then there was more.

The Chair: It looks like it was until June.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : J'ai inscrit deux nuits. Je dois partir de Saskatoon, de sorte que j'arriverai probablement la veille. Je ne sais pas si je vais passer plus d'une journée là-bas. Je ne sais pas combien de temps cela va prendre.

Le sénateur Day : Je pensais que c'était une erreur.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Non.

Le sénateur Banks : Monsieur le président, nous avons ici un de nouveaux chiffres budgétaires que personne n'avait vu avant lundi soir. Nous allons nous réunir de nouveau au cours de l'été, c'est-à-dire prochainement. Nous ne devrions pas autoriser d'autres voyages.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Sauf pour ce qui est du président.

Le sénateur Banks : Cela vaut aussi pour le président.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Non. Les déplacements du président ont déjà été approuvés.

Le sénateur Banks : Je pense que nous devrions réexaminer la question et annuler toutes les motions antérieures qui portent sur la promotion des rapports. Quand nous avons pris ces engagements, nous avions un budget de 61 000 $. Ce n'est plus le cas aujourd'hui. J'aurais réfléchi différemment à la question avant d'autoriser le président, ou le vice-président, à se déplacer en vue d'assurer la promotion des rapports.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Il a déjà fait une série de voyages.

Le sénateur Banks : Je ne le crois pas.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Si, j'en suis sûr.

Le sénateur Banks : Je ne suis pas à l'aise avec les engagements que nous avons pris ou que nous allons prendre. Je préfèrerais que nous attendions de voir si nous allons être obligés de répartir l'argent jusqu'en mars 2009, ce que nous devrons peut-être faire. Cela va influer sur vos déplacements et sur ceux du président.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Sénateur Banks, s'il a déjà fait trois voyages, pourquoi ne pourrais-je pas en faire trois, moi aussi?

Le sénateur Banks : Je ne sais pas s'il en a fait trois.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Je ne fais que poser la question. Je pense qu'il a fait trois voyages, mais je vais lui demander.

Le président : J'en ai fait trois.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Quatre?

Le président : Non, trois, au nom du comité.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Je n'ai plus rien à ajouter.

Le sénateur Banks : Ces voyages ont été autorisés alors que nous pensions que nous avions un budget de 61 000 $. Nous n'avons plus ce montant. Nous avons commis une erreur.

Une voix : Nous n'avons pas commis d'erreur.

Le sénateur Nancy Ruth : Je ne le crois pas. Le premier budget couvrait la période allant jusqu'à l'automne. D'autres fonds ont ensuite été prévus.

Le président : J'ai l'impression que ces fonds couvraient la période allant jusqu'en juin.

Senator Mitchell: You are saying we are not allowed to come back for more money. That is what you just said a little earlier. It could be into the fall; it does not matter.

Senator Tkachuk: What are you going to do with the money, then?

Senator Banks, either tell me the truth or do not.

Senator Banks: We will be meeting in July, and we will have had time to look at this.

Senator Tkachuk: But the reports will all be tabled now. We have one tabled now and two more coming up. I think I should be given the courtesy of making some plans, otherwise it becomes extremely difficult, Senator Banks. You are the one who was arguing in favour of me making these proposals.

Senator Banks: I was, when we did not know that our budget was going to be cut by $25,000. We did not know that. We now have found that out, and I am uncomfortable with making this decision in one minute.

Senator Tkachuk: That is not what you said. You said if there was more money. I know what you are trying to do, Senator Banks.

The Chair: Colleagues, there is a motion on the floor. Are there any more comments?

Senator Tkachuk: Question.

The Chair: Those in favour? Opposed?

Senator Tkachuk: Senator Day?

Senator Day: I am still reviewing these things. I have not had a chance to —

Senator Tkachuk: I am just on the Montreal one here.

Senator Day: I cannot understand why you need two days to go to Montreal.

Senator Tkachuk: That can be dropped, then.

Senator Day: Thank you.

Senator Tkachuk: How will you vote now?

Senator Day: I will vote for you.

Ms. Lemay: I have four and four, because you have not voted.

The Chair: I do not intend to vote.

Senator Tkachuk: Three, and he is not voting, so it is passed.

Senator Day: As amended.

Senator Tkachuk: Yes, as amended.

Vancouver-Calgary: I have a motion to make that the committee authorize the deputy chair to travel on its behalf. You have it all in front of you. You will note that I only have one night in Vancouver and one night in Calgary.

Le sénateur Mitchell : Vous êtes en train de dire que nous n'avons pas le droit de demander des fonds additionnels. C'est ce que vous avez dit un peu plus tôt. On pourrait le faire à l'automne. Cela n'a pas d'importance.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Que comptes-vous faire avec l'argent?

Soyez franc, sénateur Banks.

Le sénateur Banks : Nous allons nous réunir en juillet. Nous aurons eu le temps, d'ici là, de réfléchir à la question.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Mais les rapports vont tous être déposés aujourd'hui. On en a déjà déposé un, et il y en a deux autres qui vont suivre. On devrait m'accorder la courtoisie de faire des plans, autrement, cela va compliquer les choses, sénateur Banks. C'est vous qui avez insisté pour que je présente ces motions.

Le sénateur Banks : C'est vrai, mais nous ne savions pas que notre budget allait être amputé de 25 000 $. Nous ne le savions pas. Nous venons de l'apprendre, et je me sens incapable de prendre une décision en une minute.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Ce n'est pas ce que vous avez dit. Vous avez dit : s'il y a plus de fonds. Je sais ce que vous essayez de faire, sénateur Banks.

Le président : Chers collègues, nous sommes saisis d'une motion. Y a-t-il d'autres commentaires?

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Je demande le vote.

Le président : Tous ceux qui sont pour? Contre?

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Sénateur Day?

Le sénateur Day : Je suis encore en train de réfléchir. Je n'ai pas eu l'occasion...

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Il est uniquement question ici de la motion portant sur le voyage à Montréal.

Le sénateur Day : Je ne comprends pas pourquoi vous devez rester deux jours à Montréal.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : On peut laisser tomber cette partie-là.

Le sénateur Day : Merci.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Et maintenant, comment allez-vous voter?

Le sénateur Day : Je vais voter en faveur.

Mme Lemay : Il y a quatre voix pour, et quatre voix contre, parce que vous n'avez pas voté.

Le président : Je n'ai pas l'intention de le faire.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Cela fait trois. Il ne vote pas. La motion est donc adoptée.

Le sénateur Day : Telle que modifiée.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Oui, telle que modifiée.

Vancouver et Calgary : je propose que le comité autorise le vice-président à se déplacer en son nom. Vous avez le texte devant vous. Vous remarquerez que je ne passe qu'une nuit à Vancouver, et une à Calgary.

Senator Day: I noticed that right away.

Senator Tkachuk: Just so that is clear.

Senator Day: That seems quite reasonable.

Senator Tkachuk: I would like to make that motion. Question.

Senator Banks: I have the same objection.

Senator Day: You indicated that for the Montreal trip you would be flying from Saskatchewan. Your airfare to fly to Vancouver and Calgary would be $2,350.

Senator Tkachuk: I may be flying to Calgary, and I think the clerks were the ones who — I checked that out, actually. It is Calgary return. It is not a direct flight. It is two flights, actually. If I stop in Calgary, then I have to take another flight from Calgary to Vancouver and then back to Saskatoon. I am just being safe here.

Senator Day: Okay. This, again, is pro forma?

Senator Mitchell: I would like to address "just being safe." You were critical of the fact that we had budgeted for things we were not sure we were going to use, and here you are budgeting for things that you are not sure you are going to use — two nights, extra airfare. Why do you not give us a precise budget on how much this will cost?

Senator Tkachuk: This is totally precise.

Senator Mitchell: No, it is not.

Senator Tkachuk: I will be using exactly this.

Senator Mitchell: You did not in Montreal.

The Chair: Colleagues, you are either going to resolve it now or wait a long time.

Senator Tkachuk: Question.

The Chair: Those in favour? Opposed?

Senator Tkachuk: Senator Day voted for me.

Senator Day: I voted "for."

The Chair: Carried.

Senator Tkachuk: You had three trips, right, Senator Kenny? I have one already passed and two more, so I will not move the third motion.

Senator Banks: We passed two today.

Senator Tkachuk: There was another one already approved, to Toronto, I believe, and it has been passed. There are three now passed, and I will leave my third one out because of Senator Banks' argument.

Senator Day: That is the Halifax one that has not been dealt with?

Le sénateur Day : Je l'ai noté tout de suite.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Je tenais à ce que les choses soient claires.

Le sénateur Day : Cela me semble raisonnable.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Je voudrais proposer la motion. Des questions?

Le sénateur Banks : Je m'y oppose pour la même raison.

Le sénateur Day : Vous avez dit que dans le cas du voyage à Montréal, vous partiriez de la Saskatchewan. Le billet d'avion pour Vancouver et Calgary coûte 2 350 $.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Il se peut que j'aille à Calgary. Ce sont les greffiers qui — c'est moi qui ai fait les vérifications. Je passe par Calgary au retour. Ce n'est pas un vol direct. Je dois prendre, en fait, deux avions. Si j'arrête à Calgary, je dois alors prendre un autre avion pour Vancouver et un autre ensuite pour Saskatoon. Je trouve cela plus prudent.

Le sénateur Day : D'accord. Encore une fois, il s'agit d'un budget pro forma?

Le sénateur Mitchell : Vous dites que vous trouvez cela « plus prudent ». Vous avez dénoncé le fait que nous avions prévu au budget des fonds qui ne seraient peut-être pas utilisés, et voici que vous faites la même chose — deux nuits, des billets d'avion supplémentaires. Pourquoi ne pas nous donner une idée précise de ce que cela va coûter?

Le sénateur Tkachuk : C'est ce que j'ai fait.

Le sénateur Mitchell : Je ne le crois pas.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : C'est le montant que je vais dépenser.

Le sénateur Mitchell : Vous ne l'avez pas fait dans le cas du voyage à Montréal.

Le président : Chers collègues, vous avez intérêt à régler la question tout de suite, sinon, vous devrez attendre un bon bout de temps.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Je demande le vote.

Le président : Ceux qui sont pour? Contre?

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Le sénateur Day a voté pour moi.

Le sénateur Day : J'ai voté « pour ».

Le président : La motion est adoptée.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Vous avez fait trois voyages, n'est-ce pas, sénateur Kenny? J'ai déjà fait adopter une motion, plus les deux autres. Je ne présenterai donc pas la troisième.

Le sénateur Banks : Nous en avons adopté deux aujourd'hui.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Il y a une autre motion qui a déjà été approuvée, celle pour le voyage à Toronto, si je ne m'abuse. Donc, trois motions ont déjà été adoptées. Je vais laisser tomber la troisième en raison des arguments soulevés par le sénateur Banks.

Le sénateur Day : C'est celle qui porte sur le voyage à Halifax?

Senator Tkachuk: That is right.

Senator Banks: We can deal with it now.

Senator Tkachuk: Then I will move it. I would like to have that trip.

An Hon. Senator: It is 1:30.

The Chair: Time is up.

An Hon. Senator: We are playing by the rules. This meeting is over, I think, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: Yes.

The committee adjourned.

OTTAWA, Monday, July 28, 2008

The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met this day at 9:06 a.m. in camera to examine and report on the national security policy of Canada; to give consideration to a draft report; and to give consideration a draft agenda (future business).

Senator Colin Kenny (*Chair*) in the chair.

The committee resumed in public.

[*English*]

Senator Banks: Honourable senators, in light of events and information which have overtaken it, I move that the committee's approval of the report entitled *Canadians Wounded in Afghanistan* be rescinded.

The Chair: Discussion?

Senator Tkachuk: I object to this motion not only on behalf of the Conservative members of this committee but the Senate itself. We passed this report on June 16. It was referred to the steering committee for grammatical and other changes but no changes of substance. It would be highly unusual to rescind the whole report — it is the only report we have — and then authorize staff to write a new report, which I think is the intention of Senator Banks. I want to make that clear before we continue our discussion.

Senator Banks: My intention, put most simply, is that the report previously approved by the committee should be modified in light of events and information that have come to light since it was approved. Since it has not been tabled by virtue of mechanical reasons, it is still in the possession of the committee, and it is perfectly appropriate for the committee to amend or modify the report in light of that new information.

The procedure that I understand is correct in order to do that is to rescind the previous approval of the report so that it can start over again. I presume we will start over again with the report

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Oui.

Le sénateur Banks : Nous pouvons en discuter maintenant.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Je vais donc la proposer. J'aimerais faire ce voyage.

Une voix : Il est 13 h 30.

Le président : Notre temps est écoulé.

Une voix : Il faut s'en tenir aux règles. La réunion est terminée, monsieur le président.

Le président : Vous avez raison.

La séance est levée.

OTTAWA, le lundi 28 juillet 2008

Le Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense se réunit aujourd'hui à huis clos, à 9 h 6, pour étudier et faire rapport sur la politique de sécurité nationale du Canada ainsi que pour étudier une ébauche de rapport et un projet d'ordre du jour (travaux futurs).

Le sénateur Colin Kenny (*président*) occupe le fauteuil.

Le comité reprend ses travaux en séance publique.

[*Traduction*]

Le sénateur Banks : Honorables sénateurs, à la lumière des événements et de l'information qui l'ont rendu caduque, je propose que soit annulée l'approbation par le comité du rapport intitulé *Les Canadiens blessés en Afghanistan*.

Le président : Commentaires?

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Je m'oppose à cette motion au nom des membres conservateurs du comité et au nom du Sénat également. Nous avons adopté ce rapport le 16 juin. Il a été renvoyé au comité de direction pour qu'il en fasse la révision grammaticale et y apporte d'autres changements, mais ces modifications ne touchaient pas au fond. Il serait très inhabituel d'annuler l'ensemble du rapport — c'est le seul rapport que nous ayons —, puis d'autoriser le personnel à rédiger un nouveau rapport, ce qui semble être l'intention du sénateur Banks. Je veux simplement mettre les choses au clair avant que nous continuions notre discussion.

Le sénateur Banks : Mon intention est simple : je souhaite que le rapport approuvé par le comité soit modifié à la lumière des événements qui sont survenus et de l'information qui a été mise au jour depuis l'approbation du rapport. Puisque le rapport n'a pas encore été déposé pour des raisons d'ordre technique, il est toujours entre les mains du comité, et il est tout à fait approprié que celui-ci le modifie à la lumière de ces nouveaux renseignements.

Je crois que la procédure à suivre consisterait à annuler l'approbation du rapport pour qu'il soit de nouveau soumis à un examen. Je présume que nous repartirons de zéro en considérant

before us as a draft and that we will be able to make modifications to it by motions today in this meeting so that the report can be brought up to date in light of that new information.

Senator Zimmer: Would it be appropriate, Senator Banks, to include in your motion the reason you wish to rescind?

Senator Banks: I have referred to it.

Senator Zimmer: Is that what you just did?

Senator Banks: In the motion, I did refer to the fact that it was in light of information and events that have come to light since the report was approved. That is the reason.

Senator Zimmer: That is fine.

The Chair: Question?

Senator Tkachuk: I think this motion is highly inappropriate. I understand this has been going on because we received new copies of both the report on the wounded soldiers and the general's report, both of which we passed in this committee. New versions have been written without my knowledge — I am not sure about other senators' knowledge — by the chairman of the committee, and those are the versions that will be put before us today after we rescind reports that we have already dealt with and passed. This is very unusual behaviour. It is not something I have ever seen before. I think that all senators need time if we are to do a new report.

First, I think this motion is totally out of order. I know that the clerk is saying that we are in possession of the report. The Senate is not in session. If we think that the committee is acting inappropriately, we can turn to no particular body to make our case. The committee was not constituted for the summer months to do this. The committee met twice to deal with the report on emergency preparedness, not to deal with the two reports that we had already passed. That is the reason the meetings were called. Now we are bringing forth new items and reports that we have already dealt with and already passed. This kind of precedent for Senate committees should be avoided; it is unethical and wrong. I think we should not support the motion.

The Chair: Senator Tkachuk is talking nonsense. The motion put through the Senate did not make mention of the names of any reports. It simply talked about three reports.

Second —

Senator Tkachuk: Was it always your intention, chairman, to bring these two reports up?

The Chair: I am not finished.

le rapport comme une ébauche et que nous pourrons y apporter des modifications en proposant des motions au cours de la présente séance. De cette façon, nous pourrons tenir compte des nouveaux renseignements pour actualiser le rapport.

Le sénateur Zimmer : Serait-il approprié, sénateur Banks, d'inclure dans votre motion la raison pour laquelle vous souhaitez annuler l'approbation?

Le sénateur Banks : J'ai mentionné la raison.

Le sénateur Zimmer : C'est ce que vous venez de faire?

Le sénateur Banks : Dans la motion, j'ai précisé que je voulais modifier le rapport en tenant compte de l'information et des événements qui ont été mis en lumière depuis son approbation. Voilà la raison.

Le sénateur Zimmer : Bon.

Le président : Avez-vous des questions?

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Je crois que cette motion est tout à fait inacceptable. Je crois que l'on souhaite aller dans ce sens parce que nous avons reçu deux nouvelles versions du rapport sur les soldats blessés et du rapport sur les généraux, qui ont tous deux été adoptés par le comité. De nouvelles versions ont été rédigées à mon insu — je ne suis pas certain pour ce qui est des autres sénateurs — par le président du comité, et ce sont les versions sur lesquelles nous devrions nous pencher aujourd'hui si nous annulions les rapports que nous avons déjà examinés et adoptés. Il s'agit d'une procédure très inhabituelle. Je n'ai jamais vu cela auparavant. Je crois que tous les sénateurs auront besoin de temps si l'on doit rédiger un nouveau rapport.

D'abord, je crois que cette motion est totalement irrecevable. Je sais que la greffière dit que nous sommes en possession du rapport. Or, le Sénat ne siège pas actuellement. Si nous trouvions que le comité agissait de façon inappropriée, nous ne pourrions nous tourner vers aucun autre organe pour faire entendre notre point de vue. Nous n'avons pas réuni les membres du comité pendant l'été pour parvenir à cette fin. Le comité a organisé deux réunions pour examiner le rapport sur la protection civile, non pour se pencher sur deux rapports qu'il a déjà adoptés. Voilà pourquoi on a convoqué les réunions. Maintenant, nous proposons de nouveaux points à l'ordre du jour et des rapports que nous avons déjà examinés et adoptés. Dans le contexte des comités du Sénat, ce genre de situation devrait être évité; c'est contraire à l'éthique et c'est inadmissible. Je crois que nous ne devrions pas appuyer cette motion.

Le président : Le sénateur Tkachuk dit n'importe quoi. La motion présentée au Sénat ne mentionnait aucun rapport en particulier. Elle parlait seulement de trois rapports.

Deuxièmement...

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Avez-vous toujours eu l'intention, monsieur le président, de remettre ces deux rapports à l'ordre du jour?

Le président : Je n'ai pas terminé.

Senator Tkachuk: I do not care if you are not finished. Do not say I am talking nonsense, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: I just did.

Senator Tkachuk: You are talking nonsense. You have behaved nonsensically and you have behaved unethically.

The Chair: The second reason is that the changes that he has requested in this report are in the report, so for him to tell you that he was unaware that another report or that a revision to a report was going ahead is untrue because —

Senator Tkachuk: Do not lie.

The Chair: — he sent changes reflected in this report.

Senator Tkachuk: I sent those because I was trying to make a point. We were dealing with the report. It was dealt with quickly. I sent those comments. We would have dealt with it another way. If the chairman wished to bring those reports to this committee and had brought the reports and constituted a new report, or perhaps an appendix, that would be fine, but I was going to make my points. I made them public to you because I was going to make them public at a press conference. A new report was written without me or any members of the committee being notified, done in secret in your office.

Senator Day: I do not agree with these comments being made by Senator Tkachuk. It is the responsibility of each of us to improve upon any report of our committee. If we come forward with new information that will improve upon the report, we should deal with that. The chair of the committee has a greater responsibility as chair to do so.

We are not saying that we will ask you to adopt something you do not know anything about. We are rescinding a report. At this stage, the motion is to rescind a report we adopted earlier because we believe we can make improvements. Let us get on with the vote on rescinding the report, and let us see if we can make some improvements to it.

The Chair: Could I have a motion, please?

Senator Tkachuk: Do we not need authorization for a new report? I do not think we can do this.

The Chair: Those in favour?

Some Hon. Senators: Agreed.

The Chair: Those opposed?

Senator Tkachuk: Strongly opposed.

The Chair: The motion is carried.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Peu m'importe si vous n'avez pas terminé. Vous ne pouvez soutenir que j'ai dit n'importe quoi, monsieur le président.

Le président : C'est ce que je viens de faire.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : C'est vous qui dites n'importe quoi. Vous avez agi de façon absurde et vous avez manqué d'éthique.

Le président : La deuxième raison, c'est que les changements qu'il a demandés que nous apportions au rapport figurent dans le rapport, de sorte qu'il est dans l'erreur lorsqu'il vous dit qu'il ignorait qu'un autre rapport ou qu'une révision d'un rapport était en cours parce qu'il...

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Ne mentez pas.

Le président : ... a demandé des changements qui figurent déjà dans le rapport.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : J'ai demandé ces changements parce que je tentais de défendre mon point de vue. Nous examinions le rapport. Nous l'avons fait rapidement. J'ai fait parvenir ces commentaires. Nous aurions abordé cette question sous un autre angle. Si le président souhaitait présenter ces rapports au comité et qu'il les avait soumis et avait créé un nouveau rapport, ou peut-être une annexe, je n'y verrais aucune objection, mais j'allais faire connaître mon point de vue. Je vous l'ai communiqué parce que j'allais le rendre public à l'occasion d'une conférence de presse. Vous avez rédigé un nouveau rapport sans mon consentement ni celui des autres membres du comité, en secret dans votre bureau.

Le sénateur Day : Je n'approuve pas les commentaires du sénateur Tkachuk. Il en va de la responsabilité de chacun de nous d'améliorer tout rapport du comité. Si un membre présente de nouveaux renseignements qui peuvent bonifier le rapport, nous devrions en tenir compte. Le président, puisqu'il est à la tête du comité, a d'autant plus la responsabilité de le faire.

Nous ne disons pas que vous allez devoir approuver quelque chose dont vous ignoriez tout. Il s'agit d'annuler un rapport. À cette étape-ci, la motion consiste à annuler un rapport que nous avons déjà adopté parce que nous croyons que nous pouvons l'améliorer. Mettons la motion aux voix et voyons si nous pouvons apporter des améliorations au rapport.

Le président : Quelqu'un pourrait-il proposer une motion?

Le sénateur Tkachuk : N'avons-nous pas besoin d'une autorisation pour rédiger un nouveau rapport? Je ne crois pas que nous pouvons faire cela.

Le président : Que tous ceux qui sont en faveur de la motion le disent.

Des voix : D'accord.

Le président : Que tous ceux qui s'y opposent le disent.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Je m'y oppose fermement.

Le président : La motion est adoptée.

Senator Banks: Before we proceed, I would like advice from the clerk. I assume this is a properly constituted meeting of the committee. Was the motion we just considered and passed in order?

Shaila Anwar, Clerk of the Committee: It is procedurally in order.

Senator Tkachuk: We rescinded the report, so no report exists now.

Ms. Anwar: No.

The Chair: Correct.

Could we have a motion to go in camera now, please?

Senator Tkachuk: No. Why are we going in camera?

Senator Day: To debate the changes.

Senator Tkachuk: My staff is going to stay here, by the way. We are not leaving.

Senator Day: This committee is the master of its own procedure.

Senator Tkachuk: That is exactly right.

Senator Day: One person should not feel that he can usurp the desire of the majority. There is a motion, and I call the question.

The Chair: All those in favour?

Some Hon. Senators: Agreed.

The Chair: We will proceed in camera.

The committee continued in camera.

The committee resumed in public.

Senator Banks: Senators, I move that we rescind previous approval of the *Four Generals and an Admiral* report.

Senator Tkachuk: I would like to make a few comments.

First, earlier on when we were in camera, chair, you implied that I had made some comments about the report and that I knew you were rewriting it, which was totally not true. I will quote from the letter I sent to you on July 2, 2008, because of our responsibility as a steering committee to look at grammatical or style changes but not substantial changes. I wrote:

> I am writing today to outline some concerns I have over the *Four Generals and an Admiral* report which currently sits with the SCONSAD Steering Committee. As you know, the report was distributed in committee for the first time on June 16, 2008 and adopted during that same meeting, referred to the Steering Committee to correct typos and grammatical errors. Upon study, the following are comments I would like to include which reflect some of the concerns I raised during the meeting. I understand the report cannot be changed at this point, so it would perhaps

Le sénateur Banks : Avant de continuer, j'aimerais me renseigner auprès de la greffière. Je suppose que nous tenons une réunion du comité dûment constituée. La motion que nous venons d'adopter est-elle recevable?

Shaila Anwar, greffière du comité : Sur le plan de la procédure, elle est recevable.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Nous avons annulé le rapport, de sorte qu'il n'existe plus maintenant.

Mme Anwar : C'est cela.

Le président : C'est exact.

Quelqu'un voudrait-il proposer une motion pour que la séance se poursuive à huis clos?

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Non. Pourquoi devrions-nous poursuivre à huis clos?

Le sénateur Day : Pour débattre des changements.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Mon personnel va demeurer ici, soit dit en passant. Nous ne partons pas.

Le sénateur Day : Le comité décide de la procédure qu'il veut suivre.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : C'est tout à fait exact.

Le sénateur Day : Une seule personne ne devrait pas croire qu'il représente la volonté de la majorité. Il y a une motion, et je propose qu'on la mette aux voix.

Le président : Tous ceux en faveur de la motion?

Des voix : D'accord.

Le président : Nous allons poursuivre à huis clos.

La séance se poursuit à huis clos.

La séance publique reprend.

Le sénateur Banks : Chers collègues, je propose que l'on annule l'approbation du rapport intitulé *Quatre généraux et un amiral*.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : J'aimerais faire quelques commentaires.

D'abord, pendant la séance à huis clos, vous avez laissé entendre, monsieur le président, que j'avais fait des commentaires sur le rapport et que je savais que vous le récriviez, ce qui est totalement faux. Je vais vous lire un extrait de la lettre que je vous ai fait parvenir le 2 juillet 2008, étant donné que nous étions responsables, à titre de comité de direction, de réviser la grammaire ou la forme, mais non le fond. Voici l'extrait :

> Je vous écris pour exprimer mes préoccupations à l'égard du rapport *Quatre généraux et un amiral* qu'examine actuellement le comité de direction du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense. Comme vous le savez, le rapport a été présenté aux membres du comité pour la première fois le 16 juin 2008 et adopté par la même occasion, puis il a été renvoyé au comité de direction pour qu'il en fasse la révision typographique et grammaticale. Pour donner suite à l'examen, voici des commentaires que j'aimerais ajouter au rapport; ils reflètent

be simplest to add similar language that we added to the previous report issued on Afghanistan. (Regarding typos and grammar, I have a copy of the Report ready with corrections to provide to the Clerks when we are ready to finalize this report.)

For you to imply that I was asking you to change the report is totally not true and you know that, because I sent you this letter and I told you that. Yet, you sit there at this meeting and say that somehow I knew that you were rewriting the report when I did not know you were rewriting the report. I thought we were going to have a steering committee and that we would deal with this report in the way that the committee instructed us to deal with it on June 16.

The Chair: Did you not give me additions that you wanted from General Natynczyk's testimony?

Senator Tkachuk: What I did was point out some of the problems for future work. We received that report and passed it on that same day and referred it to committee. I was trying to point out that there were problems with the report. I knew and told you full well in this letter that I did not expect you to change the report, nor did I believe the report should be changed, but that we should only deal with the matters that the steering committee referred to us. I sent not only this letter but also changes that were grammatical, et cetera, that I thought had to be dealt with by the steering committee. I am not asking you to change the report.

You changed the report. I read that report and you put my name in there. You have no right to do that, stating that I believed certain things when you do not even know that I believe them. You distributed it to all members of this committee. How could you do that when you know full well that that is not the way the Senate does business, nor does the committee ever name senators in reports in that fashion?

The Chair: On your last point, you are right, and I apologize. I will recommend changes in that regard. I will do that.

Senator Tkachuk: I appreciate that.

I want you to know that I do not agree with this whole procedure, but I also realize that I am in the minority position here. I want to make my case as strongly as I can to ensure that there is no misunderstanding that I wish that this report be changed in any way or that I would ever go against the wishes of the committee.

The Chair: Thank you.

Senator Moore: Chair, it seems to me that we all want to make the best report possible. We just went through that process with the *Canadians Wounded in Afghanistan* report. The changes were

certaines des préoccupations que j'ai exprimées au cours de la réunion. Je crois savoir que le rapport ne peut être modifié à cette étape, de sorte qu'il serait peut-être plus simple d'y joindre des éléments semblables à ceux que nous avons ajoutés au rapport précédent sur l'Afghanistan. (En ce qui concerne la révision typographique et grammaticale, j'ai une copie du rapport corrigé à transmettre aux greffiers lorsque nous serons prêts à parachever ce rapport.)

Vous êtes totalement dans l'erreur lorsque vous affirmez que je vous ai demandé de changer le rapport, et vous le savez, car je vous ai envoyé cette lettre qui disait précisément ce que je viens de vous citer. Pourtant, vous venez de dire que, d'une façon ou d'une autre, je savais que vous étiez en train de récrire le rapport, alors que c'est tout le contraire. Je croyais que nous allions former un comité de direction et que nous nous pencherions sur ce rapport conformément aux consignes énoncées par le comité le 16 juin.

Le président : Ne m'avez-vous pas donné des ajouts tirés du témoignage du général Natynczyk?

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Je n'ai fait que souligner certains des problèmes en vue des travaux à venir. Nous avons reçu et adopté le rapport au cours de la même journée et nous l'avons renvoyé au comité. J'essayais de faire remarquer que le rapport présentait des lacunes. Dans la lettre, je vous ai dit très clairement que je ne m'attendais pas à ce que vous changiez le rapport, que je ne croyais d'ailleurs pas qu'il devait être modifié, et que nous devrions seulement nous attarder aux questions que le comité de direction nous avait chargé d'étudier. En plus de cette lettre, je vous ai fait parvenir des changements d'ordre grammatical, entre autres, qui, selon moi, devaient être apportés par le comité de direction. Dans la lettre, je ne vous demande pas de changer le rapport.

Or, vous l'avez modifié. J'ai lu le rapport, et vous y mentionnez mon nom. Vous n'avez aucun droit d'affirmer que je crois certaines choses lorsque vous n'en avez aucune idée. Vous avez distribué le document à tous les membres du comité. Comment pouviez-vous faire cela alors que vous savez très bien que le Sénat ne procède pas de cette façon et que le comité ne nomme jamais les sénateurs ainsi dans un rapport?

Le président : Concernant votre dernier point, vous avez raison et je m'en excuse. Je vais recommander des changements à cet égard. Soyez-en assuré.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Vous m'en voyez heureux.

J'aimerais que vous sachiez que je n'approuve pas cette procédure, mais je suis également conscient que je suis en minorité. Je veux faire valoir mes arguments du mieux possible pour être certain que tous sachent que je ne souhaite pas que ce rapport soit modifié de quelque façon que ce soit et que jamais je n'irais à l'encontre de la volonté du comité.

Le président : Merci.

Le sénateur Moore : Monsieur le président, il semble que nous souhaitions tous produire le meilleur rapport qui soit. Nous venons tout juste de bonifier le rapport intitulé *Les Canadiens*

nothing substantial, mostly cleanup. A couple of small things were added to make the report a little more illustrative, and that was it.

The Chair: There were about 50 changes, actually.

Senator Moore: Right, but nothing was substantial. I expect we will be doing the same thing with the other reports. That is our job. We are procedurally, legally and in every other way able to do that.

The Chair: That is my belief as well.

Senator Day: I think we should try to stay focused. We have been meeting now for six hours. We had an off-the-record, closed-session discussion with respect to the report entitled *Canadians Wounded in Afghanistan*, and we did a good job. The motion before us now is to rescind the *Four Generals and an Admiral*. Why not get on with this process, and then if we want to go back to the same closed-session procedure in terms of comments and background with respect to that report, we can determine as a committee whether there is a need for any changes.

Senator Tkachuk: I understand your concerns, senator. I have a huge concern over the fact that we are changing a report that has been adopted.

My second concern is that the report was changed without the knowledge of the other side.

Senator Day: It has not been changed yet.

Senator Tkachuk: Just a moment, please. The report that will be laid down before you today did not come from thin air. It has been worked on by committee staff and it changes the report that we had already passed. If we come to the conclusion that our report is not sufficient, we could rescind it and then authorize the staff and the chair, with the committee's full knowledge so that we can all contribute, to go ahead and write a new report for us to consider at a later time.

To receive a report that has already been done without authority while the other one is still on the table is what I find very unusual. I not only find it unusual, I think it is out of order. I think it is a question of privilege for senators. We are here as equals. I do not work for Senator Kenny. I work for myself, and I work for the province of Saskatchewan and my caucus in the Senate. I do not work for Senator Kenny, and neither do any of you.

Senator Banks: I do not know what the procedure is. I would like the agreement of senators to withdraw my motion. My motion was to rescind the approval of the report called *Four Generals and an Admiral*, and that is not really what I want to do.

My understanding is that this report has been approved subject to changes, not substantial change, but changes by the steering committee. I really meant to move, and I would appreciate your

blessés en Afghanistan. Les changements n'avaient rien de substantiels; il s'agissait surtout d'un peaufinage. On a seulement ajouté quelques petits détails pour rendre le rapport un peu plus représentatif, c'est tout.

Le président : En fait, on y a apporté une cinquantaine de modifications.

Le sénateur Moore : C'est exact, mais rien d'important. J'imagine qu'il en sera de même pour les autres rapports. C'est notre travail. Du point de vue procédural, législatif et à tout autre égard, nous pouvons le faire.

Le président : C'est ce que je crois également.

Le sénateur Day : Je crois que nous devrions tenter de continuer dans la même direction. Nous sommes en réunion depuis maintenant six heures. Nous avons eu une discussion à huis clos sur le rapport intitulé *Les Canadiens blessés en Afghanistan*, et nous avons fait un bon travail. La motion consiste maintenant à annuler le rapport *Quatre généraux et un amiral*. Pourquoi ne pas continuer dans cette veine? Nous déciderons si nous voulons commenter le rapport et discuter de son contexte à huis clos et nous déterminerons alors s'il y a lieu d'y apporter des changements.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Je comprends vos inquiétudes, monsieur. Je suis grandement préoccupé par le fait que nous changions un rapport qui a déjà été adopté.

Je m'inquiète également du fait que le rapport a été changé à l'insu des membres de l'autre camp.

Le sénateur Day : On ne l'a pas encore modifié.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Un instant, s'il vous plaît. Le rapport qui sera déposé devant vous aujourd'hui n'est pas apparu comme par magie : le personnel du comité l'a rédigé, et il vient modifier le rapport que nous avions déjà adopté. Si nous parvenions à la conclusion que le rapport est incomplet, nous pourrions l'annuler, puis autoriser le personnel et le président — avec le consentement de tous les membres du comité pour que chacun puisse participer à cette démarche — à aller de l'avant et à écrire un nouveau rapport que nous pourrions examiner à un moment ultérieur.

Je trouve très inhabituel que nous recevions un rapport qui a été rédigé sans autorisation, alors que le premier rapport n'a pas encore été déposé. Cette procédure est non seulement inhabituelle, elle est irrecevable. Je crois qu'il s'agit ici d'une question de privilège. Nous sommes tous sur un pied d'égalité. Je ne travaille pas pour le sénateur Kenny. Je travaille pour moi-même, pour la Saskatchewan et pour les membres de mon parti au Sénat. Je ne travaille pas pour le sénateur Kenny, et vous ne travaillez pas pour lui non plus.

Le sénateur Banks : Je ne sais pas vraiment en quoi consiste la procédure. J'aimerais obtenir l'accord des sénateurs pour retirer ma motion. Ma motion prévoyait l'annulation de l'approbation du rapport intitulé *Quatre généraux et un amiral*, et ce n'est pas vraiment ce que je souhaite faire.

Je crois savoir que le rapport a été approuvé sous réserve de modifications, non des changements substantiels, mais des modifications apportées par le comité de direction. Je souhaitais

concurrence, that we rescind the motion that authorized the steering committee to deal with changes to the report, and that this committee now deal with the changes to the report.

The Chair: The first thing I have to do is ask committee members if they wish to have Senator Banks withdraw the first motion?

Senator Moore: I am agreed.

The Chair: We have a new motion before us substituting the committee for the steering committee.

Senator Tkachuk: So that the committee would deal with this report the same way as the steering committee would deal with the report and with the same instructions given at the meeting of June 16?

Senator Banks: Exactly.

Senator Day: Is there a motion? There is no motion.

Senator Moore: Senator Banks made a motion.

Senator Day: My concern, Senator Banks, is that your motion would only allow the committee as a whole to deal with changes discussed at that earlier meeting and to make minor typographical and grammatical changes as necessary.

Senator Banks: Yes.

Senator Day: It would not allow us to consider anything submitted by anyone in relation to that report since June 16.

The Chair: Correct.

Senator Banks: No, because there are suggestions that have been made by Senator Tkachuk and by me as to the construction of the reports that are not substantive but that change the language as the steering committee would.

Senator Day: You see, that is exactly what we would like to consider, but your motion now merely takes away the delegation to the subcommittee of what was dealt with on June 16. What you want to do is set aside the adoption of that interim report, which was your earlier motion. You want to set that aside so that we can consider things that have happened since June 16.

The Chair: I would ask the clerk to clarify.

Ms. Anwar: The original motion that the committee used to adopt the report empowered the steering committee to make the changes discussed on that day as well as any minor typos, spelling, grammar, without modifying the substance of the report.

plutôt proposer, et j'aimerais obtenir votre assentiment, que nous annulions la motion autorisant le comité de direction à apporter des changements au rapport et que ce soit maintenant au comité que revienne cette tâche.

Le président : Je dois d'abord demander aux membres du comité s'ils souhaitent que le sénateur Banks retire la première motion.

Le sénateur Moore : Je suis d'accord.

Le président : La nouvelle motion qui est proposée consiste à attribuer le travail en question au comité plutôt qu'au comité de direction.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Ainsi, le comité pourrait s'occuper du rapport de la même façon que le comité de direction l'aurait fait, soit conformément aux consignes que nous avons reçues au cours de la réunion du 16 juin?

Le sénateur Banks : C'est exact.

Le sénateur Day : Y a-t-il une motion? Aucune mention n'a été présentée.

Le sénateur Moore : Le sénateur Banks a présenté une motion.

Le sénateur Day : Ce qui me préoccupe, monsieur Banks, c'est que votre motion n'autoriserait le comité qu'à aborder les changements dont il a discuté au cours de cette réunion et à apporter des modifications typographiques et grammaticales au besoin.

Le sénateur Banks : En effet.

Le sénateur Day : La motion ne nous permettrait pas d'examiner toute question relative au rapport que quiconque aurait pu soulever depuis le 16 juin.

Le président : C'est exact.

Le sénateur Banks : Non, car le sénateur Tkachuk et moi avons fait des suggestions concernant la rédaction des rapports qui ont une incidence non pas sur le fond, mais bien sur la formulation, comme l'aurait fait le comité de direction.

Le sénateur Day : Vous voyez, c'est exactement ce genre de situation que nous devrions envisager. Or, votre motion vise tout simplement à reprendre ce qui avait été délégué au sous-comité, à savoir les questions dont nous avons discuté le 16 juin. Ce que vous voulez faire, c'est annuler l'adoption du rapport intérimaire, ce que prévoyait votre première motion. Vous voulez que nous annulions l'approbation du rapport pour que nous puissions tenir compte de ce qui s'est passé depuis le 16 juin.

Le président : J'aimerais que la greffière clarifie les choses.

Mme Anwar : La motion votée par le comité pour adopter le rapport autorisait le comité de direction à y apporter les changements discutés au cours de la réunion en question, de même que des modifications concernant la typographie, l'orthographe et la grammaire, sans changer la teneur du rapport.

From our standard, anything that modifies the substance of the report would be anything beyond adding commas, periods, changing capital letters or spelling mistakes. Anything that modifies the report beyond those types of minor changes constitutes a substantive change.

Senator Banks: Editorial changes are substantive?

Ms. Anwar: Yes.

Senator Banks: With apology, I revert to my first motion because Senator Tkachuk, I and others have made proposals with respect to this report that go beyond what you have just described as minor grammatical changes.

Ms. Anwar: It will be like two reports that the committee has adopted and only one of them will be tabled in the Senate. The soundest way to proceed is to rescind the original adoption.

Senator Banks: I revert to my original motion. I move that we rescind the committee's previous approval of the report called *Four Generals and an Admiral*.

Senator Tkachuk: Just to be clear, I do not want to be drawn into something I never intended. I do not intend my questions of substance, and I never did intend, to change the report. It was to point out that because we rushed like we did, I foresaw some problems. Where I pointed out questions that were non-substantive, those can be recorded, but I do not want to leave any impression whatsoever that I want changes made to a report that has already been passed by the committee, nor do I have any intention of moving in here because I still think what we are doing here is a little out of order and that the original report is our report. I do not want any substantial changes made as a result of my letter to the chair. I made those comments to the chair because I thought it was important to make them.

Senator Banks: Since they are important, would it not be wise for us to take them into account?

Senator Tkachuk: I do not want to be drawn into something with which I totally disagree. This whole procedure is totally disagreeable to me, Senator Banks. This whole matter of not acting on the report once it is passed by the committee and then changing the report without the other side knowing is not a precedent that I will participate in, nor do I wish to participate in. I want that to be clear. I am participating in this meeting under great duress by a majority with their minds made up to get rid of two reports and to redo them. That is what you are doing.

Senator Banks: I am sorry. That is not right, senator. We are not getting rid of the reports. We are modifying them in light of suggestions which you have made and which I proposed.

Senator Tkachuk: Do not put me in there.

Selon nos critères, on entend par changements de la teneur du rapport tout ce qui ne se rapporte pas au simple ajout de virgules et de points, au changement de la casse ou à la correction de l'orthographe. Tout ce qui modifie le rapport, à l'exception des changements mineurs que je viens d'énumérer, constitue une modification de la teneur du rapport.

Le sénateur Banks : Les modifications rédactionnelles changent la teneur du rapport, alors?

Mme Anwar : Oui.

Le sénateur Banks : Avec mes excuses, j'aimerais revenir à ma première motion, car le sénateur Tkachuk, d'autres membres et moi-même avons fait des propositions relativement au rapport qui vont au-delà des changements mineurs de nature grammaticale que vous venez tout juste de décrire.

Mme Anwar : Le comité adopterait donc deux rapports, dont un seul serait déposé au Sénat. Dans ce cas, la meilleure façon de procéder serait d'annuler l'approbation initiale du rapport.

Le sénateur Banks : Je reviens à ma motion initiale. Je propose que nous annulions l'approbation du rapport intitulé *Quatre généraux et un amiral*.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Je voudrais seulement mettre les choses au clair : je ne veux pas être entraîné dans une situation que je n'ai jamais voulue. Je ne souhaite pas soulever des questions relatives au fond du rapport et je n'ai jamais voulu modifier le rapport. Je souhaitais seulement signaler le fait que, puisque nous avions précipité les choses, j'anticipais certains problèmes. J'ai proposé diverses modifications qui ne se voulaient pas substantielles, et celles-ci peuvent être consignées, mais je ne veux pas laisser l'impression que je souhaite que le comité modifie un rapport qu'il a déjà adopté, et je n'ai aucunement l'intention de m'engager dans cette voie, car j'estime toujours qu'une telle démarche déroge quelque peu au Règlement et que le rapport initial est notre rapport. Je ne veux pas qu'on y apporte des changements substantiels en conséquence de la lettre que j'ai fait parvenir au président. J'ai fait ces commentaires au président parce que je trouvais important de le faire.

Le sénateur Banks : Puisque vous jugez qu'ils sont importants, ne serait-il pas avisé pour le comité d'en tenir compte?

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Je ne souhaite pas être mêlé à quelque chose que je n'approuve aucunement. Cette procédure me contrarie vraiment, sénateur Banks. Je ne vais pas et je ne souhaite pas participer à toute cette affaire qui consiste à faire preuve d'inertie une fois le rapport adopté par le comité, puis à changer le rapport à l'insu des membres d'en face. Je veux que cela soit bien clair. Je participe à cette réunion sous la contrainte de la majorité, qui a décidé de se débarrasser de deux rapports pour les récrire. C'est ce que vous faites.

Le sénateur Banks : Pardonnez-moi, sénateur, mais vous êtes dans l'erreur. Nous ne tentons pas de nous débarrasser de rapports. Nous souhaitons les modifier à la lumière de suggestions que vous et moi avons faites.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Ne m'associez pas à cela.

Senator Banks: I have a question of the clerk: Is my motion in order?

Senator Day: Absolutely.

The Chair: Those in favour of rescinding the report —

Senator Tkachuk: Are we rescinding the report now?

Senator Banks: We are not rescinding the report. We are rescinding the previous approval of the report.

Senator Tkachuk: Is it a simple majority or is it two thirds?

The Chair: A majority, yes.

Senator Tkachuk: A simple majority to rescind.

Senator Banks: The approval of the report.

The Chair: All those in favour?

Some Hon. Senators: Agreed.

The Chair: Opposed?

Senator Tkachuk: I am opposed, and I would like the vote recorded, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Day: Before we go to an in camera session —

The Chair: We are still on a vote.

Senator Day: I am sorry.

Ms. Anwar: Honourable Senator Banks?

Senator Banks: Yea.

Ms. Anwar: Honourable Senator Day?

Senator Day: Yea.

Ms. Anwar: Honourable Senator Moore?

Senator Moore: Yes.

Ms. Anwar: Honourable Senator Tkachuk?

Senator Tkachuk: No.

The Chair: I do not want to vote.

The motion is carried three to one.

Senator Tkachuk: I am really surprised.

Senator Moore: I take it, Senator Tkachuk, that you do not want your comments considered with regard to the report that you submitted to the chair?

Senator Tkachuk: I do not want to be drawn into a process that I have not approved from the start. I told you, and I quoted from my letter, that I have no intention of undermining the votes of two of my colleagues who were at the meeting of June 16 and who voted. I am not interested in having my comments dealt with on this report. That is not why I sent them in, and certainly not to have them put into a new report by the chair without me even knowing about it.

Le sénateur Banks : J'aurais une question pour la greffière : ma motion est-elle recevable?

Le sénateur Day : Certainement.

Le président : Que tous ceux en faveur de l'annulation du rapport...

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Annulons-nous le rapport maintenant?

Le sénateur Banks : Nous n'annulons pas le rapport. Nous annulons l'approbation du rapport.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Faut-il une majorité simple ou les deux tiers?

Le président : La majorité.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Une majorité simple en faveur de l'annulation.

Le sénateur Banks : L'annulation de l'approbation du rapport.

Le président : Que tous ceux qui sont en faveur le disent.

Des voix : D'accord.

Le président : Quels sont ceux qui s'y opposent?

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Je m'y oppose et je voudrais un vote par appel nominal, monsieur le président.

Le sénateur Day : Avant que nous poursuivions à huis clos...

Le président : Nous procédons toujours au vote.

Le sénateur Day : Veuillez m'excuser.

Mme Anwar : Honorable sénateur Banks?

Le sénateur Banks : Oui.

Mme Anwar : Honorable sénateur Day?

Le sénateur Day : Oui.

Mme Anwar : Honorable sénateur Moore?

Le sénateur Moore : Oui.

Mme Anwar : Honorable sénateur Tkachuk?

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Non.

Le président : Je m'abstiens.

La motion est adoptée par trois voix contre une.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Vous m'en voyez très étonné.

Le sénateur Moore : Dois-je comprendre, sénateur Tkachuk, que vous ne voulez pas que les commentaires que vous avez soumis au président à l'égard du rapport soient pris en considération?

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Je ne veux pas être mêlé à une démarche que je réprouve depuis le début. Je vous ai dit, et j'en parle dans ma lettre, que je n'ai aucunement l'intention d'annuler le vote de deux de mes collègues qui ont assisté à la réunion du 16 juin et qui ont voté. Je ne souhaite pas que l'on tienne compte de mes commentaires concernant ce rapport. Je ne les ai pas envoyés à cette fin, et sûrement pas pour qu'ils figurent dans un nouveau rapport rédigé par le président à mon insu.

The Chair: The committee puts things into —

Senator Tkachuk: You had already written the report.

Senator Moore: I do not think the senator is undermining his caucus colleagues. He submitted some comments, and I would think he put them in to make the report better, as was everyone's intention. I guess he would like to have them considered but does not want to be ill-thought-of by his caucus colleagues.

Senator Tkachuk: Do not put words into my mouth. If you want to argue with my point of view, go right ahead.

Senator Moore: Do we consider his comments or not? That is all I want to know.

The Chair: Can we have a motion to go in camera, please?

Senator Tkachuk: Why do we have to go in camera, chair?

The Chair: Those in favour?

Some Hon. Senators: Agreed.

The Chair: Those opposed?

Carried.

Senator Tkachuk: I think we need some discussion, and I think this is out of order, chair.

Senator Banks: Do we need a minute to do that?

The Chair: Yes, we do.

Senator Tkachuk: Well, if that is the way you want to do it.

The committee continued in camera.

The committee resumed in public.

Senator Tkachuk: Let me do that again. I thought this part of the meeting was public, but I will make the point again. I am sorry to have to do this, but I want to make it in public.

I did not want to in any way leave the impression that the letter I had written regarding the generals report was an attempt by me to reopen that report. I want to quote from the letter of July 2 and make sure it is on the record. The problem I had is that the report we considered on June 16 was received, discussed, passed and referred to the steering committee all on the same day. I wanted to point out that because of the speed of all of that, here are some of the things that I thought were a bit of a problem. I wanted to alert the chair of that and also to be helpful in the steering committee process when we got together later on down the road as far as some structural and grammatical things that we thought should be raised. I wanted the report to be clear, and I want now to quote from the letter:

Le président : Le comité met les choses dans...

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Vous aviez déjà rédigé le rapport.

Le sénateur Moore : Je ne crois pas que le sénateur cause un préjudice à ses collègues conservateurs. Il a soumis des commentaires, et je présume qu'il l'a fait pour améliorer le rapport, à l'instar de tous. J'imagine qu'il aimerait que nous tenions compte de ses commentaires, mais qu'il craint d'être mal perçu par ses collègues du parti.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Ne me prêtez pas des intentions que je n'ai pas. Si vous voulez contester mon point de vue, allez-y.

Le sénateur Moore : Tenons-nous compte de ses commentaires ou non? C'est tout ce que je veux savoir.

Le président : Pouvons-nous proposer une motion pour poursuivre à huis clos?

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Pourquoi devons-nous poursuivre à huis clos, monsieur le président?

Le président : Qui est pour?

Des voix : D'accord.

Le président : Quels sont ceux qui s'y opposent?

La motion est adoptée.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Je crois que nous devons discuter sur ce point et que cette motion est irrecevable, monsieur le président.

Le sénateur Banks : Devons-nous prendre une minute pour faire cela?

Le président : Oui, nous le devons.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Bon, si c'est la façon dont vous voulez procéder.

La séance se poursuit à huis clos.

La séance publique reprend.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Je vais de nouveau exprimer mon point de vue. Je croyais que cette partie de la réunion était publique, mais je vais de nouveau prendre position. Je suis désolé d'avoir à faire cela, mais je souhaite le faire en public.

Je ne voulais en aucun cas laisser l'impression que la lettre que j'ai écrite concernant le rapport sur les généraux se voulait une tentative de relancer l'examen du rapport. Je veux lire un extrait de la lettre datée du 2 juillet et être certain qu'il sera consigné. Ce qui me préoccupait, c'est que le rapport a été reçu, débattu, adopté et renvoyé au comité de direction la même journée, soit le 16 juin. Je voulais souligner le fait que, en raison de notre empressement, il y avait certains aspects qui, à mon avis, étaient quelque peu problématiques. Je voulais le faire savoir au président et me rendre utile au comité de direction lorsqu'il se pencherait sur les questions d'ordre structurel et grammatical que nous lui avions soumises. Je voulais que le rapport soit clair, et je vais maintenant lire un extrait de la lettre :

Upon study, the following are comments I would like to include which reflect some of the concerns I raised during the meeting. I understand the report cannot be changed at this point, so it would perhaps be simplest to add similar language that we added to the previous report issued on Afghanistan.

I want that to be part of the record.

How are we dealing with this, Mr. Chair? Are we dealing with the emergency report first and then going to the other two reports that we rescinded?

The Chair: Yes.

Senator Tkachuk: Let us to go the emergency report. If I have additional comments, I will make them and then we will get to the other ones and make sure they are in public.

Senator Banks: I move the adoption of the *National Emergencies* report by the committee and that the chair be authorized to table the report with the Clerk of the Senate.

The Chair: Including today's changes, please.

Senator Banks: Yes, as we have changed it today.

Senator Moore: As amended.

The Chair: Does that work?

Ms. Anwar: So that the report on *National Emergencies* in Canada be adopted incorporating the changes that were discussed today, and that the chair table this report with the Clerk pursuant to the motion adopted in the Senate on June 18, 2008. That is the motion that authorized filing with the Clerk.

Senator Day: We do not need to repeat the words about authorizing to file because that has already been authorized, right?

The Chair: Yes.

Those in favour?

Hon. Senators: Agreed.

The Chair: Those opposed?

Carried.

Senator Moore: Unanimous.

Senator Day: I move the adoption of the draft report entitled *Four Generals and an Admiral*, with the changes that were discussed and accepted here today.

Senator Moore: Amendments.

Senator Tkachuk: Because we are on the record, I will make the arguments that I made before, but I will make them now on the public record. I will not make them again when we get to the second report.

Pour donner suite à l'examen, voici des commentaires que j'aimerais ajouter au rapport; ils reflètent certaines des préoccupations que j'ai exprimées au cours de la réunion. Je crois savoir que le rapport ne peut être modifié à cette étape, de sorte qu'il serait peut-être plus simple d'y joindre des éléments semblables à ceux que nous avons ajoutés au rapport précédent sur l'Afghanistan.

Je veux que cet extrait figure dans le compte rendu.

Comment procédons-nous, monsieur le président? Commençons-nous par le rapport sur les urgences nationales pour ensuite enchaîner avec les deux rapports que nous avons annulés?

Le président : Oui.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Commençons donc par le rapport sur les urgences nationales. Si j'ai d'autres commentaires, je les ferai, puis nous passerons aux deux autres, et nous verrons à ce que l'examen se déroule en public.

Le sénateur Banks : Je propose que le comité adopte le rapport intitulé *Urgences nationales* et que le président soit autorisé à déposer le rapport auprès du greffier du Sénat.

Le président : Rapport qui comprend les changements proposés aujourd'hui.

Le sénateur Banks : Oui, le rapport tel que nous l'avons modifié aujourd'hui.

Le sénateur Moore : Tel que modifié.

Le président : Cela convient-il?

Mme Anwar : Vous proposez donc que le rapport intitulé *Urgences nationales*, comprenant les changements convenus aujourd'hui, soit adopté, et que le président dépose ce rapport auprès du greffier, conformément à la motion adoptée par le Sénat le 18 juin 2008. Il s'agit de la motion qui autorise le dépôt du rapport auprès du greffier.

Le sénateur Day : Nous n'avons pas besoin de répéter la partie qui porte sur l'autorisation du dépôt, vu que celui-ci a déjà été autorisé, n'est-ce pas?

Le président : En effet.

Que tous ceux qui sont en faveur de la motion le disent.

Des voix : D'accord.

Le président : Quels sont ceux qui s'y opposent?

La motion est adoptée.

Le sénateur Moore : À l'unanimité.

Le sénateur Day : Je propose l'adoption du rapport préliminaire intitulé *Quatre généraux et un amiral*, qui comprend les changements débattus et adoptés aujourd'hui.

Le sénateur Moore : Modifications.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Puisque nos propos sont portés au compte rendu, je vais de nouveau exposer mes arguments, mais je le fais maintenant en public. Je ne les répéterai pas lorsque nous aborderons le deuxième rapport.

As a matter of principle, both of those reports were adopted on June 16. One was adopted with a request that the chair table it in the Senate, which is the wounded soldiers report. Then the report on the generals was adopted and referred to the steering committee to make certain additions because at the end of June we had asked for permission to file it with the Clerk of the Senate.

I want to make strong objection to the fact that we would take the wounded soldiers report, which was passed by the committee, rescind it and not issue a new report or authority for a new report, the new report having already been completed without consultation with our side by the chair and brought forward to be discussed immediately after the previous report was rescinded.

The same thing took place with the generals report which was passed and referred to the steering committee. In the meantime, that report was changed and a new report was written without the knowledge of the deputy chair and our side. I found that to be extremely inappropriate.

I have not wished in any way to impede the work of the committee. The committee had completed two reports. As far as I was concerned, there was only one left. I had serious problems with the meeting being held here today, July 28. I wanted to raise the issue and the propriety of holding the meeting without having discussions between the chair and the deputy chair as to appropriate dates and the ability of members to come and fulfill their obligations in the Senate. I do not think we were allowed that opportunity. I thought the opportunity was lost when there was no change in the position of the chair. I decided that I would come and try to protect our interests and my interest as best I could.

I did attempt to assist in the drafting of the emergency measures report that we adopted. We sent letters.

I hope that this does not happen again. My hope is that if committee meetings have to be held outside our time zone over the summer months when the Senate is not in session, a simple phone call to address a time — I had indicated that August would be fine with me and I am sure would have been fine with other members.

Senator Banks: It would not have worked with me.

Senator Tkachuk: You know what, senator, all we need is a quorum.

Senator Banks: Right.

Senator Tkachuk: It is not funny, Senator Banks.

Senator Banks: Yes, it is.

Senator Tkachuk: This is not funny; this is a serious issue. Both sides should be represented at these meetings. It should not be a forced issue. It should be an issue that is communally agreed upon. We should make every effort to ensure both sides are present, that being the only other thing we have to worry about

En principe, ces deux rapports ont été adoptés le 16 juin. Nous avons adopté le rapport portant sur les soldats blessés et demandé au président de le déposer au Sénat. Puis nous avons adopté le rapport sur les généraux et l'avons renvoyé au comité de direction pour qu'il y ajoute certains éléments, étant donné que, à la fin de juin, nous avions demandé l'autorisation de le déposer auprès du greffier du Sénat.

Je m'oppose fermement à l'idée d'annuler le rapport sur les soldats blessés, que le comité a adopté, et de ne pas présenter de nouveau rapport ni d'obtenir d'autorisation à cette fin, le nouveau rapport ayant déjà été rédigé sans que le président n'ait consulté les membres de notre côté et présenté, à des fins de discussion, immédiatement après l'annulation du rapport précédent.

La même chose s'est produite avec le rapport sur les généraux, que nous avons adopté et envoyé au comité de direction. Entretemps, on a modifié ce rapport et écrit un nouveau rapport à l'insu du vice-président et des membres de notre camp. Je trouve qu'il s'agit-là d'une procédure très inconvenable.

Je n'ai souhaité en aucune façon faire obstacle au travail du comité. Le comité avait rédigé deux rapports. Que je sache, il n'en est resté qu'un. J'avais de grandes réserves avec le fait que la réunion se tienne aujourd'hui, le 28 juillet. Je voulais souligner ce point et critiquer l'idée de tenir la réunion sans que le président et le vice-président aient pu discuter des dates appropriées et de la disponibilité des membres pour qu'ils puissent venir s'acquitter de leurs obligations au Sénat. Je ne crois pas qu'ils en aient eu la possibilité. Je crois que l'on a raté cette occasion parce que le président n'a pas revu sa position. J'ai décidé de venir pour essayer de protéger nos intérêts du mieux que je le pourrais.

J'ai bel et bien tenté d'assister à la rédaction du rapport sur les urgences nationales que nous avons adopté. Nous avons envoyé des lettres.

J'espère que cette situation ne se reproduira plus. J'espère que, dorénavant, si nous tenons des réunions du comité pendant l'été, soit lorsque le Sénat ne siège pas, et à l'extérieur du fuseau horaire où vivent certains membres, nous prendrons le temps de téléphoner aux membres pour convenir d'une date de réunion — j'avais mentionné qu'une réunion en août me conviendrait, et je suis persuadé que cela aurait convenu aux autres membres.

Le sénateur Banks : Ce moment ne m'aurait pas convenu.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Vous savez, sénateur, tout ce qu'il faut, c'est un quorum.

Le sénateur Banks : Bien sûr.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Ce n'est pas drôle, monsieur Banks.

Le sénateur Banks : Oui, ça l'est.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Il n'y a pas de quoi rire; il s'agit d'une question sérieuse. Les deux camps devraient être représentés à ces réunions. On ne devrait pas se voir imposer de telles choses. Nous devrions nous entendre sur ce genre de choses. Nous devrions faire tous les efforts possibles pour que les deux côtés soient

outside of having a quorum. This is not about one-party meetings. This is about two-party meetings. There are two parties in the Senate, and I think both of them have to be included.

I have made my point, chair. I know you have heard it before because I made it when we were in camera, but I wanted to have it on the record as much as time will allow. I am now willing to go to the agenda at hand, which was the adoption of the two other reports.

The Chair: I wish I could help you on that, but I have a few things to say before that happens.

Senator Tkachuk: You go right ahead, and we will have a little discussion here.

The Chair: First, consultations were made with all members of the committee as to when they were free. Your comments were that you wanted to take the summer off.

Senator Tkachuk: That is not what I said. Do not put words in my mouth on the record. I did not do that to you.

The Chair: I am sorry; I did not interrupt you, Senator Tkachuk.

Senator Tkachuk: But I did not say things like that.

The Chair: I am sorry; you did say it.

Senator Tkachuk: No, I did not.

The Chair: You said it in committee.

Senator Tkachuk: I sent you a letter. I told you August would be fine.

The Chair: No, what you said was that you wanted to go ahead just before the trip to Washington.

Senator Tkachuk: Do you want me to read that letter I sent you? Have you forgotten it?

The Chair: No, I do not. I want you to keep quiet for a change —

Senator Tkachuk: Well, then, do not put words in my mouth.

The Chair: — because we have heard so much from you. All we have heard is you all day. You think you can push people around by talking all the time and by talking over other people and by talking out of turn.

Senator Tkachuk: Mr. Chair, that is enough.

The Chair: You are doing that now.

Senator Tkachuk: There are one, two, three, four senators —

présents, car c'est la seule chose dont nous devons nous préoccuper à l'exception de la question du quorum. Ces réunions ne visent pas à rassembler les membres d'un même parti. Le but est de réunir les deux partis. Il y a deux partis au Sénat, et je crois que les deux doivent assister aux réunions.

J'ai dit ce que j'avais à dire, monsieur le président. Je sais que j'ai tenu les mêmes propos que lorsque la séance se déroulait à huis clos, mais je voulais profiter autant que possible de cette occasion pour que ma déclaration figure dans le compte rendu. Je suis maintenant prêt à passer au prochain point à l'ordre du jour, soit l'adoption des deux autres rapports.

Le président : J'aimerais pouvoir vous aider à cet égard, mais j'ai quelques petites choses à dire avant de passer à ce point.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Allez-y, et nous aurons une petite discussion.

Le président : D'abord, nous avons consulté tous les membres du comité pour connaître leur disponibilité. Vous avez dit que vous vouliez prendre congé tout l'été.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Ce n'est pas ce que j'ai dit. Ne me faites pas dire des choses dans le compte rendu que je n'ai pas dites. Je ne vous ai pas fait cela.

Le président : Désolé; je ne vous ai pas interrompu, sénateur Tkachuk.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Mais je n'ai pas tenu de tels propos.

Le président : Je regrette, mais c'est ce que vous avez dit.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Non, je n'ai pas dit cela.

Le président : Vous l'avez dit au comité.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Je vous ai envoyé une lettre. Je vous ai dit qu'une réunion en août me conviendrait.

Le président : Non; vous avez plutôt dit que vous vouliez aller de l'avant juste avant le voyage à Washington.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Voulez-vous que je lise la lettre que je vous ai envoyée? Avez-vous oublié ce qu'elle dit?

Le président : Non, je ne veux pas. J'aimerais que vous vous taisiez pour une fois...

Le sénateur Tkachuk : En ce cas, ne me faites pas dire des choses que je n'ai pas dites.

Le président : ... parce que vous avez été assez bavard jusqu'à maintenant. La seule personne que nous entendons aujourd'hui, c'est vous. Vous croyez que vous pouvez bousculer les gens en parlant sans cesse, en leur coupant la parole et en tenant des propos déplacés.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Monsieur le président, c'est assez.

Le président : Vous le faites à l'instant.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Il y a un, deux, trois, quatre sénateurs...

The Chair: I am sorry; you are doing that now. Nobody said a word while you had the floor. Now, you observe the same courtesy. We are quiet when you speak, so you should be quiet when other people speak.

Senator Tkachuk: I am trying to observe the same courtesy, Mr. Chair.

The Chair: Then let us not hear from you until other people are done. Everyone has the same rights here to talk, not just you. You have been talking the whole bloody day.

Senator Tkachuk: I would like to compare Liberal and Conservative space in this meeting.

The Chair: The fact that your members chose not to show up is not my problem. You have people fishing or enjoying the cottage. That has nothing to do with me.

Senator Tkachuk: That is for sure.

The Chair: We looked around to find a time where we could have a quorum and we found a time. We did not have an interest in waiting until the week before going to Washington. The letter that you sent made it very clear that you had changes that you had an interest in for the report. You interpret it the way you want; I will interpret it the way I want.

All I can tell you is that we had direct input from members on your side. There are additions to the *Four Generals and an Admiral* report that come directly from Senator Nancy Ruth. She was perfectly aware of what was going on. You had read it and were comfortable with it, you said.

Copies of the report were circulated in advance once translation was complete, and we held the reports until we were absolutely satisfied that they were complete. We have, in this room now, which I should mention, copies of every report that we are dealing with today, in both official languages. I want to verify that with the clerk.

Is that correct?

Ms. Anwar: Yes.

The Chair: The clerk says yes.

The process that we have followed has been within the Senate rules. The Senate rules call for a quorum. We have been meeting, for most of the meeting, with two in excess of a quorum. We have proceeded to retract the reports, which is perfectly within the authority of this committee to do. Until the reports are tabled with the Clerk of the house, this committee has the authority to do whatever it wishes with the reports.

Furthermore, if we see deficiencies in a report before it has been tabled, I, as chair, and any other senator have a responsibility to draw that to the attention of colleagues and to have them make the changes.

Le président : Désolé, mais c'est ce que vous êtes en train de faire. Personne n'a dit un mot pendant que vous aviez la parole. Maintenant, vous devriez faire preuve de la même courtoisie. Nous nous taisons lorsque vous parlez, alors vous devriez faire de même lorsque les autres membres s'expriment.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : J'essaie de faire preuve de la même courtoisie, monsieur le président.

Le président : En ce cas, essayez de vous retenir de parler jusqu'à ce que les autres aient terminé. Nous avons autant que vous le droit de nous exprimer. Vous n'avez pas cessé de parler toute la foutue journée.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : J'aimerais comparer le temps réservé aux libéraux et celui accordé aux conservateurs depuis le début de la réunion.

Le président : Le fait que vos membres aient choisi de ne pas se présenter ne me concerne pas. Certains s'amusent à pêcher, tandis que d'autres profitent du chalet. Je n'ai rien à voir là-dedans.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : À n'en point douter.

Le président : Nous avons tenté de trouver un moment où il y aurait un quorum, et nous en avons trouvé un. Nous ne voyions pas l'intérêt d'attendre jusqu'à la semaine précédant le voyage à Washington. La lettre que vous avez envoyée précisait clairement que vous souhaitiez apporter des changements au rapport. Vous l'avez interprété comme vous le vouliez, et je vais l'interpréter comme je l'entends.

Tout ce que je peux vous dire, c'est que les membres de votre camp ont participé directement à la rédaction des rapports. Certains ajouts au rapport *Quatre généraux et un amiral* ont été suggérés par le sénateur Nancy Ruth. Elle était parfaitement au courant de ce qui se déroulait. Vous aviez lu le rapport et aviez déclaré que vous l'approuviez.

Une fois le rapport traduit, nous en avons fait circuler des copies à l'avance, et nous avons conservé les rapports tant que nous n'étions pas absolument convaincus qu'ils étaient complets. À l'heure actuelle, il y a dans cette salle des copies de chaque rapport dont nous avons discuté aujourd'hui, dans les deux langues officielles. Je veux m'en assurer auprès de la greffière.

Est-ce exact?

Mme Anwar : Oui.

Le président : La greffière l'a confirmé.

Nous avons suivi une procédure qui respecte le Règlement du Sénat. Le Règlement du Sénat exige un quorum. Jusqu'à maintenant, pour la majeure partie de la réunion, nous avons dépassé le quorum de deux. Nous avons proposé d'annuler les rapports, ce qui relève tout à fait de la compétence du comité. Tant que les rapports ne sont pas déposés auprès du greffier de la Chambre, le comité peut en faire ce qu'il veut.

De plus, si nous constatons des lacunes dans un rapport, il est de ma responsabilité, comme président, et de celle de tout autre sénateur de le souligner à nos collègues pour qu'ils y apportent les changements qui s'imposent avant que le rapport ne soit déposé.

Every member of this committee got copies of this report as soon as we had French and English copies available, and they had an opportunity to comment. Some chose to; some chose not to. That has been the same case on every report that we have done. Some senators choose to send in comments; some senators choose not to.

The process that we have followed has been consistent with the procedural advice that we have, which is the best available to us, and we have endeavoured to follow the rules in every respect.

We have also taken the input that you brought forward, and wherever it was specific, we endeavoured to include it. We also, today, accepted numerous changes in the text that you requested.

Senator Tkachuk: I appreciate that.

The Chair: We endeavoured to come forward with an effort that was bipartisan, even to the point where you said that there was unanimous support in favour of *Four Generals and an Admiral*. That seems to me to be a positive step forward.

There was also unanimous support for *National Emergencies*. That is two unanimous reports that have gone forward, and we will have to see how the third one proceeds.

If you look at the third one, there were about 50 changes made, none of them substantive, with the exception of Senator Mitchell's email, but all of them improved the report and made it a better report going out.

I think that the record needs to reflect those views in addition to your views.

We have another report.

Senator Moore: Have we voted on the motion of Senator Day?

The Chair: No, we have not as of yet. If I may, I would like to call the question. I would like to ask all those in favour to so indicate.

Some Hon. Senators: Agreed.

The Chair: All those opposed?

Senator Tkachuk: I will abstain on the basis that I already voted for this report in June. I would like to make it clear that our meeting today was conducted in a way that we were able to come to agreement on almost all issues, but because of the procedure that was used to deal with this report, I am not able to vote for it.

Senator Moore: I want to repeat what I said earlier today. The convening and process of this meeting is absolutely within the *Rules of the Senate*. Until a report is tabled, there is a duty on each and every one of us to make the report as good and as complete as possible, and that is what we did here today.

Chaque membre du comité a reçu des copies du rapport dès que les versions française et anglaise ont été prêtes, et chacun a eu l'occasion de donner ses commentaires. Certains l'ont fait, d'autres non. La même procédure s'est appliquée à chacun des rapports que nous avons rédigés. Certains sénateurs ont préféré faire parvenir des commentaires, tandis que d'autres s'en sont abstenus.

Nous avons suivi une procédure qui se conforme aux conseils que nous avons reçus en matière de procédure, qui sont les meilleurs possibles, et nous nous sommes attachés à suivre le Règlement en tous points.

Nous avons également tenu compte de vos commentaires, et, lorsqu'ils étaient pertinents, nous nous sommes employés à les ajouter au rapport. D'ailleurs, aujourd'hui, nous avons approuvé de nombreux changements que vous aviez demandés.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Je vous en suis reconnaissant.

Le président : Nous avons tâché de recourir à une démarche bipartite, même lorsque vous avez dit que le rapport *Quatre généraux et un amiral* recevait un appui unanime. Il me semble qu'il s'agit-là d'un pas dans la bonne direction.

Le rapport *Urgences nationales* a également reçu un appui unanime. Nous avons donc approuvé deux rapports à l'unanimité et nous verrons ce qu'il en sera du troisième rapport.

Si l'on prend le troisième rapport, une cinquantaine de changements ont été approuvés, et aucun n'était substantiel, à l'exception des changements proposés dans le courriel du sénateur Mitchell. Néanmoins, toutes ces modifications ont amélioré le rapport, de sorte que nous déposerons le meilleur rapport qui soit.

Je crois que le compte rendu doit se faire l'écho de ce point de vue en plus du vôtre.

Nous avons un autre rapport.

Le sénateur Moore : La motion du sénateur Day a-t-elle été mise aux voix?

Le président : Non, cela n'a pas encore été fait. Si vous le permettez, j'aimerais passer au vote. Que tous ceux qui sont en faveur de cette motion le disent.

Des voix : D'accord.

Le président : Quels sont ceux qui s'y opposent?

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Je vais m'abstenir au motif que j'ai déjà voté pour ce rapport en juin. J'aimerais préciser que la réunion d'aujourd'hui a été menée de façon à nous permettre de parvenir à un accord sur la plupart des questions, mais que, en raison de la procédure que l'on a utilisée concernant ce rapport, je ne peux voter en faveur de ce rapport.

Le sénateur Moore : J'aimerais répéter ce que j'ai dit plus tôt aujourd'hui. La convocation et le déroulement de la réunion respectent en tous points le Règlement du Sénat. Tant que le rapport n'est pas déposé, nous avons tous l'obligation de l'améliorer autant que possible, et c'est ce que nous avons fait aujourd'hui.

Having said that, I would like to now make a motion with regard to the third report. The report is entitled, *Canadians Wounded In Afghanistan: How Well Does Canada Rescue, Treat and Rehabilitate?* I would like to move that that report —

The Chair: Our clerk is whispering in my ear that we have already adopted that.

Senator Moore: You did the generals report.

Senator Day: I did the generals report, yes.

Senator Banks: I did the *National Emergencies* report; Senator Day did the generals report.

Senator Day: Yes, he is right.

Senator Moore: I move that the report as amended today be adopted and tabled.

The Chair: Thank you.

Questions?

Senator Banks: The clerk has a question about the order in which we have done the reports. I want to ensure that we have done what we think we have done.

Ms. Anwar: I thought you had made mention of the evacuation report.

Senator Day: No. I probably misspoke. I mumbled probably because I made a little joke about "and one admiral."

The Chair: What counts is what the senators think. Are we all of the view that you have adopted the *National Emergencies* report?

Senator Day: Yes.

Senator Banks: Yes.

The Chair: Are we all of the view that we have adopted the *Four Generals and an Admiral* report?

Hon. Senators: Yes.

The Chair: Are we all of the view that the only report remaining to be voted on is *Canadians Wounded In Afghanistan: How Well Does Canada Rescue, Treat and Rehabilitate?*

Senator Moore: Yes.

Senator Banks: Yes, and that motion is now before us.

The Chair: Does anyone disagree with what I have said so far?

Senator Banks: No.

Senator Moore: That is the record so far.

The Chair: That clears the record.

Ms. Anwar: I apologize.

The Chair: No problem. It has been a long day and you have done very well.

Cela dit, j'aimerais maintenant proposer une motion qui porte sur le troisième rapport, soit *Les Canadiens blessés en Afghanistan : sauvetage, traitement et réadaptation*. J'aimerais proposer que le rapport...

Le président : Notre greffière me chuchote à l'oreille que nous l'avons déjà adopté.

Le sénateur Moore : Vous avez proposé l'adoption du rapport sur les généraux.

Le sénateur Day : C'est exact, oui.

Le sénateur Banks : J'ai proposé l'adoption du rapport *Urgences nationales*; le sénateur Day s'est chargé du rapport sur les généraux.

Le sénateur Day : Oui, il a raison.

Le sénateur Moore : Je propose que le rapport tel qu'il a été modifié aujourd'hui soit adopté et déposé.

Le président : Merci.

Des questions?

Le sénateur Banks : La greffière a une question concernant l'ordre dans lequel nous avons abordé les rapports. Je veux être certain que nous avons fait ce que nous pensons avoir fait.

Mme Anwar : Je croyais que vous aviez parlé du rapport qui traite de l'évacuation.

Le sénateur Day : Non. J'ai problablement commis une erreur. J'ai marmonné, probablement parce que j'ai fait une petite blague sur « et un amiral ».

Le président : Ce qui importe, c'est ce que pensent les sénateurs. Sommes-nous tous d'accord sur le fait que nous avons adopté le rapport *Urgences nationales*?

Le sénateur Day : Oui.

Le sénateur Banks : Oui.

Le président : Sommes-nous tous d'accord sur le fait que nous avons adopté le rapport *Quatre généraux et un amiral*?

Des voix : Oui.

Le président : Convenons-nous tous du fait qu'il ne nous reste plus qu'à voter sur le rapport *Les Canadiens blessés en Afghanistan : sauvetage, traitement et réadaptation*?

Le sénateur Moore : Oui.

Le sénateur Banks : Oui, et nous devons maintenant mettre la motion aux voix.

Le président : Y a-t-il quelqu'un qui n'approuve pas ce que j'ai dit jusqu'à maintenant?

Le sénateur Banks : Non.

Le sénateur Moore : C'est ce qui en est jusqu'à maintenant.

Le président : On a mis les choses au clair.

Mme Anwar : Je vous présente mes excuses.

Le président : Ça va. C'est une grosse journée, et vous vous en tirez très bien jusqu'à maintenant.

Senator Day: On the question, Mr. Chairman, I think it is important for the record to show that we are voting on these drafts as changed through an extensive discussion today. We want to thank you for your leadership in bringing forward a document for us to work from, but it was not in any way a report of this committee until we vote on it here and now, which is what we are doing.

The Chair: Thank you.

All those in favour of the report?

Some Hon. Senators: Yea.

The Chair: Opposed?

Senator Tkachuk: I would like to abstain for the same reasons. I object to the procedure that we used to consider these two reports after passing them both on June 16.

Again, I realize that we have had a good meeting. We participated and had good discussion, but at the same time I do not agree with the way this process has taken place, so I will abstain. I already voted once on this report.

Senator Banks: You do not disagree with the report in its present form.

Senator Tkachuk: I did not say anything. I just said that I already voted for this. I do not have to explain myself.

Senator Moore: He contributed to the improvement of it, so that is pretty good.

Senator Banks: There is a letter, of which I got a copy from Senator Tkachuk, about the payment of an invoice for Jessica Post.

The Chair: Correct.

Senator Banks: I would like to deal with this matter, if we can.

The Chair: The letter reads as follows —

Senator Banks: Can you set out the background for us? I only saw that letter; I do not know what else it is about.

The Chair: The *Rules of the Senate* and the rules that the Internal Economy Committee has set out require that both the chair and deputy chair sign off on employees' invoices.

Senator Banks: Are these contract employees?

The Chair: Yes.

Senator Tkachuk: That is correct.

The Chair: In this case, there were two invoices involved. One was approved by both Senator Tkachuk and myself, and one was only approved by me. In the event of a stalemate, the rules

Le sénateur Day : Pour ce qui est de la question, monsieur le président, je crois qu'il est important, aux fins du compte rendu, de montrer que nous votons sur des rapports qui ont été modifiés aujourd'hui à la suite d'une longue discussion. Nous aimerions vous remercier du leadership dont vous avez fait preuve, à savoir de présenter un document à partir duquel nous pouvions travailler, mais il ne s'agissait en aucun cas d'un rapport du comité tant que nous ne l'avions pas mis aux voix, ce que nous faisons en ce moment.

Le président : Merci.

Que tous ceux qui appuient le rapport veuillent bien dire oui.

Des voix : Oui.

Le président : Quels sont ceux qui s'y opposent?

Le sénateur Tkachuk : J'aimerais m'abstenir pour les mêmes raisons. Je m'oppose à la procédure que nous avons appliquée à ces deux rapports après les avoir adoptés le 16 juin.

Encore une fois, je suis conscient que nous tenons une excellente réunion. Tous y participent, et nous avons eu de bonnes discussions, mais, en même temps, je n'approuve pas la procédure que nous avons utilisée, de sorte que je vais m'abstenir de voter. J'ai déjà voté sur ce rapport.

Le sénateur Banks : Mais vous ne vous opposez pas au rapport dans sa forme actuelle.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Je ne me suis pas prononcé. J'ai seulement dit que j'avais déjà voté sur ce rapport. Je n'ai pas à fournir d'explications.

Le sénateur Moore : Il a contribué à l'amélioration du rapport, ce qui est très bien.

Le sénateur Banks : Il y a une lettre — le sénateur Tkachuk m'en a fait parvenir une copie — portant sur le paiement d'une facture de Jessica Post.

Le président : C'est exact.

Le sénateur Banks : J'aimerais aborder cette question, si c'est possible.

Le président : Voici ce que mentionne la lettre...

Le sénateur Banks : Pouvez-vous nous donner une idée du contexte? Je n'ai vu que la lettre; j'ignore à quoi d'autre elle se rapporte.

Le président : Le *Règlement du Sénat* et les lignes directrices établies par le Comité permanent de la régie interne obligent le président et le vice-président à signer les factures des employés.

Le sénateur Banks : S'agit-il d'employés contractuels?

Le président : Oui.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : C'est exact.

Le président : Dans le cas présent, il s'agit de deux factures. L'une a été approuvée par le sénateur Tkachuk et moi-même, tandis que l'autre n'a été approuvée que par moi. En cas

state that the issue has to go to the full committee at a public meeting where it will decide whether or not to pay the invoices.

I should point out that the contract that was signed requires payment within 10 days, so we are in violation of the contract. This individual is working from paycheque to paycheque. The letter that I received — actually, it is addressed to you — said:

> Please find attached two invoices for: Jessica Post for June 2008; and Dan Turner, for April, May and June 1, 2008.
>
> I cannot sign Jessica Post's contract since I have not seen any evidence of her work even though I do not dispute that it is possible that she worked 160 hours for the Committee during the month of June until June 27th when I received her invoice.
>
> I have signed Dan Turner's invoice but advise I am concerned that his bill for the month of June is dated June 2, 2008, and that his invoice does not break down his work into an hourly rate as specified in the contract. In the future, I will not sign any contracts that do not comply with our Senate contract agreements.
>
> Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions or comments about these matters.

I am bringing this matter forward to the committee, and I would like to show the committee some of the work that she has done. Here are three of the pieces she has done. Please pass them around.

Senator Banks: We are now being handed work that Jessica Post did?

The Chair: Yes. What you see there is a summary of recommendations, up until these reports, that are for the benefit of anyone, including committee members.

You are welcome to look at it at least, Senator Tkachuk. It is not a matter of shrugging.

Senator Moore: This lady has not been paid since when?

The Chair: It has been almost a month now.

Senator Moore: Do you want a motion to honour our agreement? So moved.

The Chair: Thank you. I also wanted to point out that she gathers the press clippings in both English and French for the committee. She also deals with the media calls that come to me, which run between three and five a day and which require a great deal of follow-up. That is the amount of media coverage that we have had since she has been working for the committee. She has had to do a lot of work dealing with the people coming in and going out.

d'impasse, les lignes directrices précisent que les questions doivent être soumises au comité au cours d'une séance publique où il décidera s'il paie les factures ou non.

Je devrais rappeler que, selon les termes du contrat, il faut verser le paiement dans les dix jours, de sorte que nous contrevenons actuellement au contrat. Cette personne compte sur son chèque de paie pour vivre. La lettre que j'ai reçue — en fait, elle vous est adressée — énonce ce qui suit :

> Vous trouverez ci-joint deux factures : l'une, de Jessica Post, pour juin 2008; l'autre, de Dan Turner, pour avril, mai et le 1er juin 2008.
>
> Je ne peux signer le contrat de Jessica Post, car je n'ai reçu aucune preuve de ses heures de travail, quoique je ne conteste pas la possibilité qu'elle ait travaillé 160 heures pour le comité pendant le mois de juin jusqu'au 27 juin, date à laquelle j'ai reçu sa facture.
>
> J'ai signé la facture de Dan Turner, mais je suis préoccupé par le fait que sa facture pour le mois de juin est datée du 2 juin 2008 et qu'elle ne contient pas une ventilation de ses heures de travail selon un taux horaire, comme l'exige le contrat. À l'avenir, je ne vais signer aucun contrat qui ne se conforme pas aux directives du Sénat en matière de contrat.
>
> N'hésitez pas à communiquer avec moi si vous avez d'autres questions ou commentaires à cet égard.

Je porte cette question à l'attention du comité et j'aimerais vous montrer une partie du travail que cette personne a réalisé. Voici trois des documents qu'elle a rédigés. Je vous demanderais de les faire circuler.

Le sénateur Banks : Vous nous montrez des documents que Jessica Post a produits?

Le président : C'est cela. Il y a un sommaire des recommandations qui ont été formulées jusqu'à la présentation des rapports et qui sont pour tout le monde, y compris les membres du comité.

Vous êtes invité à au moins y jeter un coup d'œil, sénateur Tkachuk. Ce n'est pas une question que nous pouvons laisser de côté.

Le sénateur Moore : Depuis combien de temps cette dame n'a pas été payée?

Le président : Depuis presque un mois.

Le sénateur Moore : Souhaitez-vous que nous proposions une motion pour honorer notre entente? Je propose donc une motion en ce sens.

Le président : Merci. Je tenais également à souligner qu'elle rassemble les coupures de presse en anglais et en français à l'intention du comité. Elle se charge également des appels des médias qui me sont destinés; il y en a de trois à cinq par jour, et cela requiert beaucoup de suivi. Il s'agit-là de la couverture médiatique à laquelle nous avons eu droit depuis qu'elle a commencé à travailler pour le comité. Elle a dû travailler dur pour s'occuper des personnes qui se présentaient à mon bureau.

The fact that Senator Tkachuk does not see it is because she sits in the office next to mine. Most of the time, the work involves questions about the committee and they come to the chair of the committee, and I deal with them.

I brought this here so committee members would have concrete evidence that in fact she not only works but she works hard and has done a good job for the committee. I think that the document you have in front of you will turn out to be a very valuable document as we proceed.

There is a motion on the floor.

Senator Day: Given that we are in default of the payment date, is there a penalty clause or should we consider a penalty clause in this instance?

The Chair: This is an opportunity to do that. Also, when the full budget came out, again, as a result to some extent of Senator Tkachuk's speech in the chamber where he opposed her position, the Internal Economy subcommittee did not see fit to continue her payment beyond the third month in the fiscal year. Therefore, she is no longer working for the committee, which is very unfortunate.

The Chair: I would like to see who is in favour of paying her invoice. All those in favour, please raise their hands.

Senator Moore: Just a second, Mr. Chair. The clerk has passed me a suggested form for the motion:

> That the committee authorize the chair to certify as payable an invoice for Jessica Post, dated June 30, 2008, in the amount of $937.

"Certify as payable" but not to "pay"? Where do we say we will pay this lady and meet our obligations?

Ms. Anwar: That will initiate the process from the Finance Directorate.

Senator Moore: Is that enough wording for the Finance Directorate to go ahead and do this?

Ms. Anwar: Yes.

Senator Moore: I so move.

Senator Day: That is what I voted for.

The Chair: All those in favour? Opposed? Carried.

Senator Banks: To ensure fullness of proceedings, certain documents have been brought forward today, some of which we will dealt with in our consideration of the reports. It would be prudent to move that documents presented to us today be accepted as evidence.

The Chair: There is more to it than that. Perhaps Ms. Anwar could speak to that.

Le sénateur Tkachuk n'est pas témoin du travail de Mme Post parce qu'elle se trouve dans le bureau adjacent au mien. La plupart du temps, le travail se rapporte à des questions sur le comité; on me le soumet, et je m'en occupe.

J'ai apporté ces documents pour que les membres du comité aient la preuve concrète qu'elle travaille dur et qu'elle a fait du bon travail pour le comité. Je crois que le document que vous avez devant vous se révélera très utile à notre démarche.

Nous sommes saisis d'une motion.

Le sénateur Day : Étant donné que nous n'avons pas respecté la date de paiement, y a-t-il une disposition qui s'applique relativement aux pénalités, ou devrions-nous envisager l'application d'une telle disposition dans le cas présent?

Le président : Voilà une occasion de le faire. Par ailleurs, lorsque le budget complet a été présenté, le comité de la régie interne n'a pas jugé bon de poursuivre son contrat après le troisième mois de l'exercice, conséquence, dans une certaine mesure, du discours que le sénateur Tkachuk a prononcé à la Chambre, dans lequel il s'opposait au maintien du poste de Mme Post. Par conséquent, elle ne travaille plus pour le comité, ce qui est très malheureux.

Le président : Que tous ceux qui sont en faveur du paiement de sa facture lèvent leur main.

Le sénateur Moore : Juste un moment, monsieur le président. La greffière m'a suggéré une formulation pour la motion :

> Que le comité autorise le président à attester le paiement de la facture de Jessica Post, en date du 30 juin 2008, d'un montant de 937 $.

« Attester le paiement » et non « payer »? Où dit-on que nous paierons cette dame pour nous acquitter de nos obligations?

Mme Anwar : Cette motion permettra à la Direction des finances d'enclencher le processus.

Le sénateur Moore : Le libellé de la motion suffit-il à habiliter la Direction des finances à procéder au règlement de la facture?

Mme Anwar : Oui.

Le sénateur Moore : Je propose donc la motion en question.

Le sénateur Day : J'ai voté pour cette motion.

Le président : Que tous ceux qui sont en faveur le disent. Qui s'y oppose? La motion est adoptée.

Le sénateur Banks : Divers documents ont été présentés aujourd'hui, dont certains nous ont été utiles lorsque nous avons examiné les rapports. Histoire de procéder dans les règles de l'art, il serait prudent de proposer que les documents présentés aujourd'hui soient acceptés comme preuve.

Le président : Il n'y a pas que ces documents. Peut-être que Mme Anwar pourrait apporter des précisions à ce sujet.

Senator Banks: For one thing, we have distributed copies of my recommendations for changes in the reports and others, your letters and new drafts of reports, as you have pointed out.

The Chair: There is also evidence in relation to the reports that was contested and needs to come forward.

Senator Banks: There are responses to questions we have asked that have to do with these reports. I already have some that were sent to me electronically.

The Chair: There is also the issue that Senator Tkachuk raised regarding information that we received during a prorogation. Do you want to read that through, Senator Banks?

Senator Banks: We have all received these electronically, right? I did, anyway.

Ms. Anwar: The items in pencil were distributed today.

Senator Banks: Right. I am talking about the notes from Senator Tkachuk; the letters from Senator Tkachuk; the notes from me on the respective reports plus the things that I think I received electronically: a response to a question taken on notice at the June 2 appearance by Lieutenant-General Natynczyk regarding the recruitment at pride events — this is in response to questions raised by Senator Nancy Ruth. There are responses from the Public Health Agency of Canada to follow up questions from the Library of Parliament on August 14, 2006; responses from Public Safety Canada to follow up questions from the Library of Parliament on August 30, 2006; and a response from Brian MacDonald to Senator Kenny regarding the future ratio of military spending to gross domestic product, which is listed in Appendix E of the report.

In order that we properly consider and have properly considered all of those things, they should be taken into evidence at this meeting. That is the nature of my motion.

Senator Day: It is a fine motion.

The Chair: Question. Those in favour? Opposed? Carried.

Senator Banks: Mr. Chair, if I may, I will raise a difficult subject. I am sorry to bring this up, senators, but I want us to discuss this matter. It has to do with the authorization under the line item in our budget of promotion of reports. I need you to convince me, Senator Tkachuk, that you will promote the reports of the committee. That is what that money is for. We are talking about monies that have been authorized; committee funds to be spent.

Senator Tkachuk: We already dealt with that.

Senator Banks: We have.

Le sénateur Banks : Entre autres choses, nous avons distribué des copies des changements que je recommandais d'apporter aux rapports et à d'autres documents, vos lettres et les nouvelles versions des rapports, comme vous l'avez souligné.

Le président : Il y a également des preuves se rapportant aux rapports qui étaient contestées et qui doivent être soumises.

Le sénateur Banks : Il y a les réponses aux questions que nous avons posées concernant ces rapports. J'en ai déjà quelques-unes qui m'ont été envoyées par courriel.

Le président : Il y a également la question que le sénateur Tkachuk a soulevée relativement à l'information que nous avons reçue au cours de la prorogation. Pourriez-vous nous lire le tout, monsieur Banks?

Le sénateur Banks : Nous avons tous reçu ces documents par courrier électronique, n'est-ce pas? En ce qui me concerne, c'est le cas.

Mme Anwar : Les documents manuscrits ont été distribués aujourd'hui.

Le sénateur Banks : C'est exact. Je parle des notes du sénateur Tkachuk, des lettres du sénateur Tkachuk, de mes notes portant sur les rapports ainsi que des documents que j'ai reçus — je crois — par courrier électronique : une réponse à une question prise en note le 2 juin au cours du témoignage du lieutenant-général Natynczyk concernant le recrutement à l'occasion d'événements célébrant la fierté gaie — il s'agit d'une réponse à la question soulevée par le sénateur Nancy Ruth —, des réponses provenant de l'Agence de la santé publique du Canada faisant suite à des questions que la Bibliothèque du Parlement a posées le 14 août 2006, des réponses de Sécurité publique Canada faisant suite à des questions posées par la Bibliothèque du Parlement le 30 août 2006 et, enfin, une réponse de Brian MacDonald, adressée au sénateur Kenny, concernant le futur ratio de dépenses militaires par rapport au produit national brut, laquelle se trouve dans l'annexe E du rapport.

Parce que nous avons dûment tenu compte de tous ces documents et que nous continuons de le faire, ceux-ci devraient servir de preuve dans le cadre de la présente réunion. Voilà la nature de ma motion.

Le sénateur Day : C'est une excellente motion.

Le président : Mise aux voix. Quels sont ceux en faveur de la motion? Qui s'y oppose? La motion est adoptée.

Le sénateur Banks : Monsieur le président, si vous me le permettez, j'aimerais aborder un sujet délicat. Veuillez m'excuser, messieurs, de soulever cette question, mais j'aimerais que nous en discutions. Elle se rapporte à l'autorisation des fonds qui figurent dans le budget, au poste « promotion des rapports ». J'aimerais, monsieur Tkachuk, que vous m'assuriez que vous ferez la promotion des rapports du comité. Ces fonds ont été alloués à cette fin. Nous parlons d'un montant qui a été autorisé, de fonds que le comité a le droit de dépenser.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Nous avons déjà réglé cette question.

Le sénateur Banks : En effet.

Senator Tkachuk: Why are we doing it again?

Senator Banks: I am asking you to tell me whether you will, in fact, go to those places. I cannot remember where they are — Vancouver, Toronto and Montreal, I think.

Senator Tkachuk: I believe it is Calgary, Vancouver, Toronto, Montreal and maybe one more. I think there are three, right?

Senator Day: Only two of them will be proceeded with.

Ms. Anwar: Calgary, Montreal and Toronto.

Senator Tkachuk: Those have been passed.

Ms. Anwar: Those are three separate authorizations.

Senator Tkachuk: Do I have any others on the books? Did I file for another one? I think those are the only three that I put forward.

Senator Banks: So far. However, since we passed those motions, we have had a budget change. Our budget has been reduced.

Senator Tkachuk: No.

Senator Banks: Yes.

Senator Tkachuk: No, that is not true.

Senator Banks: Yes, it is.

Senator Tkachuk: No. The reason we did not pass them in the first place is because the budget was not approved. We passed one. Then, when the budget was approved, we passed the other two. That is what happened after the budget was approved. That is when we passed the other two. The first one was passed when we had our initial budget. The second and third ones were passed after we got our budget approved. That is what happened.

Senator Banks: Maybe my recollection is wrong.

Senator Tkachuk: It is.

Senator Banks: However, I am concerned because of your concern expressed today, and otherwise, about the nature of our reports. What do you have in mind with respect to promoting them?

Senator Tkachuk: We have our point of view.

Senator Banks, I do not understand, first, why you are bringing this up. Senator Banks, I have been around here a long time. I do not screw around with stuff like this. What did I say I would do?

Senator Banks: Promote the reports.

Senator Tkachuk: You name me a time when I say I will do something and I do not do it? I do what I say I will do. I do not think you have any concern about that.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Pourquoi y revenons-nous?

Le sénateur Banks : Je vous demande de me dire si vous allez réellement vous rendre à ces endroits. Je ne me souviens pas très bien d'où il s'agit — je crois que c'est Vancouver, Toronto et Montréal.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Je crois qu'il s'agit de Calgary, Vancouver, Toronto, Montréal et peut-être une autre ville. Je crois qu'il y en a trois, est-ce exact?

Le sénateur Day : Seules deux motions seront adoptées.

Mme Anwar : Calgary, Montréal et Toronto.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Les motions concernant ces villes ont déjà été adoptées.

Mme Anwar : Il s'agit de trois autorisations distinctes.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Y en a-t-il d'autres? Ai-je fait une demande relativement à une autre ville? Je crois que ce sont les trois seules que j'ai proposées.

Le sénateur Banks : Jusqu'à maintenant. Toutefois, depuis que nous avons adopté ces motions, des changements ont été apportés au budget. Le budget a été réduit.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Non.

Le sénateur Banks : Oui.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Non, vous faites erreur.

Le sénateur Banks : Oui, c'est ce qui est arrivé.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Non. Si, au début, nous n'avons pas adopté ces motions, c'est parce que le budget n'avait pas été approuvé. Nous en avons adopté une. Puis, lorsque le budget a été approuvé, nous avons adopté les deux autres motions. C'est ce qui s'est produit après l'approbation du budget. C'est à ce moment-là que nous avons adopté les deux autres motions. Nous avons adopté la première au moment de la présentation du budget initial. La deuxième et la troisième ont été adoptées après l'approbation du budget. C'est comme ça que les choses se sont déroulées.

Le sénateur Banks : Peut-être que ma mémoire me fait défaut.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Je le crains.

Le sénateur Banks : Toutefois, les réserves que vous avez émises à l'égard des rapports me préoccupent. Qu'avez-vous en tête concernant la promotion de ces rapports?

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Nous avons chacun nos opinions.

Monsieur Banks, je ne comprends pas pourquoi vous soulevez cette question. Je travaille ici depuis longtemps, sénateur Banks. Je ne prends pas ces choses-là à la légère. Qu'ai je dit?

Le sénateur Banks : Que vous alliez promouvoir les rapports.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Nommez-moi une seule fois où je n'ai pas fait ce que j'avais dit que je ferais? Quand je dis que je vais faire quelque chose, je le fais. Je ne crois pas que vous ayez raison de vous inquiéter à ce sujet.

Senator Banks: My concern derives from the fact that you have reservations about the reports.

Senator Tkachuk: No, I have reservations about the process, Senator Banks. I thought we had a heck of a good discussion today.

Senator Banks: We did.

Senator Tkachuk: We finally passed — well, I thought we already passed two of the reports. It is lucky I did not hit the road then. However, they had not been filed yet, so I really could not. We had passed two of the reports. The other report that we have here is fine. What is the issue?

The Chair: For the record, you said you were not voting on these reports because you had already voted. That does not show much support for these reports.

Senator Tkachuk: Well, I am stating my point of view. I am a democrat. The committee has adopted the reports.

Senator Banks, I do not think you have any problem with me. I have not given you any problem talking to the media since I have been appointed, frankly. I do not know what the problem is. You have no problem with me.

Senator Banks: So you are going to Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto and Montreal to promote the committee's reports?

Senator Tkachuk: I will promote the committee's reports. Yes, I am.

Senator Banks: All right. Thank you.

Senator Moore: In a positive way, I would think.

Senator Tkachuk: I find this whole discussion quite offensive. We have already passed these motions, Senator Banks. We have already agreed on this. As a matter of fact, I got interested in doing this because of what you said regarding what happened with the chairman going on a couple trips. Then he moved a motion to go on others. I enquired about why we were doing this, and you said, "If you want to state your point of view, you should go."

I thought I would do that. I brought motions to the committee to pass so that I could also be involved in promoting the report. I am a Conservative member and deputy chair.

Senator Banks: It was not I who said promote your point of view, but I certainly agree.

Senator Tkachuk: I do have a point of view.

Senator Banks: Yes, but these monies in the budget are to promote reports. I just wanted to ensure that is what you had in mind for these trips. The reason I am asking the question is

Le sénateur Banks : Mes inquiétudes s'expliquent par le fait que vous avez exprimé des réserves à l'égard des rapports.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Non, j'ai des réticences concernant la procédure, sénateur Banks. Je crois que nous avons eu une fort bonne discussion aujourd'hui.

Le sénateur Banks : C'est vrai.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Nous avons finalement adopté — eh bien, je pensais que nous avions déjà adopté deux des rapports. C'est une chance que je ne sois pas parti à ce moment-là. Toutefois, ils n'avaient pas encore été déposés, de sorte que je ne pouvais pas vraiment partir. Nous avions adopté deux des rapports. L'autre rapport que nous avons ici est très bien. À quoi voulez-vous en venir?

Le président : Aux fins du compte rendu, vous avez précisé que vous vous absteniez de voter sur ces rapports parce que vous aviez déjà voté. Une telle attitude ne témoigne pas vraiment de votre appui à l'égard des rapports.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Eh bien, je présente mon point de vue. Je suis un démocrate. Le comité a adopté les rapports.

Sénateur Banks, je ne crois pas vous avoir déjà causé des difficultés. En vérité, depuis que j'ai été nommé, je ne vous ai jamais créé de problème lorsque je me suis adressé aux médias. Je ne sais pas ce qui peut bien vous inquiéter. Il n'y a aucune cause de friction entre nous.

Le sénateur Banks : Vous allez donc vous rendre à Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto et Montréal pour promouvoir les rapports du comité?

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Je vais promouvoir les rapports du comité. Oui, je vais le faire.

Le sénateur Banks : Parfait. Merci.

Le sénateur Moore : De façon positive, j'espère.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Je trouve cette discussion assez insultante. Nous avons déjà adopté ces motions, sénateur Banks. Nous sommes déjà parvenus à un accord sur cette question. D'ailleurs, je me suis intéressé à ce genre d'activités en raison de ce que vous aviez dit concernant les deux ou trois voyages du président. Il avait alors proposé une motion pour se rendre à d'autres endroits. J'avais demandé pourquoi nous faisions cela, et vous aviez répondu que si je voulais exprimer mon point de vue, je n'avais qu'à y aller.

J'ai pensé que c'est ce que je ferais. J'ai présenté des motions au comité pour pouvoir participer à la promotion du rapport. Je suis un membre conservateur et le vice-président du comité.

Le sénateur Banks : Ce n'est pas moi qui vous ai dit de promouvoir votre point de vue, mais je suis certainement d'accord avec vous.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : J'ai effectivement un point de vue.

Le sénateur Banks : Oui, mais les sommes prévues dans le budget servent à promouvoir les rapports. Je voulais seulement être certain que c'est ce que vous alliez faire à l'occasion de ces

because of reservations you have expressed about the reports in these meetings and elsewhere. However, if are going to promote the reports, then I have no question and no problem.

Senator Tkachuk: Well, there you go.

Is the interrogation over? Are we moving on to other matters?

Senator Day: What is the possibility of a collage of photographs? Do you need a motion to spend some money with respect to preparing a collage? Would that be for 13 members or 13 times $100?

Ms. Anwar: Approximately.

Senator Day: I think that is a good idea and it would be nice to have. Each member of the committee would receive them and we might possibly give one to some of the —

Ms. Anwar: It is for the members and staff who traveled to Afghanistan.

Senator Day: I would like to move:

> That the expenses incurred for the framing of a photo collage of committee members from their trip to Afghanistan in March/April, 2008, in the estimated amount of $1,300 — one for each person who traveled to Afghanistan — be applied to the line item for "office supplies" and "miscellaneous" from the "General Expenses" activity.

The Chair: Comments?

Senator Tkachuk: It is a good idea. It is very nice.

The Chair: Who is in favour?

Senator Day: Yea.

Senator Tkachuk: Yea.

Senator Banks: Do you have any interest in having one of those?

Senator Tkachuk: I was not there.

Senator Banks: I know.

Senator Tkachuk: Senator, who was there from our side? Senator Meighen? Give a nice one to Senator Meighen; that would be good.

Senator Day: Yes, I think he would like that.

The Chair: I thought Senator Tkachuk would want a picture of me on his wall.

Senator Tkachuk: I would have a place to put it.

The Chair: All those in favour? Opposed? Carried.

Senator Banks: I have another matter. I have only heard of this, but I think I recall an authorization for a trip to Israel.

voyages. Je pose la question, car, au cours des réunions et à d'autres occasions, vous avez émis des réserves à l'égard des rapports. Toutefois, si vous allez promouvoir les rapports, je n'ai aucune question ni inquiétude.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Bon, voilà.

L'interrogatoire est-il terminé? Passons-nous à d'autres questions?

Le sénateur Day : Qu'en est-il du montage photographique? Avons-nous besoin d'une motion pour allouer une certaine somme à la préparation d'un montage photographique? Cette somme tiendrait-elle compte des 13 membres, par exemple 13 fois 100 $?

Mme Anwar : Approximativement.

Le sénateur Day : Je crois que c'est une bonne idée et qu'il serait bien d'en faire un. Chaque membre du comité pourrait en recevoir un, et nous pourrions également peut-être en donner un à quelques-uns des...

Mme Anwar : Le montage serait remis aux membres et au personnel qui se sont rendus en Afghanistan.

Le sénateur Day : J'aimerais proposer la motion suivante :

> Que les dépenses engagées pour l'encadrement des photographies des membres du Comité prises à l'occasion de leur voyage en Afghanistan en mars/avril 2008, d'un montant approximatif de 1 300 $ — un encadrement pour chaque personne qui s'est rendue en Afghanistan —, soient inscrites au poste « papeterie et fournitures » et « divers » de l'enveloppe des « dépenses générales ».

Le président : Des commentaires?

Le sénateur Tkachuk : C'est une bonne idée. C'est très bien.

Le président : Quels sont ceux en faveur de la motion?

Le sénateur Day : Oui.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Oui.

Le sénateur Banks : Êtes-vous le moindrement intéressé à recevoir un montage photographique?

Le sénateur Tkachuk : J'étais absent.

Le sénateur Banks : Je sais.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Sénateur, quel membre de notre groupe était présent? Le sénateur Meighen? Réservez-en un beau pour le sénateur Meighen; ce serait bien.

Le sénateur Day : Oui, je crois qu'il aimerait en avoir un.

Le président : Je pensais que le sénateur Tkachuk voudrait accrocher ma photo sur son mur.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Je saurais bien où l'accrocher.

Le président : Quels sont ceux en faveur de la motion? Qui s'y oppose? La motion est adoptée.

Le sénateur Banks : J'aimerais aborder un autre point. J'en ai seulement entendu parler, mais je crois me souvenir d'une demande d'autorisation pour un voyage en Israël.

The Chair: Correct. There are additional stops, and it is unclear whether they will involve additional funding. A proposal has come back to visit the state counter-terrorism school.

Senator Banks: This is also in Israel?

The Chair: Yes. We would also visit the Israeli SWAT school; the Port of Ashdod; a border crossing; to have the security at Ben Gurion International Airport reviewed for us; to have a demonstration of advanced security technologies in Israel; to visit the Command and Control Centre of the Israeli Defence Force Homefront; the Western Galilee medical centre, which is the only CBRN-protected hospital in the world; and a visit to the passenger terminal at the Port of Haifa.

Senator Banks: What is the main thing?

The Chair: It is the conference.

Senator Banks: Of course.

The Chair: We have had meetings with the Mossad, with the Israeli ambassador and with an individual called Rafi Sela, who is a defence contractor. They have put together this package.

Senator Banks: The visit to the airport by itself is worth going there for if there was not a conference, but you said there might not be an additional cost. Do you have an estimate of what, if any, the additional cost would be?

The Chair: No, we do not. We know that we have a flat rate of $20,000, which is all that can be spent on conferences, and the conference registration is almost $800. The airfare is about $8,000. What are the hotel costs?

Ms. Anwar: We do not know exactly, but probably $200 a night.

The Chair: It will be nip and tuck on the expenses. We do not know whether we have to arrange for our own transportation to go to these places or whether the government will provide us with transportation.

Senator Tkachuk: How much have we allocated already? Did we not have a motion on that?

The Chair: Yes, the whole $20,000.

Senator Tkachuk: For the conference.

The Chair: That is what we budgeted.

Senator Tkachuk: That was all that was in the convention budget because we had a discussion that the whole budget is being used for one trip.

Senator Banks: What can we do about any potential additional expenses if we are tapped?

Le président : C'est exact. Des visites se sont ajoutées, et il n'est pas certain si elles exigeront des fonds supplémentaires. Il y a eu une proposition concernant une visite à l'école de contre-terrorisme de l'État.

Le sénateur Banks : Elle se trouve également en Israël?

Le président : Oui. Nous visiterions également l'école israélienne d'intervention tactique, le port d'Ashdod, un poste frontalier et l'aéroport international Ben Gourion, pour avoir un aperçu de la sécurité aéroportuaire. Par ailleurs, nous assisterions à une démonstration de technologies de pointe en matière de sécurité en Israël, nous effectuerions une visite au Centre de commandement et de contrôle des Israeli Defence Forces sur le front intérieur, au Centre médical de Galilée occidentale, qui est le seul hôpital dans le monde protégé en cas d'attentat CBRN, et, enfin, à la gare pour passagers du port d'Haïfa.

Le sénateur Banks : Quelle est l'activité principale?

Le président : C'est la conférence.

Le sénateur Banks : Bien entendu.

Le président : Nous avons rencontré des représentants du Mossad, l'ambassadeur d'Israël et une personne nommée Rafi Sela, entrepreneur dans le domaine de la défense. Ils ont préparé cet itinéraire pour nous.

Le sénateur Banks : La visite à l'aéroport vaudrait le déplacement s'il n'y avait pas la conférence, mais vous avez dit que cela pourrait occasionner des coûts supplémentaires. Auriez-vous une idée à combien pourraient s'élever les dépenses supplémentaires?

Le président : Non, nous n'en avons aucune idée. Nous savons qu'il y a un montant de base de 20 000 $, qui correspond au maximum pouvant être alloué aux conférences, et l'inscription à la conférence est de presque 800 $. Le billet d'avion est d'environ 8 000 $. Quels sont les coûts liés à l'hébergement?

Mme Anwar : Nous ne le savons pas exactement, mais ce serait probablement 200 $ la nuit.

Le président : Nous devrons limiter nos dépenses. Nous ne savons pas si nous devrons nous déplacer par nos propres moyens ou si le gouvernement mettra des véhicules à notre disposition.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Pour l'instant, combien avons-nous affecté à ce projet? Avions-nous adopté une motion en ce sens?

Le président : Oui, une motion prévoyant les 20 000 $.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Pour la conférence.

Le président : C'est le montant que nous avons prévu dans le budget.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : C'est tout ce que prévoyait le budget de la conférence, car nous avions eu une discussion sur le fait que le budget en entier était alloué à un seul voyage.

Le sénateur Banks : Que pouvons-nous faire relativement aux coûts supplémentaires possibles si nous n'avons plus de fonds?

The Chair: The conference money can only be used for conferences, but the money for report promotions may also be used for Senate business or for committee business.

Le président : Le montant réservé à la conférence ne peut servir qu'à cette fin, mais les sommes destinées à la promotion des rapports peuvent aussi être utilisées aux fins des travaux du Sénat ou des travaux du comité.

Senator Banks: If we were to consider approving whatever additional expenses there may be, I would presume it would come from the "Promotion of reports, meetings and other matters related to committee business" line item?

Le sénateur Banks : Si nous approuvions quelque dépense supplémentaire que ce soit, je présume que les fonds proviendraient du poste « promotion des rapports, réunions et autres questions liées aux affaires du comité »?

Ms. Anwar: It is for two authorizations. The conference is separate. It is a separate motion that has already been agreed to. This motion is for the Senate attendance policy: that senators would be travelling on committee business for the purpose of the attendance policy; and that any expenses be applied to the "Promotion of reports, meetings and other matters related to committee business" budget.

Mme Anwar : Ce poste concerne deux autorisations. Il ne tient pas compte de la conférence. Il s'agit d'une motion distincte qui a déjà été adoptée. Cette motion se rapporte à la politique relative à la présence des sénateurs au Sénat : que les sénateurs voyageraient dans le cadre des travaux du comité aux fins de la Politique relative à la présence des sénateurs et que toute dépense engagée serait inscrite au poste « promotion des rapports, réunions et autres questions liées aux affaires du comité ».

Senator Banks: Do we have money left in that budget?

Le sénateur Banks : Y a-t-il des sommes qui n'ont pas été allouées dans le budget?

The Chair: Yes. The plan is not to go for any longer time than was originally scheduled for the conference. The flight leaves on Thursday and gets you in Friday night. The conference starts Sunday night or Monday morning. There is a day free at the other end, with the two people coming back on Friday. It is within that time frame that it looks like they have a two-day program set up. It is the first day and the last day in all probability, or part of it may come out of the conference.

Le président : Oui. On a convenu de ne pas y séjourner plus longtemps que ce qui avait été initialement prévu pour la conférence. L'avion part le jeudi et arrive à destination dans la nuit de vendredi. La conférence débute le dimanche soir ou le lundi matin. Il y a une journée d'activités libres à la fin de la semaine, et les deux personnes reviennent le vendredi. Il semble qu'on leur ait organisé un programme de deux jours pendant cette période. Selon toute probabilité, il s'agira du premier et du dernier jours du voyage, ou il se peut que ce programme empiète par moments sur le temps consacré à la conférence.

Senator Banks: It does not sound like the additional expenses will be all that much.

Le sénateur Banks : Il semble que les dépenses supplémentaires ne seront pas très substantielles.

The Chair: There will be no additional hotel or flight expenses.

Le président : Il n'y aura pas d'autres dépenses occasionnées par l'hébergement ou les déplacements en avion.

Senator Banks: There might be with regard to renting a car.

Le sénateur Banks : Elles pourraient provenir de la location d'un véhicule.

The Chair: There may be additional expenses getting transportation back and forth, that sort of thing.

Le président : Il pourrait y avoir des dépenses supplémentaires attribuables aux déplacements locaux, ce genre de choses.

Senator Tkachuk: We have $8,000 for air travel, and $1,500; so that is $9,500 and we have $10,500 left over.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Il en coûte donc 8 000 $ pour le vol, plus 1 500 $, ce qui fait 9 500 $. Il reste donc 10 500 $.

The Chair: No, the math is not right. The airfare for two people is $16,000.

Le président : Non, le calcul n'est pas exact. Le prix des billets pour deux personnes est 16 000 $.

Senator Tkachuk: What are we asking for here? How much money are we asking for?

Le sénateur Tkachuk : De combien avons-nous besoin? Combien d'argent devons-nous demander?

The Chair: I am still waiting to find out the hotel prices.

Le président : J'attends toujours de connaître le prix de la chambre d'hôtel.

Senator Banks: What kind of motion, if we were to entertain it, would be appropriate?

Le sénateur Banks : Si nous devions en proposer une, quelle motion serait appropriée?

Ms. Anwar: Can I give you a motion to read out?

Mme Anwar : Puis-je vous donner une motion pour que vous la lisiez?

Senator Banks: Yes. I want to be sure that we do not go over the edge.

Le sénateur Banks : Oui. Je veux être certain que nous n'exagérons pas.

The Chair: I have not seen the motion yet.

Le président : Je n'ai pas encore pris connaissance de la motion.

Senator Banks: Colleagues, this is the proposed motion:

That pursuant to the motion adopted by the committee on June 18, 2008, authorizing Senator Kenny and Senator Day to travel to a conference in Herezlivam, Israel, the committee also authorize Senator Kenny and Senator Day to attend additional meetings with Israeli police representatives, airport security officials at Ben Gurion International Airport, and site visits to the counterterrorism school of the IDF and Israeli SWAT school, the port of Ashdod, the passenger terminal at the port of Haifa, to Northern Israel for a demonstration of advanced security technologies, to the Command and Control Centre of the IDF Home-front, to the Western Galilee medical centre and to a land border crossing; and

That they both be considered on official business for the purposes of the Senators Attendance Policy; and

That the cost of the expenses incurred be applied to the "Promotion of reports, meetings and other matters related to the committee business" budget activity.

Senator Tkachuk: We do not have a number?

The Chair: What it boils down to is that I am very sceptical. If you take the cost of the flight and the hotel registration, you have almost $9,000.

Senator Banks: Each.

The Chair: Yes. I do not think you can get the meals and the hotels for $1,000 and a car if you have to rent one. We are talking about essentially the per diems, the hotel bills and a car, if a car is not provided. If they are providing a car, that is terrific.

Senator Banks: It is not likely to be a large amount of money.

The Chair: I do not think so.

Senator Banks: Is there a safe envelope we can put around it using words like "up to"?

The Chair: Up to an additional $5,000?

Senator Banks: Do we have an additional $5,000?

Ms. Anwar: In the promotion of reports budget, yes.

Senator Banks: Is "up to" okay?

Senator Tkachuk: Is committee business included in that promotion of reports budget?

Ms. Anwar: "Promotion of reports, meetings and other matters related to committee business" is the title of the envelope.

Le sénateur Banks : Chers collègues, voici la motion proposée :

Que conformément à la motion adoptée par le comité le 18 juin 2008, pour autoriser les sénateurs Kenny et Day à se déplacer pour assister à une conférence à Herezlivam, en Israël, le Comité autorise aussi les sénateurs Kenny et Day à participer à d'autres rencontres avec les représentants de la police israélienne, des responsables de la sécurité aéroportuaire à l'aéroport international Ben Gourion et à effectuer des visites sur place à l'école de contreterrorisme de l'IDF et à l'école israélienne SWAT, au port d'Ashdod, à la gare pour passagers du port d'Haïfa, dans le nord d'Israël pour assister à une démonstration de technologie de pointe en matière de sécurité, au centre de commandement et de contrôle des IDF sur le front intérieur, au Centre médical de Galilée occidentale et à un poste frontière terrestre;

Que les activités des deux sénateurs soient considérées comme des engagements officiels aux fins de la Politique relative à la présence des sénateurs;

Que le coût des dépenses engagées soit inscrit au poste « promotion des rapports, réunions et autres questions liées aux affaires du comité ».

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Avons-nous un chiffre?

Le président : En somme, je suis très sceptique. Si l'on tient compte du coût des billets d'avion et de l'hébergement, on arrive à près de 9 000 $.

Le sénateur Banks : Pour chaque sénateur.

Le président : Oui. Je ne crois pas que le coût des repas et de l'hébergement peut se limiter à 1 000 $, d'autant plus qu'ils auront peut-être à louer un véhicule. Essentiellement, nous parlons des allocations journalières, des notes d'hôtel et d'une automobile, si le véhicule n'est pas fourni. Si on en met un à leur disposition, c'est merveilleux.

Le sénateur Banks : Il ne s'agira vraisemblablement pas d'un important montant d'argent.

Le président : Je ne le crois pas.

Le sénateur Banks : Est-ce que nous pouvons faire preuve de prévoyance et ajouter à la motion « jusqu'à concurrence de »?

Le président : Jusqu'à concurrence de 5 000 $?

Le sénateur Banks : Disposons-nous de 5 000 $ supplémentaires?

Mme Anwar : Oui, dans le budget se rapportant à la promotion des rapports.

Le sénateur Banks : L'expression « jusqu'à concurrence de » convient-elle?

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Le budget sur la promotion des rapports englobe-t-il les travaux du comité?

Mme Anwar : Le titre de l'enveloppe est « promotion des rapports, réunions et autres questions liées aux affaires du comité ».

Senator Tkachuk: Mr. Chair, I have a lot of trouble with spending $25,000 on one trip for two committee members. Usually, if you cannot afford something, you do something else. You know how I stand on this issue. I will not support it.

Senator Banks: I have reservations about it too, but I have to say that given our airport history, the Ben Gurion International Airport is the most secure airport in the world. Seeing it would be worth the price of admission alone.

I will move this motion, but the last sentence would say:

> That the cost up to $5,000 of the expenses incurred be applied to the "Promotion of reports, meetings and other matters related to committee business" budget activity.

In other words, the motion would read exactly they way it is written down here, with the addition of the words "up to $5,000" after the word "cost."

Mr. Chair, I reiterate: Can we afford that? Do we have that money in the budget? Do you think that will cover this trip at the outside?

The Chair: I do.

Senator Banks: So moved.

The Chair: The clerk says it will take two votes, one for the amendment of the $5,000 and then the other for the main motion as amended.

Senator Banks: Why?

The Chair: Because you have added the words "up to $5,000."

Senator Banks: That is part of my motion.

The Chair: It is all one motion?

Senator Banks: Yes. We are not amending it. We have not passed the main motion.

Senator Tkachuk: You do not need a seconder.

Senator Banks: My motion is exactly what is written here except it refers to "the cost up to $5,000 of the expenses incurred." That is the motion.

The Chair: Those in favour?

Some Hon. Senators: Agreed.

Senator Tkachuk: I would like a recorded vote.

Ms. Anwar: The Honourable Senator Banks?

Senator Banks: Yea.

Ms. Anwar: The Honourable Senator Day?

Senator Day: Yea.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Monsieur le président, j'ai énormément de difficulté à accepter que l'on dépense 25 000 $ pour un voyage que feront deux membres du comité. Normalement, lorsqu'on ne peut se permettre quelque chose, on opte pour une autre solution. Vous connaissez ma position sur cette question. Je ne l'appuierai pas.

Le sénateur Banks : J'émets également des réserves à cet égard, mais je dois admettre que, compte tenu de nos antécédents en matière d'activités aéroportuaires, l'aéroport international Ben Gourion est l'aéroport le plus sécuritaire du monde. Juste le fait de le voir vaudrait le prix du voyage.

Je vais proposer la motion, mais en modifiant la dernière phrase de la façon suivante :

> Que le coût des dépenses engagées, jusqu'à concurrence de 5 000 $, soit inscrit au poste « promotion des rapports, réunions et autres questions liées aux affaires du comité ».

Autrement dit, la motion resterait identique à ce qui est mentionné ici, mais on y ajouterait les mots « jusqu'à concurrence de 5 000 $ » après « le coût des dépenses engagées ».

Monsieur le président, je répète ma question : pouvons-nous nous le permettre? Disposons-nous de cette somme dans le budget? Croyez-vous que ce montant couvrira les frais de tout le voyage?

Le président : Je le crois, oui.

Le sénateur Banks : Je propose donc la motion.

Le président : La greffière dit qu'il faudra procéder à deux votes : un concernant l'ajout de l'expression « jusqu'à concurrence de 5 000 $ » et un autre relativement à la motion modifiée.

Le sénateur Banks : Pourquoi?

Le président : Parce que vous avez ajouté « jusqu'à concurrence de 5 000 $ »

Le sénateur Banks : Cela fait partie de ma motion.

Le président : S'agit-il d'une seule et même motion?

Le sénateur Banks : Oui. Nous ne la modifions pas. Nous n'avons pas encore adopté la motion principale.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Vous n'avez pas besoin d'un appuyeur.

Le sénateur Banks : Ma motion est identique à celle qui est décrite ici, à l'exception de la mention « jusqu'à concurrence de 5 000 $ ». Voilà ma motion.

Le président : Quels sont ceux en faveur de la motion?

Des voix : D'accord.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : J'aimerais que l'on procède au vote par appel nominal.

Mme Anwar : L'honorable sénateur Banks?

Le sénateur Banks : Oui.

Mme Anwar : L'honorable sénateur Day?

Le sénateur Day : Oui.

Ms. Anwar: The Honourable Senator Kenny?

The Chair: Yes.

Ms. Anwar: The Honourable Senator Moore?

Senator Moore: Yea.

Ms. Anwar: The Honourable Senator Tkachuk?

Senator Tkachuk: No.

The Chair: The motion is carried.

Senator Moore: Chair, I think you met with CSIS in Toronto.

The Chair: I would like to report on that, if I could.

Senator Moore: I know you went to Quebec City.

The Chair: Right. I do not have any motions for that, but I do want to make a report.

I did continue the meetings in Toronto with CSIS. Senator Meighen and I had a very constructive meeting that extended almost two and a half hours. When we go on our trip to Borden, we should take time on the way there to spend some time with the CSIS folks in Toronto.

Can I have a motion to go in camera at this point?

Senator Day: Is there anything else we need to do in public?

The Chair: No.

Senator Banks: Do we want to discuss Washington in public? Can we discuss that in camera?

Senator Tkachuk: I have no idea. We can discuss anything we want in camera or out of camera, I think. Certain things should be discussed out of camera. Are we passing any motions or are you just giving a report?

The Chair: I am just giving a report.

Senator Tkachuk: If you think it is important we do it in private, I suppose that would be all right.

Senator Banks: I move we go in camera.

The Chair: All in favour?

Hon. Senators: Agreed.

The Chair: Opposed? Carried.

The committee continued in camera.

Mme Anwar : L'honorable sénateur Kenny?

Le président : Oui.

Mme Anwar : L'honorable sénateur Moore?

Le sénateur Moore : Oui.

Mme Anwar : L'honorable sénateur Tkachuk?

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Non.

Le président : La motion est adoptée.

Le sénateur Moore : Monsieur le président, je crois que vous avez rencontré des représentants du SCRS à Toronto.

Le président : J'aimerais vous en faire rapport, si vous le permettez.

Le sénateur Moore : Je sais que vous êtes allé à Québec.

Le président : C'est exact. Je n'ai aucune motion à cet égard, mais je souhaite vraiment faire un rapport.

J'ai effectivement continué d'assister aux rencontres avec les représentants du SCRS à Toronto. Le sénateur Meighen et moi avons eu une réunion très constructive qui a duré près de deux heures et demie. Lorsque nous nous rendrons à Borden, nous devrions prendre le temps, en chemin, de rencontrer les représentants du SCRS à Toronto.

Quelqu'un peut-il proposer une motion pour que nous poursuivions à huis clos?

Le sénateur Day : Y a-t-il d'autres points que nous devons aborder en public?

Le président : Non.

Le sénateur Banks : Voulez-vous discuter du voyage à Washington en public? Pouvons-nous aborder cette question à huis clos?

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Je n'en ai aucune idée. Je crois que toute question peut se discuter à huis clos ou en séance publique. Nous devrions toutefois aborder certains sujets en séance publique. Mettons-nous une motion aux voix ou présentez-vous simplement un compte rendu?

Le président : Je ne fais que présenter un compte rendu.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Si vous croyez qu'il est important que vous le fassiez à huis clos, j'imagine qu'il serait convenable de proposer une motion en ce sens.

Le sénateur Banks : Je propose que nous poursuivions à huis clos.

Le président : Quels sont ceux en faveur de la motion?

Des voix : D'accord.

Le président : Qui s'y oppose? La motion est adoptée.

Le comité poursuit ses travaux à huis clos.

REPORT ON REDUCTIONS OF SERVICES INCOME SECURITY INSURANCE PLAN LONG TERM DISABILITY BENEFITS

An interim Report of the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs
of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence

Chair
The Honourable Michael A. Meighen

Deputy Chair
The Honourable Joseph A. Day

June 2008

Ce document est disponible en français

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39TH PARLIAMENT, 2ND SESSION

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Clerks of the Subcommittee:
Shaila Anwar and Gaëtane Lemay

ORDER OF REFERENCE

Extract from the *Journals of the Senate*, Tuesday, November 20, 2007:

The Honourable Senator Kenny moved, seconded by the Honourable Senator Banks:

That the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence be authorized to undertake a study on:

(*a*) the services and benefits provided to members of the Canadian Forces, veterans of war and peacekeeping missions and members of their families in recognition of their services to Canada;

(*b*) the commemorative activities undertaken by the Department of Veterans Affairs to keep alive for all Canadians the memory of the veterans achievements and sacrifices; and

(*c*) the implementation of the recently enacted Veterans Charter;

That the committee report to the Senate from time to time, no later than March 31, 2009.

The question being put on the motion, it was adopted.

Paul C. Bélisle

Clerk of the Senate

REPORT ON REDUCTIONS OF SERVICES INCOME SECURITY INSURANCE PLAN LONG TERM DISABILITY BENEFITS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Service Income Security Insurance Plan (SISIP) Long Term Disability (LTD) plan is a disability group insurance plan that provides members of the Canadian Forces with 75% of their income when released from the Canadian Forces (CF) as the result of a disabling injury.[(1)] This benefit is usually limited to 24 months, but can be extended in certain circumstances.

Veterans receiving SISIP LTD benefits may also qualify for a Veterans Affairs Canada (VAC) disability pension under the *Pension Act*,[(2)] for the same injury. In such cases, any payments received from a *Pension Act* disability pension cause the SISIP LTD payments to be reduced by an equal amount, so that, in total, the Veteran still receives 75% of his pre-release salary. Moreover, a Veteran receiving reduced SISIP LTD payments and a *Pension Act* disability pension for one injury will have his SISIP LTD payments reduced even further, if he subsequently becomes entitled to a second *Pension Act* disability pension awarded for an unrelated second injury.

These "clawbacks" of SISIP LTD payments are seen by Veterans, as being unfair. They seem even more unfair given the fact that injured personnel who remain in the CF continue to draw their full salary as well as their full *Pension Act* disability pension. Veterans ask why should they have their SISIP LTD benefits reduced by the amount of a *Pension Act* disability pension, when that same disability pension does not reduce the salary of serving CF members.

The Subcommittee has studied the issue and agrees that the reduction in Veterans' SISIP LTD benefits is indeed unfair. We recommend that the government cease the practice immediately.

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(1) See the SISIP LTD plan details at: http://www.sisip.ca/en/Downloads_e/901102_e.pdf (accessed June 2008).

(2) Department of Justice Canada, *Pension Act* (R.S., 1985, c. P-6), at: http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/ShowFullDoc/cs/P-6//20080530/en?command=HOME&caller=SI&search_type=all&shorttitle=pension&day=30&month=5&year=2008&search_domain=cs&showall=L&statuteyear=all&lengthannual=50&length=50&noCookie (accessed June 2008).

BACKGROUND

The SISIP LTD insurance policy was created in 1969 to provide CF members with income protection for total disability that was not attributable to military service. Since 1975, the amount of the SISIP LTD benefit has been equal to 75% of pre-release salary, less applicable reductions.

In 1976, SISIP LTD coverage was expanded to include service-attributable injuries because in certain circumstances, *Pension Act* benefits alone were inadequate. As a result, totally disabled members who were awarded a tax-free *Pension Act* disability pension were also assured of 75% of pre-release salary from all sources under the LTD provisions.

Pension Act pensions were added to the list of applicable SISIP LTD reductions,[3] in part because the "stacking" of disability payments from two federally funded sources for the same injury was not consistent with the Treasury Board design for such plans.[4] Reducing SISIP payments also ensured that the amount of disability insurance benefits would not exceed employment salary and that the net value of benefits awarded would be comparable whether the disability was attributable to military service or not. This practice also allowed the insurer to keep both the cost of the LTD program and the cost of premiums, which are co-funded by the Treasury Board (85%) and CF members (15%), as low as possible.

Originally, *Pension Act* pensions were payable only upon a member's release from the CF. In 1971, the *Pension Act* was amended so that CF members injured in a Special Duty Area (SDA) could receive a disability pension while still serving. In October 2000, Veterans Affairs sponsored an amendment to the *Pension Act* that entitled injured CF members, no matter where they were hurt, to a disability pension while still serving. While this amendment was intended to restore parity among serving members, the unexpected consequence was that the fairness of reducing a veteran's SISIP LTD benefits became an issue and resulted in an investigation by the DND and CF Ombudsman in October 2003.

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(3) SISIP LTD benefits will be reduced by any amount awarded from the *CF Superannuation Act*; Canada or Quebec Pension Plans; any employment income (reduced rate for rehabilitation work income); *Pension Act* benefits, including dependent benefits. See the SISIP LTD plan details, Part III, Division 2, Paragraph 24, at: http://www.sisip.ca/en/Downloads_e/901102_e.pdf (accessed June 2008).

(4) 5060-1 (CMP) Memo from the Chief of Military Personnel to the Chief of Staff of the Minister of National Defence, *Ombudsman Special Report: Unfair Deductions from SISIP Payments to Former CF Members*, 2 May 2006 (released under the *Access to Information Act*).

THE PROBLEM

Over the years, many Veterans have been medically released from the CF because of injuries attributable to military service. Some of these injuries have been so debilitating that the Veteran has been unable to work at any civilian job. If such a Veteran was lucky, he or she would have enrolled in SISIP and received LTD payments designed to provide 75% of their CF salary at the time of release. These payments continued for two years, after which they could remain in place if needed.

Veterans injured on duty also qualify for a disability pension under the *Pension Act*, which is administered by VAC. These disability pension payments vary according to the severity of the injury, but all are tax-free and not considered as employment income by Revenue Canada.

However, SISIP does consider *Pension Act* disability pensions as income and when an injured Veteran receives a *Pension Act* disability pension benefit, SISIP reduces the LTD payments by an equal amount. In this way, the amount of money going into the Veteran's pocket remains at 75% of their CF salary at the time of release. Many Veterans have complained that this SISIP "clawback" is unfair.

Moreover, if an injured Veteran receives SISIP LTD benefits for injury X reduced by the amount of any *Pension Act* disability pension benefits, SISIP LTD benefits will be reduced even further, by amounts equal to separate disability pension payments received for injury Y, which may be entirely unrelated to injury X, the original basis of the SISIP LTD payments. That is to say, a Veteran who begins to receive *Pension Act* disability pension payments for hearing loss will have his or her SISIP LTD benefits awarded for bad knees further reduced by the same amount. This too has been viewed as grossly unfair by Veterans.

There is yet another aspect that aggravates the perception of unfairness. SISIP LTD contributions are mandatory for serving CF personnel. Having paid into the insurance plan for many years, Veterans see their benefits, which they claim they have paid for, reduced just when they need them most.

DISCUSSION

It should be noted that this issue does not apply to those veterans who fall under the New Veterans Charter.[5] This then, has the effect of "bracketing" the issue of SISIP LTD reductions between the years 1976 and 2006.

([5]) The New Veterans Charter came into effect in 2006. It awards lump sum payments for disabling injuries sustained as a result of military service. These lump sum payments do not impact SISIP LTD benefits. See more information about the New Veterans Charter in the Veterans Affairs Canada website at http://www.vac-acc.gc.ca/

The Treasury Board has governance of SISIP LTD. Any contractual changes or rate adjustments must be agreed to by the Treasury Board Secretariat, who then makes a submission to Treasury Board as may be appropriate. The Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) is the policy owner and as such is ultimately responsible, through his delegated authority, for entering into or terminating any contractual relationship on behalf of the CF with the insurer (Manulife), and monitoring the management of LTD plans.

Applying reductions to LTD benefits is a common and accepted insurance industry practice.[6] SISIP LTD guarantees disabled veterans a higher percentage of pre-release salary than most other government plans. In addition, because the monthly *Pension Act* benefit is non-taxable and reductions to SISIP LTD are made on a dollar-for-dollar basis, the claimant's net disability benefit, after tax, actually increases, to exceed 75% of pre-release income.

The 1976 decision to apply LTD benefits to service-attributable disabilities was made to ensure that *Pension Act* recipients would receive no less than those who received LTD benefits for non-service reasons, not so they would receive more. That objective was achieved. While serving CF members who receive a disability pension are financially better off than they would have been before the October 2000 *Pension Act* amendment, disabled veterans are neither individually better nor worse off, but they do lag behind serving CF members. This is the source of the perception of "unfairness." An injured CF member who continues to serve receives his full salary and the disability pension. A more gravely injured veteran receives a disability pension and only that amount of his SISIP LTD that brings him up to 75% of his pre-release salary.

FINDINGS

This is an exceedingly complex issue, but the Subcommittee worked hard to maintain a focus on the central question as to whether the current method of reducing veterans' SISIP LTD benefits was fair. We have concluded it is not.

The DND and CF Ombudsman's Special Report of October 2003, presents an in-depth study of this issue and we are pleased to note that it comes to the same conclusion as we

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and at the Royal Canadian Legion website at http://www.legion.ca/asp/docs/serv_bur/nvc_General_e.asp. Accessed June 2008.

(6) 5060-1 (CMP) Memo from the Chief of Military Personnel to the Chief of Staff of the Minister of National Defence, *Ombudsman Special Report: Unfair Deductions from SISIP Payments to Former CF Members*, 2 May 2006 (released under the *Access to Information Act*).

have. It too judges the SISIP LTD reductions to be unfair.[7] In fact, all witnesses who appeared before us, with the exception of witnesses from the Department of National Defence (DND), felt the reductions were indeed unfair.

The Ombudsman's report delivered five recommendations, three of which have been implemented. Regrettably, DND has chosen not to move ahead with the two principal recommendations that call for an immediate end to SISIP LTD reductions and the reimbursement of Veterans who were subject to such reductions since 2000.

During our study of this issue DND was asked to provide two items of background information. First, they were asked for the average SISIP LTD payment for the past fiscal year. Second, they were asked to calculate the cost of reimbursing all Veterans whose SISIP LTD benefits had been reduced, since 1976. Both requests were made when DND witnesses appeared before us on 30 April 2008. At the time of publication of this report, DND had not yet replied.

FUTURE ACTION

The Subcommittee is concerned about all the Veterans who, since 1976, have had their SISIP LTD benefits reduced. We will revisit the complex issue of reimbursement later this year, when DND has provided the information requested.

RECOMMENDATION

> **That the government immediately cease the practice of reducing SISIP LTD benefits awarded to veterans, by the amount received in a *Pension Act* disability pension.**

([7]) DND and CF Ombudsman Special Report, *Unfair Deductions from SISIP Payments to Former CF Members*, October 2003, at: http://www.ombudsman.forces.gc.ca/rep-rap/sr-rs/sis-rar/index-eng.asp (accessed June 2008).

LIST OF WITNESSES

Organizations and Spokespersons	Date of Appearance
The Honourable Gregory Francis Thompson, P.C., M.P., Minister of Veterans Affairs Canada.	**March 5, 2008**
SISIP Financial Services: • André Bouchard, President. *Department of National Defence:* • Brigadier-General David Martin, Chief Executive Officer, Canadian Forces Personnel Support Agency.	**April 30, 2008**
The Royal Canadian Legion: • Jack Frost, Dominion President • Pierre Allard, Service Bureau Director *As individuals*: • Capt (ret) Sean Bruyea • Dennis Manuge • Peter Driscoll	**May 7, 2008**

RAPPORT SUR LA RÉDUCTION DES PRESTATIONS D'INVALIDITÉ À LONG TERME DU RÉGIME D'ASSURANCE-REVENU MILITAIRE

Un rapport provisoire du Sous-comité des anciens combattants
du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense

Président
L'honorable Michael A. Meighen

Vice-président
L'honorable Joseph A. Day

Juin 2008

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http://www.parl.gc.ca
(Travaux des comités – Sénat – 2e Session, 39e Législature)

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MEMBRES

SOUS-COMITÉ DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS
39E LÉGISLATURE, 2E SESSION

L'honorable Michael A. Meighen, président
L'honorable Joseph A. Day, vice-président
L'honorable Tommy Banks
L'honorable Colin Kenny
L'honorable Nancy Ruth

*L'honorable Marjory Lebreton, C.P. (ou l'honorable Gerald Comeau)
*L'honorable Céline Hervieux-Payette, C.P.
(ou l'honorable Claudette Tardif)
*Membres d'office

Autres sénateurs ayant participé aux travaux du sous-comité : Les honorable sénateurs Dallaire, Downe et Segal

Personnel de recherche de la Bibliothèque du Parlement :
Brigadier général (ret) Jim Cox

Greffières du sous-comité :
Shaila Anwar et Gaëtane Lemay

ORDRE DE RENVOI

Extrait des *Journaux du Sénat,* le mardi 20 novembre 2007 :

L'honorable sénateur Kenny propose, appuyé par l'honorable sénateur Banks,

Que le Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense soit autorisé à entreprendre une étude sur:

a) les services et les avantages sociaux offerts aux membres des Forces canadiennes, aux anciens combattants, aux membres des missions de maintien de la paix et à leurs familles en reconnaissance des services rendus au Canada ;

b) les activités commémoratives organisées par le ministère des Anciens combattants pour rappeler à tous les Canadiens les réalisations et les sacrifices des anciens combattants;

c) la mise en œuvre de la Charte des anciens combattants adoptée récemment;

Que le comité fasse périodiquement rapport au Sénat, au plus tard le 31 mars 2009.

La motion, mise aux voix, est adoptée.

Le greffier du Sénat

Paul C. Bélisle

RAPPORT SUR LA RÉDUCTION DES PRESTATIONS D'INVALIDITÉ À LONG TERME DU RÉGIME D'ASSURANCE-REVENU MILITAIRE

RÉSUMÉ

L'assurance invalidité prolongée (AIP) du Régime d'assurance-revenu militaire (RARM) est un régime d'assurance invalidité collective qui fournit aux membres des Forces canadiennes 75 p. 100 de leur solde lorsqu'ils sont libérés des Forces en raison d'une blessure invalidante[(1)]. La prestation est habituellement versée pendant un maximum de 24 mois, mais peut être payée pendant une plus longue période dans certains cas.

Les anciens combattants qui touchent des prestations d'AIP du RARM sont parfois aussi admissibles à une pension d'invalidité versée par le ministère des Anciens Combattants du Canada (ACC), en vertu de la *Loi sur les pensions*[(2)], pour la même blessure. Dans ces cas, le montant correspondant aux paiements versés en application de la *Loi sur les pensions* est déduit des prestations d'AIP du RARM, de sorte qu'au total, l'ancien combattant reçoive quand même 75 p. 100 de la solde qu'il touchait au moment où il a été libéré. De plus, un ancien combattant qui reçoit des prestations d'AIP du RARM réduites et une pension d'invalidité en vertu de la *Loi sur les pensions* pour une même blessure subira une autre réduction de ses prestations du RARM s'il devient ensuite admissible à une deuxième pension d'invalidité en vertu de la *Loi sur les pensions*, accordée en vue d'une deuxième blessure sans rapport avec la première.

Les anciens combattants considèrent injustes ces récupérations des prestations d'AIP du RARM. Elles semblent encore plus injustes du fait que les membres blessés qui restent dans les FC continuent de toucher l'intégralité de leur solde, en plus de la pension d'invalidité complète versée en vertu de la *Loi sur les pensions*. Les anciens combattants se demandent pourquoi on soustrait de leurs prestations du RARM le montant de la pension d'invalidité découlant de la *Loi sur les pensions*, alors que ce montant n'est pas déduit de la solde des membres actifs des FC.

Le Sous-comité a étudié la question et convient que la réduction des prestations d'AIP du RARM versées aux anciens combattants est effectivement injuste. Nous recommandons que le gouvernement mette fin immédiatement à cette pratique.

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(1) Voir les détails du régime d'AIP du RARM à (http://www.sisip.ca/fr/Downloads_f/901102_f.pdf, consulté en juin 2008).

(2) Ministère de la Justice du Canada. *Loi sur les pensions* (L.R., 1985, ch. P-6), (http://laws.justice.gc.ca/fr/ShowFullDoc/cs/P-6///fr, consulté en juin 2008).

CONTEXTE

La police d'AIP du RARM a été créée en 1969 afin de fournir aux membres des FC une protection du revenu en cas d'invalidité totale qui n'était pas liée au service militaire. Depuis 1975, le montant de la prestation d'AIP du RARM correspond à 75 p. 100 de la solde du membre au moment de sa libération, moins les réductions applicables.

En 1976, la couverture assurée par le RARM a été élargie afin d'inclure les blessures subies en cours de service, puisque dans certains cas les pensions versées en application de la *Loi sur les pensions* ne suffisaient pas. Par conséquent, les membres atteints d'invalidité totale qui ont droit à une pension d'invalidité non imposable versée en application de la *Loi sur les pensions* ont aussi droit, en vertu de l'AIP, à recevoir, toutes sources confondues, 75 p. 100 de la solde qu'ils touchaient au moment d'être libérés.

Les pensions d'invalidité découlant de la *Loi sur les pensions* ont été ajoutées à la liste des réductions applicables à l'AIP[3], en partie parce que le cumul des paiements d'invalidité provenant de deux sources fédérales pour une même blessure va à l'encontre des intentions du Conseil du Trésor à l'égard de ces régimes[4]. En réduisant les prestations du RARM, on fait également en sorte que le montant des prestations d'assurance-invalidité ne soit pas supérieur au revenu et que la valeur nette des prestations accordées soit comparable, que l'invalidité soit liée au service militaire ou non. Cette pratique a aussi permis à l'assureur de réduire au minimum le coût de l'AIP ainsi que le coût des primes, dont le financement est partagé par le Conseil du Trésor (85 p. 100) et les membres des FC (15 p. 100).

À l'origine, les pensions versées aux termes de la *Loi sur les pensions* étaient payables uniquement quand le militaire était libéré des FC. En 1971, la *Loi* a été modifiée afin que les membres des FC blessés dans une zone de service spécial (ZSS) puissent recevoir une pension d'invalidité, tout en restant en service. En octobre 2000, Anciens Combattants Canada a parrainé une modification à la *Loi sur les pensions* pour rendre admissible aux pensions d'invalidité les membres des FC blessés, peu importe où ils ont été blessés. Cette modification

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([3]) Le montant des prestations doit être réduit du total des montants provenant des sources suivantes : la *Loi sur la pension de retraite des Forces canadiennes*; le Régime de pensions du Canada ou la Régie des rentes du Québec; tout revenu d'emploi (réduction partielle dans le cas d'un programme de réadaptation); la *Loi sur les pensions*, y compris les indemnités de personnes à charge. Voir les détails du régime d'AIP du RARM, Partie III, Section 2, paragraphe 24, (http://www.sisip.ca/fr/Downloads_f/901102_f.pdf, consulté en juin 2008).

([4]) 5060-1 (CMP) Note de service du chef du personnel militaire au chef d'état-major du ministre de la Défense nationale. *Rapport spécial de l'Ombudsman de la MDN et des FC : Déductions injustes des paiements du RARM effectués à d'ex-membres des FC*, 2 mai 2006. Divulguée en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information.*

était destinée à rétablir la parité entre les membres actifs, mais elle a eu pour conséquence inattendue de soulever des doutes quant à l'équité de réduire les prestations d'AIP du RARM versées aux anciens combattants, ce qui a donné lieu, en octobre 2003, à une enquête par l'Ombudsman de la MDN et des FC.

LE PROBLÈME

Au fil des années, de nombreux anciens combattants ont été libérés des FC pour des raisons médicales, à cause de blessures liées au service militaire. Certaines de ces blessures sont si débilitantes que l'ancien militaire n'a pas pu occuper un emploi au civil. S'il était chanceux, et avait souscrit au RARM, il touchait des prestations d'AIP conçues pour fournir 75 p. 100 de la solde reçue au moment de la libération des FC. Ces paiements étaient versés pendant deux ans, après quoi ils pouvaient continuer au besoin.

Les anciens combattants blessés dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions sont aussi admissibles à une pension d'invalidité en vertu de la *Loi sur les pensions*, laquelle est administrée par AAC. Le montant de cette pension d'invalidité peut varier selon la gravité de la blessure, mais la pension est toujours exempte d'impôt et n'est pas considérée comme un revenu d'emploi aux fins de Revenu Canada.

Cependant, le RARM, pour sa part, considère comme un revenu les pensions d'invalidité versées aux termes de la *Loi sur les pensions*, de sorte que lorsqu'un ancien combattant blessé reçoit ce type de paiement, le RARM réduit les prestations d'AIP d'un montant équivalent. De cette façon, le montant total que touche l'ancien combattant continue de correspondre à 75 p. 100 de la solde à la date de sa libération des FC. De nombreux anciens combattants se sont plaints que cette récupération par le RARM est injuste.

De plus, si un ancien combattant blessé touche, en vue d'une blessure X, des prestations d'AIP du RARM réduites du montant équivalent à la pension d'invalidité versée en vertu de la *Loi sur les pensions*, il subira une autre réduction des prestations d'AIP correspondant aux montants des paiements d'invalidité distincts reçus pour une blessure Y, qui peut n'avoir aucun lien avec la blessure X en fonction de laquelle a été calculé à l'origine les paiements d'AIP du RARM. Cela signifie qu'un ancien combattant qui commence à recevoir une pension d'invalidité aux termes de la *Loi sur les pensions* en raison d'une perte d'ouïe, subira une déduction d'un montant équivalent de ses prestations d'AIP du RARM accordées pour son problème de genoux. Cette situation est aussi considérée très injuste par les anciens combattants.

Il existe encore un autre élément qui exacerbe l'impression d'injustice. Les cotisations au régime d'AIP du RARM sont obligatoires pour les membres actifs des FC. Les anciens combattants, après avoir payé des primes d'assurance pendant de nombreuses années, voient leurs prestations, qu'ils affirment avoir payées, réduites juste au moment où ils en ont le plus besoin.

DISCUSSION

Il convient de souligner que cette question ne vise pas les anciens militaires auxquels s'applique la nouvelle Charte des anciens combattants[5]. Par conséquent, la question des réductions des prestations d'AIP du RARM est circonscrite entre les années 1976 et 2006.

L'assurance invalidité prolongée du RARM relève du Conseil du Trésor. Les modifications apportées aux contrats ou aux taux doivent être approuvées par le Secrétariat du Conseil du Trésor qui fait ensuite une présentation au Conseil du Trésor s'il y a lieu. Le Chef d'état-major de la Défense (CEND) est le propriétaire de la police et, à ce titre, porte la responsabilité, en vertu du pouvoir qui lui est délégué, de conclure ou de rompre au nom des FC toute relation contractuelle avec l'assureur (Manuvie) et de suivre la gestion des régimes d'AIP.

La réduction des prestations d'AIP est une pratique courante et acceptée dans le secteur de l'assurance[(6)]. L'AIP du RARM garantit aux anciens combattants invalides un pourcentage plus élevé du salaire au moment de la libération que ce que prévoient la plupart des autres régimes du gouvernement. De plus, étant donné que la pension mensuelle versée en vertu de la *Loi sur les pensions* est non imposable et que les réductions à l'AIP du RARM sont effectuées en montants absolus, la prestation d'invalidité nette du demandeur, après impôt, augmente et finit par dépasser 75 p. 100 de la solde au moment de la libération.

La décision de 1976 portant que les prestations d'AIP s'appliquent aux invalidités liées au service a été prise afin que les bénéficiaires de la *Loi sur les pensions* ne soient pas défavorisés par rapport à ceux qui touchent des prestations d'AIP pour des raisons qui ne sont

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([5]) La nouvelle Charte des anciens combattants est entrée en vigueur en 2006. Elle prévoit l'octroi d'un montant forfaitaire pour blessure invalidante subie dans le contexte du service militaire. Ce montant forfaitaire est sans effet sur les prestations d'invalidité prolongée du Régime d'assurance-revenu militaire. On trouvera de plus amples renseignements sur la Charte sur le site du ministère des Anciens combattants (http://www.vac-acc.gc.ca/) et sur celui de la Légion royale canadienne (http://www.legion.ca/asp/docs/serv_bur/nvc_General_f.asp). Documents consultés en juin 2008.

([6]) 5060-1 (CMP) Note de service du chef du personnel militaire au chef d'état-major du ministre de la Défense nationale. *Rapport spécial de l'Ombudsman de la MDN et des FC : Déductions injustes des paiements du RARM effectués à d'ex-membres des FC*, 2 mai 2006. Divulguée en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information.*

pas liées au service, et non pour qu'ils reçoivent plus. Cet objectif a été réalisé. Les membres actifs des FC qui touchent une pension d'invalidité reçoivent plus d'argent qu'avant la modification apportée à la *Loi sur les pensions* en octobre 2000, mais les anciens combattants invalides, bien qu'ils ne touchent ni plus ni moins d'argent qu'avant, en reçoivent moins que les membres actifs des FC, d'où une impression d'injustice. Un membre blessé des FC qui reste actif reçoit à la fois sa pleine solde et la pension d'invalidité. Un ancien militaire plus gravement blessé reçoit une pension d'invalidité et seulement la part de l'AIP du RARM nécessaire pour que le montant total qu'il touche corresponde à 75 p. 100 de la solde à la date de sa libération.

CONSTATATIONS

Il s'agit d'une question extrêmement complexe, mais le Sous-comité s'est évertué à se concentrer sur la question centrale, à savoir si la méthode actuelle, qui réduit les prestations d'AIP du RARM versées aux anciens combattants, est juste. Nous avons conclu qu'elle ne l'est pas.

Le rapport spécial de l'Ombudsman de la Défense nationale et des Forces canadiennes d'octobre 2003 présente une analyse détaillée de la question et nous constatons avec plaisir qu'il en vient à la même conclusion que nous. Il juge aussi injustes les réductions des AIP du RARM[(7)]. En fait, tous les témoins qui ont comparu devant nous, à l'exception de ceux du ministère de la Défense nationale (MDN), conviennent que les réductions sont injustes.

Le rapport de l'Ombudsman contenait cinq recommandations dont trois ont été mises en œuvre. Malheureusement, le ministère de la Défense nationale a décidé de ne pas donner suite aux deux principales recommandations, soit qu'on mette fin immédiatement à la réduction des prestations d'AIP du RARM et que l'on rembourse les anciens combattants assujettis à ces réductions depuis 2000.

Au cours de notre étude sur la question, nous avons demandé au ministère de la Défense nationale de nous fournir deux éléments d'information. Premièrement, nous lui avons demandé le paiement moyen d'AIP du RARM pour l'exercice écoulé. Deuxièmement, nous lui avons demandé de calculer le coût du remboursement de tous les anciens combattants dont les prestations d'AIP du RARM avaient été réduites depuis 1976. Les deux demandes ont été

(7) Rapport spécial de l'Ombudsman de la MDN et des FC. *Déductions injustes des paiements du RARM effectués à d'ex-membres des FC*, octobre 2003, (http://www.ombudsman.forces.gc.ca/rep-rap/sr-rs/sis-rar/index-fra.asp, consulté en juin 2008).

adressées aux témoins du Ministère quand ils ont comparu le 30 avril 2008. Au moment de la publication du présent rapport, le Ministère ne nous avait pas encore répondu.

SUIVI

Le Sous-comité se soucie de tous les anciens combattants dont les prestations d'invalidité prolongée au titre du Régime d'assurance-revenu militaire ont été réduites depuis 1976. Nous reviendrons sur la question complexe du remboursement plus tard cette année, lorsque le ministère de la Défense nationale nous aura communiqué les informations que nous lui avons demandées.

RECOMMANDATION

Que le gouvernement cesse immédiatement de réduire les prestations d'AIP du RARM accordées aux anciens combattants d'un montant équivalent à la pension d'invalidité versée en vertu de la *Loi sur les pensions*.

LISTE DES TÉMOINS

Nom de l'organisme et représentants	Date de comparution
L'honorable Gregory Francis Thompson, C.P., député, Ministre des Anciens Combattants Canada	**5 mars 2008**
Services financiers du RARM : • André Bouchard, président *Ministère de la Défense nationale :* • Brigadier-général David Martin, président-directeur général, Agence de soutien du personnel des Forces canadiennes	**30 avril 2008**
La Légion royale canadienne : • Jack Frost, président national • Pierre Allard, directeur, Bureau d'entraide *À titre personnel :* • Capt (ret) Sean Bruyea • Dennis Manuge • Peter Driscoll	**7 mai 2008**

Four Generals and an Admiral:

The View from the Top

Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence

Committee Members

Sen. Colin Kenny – Chair
Sen. David Tkachuk – Deputy Chair
Sen. Tommy Banks
Sen. Joseph A. Day
Sen. Grant Mitchell
Sen. Michael A. Meighen
Sen. Wilfred P. Moore
Sen. Nancy Ruth
Sen. Rod A. A. Zimmer

Second Session
Thirty-ninth Parliament
2008

Ce document est disponible en français

Available on the Parliamentary Internet:
http://www.parl.gc.ca
(Committee Business – Senate – 2nd Session, 39th Parliament)

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Four Generals and an Admiral:

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THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE

39TH PARLIAMENT, 2ND SESSION

The Honourable Colin Kenny
Chair

The Honourable David Tkachuk
Deputy Chair

and

The Honourable Senators:

Tommy Banks
Joseph A. Day
Michael A. Meighen
Grant Mitchell
Wilfred P. Moore
Nancy Ruth
Rod A.A. Zimmer

*The Honourable Marjory Lebreton, P.C. (or the Honourable Gerald Comeau)
*The Honourable Céline Hervieux-Payette, P.C.
(or the Honourable Claudette Tardif)
*Ex Officio Members

Other Senators who have participated in the work of the committee on this topic:
The Honourable Senators Munson and Stollery

Special Advisors to the Committee:
MGen (ret) Keith McDonald and Barry Denofsky

Library of Parliament Research Staff:
Melissa Radford, Maureen Shields and Jason Yung

Clerks of the Committee:
Shaila Anwar and Gaëtane Lemay

Extract from the *Journals of the Senate*, Tuesday, November 20, 2007:

The Honourable Senator Kenny moved, seconded by the Honourable Senator Banks:

That the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence be authorized to examine and report on the national security policy of Canada. In particular, the committee shall be authorized to examine:

(*a*) the capability of the Department of National Defence to defend and protect the interests, people and territory of Canada and its ability to respond to and prevent a national emergency or attack, and the capability of the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to carry out its mandate;

(*b*) the working relationships between the various agencies involved in intelligence gathering, and how they collect, coordinate, analyze and disseminate information and how these functions might be enhanced;

(*c*) the mechanisms to review the performance and activities of the various agencies involved in intelligence gathering; and

(*d*) the security of our borders and critical infrastructure;

That the papers and evidence received and taken and work accomplished by the committee on this subject since the beginning of the First session of the Thirty-seventh Parliament be referred to the committee; and

That the committee report to the Senate no later than March 31, 2009 and that the committee retain all powers necessary to publicize its findings until 90 days after the tabling of the final report.

The question being put on the motion, it was adopted.

Paul C. Bélisle

Clerk of the Senate

An Interim Report on the State of the Military

On June 2 and June 9 five of Canada's most senior military officers, led by Lieutenant General Walt Natynczyk, expressed their views on the state of the Canadian military before the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence.

Lieutenant General Natynczyk's appointment as Chief of the Defence Staff was announced on June 5, just three days after he testified. The Committee also heard from four other officers senior enough to be considered for that top job:

- Lieutenant-General Michel Gauthier, Commander Canadian Expeditionary Force Command
- Vice-Admiral Drew Robertson, Commander of the Navy[1]
- Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, Commander of the Land Force[2]
- Lieutenant-General Angus Watt, Commander of the Air Force[3].

The Committee was anxious to hear from all five of these top officers in the wake of the release in May 2008 of the long awaited Canada First Defence Strategy by the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defence.

The Committee was interested in what progress has been made in restructuring the Forces. General Hillier, General Natynczyks' predecessor, had initiated an ambitious plan to reorganize the Forces, and the Committee was eager to get some insights as to whether the "transformed" military structure constituted an improvement on the previous model and whether changes might be required to improve the current structure's effectiveness.

[1] Also known as Chief of the Maritime Staff, (CMS)
[2] Also known as Chief of the Land Staff, (CLS)
[3] Also known as Chief of the Air Staff, (CAS)

The Committee was also interested in acquiring details on any budgetary problems facing the military. Committee members have repeatedly argued in recent years that Canada's military is seriously underfunded.

That case will be presented later in this report. It is based on two sets of assessments of what the Canadian Forces need to perform to the level Canadians require of their military: (a) the number-crunching the Committee has done on its own; and (b) the number-crunching that leaders of various branches of the military submitted to the Government earlier this year outlining their needs. The latter "needs lists" – three of which were leaked to the media after they were submitted – do document where Canada's military deficiencies lie and suggest that funding will have to be increased significantly or those weaknesses are going to be intensified.

Canadian Forces Funding to Erode

Members of the Committee are in general agreement that anyone who looks beyond occasional announcements of expensive equipment purchases, and beyond government promises of "stable" military funding into the future will find a most unpleasant reality: chronic underfunding that is going to get worse rather than better under current spending commitments.

Did we expect to hear this from the four generals and the admiral? Frankly, it would have been a surprise, particularly three days before the Prime Minister was to announce who General Hillier's successor would be. Government sources have made it clear to reputable Canadian journalists in recent months that the Prime Minister's Office was not pleased with General Hillier's outspokenness. So it would have been (a pleasant) surprise to have any of these officers acknowledge the funding problem.

Senior Canadian military brass is not expected to criticize their political bosses in public. The majority of our Committee's members may lament that fact, but with the tight reign the Prime Minister's Office keeps on politicians and civil servants generally, the chances of getting a candid appraisal of funding shortfalls were remote. Let the reader be the judge.

The Honourable Senator Tkachuk believes that what the Committee got from these senior officers over those two days of testimony *was* their best professional opinion rather than a message from the Prime Minister's Office.

The Brass Presented a Positive Front: It's a great Time to be in the Canadian Military!

The Committee heard nothing but positive testimony from all five senior officers about the improved state of the military, the high morale, the commitment from the Government to maintain reasonable funding levels, the impressive capital projects either in implementation or on the horizon, the challenging work that the Canadian Forces are doing, and the ability to conduct their government-assigned tasks. The gist of their message was that "it is a great time to be in the Canadian Military. "

However, Canadians have been hearing a very different story. They have been hearing that there are substantial funding shortages within the Canadian Forces and that extreme measures have been contemplated to mitigate the lack of resources provided to the various commands. Leaked "needs reports" from the Army, Navy and Air Force disseminated by the news media, which the Committee has seen, have suggested that none of the three branches have adequate funding to perform the roles expected of them in the coming years. Many defence analysts have gone on record as stating that Afghanistan is bleeding the remainder of the military dry when it comes to "reasonable funding levels" for the other missions and tasks.

The Committee had hoped to discuss these reports with the Commanders, but took Lieutenant General Natynczyk at his word when he said that it would be inappropriate to comment because the "business planning" process that these reports are part of had not been concluded – in other words, the Commanders had not been advised whether the gaps in funding identified in their reports would be filled. (DND has committed to providing the Committee with the copies of the final funding-authorization documents once the process is complete.)

The Commanders all stated that their concerns were being addressed, and that they were confident that they would receive all the funding they required to execute their assigned missions. The final allocations for this year had not been made, although they were expected by the end of June for the fiscal year 2008/09. Notwithstanding requests by the Committee for an update, the process had apparently not yet been completed at the time of writing of this report.

General Says Forces Protected From Future Fuel Cost Hikes

On the specific issue of the increased cost of fuel, Lieutenant General Natynczyk and the Commanders were unanimous that they had accounted for a significant increase in the price of fuel and had factored that increase into their plans. In fact, Lieutenant General Natynczyk went on to state that while the military expects fuel costs to rise over the next five years, there was adequate funding in the budget to address those increases. Increases in fuel costs, he said, would not have an impact on operations:

> **Senator Munson:** You were saying no matter what the fuel costs – because Canadians are all getting whacked on fuel costs – … you are saying no matter what the fuel costs, there will be no cuts?
>
> **Lieutenant General: Natynczyk:** What I am saying is "in-year", I can see that we have been able to address the pressures by the services in terms of what they are facing now for fuel…
>
> ...In terms of forever, I cannot make "forever" statements. I know my "in-year" and four years for sure, and those are the fuel costs. We have put that into our overall budgeting plan.[4]

Minority Governments Cannot Make Long-Term Commitments – Stable or Otherwise

The five senior officers presented a much rosier picture than has been mooted by many Canadian defence analysts, many of whom have expressed concern that Canada's mission to Afghanistan is putting a severe budgetary and operational strain on the Forces, and that, to date, nothing in announced Government military budgeting is likely to reduce that strain.

[4] Lieutenant General W. Natynczyk, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, June 2, 2008, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.

According to Lieutenant General Natynczyk:

> Together, Budgets 2005 and 2006 represent approximately a 30 percent increase to the defence services program over a period of six years. However, long-term planning and resource management are best accomplished within a stable and predictable funding environment. Budget 2008 addressed this requirement with a commitment to raise the automatic annual increase in defence funding from 1.5 to 2 percent, beginning in 2011-12. Over the next 20 years, this will provide National Defence with an additional $12 billion in funding. This infusion of stable, predictable funding allows the department to plan beyond the next budget cycle to conduct a comprehensive examination of the defence portfolio and future requirements.

He also said:

> . . . we have seen that defence funding in the next four to five years will increase at a greater rate than our capacity – particularly with regard to personnel, industry and the capital procurement approval process – to fully invest the available funds across the four components for military capacity: personnel, capital, infrastructure and operational readiness.

Is the General *really* saying that the Canadian Forces – known for their can-do capacity for innovation – don't have the dexterity to expand, even if they were given the funds to do so? Or should his words be interpreted to mean the Government will not *allow* him to expand? The General is known as a warrior, an innovator, and a superb organizer. And he couldn't find a way to grow the Forces in the next four or five years if he had the money? Hard to believe.

In fact, asked what major challenges would face the new Chief of the Defence Staff, Lieutenant General Natynczyk's answer wasn't about finding money or equipment, or winning the war in Afghanistan – it was about keeping the trust of the public back home.

General Says Money Not the Problem

> **Lieutenant General Natynczyk:** We are riding a wave in Canada where Canadians can identify with those men and women who are in harm's way, representing them, be they at the point of the spear in

> Afghanistan, be they at 40,000 feet, or in the North Atlantic. [5]

While the Committee agrees that the Canadian Forces have won new respect among Canadians during General Hillier's tenure, we disagree with the rosy testimony we heard from these senior officers that other problems – most of which stem from inadequate financing – are under control. In fact there are significant challenges that must be overcome. These are challenges that our witnesses obviously had difficulty in addressing in public, but they are challenges that the Canadian public needs to be aware of.

After years of scraping by with insufficient funds, the Canadian Forces' senior leadership gives the impression that it is happy with the level of funding that has been announced. Has their experience driven their expectations so low that they no longer want to face the consequences of pushing for robust, capable, effective and expanded Canadian Forces that Canada's interests demand? Or are the political pressures to toe the Government's line so intense that nobody dares speak? Whatever the reason, a cone of silence seems to have dropped over public debate of this very important issue.

[5] Lieutenant General Natynczyk, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, June 2, 2008, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.

Scrutinizing the Real Challenges Facing the Canadian Forces

Challenge # 1 – Budget

Lieutenant General Natynczyk observed that the Canadian Forces budget has grown substantially over the past few years and that the Government commitment to an annual increase of 1.5percent until 2011 and 2percent from 2011/12 until 2031[6] meant that the Canadian Forces was able to develop a long term plan based on "guaranteed" funding levels.

It should be noted that while this Canada First "plan" was publicized in speeches and press releases, and outlined on the DND website, no official government document has yet appeared to nail down the details of how the strategy will be implemented. Very convenient.

Lieutenant General Natynczyk was adamant that there are sufficient funds within the Defence budget to address the large capital project outlay required over the next 25 years, grow the force, rebuild and repair defence infrastructure and complete transformation. He stated that the defence budget would grow by $12 billion over the period 2011 to 2031.

> **The Chair:** On the subject of the Canada First defence plan, the increases in your budget are 1.5 percent until 2011, and then for the next 10 years, 2 percent. If you do the calculations, we drop from 1.2 to 1.3 percent of GDP down to .87 percent of GDP. When you take a look at increases in inflation, and particularly military inflation, which appears to be higher than the Consumer Price Index, how will you afford to fund things down the road?
>
> **Lieutenant General Natynczyk:** Senator, all I can say is that we have looked at the estimates we have in terms of those budgets allocated. We have looked at the major combat fleet replacements

[6] The Canada First Defence Strategy which was published on the DND website after the testimony was taken outlined the Government commitment of funding until 2027/28 not 2031.

> over that period of time and the essential combat capabilities. One of the things we had to do was to lay out over that period of time how we will afford those combat replacements in the numbers that were announced. Based upon the best budget information we have from our costers dealing with the acquisition people, we laid out a plan where it was achievable to meet those requirements over that period of time. […]
>
> **The Chair**: General, on this there is a paper coming forward at some point, and I must say that the committee struggles with these numbers. Can we arrange for further briefing on it to get an understanding of how the financing works into the future?
>
> **Lieutenant General Natynczyk:** Absolutely. Again, my chief of program, Assistant Deputy Minister of Finance and Corporate Services, worked out our costing formulas into the future. We went through a rigorous process to ensure that right down to the individual person, the individual supply supporting that ship, that aircraft, that soldier battalion in the field has been costed from stem to stern.
>
> **The Chair:** No one here has said you are wrong, but we are saying there is a degree of scepticism going forward that you are sufficiently funded, and we would like to, at some point over the next few weeks, arrange for someone to give us more briefing on that.
>
> **Lieutenant General Natynczyk:** Absolutely.[7]

To date this has not happened.

The General appears satisfied with enough funding to *replace* the military's basic needs.

Again, we come back to funding. The problem is that the "guaranteed" increase in the DND budget will in fact be a decrease in any year that defence price inflation exceeds 1.5 percent (until 2011), and 2 percent thereafter. It is inconceivable that inflation on defence costs will come in under 2 percent over the next decade. This means that the "guaranteed *increases*" will almost surely be "guaranteed *decrease*s."

[7] Lieutenant General Natynczyk, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, June 2, 2008, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.

Why isn't 2 percent enough? For a start, the Canadian Forces should be playing catch-up. Long years of underfunding by previous Progressive Conservative and Liberal governments, and now the current Government, calls for a surge in funding, not a diminution. With only the lowest-common-denominator funding required for *replacing* current equipment and personnel, there is nothing left for the growth and revitalization of the Canadian Forces that Canada needs and that this Government promised during the last election campaign. With this kind of minimalist funding, the Canadian military will remain over-stretched, with only enough capacity to sustain 1,000 troops on the battlefield in a single location, and no more. That equates to the same kind of overstretching of our military that Canadians have had to endure for more than two decades.

The Decrease That Pretends to Be an Increase

- How can a 2 percent annual *increase* lead to a real decrease in defence spending? Simply because there probably isn't an economist in the country who believes that Canada's inflation rate is going to be 2 percent or lower in the coming years. In the July 16 *Globe and Mail*, the Bank of Canada estimated that inflation will rise to above 4 percent early in the next year. That will mean that the Canadian Forces will suffer a spending cut of 2.5 percent in the first year of the Government's spending schedule.

Higher fuel prices, higher food prices and higher commodity prices are driving up inflation rates around the world, and Canada is no exception. Moreover, the inflation rate on defence purchases always runs higher than the normal inflation rate. Improvements in defence equipment are based on improvements in sophisticated high cost technology.

In short, 2 percent budgetary increases will become decreases in any year that the military's inflation rate is above 2 percent, and it is safe to predict that this will happen every year into the foreseeable future.

"Stable predictable funding" at the 2 percent level will mean diminished spending power for the Canadian Forces in any year that military costs rise more than 2 percent.

The truth is that there is no such thing as "stable, predictable funding" in a parliamentary democracy. The current government is in a minority position. It may

win the next federal election or it may not, but if it does not win – and win a majority – all of its funding guarantees go out the window.

Defence Spending as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

One honest way of determining whether a government is increasing a country's defence funding appropriately is to measure that spending as a percentage of GDP. This means that, as a country, we tie our defence spending to the wealth we create. Wealth goes up – so does defence spending. Wealth goes down, the reverse.

Defence expenditures measured as a percentage of Canada's annual Gross Domestic Product will continue to plummet under this spending formula. Both the Committee and the Conference of Defence Associations estimate that the Defence Budget in 10 years could fall to as low .89 per cent of GDP[8], less than half the NATO goal. The Conference of Defence Associations further estimated that it could plummet to .77 percent of GDP over 15 years – down to a little more than a third of the NATO target of 2 % of GDP agreed to by all member countries.

How will all the defence spending that the Government has announced fit into this shrinking budget? Lieutenant General Natynczyk stated that the five projects announced by the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defence in early May 2008 could cost upwards of $45-$50 Billion. Or more.

The Government has already started running into trouble fitting big promises into small spending envelopes. It is encountering delays, uncertainties, cost overruns and/or refusals to bid on the Maritime Helicopter Project, the Joint Support Ship Project, the Halifax Class Modernization/Frigate Life Extension, the Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle Project, repair of the Cormorant tail rotor,, the replacement of the fixed-wing search and rescue fleet, replacements for the Aurora surveillance aircraft, the purchase of attack helicopters, the replacement of the destroyer fleet, the purchase of surveillance satellites, the purchase of new fighters and the replacement of all the equipment that will be worn out and left behind in Afghanistan.

Nor does there appear to be enough funding to increase the number of personnel in the Canadian Forces by the number the government originally promised (15,000,

[8] Email from CDA, April 30, 2008.

since cut to 7,500), let alone the 25,000 additional personnel the Committee believes that the Canadian Forces really need.

Blithe Spirits

So why did four generals and an admiral say they are happy with a guarantee that isn't really a guarantee, and that carries a percentage that is so low that the spending power of the Canadian Forces is almost surely going to decline, as is the military budget as a percentage of government spending? A two percent increase is ludicrous, as any government accountant must be well aware. A two percent increase *over and above* inflation would at least be an honest gesture. But even that won't come close to meeting the NATO target.

Perhaps the Government will come through with additional funding to cover skyrocketing fuel costs, when fuel accounts for such a major component of military spending.

Perhaps some magical way will be found to cover the funding gap outlined in the needs reports of the Navy, Army and Air Force. Lieutenant General Natynczyk is hopeful that budgetary funds that lapsed last year and may lapse this year because of slow purchasing procedures can somehow be used to cover the shortfalls. To receive substantial lapsed funding on a regular basis would require a change in government policy. [9]

There is, of course, a third "perhaps." Perhaps the Government will finally acknowledge that a 1.5 percent "guarantee" of increased funding that will shift to 2 percent in 2011 amounts to a budget cut for the Canadian Forces.

At this point, however, there hasn't been the slightest hint from the Government that any of these adjustments are in the works.

[9] Lieutenant General Natynczyk, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, June 2, 2008, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.

Challenge # 2 – Personnel

The Committee agrees with testimony from these senior officers that the men and women of the Canadian Forces are doing outstanding work on behalf of Canadians. Their dedication and ability is not in question. The problem is that there are not enough of them. The pay and benefits shortfalls of the 1990s have largely been addressed. Nonetheless, the Forces Reduction Program (FRP) and limited recruiting during the 1990s have produced a shortage in trained and experienced personnel. So something has to be done.

> **Senator Zimmer:** What keeps you awake at night?
>
> **Lieutenant General Natynczyk:** People. I worry about having the right person, at the right time, with the right skill set and the right training to do his or her job. We are learning about the demographics. Our recruiting dropped in the 1990s. We have a few generations of military members reaching their 20-, 25- and 30-year windows. Yet, those who we should have hired in the 1990s are not right there providing them that bench strength.[10]

All three services are hollowed out at the core, short of the kinds of experienced non-commissioned officers and the mid-level officers needed in the training system who can take on complex staff issues from planning to project management. This shortage has been exacerbated by additional demand for "experienced personnel" to fill positions in the new headquarters organizations created by General Hillier's vision of a transformed Canadian Forces.

Given the concerns over lack of staff – or "bench strength," as Lieutenant General Natynczyk calls it – it is impossible to understand how the Government could announce a plan, with great fanfare, to increase regular forces by 15,000 and reserves by 10,000 in 2006, then in November 2007 very quietly make the decision to "reprofile" the Canadian Forces by reducing the 15,000 regulars increase to 7,500 and reducing the 10,000 reservists increase to 1,000 and delay the whole process by another year. No wonder Lieutenant General Natynczyk lies awake worrying about lack of bench strength.

[10] Lieutenant General Natynczyk, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, June 2, 2008, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.

This Committee has been on the record for seven years that the Canadian Forces needs 90,000 personnel simply to meet the kinds of demands that respective governments have made of it – let alone take on new tasks.

Transformation Bloating Military Staff

General Hillier's transformation plan introduced a function-based command structure to the Forces. Previously, the Forces featured a Chief of Defence Staff, a Deputy Chief of Defence staff in charge of all domestic and foreign operations, and a Vice-Chief of Defence Staff who handled long-term planning and internal issues.

The new system called for a Chief of Defence Staff, General Hillier, and four new commands reporting to him: Canada Command, Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command, Canadian Operational Support Command and Canadian Special Operations Forces Command[11], each with its own bureaucracy. Those bureaucracies have inhaled top personnel that could have been commanding and training. General Hillier's staff itself grew to more than 100 personnel, and gained a reputation for micromanaging[12] in the other jurisdictions.

For the most part, all of the Commanders endorsed the "transformed headquarters" as a logical method to address operations. Creating two different commands responsible for operations was deemed to be an effective method of dividing and managing missions. Lieutenant General Gauthier, the Commander of Canadian Expeditionary Command (CEFCOM) responsible for all Canadian Forces missions outside Canada, stated that he was continually challenging his staff to find better ways to execute their planning and coordination tasks. He stated that the command was still in transition and some responsibilities had been transferred to different parts of the Canadian Forces as they were not strictly related to "overseas

[11] Canada Command is responsible for military operations within Canada,
Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command is responsible for military operations outside Canada
Canadian Operational Support Command delivers national-level operational support to Canadian Forces missions at home and abroad; and Canadian Special Operations Forces Command provides agile, high-readiness Special Operations Forces capable of operating across the spectrum of conflict at home and abroad.

[12] Lieutenant General R.R. Crabbe (retired), Vice Admiral L.G. Mason (retired)' Lieutenant General F.R. Sutherland (retired), *"A Report on the Validation of the Transformed Canadian Forces Command Structure,"* 31 January 2007.

missions." As a force employer, he did not encounter the personnel, training and infrastructure challenges facing the force generators.

The Force Generators, (Commanders of the Navy, Army and Air Force), while supportive of the new command structure, were less enthusiastic about the requirement to provide experienced officers and senior non-commissioned officers to populate the new commands. This requirement left them short of experience in a myriad of areas of responsibility – from training, to planning, to project management.

A report[13] on the new command structure, prepared for the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) by three former senior officers, criticized the redundancy in the new structure, but suggested that now was not the time to make significant changes to the present transformed command headquarters. The feeling was that there are too many diverse tasks facing the Canadian Forces at the present time. Lieutenant General Gauthier stated that the organizational structure continues to be a contentious topic among Commanders and senior National Defence Headquarters staff:

> **Lieutenant General Gauthier:** The last time we got together as operational Commanders, together with force generators with the VCDS, CDS, Chief of Force Development and others and looked at how we were doing and whether or not we were on the right track, was certainly within the last three months, looking ahead out past the 2010 Olympics.
>
> **Senator Meighen:** What was the answer?
>
> **Lieutenant General Gauthier:** The answer was, we are on the right course. At this stage, there is not a strong appetite to make dramatic changes one way or the other. We are immersed in a challenge in Afghanistan. We are immersed in another challenge, which is to prepare for domestic challenges on a day-to-day basis as well as longer-term, with major events coming up in 2010.

[13] Lieutenant General R.R. Crabbe (retired), Vice Admiral L.G. Mason (retired), Lieutenant General F.R. Sutherland (retired), *"A Report on the Validation of the Transformed Canadian Forces Command Structure,"* 31 January 2007.

> I cannot speak for the new Chief of the Defence Staff and I cannot speak for the minister, either, but I would not expect there to be dramatic changes between now and the 2010 Olympics.[14]

More Project Managers Needed

Another part of the personnel challenge is finding qualified project managers to work on the large number of capital projects already contracted and announced by the Government. The Canadian Forces have come through a period during which there were very few major crown projects, so they lost some of their capacity and capability to manage large projects. If the announced projects are approved, then the Canadian Forces will be required to manage a large number of major crown projects simultaneously. The Air Force and the Navy are facing a number of projects with an inadequate number of experienced and qualified project managers.

As Vice Admiral Robertson stated:

> I have a challenge to find the number of people that the materiel group will need to manage the project teams, and that is something I will be working on over the next couple of years. It will mean restructuring some of what we do inside the maritime staff and inside the Navy as well. I will also need help from the vice chief in terms of freeing up people with particular skills to (be) able to turn to this capitalization.[15]

The Question: The fundamental question is why are we spending $18 billion a year on a "newly transformed" Canadian Forces that can only sustain 1,000 soldiers in combat on a continuous basis?

Clearly, transformation has done nothing to solve this problem, and many would argue that the new, enlarged staff it created has taken away the very people that should be being used by the force generators to train new recruits or to work as project managers to obtain new equipment.

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[14] Lieutenant General M. Gauthier, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, June 9, 2008, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.
[15] Vice Admiral Drew Robertson, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, June 9, 2008, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.

Recruitment, Attrition and The Painful Legacy of the 1990s Reductions

Between Afghanistan and the new system, the Canadian military is short-staffed in places in which it most needs key personnel. The Navy is approximately one ship's company short of personnel on each coast. Even this is based on the assumption that we have a Navy that is the right size. In previous reports we have talked about Canada's changing demographics and the growing importance of the Asia-Pacific theatre, which is dominated by naval power.

As it takes 10 to 15 years to design and build a ship, Canada must start now to ensure that we have the Navy we need. The cost of failing to do this will be paid over the next two decades when we will have to do without the command-and-control and air defence capabilities of destroyers. The planned 15 surface combatants and four submarines will clearly be insufficient to protect Canada and further its interests. A forward-looking government should be examining a continuous shipbuilding program involving twice that number – providing both valuable manufacturing jobs and security for the country.[16]

To man these vessels the Navy will need to fill existing vacancies and then recruit for the future.

While Admiral Robertson was asked only about personnel, and not capital projects, he – more than anyone – knows about the need to balance the Navy between the Atlantic and Pacific coast, and expanding it to meet the challenges hurtling toward Canada from the Asia-Pacific.

Vice Admiral Robertson, Chief of the Maritime Staff, addressed his personnel shortages during his testimony:

> **Senator Meighen:** Welcome, Vice-Admiral Robertson. I want to ask you about shortages, not so much in relation to the challenges you face with respect to the capital projects, design and that sort (of) business, but the more traditional shortages. We were told that the Army is

[16] The Committee is reviewing its previous recommendation (#27) expressed in its 2006 report "The Government's Number One Job" which stated "The Government aggressively pursue the recapitalization of the Navy and Coast Guard fleets as quickly as possible, wherever the most cost-effective solutions can be acquired"

> missing a whole middle management sector, the senior non-commissioned officers and the people who do the training. Are you faced with a similar type of shortage in the Navy? ….
>
> **Vice Admiral Robertson:** We have some issues that are common across the Canadian Forces and others that are quite different. The common issue for all is that the force reduction program of the 1990s was done over a very short period of time and a relatively narrow group of people left. As a result, we have quite a distortion in the ideal age curve for the Canadian Forces. The age profile with the lowest number of people is coming to the point at which they can elect retirement and receive appropriate benefits. The decision making is in their hands at that point.
>
> The challenge would be a Navy that is under strength by about 400 people now, which is close to two ship's companies, although that may be aggregating it improperly.[17]

The Army's operational capacity has not grown to any extent in the past five years, in spite of a number of increases in Army intake.

Lieutenant General Leslie, Chief of the Land Staff, addressed his personnel issues as follows:

> **Senator Meighen:** I am sorry, but why is it not running at 100 percent? Is it because it is not big enough; is it because there is not enough money; is it because there are not enough people?
>
> **Lieutenant General Leslie:** The main issue for the Army is junior and senior NCOs, non-commissioned officers, the core and backbone of any Army, are leaving.
>
> **Senator Meighen:** They are leaving.
>
> **Lieutenant General Leslie:** However, we are placing additional demands on them. Because of demographics they are leaving, but thankfully many are choosing to stay when they could get moderately well-paying jobs. I was going to say great-paying jobs, but I do not

[17] Vice Admiral Drew Robertson, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, June 9, 2008, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.

> want to encourage other senior NCOs to leave. They are staying out of a sense of duty and trying to pass on their hard-earned experience to the folks coming behind them.
>
> The Army right now is short 1,000 master corporals, which is the base level leadership. [18]

"The great paying jobs" Lieutenant General Leslie was referring to for senior NCOs is clearly a coded request for more money. Of course, there are other factors such as too many months away from home that disrupt and sometimes destroy families. But pay, retention packages and bonuses would obviously assist in solving the General's personnel problems. Too many key people – still under the age of 50 – are retiring to take their pensions and to go to better-paying jobs.

The Air Force is short of pilots and experienced technicians, with a total strength of approximately 11,670 trained and qualified regular Air Force members and 2,300 reservists[19].

Lieutenant General Watt, Chief of the Air Staff, addressed his personnel shortages as follows:

> **Senator Zimmer:** Currently you need to attract, train and retain people. You indicated that years ago you were giving them buy-outs. Why was that? Did you have a saturation of pilots at that time?
>
> **Lieutenant General Watt:** In the mid-1990s, we had to rapidly downsize the Canadian Forces. As a result, we had the FRP, the force reduction program, which targeted certain occupations that were over strength based on the revised need for the Canadian Forces after the downsizing.
>
> At that time, the pilot occupation was over strength because the Air Force was being downsized. By the rules of the day, pilots were included in that forced reduction program and were given bonuses to

[18] Lieutenant General Andrew Leslie, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, June 2, 2008, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.
[19] Lieutenant General Angus Watt, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, June 9, 2008, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.

> leave. We paid people to get out and quickly overshot our target, went well below it and have never recovered.[20]

A number of "mitigation" strategies have been developed by the various services, such as reviews of training courses, increased use of simulation, and computer-based training. But the gap in experienced personnel persists and bold steps must be taken to solve this problem. Governments and the Canadian Forces have known it was coming for a decade, and our leaders – Liberal and Conservative - have all ducked.

The Army is initiating a "fast track" system to promotion through "battlefield promotion" criteria and applying a higher factor to "operational field experience" to accelerate promotion to master corporal this year, and then using the same "operational field experience criteria" to address more senior ranks in upcoming years. Under the circumstances this is one of a number of strategies that must be taken to dig out of the hole the Army is in.

Gender Issues

The Committee heard testimony that the military is increasing its efforts to recruit and integrate women into all trades in the military.

> **Senator Mitchell**: I think the military has made a great deal of progress in integrating women. I notice that you have a woman officer with you here today. She is not from the Air Force, though.
>
> In particular, given the pressures of personnel and so on, what is the percentage of your personnel who are women? Is there some opportunity to attract more women to this career? Are you taking steps in that regard?
>
> **Lieutenant General Watt:** The Air Force has 18 percent women, which is one of the highest in the Canadian Forces in the regular force, and 28 percent of our reservists are women. We have women at every level and in every occupation, pilot, maintainers, engineers …

[20] Lieutenant General Angus Watt, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, June 9, 2008, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.

> at every level in the Air Force; we welcome females and enable their success.[21]

Lieutenant General Watt provided the Committee with a recent example of the Air Force adapting its policies to provide airwomen with equal opportunities. According to Lieutenant General Watt, in the last four years, the Air Force has developed a "world class system" that has redefined anthropometric standards, which "define for air crew the length of various limbs on your body to ensure that you can fit into cockpits."[22] Previous standards dated back to the 1940s. According to Watt, "this modernization allows for a greater proportion of females, who tend to be a bit smaller, to now qualify for air crew."[23]

However, there is room for improvement. Unfortunately, efforts to recruit women into the Canadian Forces are not consistent across all services. Vice Admiral Robertson did mention that he would like to see an increase in the recruitment of women, as well as Francophones. In terms of female sailors, he has seen the numbers drop over the last few years, a trend that he is concerned about. According to Vice Admiral Robertson, he is looking for "the best talent we can bring through the door."[24]

The Committee notes that each Force Generator highlighted its concerns about recruitment including the need to recruit from all sectors of Canadian society. The Commanders would like to see a Canadian Forces that is representative of today's Canada and the Committee is supportive of this commitment.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325

The Committee was disappointed that not all the Commanders knew about United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, or about the training provided by the Canadian Forces to its deploying members based on the Resolution. Resolution 1325 is the first resolution ever passed by the Security

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[21] Lieutenant General Angus Watt, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, June 9, 2008, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.
[22] Lieutenant General Angus Watt, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, June 9, 2008, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.
[23] Lieutenant General Angus Watt, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, June 9, 2008, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.
[24] Vice Admiral Drew Robertson, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, June 9, 2008, 39th Parliament, and 2nd Session.

Council that specifically addresses the impact of war on women, and women's contributions to conflict resolution and sustainable peace.[25]

> **Senator Nancy Ruth:** One's perspective is a function of where we sit, and here I sit as a woman on this Committee. My interest is a question about training, particularly about something known as resolution 1325. Resolution 1325 is the United Nations Security Council resolution, which Canada was part of drafting and accepting, on women, peace and security. It is of great concern to me that soldiers know about this before they go overseas.
>
> Can you tell me a bit about how that feeds into your curriculum and what kind of training soldiers get in that?
>
> **Lieutenant General Leslie:** Senator, I am not aware, and I apologize for that, of any specific training which is based on United Nations Security Council resolution 1325.[26]

The Committee understands that not all members of the Canadian Forces would have the opportunity to engage with local women while on deployments. The Navy, for example, mainly interdicts and boards suspicious vessels on the high seas where they confront mainly male pirates or conduct search and rescue operations where men and women are treated equally. However, the Committee remains concerned about military personnel who are on the ground, participating in stabilization missions overseas, and Canada's obligation in upholding UNSCR 1325. Lieutenant General Gauthier did shed some light on this issue:

> **Lieutenant General Gauthier:** The most important aspect of applying these resolutions and there are any number of Security Council resolutions that apply is to ensure our personnel are properly trained prior to going overseas.
>
> I am informed by the Army that all of our personnel deployed on missions abroad receive specific pre-deployment training on the protection of women, children and other vulnerable populations. The

[25] Security Council Resolution 1325 was passed unanimously on 31 October 2000 .For more information on this resolution see: http://www.peacewomen.org/un/sc/1325.html

[26] Lieutenant General Andrew Leslie, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, June 2, 2008, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.

> curriculum for this training is given at Kingston at the Peace Support Training Centre, and it is regularly updated.[27]

Although the Committee acknowledges and encourages this type of pre-deployment training, we are also interested in the follow-through. The Committee is interested in knowing whether or not this training is useful and effective in practical terms, as well as whether or not this training is having an impact on the ground. Lieutenant General Gauthier told the Committee that he would ask these questions on his next visits to Canadian missions overseas[28]. The Committee acknowledges Lieutenant General Gauthier's support on this issue and looks forward to hearing of his findings.

Challenge #3 – Equipment

The five senior officers all expressed delight with the announced capital acquisition plans. They have already conducted their planning on the assumption that old time-expired platforms will be replaced in a timely way with new, more capable platforms.

They should be more wary. This assumption has repeatedly failed to bear fruit as governments continue to encounter difficulties with estimating, contracting and getting delivery on time. The current problems with the Joint Support Ship and Halifax-Class life extension and managing contracts such as the submarine project and maritime helicopter project are two examples that have almost become the rule. Late arrival of new equipment means that more funds are required to maintain and extend the life of existing equipment.

To fit with the "plan", a number of actions have already been taken to extend the present life expectancy of major equipment operated by the Canadian Forces. For example, the number of CF 18s being flown has been reduced from 79 to mid- to

[27] Lieutenant General M. Gauthier, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, June 9, 2008, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.
[28] Lieutenant General M. Gauthier, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, June 9, 2008, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.

upper-60s to ensure the aircraft will last until 2017, when the new fighter is expected to come on line. Similar limitations have been placed on the Aurora aircraft.[29]

Even with these attempts to mitigate the problem, there will be a gap in capability due to the retirement of fleets prior to being replaced. One such example is the "area air defence capability" and command-and-control capability of the Navy. With the retirement of the destroyers, the Canadian fleet will lose the ability to conduct area air defence[30] until a replacement comes online in the 2020-to-2030 timeframe. There may be similar problems with submarines, C-130Js Hercules aircraft, and other platforms.

Challenge # 4 – Excessive Infrastructure

DND owns huge amounts of infrastructure spread out across the country. A lot of the infrastructure is in bad shape. Maintaining excess infrastructure drains funds from operations.

When DND buys new equipment, that equipment often requires new infrastructure, so infrastructure costs continue to rise, and the military scrambles to find purses to steal from. A large part of the additional infrastructure in Trenton to support C17 operations, for instance, was not bankrolled from capital project funds, but shunted over from an Air Force budget that had already been struggling to meet demands.

One hopes that the solution will be found in the Canada First Defence Strategy, since it has announced that infrastructure improvement will be a high priority item in future DND budgets. In fact, the Strategy states that a new "National Portfolio Management Plan" is being developed that will result in:

- 25 percent of infrastructure being replaced or refurbished in the next 10 years
- 50 percent being replaced over the next 20 years.[31]

[29] On 18 December 2007, the Minister of National Defence announced that only 10 of the Aurora aircraft fleet would complete core structural upgrades. Flying rates are being reduced to extend the life of the aircraft to 2020.
[30] Vice Admiral Drew Robertson *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, June 9, 2008, 39th Parliament, and 2nd Session.
[31] DND technical briefing on Canada First Defence Strategy 14 May 2008

That seems to be the idea, but then no detailed plan has been forthcoming, so it is hard to tell whether the numbers support the promises.

When will the Government tell us what infrastructure will be eliminated? The Canadian Forces are riddled with redundant infrastructure from coast to coast to coast, and it is time for the Government to make the tough decisions required to reduce the waste.

Conclusion:
When and How Much

The Committee admires the positive attitude of the senior officers who appeared before us on June 2 and June 9. It is clear that they are all enthusiastically addressing their challenges to provide the best "defence product" for the Canadian taxpayer that is possible given their funding levels. Canadians should be proud of the many ways the Canadian Forces find of making do within impossible budgets and unnecessary infrastructure burdens.

That having been said, budgets have been too tight under both Liberal and Conservative governments over the past two decades to give Canadians a reasonable level of protection at home and to allow them to contribute to a more stable world abroad.

Not only is current funding too low, it is not cost-effective. Current funding barely allows Canada to field a fighting force of 1,000 in any given off shore theatre – the current theatre being Afghanistan. There isn't enough funding to go into any other theatre whatever the need might be to do that. And in the case of Afghanistan, it isn't enough for Canadian Forces alone to secure the Kandahar Province area.

It is clear to everyone that the Canadian Forces are desperately short of personnel. This is largely outside of the Forces' control. More funding to assist in mounting an aggressive recruiting program, streamline intake processes and expand training capability are critical to the much-needed expansion of the Canadian Forces.

The Committee's issues are not with the Forces and those who command them. Our issues continue to revolve around a shortfall in the funding level of the Forces, and timely approval of major capital projects. It is one thing to announce that a project is part of a plan, but if there is no overall plan put forward for the public to assess, then how can anybody decide whether it will really be feasible to do a number of different things within a specified spending envelope?

We applaud the announcement of the Canada First Defence Strategy. But it is not enough to *announce* a strategy – if there is really any thoughtful planning behind this strategy it needs to be spelled out. Photo ops aren't enough on these important

issues. Canadians need to see the nuts and bolts of the Strategy to determine whether its various parts fit together.

The five military leaders who appeared before the Committee are highly decorated, combat-experienced men who have demonstrated outstanding managerial abilities and risen to the very peak of their profession. The Prime Minister was indeed privileged to have such excellent people from whom to choose a new Chief of Defence Staff. Any of the five would have been up to the job. They are men of intelligence, courage and integrity. But they need the tools to do the job.

The Committee has the following observations based on seven years of testimony examining Canada's military policy, and its reaction to the announcement of the Canada First Defence Plan.

- The Committee notes that all Commanders (other than the force employers) acknowledged that they have significant personnel shortage issues that must be addressed immediately.
- The Committee notes that experienced leadership is in short supply for operations. There are too many capable operational people involved in bureaucratic staff duplication.
- The Committee notes that specialized trades are at a premium, both because trades people have reached retirement age, and the resource-based economic boom in Canada is poaching qualified personnel. The Forces are going to have to forge a plan to deal with this: no modern military can operate without adequate skilled trades' people.
- The Committee notes that the Canadian Forces will experience significant challenges in finding the "project management" personnel needed to manage the large number of capital projects coming on line. Finding military project managers for upcoming major acquisitions will create staff shortages in the Navy, Air Force and to a lesser extent, the Army.
- DND has too much infrastructure and needs direction from the Government to divest itself of anything it doesn't need.
- While recognizing increases in military spending by the previous and current governments, nothing the Committee heard convinced us that 1.5 percent and 2 percent increases in funding are going to increase the capacity of the

Canadian Forces, when inflation – particularly in the area of military spending – is almost certainly going to exceed these numbers.

- The Committee believes that a "major review" of the organizational structure of the Canadian Forces should be conducted immediately to validate and/or reorganize the Canadian Forces' headquarters structure.

Conference of Defence Associations Calculations

1. To establish the 2008/09 Baseline

Statscan shows the Canadian 2007 GDP at $1.536 trillion,
Treasury Board shows the "Total Departmental Spending" (ME) for FY 2007/8 at $18.619 billion
By calculation defence spending/GDP (ME/GDP) for 2007 is 1.21%

Conference Board predicts 2008 GDP growth at 3.5% Nominal (1.7% Real and 1.8% inflation)
By calculation GDP 2008 is $1.589 trillion
Treasury Board shows ME at $19.508 billion
By calculation ME/GDP for 2008 is 1.23%

Conference Board predicts 2009 GDP growth at 4.3% Nominal (2.4% real and 1.9% inflation)
By calculation GDP 2009 is $1.68 trillion
Treasury Board shows ME at $20.057 billion
By calculation ME/GDP is 1.21%

2. To Project forward to 2027/28 (end point CFDS)

Three growth scenarios:

a. Nominal 3.1% (Real 1%, Inflation 2.1%, which is the inflation assumption in CFDS, which is consistent with the BofC target rates of 1-3%)
b. Nominal 4.1% (Real 2%, inflation 2.1%)
c. Nominal 5.1% (Real 3%, inflation 2.1%)

ME/GDP 2027/28 by calculation

a. 1.13% (Nominal GDP growth 3.1%)
b. 0.95% (Nominal GDP growth 4.1%)
c. 0.80% (Nominal GDP growth 5.1%)

3. Spreadsheet with Calculations:

GDP 3.1%	GDP 4.1%	Year	GDP 5.1%	ME	ME/GDP 3.1	ME/GDP 4.1	ME/GDP 5.1
1.65774E+12	1.65774E+12	2009	1.65774E+12	2.0057E+10	1.21%	1.21%	1.21%
1.70913E+12	1.7257E+12	2010	1.74228E+12	2.0598E+10	1.21%	1.19%	1.18%
1.76211E+12	1.79646E+12	2011	1.83114E+12	2.1154E+10	1.20%	1.18%	1.16%
1.81674E+12	1.87011E+12	2012	1.92453E+12	2.1726E+10	1.20%	1.16%	1.13%
1.87305E+12	1.94679E+12	2013	2.02268E+12	2.2312E+10	1.19%	1.15%	1.10%
1.93112E+12	2.02661E+12	2014	2.12583E+12	2.2915E+10	1.19%	1.13%	1.08%
1.99098E+12	2.1097E+12	2015	2.23425E+12	2.3533E+10	1.18%	1.12%	1.05%
2.0527E+12	2.19619E+12	2016	2.3482E+12	2.4169E+10	1.18%	1.10%	1.03%
2.11634E+12	2.28624E+12	2017	2.46796E+12	2.4821E+10	1.17%	1.09%	1.01%
2.18194E+12	2.37997E+12	2018	2.59382E+12	2.5491E+10	1.17%	1.07%	0.98%
2.24959E+12	2.47755E+12	2019	2.72611E+12	2.618E+10	1.16%	1.06%	0.96%
2.31932E+12	2.57913E+12	2020	2.86514E+12	2.6887E+10	1.16%	1.04%	0.94%
2.39122E+12	2.68488E+12	2021	3.01126E+12	2.7612E+10	1.15%	1.03%	0.92%
2.46535E+12	2.79496E+12	2022	3.16484E+12	2.8358E+10	1.15%	1.01%	0.90%
2.54177E+12	2.90955E+12	2023	3.32624E+12	2.9124E+10	1.15%	1.00%	0.88%
2.62057E+12	3.02884E+12	2024	3.49588E+12	2.991E+10	1.14%	0.99%	0.86%
2.70181E+12	3.15303E+12	2025	3.67417E+12	3.0718E+10	1.14%	0.97%	0.84%
2.78556E+12	3.2823E+12	2026	3.86155E+12	3.1547E+10	1.13%	0.96%	0.82%
2.87192E+12	3.41687E+12	2027	4.05849E+12	3.2399E+10	1.13%	0.95%	0.80%

4. There is a minor discrepancy between the CFDS and Treasury Board numbers for "Total Defence Spending" which gets a bit bigger at the 2027 end. I attribute that to be the consequence of the Treasury Board figures being published before the CFDS figures. I don't view it as material for this level of analysis (Brian MacDonald, Conference of Defence Associations).

5. References:

Statscan: http://www40.statcan.ca/l01/cst01/econ04.htm
Treasury Board: http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/2008-2009/inst/dnd/dnd01-eng.asp#sec1f_e
Conference Board: http://www.conferenceboard.ca/budget/

Comment from the Economics Division – Library of Parliament

The Parliamentary Information and Research Service was asked to review the assumptions underlying the calculation of the defence spending to GDP ratio presented by Col. (Ret.) Brian MacDonald of the Conference of Defence Associations.

The proposed calculations depend on expectations about the future trend of two variables: Canadian defence spending and GDP. The defence spending figure for fiscal year 2009-2010 comes from the *Department of National Defence: 2008-2009 Report on Plans and Priorities*. Funding figures from 2010-2011 onwards are based on increasing the 2009-2010 figure by the spending growth committed to in the *Canada First Defence Strategy*. The strategy says that defence funding will increase by a long-run average of 2.7% per year from 2008-2009 to 2027-2028, although the growth rate will vary from year to year. Because the strategy does not provide detailed year by year expenditures, the calculation ignores variations in the growth rate and assumes it will remain constant at 2.7% per year. This assumption will affect the calculation of the defence spending to GDP ratio.

To determine 2009 GDP, Statistics Canada data for 2007 GDP was increased by the Conference Board of Canada's estimates of nominal GDP growth in 2008 (3.5%) and 2009 (4.3%). Long-run estimates of GDP growth are more difficult to predict than short-run estimates. For this reason, the calculations consider three long-run growth rate scenarios: low (3.1% per year nominal growth), medium (4.1% per year nominal growth), and high (5.1% year nominal growth) for GDP growth from 2010 to 2027. These growth rates are then applied to the 2009 GDP estimate.

The assumptions underlying these calculations are one out of many sets of possible reasonable assumptions. Numerous organizations produce economic forecasts and any one of these could be used in place of the Conference Board's estimates. Similarly the long-run growth rate estimates could be increased or decreased. The federal government has committed to augment the defence budget by $1.8 billion in 2010-2011 and then increase it by 2% per year until 2027-2028. This means that long-run defence spending growth will average 2.7% per year over the next 20 years. However, this method will produce different defence spending estimates for

the years between 2008-2009 and 2027-2028 than a method assuming a constant 2.7% annual increase in defence spending. Therefore, it is worth noting that the calculations are sensitive to the assumptions chosen, and any change in the assumptions may affect the results.

Agency and Spokesperson	Date
Department of National Defence: • Lieutenant-General W. J. Natynczyk, Vice Chief of the Defence Staff • Lieutenant-General A.B. Leslie, Chief of the Land Staff • Chief Warrant Officer Wayne Ford, Army Sergeant Major	**June 2, 2008**
Department of National Defence: • Lieutenant-General J.C.M. Gauthier, Commander, Canadian Expeditionary Force Command • Vice-Admiral Drew Robertson, Chief of the Maritime Staff • Lieutenant-General W. Angus Watt, Chief of the Air Staff	**June 9, 2008**

Quatre généraux et un amiral :

La situation vue d'en haut

Rapport du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense

<u>Membres du comité</u>

Sén. Colin Kenny – Président
Sén. David Tkachuk – Vice-président
Sén. Tommy Banks
Sén. Joseph A. Day
Sén. Grant Mitchell
Sén. Michael A. Meighen
Sén. Wilfred P. Moore
Sén. Nancy Ruth
Sén. Rod A. A. Zimmer

Deuxième session
Trente-neuvième législature
2008

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http://www.parl.gc.ca
(Travaux des comités – Sénat – 2e Session, 39e Législature)

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Site Web du comité : www.sen-sec.ca
Greffières du comité : defence@sen.parl.gc.ca
1-800-267-7362 (numéro sans frais)

Quatre généraux et un amiral :

La situation vue d'en haut

Rapport du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense

Deuxième session
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LE COMITÉ SÉNATORIAL PERMANENT DE LA SÉCURITÉ NATIONALE ET DE LA DÉFENSE

39E LÉGISLATURE, 2E SESSION

L'honorable Colin Kenny
Président

L'honorable David Tkachuk
Vice-président

et

Les honorables sénateurs :

Tommy Banks
Joseph A. Day
Michael A. Meighen
Grant Mitchell
Wilfred P. Moore
Nancy Ruth
Rod A.A. Zimmer

*L'honorable Marjory Lebreton, C.P. (ou l'honorable Gerald Comeau)
*L'honorable Céline Hervieux-Payette, C.P.
(ou l'honorable Claudette Tardif)
*Membres d'office

Autres sénateurs qui ont participé au travail du comité à ce sujet :
Les honorables sénateurs Munson et Stollery

Conseillers spéciaux du comité :
MGen (ret) Keith McDonald et Barry Denofsky

Personnel de recherche de la Bibliothèque du Parlement :
Melissa Radford, Maureen Shields et Jason Yung

Greffières du comité :
Shaila Anwar et Gaëtane Lemay

Extrait des *Journaux du Sénat*, le mardi 20 novembre 2007 :

L'honorable sénateur Kenny propose, appuyé par l'honorable sénateur Banks,

Que le Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense soit autorisé à mener une étude et à faire rapport sur la politique de sécurité nationale du Canada. Le comité sera en particulier autorisé à examiner:

a) la capacité du ministère de la Défense nationale de défendre et de protéger les intérêts, la population et le territoire du Canada et sa capacité de réagir à une urgence nationale ou à une attaque et de prévenir ces situations, ainsi que la capacité du ministère de la Sécurité publique et de la Protection civile de remplir son mandat;

b) les relations de travail entre les divers organismes participant à la collecte de renseignements, comment ils recueillent, colligent, analysent et diffusent ces renseignements, et comment ces fonctions pourraient être améliorées;

c) les mécanismes d'examen de la performance et des activités des divers organismes participant à la collecte de renseignements;

d) la sécurité de nos frontières et de nos infrastructures essentielles;

Que les documents reçus, les témoignages entendus, et les travaux accomplis par le comité sur ce sujet depuis le début de la première session de la trente-septième législature soient renvoyés au comité;

Que le comité fasse rapport au Sénat au plus tard le 31 mars 2009 et qu'il conserve tous les pouvoirs nécessaires pour diffuser ses conclusions pendant les 90 jours suivant le dépôt de son rapport final.

La motion, mise aux voix, est adoptée.

Le greffier du Sénat

Paul C. Bélisle

Rapport provisoire sur l'état des forces armées

Les 2 et 9 juin, cinq des plus hauts gradés des Forces canadiennes, menés par le lieutenant-général Walt Natynczyk, ont exposé leur point de vue sur l'état des forces armées canadiennes devant le Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense.

La nomination du lieutenant-général Natynczyk au poste de Chef d'état-major de la Défense a été annoncée le 5 juin, soit trois jours après son témoignage. Le Comité a aussi entendu quatre autres officiers qui, par leur rang et leur ancienneté, auraient pu être candidats à ce poste :

- le lieutenant-général Michel Gauthier, commandant de la Force expéditionnaire du Canada;
- le vice-amiral Drew Robertson, commandant de la Marine[1];
- le lieutenant-général Andrew Leslie, commandant de la Force terrestre[2];
- le lieutenant-général Angus Watt, commandant de la Force aérienne[3].

Le Comité avait hâte d'entendre ces cinq officiers depuis l'annonce, faite en mai 2008 par le premier ministre et le ministre de la Défense nationale, de la Stratégie de défense intitulée « Le Canada d'abord », que l'on attendait depuis longtemps.

Le Comité souhaitait faire le point sur la restructuration des Forces. En effet, le général Rick Hillier, le prédécesseur du général Natynczyk, avait lancé un ambitieux programme de réorganisation, et le Comité voulait savoir si la nouvelle structure constituait un progrès sur l'ancienne et s'il était nécessaire d'y apporter des modifications pour en améliorer l'efficacité.

[1] Aussi appelé chef d'état-major de la Force maritime
[2] Aussi appelé de la chef d'état-major de l'Armée de terre
[3] Aussi appelé chef d'état-major de la Force aérienne

Le Comité cherchait aussi à se renseigner sur les éventuels problèmes budgétaires des Forces. Les membres du Comité ont fait valoir à plusieurs reprises ces dernières années que les Forces canadiennes souffrent d'un grave manque de ressources.

Cet aspect de la question sera abordé plus loin. Notre analyse repose sur deux évaluations des ressources dont les Forces ont besoin pour répondre aux attentes des Canadiens : a) des calculs effectués par le Comité et b) les chiffres soumis par les dirigeants des diverses branches des Forces canadiennes au gouvernement plus tôt cette année sur leurs besoins. Ces « listes de besoins » – dont trois ont fait l'objet de fuites après qu'elles ont été présentées aux autorités – mettent en relief les lacunes des Forces canadiennes et donnent à croire que, faute d'une augmentation sensible des budgets, la situation risque de s'aggraver.

Les ressources des Forces canadiennes vont s'amenuiser

Les membres du Comité s'entendent dans l'ensemble pour dire que quiconque sait voir au-delà de l'annonce occasionnelle de l'achat de matériel coûteux et des déclarations du gouvernement quand il promet d'assurer aux Forces un financement prévisible et « stable » aboutit à un triste constat : les engagements de dépenses courants laissent entrevoir que le sous-financement chronique des Forces ne peut que s'aggraver.

Nous attendions-nous à ce que ce soit là le message des quatre généraux et de l'amiral? À vrai dire, cela aurait été étonnant, surtout à trois jours de l'annonce, par le premier ministre, du nom du successeur du général Hillier. Ces derniers mois, des journalistes sûrs ont appris de sources au sein du gouvernement que le cabinet du premier ministre n'appréciait pas le franc-parler du général Hillier. Nous aurions donc été (agréablement) surpris si l'un ou l'autre de ces officiers avait fait état du problème de financement.

Les hauts gradés des Forces canadiennes ne sont pas censés critiquer publiquement leurs dirigeants politiques. Quand on voit de quelle façon le cabinet du premier ministre tient la bride serrée aux politiques et aux fonctionnaires en général, ce que déplorent d'ailleurs la plupart des membres du Comité, nous avions peu de chances d'obtenir une franche évaluation des pénuries de fonds. Le lecteur en jugera.

L'honorable sénateur Tkachuk, lui, est d'avis que, durant ces deux jours d'audiences, ce que le Comité a obtenu de ces officiers supérieurs, *c'est* leur opinion de professionnels et non un message du cabinet du premier ministre.

Les officiers ont brossé un tableau optimiste de la situation : le moment est bien choisi de faire partie des Forces canadiennes!

Les cinq officiers supérieurs n'avaient que des choses positives à raconter au Comité. Ils ont parlé du meilleur état dans lequel se trouvent maintenant les Forces canadiennes, du moral qui est à la hausse, de l'engagement pris par le gouvernement de maintenir des niveaux de financement raisonnables, des impressionnants projets d'immobilisations en cours ou à l'horizon, du travail stimulant accompli par nos soldats et de leur capacité de s'acquitter des tâches qui leur sont confiées par le gouvernement. L'essentiel de leur message, c'est que le moment est bien choisi de faire partie des Forces canadiennes.

Pourtant, c'est un autre son de cloche qu'entendent les Canadiens. Ils entendent dire que les Forces canadiennes souffrent d'un manque chronique de financement et qu'on a été jusqu'à envisager des mesures extrêmes pour pallier l'insuffisance des ressources attribuées aux divers commandements. D'après les rapports sur les besoins de l'Armée de terre, de la Marine et de la Force aérienne qui ont fait l'objet de fuites et ont été diffusés par les médias, aucune des trois forces ne dispose d'un financement suffisant pour jouer le rôle qu'on attend d'elles. De nombreux analystes de la défense ont déclaré publiquement que l'Afghanistan est en train de saigner à blanc le reste des forces armées en ce qui a trait aux « niveaux de financement raisonnables » des autres missions et tâches.

Le Comité aurait aimé discuter de ces rapports avec les commandants, mais le lieutenant-général Natynczyk a affirmé qu'il serait prématuré d'en parler parce que le processus de « planification des activités » n'était pas encore terminé – autrement dit, les commandants ne savaient pas encore si les pénuries de fonds identifiées dans leurs rapports seraient comblées. (Le MDN s'est engagé à remettre au Comité les documents d'autorisation de financement définitifs une fois le processus terminé.)

Les commandants ont tous affirmé qu'on tenait compte de leurs préoccupations et qu'ils étaient convaincus qu'ils recevraient tous les fonds dont ils ont besoin pour accomplir leurs missions respectives. Les dernières affectations budgétaires pour

l'exercice courant n'étaient pas prêtes, mais elles devaient arriver avant la fin de juin, pour l'année 2008-2009. Le Comité a demandé une mise à jour à ce sujet, mais apparemment, le processus n'avait pas encore abouti au moment de la rédaction du présent rapport.

Le général affirme que les Forces sont protégées contre les augmentations futures des coûts de carburant

À propos des hausses du prix de l'essence, le lieutenant-général Natynczyk et ses collègues ont dit qu'ils avaient prévu ces hausses et en avaient tenu compte dans leurs plans. Le lieutenant-général Natynczyk a même ajouté que les Forces canadiennes prévoyaient des hausses à ce chapitre au cours des cinq prochaines années, mais que le budget était suffisant pour les couvrir. Il a affirmé que les augmentations de coût du carburant n'auront aucun impact sur les opérations :

> **Le sénateur Munson :** Vous dites que, peu importe le coût du carburant — parce que les Canadiens font face à des coûts exorbitants —, peu importe, il n'y aura pas de compressions?
>
> **Le lieutenant-général Natynczyk :** Ce que je dis, c'est que, au cours du présent exercice, nous avons été en mesure de répondre aux besoins des services découlant du prix actuel du carburant […]
>
> […] je ne peux pas vous dire qu'il va toujours en être ainsi. Je sais ce qui se passe pendant l'exercice en cours et ce qui va se passer au cours des quatre prochains exercices, et je peux vous dire quels vont être les coûts en carburant. Nous avons intégré cela à notre plan budgétaire global[4].

Un gouvernement minoritaire ne peut pas prendre d'engagements à long terme – stables ou non

Les cinq officiers supérieurs ont brossé un tableau beaucoup plus optimiste que celui présenté par les nombreux analystes de la défense du Canada, qui, dans bien

[4] Lieutenant-général Natynczyk, Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 2 juin 2008, 39e législature, 2e session.

des cas, s'inquiètent du fait que la mission en Afghanistan constitue un lourd fardeau pour les ressources budgétaires et opérationnelles de nos Forces et qu'aucune des mesures budgétaires annoncées jusqu'à présent par le gouvernement n'est de nature à alléger ce fardeau.

D'après le lieutenant-général Natynczyk :

> Ensemble, les budgets de 2005 et de 2006 représentent une augmentation d'environ 30 p. 100 du financement du programme des services de la défense sur six ans. Cependant, la planification à long terme et la gestion des ressources bénéficient d'un environnement de financement stable et prévisible. Le budget de 2008 a répondu à ce besoin, par l'intermédiaire d'un engagement à faire passer l'augmentation annuelle automatique du financement de la défense de 1,5 à 2 p. 100, à partir de 2011-2012. Ainsi, la Défense nationale va obtenir un financement supplémentaire d'environ 12 milliards de dollars au cours des 20 prochaines années. Ce financement stable et prévisible permet au ministère de faire une planification qui dépasse le prochain cycle budgétaire afin d'effectuer un examen complet du portefeuille de la défense et des besoins futurs.

Le général a dit aussi :

> […] nous avons constaté que le financement de la défense pour les quatre à cinq prochaines années va augmenter plus rapidement que notre capacité, surtout en ce qui a trait à l'effectif, à l'industrie et au processus d'approbation de l'acquisition d'immobilisations pour investir l'intégralité des fonds accessibles dans les quatre volets de la capacité militaire : l'effectif, les immobilisations, l'infrastructure et l'état de préparation opérationnelle.

Le général veut-il *vraiment* dire que les Forces canadiennes – dont l'attitude gagnante quand il s'agit d'innover est bien connue – n'ont pas suffisamment d'ingéniosité pour prendre de l'expansion même si on leur en donnait les moyens? Faut-il plutôt interpréter sa déclaration comme voulant dire que le gouvernement ne lui *permettra* pas de procéder à une expansion? La réputation du général comme guerrier, innovateur et organisateur de talent n'est plus à faire. Et il ne pourrait pas trouver le moyen d'opérer une expansion des Forces sur les quatre ou cinq prochaines années si on lui en donnait les moyens? Difficile à croire.

En fait, quand on l'a interrogé à propos des principaux défis qu'aura à relever le

nouveau Chef d'état-major de la Défense, le lieutenant-général Natynczyk a dit que ce ne serait pas de trouver de l'argent ou de l'équipement, ou encore de gagner la guerre en Afghanistan, mais de conserver la confiance des Canadiens.

Pour le général, le problème n'est pas d'ordre financier

> **Le lieutenant-général Natynczyk :** […] les Canadiens s'identifient aux hommes et aux femmes qui sont en danger, qui les représentent, que ce soit à la pointe de l'épée en Afghanistan, à 40 000 pieds dans les airs ou dans l'Atlantique Nord[5].

Le Comité reconnaît que les Forces canadiennes ont gagné un certain respect au sein de la population canadienne sous le commandement du général Hillier, mais il n'est pas d'accord avec les officiers supérieurs venus témoigner devant lui quand ils disent que les autres problèmes – dont la plupart tiennent à un manque de fonds – sont maîtrisés. En fait, il y a des difficultés importantes à surmonter, des difficultés que nos témoins ont manifestement eu du mal à aborder en public, mais que la population canadienne doit connaître.

Après des années à se serrer la ceinture faute de ressources adéquates, les dirigeants des Forces canadiennes donnent l'impression qu'ils sont satisfaits du niveau de financement qui a été annoncé. Est-ce l'expérience qui a tant réduit leurs attentes et qui les incite à renoncer à réclamer ce dont ils auraient besoin pour accroître l'effectif des Forces canadiennes et faire de celles-ci un outil robuste, capable et efficace comme l'exigent les intérêts du Canada? Ou la pression politique est-elle si forte que tout le monde s'incline devant la volonté du gouvernement et que personne n'ose parler? Quelle que soit la raison, le débat public de cette très importante question semble muselé.

[5] Lieutenant-général Natynczyk, Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 2 juin 2008, 39e législature, 2e session.

Examen des vrais défis auxquels sont confrontées les Forces canadiennes

Premier défi – Le budget

Le lieutenant-général Natynczyk a fait observer que le budget des Forces canadiennes avait beaucoup augmenté au cours des quelques dernières années et que l'engagement pris par le gouvernement de le hausser annuellement de 1,5 p. 100 jusqu'en 2011 et de 2 p. 100 par la suite jusqu'en 2031[6], avait permis l'établissement d'un plan à long terme fondé sur des niveaux de financement « garantis ».

Il importe de noter que le « plan » en question, intitulé « Le Canada d'abord », a été mentionné dans des discours et des communiqués et est décrit sur le site Web du MDN, mais qu'aucun document officiel du gouvernement n'a encore été publié pour fixer les détails de sa mise en œuvre. Tiens donc.

Le lieutenant-général Natynczyk a affirmé catégoriquement qu'il y a suffisamment de fonds dans le budget de la Défense pour mener à bien l'imposant projet d'immobilisations prévu au cours des 25 prochaines années, grossir les effectifs, reconstruire et réparer les infrastructures de défense et achever la transformation. Il a ajouté que le budget de la Défense augmenterait de 12 milliards de dollars entre 2011 et 2031.

> **Le président :** Au sujet de la stratégie Le Canada d'abord de la Défense, l'augmentation prévue de votre budget est de 1,5 p. 100 jusqu'à 2011, puis de 2 p. 100 pour les dix années suivantes. Si vous faites le calcul, ça revient à passer de 1,2 à 3 p. 100 du PIB à 0,87 p. 100 du PIB. Compte tenu de l'inflation, et surtout de l'inflation dans le domaine militaire, qui semble être plus élevée que

[6] La première Stratégie de défense du Canada qui a été publiée sur le site web du MDN après que le témoignage a été entendu faisait état de l'engagement financier du gouvernement jusqu'en 2027-2028 et non 2031.

l'indice des prix à la consommation, comment allez-vous arriver à assurer le financement dans l'avenir?

Le lieutenant-général Natynczyk : Sénateur, tout ce que je peux dire, c'est que nous avons jeté un coup d'œil sur les prévisions que nous avons pour ce qui est des budgets alloués. Nous avons examiné la question du remplacement des principales flottes de combat sur cette période, ainsi que des capacités de combat essentielles. Nous avons dû vérifier, pour cette période, si nous allons avoir les fonds nécessaires pour effectuer ces remplacements dans les proportions annoncées. En fonction de l'information budgétaire la plus précise qui nous vient de notre agent chargé d'établir les coûts et de faire affaire avec les gens du service des acquisitions, nous avons établi un plan pour qu'il nous soit possible de répondre à ces besoins pendant cette période.

[…]

Le président : Général, un document va bientôt être publié là-dessus, et je dois dire que les membres du comité ont de la difficulté à démêler tous ces chiffres. Pouvons-nous vous demander de revenir nous faire un compte rendu sur le financement?

Le lieutenant-général Natynczyk : Certainement. Encore une fois, mon chef de programme et le sous-ministre adjoint des Finances et des Services ministériels ont déterminé nos formules d'établissement des coûts pour l'avenir. Nous avons suivi un processus rigoureux pour nous assurer d'établir tous les coûts, jusqu'aux coûts liés à chacun des membres des Forces, et aussi à l'équipement de soutien de chacun des navires, de chacun des avions et de chacun des bataillons de soldats.

Le président : Personne ici ne dit que vous avez tort, mais ce que nous disons, c'est qu'il y a un certain scepticisme quant au fait que le financement qui vous est accordé pour l'avenir est suffisant, et nous aimerions que quelqu'un nous fasse un compte rendu là-dessus au cours des prochaines semaines.

Le lieutenant-général Natynczyk : Certainement[7].

Nous attendons encore.

Le général semble se satisfaire d'un financement qui permet seulement de *remplacer* l'équipement et le personnel de base des Forces canadiennes.

On en revient à la question du financement. Le problème, c'est que l'augmentation « garantie » du budget de la Défense nationale se transformera en baisse toutes les années où le taux d'inflation dépassera 1,5 p. 100 d'ici 2011, et 2 p. 100 par la suite. On voit mal comment l'inflation des coûts de la défense pourrait demeurer sous la barre des 2 p. 100 au cours de la prochaine décennie. C'est donc dire que les « augmentations garanties » se transformeront presque certainement en « baisses garanties ».

Pourquoi 2 p. 100 ne suffisent pas? D'abord, les Forces canadiennes ont du rattrapage à faire. Après de longues années de sous-financement sous le régime des gouvernements progressistes-conservateurs et libéraux précédents, et sous le gouvernement actuel, ce qu'il faut, c'est un afflux de fonds, pas une diminution. Avec seulement le minimum nécessaire pour *remplacer* le matériel et le personnel courants, il ne reste rien pour assurer la croissance et la revitalisation des Forces canadiennes dont le Canada a besoin et que le gouvernement avait promises durant la dernière campagne électorale. Avec ce genre de financement minimaliste, les Forces canadiennes continueront d'être mises à rude épreuve, car elles ne pourront soutenir que 1 000 combattants sur un théâtre d'opérations et un seul, pas plus. Bref, on continuera de demander aux forces armées d'en faire beaucoup avec trop peu de moyens, un *statu quo* qui perdure depuis plus de vingt ans.

Une hausse qui n'en est pas vraiment une

- Comment une *augmentation* annuelle de 2 p. 100 peut-elle aboutir à une réduction des dépenses de défense en termes réels? Simplement parce qu'il ne se trouve sans doute pas un économiste au Canada qui croit que le taux d'inflation va plafonner à 2 p. 100 dans les prochaines années. Dans le numéro du 16 juillet du *Globe and Mail*, on signale que, suivant les

[7] Lieutenant-général Natynczyk, Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 2 juin 2008, 39e législature, 2e session.

> estimations de la Banque du Canada, le taux d'inflation devrait dépasser les 4 p. 100 au début de l'année prochaine. Cela veut dire que les Forces canadiennes devront composer avec une réduction de dépenses de 2,5 p. 100 dans la première année du plan de dépenses du gouvernement.

L'augmentation des prix du carburant, des produits alimentaires et des produits de base fait grimper les taux d'inflation dans le monde entier, et le Canada ne fait pas exception. De plus, le taux d'inflation sur les achats de défense est toujours plus élevé que le taux d'inflation normal. Les améliorations du matériel de défense reposent sur les progrès de technologies avancées très coûteuses.

Bref, une augmentation budgétaire de 2 p. 100 devient une réduction de budget chaque année où le taux d'inflation des dépenses militaires dépasse 2 p. 100, et il y a fort à parier que c'est justement ce qui se produira chaque année dans le proche avenir.

Une augmentation annuelle « stable et prévisible » de 2 p. 100 du budget des Forces canadiennes entraînera en fait une baisse du pouvoir d'achat des Forces chaque année où les coûts augmenteront de plus de 2 p. 100.

En vérité, il n'y a pas de « financement stable et prévisible » dans une démocratie parlementaire. Le gouvernement est minoritaire. Nul ne sait s'il remportera les prochaines élections, mais s'il n'est pas reporté au pouvoir, avec une majorité, toutes les promesses de financement resteront lettre morte.

Les dépenses de défense en pourcentage du produit intérieur brut (PIB)

Une façon honnête de déterminer si un gouvernement augmente suffisamment le budget de la défense consiste à exprimer ces dépenses en pourcentage du PIB. Cela veut dire que les dépenses de défense sont en rapport avec la richesse que nous créons. Quant la richesse augmente, les dépenses de défense aussi, et inversement.

Dans le plan du gouvernement, les dépenses de défense en pourcentage du produit intérieur brut vont continuer de dégringoler. Le Comité comme la Conférence des associations de la défense estiment que, dans dix ans, le budget de la Défense pourrait tomber à 0,89 p. 100 du PIB[8], soit moins de la moitié de l'objectif fixé par

[8] Courriel de la CAD du 30 avril 2008.

l'OTAN. La Conférence des associations de la défense estime en outre qu'il pourrait tomber à 0,77 p. 100 du PIB d'ici 15 ans – un peu plus du tiers de l'objectif de l'OTAN, soit 2 p. 100 du PIB, sur lequel se sont entendus les pays membres de l'Organisation.

Comment les dépenses annoncées par le gouvernement pour la défense cadrent-elles avec un budget qui rapetisse avec les années? Le lieutenant-général Natynczyk a expliqué que les cinq projets annoncés par le premier ministre et le ministre de la Défense nationale au début de mai pourraient coûter à eux seuls de 45 à 50 milliards de dollars. Peut-être même plus.

Or, le gouvernement a déjà du mal à financer ses grosses promesses à partir de petites enveloppes de dépenses. Que ce soit pour l'acquisition d'hélicoptères maritimes ou de navires de soutien interarmées, la modernisation et la prolongation de la durée de vie des frégates de classe Halifax, l'achat de véhicules aériens sans pilote, la réparation du rotor de queue des Cormorant, le remplacement de la flotte de recherche et de sauvetage à voilure fixe, le remplacement de l'appareil de surveillance Aurora, l'achat d'hélicoptères d'attaque, le remplacement de la flotte de destroyers, l'achat de satellites de surveillance, l'achat de nouveaux chasseurs et le remplacement du matériel qui, usé, sera laissé en Afghanistan, il doit essuyer des retards, des incertitudes, des dépassements de coûts et des refus de soumissionner.

Les fonds ne semblent pas suffisants non plus pour augmenter l'effectif des Forces canadiennes d'autant que le gouvernement l'avait promis initialement (de 15 000 personnes, nombre qui a depuis été ramené à 7 500), et encore moins pour lui ajouter les 25 000 personnes dont le Comité estime que les Forces canadiennes ont vraiment besoin.

Un sentiment de réjouissance

Pourquoi donc est-ce que quatre généraux et un amiral affirment être satisfaits d'une garantie qui n'en est pas une et d'une augmentation d'un pourcentage si faible que le pouvoir de dépenser des Forces canadiennes va sûrement baisser, tout comme le budget de la Défense en pourcentage des dépenses publiques totales? Une augmentation de 2 p. 100 est ridicule, comme le sait certainement n'importe quel comptable de l'administration publique. Une augmentation de 2 p. 100 *de plus* que le taux d'inflation serait au moins un geste honnête, mais ne suffirait quand même pas, et de loin, si l'on veut atteindre l'objectif de l'OTAN.

Le gouvernement va peut-être accorder un financement additionnel pour compenser la hausse vertigineuse des coûts de carburant, ceux-ci représentant une importante part des dépenses de défense.

On trouvera peut-être une solution magique pour répondre aux pénuries de fonds signalées dans les rapports sur les besoins de la Marine, de l'Armée de terre et de la Force aérienne. Le lieutenant-général Natynczyk espère que les crédits inutilisés l'année dernière et les crédits qui pourraient être inutilisés cette année à cause de la lenteur de la procédure d'achat pourront d'une manière ou d'une autre servir à remédier aux pénuries. Cependant, il faudrait modifier la politique gouvernementale pour attribuer des sommes substantielles provenant de crédits inutilisés[9].

Il y a, bien sûr, un troisième « peut-être ». Le gouvernement va peut-être admettre qu'une augmentation « garantie » de 1,5 p. 100 qui passera à 2 p. 100 en 2011 représente en fait une réduction de budget pour les Forces canadiennes.

Pour le moment cependant, rien ne permet de penser que le gouvernement a l'intention de rectifier le tir.

Deuxième défi – Le personnel

Le Comité est tout à fait d'accord avec les cinq officiers supérieurs quand ils disent que les hommes et les femmes des Forces canadiennes font du travail remarquable dans l'intérêt des Canadiens. On ne peut douter de leur dévouement ni de leur compétence. Le problème est qu'ils sont en nombre insuffisant. Les déficits qui s'étaient creusés dans les années 90 au chapitre des salaires et des indemnités ont en grande partie été comblés, mais le Programme de réduction des Forces et le recrutement limité au cours de cette décennie ont fini par causer une pénurie de personnel qualifié et d'expérience. Il importe donc de faire quelque chose.

> **Le sénateur Zimmer :** [Q]u'est-ce qui vous tient éveillé la nuit?
>
> **Le lieutenant-général Natynczyk :** [J]e suis préoccupé par le fait que la bonne personne occupe le bon poste au bon moment, et qu'elle possède les compétences voulues. Nous apprenons des choses sur le plan démographique. Le recrutement a diminué dans les années 90.

[9] Lieutenant-général Natynczyk, Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 2 juin 2008, 39e législature, 2e session.

> Nous comptons dans nos rangs quelques générations de soldats qui arrivent à 20, 25 ou 30 ans [de service]. Cependant, les soldats que nous aurions dû embaucher dans les années 90 ne sont pas là pour [prendre la relève][10].

Les trois services sont creux à l'intérieur. Ils manquent de personnel chevronné aux grades de sous-officier et d'officier intermédiaire dans le système d'instruction et aussi à différentes étapes des projets menés par les Forces canadiennes, de la planification à la gestion. Cette pénurie de personnel a été accentuée par la nécessité d'affecter des militaires d'expérience dans les nouveaux quartiers généraux imaginés par le général Hillier dans le but de transformer les Forces canadiennes.

Vu les préoccupations que suscite le manque d'effectifs – l'absence de relève – on voit vraiment mal comment le gouvernement a pu annoncer en 2006 avec tambours et trompettes un plan visant à accroître l'effectif des forces régulières de 15 000 personnes et celui de la réserve de 10 000 personnes pour ensuite décider tranquillement en novembre 2007 de « reprofiler » les Forces canadiennes en ramenant à 7 500 personnes et 1 000 personnes respectivement l'augmentation d'effectif des forces régulières et de la réserve, et de retarder encore d'un an le processus. Pas étonnant que le lieutenant-général Natynczyk en perde le sommeil.

Cela fait sept ans que le Comité répète que les Forces canadiennes ont besoin d'un effectif de 90 000 personnes rien que pour exécuter les tâches qui leur ont été confiées jusqu'à maintenant, et c'est sans parler de celles qu'on pourrait envisager de leur attribuer.

La transformation a gonflé les états-majors

Le général Hillier voulait doter nos Forces d'une structure de commandement axée sur les fonctions. Auparavant, les Forces canadiennes avaient à leur tête un Chef d'état-major de la Défense, assisté d'un sous-chef d'état-major de la Défense, chargé de toutes les opérations au Canada et à l'étranger, et d'un vice-chef d'état-major de la Défense, qui s'occupait des questions internes et de la planification à long terme.

[10] Lieutenant-général Natynczyk, Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 2 juin 2008, 39e législature, 2e session.

La nouvelle structure prévoyait un Chef d'état-major de la Défense, le général Hillier, et quatre nouveaux commandements placés sous ses ordres, soit le Commandement Canada, le Commandement de la Force expéditionnaire, le Commandement du soutien opérationnel et le Commandement des Forces d'opérations spéciales[11], ayant chacun leur propre bureaucratie. Ces bureaucraties ont absorbé beaucoup de personnel de haut calibre qui aurait pu assumer des fonctions de commandement et de formation. Même l'état-major personnel du général Hillier comptait plus de cent personnes et il s'était acquis la réputation de faire de la microgestion[12] dans d'autres secteurs.

La plupart des commandants souscrivaient à l'idée d'un « quartier général transformé », qui leur apparaissait comme une façon logique d'envisager les opérations. Il leur a paru efficace de créer deux commandements différents responsables des opérations pour diviser et gérer les missions. Le lieutenant-général Gauthier, commandant du Commandement de la Force expéditionnaire du Canada (COMFEC), responsable de toutes les missions des FC à l'extérieur du Canada, a dit qu'il mettait continuellement son personnel au défi de trouver de meilleures méthodes de planification et de coordination. Il a ajouté que le commandement était toujours en période de transition et que certaines responsabilités avaient été transférées à d'autres éléments des FC, parce qu'elles ne touchaient pas uniquement les missions outremer. En tant qu'utilisateur de force, il n'a pas eu à faire face aux difficultés au chapitre du personnel, de la formation et des infrastructures auxquelles sont exposés les créateurs de force.

Bien que d'accord avec la nouvelle structure de commandement, les créateurs de force (les commandants de la Marine, de l'Armée de terre et de la Force aérienne) étaient moins chauds à l'idée de fournir des officiers et des sous-officiers supérieurs chevronnés aux nouveaux commandements. Cela les privait de personnel d'expérience dans une foule de secteurs de responsabilité, de la formation à la planification et la gestion de projet.

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[11] Le Commandement Canada est responsable des opérations militaires au Canada, le Commandement de la Force expéditionnaire, des opérations militaires à l'extérieur du Canada, le Commandement du soutien opérationnel, de la prestation d'un soutien opérationnel national aux missions des Forces canadiennes au Canada et à l'étranger, et le Commandement des forces d'opérations spéciales, des Forces d'opérations spéciales souples, capables d'intervenir rapidement et pouvant mener des opérations sur tout l'éventail des conflits, au Canada comme à l'étranger.

[12] Lieutenant-général R.R. Crabbe (à la retraite), le vice-amiral L.G. Mason (à la retraite), le lieutenant-général F.R. Sutherland (à la retraite), « *A Report on the Validation of the Transformed Canadian Forces Command Structure* », 31 janvier 2007.

Un rapport[13] préparé pour le Chef d'état-major de la Défense par trois anciens officiers supérieurs sur la nouvelle structure de commandement critique la redondance de la nouvelle structure tout en admettant que ce n'est pas le temps de modifier considérablement les quartiers généraux de commandement, car les Forces canadiennes ont trop de choses à faire pour l'instant. Le lieutenant-général Gauthier a indiqué néanmoins que la structure organisationnelle demeure une pomme de discorde dans les discussions entre les commandants et la haute direction au quartier général de la Défense nationale.

> **Le lieutenant-général Gauthier :** Notre dernière rencontre à titre de commandants d'opérations, qui réunissait également des responsables de la mise sur pied de forces, le sous-chef d'état-major de la Défense, le chef d'état-major de la Défense, le chef de développement des forces et d'autres personnes, où nous nous sommes penchés sur notre rendement et où nous avons vérifié si nous étions sur la bonne voie, a certainement eu lieu au cours des trois derniers mois, et nos projections s'étendaient au-delà des Jeux olympiques de 2010.
>
> **Le sénateur Meighen :** Qu'en avez-vous conclu?
>
> **Le lieutenant-général Gauthier :** Que nous étions dans la bonne voie. À ce stade-ci, nous ne sommes pas très enclins à apporter des changements majeurs dans un sens ou dans l'autre. Nous avons un défi à relever en Afghanistan. Un autre défi se pose également à nous, à savoir celui de nous préparer à remplir notre mission au pays, aussi bien quotidiennement qu'à long terme, compte tenu des événements majeurs qui se dérouleront en 2010.
>
> Je ne peux pas parler au nom du nouveau chef d'état-major de la Défense, et je ne peux pas parler au nom du ministre non plus, mais je ne m'attends pas à des changements spectaculaires d'ici les Jeux olympiques de 2010[14].

[13] Lieutenant-général R.R. Crabbe (à la retraite), le vice-amiral L.G. Mason (à la retraite), le lieutenant-général F.R. Sutherland (à la retraite), « *A Report on the Validation of the Transformed Canadian Forces Command Structure* », 31 janvier 2007.
[14] Lieutenant-général M. Gauthier, Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 9 juin 2008, 39e législature, 2e session.

On va manquer de directeurs de projet

La pénurie de personnel touche aussi les directeurs de projet qualifiés dont on a besoin pour gérer les nombreux projets d'immobilisations en cours et ceux qu'a annoncés le gouvernement. Il y a eu peu de grands projets de l'État ces dernières années si bien que les Forces canadiennes ont perdu un peu de leur capacité dans la gestion de grands projets. Si les projets annoncés sont approuvés, il va falloir gérer beaucoup de grands projets simultanément. La Force aérienne et la Marine vont manquer de directeurs de projet qualifiés et expérimentés pour administrer les projets.

Le vice-amiral Robertson nous a dit à ce sujet :

> Il ne sera pas facile de trouver le nombre de personnes dont aura besoin le Groupe des matériels pour gérer les équipes de projets, et je devrai travailler sur cela au cours des deux prochaines années. Cela impliquera une restructuration de certaines de nos activités avec notre personnel maritime et avec nos services de la Marine. J'aurai également besoin de l'assistance du vice-amiral pour que certaines compétences soient mises à disposition concernant ce projet d'investissement[15].

La question : il est fondamental de se demander pourquoi nous consacrons 18 milliards de dollars par an à des Forces canadiennes « nouvellement transformées » qui ne peuvent soutenir que 1 000 soldats au combat en permanence.

Manifestement, la transformation n'a rien fait pour résoudre ce problème. Beaucoup diraient d'ailleurs que la constitution de nouveaux états-majors encore plus nombreux prive les Forces des personnes qui devraient plutôt être employées à former les recrues ou à diriger des projets en vue de renouveler le matériel.

[15] Vice-amiral Drew Robertson, Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 9 juin 2008, 39e législature, 2e session.

Le recrutement, l'attrition et les terribles conséquences des réductions de personnel dans les années 1990

Sollicitées par la mission en Afghanistan et la nouvelle structure, les Forces canadiennes sont amputées de personnel clé à des endroits où elles en ont cruellement besoin. Il manque à la Marine l'équivalent d'un équipage de navire sur chaque côte, en supposant même que notre Marine soit de la bonne taille pour commencer. Nous avons parlé, dans des rapports précédents, de l'évolution démographique du Canada et de l'importance croissance du théâtre de l'Asie-Pacifique, dominé par la puissance navale.

Comme il faut de dix à quinze ans pour concevoir et construire un navire, il importe d'agir dès maintenant pour nous assurer d'avoir la Marine dont nous aurons besoin, faute de quoi nous en paierons le coût dans les vingt ans qui suivront, quand nous serons privés de la capacité de commandement et de contrôle et de défense aérienne des destroyers. Les 15 navires de combat et les quatre sous-marins prévus ne suffiront certainement pas à protéger le Canada et ses intérêts. Un gouvernement qui voit loin doit envisager un programme permanent de construction navale portant sur deux fois plus d'unités, ce qui permettrait de faire d'une pierre deux coups : assurer la sécurité du Canada et créer des emplois dans le secteur manufacturier[16].

Pour doter ces bâtiments, la Marine devra combler les postes vacants et ensuite recruter en vue de l'avenir.

Nos questions au vice-amiral Robertson ont porté uniquement sur les problèmes de personnel, et non pas sur les grands projets, mais il est conscient plus que quiconque de la nécessité de bien distribuer les ressources de la Marine entre la côte atlantique et la côte du Pacifique et de grossir la Marine pour relever les défis qui émaneront de la région de l'Asie-Pacifique.

Le vice-amiral Robertson, chef d'état-major de la Force maritime, a tenu ces propos concernant les pénuries de personnel dans son service :

> **Le sénateur Meighen :** Bienvenue parmi nous, vice-amiral. J'aimerais que vous nous parliez de vos pénuries de personnel, pas tant des compétences qui vous font défaut pour les projets d'équipement,

[16] Le Comité réexamine la recommandation 27 de son rapport de 2006 intitulé *La priorité n° 1 du gouvernement*, laquelle veut : « Que le gouvernement procède résolument à la recapitalisation des flottes de la Marine et de la Garde côtière le plus vite possible chaque fois que le meilleur rapport qualité-prix peut être obtenu. »

> d'études techniques, etc. mais des pénuries de personnels plus traditionnelles. On nous a dit que l'armée manquait cruellement de cadres intermédiaires et de sous-officiers ainsi que de personnels de formation. La Marine a-t-elle le même problème? […]
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> **Le vice-amiral Robertson :** Nous avons des problèmes semblables à ceux qu'éprouvent tous les éléments des Forces canadiennes, et d'autres problèmes qui sont différents. Le problème général est que le programme de compression des effectifs qui a été mené dans les années 1990 s'est déroulé sur une courte période et a porté sur une cohorte spécifique. Il en est résulté une distorsion de la courbe d'âge optimale des Forces canadiennes. La cohorte où l'effectif est le moins nombreux est celle des gens qui arrivent à la retraite et qui pourront bientôt toucher leur pension. C'est eux qui ont le pouvoir de décision. À l'heure actuelle, la Marine est en sous-effectif de 400 personnes, soit l'équivalent d'environ deux équipages de navire, quoique ce soit peut-être une manière inexacte de représenter la chose[17].

La capacité opérationnelle de l'Armée de terre piétine depuis cinq ans en dépit de l'augmentation du recrutement.

Voici ce que le lieutenant-général Leslie, chef d'état-major de l'Armée de terre, avait à dire au sujet des pénuries de personnel dans son service :

> **Le sénateur Meighen :** Je m'excuse, mais pourquoi le système ne fonctionne-t-il pas à sa pleine capacité? Est-ce parce qu'il n'est pas assez vaste, ou manque-t-il d'argent ou de personnes?
>
> **Le lieutenant-général Leslie :** Le principal problème de l'armée, c'est que des sous-officiers subalternes et supérieurs s'en vont; ces gens sont le cœur et l'épine dorsale de tout corps armé.
>
> **Lieutenant-général Leslie :** […] On les perd à cause du vieillissement de la population, mais nous avons la chance d'en voir un bon nombre rester, alors qu'ils pourraient obtenir ailleurs un poste assez bien rémunéré — j'allais dire « un poste très bien rémunéré, » mais je ne veux pas encourager d'autres sous-officiers supérieurs à partir. Ils

[17] Vice-amiral Drew Robertson, Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 9 juin 2008, 39e législature, 2e session.

> restent par devoir et par volonté de transmettre leur expérience durement acquise aux gens qui viennent après eux.
>
> Actuellement, il manque à l'armée 1 000 caporaux-chefs, poste de leadership de base[18].

Il est clair que l'allusion du lieutenant-général Leslie à des emplois « très bien rémunérés » au sujet des sous-officiers supérieurs est une manière discrète de demander plus d'argent. Bien sûr, d'autres facteurs expliquent le phénomène, comme les trop longs mois d'absence qui nuisent aux familles quand ils ne les détruisent pas, mais une rémunération, des primes de maintien et des indemnités suffisantes contribueraient de toute évidence à résoudre les problèmes de personnel du général. Trop de gens de moins de cinquante ans qui occupent des postes importants prennent leur retraite pour toucher leur pension et prendre un emploi mieux rémunéré ailleurs.

La Force aérienne, qui compte au total environ 11 670 membres réguliers entraînés et qualifiés et 2 300 réservistes, manque de pilotes et de techniciens d'expérience[19].

Le lieutenant-général Watt, chef d'état-major de la Force aérienne, a parlé à son tour de ses problèmes de personnel :

> **Le sénateur Zimmer :** À l'heure actuelle, vous devez attirer, former et conserver du personnel. Il y a quelques années, vous dites avoir offert des indemnités forfaitaires à des pilotes. Pourquoi? Aviez-vous trop de pilotes à l'époque?
>
> **Le lieutenant-général Watt :** Vers le milieu des années 1990, nous avons rapidement réduit la capacité des Forces canadiennes. Le Programme de réduction des Forces, PRF, avait alors été mis sur pied. Il visait certaines occupations jugées excessivement dotées selon les besoins révisés des Forces canadiennes à la suite de la réduction des effectifs.
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> À l'époque, les pilotes étaient trop nombreux en raison de la compression des effectifs de la Force aérienne. Selon les règles en

[18] Lieutenant-général Andrew Leslie, Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 2 juin 2008, 39e législature, 2e session.
[19] Lieutenant-général Angus Watt, Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 9 juin 2008, 39e législature, 2e session.

> vigueur, les pilotes faisaient partie du Programme de réduction des Forces et se sont vu octroyer des primes de départ. Nous avons offert des compensations monétaires aux gens pour qu'ils quittent les Forces et nous avons rapidement dépassé notre objectif. Nous l'avons largement dépassé et ne nous en sommes jamais remis[20].

Des mesures « d'atténuation » ont été prises par les divers services, comme des études sur l'usage accru de simulateurs et de la formation assistée par ordinateur, mais on continue de manquer de personnel d'expérience, et il faut prendre des mesures énergiques pour résoudre le problème. Le gouvernement et les Forces canadiennes voient venir le problème depuis dix ans, mais tous nos dirigeants – libéraux et conservateurs – se sont dérobés à leurs responsabilités à ce sujet.

L'Armée de terre est en train de mettre sur pied un système d'avancement accéléré suivant des critères de « promotion sur le champ de bataille ». Dès cette année, elle accordera plus de poids à l'expérience pratique sur le terrain pour accélérer l'avancement au grade de caporal-chef; dans les années suivantes, elle fera de même pour l'avancement à des grades supérieurs. Compte tenu des circonstances, voilà une des stratégies à appliquer pour sortir de l'ornière.

Intégration des femmes

Des témoins ont dit au Comité que les Forces armées multiplient les efforts de recrutement et d'intégration des femmes dans tous les groupes professionnels des Forces.

> **Le sénateur Mitchell** : Je crois que l'armée a fait beaucoup de progrès en ce qui concerne l'intégration des femmes. J'ai remarqué qu'une officière vous accompagne aujourd'hui. Elle n'appartient pas à la Force aérienne, par contre.
>
> Compte tenu, entre autres, des pressions sur le plan du personnel, quel est le pourcentage de femmes dans votre effectif? Est-il possible d'attirer davantage de femmes dans cette carrière? Prenez-vous des mesures à cet effet?

[20] Lieutenant-général Angus Watt, Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 9 juin 2008, 39e législature, 2e session.

> **Le lieutenant-général Watt :** La Force aérienne compte 18 p. 100 de femmes, un des pourcentages les plus élevés dans la force régulière des Forces canadiennes. De plus, 28 p. 100 des réservistes sont des femmes. Les femmes se trouvent à tous les niveaux et occupent tous les types d'emplois : pilotes, agentes d'entretien et ingénieures […] À tous les niveaux de la Force aérienne, nous accueillons les femmes et leur permettons de réussir[21].

Le lieutenant-général Watt a mentionné un exemple récent où la Force aérienne avait modifié ses politiques en vue d'offrir l'égalité d'accès à l'emploi aux aviatrices. Selon lui, au cours des quatre dernières années, la Force aérienne s'est dotée d'un « système de réputation mondiale » qui a redéfini les normes anthropométriques, lesquelles « établissaient, pour l'équipage d'aéronefs, la longueur des membres du corps nécessaire pour se trouver dans le poste de pilotage[22] ». Les normes n'avaient pas été mises à jour depuis les années 1940. D'après le lieutenant-général Watt, cette modernisation a « permis à davantage de femmes, qui sont généralement un peu plus petites, de remplir les conditions requises pour faire partie de l'équipage d'aéronefs[23] ».

Il reste quand même beaucoup de progrès à faire. Malheureusement, les efforts de recrutement des femmes dans les Forces canadiennes ne sont pas uniformes dans tous les services. Le vice-amiral Robertson a indiqué qu'il aimerait recruter plus de femmes, et plus de francophones. Pour ce qui est des femmes marins, il a noté une baisse depuis quelques années, une tendance qui l'inquiète. Il dit chercher à recruter « les meilleurs éléments possible[24] ».

Le Comité constate que les témoins ont fait valoir leurs préoccupations au sujet du recrutement, notamment quant à la nécessité de recruter dans tous les secteurs de la société canadienne. Les commandants aimeraient que les Forces canadiennes soient représentatives du Canada d'aujourd'hui, et le Comité souscrit à cet objectif.

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[21] Lieutenant-général Angus Watt, Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 9 juin 2008, 39e législature, 2e session.
[22] Lieutenant-général Angus Watt, Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 9 juin 2008, 39e législature, 2e session.
[23] Lieutenant-général Angus Watt, Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 9 juin 2008, 39e législature, 2e session.
[24] Vice-amiral Drew Robertson, Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 9 juin 2008, 39e législature, 2e session.

Résolution 1325 du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies

Le Comité a été déçu de constater que certains commandants n'étaient pas au courant de la Résolution 1325 du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies sur les femmes, la paix et la sécurité, ou de la formation que donnent les Forces canadiennes aux unités déployées en vertu de cette Résolution, la première jamais adoptée par le Conseil de sécurité qui traite précisément de l'impact de la guerre sur les femmes et de leur contribution à la résolution des conflits et à la paix durable[25].

> **La sénatrice Nancy Ruth :** La perspective varie selon l'endroit où l'on est assis, et me voici : une femme qui siège au comité. Je suis intéressée par l'instruction, surtout à la lumière de la résolution 1325 du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies; le Canada a participé à la rédaction et à l'adoption de la recommandation concernant les femmes, la paix et la sécurité. Je tiens vraiment à ce que les soldats connaissent ce texte avant qu'ils partent outre-mer.
>
> Voulez-vous me parler un peu de la façon dont cela s'inscrit dans votre programme et quel type de formation les soldats suivent à cet égard?
>
> **Le lieutenant-général Leslie :** Sénateur, je ne sais pas — et je m'en excuse — si l'on dispense une formation particulière fondée sur la résolution 1325 du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies[26].

Le Comité comprend que ce ne sont pas tous les membres des Forces canadiennes qui auraient l'occasion d'intervenir auprès de femmes de la population locale pendant leur déploiement. Le travail de la Marine, par exemple, consiste essentiellement à contrôler des navires suspects en haute mer où elle est surtout confrontée à des pirates masculins et à mener des opérations de recherche et de sauvetage où les hommes et les femmes sont traités sur un pied d'égalité. Le Comité, toutefois, se préoccupe quand même de la situation du personnel militaire au sol, qui participe à des missions de stabilisation à l'étranger, et de l'obligation du Canada de faire respecter la Résolution 1325. Le lieutenant-général Gauthier nous a éclairés quelque peu sur cette question :

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[25] La Résolution 1325 du Conseil de sécurité a été adoptée à l'unanimité le 31 octobre 2000. Pour plus de renseignements, voir : http://www.peacewomen.org/un/sc/1325.html.

[26] Lieutenant-général Andrew Leslie, Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 2 juin 2008, 39e législature, 2e session.

> **Le lieutenant-général Gauthier :** L'aspect le plus important de l'application de ces résolutions — et de bien d'autres résolutions du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies — est d'assurer la formation adéquate des membres de notre personnel avant de les envoyer à l'étranger.
>
> D'après ce que les Forces militaires m'ont dit, tout le personnel participant à des missions à l'étranger reçoit une formation bien ciblée sur la protection des femmes, des enfants et d'autres populations vulnérables. Le programme de formation est donné au Centre de formation pour le soutien de la paix à Kingston, et il est constamment mis à jour[27].

Même si le Comité reconnaît la valeur de ce type de formation donnée préalablement au déploiement et qu'il l'encourage, il s'intéresse également à ce qui se passe par la suite. Il aimerait savoir si cette formation est utile et efficace en pratique et si elle a une incidence sur le terrain. Le lieutenant-général Gauthier lui a dit qu'il se renseignerait à ce sujet à l'occasion de ses prochaines visites aux missions canadiennes à l'étranger[28]. Le Comité le remercie pour son appui et est impatient de connaître ses constatations.

Troisième défi – L'équipement

Les cinq officiers supérieurs que nous avons rencontrés se sont dits ravis des plans d'acquisition d'équipement annoncés. Ils ont déjà fait leur planification en tenant pour acquis que leurs vieilles plateformes désuètes seraient remplacées en temps utile par de nouvelles plateformes plus performantes.

Ils devraient se montrer plus méfiants. Il est souvent arrivé que les choses ne tournent pas comme on l'aurait voulu, les gouvernements ayant des difficultés à estimer les coûts exacts des projets, à passer des marchés et à se faire livrer l'équipement dans les délais prévus. Les problèmes que l'on connaît avec l'acquisition de navires de soutien interarmées et la prolongation de la durée de vie

[27] Lieutenant-général M. Gauthier, Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 9 juin 2008, 39e législature, 2e session.
[28] Lieutenant-général M. Gauthier, Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 9 juin 2008, 39e législature, 2e session.

des navires de classe Halifax, de même qu'avec la gestion des contrats, comme ceux des sous-marins et des hélicoptères maritimes, en sont deux exemples qui sont presque devenus la règle. L'arrivée tardive du nouvel équipement nous oblige à investir davantage dans l'entretien et la prolongation de la durée de vie de l'équipement existant.

Pour que l'on puisse respecter le « plan », des mesures ont déjà été prises dans le but de prolonger la durée utile prévue des gros équipements utilisés par les Forces canadiennes. Par exemple, on a réduit le nombre de CF-18 en service, de 79 à entre 65 et 70, pour pouvoir continuer d'exploiter ces appareils jusqu'en 2017, année prévue pour l'acquisition de nouveaux chasseurs. Des restrictions similaires ont été imposées dans le cas des aéronefs Aurora[29].

Malgré ces tentatives pour atténuer le problème, nos Forces devront faire face à une pénurie d'équipements en raison du retrait de certains éléments avant qu'on puisse les remplacer. Prenons, par exemple, la « capacité de défense aérienne de zone » et la capacité de commandement et de contrôle de la Marine. Une fois les destroyers mis au rancart, la flotte canadienne ne pourra plus assurer la défense aérienne de zone[30] avant l'arrivée des navires de remplacement, entre 2020 et 2030. On pourrait observer des problèmes similaires avec les sous-marins, les Hercules C-130J et d'autres biens d'équipement.

Quatrième défi – L'infrastructure excédentaire

La Défense nationale possède une énorme quantité d'infrastructures partout au pays. Une bonne partie d'entre elles sont dans un piètre état. L'entretien d'infrastructures excédentaires sape une partie des fonds qui pourraient servir aux opérations.

Le nouvel équipement acheté par la Défense nationale nécessite souvent de nouvelles infrastructures, ce qui continue de faire grimper les coûts à ce chapitre. Il faut alors faire des pieds et des mains pour trouver des fonds. Ainsi, une bonne partie des infrastructures supplémentaires nécessaires à Trenton pour les opérations des C-17 n'ont pas été financées à même les fonds d'immobilisations, mais en

[29] Le 18 décembre 2007, le ministre de la Défense nationale a annoncé que seulement dix aéronefs de la flotte des CP-140 Aurora feraient l'objet d'une modernisation structurale. Il y aura réduction des taux d'utilisation des aéronefs pour en prolonger la durée de vie jusqu'en 2020.
[30] Vice-amiral Drew Robertson, Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 9 juin 2008, 39e législature, 2e session.

redirigeant des fonds d'un budget de la Force aérienne déjà grevé par d'autres demandes.

Il est à espérer que la Stratégie de défense « Le Canada d'abord » aura une solution à ce problème, puisqu'on a annoncé que l'amélioration des infrastructures sera une des grandes priorités dans les prochains budgets du ministère de la Défense nationale. En fait, selon la Stratégie, un nouveau Plan national de gestion du portefeuille en cours d'élaboration prévoit que[31] :

- 25 p. 100 des infrastructures seront remises à neuf ou remplacées au cours des dix prochaines années, et
- 50 p. 100 seront remplacées au cours des 20 prochaines années.

Comme il n'y a aucun plan détaillé sur le sujet, cela ne semble être qu'une idée pour l'instant. Il est difficile, dans les circonstances, de dire si les chiffres sont à la hauteur des promesses.

Quand le gouvernement va-t-il nous dire quels éléments d'infrastructure seront éliminés? Les Forces canadiennes ont sur les bras un grand nombre d'infrastructures excédentaires d'un océan à l'autre, et il est temps que le gouvernement prenne les décisions nécessaires, aussi difficile que ce soit, pour réduire le gaspillage.

[31] Document d'information technique du MDN sur la Stratégie de défense « Le Canada d'abord », daté du 14 mai 2008. [*traduction*]

Conclusion : Quand et combien

Le Comité admire l'attitude positive des officiers supérieurs qui ont comparu devant lui les 2 et 9 juin dernier. Il est clair que tous s'emploient avec enthousiasme à relever les défis auxquels ils sont confrontés afin d'offrir la meilleure défense possible aux Canadiens compte tenu de leurs moyens financiers. Les Canadiens devraient être fiers de la manière dont les Forces canadiennes se débrouillent avec des budgets impossibles et un surplus d'infrastructures qui est un vrai fardeau.

Cela étant dit, les budgets accordés à la Défense depuis vingt ans par les gouvernements libéral et conservateur sont insuffisants pour assurer aux Canadiens un niveau de protection raisonnable sur leur territoire et permettre au Canada de contribuer à la stabilité au niveau international.

Non seulement le financement est insuffisant, mais il n'est pas efficace. Le niveau de financement actuel permet à peine au Canada d'entretenir une force de combat de 1 000 personnes sur un théâtre d'opérations donné outre-mer – actuellement, l'Afghanistan. Le budget est insuffisant pour dépêcher des soldats sur un autre théâtre d'opérations, quels que soient les besoins et, dans le cas de l'Afghanistan, il ne permet pas aux Forces canadiennes seules de sécuriser la province de Kandahar.

Personne n'ignore que les Forces canadiennes ont désespérément besoin de personnel, mais celles-ci ne peuvent pas élargir leurs cadres – alors que les besoins sont grands – si on ne leur fournit pas les fonds nécessaires pour mettre en œuvre un programme de recrutement énergique, simplifier les procédures d'admission et accroître la capacité de formation.

Le Comité n'en a pas après les Forces ou ceux qui les commandent. Il se soucie surtout de l'insuffisance des fonds dont elles disposent et du temps qu'il faut pour approuver ses grands projets d'immobilisations. On peut bien annoncer un nouveau projet qui ferait partie d'un plan, mais faute d'un plan d'ensemble soumis à l'examen public, comment décidera-t-on s'il est réellement possible de faire telle ou telle chose dans les limites du budget?

Nous nous réjouissons de la stratégie « Le Canada d'abord », mais il ne suffit pas d'*annoncer* une stratégie et de se prêter à une séance de photos; il faut aussi en expliquer les fondements, car le sujet est trop important. Les Canadiens doivent connaître les détails de la stratégie pour voir si elle se tient.

Les cinq officiers supérieurs qui ont comparu devant le Comité sont tous des soldats très décorés possédant une expérience du combat, qui ont fait preuve d'exceptionnelles qualités de gestionnaires pour se hisser au sommet de leur profession. Le premier ministre a eu de la chance de pouvoir choisir le nouveau Chef d'état-major de la Défense parmi une telle brochette de candidats, car tous étaient à la hauteur. Ce sont des hommes intelligents, courageux et intègres, mais il faut leur fournir les outils dont ils ont besoin pour faire leur travail.

Le Comité fait les quelques observations suivantes, fondées sur sept ans de témoignages sur la politique militaire du Canada et sa réaction à la stratégie de défense « Le Canada d'abord ».

- Mis à part les utilisateurs de force, tous les commandants reconnaissent être aux prises avec d'importantes pénuries de personnel auxquelles il importe de réagir immédiatement.
- Il manque de meneurs d'hommes d'expérience au niveau opérationnel. Il y a trop de gens qualifiés dans le domaine opérationnel qui occupent des fonctions bureaucratiques redondantes.
- Les personnes de métier sont devenues une denrée rare parce que beaucoup partent à la retraite et que l'effervescence économique dans le secteur des ressources attire beaucoup d'employés qualifiés. Les Forces vont devoir concevoir un plan pour résoudre ce problème, car aucune force militaire moderne ne peut se passer de gens de métier compétents.
- Les Forces canadiennes auront du mal à trouver le personnel nécessaire pour gérer les nombreux projets d'immobilisations à venir. La mobilisation de gestionnaires de projets militaires va susciter des pénuries de personnel dans la Marine, la Force aérienne et, dans une moindre mesure, l'Armée de terre.
- Le MDN a trop d'infrastructures et a besoin que le gouvernement lui enjoigne de se départir de celles dont il n'a plus besoin.
- Le Comité reconnaît qu'il y a eu des augmentations des dépenses militaires de la part des gouvernements précédent et actuel, mais il n'est pas convaincu, malgré tout ce qu'il a entendu, que des augmentations budgétaires annuelles de 1,5 et 2 p. 100 vont réellement augmenter la

capacité de nos Forces, quand le taux d'inflation, surtout dans l'industrie militaire, va presque certainement dépasser ces chiffres.

- Le Comité estime qu'il faut procéder immédiatement à une étude en profondeur de la structure organisationnelle des Forces canadiennes, afin de confirmer ou de réorganiser la structure des quartiers généraux.

Calculs de la Conférence des associations de la défense

1. Établissement du niveau de référence – 2008-2009

Le PIB du Canada s'est établi à 1,536 billion de dollars en 2007 (Statistique Canada).
Le « Total des dépenses du Ministère » (prévues au BPD) pour l'exercice 2007-2008 s'élève à 18,619 milliards de dollars (Conseil du Trésor).
Donc, les dépenses de défense (BPD) ont représenté 1,21 % du PIB en 2007.

Le Conference Board prédit que le PIB affichera un taux de croissance nominal de 3,5 % en 2008 (taux réel de 1,7 % compte tenu d'un taux d'inflation de 1.8 %).
Cela donne un PIB théorique de 1,589 billion de dollars en 2008.
D'après les chiffres du Conseil du Trésor, les dépenses de défense prévues au BPD s'élèveront à 19,508 milliards de dollars.
Donc, les dépenses de défense (BPD) représenteront 1,23 % du PIB en 2008.

Le Conference Board prédit que le PIB affichera un taux de croissance nominal de 4,3 % en 2009 (taux réel de 2,4 % compte tenu d'un taux d'inflation de 1,9 %).
Cela donne un PIB théorique de 1,68 billion de dollars en 2009.
D'après les chiffres du Conseil du Trésor, les dépenses de défense prévues au BPD s'élèveront à 20,057 milliards de dollars.
Donc, les dépenses de défense (BPD) représenteront 1,21 % du PIB.

2. Calcul des projections jusqu'en 2027-2028 (terme de la SDCD)

Trois scénarios de croissance :

a. Taux nominal de 3,1 % (taux réel de 1 %, taux d'inflation de 2,1 %, le taux sur lequel repose la SDCD, lequel est conforme à la fourchette cible de 1 à 3 % de la BdC)
b. Taux nominal de 4,1 % (taux réel de 2 %, taux d'inflation de 2,1 %)
c. Taux nominal de 5,1 % (taux réel de 3 %, taux d'inflation de 2,1 %)

Dépenses de défense (BPD) en % du PIB en 2027-2028

a. 1,13 % (taux de croissance nominal du PIB de 3,1 %)

b. 0,95 % (taux de croissance nominal du PIB de 4,1 %)
c. 0,80 % (taux de croissance nominal du PIB de 5,1 %)

3. Feuille de calcul :

PIB 3,1%	PIB 4,1%	Année	PIB 5,1%	BPD	BPD/PIB 3,1	BPD/PIB 4,1	BPD/PIB 5,1
1,65774E+12	1,65774E+12	2009	1,65774E+12	2,0057E+10	1,21%	1,21%	1,21%
1,70913E+12	1,7257E+12	2010	1,74228E+12	2,0598E+10	1,21%	1,19%	1,18%
1,76211E+12	1,79646E+12	2011	1,83114E+12	2,1154E+10	1,20%	1,18%	1,16%
1,81674E+12	1,87011E+12	2012	1,92453E+12	2,1726E+10	1,20%	1,16%	1,13%
1,87305E+12	1,94679E+12	2013	2,02268E+12	2,2312E+10	1,19%	1,15%	1,10%
1,93112E+12	2,02661E+12	2014	2,12583E+12	2,2915E+10	1,19%	1,13%	1,08%
1,99098E+12	2,1097E+12	2015	2,23425E+12	2,3533E+10	1,18%	1,12%	1,05%
2,0527E+12	2,19619E+12	2016	2,3482E+12	2,4169E+10	1,18%	1,10%	1,03%
2,11634E+12	2,28624E+12	2017	2,46796E+12	2,4821E+10	1,17%	1,09%	1,01%
2,18194E+12	2,37997E+12	2018	2,59382E+12	2,5491E+10	1,17%	1,07%	0,98%
2,24959E+12	2,47755E+12	2019	2,72611E+12	2,618E+10	1,16%	1,06%	0,96%
2,31932E+12	2,57913E+12	2020	2,86514E+12	2,6887E+10	1,16%	1,04%	0,94%
2,39122E+12	2,68488E+12	2021	3,01126E+12	2,7612E+10	1,15%	1,03%	0,92%
2,.46535E+12	2,79496E+12	2022	3,16484E+12	2,8358E+10	1,15%	1,01%	0,90%
2,54177E+12	2,90955E+12	2023	3,32624E+12	2,9124E+10	1,15%	1,00%	0,88%
2,62057E+12	3,02884E+12	2024	3,49588E+12	2,991E+10	1,14%	0,99%	0,86%
2,70181E+12	3,15303E+12	2025	3,67417E+12	3,0718E+10	1,14%	0,97%	0,84%
2,78556E+12	3,2823E+12	2026	3,86155E+12	3,1547E+10	1,13%	0,96%	0,82%
2,87192E+12	3,41687E+12	2027	4,05849E+12	3,2399E+10	1,13%	0,95%	0,80%

4. On observe des divergences mineures entre les chiffres de la SDCD et ceux du Conseil du Trésor au sujet des dépenses de défense totales, divergences qui s’accentuent à la fin de la période qui se termine en 2027. Je crois que cela tient au fait que les chiffres du Conseil du Trésor ont été publiés avant ceux de la SDCD. À ce niveau d’analyse, ces divergences sont sans conséquence (Brian MacDonald, Conférence des associations de la défense).

5. Références

Statistique Canada : http://www40.statcan.ca/l02/cst01/econ04_f.htm
Conseil du Trésor : http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/2008-2009/inst/dnd/dnd01-fra.asp
Conference Board: http://www.conferenceboard.ca/budget/

Commentaire de la Division de l'économie – Bibliothèque du Parlement

On a demandé au Service d'information et de recherche parlementaires de revoir les hypothèses qui sous-tendent le calcul des dépenses de défense en pourcentage du PIB effectué par le colonel (à la retraite) Brian MacDonald de la Conférence des associations de la défense.

Les calculs proposés dépendent de l'évolution supposée de deux variables, les dépenses de défense et le PIB du Canada. Les chiffres sur les dépenses de défense pour l'exercice 2009-2010 sont tirés du *Rapport sur les plans et les priorités 2008-2009* du ministère de la Défense nationale. À partir de 2010-2011, les chiffres de dépenses sont calculés en appliquant au chiffre de 2009-2010 le taux d'augmentation promis dans la stratégie de défense « Le Canada d'abord », laquelle prévoit que les dépenses de défense afficheront une augmentation annuelle moyenne à long terme de 2,7 % de 2008-2009 à 2027-2028, quoique le taux variera d'une année à l'autre. Comme la stratégie ne donne pas le détail des dépenses par année, le calcul fait abstraction de toute variation et repose sur un taux d'augmentation constant de 2,7 % par an. Cette hypothèse influera sur le calcul des dépenses de défense en pourcentage du PIB.

Pour calculer le PIB de 2009, on s'est fondé sur le PIB de 2007 établi par Statistique Canada, qu'on a ensuite augmenté du taux nominal estimatif d'augmentation du PIB établi par le Conference Board pour 2008 (3,5 %) et 2009 (4,3 %). Pour ce qui est de l'augmentation à long terme du PIB, plus difficile à prédire, on envisage trois scénarios : progression faible (taux nominal annuel de 3,1 %), moyenne (4,1 %) et élevée (5,1 %), pour 2010 à 2027. Ces taux sont ensuite appliqués à l'estimation du PIB en 2009.

Les hypothèses qui sous-tendent ces calculs constituent un ensemble possible d'hypothèses raisonnables parmi de nombreux autres. Beaucoup d'organisations produisent des prévisions économiques qui auraient pu être utilisées au lieu des estimations du Conference Board. De même, les estimations de croissance à long terme pourraient être supérieures ou inférieures. Le gouvernement fédéral s'est engagé à relever le budget de la défense de 1,8 milliard de dollars en 2010-2011 pour ensuite l'augmenter de 2 % par an jusqu'en 2027-2028. Cela veut dire que, sur l'ensemble de la période de 20 ans, les dépenses de défense croîtront en moyenne de 2,7 % par année. Cependant, cette méthode produira des estimations

des dépenses de défense différentes pour les années situées entre 2008-2009 et 2027-2028 de celles que produit un calcul reposant sur une augmentation annuelle constante de 2,7 % par an. Il importe donc de se rappeler que les calculs sont sensibles aux hypothèses retenues et que toute modification de celles-ci peut influer sur les résultats.

Agence et porte-parole	Date
Ministère de la Défense nationale : • le lieutenant-général W. J. Natynczyk, vice-chef d'état-major de la Défense • le lieutenant-général A.B. Leslie, commandant de la Force terrestre • l'adjudant-chef Wayne Ford, sergent-major de l'Armée	**2 juin 2008**
Ministère de la Défense nationale : • le lieutenant-général J.C.M. Gauthier, commandant de la Force expéditionnaire du Canada • le vice-amiral Drew Robertson, commandant de la Marine • le lieutenant-général W. Angus Watt, commandant de la Force aérienne	**9 juin 2008**

Bringing Our Wounded Home Safely

Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence

Committee Members

Sen. Colin Kenny – Chair
Sen. David Tkachuk – Deputy Chair
Sen. Tommy Banks
Sen. Joseph A. Day
Sen. Grant Mitchell
Sen. Michael A. Meighen
Sen. Wilfred P. Moore
Sen. Nancy Ruth
Sen. Rod A. A. Zimmer

Second Session
Thirty-ninth Parliament
2008

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THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE

39TH PARLIAMENT, 2ND SESSION

The Honourable Colin Kenny
Chair

The Honourable David Tkachuk
Deputy Chair

and

The Honourable Senators:

Tommy Banks
Joseph A. Day
Michael A. Meighen
Grant Mitchell
Wilfred P. Moore
Nancy Ruth
Rod A.A. Zimmer

*The Honourable Marjory Lebreton, P.C. (or the Honourable Gerald Comeau)
*The Honourable Céline Hervieux-Payette, P.C.
(or the Honourable Claudette Tardif)
*Ex Officio Members

Special Advisors to the Committee:
MGen (ret) Keith McDonald and Barry Denofsky

Library of Parliament Research Staff:
Melissa Radford, Maureen Shields and Jason Yung

Clerks of the Committee:
Shaila Anwar and Gaëtane Lemay

Extract from the *Journals of the Senate*, Tuesday, November 20, 2007:

The Honourable Senator Kenny moved, seconded by the Honourable Senator Banks:

That the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence be authorized to examine and report on the national security policy of Canada. In particular, the committee shall be authorized to examine:

(*a*) the capability of the Department of National Defence to defend and protect the interests, people and territory of Canada and its ability to respond to and prevent a national emergency or attack, and the capability of the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to carry out its mandate;

(*b*) the working relationships between the various agencies involved in intelligence gathering, and how they collect, coordinate, analyze and disseminate information and how these functions might be enhanced;

(*c*) the mechanisms to review the performance and activities of the various agencies involved in intelligence gathering; and

(*d*) the security of our borders and critical infrastructure;

That the papers and evidence received and taken and work accomplished by the committee on this subject since the beginning of the First session of the Thirty-seventh Parliament be referred to the committee; and

That the committee report to the Senate no later than March 31, 2009 and that the committee retain all powers necessary to publicize its findings until 90 days after the tabling of the final report.

The question being put on the motion, it was adopted.

Paul C. Bélisle

Clerk of the Senate

Canadians Wounded in Afghanistan:

How Well Does Canada Rescue, Treat and Rehabilitate?

Since the Government of Canada began its military mission to Afghanistan in 2002, 88 Canadian soldiers and 1 diplomat have been killed there. Another 280[1] have been wounded, some seriously.

Non-battle injuries – including personnel repatriated to Canada for compassionate reasons, including operational stress disorders, have totaled 395.[2]

The Senate Committee on National Security and Defence has studied the Afghanistan mission, visited the country three times, and has made many recommendations on the goals and conduct of the mission.

In doing so, we have paid tribute to the soldiers who have died in service for Canada in Afghanistan: our last report – ***How are We Doing in Afghanistan?*** – concluded with a list of the names of those soldiers killed up to the first week of June 2008.

There is nothing we can do for those who have died in Afghanistan, other than honour their valour and comfort their families. But the Committee does believe that it can be of some use to Canadians who have been injured in Afghanistan and their families. To help us understand the challenges, we have made an effort to walk with the wounded.

Toward that end, we have visited the Kandahar Air Field (KAF) Hospital in Kandahar, the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center (LRMC) in Landstuhl, Germany, the Glenrose Rehabilitation Hospital in Edmonton, as well as other Canadian facilities.

[1] Figure for "Wounded in Action" from 2002 until the end of December 2007. Figure provided by the Department of National Defence on May 6th 2008 in response to a Committee request for information.
[2] Figure for "Non-Battle Injuries" from 2002 until the end of December 2007. Figure provided by the Department of National Defence on May 6th 2008 in response to a Committee request for information.

Important Questions

The questions we asked ourselves on those visits were questions every Canadian would have asked in our place. Are Canadians wounded on the battlefield receiving the kind of quick and capable attention they deserve? Have those who need more sustained treatment – either physical or psychological – received such treatment when they returned home?

The Committee has done enough personal examination of facilities and asked enough questions of military personnel to reach some conclusions. Most of our conclusions are positive so far, but some are not, and we hope the latter will encourage Canadians across the country to take a close look at whether soldiers who have been injured in Afghanistan are getting the kind of state-of-the-art treatment that their country owes them.

An Early Assessment

To this point the Committee has determined that there are very good things happening in terms of treatment of Canada's wounded military personnel. But while these people appear to be receiving first-rate treatment overseas, it is evident that they are receiving a uniformly high standard of treatment across the country once they arrive back home.

1(a) Rescue in Kandahar

In Kandahar, it goes without saying that by far the greatest number of Canadian casualties occur "outside the wire" – in patrols or convoys that deploy outside the defensive perimeter of the Joint Task Force Afghanistan (JTF-AFG) headquarters at Kandahar Airfield.

These operations are always prepared to move quickly to minimize human trauma when incidents occur. For a start, all Canadian soldiers are trained in advanced first aid. Furthermore, it is a Canadian operational imperative that Canadian troops who operate outside the wire are never far from a medic. A medic is a soldier with medical training similar to that of an ambulance paramedic, but with advanced training in combat casualty care designed to deal with trauma in the field.

Physician's assistants are also required to be close at hand. The U.S. military has used physician's assistants for many years but the role is relatively new within the Canadian Forces. Physician's assistants are not qualified to perform all the duties of a doctor, but may specialize in some medical areas. They are also given advanced training in trauma care before being deployed to Afghanistan.

Helicopters Quick to the Scene

When a Canadian soldier is injured, a U.S. helicopter is sent immediately to transport the soldier to Kandahar Airfield (KAF) Hospital. This hospital serves all of Southern Afghanistan. Round trips are expected to take no more than two hours, with a one hour targeted maximum for areas designated as having "hot" combat potential. American physician's assistants are on board. The distance between the helicopter landing pad at the Hospital and the trauma unit is approximately 15 metres.

1(b) Kandahar Airfield Hospital

Committee members visited KAF Hospital in December 2006. We were pleased to learn of the hospital's informal motto: "You arrive alive – you stay alive." It may be an impossible goal to live up to, but it is certainly a worthy one.

The hospital is not only the first destination for Canadian soldiers and their allies operating in Southern Afghanistan, it is also an alternate medical facility for the treatment of Afghan National Army (ANA) troops, since local hospital facilities are usually inadequate for the treatment of critical injuries.

KAF Hospital, a NATO asset, is a Role 3 hospital, equivalent to a tertiary care trauma centre in North America – that is, a centre that can offer specialty care, intensive care and perform major operations. Canada provides lead staff. KAF Hospital is typically staffed by two trauma surgeons, two orthopedic surgeons one oral maxillofacial surgeon (for head, neck, face and jaw), and now has one neurosurgeon. This can change depending upon which surgeons are available on any particular rotation.

Stabilize and Treat

The first imperative at KAF Hospital, of course, is to stabilize a soldier's condition in preparation for possible further interventions. Given that the majority of injuries

treated there result from Improvised Explosive Device (IED) blasts, resulting in injuries such as compound fractures, most surgeries are orthopedic.

For serious injuries, evacuation from KAF Hospital is often a second step to full treatment. One example: for a soldier with a compound fracture, KAF Hospital will do open reduction and external fixation. What this means is that the wound is actually left open and flushed on a regular basis while the limb is stabilized with bolts and rods in the bone. Wounds are left open because of the risk of closing a wound that may be infected with local infections to which the soldier has not built up a resistance. Such a wound would eventually be closed at Landstuhl Regional Medical Centre (LRMC) hospital.

2. The Landstuhl Regional Medical Center (LRMC)

The Committee visited the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center (LRMC) on April 4, 2008. LRMC is an overseas military hospital operated by the U.S. Army and the Department of Defense, and is available to NATO troops.

LRMC is the largest military hospital outside of the continental United States. It serves as the closest emergency treatment centre for wounded soldiers that have to be evacuated from Iraq and Afghanistan.

Some facts learned by Committee members during our visit:

- LRMC has treated 46,000 soldiers since October 2001, a small percentage of whom have been Canadians.
- Canadian soldiers stay an average of 5 days.
- Staff is mostly U.S. military and civilian medical personnel, augmented by German civilian personnel.
- The Canadian Forces do not have any personnel posted to LRMC. The Canadian Forces do have three medical personnel posted to the Canadian Forces facility at Geilenkirchen, Germany (one nursing officer, one medical officer and one medical technician) who are available for medical evacuations and tasked with providing support to Canadian Forces members sent to LRMC[3].

[3] Information provided by the Department National Defence in response to a Committee request for information on December 19, 2007.

- All patients are assessed for traumatic brain injury (TBI) to determine whether it is mild, moderate, or severe).

  Traumatic brain injuries can be very difficult to diagnose and can cause long-term problems. Continual and follow-up medical care is necessary for this type of injury.

- Battle injuries often involve limbs.

- Many of the evacuees do not suffer from direct physical wounds – the Center treats an average of one suicidal patient[4] a week.

- Mental Health Services perform psychological assessments on *all* in-patients.

- There are 140 beds, but it is rare that 100 are in use.

- Canadian Government civilians working in Afghanistan are also treated there.

Advantages of the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center

LRMC has one advantage over the average civilian hospital – staffs usually know at least 12 hours in advance if a patient will be arriving, and what his or her needs might be. They also have a breadth of experience in dealing with battlefield injuries, whether they be physical or mental.

Another critical advantage is that LRMC has the facilities to offer cost-free living to close family members so they can be with injured soldiers during the critical days they spend there. This is thanks to the U.S.-based Fisher Foundation, which builds "comfort homes" on the grounds of major U.S. military and veterans' affairs medical centres. The Fisher House™ at Landstuhl is the one of only two located outside U.S. territory and is happy to accommodate Canadian families as well as families from other NATO countries involved in missions with the U.S. military.

Fisher Houses™ are designed so that visitors can live lives that are as normal as possible under the circumstances. They feature a number of suites with common kitchens, laundry facilities, a spacious dining room and an inviting living room

[4] The Committee would like to clarify: LRMC treats an average of one suicidal patient out of the total number of patients (not just Canadian) a week.

with library, and toys for children. These are designed as temporary residences – not treatment facilities, hospices or counselling centres. Volunteers help keep the houses going, and chaplains are available.

We were told that 24 Canadian families have stayed at the Fisher House™ at LRMC.

Some Committee members had the opportunity to sit down and chat with a Canadian family whose son was undergoing double amputation surgery below the knee. They were very appreciative of the accommodations and of the Canadian Forces' support, which provides a full time assisting officer to accompany the family from home. Sadly, we were also witness to the overwhelming sadness of an American family that had to make the decision to take their son off life support.

We weren't there long, but it was obvious that staff at Fisher House™ are extremely compassionate and capable of developing close relationships with visiting families over a very short time. They have been trained to give families space and to encourage them to feel at "home" and keep themselves busy with cooking, laundry, etc. But they are also there when support is needed.

Committee members are not experts on the capabilities of medical practitioners, so we would not be able to offer an opinion on the expert staffing of the medical centre – even if our visit had lasted for weeks. But LRMC has a reputation for first-class treatment, and the backup facilities for families at Fisher House™ impressed us very much.

One last thought: One staff member mentioned how appreciative Fisher House™ is that Canadians in recent years have donated disproportionately to the Foundation, even though it is a U.S.-based institution. Anyone considering making a donation should take to the Web at www.fisherhouse.org.

3. Back in Canada

Wounded Canadian soldiers are repatriated to Canada via contracted civilian medical flights, Canadian military flights or U.S. military flights.

For anyone who has suffered significant physical or psychological wounds in Kandahar, the next step is invariably rehabilitation.

Our Committee visited the Glenrose Rehabilitation Hospital in Edmonton, Alberta on January 30, 2007. We toured the facility and were briefed on the Adult Amputee Program, as well as the Prosthesis Service.

When prostheses are required, they are custom designed and fitted in keeping with each individual's functional needs and/or goals. Those services are provided by professional and technical staff with expertise in the treatment of persons with complex needs.

The Committee visited a room equipped with an array of motion and other sensors. Any movement is picked up and computerized to determine a person's range of motion. This helps specialists determine if someone is walking, running or otherwise moving properly.

Rehabilitative physiotherapy is then employed in an attempt to correct any abnormalities. This is especially helpful when a patient is beginning to use prosthetics. If the patient is not moving properly the prosthetics may have to be adjusted.

On 25 July 2008, the Committee received a report from Senator Grant Mitchell regarding his recent meeting with the injured soldier whose parents the Committee met during our Landstuhl visit. Senator Mitchell stated that "I actually visited him last week in Edmonton in the Glenrose rehab center and he asked me to go with him to his therapy session that day.…The Glenrose is a great facility giving him wonderful care."

During its visit to Glenrose in January 2007, the Committee met with Master Corporal Paul Franklin and his wife Audra. On January 15, 2006 Master Corporal Franklin, with One Field Ambulance of the Edmonton Garrison, was driving an armoured Mercedes jeep in a convoy in Kandahar in Afghanistan when a suicide bomber succeeded in blowing up the vehicle. The bomber killed diplomat Glyn Berry and delivered devastating injuries to Franklin, Private William Salikin and Corporal Jeff Bailey. Franklin lost both his legs, besides sustaining third-degree burns and wounds all over his body.

We found Master Corporal Franklin to be incredibly optimistic and ready to move forward with his life, but he also told us that the military isn't necessarily generous to its casualties unless they stand up and fight for what they deserve. An excellent article in the *Legion Magazine* on November 6, 2007 documented both his optimism and his struggles. Here is an excerpt:

> *Through it all–and despite the fact that he doesn't sleep too well these days–he's managed to maintain a positive outlook. "This time is just dessert, because I died last year. Everything else is just fluff. Just enjoy it."*
>
> *But his optimism has been tested. One of the most severely injured of the Canadian Forces members to survive the war in Afghanistan, he has come across a bewildering array of situations–from red tape to petty jealousies–in obtaining necessities such as home adaptations and in trying to maintain a career within the [Canadian Forces]. "I want to say I got good care," says Franklin, "because I did." He got top-notch treatment at the Glenrose Rehabilitation Hospital in Edmonton, where he learned to walk again, and, thanks to the $250,000 cheque he got immediately from the Service Income Security Insurance Plan, he was able to buy his car and relocate with his family to a house more suited to his needs.*
>
> *Still, despite becoming well-known in the media and gaining the ear of powerful people like the Chief of the Defence Staff General Rick Hillier, he's had his share of struggles with the system–and with perceptions. "People tell me all the time–oh, you had it easy. And yet, I've had to fight for everything."*[5]
>
> *Fortunately, his trials–and triumphs–are helping to bring about changes in the way the military, the Department of National Defence and Veterans Affairs Canada are looking after injured CF members.*

Care at Home Varies Widely From Province to Province

The Committee was extremely impressed with the rehab offered at Glenrose Rehabilitation Hospital. But conversations with military personnel at both the senior and junior levels have made it clear that while Glenrose offers the kind of

[5] http://www.legionmagazine.com/en/index.php/2007/11/the-quiet-fight/

rehabilitation that all damaged Canadian soldiers *should* receive when they return home, that kind of treatment is not generally available across the country. Far from it. In Alberta, Glenrose stands out. In Canada, Glenrose stands out like a 2009 Lamborghini on a car lot dotted with far too many 1970 Ladas.

Health care is the jurisdiction of the provinces, and every Canadian knows the quality of health care can vary dramatically from province to province. It is the Committee's belief that Canadian military personnel wounded in the service of their country should receive one standard of rehabilitative treatment when they return home: *first class.*

> **If all provinces cannot or will not provide this first-class level of treatment, the federal government should step in and ensure that it is made available to every wounded returnee.**

Reserves Especially Vulnerable

The Committee is also concerned about the unequal and inconsistent treatment received by Reservists who are injured in the line of duty in comparison to treatment received by injured Regular Force members. In a CBC interview on April 3, 2008 following the release of her report entitled "Reserved Care: An Investigation into the Treatment of Injured Reservists," DND's Interim Ombudsman, Mary McFadyen has stated that it is unacceptable that in the Canadian Forces a Reservist's limb is worth less than that of a Regular Force member's [6]. In a strongly-worded report issued April 3, 2008 Ms. McFadyen observed, for example, that a reservist who loses a hand while serving with the Canadian Forces currently receives $50,000 in compensation, while a Regular Force member who loses a hand gets $125,000. "Frankly, the rule should be if you break them, you fix them."

Reservists currently make up approximately 20 percent of the Canadian contingent deployed to Afghanistan. Although Reservists serving in Afghanistan receive a classification equal to that of Regular Force members and are therefore entitled to full medical coverage, other discrepancies arise when Reservists return home. Often Reserve armouries are not close to large military bases and do not have the support systems that these bases offer Canadian Forces Regulars. In addition, there are a number of other complications. There is an obligation for Reservists to prove

[6] CBC News, "Reservists short-changed by military health-care system: ombudsman," April 3, 2008, accessible at http://www.cbc.ca/canada/edmonton/story/2008/04/03/reservist-health.html#socialcomments

that injuries have been sustained in the line of duty. Obstacles like these can be overwhelming to injured soldiers.

The Department of National Defence has committed itself to look into these issues, and the Committee looks forward to hearing the results of this investigation

Conclusions

1. The care and rehab facilities we visited in Kandahar, Landstuhl and Edmonton appear to operate with the kind of expertise and concern that Canadians serving in battlefields on behalf of all Canadians certainly deserve.

2. The backup facilities provided by the Fisher Foundation in Landstuhl represent the kind of supportive attitude toward soldiers and their families that the Committee applauds.

3. The Committee has heard enough anecdotal evidence to understand that we've witnessed only the best care Canada provides its soldiers, and that there have been cases in which such superb care has not been forthcoming.

4. The Committee notes that when it comes to rehabilitation, provincial plans drive the level of care received by injured soldiers when they return home. The Committee encourages programs designed to enhance the sharing of information and lessons learned among rehab centres across Canada regarding the care of injured soldiers.

5. The Canadian military stopped funding its own military care many years ago, primarily because it was expensive. The Department of National Defence MUST do one of two things: (a) reach an arrangement with all provinces to guarantee state-of-the-art treatment for wounded military returnees; or (b) offer such treatment itself.

6. Department of National Defence rules must be changed to give Reservists exactly the same compensation for injuries that Canadian Forces Regulars receive. Wounded Reservists should also receive the same state-of-the-art treatment in Canada that Regulars receive.

Is the Committee saying that Canadian Forces personnel who are either physically or psychologically injured in the service of their country deserve special treatment – treatment that isn't always available to all Canadians in all parts of the country?

That is ***exactly*** what we are saying. These are special people doing a special job for Canada. They deserve nothing but our best.

Encouraging Words

We will conclude with an excerpt from an *Ottawa Citizen* editorial published on May 16, 2008, which suggests that the current government may also be interested in assuring that these returnees get the very best:

> *Every death is counted and mourned, as it must be, and every injury is noted. And now there are signals that the hidden but equally dangerous injuries of war are also going to be counted and treated.*
>
> *The recent announcement of new clinics in Ottawa and across the country to treat returning soldiers and veterans suffering from emotional stress injuries is timely. Canadian Forces officials say the number of soldiers suffering from operation stress disorders has risen in the past five years from about 3,500 to 11,000, largely because of better efforts at early detection.*
>
> *The establishment of new specialized clinics, in addition to existing centres, to treat soldiers with stress injuries is a sign that the armed forces are doing more than paying lip service to the issue. By acknowledging the legitimacy of these disorders, military leaders are encouraging soldiers to come forward for treatment -- soldiers who in times past might have tried to cope on their own.*

If this proves to be a trend in the treatment of Canada's wounded soldiers, it will be a very welcome one.

Le rapatriement des soldats blessés

Rapport du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense

Membres du comité

Sén. Colin Kenny – Président
Sén. David Tkachuk – Vice-président
Sén. Tommy Banks
Sén. Joseph A. Day
Sén. Grant Mitchell
Sén. Michael A. Meighen
Sén. Wilfred P. Moore
Sén. Nancy Ruth
Sén. Rod A. A. Zimmer

Deuxième session
Trente-neuvième législature
2008

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LE COMITÉ SÉNATORIAL PERMANENT DE LA SÉCURITÉ NATIONALE ET DE LA DÉFENSE

39E LÉGISLATURE, 2E SESSION

L'honorable Colin Kenny
Président

L'honorable David Tkachuk
Vice-président

et

Les honorables sénateurs :

Tommy Banks
Joseph A. Day
Michael A. Meighen
Grant Mitchell
Wilfred P. Moore
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Rod A.A. Zimmer

*L'honorable Marjory Lebreton, C.P. (ou l'honorable Gerald Comeau)
*L'honorable Céline Hervieux-Payette, C.P.
(ou l'honorable Claudette Tardif)
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Personnel de recherche de la Bibliothèque du Parlement :
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Shaila Anwar et Gaëtane Lemay

Extrait des *Journaux du Sénat*, le mardi 20 novembre 2007 :

L'honorable sénateur Kenny propose, appuyé par l'honorable sénateur Banks,

Que le Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense soit autorisé à mener une étude et à faire rapport sur la politique de sécurité nationale du Canada. Le comité sera en particulier autorisé à examiner:

a) la capacité du ministère de la Défense nationale de défendre et de protéger les intérêts, la population et le territoire du Canada et sa capacité de réagir à une urgence nationale ou à une attaque et de prévenir ces situations, ainsi que la capacité du ministère de la Sécurité publique et de la Protection civile de remplir son mandat;

b) les relations de travail entre les divers organismes participant à la collecte de renseignements, comment ils recueillent, colligent, analysent et diffusent ces renseignements, et comment ces fonctions pourraient être améliorées;

c) les mécanismes d'examen de la performance et des activités des divers organismes participant à la collecte de renseignements;

d) la sécurité de nos frontières et de nos infrastructures essentielles;

Que les documents reçus, les témoignages entendus, et les travaux accomplis par le comité sur ce sujet depuis le début de la première session de la trente-septième législature soient renvoyés au comité;

Que le comité fasse rapport au Sénat au plus tard le 31 mars 2009 et qu'il conserve tous les pouvoirs nécessaires pour diffuser ses conclusions pendant les 90 jours suivant le dépôt de son rapport final.

La motion, mise aux voix, est adoptée.

Le greffier du Sénat

Paul C. Bélisle

Les Canadiens blessés en Afghanistan :

Quelle est la qualité des services de sauvetage, de traitement et de réadaptation offerts par le Canada?

Depuis le début de la mission militaire du Canada en Afghanistan en 2002, 88 soldats canadiens et un diplomate ont été tués là-bas et 280[1] blessés, certains gravement.

On dénombre par ailleurs 395 cas de blessures hors combat – qui concernent aussi le personnel rapatrié au Canada pour des raisons d'ordre humanitaire, notamment pour stress opérationnel[2].

Le Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense a étudié la mission en Afghanistan; il s'est rendu là-bas trois fois et a formulé de nombreuses recommandations sur les objectifs et la conduite de la mission.

Ce faisant, il a rendu hommage aux soldats morts au service du Canada en Afghanistan. En effet, il a inséré à la fin de son dernier rapport – **Qu'en est-il pour nous en Afghanistan? –** la liste des soldats tués en Afghanistan jusqu'à la première semaine de juin 2008.

Nous ne pouvons rien pour ceux qui sont morts en Afghanistan si ce n'est d'honorer leur bravoure et réconforter leurs familles. Mais le Comité pense qu'il peut être utile auprès des Canadiens qui ont été blessés en Afghanistan et de leurs familles. Afin de mieux comprendre leurs difficultés, nous avons fait un effort pour passer un peu de temps avec les blessés.

Ainsi, nous avons visité l'hôpital de l'aérodrome de Kandahar, le Centre médical régional de Landstuhl en Allemagne, l'hôpital de réadaptation Glenrose d'Edmonton en Alberta et d'autres installations canadiennes.

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[1] Nombre de « blessés au combat » entre 2002 et la fin de décembre 2007. Chiffre fourni par le ministère de la Défense nationale le 6 mai 2008 en réponse à une demande d'information du Comité.
[2] Nombre de « blessés hors combat » entre 2002 et la fin de décembre 2007. Chiffre fourni par le ministère de la Défense nationale le 6 mai 2008 en réponse à une demande d'information du Comité.

Questions importantes

Les questions que nous nous sommes posées lors de ces visites sont des questions que tout Canadien se serait posées à notre place. Les Canadiens blessés sur le champ de bataille reçoivent-ils rapidement les services qualifiés qu'ils méritent? Ceux qui avaient besoin de soins – physiques ou psychologiques – de longue durée en ont-ils bénéficié à leur retour?

Le Comité a suffisamment examiné les installations et posé suffisamment de questions au personnel militaire pour tirer des conclusions. La plupart de celles-ci sont positives jusqu'à maintenant, mais certaines ne le sont pas, et nous espérons que ces dernières inciteront l'ensemble de la population canadienne à vérifier de près si les soldats blessés en Afghanistan reçoivent les meilleurs soins possible qu'ils méritent de leur pays.

Évaluation préliminaire

À ce jour, nous avons constaté qu'il se fait de très bonnes choses pour le traitement de nos militaires blessés. Mais si ceux-ci reçoivent les meilleurs soins à l'étranger, il est évident que ce n'est pas le cas partout au pays à leur retour.

1(a) Sauvetage à Kandahar

Il va sans dire que la presque totalité des incidents faisant des victimes ont lieu lors de patrouilles à l'extérieur du périmètre de sécurité qui protège le quartier général de la force opérationnelle interarmées – Afghanistan à l'aérodrome de Kandahar.

Ces opérations sont toujours préparées de manière à permettre une intervention rapide propre à minimiser les traumatismes en cas d'incident. D'abord, tous les soldats canadiens reçoivent une formation de secourisme avancé. Ensuite, dans toutes les opérations canadiennes, un impératif veut que les soldats envoyés en dehors du périmètre de sécurité ne soient jamais loin d'un infirmier, c'est-à-dire un soldat qui a une formation similaire à celle d'un ambulancier paramédical, mais qui a en outre une formation avancée sur les soins aux victimes de combat qui lui permet de dispenser des soins sur le terrain.

On doit aussi avoir un auxiliaire médical sous la main. L'armée américaine a recours à des auxiliaires médicaux depuis plusieurs années, mais ce poste est

relativement nouveau dans les Forces canadiennes. Les auxiliaires médicaux ne sont pas habilités à remplir toutes les fonctions d'un médecin, mais ils peuvent se spécialiser dans certains domaines médicaux. Ils reçoivent aussi une formation poussée en traumatologie avant d'être expédiés en Afghanistan.

Évacuation rapide en hélicoptère

Quand un soldat canadien est blessé, il est immédiatement évacué par un hélicoptère américain vers l'hôpital de l'aérodrome de Kandahar, qui sert tout le sud de l'Afghanistan. L'aller-retour est censé prendre au plus deux heures, mais on vise une heure dans les secteurs où le potentiel de combat est élevé. Des auxiliaires médicaux américains sont à bord. La distance entre l'aire d'atterrissage des hélicoptères de l'hôpital et le service de traumatologie est d'environ 15 mètres.

1(b) L'hôpital de l'aérodrome de Kandahar

Des membres du Comité se sont rendus à l'hôpital de l'aérodrome de Kandahar en décembre 2006. Nous avons été heureux d'apprendre le mot d'ordre officieux de l'hôpital : « Qui arrive vivant le reste ». C'est un objectif peut-être impossible à atteindre, mais il est à coup sûr motivant.

L'hôpital n'est pas seulement la première destination des soldats canadiens et de leurs alliés affectés dans le sud de l'Afghanistan, mais il sert aussi d'installation de rechange pour le traitement des soldats de l'Armée nationale afghane, car les hôpitaux locaux sont en général mal équipés pour traiter des blessés graves.

L'hôpital de l'aérodrome de Kandahar, un établissement de l'OTAN, est un hôpital de rôle 3, l'équivalent d'un centre de traumatologie de soins tertiaires en Amérique du Nord – c'est-à-dire un centre hospitalier équipé pour offrir des soins spécialisés et des soins intensifs et réaliser des opérations chirurgicales majeures. Le personnel cadre est canadien. L'hôpital compte en général deux chirurgiens spécialisés en traumatologie, deux chirurgiens orthopédistes, un chirurgien spécialiste de la chirurgie buccale et maxillo-faciale (tête, cou, visage et mâchoire) et compte maintenant un neurochirurgien. La distribution des spécialités varie suivant la rotation.

Stabiliser et traiter

Naturellement, le premier impératif à l'hôpital de l'aérodrome de Kandahar, c'est

de stabiliser l'état des soldats blessés qui y sont amenés avant les interventions qui suivront éventuellement. La plupart des blessures étant causées par des engins explosifs improvisés, les fractures ouvertes sont nombreuses et la majorité des cas relèvent de la chirurgie orthopédique.

Dans le cas de blessures graves, la seconde étape est souvent l'évacuation vers un établissement de soins complets. Par exemple, dans le cas d'un soldat souffrant d'une blessure ouverte, on procède à une réduction chirurgicale avec fixation externe. Cela veut dire que le membre blessé est stabilisé au moyen de tiges de métal et de boulons implantés dans l'os, mais qu'on laisse la blessure ouverte et irriguée à intervalles réguliers. On évite de fermer ces blessures parce qu'elles risquent d'être infectées et que le soldat n'a pas eu le temps d'acquérir une résistance aux infections locales. Ces blessures sont fermées au Centre médical régional de Landstuhl (LRMC).

2. Le Centre médical régional de Landstuhl (LRMC)

Le Comité a visité le Centre médical régional de Landstuhl (LRMC) le 4 avril 2008. Le Centre est un hôpital militaire exploité par l'armée américaine et le ministère de la Défense des États-Unis, et il est mis à la disposition des soldats de l'OTAN.

Le LRMC est le plus grand hôpital militaire en dehors de la zone continentale des États-Unis. C'est le plus proche centre de traitement d'urgence pour les soldats blessés évacués d'Iraq et d'Afghanistan.

Voici certains faits que les membres du Comité ont appris lors de leur visite :

- Le LRMC a traité 46 000 soldats depuis octobre 2001, dont un faible pourcentage de Canadiens.
- Le séjour moyen des soldats canadiens est de cinq jours.
- Le personnel est constitué en majorité de médecins militaires et civils américains, avec en complément du personnel civil allemand.
- Les Forces canadiennes n'ont aucun représentant au LRMC. Deux de leurs intervenants médicaux affectés à leur établissement de Geilenkirchen en Allemagne (un infirmier, un médecin militaire et un technicien médical) sont disponibles pour les évacuations médicales et se

chargent de soigner les membres des Forces canadiennes envoyés au LRMC[3].

- Tous les malades sont examinés pour déceler s'ils sont atteints d'un traumatisme cérébral léger, modéré ou grave.

  Les traumatismes cérébraux sont parfois très difficiles à diagnostiquer et peuvent causer des troubles de longue durée. Ils requièrent des soins médicaux suivis.

- Les blessures de guerre concernent souvent les membres.

- Parmi les personnes évacuées, beaucoup ne souffrent pas de blessures physiques – le centre traite en moyenne un soldat suicidaire[4] par semaine.

- Le Service de santé mentale fait passer des tests psychologiques à *tous* les malades hospitalisés.

- Le Centre compte 140 lits, mais il y a rarement plus de 100 malades hospitalisés.

- Les fonctionnaires canadiens travaillant en Afghanistan sont eux aussi traités dans cet établissement.

Avantages du Centre médical régional de Landstuhl

Le LRMC comporte un avantage par rapport à un hôpital civil ordinaire – le personnel est généralement informé au moins 12 heures à l'avance de l'arrivée d'un patient et des soins dont celui-ci aura besoin. Le personnel du LRMC a aussi une vaste expérience des traitements liés aux blessures subies au combat, qu'elles soient d'ordre physique ou mental.

Le LRMC offre aussi un autre avantage important : il dispose des installations nécessaires pour permettre à des proches parents de vivre gratuitement auprès des soldats blessés au cours des jours critiques qu'ils y passeront. Cela est possible grâce à la Fisher Foundation, établie aux États-Unis, qui construit des maisons d'accueil sur le terrain des grands centres hospitaliers militaires et des anciens

[3] Renseignements fournis par le ministère de la Défense nationale en réponse à une demande d'information du Comité datée du 19 décembre 2007.
[4] Le Comité précise que le LRMC traite un soldat suicidaire par semaine en moyenne parmi tous les patients (non seulement des Canadiens).

combattants des États-Unis. La Fisher House™ de Landstuhl est une des deux seules établies en dehors du territoire des États-Unis. Elle accueille aussi les familles des soldats canadiens ainsi que les familles des soldats des pays membres de l'OTAN qui participent à des missions avec les forces armées américaines.

Les maisons d'accueil sont conçues pour permettre aux visiteurs de continuer de mener une vie aussi normale que possible dans les circonstances. Elles comprennent un certain nombre de chambres avec une cuisine commune, une buanderie, une salle à manger spacieuse et une salle de séjour invitante dotée d'une bibliothèque et de jouets pour les enfants. Ces maisons sont destinées à servir de résidences temporaires. Ce ne sont pas des établissements de traitement, des centres de soins palliatifs ou des centres de counseling. Des bénévoles aident à les exploiter et des services d'aumônerie sont offerts.

On nous a informés que 24 familles canadiennes avaient séjourné à la Fisher House du LRMC.

Des membres du Comité ont eu l'occasion de s'entretenir avec une famille dont le fils se trouvait au bloc opératoire pour subir l'amputation des deux jambes sous le genou. Cette famille a vraiment apprécié d'être hébergée de la sorte et de bénéficier du soutien des Forces canadiennes, qui ont fourni un officier à temps plein pour l'accompagner depuis le lieu de résidence de la famille. Malheureusement, nous avons aussi été témoins de l'indicible tristesse d'une famille américaine quand les parents ont dû prendre la décision de faire débrancher leur fils des systèmes d'assistance cardio-respiratoire.

Nous n'avons pas été là longtemps, mais il était évident que le personnel de la Fisher House montrait beaucoup de compassion et était capable de nouer des liens étroits avec les familles en visite, et ce, très rapidement. Le personnel a été formé de sorte à donner aux familles l'espace nécessaire et à les encourager à se sentir chez elles et à se tenir occupées en cuisinant, en faisant la lessive, etc., tout en fournissant aussi un soutien en cas de besoin.

Les membres du Comité n'ont pas les compétences nécessaires pour évaluer les capacités des praticiens, ce qui fait que nous ne pourrions pas donner notre avis quant à l'expertise du personnel médical même si notre visite avait duré plusieurs semaines. Mais le LRMC est réputé pour son traitement de premier ordre, et l'appui offert aux familles à la Fisher House nous a beaucoup impressionnés.

Nous nous permettrons une dernière réflexion : un membre du personnel nous a mentionné combien la Fisher House est reconnaissante aux Canadiens qui sont

particulièrement généreux ces dernières années envers la fondation, bien qu'il s'agisse d'une institution américaine. Toute personne souhaitant faire un don peut le faire à l'adresse Web suivante : www.fisherhouse.org.

3. Retour au Canada

Les soldats canadiens blessés sont rapatriés au Canada sur des vols médicaux civils visés par un contrat d'exploitation, ou sur des vols militaires canadiens ou américains.

Pour toute personne ayant subi des blessures physiques ou psychologiques importantes à Kandahar, l'étape suivante est invariablement la réadaptation.

Le 30 janvier 2007, le Comité s'est rendu au Glenrose Rehabilitation Hospital à Edmonton, en Alberta. Nous avons visité l'hôpital et avons assisté à une séance d'information sur le programme à l'intention des amputés adultes, ainsi que sur le service des prothèses.

Lorsque des prothèses sont requises, elles sont faites sur mesure et ajustées pour répondre aux besoins et aux objectifs fonctionnels de chaque personne. Ces services sont fournis par du personnel professionnel et technique ayant l'expertise nécessaire pour soigner les personnes aux prises avec des besoins complexes.

Le Comité a visité une salle équipée d'une gamme d'appareils, détecteurs de mouvement et autres. Tout mouvement est détecté et informatisé pour déterminer l'amplitude des mouvements d'une personne. De tels détecteurs aident les spécialistes à déterminer si une personne marche, court ou se déplace correctement.

On recourt ensuite à la physiothérapie de réadaptation pour essayer de corriger les anomalies. La physiothérapie s'avère particulièrement utile lorsqu'un patient commence à porter des prothèses. Si le patient ne se déplace pas correctement, les prothèses peuvent devoir être ajustées.

Le 25 juillet 2008, le Comité a reçu un rapport du sénateur Grant Mitchell concernant une récente rencontre avec le soldat blessé dont les parents avaient rencontré le Comité lors de sa visite à Landstuhl. Le sénateur Mitchell explique : « Je lui ai rendu visite la semaine dernière à l'hôpital de réadaptation Glenrose et il m'a invité à l'accompagner à sa séance de thérapie […] Le Glenrose est un établissement remarquable, qui lui prodigue d'excellents soins. »

Lors de sa visite à l'hôpital Glenrose en janvier 2007, le Comité a rencontré le caporal-chef Paul Franklin et son épouse Audra.

Le 15 janvier 2006, le caporal-chef Franklin de la 1re Ambulance de campagne d'Edmonton conduisait une jeep Mercedes blindée dans un convoi sur la route de Kandahar en Afghanistan lorsqu'un attentat-suicide a fait exploser le véhicule, tuant le diplomate Glyn Berry et causant des blessures graves au caporal-chef Franklin, au soldat William Salikin et au caporal Jeff Bailey. Le caporal-chef Franklin a perdu les deux jambes, en plus de subir des brûlures du troisième degré et des blessures sur l'ensemble de son corps.

Le caporal-chef Franklin nous a tous impressionnés par son optimisme incroyable et sa volonté d'aller de l'avant. Il nous a dit cependant que les Forces canadiennes ne se montraient pas nécessairement généreuses envers les soldats blessés et que ceux-ci doivent se démener pour obtenir ce qu'ils méritent. Un excellent article, publié dans la *Revue Légion* en date du 6 novembre 2007, relatait à la fois son optimisme et ses luttes. En voici un extrait :

> *Pendant toute cette épreuve et en dépit du fait qu'il ne dort pas très bien ces jours-ci, il a su garder son optimisme. « Cette période est du gâteau, parce que je suis mort l'an dernier. Tout le reste est sans importance. Il faut en profiter. »*
>
> *Mais son optimisme a été mis à rude épreuve. Étant un des membres des Forces canadiennes les plus grièvement blessés à avoir survécu à la guerre en Afghanistan, il a dû faire face à plusieurs situations difficiles – allant des formalités administratives aux jalousies mesquines – pour obtenir des choses essentielles comme des mesures d'adaptation à son domicile et essayer de poursuivre sa carrière au sein des Forces*

canadiennes. « Je tiens à dire que j'ai obtenu d'excellents soins, a mentionné Franklin, car c'est un fait incontestable. » Il a reçu un traitement de premier ordre au Glenrose Rehabilitation Hospital d'Edmonton, où il a appris à marcher de nouveau. De plus, grâce au chèque de 250 000 $ que lui a immédiatement remis le Régime d'assurance-revenu militaire, il a été capable d'acheter sa voiture et de se réinstaller, avec sa famille, dans une maison mieux adaptée à ses besoins.

Malgré le fait qu'il soit devenu bien connu des médias et qu'il ait l'oreille de gens influents comme le chef d'état-major de la Défense, le général Rick Hillier, il a connu sa part de problèmes avec le système – et avec les perceptions. « Des gens me disent tout le temps que je l'ai eu facile. Or, dans les faits, j'ai dû me battre pour tout[5]. »

Heureusement, ses épreuves – mais aussi ses triomphes – aident à apporter des changements à la manière dont les forces armées, le ministère de la Défense nationale et Anciens Combattants Canada prennent en charge les membres des FC qui sont blessés au combat.

Les soins au pays varient beaucoup d'une province à l'autre

Le Comité a été fort impressionné par les services de réadaptation offerts à l'hôpital de réadaptation Glenrose. Mais il est ressorti de nos échanges avec des militaires de tous rangs que, même si l'hôpital Glenrose offre les services de réadaptation que tous les soldats canadiens blessés *devraient* recevoir à leur retour, ces services ne sont en général pas offerts partout au pays. Loin de là. L'hôpital Glenrose se distingue en Alberta et, au Canada, il se distingue comme une Lamborghini 2009 dans un parc d'automobiles truffé de Lada 1970.

Les soins de santé relèvent des provinces, et chaque Canadien sait que la qualité des soins varie grandement d'une province à l'autre. Le Comité est d'avis que les militaires canadiens blessés en servant leur pays devraient recevoir les mêmes services de réadaptation à leur retour, des *services de première classe*.

Si les provinces ne peuvent pas ou ne veulent pas toutes offrir ces services de première classe, le gouvernement fédéral devrait intervenir et s'assurer qu'ils sont offerts à chaque blessé à son retour.

[5] http://www.legionmagazine.com/en/index.php/2007/11/the-quiet-fight/

La Réserve est particulièrement vulnérable

L'inégalité des traitements dont bénéficient les réservistes blessés au combat par rapport aux membres de la Force régulière inquiète également le Comité. Dans une entrevue diffusée par la CBC le 3 avril 2008, à la suite de la diffusion de son rapport intitulé, « Des soins sous toutes réserves : Une enquête sur le traitement des réservistes blessés », Mary McFadyen, ombudsman intérimaire au MDN, a dit qu'il est inacceptable que le bras ou la jambe d'un réserviste vaille moins que celui d'un membre de la Force régulière[6]. Dans un rapport virulent publié le 3 avril 2008, Mme McFadyen souligne notamment qu'un réserviste qui perd une main lorsqu'il sert dans les Forces canadiennes reçoit actuellement une indemnité de 50 000 $, alors qu'un membre de la Force régulière touche 125 000 $. La règle devrait être bien simple : si un militaire perd un membre, il faut le lui remplacer.

Les réservistes représentent maintenant environ 20 p. 100 du contingent canadien déployé en Afghanistan. Même si ceux qui servent en Afghanistan ont la même classification que les membres de la Force régulière et qu'ils ont par conséquent droit à une couverture médicale complète, d'autres différences surgissent lorsqu'ils retournent au service de la Réserve. Dans bien des cas, les manèges militaires sont situés loin des grandes bases militaires et ne sont pas dotés des ressources que celles-ci offrent aux membres de la Force régulière. Il y a un certain nombre de complications additionnelles. Les réservistes doivent prouver que leurs blessures sont survenues dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions. De tels obstacles sont très difficiles à surmonter pour des soldats blessés.

Le ministère de la Défense nationale s'est engagé à se pencher sur ces questions, et le Comité est impatient de prendre connaissance des résultats de l'enquête.

[6] CBC News, « Reservists Shortchanged by military health-care system: ombudsman », 3 avril 2008, accessible à http://www.cbc.ca/canada/edmonton/story/2008/04/03/reservist-health.html#socialcomments

Conclusions

1. Les centres de soins et de réadaptation que nous avons visités à Kandahar, à Landstuhl et à Edmonton nous semblent être exploités avec le genre d'expertise et de souci que les Canadiens servant sur les champs de bataille pour le compte de l'ensemble de la population canadienne méritent incontestablement.

2. Le centre d'accueil de la Fisher Foundation à Landstuhl traduit une attitude d'appui envers les soldats et leurs familles que le Comité applaudit.

3. Le Comité a entendu suffisamment de témoignages pour comprendre que nous avons seulement été témoins des meilleurs soins que le Canada fournit à ses soldats, et qu'il y a eu des cas dans lesquels ce niveau de soins exceptionnel n'a tout simplement pas été fourni.

4. Le Comité souligne qu'en ce qui concerne les cas de réadaptation, les régimes provinciaux déterminent le niveau de soin que reçoivent les soldats blessés lorsqu'ils rentrent chez eux. Il aimerait que les régimes prévoient un meilleur partage de l'information et qu'ils tirent des leçons des centres de réadaptation au Canada au sujet du traitement des soldats blessés.

5. Les militaires canadiens ont cessé de financer les soins à leurs membres il y a bien des années, principalement parce que c'était trop coûteux. Le ministère de la Défense nationale DOIT faire l'une de deux choses : a) conclure une entente avec toutes les provinces pour garantir les meilleurs soins aux militaires blessés à leur retour ou b) offrir lui-même ces soins.

6. Le ministère de la Défense nationale doit modifier ses règles de façon à offrir aux réservistes pour une blessure donnée exactement la même indemnité qu'il offre aux membres de la Force régulière. Les réservistes blessés devraient aussi recevoir, comme les membres de la Force régulière, les meilleurs soins au Canada.

Est-ce bien ce que le Comité dit, que les membres des Forces canadiennes qui subissent un traumatisme physique ou psychologique lorsqu'ils servent leur pays méritent un traitement spécial – un traitement qui n'est pas toujours offert à tous les Canadiens dans toutes les régions du pays?

C'est ***exactement*** ce que nous disons. Ces personnes qui font un travail spécial pour le Canada sont spéciales. Elles méritent rien de moins que le meilleur de notre part.

Une note encourageante

Nous souhaitons conclure avec un extrait d'un éditorial du *Ottawa Citizen* publié le 16 mai 2008, qui donne à penser que le gouvernement aussi souhaite que les soldats qui rentrent au pays n'obtiennent que les meilleurs soins :

> *Chaque décès est compté et pleuré, comme il se doit, et chaque blessure est relevée. Et maintenant, il y a des signes que les blessures cachées de la guerre, mais tout aussi dangereuses, seront aussi comptées et soignées.*
>
> *L'annonce récente concernant la mise sur pied de nouvelles cliniques à Ottawa et dans l'ensemble du pays pour soigner les soldats qui rentrent au pays ainsi que les anciens combattants qui souffrent de traumatismes liés au stress opérationnel vient à point. Les représentants des Forces canadiennes indiquent que le nombre de soldats aux prises avec des traumatismes liés au stress opérationnel a augmenté au cours des cinq dernières années, passant d'environ 3 500 à 11 000. Cette hausse est attribuable en grande partie aux efforts accrus qui sont déployés pour détecter les symptômes plus rapidement.*
>
> *La création de nouvelles cliniques spécialisées, en plus des centres déjà en place, pour soigner les soldats souffrant de traumatismes liés au stress opérationnel, est un signe que les forces armées font davantage que d'exprimer des vœux pieux sur la question. En reconnaissant la légitimité de ces troubles, les dirigeants militaires encouragent les soldats à se faire soigner -- soldats qui, dans le passé, pourraient avoir essayé de s'en sortir seuls.* [Traduction]

Si cette tendance se poursuit au chapitre du traitement fourni aux soldats blessés du Canada, elle sera accueillie très favorablement.

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IN CANADA

How the fine arts of bafflegab and procrastination hobble the people who will be trying to save you when things get really bad…

Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence

<u>Committee Members</u>

Sen. Colin Kenny – Chair
Sen. David Tkachuk – Deputy Chair
Sen. Tommy Banks
Sen. Joseph A. Day
Sen. Grant Mitchell
Sen. Michael A. Meighen
Sen. Wilfred P. Moore
Sen. Nancy Ruth
Sen. Rod A. A. Zimmer

Volume 1
Second Session
Thirty-ninth Parliament
2008

The report *Emergency Preparedness in Canada* is comprised of four volumes.
The first volume contains the committee's findings, observations and recommendations.
Volumes 2, 3 and 4 contain the responses to an emergency preparedness questionnaire received from 92 of the 100 municipalities surveyed by the committee.

All four volumes are available online at www.sen-sec.ca.
Hard copies are available upon request.

For more information, please contact:
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Ce document est disponible en français

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THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE
39th Parliament, 2nd Session

The Honourable Colin Kenny
Chair

The Honourable David Tkachuk
Deputy Chair

and

The Honourable Senators:

Tommy Banks
Joseph A. Day
Michael A. Meighen
Grant Mitchell
Wilfred P. Moore
Nancy Ruth
Rod A.A. Zimmer

*The Honourable Marjory Lebreton, P.C.
(or the Honourable Gerald Comeau)
*The Honourable Céline Hervieux-Payette, P.C.
(or the Honourable Claudette Tardif)
*Ex Officio Members

Other Senators who have participated from time to time on this study:
The Honourable Senators Dallaire, Downe, Massicotte, Nolin, Peterson and Segal

Special Advisors to the Committee:
MGen (ret) Keith McDonald and Barry Denofsky

Library of Parliament Research Staff:
Melissa Radford, Maureen Shields, Jason Yung and Steven James

Clerks of the Committee:
Shaila Anwar and Gaëtane Lemay

Extract from the *Journals of the Senate*, Tuesday, November 20, 2007:

The Honourable Senator Kenny moved, seconded by the Honourable Senator Banks:

That the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence be authorized to examine and report on the national security policy of Canada. In particular, the committee shall be authorized to examine:

(*a*) the capability of the Department of National Defence to defend and protect the interests, people and territory of Canada and its ability to respond to and prevent a national emergency or attack, and the capability of the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to carry out its mandate;

(*b*) the working relationships between the various agencies involved in intelligence gathering, and how they collect, coordinate, analyze and disseminate information and how these functions might be enhanced;

(*c*) the mechanisms to review the performance and activities of the various agencies involved in intelligence gathering; and

(*d*) the security of our borders and critical infrastructure;

That the papers and evidence received and taken and work accomplished by the committee on this subject since the beginning of the First session of the Thirty-seventh Parliament be referred to the committee; and

That the committee report to the Senate no later than March 31, 2009 and that the committee retain all powers necessary to publicize its findings until 90 days after the tabling of the final report.

The question being put on the motion, it was adopted.

Paul C. Bélisle
Clerk of the Senate

National Emergencies

Alarmist Committee Attempts to Terrify Canadians!

Again!

Hey, we're not trying to terrify anybody.

That having been said, stuff happens. Emergencies happen. Not often enough to put Canadians on a war footing, ready to run to the closest bomb shelter at a moment's notice. But often enough that intelligent people with ample resources should use some of those resources to prepare themselves, to defend themselves against tragedy.

Prepare for what?

Earthquakes. Power failures. Explosions. Infectious disease outbreaks. Gas leaks. Tainted water supplies. Terrorist attacks. Cyber breakdowns. Nuclear meltdowns. Tsunamis. Crazed gunmen. Forest fires. Floods.

Those are a few. They don't happen often and they mostly happen to other people, but sometimes they come to Canada. Some can be pre-empted. Some can't. All can be prepared for – minimizing the risk that they will turn into disasters.

So we on the Senate Committee for National Security and Defence would like to go on record: the sky is not falling. Actually, we would like to go on record twice: The sky is not falling but somewhere soon in Canada it will seem like it is, and Canadian governments are not moving quickly enough to minimize the damage.

Years have passed since the wakeup calls of July 21, 1987 (Edmonton Tornado), July 20, 1996 (Saguenay River floods in Quebec), April 29, 1997 (Red River floods in Manitoba), January 9, 1998 (ice storms in eastern Ontario and western Quebec), September 11, 2001 (terrorists attacks in Manhattan and Washington, DC), March 5, 2003 (SARS epidemic in Toronto), August 14, 2003 (largest power blackout in North American history), September 28, 2003 (Hurricane Juan, Nova Scotia)

…this is a partial list.

During the intervening years various orders of government have inched toward improved national coordination for disaster relief, but even “inched” often seems like a generous word, used here only because “centimetered” hasn’t come into common usage.

In the following pages the Committee has examined governments’ efforts to improve Canada’s disaster preparation and disaster response capacity, in areas such as

- continuity of essential government services during emergencies
- the capacity of the Canadian Forces to offer assistance during emergencies
- the usefulness of emergency caches scattered about the country
- funding municipalities for emergency equipment and training
- collaboration among federal, provincial, territorial and municipal governments
- archiving lessons learned and best practices
- emergency public communications
- policing during emergencies

The Committee has been assisted in examining these issues by the testimony of more than 110 witnesses from 2001-2008 who testified in Ottawa and other locations, as well as two emergency preparedness surveys – the first of which was conducted in 2003, and the second in 2007. This report draws primarily on the most recent survey, responded to by 92 municipal emergency coordinators. The survey asked about their ability to deal with emergencies, their perception of how well senior levels of government are performing in preparation for emergencies, plus the gaps they believe should be filled to improve Canada’s capacity to deal with emergencies.

Our report focuses on what governments have done in recent years to ready us for the next big one.

Sadly, for the most part, this is not a heroic story.

Emergency Preparedness

Problem 1:
Lack of Emergency Management

The Problem as We Saw It in 2004: Federal departments were not being tested to ensure that essential government operations can continue to function effectively during and following an emergency. Apparently the breakdowns that occurred during the blackout in central and eastern Canada in August 2003 did not serve as a lesson learned. No politician or bureaucrat should ever be allowed to forget that during this crisis – when the Prime Minister's Office should have been operating at peak efficiency – the PMO was working by candlelight.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION (2004)

- **The Committee recommended that Public Safety Canada conduct evaluations to ensure that all federal departments and agencies are able to continue to operate during a crisis and that their preparedness plans are in effect.**[1]

GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS (2006 – 2008)

Two and a half years later – on August 20, 2006 – Public Safety Canada[2] responded in writing to the Committee's 2004 recommendation:

> "Under section 4(1) (a) (b) (c) of Bill C-12 (the proposed *Emergency Management Act)*, the Public Safety Minister would establish policies, programs and other measures and provide advice on the preparation, maintenance, testing and implementation of Government of Canada emergency management plans.

[1] Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, March 2004), pg. 64. See recommendation 17 A - This sub-recommendation is a part of a larger recommendation that is dealt with below. The sub-recommendation is separated here because of its importance.

[2] Public Safety Canada was known as Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC) until 2007. In this report, the Committee will utilize the new name, but will not edit any external text that refers to the old PSEPC.

> These plans would also be analyzed and evaluated. The Bill further states, under section 6 (a) (b) that all Government of Canada ministers would prepare, maintain, test and implement emergency management plans within their area of responsibility according to the policies, programs and measures established by the Public Safety Minister."[3]

The *Emergency Management Act* was passed on June 22nd, 2007,[4] giving the Minister of Public Safety the authority to "establish policies, programs and other measures and provide advice on the preparation, maintenance, testing and implementation of Government of Canada emergency management plans." So what has been done?

On September 19, 2007, Library of Parliament researchers[5] followed up with Public Safety Canada by asking "what work has been done on the 'emergency management plans' that the Public Safety Minister has been given authority to establish?" Five months later, on February 26, 2008, came this reply:

> "Public Safety Canada (PS) has established an Emergency Management Planning Unit that provides a strategic focus for planning activities. The first activity undertaken by this unit was to spearhead the negotiation of the North American Plan for Avian and Pandemic Influenza with Mexico and the United States.
>
> Section 6(2) (c) of the Emergency Management Act (EMA) indicates that an emergency management plan includes 'any programs, arrangements or other measures to provide for the continuity of the operations of the government institution in the event of an emergency'. In the Government of Canada such plans are commonly referred to as Business Continuity Plans (BCPs). In addition to the EMA, both the Government Security Policy and the National Security Policy require departments to have BCPs in place to ensure that the federal government can maintain critical service delivery to Canadians in the event of a disruption. Both of these policies are publicly available.

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[3] Public Safety Canada, "Update on PSEPC/Portfolio on Reports from SCONSAD," August 30, 2006, pg. 16.

[4] *The Emergency Management Act*, First Session, Thirty-ninth Parliament, 55-56 Elizabeth II, 2006-2007. For a text of the Act, please see http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?pub=bill&doc=C-12&parl=39&ses=1&language=E

[5] The September 19, 2007 Library of Parliament correspondence with Public Safety Canada was conducted during a period of prorogation (which lasted from September 14, 2007 – October 16, 2007). During prorogation, the House of Commons and the Senate of Canada, as well as their committees, are dissolved. The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence was not reconstituted until November 13, 2007. Correspondence pertaining to this report that is dated to this time was conducted by the Library of Parliament at the request of Senator Colin Kenny, who is the current Chair of the Committee.

> With respect to Business Continuity Plans (BCP), the NSP [National Security Policy] gives PS the responsibility to: '...review [sic] the plans of federal departments to ensure their ability to continue operating during emergencies.'
>
> The GSP [Government Security Policy] states that 'Departments must establish a business continuity planning (BCP) program to provide for the continued availability of critical services and assets, and of other services and assets when warranted by a threat and risk assessment.'"[6]

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT (2008)

Still No Assurance that the Feds Will Function in a Crisis

A North American Pandemic Plan was needed, and the Committee congratulates the Emergency Planning Management Unit for playing a leadership role in putting one in place.

Now, getting back to the Committee's recommendation: Has Public Safety Canada conducted evaluations to ensure that all federal departments and agencies are able to continue to operate during a crisis and that their preparedness plans are in effect? Has it audited the Business Continuity Plans of other departments to ensure that they have the systems in place to get through an emergency?

Public Safety Canada's 2008 response says that every department is *required* to have a Business Continuity Plan, and it also tells us that Public Safety Canada has the *responsibility* to review these plans. But does every department really have one, and has every department been tested by Public Safety Canada to assure that their plan is workable?

[6] Public Safety Canada, "Follow UP Questions for Public Safety Canada regarding: Recommendations and PSEPC/Portfolio Responses to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence (SCONSAD)'(August 30, 2006)," February 26, 2008. pg 1.

We do not know the answers to these questions, but as the Auditor General wrote while examining the emergency plans of Public Safety Canada in April 2005:

> **Section 7 of the *Emergency Preparedness Act*[7] requires that departments prepare emergency response plans for areas within their mandates. We noted a potential, as emergencies develop and implicate more departments and agencies, for conflict between having to work together with other departments and supporting the line responsibilities of their own mandates.**
>
> **Officials at PSEPC could not show us an inventory of departmental emergency response plans that could be activated in the event of a CBRN terrorist event. Nor could they provide us with an analysis showing how, in a complex emergency involving several departments, the plans would work together to achieve a seamless federal response.** [8]

Like the Auditor General, the Committee has not been shown evidence that federal departmental emergency plans even exist.

No plan is worth the paper it is written on if the components of the plan have not been implemented. And even if the plan has been implemented, it is unreliable by definition unless it has been tested. The Committee presumes that if systems were in place and had been tested, the responses would say that. They don't. We simply have no evidence that implementation and testing has taken place. This means Canadians have no assurance that essential government operations will function during emergencies.

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[7] The 2007 *Emergency Management Act* replaces parts of the 1985 *Emergency Preparedness Act* to "strengthen the Government of Canada's response to emergencies through enhanced planning activities under a standardized framework and a clear delineation of roles and responsibilities of federal Ministers." The *Emergency Preparedness Act* remains the primary source of emergency management legislation. For more information on the two Acts, please see Public Safety Canada, "FAQ – Tabling of the proposed Emergency Management Act," Available at http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/media/nr/2006/nr20060508-3-eng.aspx

[8] Auditor General of Canada, "Chapter 2—National Security in Canada—The 2001 Anti-Terrorism Initiative—Air Transportation Security, Marine Security, and Emergency Preparedness" in *Report of the Auditor General of Canada*, (Office of the Auditor General of Canada: April 2005), pg 21. Available at http://209.71.218.213/internet/English/aud_ch_oag_200504_2_e_14933.html

NEW RECOMMENDATIONS:

The Committee recommends that:

1. Public Safety Canada table an annual report in Parliament documenting the Business Continuity Plan of each government department and agency, and provide evidence whether they have been implemented and tested, and that the results be made publicly available.

2. If Public Safety Canada is unable or unwilling to table such a report, a third party national security auditor be appointed to do so.

Problem 2:
Use of the Canadian Forces for Domestic Emergencies

The Problem as We Saw It in 2004: The Canadian Forces Regular Force and Reserves had not been assigned a role in Canada's emergency preparedness. There were no assurances that the Forces would respond to an emergency if they were needed, even though many Canadians took it for granted that they would. Lieutenant-Colonel Blair McGregor told the Committee during a visit to Vancouver in 2003 that "People in the local area . . . . look to [us] as a source of immediate disaster relief . . . We do not train for that and we are not funded for it."

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATIONS (2004)

- **The Committee recommended that the Canadian Forces should enhance their capabilities to respond to national emergencies by:**
    - **Ensuring that the Regular Forces are equipped and trained to deal with significant emergencies in Canada and that they are involved in regional emergency planning;**
    - **Expanding the role of the Militia to be a civil defence force capable of quickly aiding local authorities in the event of a national emergency;**
    - **Involving the Militia in emergency planning and training in conjunction with municipalities across the country;**
    - **Equipping and training the Militia for emergency preparedness operations.**

- **The Committee recommended that Public Safety Canada:**
    - **Include the Canadian Forces Militia in the national inventory of emergency preparedness resources; and provide first responders with details of the Militia's assets and capabilities.**[9]

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE (2006)

In response to the recommendation that the Regular Forces "be equipped and trained to deal with significant emergencies in Canada and that they are involved in regional emergency planning," the Department of National Defence (DND) wrote on August 14, 2006:

> "The Department of National Defence (DND) and the CF work diligently with other departments and agencies to help ensure the safety and security of Canada and Canadians. The Government has plans and response capabilities in place to protect Canada and Canadians – DND and the CF stand ready to assist other Government departments and agencies when asked."

But Talk Needs Walk

This response was at least somewhat encouraging. Clearly there had been progress in formatting a role for the Canadian Forces in response to national emergencies. And communications have improved between the Forces and municipalities about what can be expected during emergencies.

Improved communications between the Forces and municipalities is a starting point: 85 percent of respondents to the Committee's survey of municipalities said they "expected" support from the military, although only 46 percent said they had "liaised" with the military about what to expect. This obviously is not a perfect communications record, but it represents a huge improvement considering that five years ago there was almost no liaison.

[9] Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, March 2004), pg. 35, 47. See recommendation #3 and recommendations #10, 11.

The question, of course, is whether the military has developed significantly increased *capacity* to respond to domestic emergencies. More on that in the next few pages.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE (2006) con't.

To our recommendation that DND "expand the role of the Militia to be a civil defence force capable of quickly aiding local authorities in the event of a national emergency," the department replied on August 14, 2006:

> "In order to respond to new security threats, the CF continues to examine ways to introduce dual-role capabilities for the Reserves - such as chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence - which could also help respond to domestic security threats. The Governor General's Foot Guards and the Régiment de Hull trialled the concept for the army Reserves' expanded Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) response and domestic defence capabilities in November 2004, with a good degree of success.
>
> "More work is needed to build the capability to the point where it can be stood up on a permanent basis and spread across the nation. This capability is being developed within the Army's capability development process and is being studied in conjunction with the overall CF requirement to provide such a capability. In addition to this capability, each Reserve Canadian Brigade Group has created a composite, company-sized organization that is capable of responding to regional situations as required when requested by the appropriate authorities through the accepted lines of communication.
>
> "Nevertheless, due to the availability of reservists and their terms of employment; it is very likely that regular force organizations will be the first to respond to any given situation. As part of its Canada First defence strategy the government has indicated its intention to further enhance the capacity of the CF to respond to domestic emergencies. The 2006 Budget included funds to initiate the establishment of territorial battalions."[10]

[10] Department of National Defence, "2006 Update on SCONSAD Recommendations," August 14, 2006, 11-12.

Behind All the Gobbledygook, Where's the Beef?

The Committee is ever alert to phrasing like "the Canadian Forces continues to examine ways . . ." That's bureaucratese for "ways have not yet been found." Then again there are sentences like the following, dealing with the question of whether the Reserves will be given a CBRN[11] role:

> "This capability is being developed within the Army's capability development process and is being studied in conjunction with the overall CF requirement to provide such a capability."

Did you follow that? Perhaps a capability is being developed. And perhaps it is being studied. And it is good that the reply acknowledges that such a capability is required. However, there is nothing here to suggest that there has been any progress toward actually *creating* such a capability, other than holding one exercise in the national capital area in 2004. That was four years ago.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE (2006) con't.

In response to the Committee's recommendation that DND "involve the Militia in emergency planning and training in conjunction with municipalities across the country," the department responded on August 14, 2006:

> "When complete, the Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR) will assist in ensuring the long-term relevance and effectiveness of the army Reserve and the CF as a whole. The purpose of the LFRR project is to develop an effective and credible army Reserve that both complements and supplements the regular force. In addition, the Army has begun deploying community-based contingency planning officers at unit and formation headquarters. These officers are becoming familiar with the emergency planning organizations within in their areas of responsibility, building regional lines of communication, educating the civil authorities and managing expectations as to what the CF can do, and facilitating planning for the application of military support should the need arise. Also, units have received the task to develop plans to form platoon-sized groups (Security Platoons) to be available on short notice for humanitarian assistance. Further, army Reservists trained for civil-military cooperation on expeditionary operations

[11] CBRN refers to capabilities pertaining to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear materials.

> will also be very useful in coordinating army support to civil authorities in domestic operations."[12]

Using Reserves Good Idea, But Reserves are in Short Supply

This reply sounds very constructive, and, as was noted earlier, it appears that communication with municipalities has genuinely improved. But exchanges of words are not enough. If the Canadian Forces are going to have "an effective and credible army Reserve that both complements and supplements the regular force" when emergencies arise, then somebody has to put trained and equipped people on the ground to perform when the crunch comes.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE (2006) con't.

Regarding the recommendation that "the Reserve also be trained for emergency preparedness operations," the department responded on August 14, 2006:

> "The Government has recently announced an increase in reserve force personnel. This means that additional resources will be made available for civil preparedness, including an increase in capacity to deal with natural disasters and local emergencies. The Army foresees that the most pressing requirement for military personnel in the domestic security domain will be for disciplined, organized, pools of manpower; additional training for the provision of humanitarian assistance is not necessarily required, and current equipment levels are deemed to be sufficient."[13]

It is true that in 2006 the government did announce a plan for a significant increase in personnel: 13,000 Regular Force personnel and 10,000 Reservists. This would result in an end state of 75,000 Regular Force members and 35,000 Primary Reservists paid strength, the first phase being to grow the Regular Force to 70,000 and Reserve Force paid strength to 30,000 over five years. That proposed increase might have given the Reserves the capacity to respond to national emergencies, which is what the Committee recommended.

[12] Department of National Defence, "2006 Update on SCONSAD Recommendations," August 14, 2006, pg 12.
[13] Department of National Defence, "2006 Update on SCONSAD Recommendations," August 14, 2006, 13.

The October 2007 Speech from the Throne furthered this commitment stating:

> "Ensuring our capacity to defend Canada's sovereignty is at the heart of the Government's efforts to rebuild the Canadian Forces. Canada's men and women in uniform risk their lives for their country, and deserve the equipment and training required for a first-class, modern military. Our Government will modernize Canada's military to provide effective surveillance and protection for all of our country, cooperate in the defence of North America, and meet our responsibilities abroad to the United Nations and our allies."[14]

However, two weeks later DND's Departmental Performance Report[15] for the period ending March 31, 2007 quietly announced that sustained operational commitments in Afghanistan, preparing for Olympics 2010 and supporting CF transformation, has caused the Department to "re-profile" the planned expansion to 68,000 Regular Force and 26,000 Primary Reserve paid strength by fiscal 2011 to 2012. Apparently "re-profile" means "lower the target and add a year in the program."

The announced target of increasing the Regular Forces by 13,000 to put 75,000 in place was cut in half – the current target is 7,000. The planned increase in the Reserves (from 25,000 to 35,000) was cut by 90 percent. That means an increase of just 1,000 reservists.

BOTTOM LINE: a 54 percent cut for the announced Regular Force increase and a 90 percent cut for the announced Reserve Force increase.

Finally, the most recent document to shed light on the recruitment plan – the Canada First Defence Strategy – was released on June 19, 2008. The plan has now reverted to the initial first phase of the Budget 2006 commitment of expanding the Canadian Forces to 70,000 Regular Force and 30,000 Reserve Force personnel. However, instead of accomplishing this over five years, as stated in Budget 2006, the government intends to meet this target by 2028 – adding just over 20 years to the original program.

[14] The Governor General of Canada, *Strong Leadership. A Better Canada – Speech from the Throne*, October 16, 2007. Available at: http://www.sft-ddt.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1364

[15] Department of National Defence, *2006-2007 Departmental Performance Report*, November 2007, pg. 13.

Smaller Increase Over a Longer Time

All those announcements aren't going to get things done during emergencies if the capacity isn't actually there. Clearly the Canadian Forces had every intention of taking Canada First seriously. But with a commitment on increasing the size of the Forces that will only be attained in two decades, where's the beef?

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE (2006) con't.

Regarding the Committee's recommendation that Public Safety Canada include the Reserves in a national inventory of emergency preparedness resources, as well as to provide first responders with details of the Reserve's assets and capabilities, the department replied on August 30, 2006:

> "Both Regular and Reserve components of the Canadian Forces (CF) play an important role in emergency management in Canada. When requested, the CF will provide assistance to civilian authorities. The composition of the CF response is the purview of CF authorities and as recent deployments have demonstrated, often involve both Regular and Reserve members. The CF, with PSEPC input, is examining where the Reserves can better assist civilian authorities in civil preparedness.
>
> The CF is implementing a new command structure to better manage how it responds to threats at home and abroad. The domestic component, Canada Command, will enhance the CF's ability to respond to threats and emergencies in Canada. Canada Command and its six regional headquarters will be closely tied to provincial and territorial emergency management organizations within their respective regions, as well as to PSEPC regional offices.
>
> PSEPC and DND have developed an interface between the Government Operations Centre, housed within PSEPC, and the new CF command structure, which includes the Strategic Joint Staff and Canada Command. PSEPC and DND/CF will continue to work closely together in planning for the use of the CF in responding to emergencies. The two departments are committed to maintaining an open dialogue with provincial and territorial authorities regarding the provision of CF assistance in the event of an emergency."[16]

[16] Public Safety Canada, "Update on PSEPC/Portfolio on Reports from SCONSAD," August 30, 2006, pg 12.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT (2008)

Good Communications Cannot Make Up for Lack of Capacity

Better communications between the Canadian Forces and local emergency management officials is a good thing. But talk needs walk. Consider this: according to the Committee's survey, 85 percent of responding municipalities expect the Canadian Forces to play a role in their community in the event of a major disaster. But only 32 percent have included the Canadian Forces Reserves in their emergency plans. Why the disconnect? The surveys showed that too often municipal representatives, used to dealing with their provincial governments, feel uncomfortable approaching the federally-run military. There is generally no direct communication between municipalities and the federal government – any communications must trickle back and forth through the provinces.

At least our survey is telling us that the Canadian Forces have been taking the initiative by contacting communities to make them aware of what kind of support to expect in case of an emergency.

Again, the problem no longer appears to be flawed communications. It is lack of capacity to respond. The second paragraph of the Public Safety Canada reply refers to "the domestic component, Canada Command, [which] will enhance the Canadian Forces' ability to respond to threats and emergencies in Canada." However, as the Committee will demonstrate next, a territorial response capability under Canada Command barely seems to exist.

A Dozen (Phantom?) Battalions

DND's Report on Plans and Priorities 2006-2007 said this:

> "As part of the overall CF expansion, **four new Rapid Reaction Battalions** will also be created. The military will locate these units strategically across the country, in Comox, Trenton, Bagotville and Goose Bay to provide a Regular Force presence and to help ensure an effective response to natural disasters and terrorist attacks. The Forces will organize these units around key capacities that can be used locally, or transported rapidly to support Canadian Forces operations. Implementation will begin in 2006."[17]

The Committee has been unable to retrieve any information as to whether "security platoons[18]" or these "rapid reaction battalions" are for real, or figments of someone's hopeful imagination.

In the same document, the department said this:

> "To better respond to domestic emergencies, the Land Force will also create a **territorial response capability** in centers such as Vancouver, Calgary, Regina, Winnipeg, Niagara-Windsor, Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal, Quebec City, Saint John, Halifax and St John's. In addition, the Land Force, in conjunction with Canada COM, will identify other key capabilities in each region that could be used in a domestic emergency."
>
> "The territorial response capability that will eventually be formed will include full-time and part-time personnel in each location. To achieve this capability in an efficient and effective manner, the Land Force will review the current Reserve unit structure in each named location with a view to grouping and/or amalgamating units, as necessary. Where circumstances allow, the territorial battalions may also be supported by other Reserve components, as directed by Canada COM."[19]

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[17] Department of National Defence, *2006-2007 Report on Plans and Priorities*, pg. 16.
[18] "Security platoons" was referred to in the Department of National Defence's August 14, 2006 response to SCONSAD recommendations on p. 11 of this report.
[19] Department of National Defence, *2006-2007 Departmental Performance Report*, November 2007, pg. 17.

In DND's 2006-2007 Departmental Performance Report released a few months later, the department updates the public with this:

> "The nuclei of Territorial Defence Battalion Groups have been established across Canada."[20]

A year later, the DND's Report on Plans and Priorities 2007-2008 added this:

> "Force development work in support of a concept of territorial defence battalion groups regionally distributed across the country will lead to the establishment of initial cadres in six urban locations fiscal 2007-2008, with an expanded capability in fiscal 2008-2009. This initiative will support the Government of Canada's Canada First policy by creating a coordinated domestic response capability across the country."[21]

The department's 2008-2009 Report on Plans and Priorities does mention "Territorial Battalions" once, but offers no descriptive update on their current status.[22]

And finally, although the Government's Canada First Defence Strategy, released on June 19, 2008, identifies "respond(ing) to a major terrorist attack" and "support(ing) civilian authorities during a crisis in Canada such as a natural disaster" as two core missions for the Canadian Forces, the strategy does not mention anything about security platoons, rapid reaction battalions or territorial defence battalion groups.

Deal or No Deal?

When former Defence Minister Gordon O'Connor first announced the concept of the Territorial Defence Battalion Groups, he said they would be located in 12 Canadian cities. Each would be founded around a cadre of 100 Regular soldiers, around which Reserves would function. These units would be the essence of the "Canada First" concept, defending Canadians

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[20] Department of National Defence, *2006-2007 Report on Plans and Priorities*, pg. 26.
[21] Department of National Defence, *2007-2008 Report on Plans and Priorities*, pg. 22.
[22] The Report states: "with respect to domestic operations, the Primary Reserve will continue to conduct coastal operations, air operations, as well as providing the personnel for Territorial Battalions." See Department of National Defence, *2008-2009 Report on Plans and Priorities*, February 2008, pg. 48.

from attack on their home territory but also able to come to the rescue following natural disasters.

Notwithstanding the initial commitment, these battalions have not been established.

No such permanent units have been established. Why? On February 22, 2008 Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie[23] told the Conference of Defence Associations that the Canadian Forces schools are short 200 personnel and that the current tempo has been unbelievably hard on them.[24] Lieutenant-General Leslie also told the Committee on June 2, 2008 that the Canadian Forces is currently short 1,000 non-commissioned officers – master corporals to be exact[25]. You can't set up new units without commissioned officers to command them and non-commissioned officers to run them. The Committee has also learned that officers and other ranks have been "double-hatted"[26] in various Canadian locations, and told that they may be needed for emergency duties elsewhere in Canada from time to time.

The Army's incapacity to follow up on Mr. O'Connor's announcement of a dozen permanently located groups is just one manifestation of the Canadian Forces' continuing shortage of personnel. This comes right down to funding, retention and training capacity. The Speech from the Throne and the *Departmental Performance Report* make this clear: the Canadian Forces have barely enough people to handle the mission in Afghanistan, let alone expand their responsibilities domestically.

The Forces are now virtually the same size – approximately 64,000 – as they were in November 2002 when the Committee recommended a pause in foreign deployments because they

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[23] Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie is Commander of the Land Forces and responsible for army force generation.

[24] Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie in a speech before the Conference of Defence Associations on February 22, 2008. The full speech can be viewed at http://www.cpac.ca/forms/index.asp?dsp=template&act=view3&pagetype=vod&lang=e&clipID=983

[25] Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, June 2, 2008, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.

[26] "Double hatting" refers to someone or something that performs two roles.

were so over-stretched[27]. Our recommendation was dismissed at the time because, it was said, a pause would be an embarrassment to Canada. But, embarrassment or not, the pause was implemented 20 months later[28] when everyone involved finally recognized that Canada's military was burned out.

Canada obviously cannot call a halt to foreign deployments now. Parliament has re-committed to Afghanistan until 2011, so a rebuilding pause is impossible. But nobody should try to pretend that the Canadian Forces aren't staggering under the same kind of debilitating over-extension that so weakened them during the two preceding governments.

Canada Command will fail in parts of its mandate until and unless a Canadian government finally provides our military with the funding required to come to the rescue of Canadians at home while serving their interests abroad. As a result, first responders cannot be assured that Canadian Forces personnel will be at the ready to give them a hand in times of crisis.

It's all in the Numbers

As mentioned, the Committee strongly believes that the Canadian Forces are dangerously short of personnel. For example, the Forces recruited 6,716 personnel in the fiscal year (2007-2008) as of December 2007. Unfortunately, to that point they had lost 6,088 personnel, resulting in a net increase of 628 personnel.[29] According to DND's Report on Plans and Priorities (2008-2009), the Forces are experiencing a higher attrition rate

[27] Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *For an Extra $130 Bucks …an Update on Canada' Military Financial Crisis: a View From the Bottom Up,* (The Senate of Canada: November 2002), pg 20. See recommendation 2.

[28] The operational pause in overseas deployments of the Canadian Forces lasted from August 2004 to February 2006.

[29] Recruitment and attrition numbers in fiscal year 2007-2008 as of March 31, 2008 and were provided by the Department of National Defence through a Request for Information. Please see Appendix F for more details.

than the historical norm[30]. The document also acknowledges that "despite the success in recruiting over the past few years, higher attrition has hindered the Canadian Forces' growth."

Further, the Committee has been told that projected recruitment and attrition figures for the following years are looking dismal. In hearings, the Committee has heard that some of the challenges facing Canadian Forces retention include demographics and a strong Canadian economy.[31] However, it has only been in private conversations that some Committee members and staff have heard the extent to which future figures are looking grim. Sources have explained that they could not speak publicly about these details because it is made clear to them to "stay in their lane" when speaking to Parliamentarians. Many fear that speaking candidly could potentially be career ending.

In its travels across the country, the Committee has also heard the tragic stories resulting from excessive strain: family breakups, missed training and personal development opportunities, and burnout, all of which leads to more attrition.

The financial situation for the department is only going to get worse due to the introduction of accrual accounting. Accrual accounting is designed to do a better job than cash accounting at smoothing out budgetary bumps that are sometimes created by spending on expensive military equipment. For example, in terms of equipment procurement, the impact on DND's budgets is spread over the life of equipment.

The problem here is that any well-planned budget should have provisions for a contingency to confront the unexpected. Canada's military never has any room left in its budgets because it is always cash starved. With accrual accounting, the money is locked in and if any surprises come up, Commanding Officers will have to take money from other already under-funded

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[30] According to the Report, "Last year the attrition rate was 7.9% versus the historical rate, which hovered around 6.2 to 6.4%." See Department of National Defence, *2008-2009 Report on Plans and Priorities*, February 2008, pg. 42.

[31] Lieutenant-General W.J. Natynczyk, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, June 2, 2008, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.

portfolios, such as personnel, and operations and maintenance (O&M).

Counting the money differently isn't going to put a dent in the performance of an under-funded organization.

The Canadian Forces is undertaking a number of complex international and domestic operations and duties. Did the Government bite off more than it could chew when it announced new domestic initiatives under the very alluring concept of putting a priority on defending Canadians at home through Canada Command?

It appears so.

While these new commitments remain so illusory, first responders have no way of knowing what they can actually expect from the Canadian Forces in times of crisis.

Problem 3:
Hidden Emergency Caches

Health Canada's National Emergency Stockpile System (NESS) consists of a central depot in Ottawa, eight warehouses, and 1,300 pre-positioned supply caches strategically located across Canada, under the combined management of the provinces and the federal government.[32]

Health Canada claims that the caches contain many things that one would expect to find in a hospital, from beds and blankets to a supply of pharmaceuticals and a range of antibiotics. This includes 165 "field hospitals", or mobile hospitals, with 200 beds in each. These are positioned throughout the country. The units can be deployed on short notice (within 24 hours) to be set up in existing buildings such as schools and community centres.

Additional capacities include supplies to set up first aid and triage stations. Pre-positioned supply centres have a mix of supplies depending on their location and anticipated emergencies that might occur.

The Problem as We Saw It in 2004: First responders often didn't know where the caches were, or what was in them. First responders had not been consulted on whether the contents of the caches matched what they needed or duplicated what they already had. Some emergency coordinators who had seen the caches told us that many of their contents were outdated.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION (2004)

- **The Committee recommended that Health Canada overhaul the way it administers and manages the emergency caches it controls, with the aim of more efficiently and effectively aiding first responder agencies to help Canadians across the country. The overhaul should ensure, among other things, that local officials are:**

[32] Public Health Agency of Canada, National Emergency Stockpile System, http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/ep-mu/ness-eng.php

Made aware of the locations of any caches in their vicinity;

Advised how to access the caches in emergencies;
Given a role in determining caches' contents; and

Encouraged to include the caches in their planning and training.[33]

GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS (2006 – 2007)

In response to the Committee's 2004 recommendations, Health Canada wrote on August 2006:

"Health Canada (through PHAC [Public Health Agency of Canada]) is taking action as follows:

- Coordination and cooperation with the provinces and territories (P/Ts) are ongoing. The P/Ts continue to send us annual updates of custodian contact names and also inform us whenever a unit is to be moved. It is then the responsibility of the provincial or territorial (P/T) Emergency Health Services Director to have ongoing communications with local emergency managers and emergency personnel.

- Federal, provincial and territorial (F/P/T) protocols and agreements have been in place for some time with our P/T Emergency Health Services Director counterparts to ensure quick and easy access to the National Emergency Stockpile System (NESS).

- The contents of the supply locations are well known to all the P/T Emergency Health Services Directors who have approved access to NESS.

- A NESS F/P/T Strategic Review Working Group is undertaking a strategic review of NESS and based on the recommendations of the Working Group, NESS will be making the necessary medical supply and equipment purchases to support existing NESS components.

[33] Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, March 2004), pg. 35. See recommendation #5.

- Three orientation courses detailing the set-up and operation of the 200-bed Emergency Hospital were provided in November 2004 and in October and November 2005. Two NESS Orientation and Unit Box Identification Courses were conducted in January 2005 and February 2006. The basic training courses for both Emergency Health Services and Emergency Social Services have been developed in consultation with the P/Ts and includes information about NESS, discussion of the contents of NESS, and information on how NESS is accessed in their P/Ts. The course is designed to be delivered in an on-line learning format. It is expected the on-line learning program will be ready for launch in 2006.

- The National Office of Health Emergency Response Teams (NOHERT) has been working with NESS to coordinate the storage of equipment and supplies for our Health Emergency Response Teams (HERTs). The designated HERT equipment and supplies stored by NESS will be available to HERTs when field deployment is requested by P/Ts nationally."[34]

How Do First Responders Find Sites?

Following up on September 19, 2007, Library of Parliament researchers[35] asked the Public Health Agency of Canada: What are the formal protocols or procedures for local officials to get access to the nearest NESS site? What are the protocols for provincial officials? Health Canada replied on October 30, 2007:

> "If the emergency should require an immediate response, local and provincial authorities have prior approval to access the NESS supplies pre-positioned within their jurisdictions and contact the PHAC Office of Emergency Response Services (OERS), Centre for Emergency Preparedness and Response (CEPR) as soon as time permits. The local officials in collaboration with the emergency managers and first responders as per their local disaster plan will arrange for the issuing of the NESS supplies to the required response centres."

[34] Health Canada, "Response to Committee Recommendations," August 2006, pg. 4.
[35] The September 19, 2007 Library of Parliament correspondence with the Public Health Agency of Canada was conducted during a period of prorogation (which lasted from September 14, 2007 – October 16, 2007). During prorogation, the House of Commons and the Senate of Canada, as well as their committees, are dissolved. The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence was not reconstituted until November 13, 2007. Correspondence pertaining to this report that is dated to this time was conducted by the Library of Parliament at the request of Senator Colin Kenny, who is the current Chair of the Committee.

We also asked Health Canada: How do the contents and location information diffuse down to the first responder levels during an emergency? How fast does this happen? The reply:

> "The protocols at the local level are in place when an emergency event has escalated to the point where it is likely to overwhelm local response capacity. At this point, it is understood that local officials would contact the provincial emergency health/social service directors for approval to access the National Emergency Stockpile System (NESS).
>
> The provincial and territorial emergency health/social service Directors, after receiving a request to access NESS support from a community, would in turn, contact the director or alternate at the OERS, the CEPR to receive approval to access NESS support."

What Input Will First Responders Have?

We asked further: When will this Review of NESS be completed? How are the future contents of the NESS determined? Will first responders have input into this process? The reply:

> "A working group completed a complex strategic review of the National Emergency Stockpile System (NESS) in December 2006. The working group consisted of federal and provincial representation. The process involved an evaluation by health professionals (first responders) of stockpile systems, an examination of NESS content and functionality, and a needs/gaps analysis designed to enhance NESS ability to assist local, provincial and territorial authorities when they find themselves overwhelmed by a given event. The report also contains a risk and threat analysis which was developed by the working group in collaboration with the Integrated Threat Assessment Center (ITAC), PSEPC and Provinces/Territories. This document is being used as a framework to design and plan a modern day stockpile based on 64 hazards/disasters with threat and casualty scenarios for natural and human caused disasters and will be used as a guide for the NESS procurement strategy. The final report contains recommendations to be used as the framework to improve NESS emergency preparedness and response capacity."

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

Progress to date: None

From what the Committee has gathered from municipal survey responses and testimony from Health Canada, it is clear that no progress has been made in any of the Committee's recommendations. Particularly, there has been little progress by the federal government in updating the contents of caches, or in keeping first responders better informed about cache contents and locations. As well, first responders still have virtually no input into what goes into these vital caches.

Outdated Contents

Health Canada's responses to the Committee's questions suggest that there has been a lot of consultation and analysis and cooperation and coordination among federal, provincial and territorial public servants determined to overhaul the national system of emergency supplies. But there are information gaps in the government's responses. When the Committee has endeavored to fill those gaps by asking questions to witnesses at hearings, and by sending questionnaires to municipalities, we have discovered what we deem to be three major flaws in the system:

1. **At least some of the content of the caches still appear to be outdated, or not to be what municipal emergency managers think is needed to respond to emergencies, or both;**

2. **Many municipal emergency managers do not know what is in the caches, or where they are located;**

3. **Despite claims that municipalities are consulted as to what should be in the caches, only one of 92 respondents to our survey of municipalities said that the municipality had been consulted.**

Despite the Committee's warning back in 2004 that at least some of the content of the caches appeared to be outdated or otherwise inappropriate, the testimony of Dr. David Butler-Jones, Canada's Chief Public Health Officer, on February 4, 2008 revealed that the process of updating them is only starting to be put in motion four years later:

> **Senator Banks:** What is in [the caches] now?
>
> **Dr. David Butler-Jones, Chief Public Health Officer, Public Health Agency of Canada:** We are starting to update them. We got rid of some of the non-essential stuff. That is going to be an ongoing process. It also required a re-evaluation of what is needed today, as opposed to 10, 15 or 20 years ago.[36]

In response to the Committee's municipal questionnaire some emergency officers who had seen the caches said there were contents more appropriate to the Korean War era than to the needs of first responders today. As Trent Elyea, Community Emergency Management Coordinator for the City of Orillia wrote in his response to the Committee's 2007 emergency preparedness survey:

> "If the caches referred to are the ones with the field hospitals they are of little use during an emergency. The complexity and age of the equipment will create some logistical issues and the supplies in the cache are from the Korean and Vietnam wars. There may be some things within the cache that may of use but they are so outdated they will likely not be adequate."

Linley Biblow, Disaster Services Coordinator for the City of Calgary, wrote in the survey:

> "PHAC representatives who give presentations at the Government of Canada CBRN First Responder Training Program (Intermediate Level course given at the Canadian Emergency Management College in Ottawa) continue to receive very robust challenges from first responder students. Although they claim that they offer 150 mobile hospitals and that supplies physically exist, reports are that the actual vintage of these supplies is decades old. As one example, some suction apparatus dates back to Korean War vintage."

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[36] David Butler-Jones, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, February 4, 2008, Issue 4, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.

Hidden Caches

It seems obvious to the Committee that first responders should know exactly what emergency supplies are available to them, and where they are located. But Dr. Butler-Jones does not agree. This exchange took place when Dr. Butler-Jones testified in front of the Committee on February 4, 2008:

> **Senator Banks:** ….I believe there was a review conducted by your agency in December 2006 of those national emergency stockpiles in various parts of the country. What would we find if we looked at them now? There are two parts to the question: Would the local responders to whom they would be the most use know either where they are or how to get at them; and second, are they in good shape and now contain useful supplies?
>
> **Dr. David Butler-Jones, Chief Public Health Officer, Public Health Agency of Canada:** In terms of the first part of the question, local responders would not necessarily know where they are.
>
> **Senator Banks:** Should they not know that?
>
> **Dr. Butler-Jones:** I would argue that they should not. You may disagree. It is not local responders who decide when to implement or use it. It is up to the provincial emergency people. We provide it based on a request from the provincial emergency people. The escalation is that if you cannot do it locally, you manage it provincially. If you cannot manage provincially, then you engage us federally. They are across the country. Some may know, but the point is that they need to know to talk with the emergency coordinator, who talks with the province, and things get there quickly.[37]

The suggestion that municipal emergency officers need not know where the caches are located – that they should only know which provincial officials to contact in times of emergency to find out – is a bit of a mind boggler.

Yes, Canada has a constitution that makes the municipalities creatures of the provinces. But emergencies, by their very nature, often cause chaos and catastrophes. Communications can break down. Key figures in bureaucratic protocol can be knocked completely out of the loop.

[37] David Butler-Jones, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, February 4, 2008, Issue 4, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.

How can anyone suggest that municipal emergency officers should not be kept fully informed as to what is in emergency caches, and exactly where they are located? Municipal responders are first on the scene and operate without assistance from the province or federal government until they request such assistance. If they are on their own, they should know exactly what resources are available to assist them and how they can access them quickly.

The September 19, 2007 reply from the Public Health Agency of Canada cited above said this:

> If the emergency should require an immediate response, local and provincial authorities have prior approval to access the NESS supplies pre-positioned within their jurisdictions and contact the PHAC Office of Emergency Response Services (OERS), Centre for Emergency Preparedness and Response (CEPR) as soon as time permits.

So local authorities have prior approval to access the NESS supplies. Good. That makes sense. But many municipal authorities don't know where the NESS caches are, or what is in them. Having prior approval to access something doesn't do much good if you don't know where it is or what it is.

Why wouldn't it be considered imperative to take every chief emergency officer from across the country to the closest cache to examine what he or she might be able to make use of during an emergency, and to make suggestions as to what else might be provided?

How can the federal government recognize that emergencies happen *locally,* but then hide vital tools like NESS from local first responders?

If this is a matter of these officers getting security clearances, how hard would it be for the RCMP to check out a couple of hundred municipal employees who are being counted on to save their communities during emergencies? It's unlikely that these people would prove to be security risks, but if that's what it takes to keep them fully informed, why not check them out?

Carl Shaw, Emergency Measures Coordinator for Colchester County, Ontario wrote:

> "I know nothing about the National Emergency Stockpile System . . . If there is a cache in my area I do not have any knowledge about it, as to where it is or what is contained in it."

Lack of Consultation on Contents

Various municipal emergency managers who have seen the caches have told the Committee that some contents aren't likely to correspond to community needs during emergencies. The Chair of the Committee queried Dr. Butler-Jones about this at the Feb. 4, 2008 hearing:

> **The Chair:** What participation do local municipalities have in determining what might be in the stockpile near them?
>
> **Dr. David Butler-Jones, Chief Public Health Officer, Public Health Agency of Canada:** We consult with the provincial coordinators, who I am presuming are consulting, we encourage them to consult and engage with the local municipalities in terms of what is most useful. It will depend.[38]

Dr. Butler-Jones' presumption doesn't jibe with the result of the Committee's survey of municipalities. Out of 92 respondents, only the emergency management officials from Quebec City replied that there had been consultation on contents.

Randy Hull, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator for the City of Winnipeg, testified on March 3, 2008:

> **Senator Day:** You talked earlier about supplies in the event of an emergency. During the survey that we asked you to reply to, we asked if you were aware of the federal emergency stockpile system. In our travels, we discovered that in certain areas people did not know about this stockpile and the material wasn't up to date. Could you tell us about the stockpile of the federal government under the National Emergency Stockpile System? What does it look like? Have you seen it? Would it be helpful to see it? Does it complement what the City of Winnipeg has?

[38] David Butler-Jones, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, February 4, 2008, Issue 4, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.

> **Mr. Hull:** I know the location of the federal stockpile system in Winnipeg. I have not seen it but I know the location and the building because I have driven past it many times. I know that the Province of Manitoba has, on occasion over the last couple of years, pulled out the hospital-in-a-box concept and worked hard to assemble it. I have heard that it is antiquated and difficult to work with. I am more familiar with the stockpile that we have in our facilities for the Red Cross. For me, that is more attainable and reachable.[39]

First responders often had very interesting insights into the caches – not only what their contents should be, but how the government should go about stockpiling. Barry Manuel, Emergency Measures Organization Coordinator for the City of Halifax wrote:

> "There are a tremendous amount of resources in our country that can be brought to bear in an emergency. One needs to be careful not to stockpile resources that are readily available. Once resources are stockpiled, they require maintenance to ensure that the materials remain in an operational readiness state. There is little value in having a resource on paper that is years out of date or unusable. With current emergency legislation, governments have the ability to commandeer resources in times of crises and to deploy them for the greater good. One needs to balance the urge to stockpile and the end result of hoarding. A better system would be to identify critical resources and then have a tracking system in place that would show where they were throughout the province (and ultimately the country) at all times. This tracking system would be accessible to all levels of government and NGOs to search and also to maintain their segments. This would be a more efficient use of resources than stockpiling material away and allowing it to age."

[39] Randy Hull, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, March 3, 2008, Issue 6, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.

The Committee reiterates its 2004 recommendation that Health Canada overhaul the way it administers and manages the emergency caches so that they better serve our first responders.

NEW RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW TO DO THE ABOVE:

The Committee recommends that:

1. For perishable supplies, Health Canada develop a tracking system, accessible to all orders of government, which would identify available providers throughout the provinces/territories.

2. Regular live exercises, and a budget to support the live exercises, are established in order to test the new emergency supply tracking system.

3. First Responders have a greater say in the stockpiling of non-perishable emergency supplies, including where the inventories are held, whether there is duplication and how they are accessed.

Problem 4:
Lack of Funding for Equipment & Training

The Problem as We Saw It in 2004: It is not hard to imagine the incredible agony and devastation that would result from a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or explosive disaster. Events as disparate as the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986, the Bhopal industrial disaster in India in 1984, the Tokyo subway Sarin gas attack of 1995, and the World Trade Center terrorist attack of 2001 provide horrific reminders to the kinds of challenges that people in any country in the world could be faced with.

In the first federal budget following September 11, 2001 the government of the day provided six years of funding to municipalities to build the capability to handle chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive (CBRNE) incidents. But large scale equipment purchases are only the beginning – the true cost of a capability must include the maintenance and training needed to sustain it – something that the federal government did not provide. As a result, municipalities are the ones stuck with the bill for maintaining expensive equipment in the long run.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION (2004)

- **The federal government should provide four additional years of funding ($5 million per year) for the purchase of CBRN[40] protection equipment.[41]**

[40] The acronym for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear weapons (CBRN) is now generally expanded to include explosives: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive weapons (CBRNE).
[41] Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, March 2004), pg. 36. See recommendation #6.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO THE COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATIONS (2006-2008)

CBRN Equipment and Funding

In response to the above 2004 recommendation, Public Safety Canada wrote to the Committee on August 30, 2006:

> "The 2001 Federal budget allocated $10 million over two years for the purchase of CBRN equipment for first responders across the country. Funds were fully dispersed to the provinces and territories, who used the funds to build capacity in the largest urban centres and to build relatively uniform capabilities in strategic centres to provide a response capacity throughout their jurisdictions. The Joint Emergency Preparedness Program (JEPP) was used to administer these funds.
>
> Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSPEC) recognizes that additional and ongoing funding is needed.
>
> PSEPC has proposed to provinces and territories that a new Federal-Provincial-Territorial CBRN Working Group be formed to coordinate efforts to address CBRN incidents, including further assessing the need and priorities for new funding for CBRN equipment for first responders."[42]

That certainly was a start – setting up a working group to assess the need for new funding for CBRNE equipment. Library of Parliament researchers[43] followed up on this development on September 19, 2007 by asking Public Safety Canada: <u>What is the status of this CBRN Working Group? How often do meetings convene, and what accomplishments can it list to date?</u>

Five months later, on February 26, 2008, the Department replied:

> "In April 2007, it was agreed by federal, provincial and territorial emergency management officials that a CBRN Sub-Working Group would be formed under the already established Response Working Group of the Senior Officials Responsible for Emergency Management. The working group is co-chaired by Public Safety Canada and a provincial/territorial official.

[42] Public Safety Canada, "Update on PSEPC/Portfolio on Reports from SCONSAD," August 30, 2006, pg. 10.
[43] See footnote #5.

> To date, the sub-group's activities have included soliciting membership and participation, and drafting Terms of Reference and a Work Plan outline for consideration.
>
> It is envisioned that the sub-group will work collaboratively on such issues as information sharing, identifying capability gaps, developing a future national strategy, updating inter-jurisdictional mutual aid agreements and establishing collaborative links between government, academia, industry and the public and finally, enhancing CBRNE research and development efforts."[44]

That Quicksand
Just Keeps Sucking

Two years after the Committee identified the funding gap, Public Safety Canada proposed setting up a working group to examine the recognized need for new equipment. Nearly *four* years after the Committee identified the funding gap, Public Safety Canada had set up a sub working group to identify possible "capability gaps" – even though the Committee had already identified a very big gap indeed: **no funds to update equipment!**

To date, Public Safety Canada says that the sub-group's activities have included: (a) soliciting membership and participation, and (b) drafting Terms of Reference and a Work Plan outline for consideration.

As for action, none yet. No guarantee of action in anyone's lifetime. First responders are waiting, Canadians are at risk, and groups of bureaucrats are still soliciting and drafting and considering.

Let's give Nero credit where credit is due. At least he played the fiddle.

[44] Public Safety Canada, "Follow UP Questions for Public Safety Canada regarding: 'Recommendations and PSEPC/Portfolio Responses to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence (SCONSAD)' (August 30, 2006)," February 26, 2008, pg 2.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

CBRNE and USAR Needs

First, the Committee reiterates what it said about CBRN in 2004:

CBRN events are now known as CBRNE – chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive events. Capabilities are needed to combat threats from these five directions that may come at Canadians through industrial accidents, natural disasters or terrorism.

The government must ensure that first responders have sufficient funding to buy and maintain CBRNE equipment and training. As well, equipment funding must match training funding.

The training of first responders to properly use CBRNE equipment should continue to be a government priority. Funding for training cannot dry up or first responders' hard-acquired readiness to respond will rapidly diminish. Funding and training must be matched with maintaining - buy, train, maintain.

Second, the Committee will add a component it overlooked in 2004 – Urban Search and Rescue (USAR).

USAR is defined as "a group of specialized rescue skills supplemented by search, medical and structural assessment resources combined in a mobile, highly integrated team."[45] USAR does things like rescue people from collapsed buildings. There are five nationally recognized Heavy USAR teams (known

[45] Public Safety Canada, "Canadian Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) Classification Guide," Available at http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/em/usar/usar-guide-eng.aspx

as HUSAR) in Vancouver, Calgary, Brandon, Toronto and Halifax.[46]

The reason there are only 5 HUSAR teams, is that they are expensive to maintain and are composed of first responders that are full-time members. These teams were developed to be deployed by the federal government anywhere in Canada. These are *national* teams, and as such, the federal government must play a lead role in sustaining a national HUSAR capability through ongoing financial support and leadership.

Level of Funding Inadequate

On February 1, 2007 Fire Chief Bruce Burrell, Calgary's Director of Disaster Services, pointed out how underfunded Canada's HUSAR capability is compared to what is available in the United States:

> **Mr. Burrell:** . . . A U.S. Department of Homeland Security audit report found that American urban search and rescue teams were underfunded. Those teams, over a four-year period, received approximately $7.4 million U.S. per team. The Canadian teams, over a five-year period, have received approximately $2.4 million Canadian per team. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security said, at $7.4 million U.S., the teams in the U.S. that are constructed to the same standard are underfunded.[47]

The December 2001 federal budget committed $20 million over six years (2001-02 to 2006-07) to develop a national HUSAR capacity.[48] However, according to Public Safety Canada's *Departmental Performance Reports* since 2001, only $2.4 million was allocated to each of the five national HUSAR Teams (in

[46] In response to a "Question Taken on Notice" stemming from the appearance of Scott Broughton, Public Safety Canada on January 28, 2008 before the Committee, Public Safety Canada addressed the issue of why there was no federally mandated HUSAR team in Quebec: "In 2004 the City of Montreal submitted a JEPP application for approximately $2 million to increase HUSAR capabilities. This request was subsequently withdrawn in January, 2005."

[47] Bruce Burrell, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, February 1, 2007, Issue 9, 39th Parliament, 1st Session.

[48] Public Safety Canada, "Government of Canada Provides over $1 Million in funding for Urban Search and Rescue Equipment," September 2, 2004. Available at http://ww2.ps-sp.gc.ca/publications/news/2004/20040902_e.asp

2003-2004).[49] While an additional $3 million was announced by the Deputy Prime Minister in 2005, the Committee could not verify that these funds had been provided to HUSAR teams through an examination of departmental performance reports. Most recently, $2 million was announced for the Toronto HUSAR team in 2007.[50] The Committee plans to follow up on this announcement.

Funding of Equipment Maintenance

The first responders operating USAR have faced essentially the same type of problems as CBRNE first responders. Like CBRNE funding, the federal government funded basic USAR equipment purchases for two years only, apparently forgetting that this would be an ongoing need. As a result, some municipalities that never got the equipment in the first place are now without access to funds to get it. Municipalities that want to upgrade or replace equipment face the same problem.

In Public Safety Canada's 2006-2007 *Departmental Performance Report* the department recognizes the shortfall in HUSAR funding, promising that revisions would be made to "the JEPP [Joint Emergency Preparedness Program] terms and conditions to allow for support of operating and maintenance expenditures for heavy urban search and rescue teams – by end of 2007-2008."[51]

When we asked Public Safety Canada if there had been changes to USAR funding criteria, we were told that "Treasury Board recently approved an amendment to JEPP's terms and conditions to make operational and maintenance costs for USAR

[49] In Public Safety Canada's Departmental Performance Reports from 2001-2006, only one specifically mentions specific funding delivery for USAR. "Canada's capacity for heavy urban search and rescue was advanced in 2003-04 through the ongoing collaboration of a multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary Urban Search and Rescue Advisory Committee and the allocation of $2.4 million in federal funding to five selected municipalities across Canada." Public Safety Canada, *2003-2004 Departmental Performance Report*, http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rma/dpr/03-04/PSEPC-SPPCC/PSEPC-SPPCCd3401_e.asp#7

[50] Canada News Centre, Minister Day launches Emergency Preparedness Week by announcing $5 million for emergency preparedness in Canada, http://news.gc.ca/web/view/en/index.jsp?articleid=396579&keyword=husar

[51] Public Safety Canada, *2006-2007 Departmental Performance Report*, November 1, 2007. Available at http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/dpr-rmr/2006-2007/inst/psp/psp02-eng.asp

initiatives eligible for cost sharing effective April 1, 2008." This is a positive development, although the Committee will be monitoring this issue with first responders to see if the good news trickles down.

Third, municipalities are in desperate need of money to train USAR and CBRNE personnel.

All first responders should have at least a basic level of CBRNE training. The Committee heard testimony that CBRNE training can cost $1 million a year in large municipalities.

On January 29, 2007, the Committee heard from Patricia Doge, Vancouver's Director of Risk and Emergency Management:

> **Ms. Doge**: We need funding for first responder training. I think all first responders should have a basic level of CBRN training and even people like dispatchers or call takers, because really it makes a huge difference if they ask the right questions.[52]

On February 1, 2007 Calgary Fire Chief Bruce Burrell emphasized to the Committee the need for better training in CBRNE in both large and small municipalities:

> **Mr. Burrell:** The City of Calgary requires more fully trained responders for CBRNE. Once again, we have a training issue with the Canadian Emergency Management College, which provides limited spots in the provinces in an attempt to train everyone in the country to the same level, regardless of whether they have the equipment, resources or commitment to field a response-ready team.
>
> The provinces, in turn, dictate which municipalities receive the spots for training, which makes it difficult for the municipalities to build the capacity they need to have an effective team.

[52] Patricia Doge, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, January 29, 2007, Issue 9, 39th Parliament, 1st Session.

> A level of training is missing in the federal program to allow smaller municipalities to be trained for levels of response that are within their capacity.
>
> The CBRNE intermediate course at the Canadian Emergency Management College could be delivered potentially within the provinces or major cities, maximizing the number of students that could be trained.
>
> To train municipal first responders to the standards proposed by the CEMC [Canadian Emergency Management College] would cost the City of Calgary approximately $1 million.[53]

If more money is needed for CBRNE training for smaller municipalities, the same is true for HUSAR training. In addition to the five large HUSAR units referred to earlier, smaller urban search and rescue units are being developed across the country. On January 29, 2007, Tim Armstrong, Assistant Chief, Special Operations, Vancouver Fire & Rescue, testified:

> **Senator Day:** I did not realize that the Heavy Urban Search and Rescue teams are limited to four or five cities. What is happening in the rest of the urban areas that do not have these teams?
>
> **Mr. Armstrong:** Initially PSEPC accepted three teams: light- medium- and heavy- teams. The five teams have eaten up most of the funding, which has left the smaller municipalities out of luck. I believe smaller regional teams are necessary.[54]

In response to the Committee's survey of municipalities, 13 percent of respondents said that their municipality was either developing or had a functional USAR capability. Among the cities which were developing/possessed USAR capability are: Saskatoon, Sask.; Victoria, B.C.; Halton Hills, On; Campbell River, B.C.;, Alma, Que.; St. Georges, Que.; Strathcona County Alta.; Thunder Bay, On., and Victoriaville, Que.

It is clear to the Committee that neither large nor small Canadian communities are receiving the funds they require from the federal government's Joint Emergency Preparedness Program

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[53] Bruce Burrell, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, February 1, 2007, Issue 9, 39th Parliament, 1st Session.
[54] Tim Armstrong, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, January 29, 2007, Issue 9, 39th Parliament, 1st Session.

for defence against Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear or Explosive (CBRNE) threats, or for Urban Search and Rescue (USAR).

NEW RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. The Committee recommends that the government should establish an *evergreening fund* dedicated to:

a. Maintaining current Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) and CBRNE capabilities, including equipment purchase, maintenance, and training for all relevant emergency workers, based on a negotiated funding formula;

b. Allow smaller municipalities attempting to set up USAR facilities to receive funding;

2. The Committee recommends that the government design a HUSAR kit that would fit into a Hercules aircraft (or C-17) enabling the Canadian Forces to transport USAR teams to emergency sites across Canada, or internationally, in a timely manner.

Problem 5:
Poor Collaboration Among Governments

The Problem as We Saw It in 2004: The level of inter-jurisdictional information sharing, collaboration and co-operation among different orders of government in Canada with respect to emergencies has been inadequate. Provinces, territories, and communities have not been sufficiently included in strategic emergency planning and management.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION (2004)

The Committee recommended that:

- **Public Safety Canada negotiate memoranda of understanding between the federal government and the provinces and territories that details inter-jurisdictional responsibilities for both emergency preparedness and response.**[55]

- **The Minister of Public Safety Canada ensure that new effective data-sharing protocols and mutual assistance agreements between federal, provincial, territorial and municipal governments be implemented.**[56]

[55] Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, March 2004), pg. 40. See recommendation #9.
[56] Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, March 2004), pg. 77. See recommendations #18 B.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS (2006 – 2008)

Data Sharing and Mutual Assistance Agreements

Regarding the Committee's recommendation that new effective data-sharing protocols and mutual assistance agreements between federal, provincial, territorial and municipal governments be implemented, Public Safety Canada wrote on August 30, 2006:

> "The Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC) was established in 2004. ITAC's primary objective is to provide comprehensive threat assessments related to terrorism which are shared within the intelligence community, with other government departments, provinces/territories, municipalities, international partners, and to relevant first-line responders.
>
> In addition, in 2005 a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on information sharing between PSEPC and the Department of Public Safety in New Brunswick was completed. It is hoped that this MOU can serve as a template for the development of similar MOUs with other provinces and territories.
>
> Furthermore, PSEPC's Canadian Cyber Incident Response Centre has developed a Framework for Operational Cooperation with provincial, territorial and municipal governments. The Framework is an action plan for cooperation and outlines the operational commitments of each jurisdiction in the area of cyber security."[57]

The establishment of the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC) under CSIS was a welcome development. Also welcome is the fact that ITAC shares information on potential terrorist threats not just with provinces and territories, but also with municipalities and "relevant first line responders."

If this really is what ITAC does – bring local authorities into the picture – then it transcends the usual bureaucratic two-step whereby even during emergencies the federal government is reluctant to talk to muncipalities directly.

[57] Public Safety Canada, "Update on PSEPC/Portfolio on Reports from SCONSAD," August 30, 2006, pg. 19.

So if this is really happening – and several chiefs of police contacted by the Committee says that it is – *Hosanas! Kudos!* A breakthrough!

What ITAC seems to recognize that other branches of Public Safety Canada do not, is that to gather the information it needs, the Centre must listen to local police forces – direct contact and exchanges of information with those forces is essential.

The rest of Public Safety Canada works around the principle that federal departments must deal with provincial departments, and then provincial departments must deal with municipalities.

Public Safety Canada, which administers funding programs like JEPP [Joint Emergeny Preparedness Program], should be making direct contact with Municipal Emergency Officers. They should keep them informed and listen to them, the same way ITAC connects with local police forces.

That is how Public Safety Canada could quickly ascertain what municipalities' priorities are, and get on with fixing the programs that would fund those priorities. That is how Public Safety Canada could have figured out years ago what should and should not be in its emergency caches.

There was no mention in the above response of anything about the implementation of data-sharing protocols.

The Federal/Provincial/Territorial 8-Point "Action Plan"

On September 19, 2007, regarding the 8-point FPT [Federal/Provincial/Territorial] action plan mentioned in their reply, Library of Parliament researchers[58] asked Public Safety: "What are the specifics of the 8-point FPT Action Plan? What is the status of this plan?" On February 26, 2008, Public Safety Canada replied:

> 1. Emergency Response Framework - Government collaboration intended to harmonize the federal system so that it complements each provincial and territorial system with respect to emergency response.

[58] See footnote 5.

2. Disaster Assistance - Ongoing discussion of reinforcing the current Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements (DFAA) and the development of financial assistance options outside of the existing DFAA.

3. Inventory of Disaster Assistance Programs - Creation of an inventory of the disaster assistance programs with the incorporation of provincial and territorial programs into the existing federal inventory.

4. Disaster Mitigation - Preparation of development options for a National Disaster Mitigation Strategy.

5. Training - Revision and update of the Training Strategy Action Plan for 2005-2010.

6. Exercise Calendar - Develop a calendar of joint FPT emergency response exercises.

7. Public Alerting - Expedite the development and implementation of the National Public Alerting Strategy.

8. Critical Infrastructure Protection Strategy - Development of the National Critical Infrastructure Protection work plan.

"The 8-point action plan was addressed at the January 10, 2007, Federal-Provincial-Territorial (FPT) Meeting of Ministers responsible for Emergency Management. An Emergency Management Framework for Canada was approved that supports the design, implementation and on-going improvements of emergency management in Canada. The Strategy for Emergency Training in Canada was also approved which helps advance the shared emergency management training aims of all jurisdictions."[59]

This action plan was agreed upon in January 2005, and many elements of that strategy were supposed to have been completed by summer 2005. With the exception of the approval of a "Strategy for Emergency Training in Canada" and completing the "Emergency Management Framework", the above appears to be only a "to-do" list.

What we would prefer to see – anytime soon – is a "done" list.

[59] Public Safety Canada, "Follow UP Questions for Public Safety Canada regarding: 'Recommendations and PSEPC/Portfolio Responses to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence (SCONSAD)' (SCONSAD)' (August 30, 2006)," February 26, 2008, pg 5.

Memoranda of Understanding

With regard to the Committee's recommendation regarding memoranda of understanding between the provinces and territories, Public Safety Canada responded on August 30, 2006:

> "Memoranda of understanding on federal, provincial and territorial (FPT) emergency management already exist with most provinces and territories (except Quebec, Alberta and Nunavut). There is an ongoing need to ensure that emergency management practices are current and coordinated, and PSEPC is actively engaged in working with the provinces and territories to achieve further.
>
> "Ministers responsible for emergency management met in January 2005 to discuss plans to strengthen Canada's emergency management system and agreed on an 8-point FPT[60] Action Plan for priority initiatives in emergency management. FPT Deputy Ministers responsible for emergency management met in September 2005 and in May 2006. The next Ministerial meeting is planned for September 2006, at which time Ministers will receive an update on the FPT Action Plan and consider new priorities.
>
> "With full participation of the federal and provincial governments, FPT working groups were created to address the 8-point Action Plan. Significant work has been undertaken by the groups in areas that include the enhancement of the federal emergency response framework that will complement those of the P/Ts, financial assistance to the provinces, strategies for mitigation, critical infrastructure, public alerting, and communications, and a training action plan and an exercise calendar.
>
> "An FPT Operations working group is actively defining the inter-jurisdictional response when dealing with emergency management and security issues.
>
> "FPT Senior Officials and Deputy Ministers have been working closely together to develop an Emergency Management Framework for Canada for approval by FPT Ministers Responsible for Emergency Management. FPT officials consider this framework to be a cornerstone of the national emergency management system. This framework also addresses the resolution taken at the July 2004 Council of the Federation meeting, where Premiers agreed to direct their Ministers Responsible for Emergency Management to work with the federal government to develop a coordinated strategy for emergency response in Canada, respecting provincial and territorial laws and plans already in place."[61]

A bureaucratic rule: *When in doubt, smother them in words.*

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[60] FPT refers to Federal/Provincial/Territorial

[61] Public Safety Canada, "Update on PSEPC/Portfolio on Reports from SCONSAD," August 30, 2006, pg. 11.

This response acknowledges that MOUs have not been signed with Quebec, Alberta or Nunavut. That represents a gap of approximately a third of the country. It is difficult to contemplate a functioning national emergency matrix with that huge a hole in it.

An Emergency Management Framework

On September 19, 2007, regarding the Emergency Management Framework referred to above, Library of Parliament researchers[62] asked Public Safety Canada: "What are the basic principles of this Framework? How will this Framework be operationalized, and how is it related to the National Emergency Response System (NERS)?" On February 26, 2008, Public Safety Canada replied:

> "The Emergency Management Framework for Canada and the National Emergency Response System (NERS) responds to the direction of the Federal, Provincial and Territorial officials who agreed in January 2008, to "work together to improve and enhance the emergency response framework in order to harmonize the federal system so that it complements each provincial and territorial system".
>
> The Framework was approved by Federal, Provincial and Territorial officials in January 2007. It is a policy-level document that defines the four interdependent functions of emergency management -prevention/mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. It describes the underlying belief and goals of Canadian emergency management and helps establish a common approach and lexicon for the emergency management community.
>
> The nine principles that underpin the Framework are: responsibility, comprehensive, partnerships, coherency of action, risk-based, all-hazards, resilience, clear communications, and continuous improvement. They provide a strategic framework to support the design, implementation and ongoing improvement of policies, procedures, programs, and activities of emergency management."[63]

There is no mention that Quebec, Alberta and Nunavut have joined the parade. We must assume they have not.

[62] See footnote #5.
[63] Public Safety Canada, "Follow UP Questions for Public Safety Canada regarding: Recommendations and PSEPC/Portfolio Responses to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence (SCONSAD)' (August 30, 2006)," February 26, 2008, pg 6.

At this stage, the remaining provinces and territories have, the response says, "a strategic framework to support the design, implementation and ongoing improvement of policies, procedures, programs and activities of emergency management."

So, seven years after 9-11, Canada has a framework that eight provinces and two territories can work within to improve the way governments cooperate during major emergencies. As for actual improvements in the way Canada coordinates its emergency responses – nothing concrete to report.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT (2008)

What is Missing, Other Than Just About Everything?

In all these responses, there is no mention of the Government Operations Centre (GOC) which, according to its website, is:

> "The hub of a network of operations centres run by a variety of federal departments and agencies including the RCMP, Health Canada, Foreign Affairs, CSIS and National Defence. The GOC also maintains contact with the provinces and territories as well as international partners such as the United States and NATO. It operates 24 hours a day, seven days a week, gathering information from other operations centres and a wide variety of sources, both open and classified, from around the world. The GOC deals with anything -- real or perceived, imminent or actual, natural disaster or terrorist activity -- that threatens the safety and security of Canadians or the integrity of Canada's critical infrastructure." [64]

If the Government Operations Centre really is maintaining contact with the provinces and territories, can anybody say what is being accomplished when contact is made?

This gets back to substance. A framework is one thing. Improved policies, procedures, programs and activities are other things – in fact, they're the *main* things. The only thing our Committee is asking for is evidence that Canadian governments are currently sharing substantive information that will help everyone prepare for emergencies, and that there are systems in

[64] Public Safety Canada, "Government Operations Centre", February 1, 2008. Available at http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/em/goc/index-eng.aspx

place to offer substantive practical assistance during – and in the wake of – emergencies.

To this end, the Committee has been monitoring the development of the National Emergency Response System (NERS), Public Safety Canada's supposed inter-departmental, inter-governmental system for dealing with emergencies. However, NERS has been in development since 2003 and – five years later – no one knows when it will be complete. More on NERS and Son of NERS in Problem 11.

So far, the good news that the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC), is connecting with first responders on terrorist threats. Beyond that, the gruel gets thin.

There's a national framework with a large hole in it that seems to have a lot of good intentions, but to date there doesn't appear to be anything to show for those intentions. Then there is an Operations Centre that went unmentioned in the responses. It may or may not be transferring useful information among governments. We don't know.

The Committee has a new recommendation that responds to the fact that one of the barriers to sharing useful information with municipalities may be a set of Treasury Board regulations that forbid sharing federal information with anyone who does not have a federal security clearance.

NEW RECOMMENDATIONS:

The Committee recommends that:

1. The federal government identify municipal emergency officers across the country who require security clearances to receive federal information, ensure that they are checked out and given security clearances if they pass; and

2. Public Safety Canada communicate directly with municipal emergency officers at any time that the department has information or other resources that could improve the emergency response capacity of these municipalities

3. The federal government conduct a "value for money" audit of Public Safety Canada.

Problem 6(a):
Lessons Learned Not Remembered

Knowing how to act quickly and appropriately in chaotic circumstances is at the heart of disaster response. Being aware of pre-existing "lessons learned" from other disasters is key to avoiding delays and mistakes in emergency response and management. Lessons learned should turn into agreed-upon best practices, which may then turn into standards.

The Problems as We Saw Them in 2004: Government witnesses acknowledged that the government's "lessons learned" archive was close to being non-existent. One glaring weakness – it didn't contain lessons from major disasters. In addition, the information in the archive was not being disseminated to first responders – the people who need it most. When you have problems with both content and delivery, you have problems.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION (2004)

- **Public Safety Canada must structure its "lessons learned" archive so that it is:**
  - **Up to date and historically deep; and**
  - **Accessible and helpful to First Responders.**[65]

- **Public Safety Canada should act as a clearinghouse to assist other orders of government by distributing provincial / territorial and municipal "lessons learned" to other jurisdictions as required; and**

- **Public Safety Canada should also prepare and publish a preliminary public report within sixty (60) days of the emergency followed by a formal public report within one year of any national**

[65] Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, March 2004), pg. 36. See recommendation #7.

emergency outlining "lessons learned" from the emergency and various responses to it.[66]

GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS (2006 – 2008)

Not Capturing Lessons-learned

In response to the Committee's recommendations to create a "lessons learned" archive, the Department of Public Safety wrote on August 30, 2006:

> "The National Exercise Division (NED) of [Public Safety Canada] PSEPC has developed and is piloting a secure web site that allows federal, provincial and territorial partners to exchange exercise information, lessons learned and best practices.
>
> "Through the Interdepartmental Exercise Coordination Committee, NED is providing a forum for federal government departments and agencies to regularly update counterparts on exercise findings. The Committee will be establishing a team to address key elements related to the further development of the lessons learned holdings and expanded access across jurisdictions. PSEPC is amending its national response structure to capture lessons learned from events and exercises to incorporate operational procedures. These efforts will help to identify improvements and sustain progress."[67]

Regarding the lessons-learned processes, Library of Parliament researchers[68] asked on September 19, 2007: "When will this formalized 'lessons learned' process be operational? Will the progress assessments be available publicly?" On February 26, 2008, Public Safety Canada responded:

> "The National Exercise Division is currently consulting with other governments, domestic and international, on current and emerging models of systems for lessons learned and related processes. The process will be operational in the

[66] Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, March 2004), pg. 78. See recommendation #18 G (i).
[67] Public Safety Canada, "Update on PSEPC/Portfolio on Reports from SCONSAD," August 30, 2006, pg. 10.
[68] See footnote #5.

> Spring of 2009. Due to the sensitive nature of the content of progress assessments, it is not anticipated that they will be available publicly."

What is so sensitive about lessons learned/best practices? If there are components that deal with sensitive technologies or techniques that terrorists should not be aware of, surely these components can be categorized and only made available to people with the highest security clearance. Otherwise, why not make the information available to first responders – the people most in need of it?

One suspects that this "sensitive" issue is really just the tired issue of federal and provincial bureaucrats bowing scrupulously to one another's jurisdictions. One would think that trying to pre-empt disasters would call for a more vigorous approach.

Getting Important Lessons Learned to First Responders

Regarding the Senate Committee's recommendation that Public Safety Canada act as a clearinghouse for all of government, Public Safety Canada wrote on August 30, 2006:

> "The National Exercise Division (NED) of PSEPC has developed and is piloting a secure web site that allows federal, provincial and territorial partners to exchange exercise information, lessons learned and best practices.
>
> "In addition, selected publicly available lessons learned reports as well as other emergency management articles and other reports are now being added to the Resources section of the expanded web site of the Canadian Emergency Management College launched in May 2006."[69]

Regarding the lessons learned and best practices website, Library of Parliament researchers[70] asked on September 19, 2007: "When will this website be fully operational?" On February 26, 2008, Public Safety Canada responded:

> "The Web site is being further developed in tandem with the lessons learned process, with a target date of Spring 2009.

[69] Public Safety Canada, "Update on PSEPC/Portfolio on Reports from SCONSAD," August 30, 2006, pg. 18.
[70] See footnote #5.

> The site is already functioning and available to provinces and territories P/Ts but being upgraded. As part of this process, we intend to use the outputs of the upcoming Best Practices and Lessons Learned Forum with P/Ts (an initiative of the Preparedness Working Group of SOREM [Senior Officials Responsible for Emergency Management]) through which we will consult further with provinces, territories, academics and American counterparts on the design and collaborative implementation of a more formalized lessons learned process which will contribute to broad-based knowledge management and advance continuous improvement."

What can one say? Canadians experienced the devastating Saguenay (Quebec) floods in July 1996, the Red River (Alberta) floods in 1997, the Ice Storm of 1998 – to name a few. The alarm bells have been ringing for a while, and the target date for a shared lessons-learned catalogue is **Spring 2009**. One small mercy is that there is at least a target date. If preparation for emergencies were really taken seriously in this country, that target date would be called a *deadline* – and there would be repercussions if it were allowed to slip by.

Annual Public Safety Reports

Finally, regarding our recommendation that Public Safety Canada publish annual reports, Public Safety responded on August 30, 2006:

> "PSEPC is amending its national response structure to improve how it captures lessons learned from operations and to incorporate these lessons into operational procedures. The formalized version of this enhanced lessons learned process will include regular progress assessments."[71]

We asked Public Safety to table regular reports on lessons learned – and so far, as their response indicates, nothing seems to have happened. It is not hard to imagine why – their 'secure' best practices/lessons learned website has been in development for years, and Public Safety seems to be consulting without having any final product.

[71] Public Safety Canada, "Update on PSEPC/Portfolio on Reports from SCONSAD," August 30, 2006, pg. 22.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

Get the Heavy Lifters The Information They Need

Three years have passed since the Committee recommended a national catalogue of best practices for emergencies. According to the responses we got, another year will have sauntered by before the electronic catalogue actually exists.

When the catalogue does finally make its appearance, there are no signs that it will be made available directly to first responders in the municipalities. The list will first have to go from the federal government to the provinces who own the municipalities. The catalogue *may* then be passed on to people in municipalities responsible for responding to emergencies.

If it is eventually passed on, how long will it take for all the provinces and territories to get this kind of vital information to first responders? The Committee is concerned it will take too long.

Bureaucrats over the years have created so many non-dictionary words to communicate with one another that even some of them refer to their polite, muffled and acronym-laden language as "Bureaucratese."

The following exchange took place between members of the Committee and Scott Broughton, Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, Emergency Management and National Security, Public Safety Canada, on January 28, 2008:

> **The Chair:** Do you not consciously keep a catalogue, a 20-minute brief, a two-hour brief or a two-day brief on how to educate people to deal with ice storms, blackouts, flood conditions, et cetera, so that people are not reinventing the wheel when these occur?
>
> **Mr. Broughton:** Like all organizations in emergency preparedness across the country, through exercises and actual events, numerous reports are

done. From that point of view, there is a learning process that happens in organizations. Whether we would have an expert sitting in the right place specifically experienced about ice storms at any given point in time, the answer is probably not. There are probably enough people who have expertise. I think our Government Operations Centre would have general and generic advice that would be of use. However, in terms of having people ready on each one of those, I am not sure we would have somebody sitting there at the ready.

The Chair: Why not?

Mr. Broughton: Immediate response is a provincial and territorial responsibility.

The Chair: Are you satisfied that that information rests with the provinces and that you can say, ``You should go and ask the people in Quebec''?

Mr. Broughton: Not necessarily. If we did not have it, I think we would be able to find it quickly.

Whether there is an expert sitting in our Government Operations Centre or some other place that knows exactly what to do around an ice storm, I think they would know what to do. However, in terms of having the 20-minute brief, I would have to go back and check with them to see if they have that in detail. Clearly, they have learned through those processes and could be of assistance. However, I have not seen something that precise myself. I would have to go back and ask.[72]

There appear to be no words for "urgent" or "emergency" or "crisis" in Bureaucratize. But like the Inuit – who have a multiplicity of words to describe snow – the federal bureaucracy can find hundreds of ways to say "slow".

[72] Scott Broughton, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, January 28, 2008, Issue 4, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.

Problem 6(b):
Lack of Leadership on Best Practices

The Problem as We Saw It in 2004: The federal government was largely out of touch with first responders and is not playing a lead role in developing a catalogue of "best practices" as a guide to the first responders' community, which would naturally be developed after examining "lessons learned" as a guide (which the Committee discussed in 6a).

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION (2004)

- **The Committee recommended that the Minister and the Department of Public Safety Canada:**
    - **Ensure that Canadian communities are fully informed about the availability of training programs and other resources to help them prepare to respond to emergencies;**
    - **Facilitate and finance a peer review system among emergency managers and first responders to ensure that "best practices" are being implemented and to foster greater interoperability[73];**
    - **Ensure that all agreements to provide funds to provincial and territorial governments disclose what percentage of those funds will be given to first responders in the municipalities;**
    - **Prepare and publish reports annually to Parliament on its activities. This report should emphasize the measures that Public Safety Canada has taken to upgrade Canada's capacity to respond to national emergencies and the**

[73] Interoperability refers to the ability of diverse systems and organizations to work together (inter-operate).

perceived shortfalls between assets and capabilities of first responders.[74]

- **Public Safety Canada, in cooperation with municipal emergency response units, provincial and federal governments, and relevant federal departments, develop a set of "best practices" for potential natural and man-made disasters.**[75]

GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS (2006 – 2008)

Regarding the recommendation that Public Safety Canada ensure that Canadian communities are fully informed about the availability of training programs and other resources to help them prepare to respond to emergencies, the Department wrote on August 30, 2006:

> "Emergency management training in Canada is a shared responsibility involving all jurisdictions and, increasingly, private training institutions, colleges and universities. As the federal government's focal point for emergency management learning, PSEPC's Canadian Emergency Management College (CEMC) works closely with provinces and territories to ensure maximum awareness of training opportunities and related resources.
>
> "Action items being addressed by CEMC and its Provincial-Territorial partners include the collaborative aggregation and review of current training materials relevant to Business Continuity Planning, Recovery Management, Public Information and Exercise Design.
>
> "PSEPC and its partners are delivering a four-level chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) training program for first-responders that was developed in partnership with federal departments/agencies and first-responder experts. On-line CBRN Awareness and Basic courses were launched in May 2006 and the delivery of Intermediate and Advanced CBRN courses has been increased.

[74] Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, March 2004), pg 77, 78. See recommendations #18 A, D, E, F, and Recommendation G(ii). Parts B, C, and G(i) of recommendation #18 are addressed elsewhere in this chapter.

[75] Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, March 2004), pg 77. See recommendation #18 C.

> "The first phase of an expanded CEMC website was launched in spring 2006 bringing a greater range of information about training and other learning resources to the knowledge of all stakeholders. Further development of this expanded site will incorporate a searchable emergency management training database broadly capturing emergency management related training offered in Canada.
>
> In collaboration with other partners, PSEPC is working to build the capacity of the Canadian emergency management community through advancement of the emergency management body of knowledge, and the development of the broader emergency management educational community. For example, in November 2005, PSEPC organized a national gathering of officials, academics, and others to discuss emergency management education. A further emergency management education workshop will be held in Fall 2006."[76]

Get Every First Responder Involved

Regarding the recommendation that Public Safety Canada facilitate and finance a peer review system among emergency managers and first responders to ensure that "best practices" are being implemented and to encourage greater interoperability, they responded on August 30, 2006:

> "PSEPC regularly involves stakeholders to develop and disseminate new products and tools to assist first responders. A Domestic Group on Emergency Management is being established to provide national voluntary and first responder associations with a platform to discuss emergency response in Canada during all four phases of emergency management (prevention/mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery). Members such as the Canadian Red Cross, Canadian Association of Fire Chiefs, Canadian Volunteer Fire Services Association, Salvation Army, Mennonite Disaster Services, and St. John Ambulance would gather as a formal group to discuss policy and operational issues of mutual interest that arise in complex domestic emergencies. Joint activities may include public communications, training opportunities and drill and exercises. The next meeting of this group is scheduled for Fall 2006."[77]

This sounds to the Committee like progress. But every municipal emergency coordinator in the country should be invited to these sessions. And for those who can't come, these gatherings should produce tangible materials that are useful to first responders across the country (i.e. workbooks, CDs and

[76] Public Safety Canada, "Update on PSEPC/Portfolio on Reports from SCONSAD," August 30, 2006, pg. 20-21.
[77] Public Safety Canada, "Update on PSEPC/Portfolio on Reports from SCONSAD," August 30, 2006, pg. 21.

website content). Not everybody can attend these kinds of gatherings, but those who can't need access to anything of value that the meeting produces.

Responding to the recommendation that Public Safety Canada ensure that all agreements to provide funds to provincial and territorial governments disclose what percentage of those funds will be given to first responders in the municipalities, the Department responded:

> "Under current assistance programs such as the Joint Emergency Preparedness Program (JEPP) or funding provided from Public Safety and Anti-Terrorism (PSAT) Budget (2001), provinces and territories disclose how funding is directed within their jurisdictions. While JEPP delivers funding to the provinces and territories, more than 90 percent of projects funded under JEPP are led by the municipalities. Under JEPP, provinces and territories prioritize funding requirements based on an assessment of needs throughout their jurisdictions.[78]

Good. The requirement for provincial disclosure of where the money is going is exactly what the Committee recommended.

Skimpy Reports

Regarding the recommendation that Public Safety Canada prepare and publish reports to emphasize the measures that it has taken to upgrade Canada's capacity to respond to national emergencies and the perceived shortfalls between assets and capabilities of first responders, the department wrote:

> "PSEPC reports annually to Parliament through its Report on Plans and Priorities and Departmental Performance Report."[79]

The Committee was looking for the Department to honestly take a look at the capacity of the nation to respond to emergencies, including provincial and local response capabilities. The report on Plans and Priorities does not serve this purpose. But perhaps the Committee was barking up the wrong tree. More about this later.

[78] Public Safety Canada, "Update on PSEPC/Portfolio on Reports from SCONSAD," August 30, 2006, pg 21.
[79] Public Safety Canada, "Update on PSEPC/Portfolio on Reports from SCONSAD," August 30, 2006, pg. 22.

Regarding setting up "best practices", Public Safety Canada wrote on August 30, 2006:

> "PSEPC is continuing to develop and promulgate best practices and reports on emergencies to its partners. The Department produces numerous products to allow practitioners to understand how and why emergencies happen and how to best mitigate, respond to and recover from their consequences. These products are available through PSEPC s website."[80]

Getting It Together

A check of the Public Safety Canada website shows that it does indeed offer this kind of information, even if it is not all in one place:

- *getprepared.ca* is a spin-off site from Public Safety Canada, and is a useful source of emergency management information for the public

- Public Safety Canada also offers two guidebooks for practitioners on business continuity planning and basic rescue skills

- The Public Safety Canada website includes a page on Best Practices for the Assurance of Critical Infrastructure

- The website also has a section entitled: *Emergency Management Articles and Reports*, which contains links to 15 reports of lessons learned from emergencies worldwide, including Hurricane Katrina 2005; the 2003 blackout; and the 1998 ice storm.

Good, but not great. There is material scattered all over the website. While some information is available in some places of the website, it is neither organized nor systematic. Moreover, it does not come close to offering a comprehensive package of "lessons learned" and "best practices" to first responders across the country. Public Safety Canada is on the right track, but not the fast track. Public Safety Canada is also running into jurisdictional problems. How hard can it be to set up this kind of catalogue and add to it after any major emergency is confronted?

[80] Public Safety Canada, "Update on PSEPC/Portfolio on Reports from SCONSAD," August 30, 2006, pg 20.

Public Safety Canada's job is to help first responders navigate uncharted waters. Why provide a jumbled and incomplete map?

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

A Cost Effective Investment

The concept of one central source distributing "best practices" to emergency responders across the country is really quite vital. How can we talk about emergency preparedness without doing everything in our power to ensure that first responders are as prepared as they possibly can be? They need equipment and training. Both are expensive. But getting information on best practices to them would be relatively inexpensive.

The following exchange from a Committee hearing on January 28, 2008 demonstrates how frustrating it can be to see a federal agency so consumed with inter-governmental protocol and seemingly so distant from potential tragedy:

> **The Chair:** What role does the department have in terms of developing best practices and serving as a corporate memory for provinces and municipalities in Canada?
>
> **Scott Broughton, Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, Emergency Management and National Security:** Around emergency preparedness, we have a significant role within the federal government. In terms of business continuity planning, exercises and the way emergencies are handled, we would play a significant role. I am not aware of anything we do that lays out standards or methods of operations other than working with the provinces and territories. In this country, in terms of a national system, it is really made up of individual systems across the country. Each province and territory is pretty sophisticated on its own and has a different way of organizing its centre. We would not have a process of standards, per se, in terms of how you would do business continuity or how to run an operations centre.
>
> **The Chair:** For example, not all the provinces went through the ice storm experience but all provinces could go through a similar experience. Would you be good people to go to if someone received a forecast suggesting an ice storm? Would you be able to provide advice and counsel to them?

Mr. Broughton: There is a two-part answer to that. Possibly, but, more important, if we did not have the advice ourselves, we would make sure we could organize to get the help and advice.

……

Senator Mitchell: There are certain areas in this process where you can imagine that consistent federal standards, if not necessary, would certainly offer something. An example would be in risk assessment. When a municipality or province does risk assessment, it gets back to the best practices idea.

Would you agree that there is a role for federal standards and parameters in defining the parameters of risk- assessment processes and planning, and are you doing any work at the federal level and with the provinces to create some national standards in that regard or in other areas that might be applicable?

Mr. Broughton: I do not want to be cute with the words, but there would be a difference between federal standards and national standards. I would say ``no'' to federal standards. I do not think there is a need or an interest or an appetite for us to create federal standards and try to dictate them to people.

National standards, where we work with colleagues and could agree on them, would obviously be of some benefit. We try to work closely with our provincial-territorial colleagues in a variety of ways to make that happen. By virtue of the number of times we function together, many of the operations, the way we talk and do things, end up being similar.

In terms of specific standard setting subject by subject, we would be happy to sit down and have the discussion, but we have not viewed it as something the federal government should arbitrarily or on its own create. The value of those standards would vary. If you have the opportunity to talk to some people from the provinces and territories, they would start out with the principle of why national standards make sense. When you get down to the crunch, you get into the differences of how they function, and you cannot compare a small community in Northern Quebec to whatever. You start to get into that dynamic, and it starts to get harder to do the national standard. It really does depend on what you are talking about. In principle, we would all say it has merit.

The Chair: We are looking for clarification of the words in the Emergency Management Act, promoting a common approach to emergency management, including the adoption of standards and best practices.

Mr. Broughton: The key word is ``promoting.'' We would do that. We would talk to our provincial and territorial colleagues about interoperability, the connection across emergency operations centres, the way in which we react to

> events and, to the extent we could standardize those, we would be promoting that.[81]

Mr. Broughton does not want to be "cute with words." Better that Public Safety Canada stop being cute with the degree of urgency it attaches potential emergencies.

It is one thing if the federal government feels it must go through the provinces and territories to get equipment and training to first responders. But to get information to them? To let them in on what people with experience have discovered about the best way to deal with various types of emergencies? If the federal government cannot find a way to distribute this kind of information to municipal emergency coordinators across the country, it should start funding an institution that will.

The following testimony from John Ash, Manager of Emergency Management Ottawa given on January 28, 2008 is a prime example of how frustrating it can be for a municipal emergency coordinator in this country to get information on how best to proceed:

> **Mr. Ash:** What would happen if there were a dirty bomb-type of incident that involved the Hill? Is there an expectation that members of Parliament — the Senate and what have you — will receive preferential treatment with regard to decontamination?
>
> **Senator Nancy Ruth:** Are you asking us?
>
> **Senator Tkachuk:** I have no idea.
>
> **Mr. Ash:** I have no idea myself, but I have asked some people within the federal government and there is an assumption that there would be. If there are hundreds of people that require decontamination, is there an expectation of service?
>
> We say, let us sit down and talk about -- that expectation. Let us throw the cards on the table to say, ``This is what it costs us to provide this level of service.'' Perhaps there is a formula or some way we can equate added benefit to the city. We want to have that dialogue. We want to be frank and candid, throw the cards on the table and say this is where we are at, so we can close the gaps if necessary.

[81] Scott Broughton, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, January 28, 2008, Issue 4, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.

Senator Tkachuk: Are you pushing for that dialogue now?

Mr. Ash: Yes.

Senator Tkachuk: Are they being helpful or are they stalling you? What is happening? Maybe we can help you.

Mr. Ash: It was challenging for me, because I spent probably two years trying to find the right person to talk to.

Senator Nancy Ruth: We have the same problem.

Mr. Ash: I say that with some understanding of the complexity because there is each individual department. My issues are about the government and not individual departments. Whether it is a municipal pipe that comes into the various buildings, I need to know about the dependency on the water, because we are responsible for that. If we do not have that dialogue holistically, as the federal government to the City of Ottawa, it will be difficult for us to prioritize critical infrastructure and all those kinds of things.

Coming back to your question, we understand clearly that there is a benefit. However, we want to ensure that we are both talking about apples and apples and that there is a clear expectation of what service will be provided and the cost for that service.[82]

This sort of frustration is reiterated in testimony the Committee received from Randy Hull, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator for the City of Winnipeg on March 3, 2008:

Senator Day: We were talking earlier about New Orleans and you had spoken to someone who was very involved in the flooding in New Orleans caused by Hurricane Katrina. You had mentioned asking if they checked with North Dakota. Could you tell us that story? I think it illustrates the importance of overall coordination.

Mr. Hull: We had a conference of our Public Health Agency and health care providers. There was a doctor who came up from New Orleans. He was one of the doctors who had to evacuate the Tulane hospital and was also responsible for all the hospitals getting back together. I asked him in our conversation: "Have you ever had a conversation with the people from Grand Forks?" Similarly, they lost 80 per cent of their city. Although smaller in size, the structure of their recovery program was unique. The City of Winnipeg developed its recovery plan based on a plan out of Australia and the city of Grand Forks. I presented that at

[82] John Ash, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, January 28, 2008, Issue 4, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.

the World Conference on Disaster Management back in 2002. We wanted to share that.

The doctor from New Orleans said, "Grand Forks, North Dakota? Why would I call them?" I am sure some people in Louisiana are not sure where that is. They are land-locked. I told him they had exactly the same situation, though on a smaller scale. However, the recovery plan was exhaustive and unique, and it worked so well. I told him they were up and recovered within five years. You are talking to me about New Orleans and it is two years plus and you are still in dire straits.

I gave him the contact names of three people from Grand Forks that I had. One of those three called me a month later and said, "I am going to New Orleans for three months."

It took a contact from New Orleans talking someone in Winnipeg to be told about Grand Forks. Why is Federal Emergency Management Agency not laying out saying, "Here is a perfect case scenario of another American city that you should follow."? Likewise, here in Canada, it would be nice to learn more about other regions. I have learned about the B.C. forest fires and the evacuations from 2003. However, I have learned it from my counterparts in B.C. Never once have I seen something federally that says, "Here is an exhaustive list of things learned from B.C. or learned in the flooding in Quebec."

I am not sure what the policy people and the planners are doing in Ottawa at the federal level that we are not sharing that information as well as we could be.

The Chair: Could you summarize on that subject? You have raised a couple of areas, one being a repository for best practices in Ottawa. What else, from your perspective municipally, would you like to see from Ottawa?

Mr. Hull: I would like to see best practices and information about growing trends, both nationally and internationally. I am amazed at some of the stuff I pull out of contacts that I have with Australia. They are often a key player at one of the disaster management conferences held in Toronto. Also, I would like to see consistent templates of what would be a good emergency management contingency. It would be nice for Ottawa, along the lines of the provinces, saying if you have a city greater than 50,000 you should have two people; or, if you are a city of 300,000 you should have three people. That would bode well for me, from a city that has one emergency planner.[83]

[83] Randy Hull, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, March 3, 2008, Issue 6, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.

Perhaps it is time for Committee members to quit banging our heads against the wall in the hope that the federal government will eventually take a lead in educating municipal first responders about how best to prepare for emergencies.

A Best Way for Best Practices?

The following testimony shows that – even within the confines of a *single* provincial government – collecting "lessons learned" and "best practices" can be an exercise in spinning one's wheels and getting nowhere. The Committee listened attentively to solutions to this problem in the testimony from Mark Egener, Managing Director of Emergency Management, Alberta on January 30, 2007:

> **Mark Egener, Managing Director, Emergency Management Alberta:** Recently we have had a number of large-scale disasters in Alberta; in particular, a year and a half ago now, there was the Wabamun train derailment, which is on page 7. No people were killed in that incident, but 41 freight cars carrying bunker C fuel oil and a nasty lubrication oil spilled into Lake Wabamun, a catastrophic event for the community and a disaster for the environment.
>
> Following that, Alberta formed the Environmental Protection Commission, chaired by Eric Newell, former head of Syncrude and now chancellor of the University of Alberta. The commission comprised six other members — all also leading national experts in disaster management — and benefited from a number of expert advisors. The commission's report, which I believe you have, outlined ten recommendations to strengthen Alberta's emergency management system and move it towards a world-class system to protect the safety and security of Albertans. We are currently implementing those ten recommendations.
>
> …Second, the commission recommended the establishment of an institute to support the whole function [of emergency management] in Alberta. This is probably the most innovative of their recommendations. They found that there were several things that governments were not equipped or well-positioned to do, such as research, evaluations of incidents, and collecting lessons learned from around the world. Therefore, they recommended the establishment of an institute based on a major educational or research institution, such at the University of Alberta, to support the whole function.[84]

[84] Mark Egener, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, January 30, 2007, Issue 9, 39th Parliament, 1st Session.

If one government like Alberta has the good sense to realize that it is "not equipped or well-positioned to" do certain things – namely research and evaluate incidents and collect lessons learned from around the world and therefore contract these things out to 3rd party institutions – why does the committee continue to pretend that the federal department – depending on input from ten provinces and three territories – can manage this task? The Committee believes that Canadians would be better served if the Government of Canada stepped boldly outside the confines of government to finally address this important task.

In fact, the closest thing to national standards Canadians have access to were all formulated by non-government entities. For instance, the emergency preparedness, management and recovery standards that many emergency managers across Canada use today were developed by the (American) National Fire Protection Association and the Canadian Standards Association.[85]

Given the long-running constitutional difficulties in any endeavour involving the three orders of government, perhaps an independent institution, outside of any level of government, could circumvent constitutional boundaries and instead of spending time wrangling over jurisdiction, just sit down and actually consider what sort of best practices would benefit the first responders of the nation.

[85] Many Canadian emergency managers at the local level have used the (American) National Fire Protection Association NFPA 1600 standard. On February 29, 2008 the Canadian Standards Association released the CSA Z1600 standard for emergency planning which, they claim, is Canada-specific and an improvement upon the NFPA 1600. For more details about both sets of standards, see: Canadian Standards Association, "CSA OHS Matters - CSA Z1600: Setting a new standard for emergency management and business continuity in Canada," February 29, 2008. Available at http://ohs.csa.ca/news/dsp_Z1600.asp

NEW RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. The Committee recommends that the government should call for tenders from Canadian universities and institutions involved in dealing with emergencies and transfer funding from Public Safety Canada to one such institution that will:

- **Develop and maintain an online catalogue of "lessons learned" and "best practices" from past emergencies in Canada and around the world and share that catalogue with all Canadian first responders;**

- **Provide to any Canadian municipality requesting it an audit of that municipality's emergency measures response capacity;**

- **Report to Parliament annually on any deficiencies the institution might find in Canada's system of preparing for, and responding to, emergencies.**

- **Formulate a protocol to consult the emergency managers of different orders of governments and first responders for the purposes of determining how to best assemble national standards for best practices.**

2. The Committee recommends that after each meeting of the Domestic Group on Emergency Management, the government should compile a list on topics discussed, information shared, and to convert this list into materials (ie. workbooks, CDs, web content) that can be disseminated and used by first responders across the country.

Problem 7:
Emergency Public Communications

The Problem as We Saw It in 2004: No province or territory has legal authority to insist that private-sector media disseminate emergency-related information immediately to citizens within their jurisdiction.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION (2004)

- **In order to ensure that authorities have the power and the capability to interrupt radio and television broadcasts during emergencies:**
    - **Public Safety Canada design standards for the establishment of emergency public warning systems for all provinces and territories;**
    - **the Governor in Council, by order, direct the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) to introduce such regulations as necessary to ensure that all public and private broadcasters are required to cooperate in the establishment of provincial / territorial and national public warning systems; and**
    - **a national emergency website with links to provincial and territorial emergency websites be established so that emergency information and instructions can quickly be communicated via the Internet during a national emergency.**
- **Public Safety Canada encourage the installation of a system like "Reverse 911®"[86] in all municipalities, funding at least a third of**

[86] According to their company website, the Reverse 911® technology allows "users [to] quickly target a precise geographic area and saturate it with thousands of calls per hour. The system's interactive technology provides immediate interaction with recipients and aids in rapid response to specific needs." For more, please visit: http://www.reverse911.com/index.php

the cost, with remaining costs to be divided between the provinces / territories and municipalities.[87]

GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS (2006 – 2008)

Toward a Standardized National Public Alerting System?

In response to the Committee's recommendation that Public Safety Canada develop national standards for a public warning system, the Department wrote on August 30, 2006:

> "Industry Canada and Canadian Heritage have the expertise and accountability for telecommunications and broadcasting undertakings, including their adaptation and use in emergencies. PSEPC is working closely with these departments as they work to address public alerting issues. Industry Canada has been leading a comprehensive review and assessment of public alerting technologies and opportunities with funding from the December 2001 Budget.
>
> "Industry Canada, in close collaboration with PSEPC, is leading an initiative to develop a Canada-wide public alerting system, named CANALERT, to provide an effective capability to all levels of government to issue alerts and warnings of imminent emergencies to populations likely to be adversely impacted. CANALERT would allow authorized emergency management personnel to issue urgent emergency warnings to the public using technologies such as radio, television, landline telephones, wireless devices, the Internet and other communication technologies.
>
> "Officials from Industry Canada and PSEPC briefed Federal-Provincial-Territorial (FPT) Deputy Ministers Responsible for Emergency Management (May 31, 2006) on the status of the CANALERT initiative. A demonstration of the CANALERT concept and capabilities was also provided. FPT Deputy Ministers agreed on the need to work collectively to develop a solid business case for a national public alerting strategy and to seek funding."[88]

[87] Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, March 2004), pg. 63. See recommendations #12 and 13.
[88] PSEPC, "Update on PSEPC/Portfolio on Reports from SCONSAD," August 30, 2006. Pg. 12-13.

On September 19, 2007, regarding CANALERT, Library of Parliament researchers[89] asked the following follow-up question to Public Safety Canada: "What is the status of development of the CANALERT system? How long has this system been in development, and when will it be completed?" On February 26, 2008 the Department responded:

> "The need for a national public alerting system has been advanced as a coordinated federal-provincial-territorial (FPT) effort since 2002. In 2007, FPT officials agreed on the main components and requirements of a national public alerting system, and presented these recommendations to FPT Ministers responsible for emergency management on January 9,2008. Ministers were supportive, and instructed officials to continue working with the broadcasting industry to establish a Canadian public alerting system, to be operational in 2010.
>
> The proposed system would enable authorized FPT officials to create alert messages and make them available to telecommunications service providers, which would transmit the alerts to the public. The focus to date has been on using radio and television for alert distribution, with the intention of adding distribution over Internet and wireless devices in time. Industry participation in the national public alerting system would be voluntary, in keeping with the February 2007 decisions of the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission."

The Committee is fed up with having to harp on this theme. But more than two years after our report drew attention to this problem – and fully five years after budget funding was provided for a review of public alerting systems – Industry Canada seems to have gotten its act together and set out some clear deadlines for a national public alerting system, whether it is called CANALERT or not. More on this in our "Challenge to Government" below.

Will Private Broadcasters Be Forced to Cooperate?

Regarding the Committee's recommendation that the Governor in Council direct the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission to introduce such regulations to ensure that all public and private broadcasters are required to cooperate in the establishment of

[89] See footnote #5.

provincial/territorial and national public warning systems, CRTC responded on July 13, 2006:

> "We have not been directed by the GIC to introduce such regulations since my last correspondence to you dated October 7, 2004.
>
> However, in 2005 we received an application for authority to provide an All Channel Alert (ACA) service to Broadcasting Distribution Undertakings (BDUs) across Canada. In view of the nature, scope and national implications of the proposal, the Commission decided to call for competing applications and issued a Public Notice."[90]

Good. In 2006 the CRTC was already treating this issue with some degree of resolve. The CRTC's intervention is welcome here. It had been difficult to see much progress within the federal bureaucracy since 2001.

'**Reverse 911®'**: **Notifying the Public Quickly**

Regarding the recommendation that Public Safety Canada encourage the installation of a system like Reverse 911® system in all municipalities, the Department replied on August 30, 2006:

> "'Reverse 911®' is one of several competing commercial notification services utilizing automated telephone dialling. Because of the time required in relation to the cost of multiple dedicated lines, this technology may not be as effective as others. A more effective (but intrusive and expensive) use of the telephone involves a special pre-coded receiver in each household or workplace that can be digitally activated, simultaneously. This technology is already being trialed by several major telephone companies.
>
> One of the major weaknesses of all telephone-based alerting systems is the lack of regularly maintained databases of telephone numbers. Such databases exist (e.g. 911 databases) but are strictly protected and precluded from dial-out access by telephone companies in accordance with privacy considerations (i.e. unlisted numbers). Industry Canada has been working with prototype communities, the CRTC and the Privacy Commissioner, to develop conditions and criteria for access to the 911 database."[91]

[90] Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, "Response to Committee Recommendations," July 13, 2006.
[91] Public Safety Canada, "Update on PSEPC/Portfolio on Reports from SCONSAD," August 30, 2006, pg 13.

Regarding the 911 database that would enable the use of the Reverse 911® system, Library of Parliament researchers[92] asked Public Safety Canada on September 19, 2007: "What progress has been made in the development of these 'conditions and criteria', and when will a system of automatic notification be expected to become operational? How will this function with CANALERT?" On February 26, 2008 the Department responded:

> "Community notification systems (CNS) are commercially available today and are currently used by some municipalities to notify residents of emergency situations. In the February 28, 2007, Telecom Decision CRTC 2007-13, the CRTC determined that it is in the public interest to allow public authorities to use the telephone numbers and associated addresses contained in 911 databases, in order to enhance the effectiveness of CNS. The CRTC has since established an interconnection steering committee, to assist parties in developing common security, privacy and accountability standards for enhanced CNS.
>
> As part of the groundwork for developing a national public alerting system, public and private stakeholders are developing a standard alert format (Common Alerting Protocol Canadian Profile) that may be used across multiple technologies, including CNS."[93]

The CRTC has relaxed restrictions on the use of 911 databases, giving emergency managers the ability to access an up-to-date and accurate list of phone numbers in the event they need to reach the public at a critical time. This is a major breakthrough in the implementation of an emergency alerting system.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

CRTC to the Rescue

In testimony before the Committee, Serge Beaudoin, Director General, Preparedness and Recovery of Public Safety Canada testified that the federal, provincial and territorial bureaucracies were "on track" to have a national public alerting system in place by 2010. Admittedly, the Committee was skeptical about this claim at first due to having, over the years, seen many

[92] See footnote #5.
[93] Public Safety Canada, "Follow UP Questions for Public Safety Canada regarding: Recommendations and PSEPC/Portfolio Responses to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence (SCONSAD)'(August 30, 2006)," February 26, 2008, pg 7-8.

promised programs that never saw the light of day. However, the Committee was surprised to see this promise armed with some teeth – teeth known as the Canadian Radio-Telecommunications Commission (CRTC).

The Committee was delighted to hear testimony from Scott Hutton, Associate Executive Director of the CRTC, who told us that if private industry does not get its act together to implement a national public alerting system by next year, the CRTC will act unilaterally to force private industry to get its act together. His testimony:

> **Scott Hutton, Associate Executive Director, CRTC:** In February 2007, the commission challenged emergency management officials, broadcasters and companies that distribute broadcasting services, such as cable or satellite companies, to work together on a voluntary basis to build and operate an emergency alert system.
>
> In issuing this challenge, we gave the industry two years, or until March 1, 2009 to come up with a workable system. Following this decision, we acted quickly to remove a major regulatory barrier that would have interfered with the implementation of an emergency alert system. This was done by amending our broadcast distribution regulations to allow companies that distribute broadcasting services to insert warnings into a program without first having to obtain the network's consent.
>
> We hope that a spirit of cooperation will prevail in the industry and that our deadline will be met. However, we will not hesitate to act if, by March 1, 2009, broadcasters and companies that distribute broadcasting services have not come together to build and operate a national emergency alert system. The commission has the necessary powers to designate a single entity to serve as the system's aggregator and to ensure that the system is funded by the industry.[94]

What? Did one of the top officials from CRTC just testify that if private industry hasn't implemented a national public alerting system by the first of March 2009, the CRTC would unilaterally force them to comply? It certainly sounds that way. But just to clarify:

[94] Scott Hutton, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, February 4, 2008, Issue 4, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.

> **Scott Hutton, Associate Executive Director, CRTC:** …Let me repeat on behalf of the CRTC: if a national emergency alert system has not been implemented on a voluntary basis by March 1, 2009, the Commission will use its powers to designate a single entity to operate the system and to ensure it is properly funded.
>
> This project is of the utmost importance to the safety and security of all Canadians, and we will do everything within our power to ensure the successful implementation of a reliable system. In the absence of a national emergency alert system, some Canadian municipalities have established telephone-based notification services to warn the public of an imminent danger or to communicate with the public during an emergency situation.[95]

The Committee seldom hears such bold claims from government agencies, and we will hold the CRTC to its word on this important issue.

Three Key Features

Even better, officials from Public Safety Canada, the CRTC and Industry Canada who testified before the Committee on February 4, 2008 also promised Canadians three key features of this national public alerting system:

First Feature: The system would be able to turn threat detection into public notification in 3 minutes.

> **Serge Beaudoin, Director General, Preparedness and Recovery of Public Safety Canada:** The system we are trying to build is one that will allow us to get to the public within two or three minutes, regardless of where you are.[96]

Second Feature: The system would be accessible by local first responders.

> **Senator Tkachuk:** If there is an emergency in Prince Albert, you want Prince Albert to know; you do not care if I know in Ottawa. Why do you say you want everyone to know, regardless where we are?

[95] Scott Hutton, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, February 4, 2008, Issue 4, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.
[96] Serge Beaudoin, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, February 4, 2008, Issue 4, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.

Serge Beaudoin, Director General, Preparedness and Recovery of Public Safety Canada: Let me clarify. We want a national public alerting system, but for the most part it will be used at the local level. By national, we mean a system that works from coast to coast to coast; however, using geocodes, you can specify the population you want to alert.[97]

……

Senator Day: Who will decide if the municipalities' alert should go through the system?

Chaouki Dakdouki, Director, Regulatory Policy and Planning, Industry Canada: That is why we had this working group. During an emergency, we will not sit down and come up with a committee to discuss who will do what. We have to solve these issues up front. The decision is that whoever is in charge of the emergency will be able to issue the alert.[98]

……

Senator Day: Let us talk about the authority. Suppose that I am the mayor of a municipality and I have an emergency. To whom do I have to go to get authority to use this system?

Serge Beaudoin, Director General, Preparedness and Recovery of Public Safety Canada: To use this system, you would go to your provincial emergency management office initially. If your province accredits you, then you would have access directly to the system. If you are running a 24-7 operation and have certain parameters to meet, you can then issue the warning directly to your population.[99]

Third Feature: The system would utilize Radio, Television, Wireless devices and Internet.

Serge Beaudoin, Director General, Preparedness and Recovery of Public Safety Canada: To clarify, this will be an automated process. It will be housed in the Government Operations Centre, to ensure that it has technical support 24 hours a day, but it is an automated process. It will go through, using technology to authenticate who they are getting it from, and they will be issuing it to all — radio, television, wireless and the Internet. The idea is to send it to the various

[97] Serge Beaudoin, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, February 4, 2008, Issue 4, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.
[98] Chaouki Dakdouki, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, February 4, 2008, Issue 4, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.
[99] Serge Beaudoin, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, February 4, 2008, Issue 4, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.

> sources and let the private sector deal with their subscribers, the Canadian public, directly.[100]

This is a start. But a reliable system will require 100 percent participation. The word "voluntary" should not be part of the equation, unless every Canadian company broadcasting to the Canadian public comes on board. In the end, some broadcasters may have to be told to come on board.

> **Senator Banks:** I hope you have in the CRTC the authority to bring into place the recommendation this committee made years ago, long after others had recommended it, too, that this will be done. I hope this will be mandatory among broadcasters and other means of communication in the country.
>
> Mr. Hutton, do you have the authority to do that?
>
> **Mr. Hutton:** Yes, we do.
>
> **Senator Banks:** Will you do it?
>
> **Mr. Hutton:** We will do it.[101]

While 2004 would have been better than 2009 or 2010, the Committee congratulates the CRTC on moving ahead on this.

Increasingly, the challenge will be to establish a reliable emergency warning system that funnels warnings through different types of medium, including broadcasting, phones and the Internet.

There are legal and technical hurdles to doing this, but the Committee intends to hear further testimony as to the best means of achieving those objectives.

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[100] Serge Beaudoin, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, February 4, 2008, Issue 4, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.
[101] Scott Hutton, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, February 4, 2008, Issue 4, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.

Problem 8:
Lack of First Responder Interoperability

> **Mr. Mike Boyd, Police Chief of the Edmonton Police Services:** There is also the never-ending issue of interoperability of communications. We have not resolved the issue of being able to talk with one another when we need to work together, especially in an emergency.[102]

There is not a reliable strategy or system in place to adequately equip Canada's first responder community with interoperable communications devices to use in times of emergency. Such systems need to be put in place by all orders of government, with leadership coming from the federal level.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATIONS (2004)

- **Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (PSEPC) should enter into negotiations to equip the entire first responder community nationwide with handheld communications devices, with the federal government funding at least a third of the cost, with remaining costs to be divided between the provinces / territories and municipalities.**

- **Each order of government should create the capacity to communicate with its first responders, within itself and with other orders of government. All systems should have wireless back-ups.[103]**

[102] Mike Boyd, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, February 25, 2008, Issue 5, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.
[103] Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, March 2004), pg. 63-64. See recommendations #15.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS (2006 – 2008)

Handheld Communication Devices

Regarding the recommendation that Public Safety Canada should equip the nation's first responders with handheld communications devices, Public Safety Canada wrote on August 30, 2006:

> "The Department of Public Safety recognizes the importance of first responders being able to communicate with each other to minimize loss of life and ensure the safety and security of Canadians when a major event, either planned or unplanned, occurs.
>
> The development of seamless interoperable radio communications throughout the country requires collaboration among all public safety agencies, across all jurisdictions. Such communications would enable first responders to talk across disciplines and jurisdictions via radio communications systems, exchanging voice and/or data with one another on demand, in real time, when needed, and as authorized.
>
> It is recognized that radio communications interoperability cannot be solved by any one entity alone – addressing the issue requires collaboration among all public safety agencies. A federal/provincial/territorial working group of emergency management partners is being established to incorporate input from all jurisdictions and assist in determining how interoperable communications can be achieved."[104]

Working Groups Just Not Working

A working group is being established. Those six words should be carved in stone in front of Public Safety Canada's Ottawa Headquarters. One sure sign that nothing much is happening is the establishment of one more working group.

[104] Public Safety Canada, "Update on PSEPC/Portfolio on Reports from SCONSAD," August 30, 2006, pg. 14.

Inter-Governmental Communication

Regarding the recommendation that communication infrastructure be created between each order of government and its first responders (with wireless backups), Public Safety Canada wrote on August 30, 2006:

> "PSEPC has Business Continuity Plans (BCPs), and related policies and governance. Critical services have been identified, and associated redundancies are in place for both power and communications. This includes backup power to run critical computer systems, as well as cellular and satellite telephones. The satellite telephones have fixed and wireless capabilities. A Business Impact Analysis is currently underway to update and confirm critical services as listed. As business continuity planning is an iterative process, the department continues to develop, update, and test for full compliance with the Government Security Policy (GSP), including the BCP and Management of Information Technology Security (MITS) Standards.[105]
>
> The Government is working in other areas to improve communication between departments and with other levels of government. For example, the PSEPC is responsible for interoperability and the integration of public safety and security (PS&S) information between departments and agencies in Canada. This work is intended to improve information sharing across a range of organizations in support of public safety and security, while adhering to the *Privacy Act* and the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms.*
>
> As part of this responsibility, a National Radio Communications Interoperability Strategy is being explored, as described under Recommendation #14, in consultation with the PS&S sector. This initiative will enable PS&S agencies to communicate across disciplines and jurisdictions with one another on demand, in real time, when needed, and as authorized."[106]

On September 19, 2007, regarding the Federal/Provincial/Territorial (FTP) working group of emergency management partners, Library of Parliament researchers[107] asked Public Safety Canada: "What is the status of this FPT working group, and what accomplishments has the group achieved in furthering interoperable communications for Canada's first responders?" In February 2008 Public Safety Canada responded:

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[105] Public Safety Canada, "Update on PSEPC/Portfolio on Reports from SCONSAD," August 30, 2006, pg. 14.
[106] Public Safety Canada, "Update on PSEPC/Portfolio on Reports from SCONSAD," August 30, 2006, pg. 15.
[107] See footnote #5.

> "Public Safety Canada continues to seek a formal Federal-Provincial-Territorial forum to discuss the challenges and solutions to radio communications interoperability and to facilitate consultations with public safety stakeholders. The Department is engaging with provinces on this issue, particularly with jurisdictions which are planning to upgrade or replace their radio communication networks in the near future: It is also facilitating discussions between provinces and between provincial officials and representatives of federal organizations that operate within these jurisdictions."[108]

The Language of Lassitude

Public Safety Canada is "seeking a formal FPT forum," and is "engaging with the provinces" and "facilitating discussions between provinces". The reality is that this issue has *not* been discussed at any of the annual meetings of the Federal-Provincial-Territorial Meeting of Ministers responsible for Emergency Management in recent years.[109] If this issue is as important as the government response implies, then why can't it be included in the formal agenda? Who are they "facilitating and engaging" with?

On September 19, 2007, regarding integration and interoperability, Library of Parliament researchers[110] asked Public Safety Canada: "What are the specific organizations in the "range of organizations" mentioned above? What is the status of this work on interoperability and integration?" Public Safety Canada responded on February 26, 2008:

> "The specific organizations in the "range of organizations" mentioned above include the following:
>
> 1. Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (CATSA)
> 2. Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA)
> 3. Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics (CCJS)
> 4. Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA)
> 5. Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS)
> 6. Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC)
> 7. Communications Security Establishment (CSE)

[108] Public Safety Canada, "Follow UP Questions for Public Safety Canada regarding: 'Recommendations and PSEPC/Portfolio Responses to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence (SCONSAD)' (August 30, 2006)," February 26, 2008, pg 8.
[109] There is no indication that interoperability for first responders was part of the formal agenda for discussion in the Federal-Provincial-Territorial Meeting of Ministers responsible for Emergency Management in 2002 & 2004-2008 sessions. (There was no meeting of FPT emergency managers in 2003). See the Canadian Intergovernmental Conference Secretariat http://www.scics.gc.ca/menu_e.html
[110] See footnote #5.

8. Correctional Service Canada (CSC)
9. Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO)
10. Department of National Defence (DND)
11. Environment Canada (EC)
12. Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC)
13. Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC)
14. Justice and Deputy Attorney General (Justice)
15. National Parole Board (NPB)
16. Natural Resources Canada (NRCan)
17. Office of the Privacy Commissioner (PrivCom)
18. Passport Canada (PPT)
19. Privy Council Office (PCO)
20. Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC)
21. Public Safety Canada (PS)
22. Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC)
23. Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)
24. Statistics Canada (StatsCan)
25. Transport Canada (TC)
26. Treasury Board of Canada, Secretariat (TBS)

Public Safety Canada is currently refining an interoperability policy framework and action plan in consultation with the Privy Council Office (PCO) and Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) Chief Information Office Branch."[111]

Get the Users Involved

Regarding national radio communications interoperability, the Committee asked: "What is the status of the National Radio Communications Interoperability strategy? What set of programs or actions will this strategy lead to?" Public Safety Canada responded February 26, 2008:

> "A Federal Committee of key departments (Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Department of National Defence, Canada Border Services Agency, Canadian Coast Guard, Industry Canada and Defence Research and Development Canada) has been established, under the leadership of Public Safety Canada, to assist in the creation of a National Public Safety Radio Communications Strategy. The Committee is now examining, as a matter of priority, challenges and prospects for a way forward on specific initiatives, such as:

[111] Public Safety Canada, "Follow UP Questions for Public Safety Canada regarding: 'Recommendations and PSEPC/Portfolio Responses to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence (SCONSAD)' (August 30, 2006)," February 26, 2008, pg 9.

- Radio Spectrum management and the articulation of public safety requirements;
- Assisting in the development of cross-border interoperable radio communications;
- Governance issues, involving multiple jurisdictions and mandates; and,
- Policy development to guide first responder communities in the planning, implementation, and use of interoperable radio communications equipment."[112]

If the National Radio Communications Interoperability strategy meant to, as Public Safety Canada stated, "enable first responders to talk across disciplines and jurisdictions via radio communications systems, exchanging voice and/or data with one another on demand, in real time, when needed, and as authorized," *then why are federal bureaucrats the only ones involved in developing the strategy*?

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

There is good news and there is bad news.

Good news: just under 2/3 of municipalities we surveyed told us that their first responders have access to some sort of interoperable communications (62%).

Bad news: less than 1/5 of the municipalities we surveyed have interoperable communications with their nearby provincial and federal partners (17%).

Respondents like Trent Elyea, Community Emergency Management Coordinator for Orillia wrote: "Our police are Provincial, our ambulance is County and we are municipal. All three operate on different systems and have totally different operating abilities."

Interoperability during an emergency can be the difference between life and death – a critical fact that is understood full well by the emergency management folks in Alberta. Alberta is

[112] Public Safety Canada, "Follow UP Questions for Public Safety Canada regarding: 'Recommendations and PSEPC/Portfolio Responses to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence (SCONSAD)' (August 30, 2006)," February 26, 2008, pg 10.

an example of a province that clearly understands why interoperable communications are a necessity for first responders, and has taken action to do something about it. On February 11, 2008 David Hodgins, Managing Director, Alberta Emergency Management Agency testified in to the Committee:

> **Mr. Hodgins: "With respect to the safety of the public and first responders, communications is an absolute priority. Again, on a personal note, having been involved with many emergency events and exercises in preparation for emergency events, the first thing brought forward as a result of the post-event analysis is communications that could have been better or should have been better. Police need to be able to better talk to fire officials and paramedics, and the system generally needs to be able to better communicate in the interests of getting the right resources to the right place at the right time."[113]**

Not only does Alberta recognise the problem, they have an action plan to accomplish the goal and plug the holes. David Hodgins said to the Committee on February 11, 2008:

> **Mr. Hodgins: "Another paradigm associated with creating joined up systems is Alberta's first responder radio communications system project. This proposed multi-million-dollar system will provide modern communications equipment to ensure police, paramedics, firefighters, search and rescue personnel, as well as a myriad of support and essential resource agencies are able to connect and communicate with each other during day-to-day events as required, and, in particular, during major emergency events."[114]**

This project that David Hodgins speaks of is called the Alberta First Responders Radio Communications System (AFRRCS). This initiative is described on the AFRRCS website:

> **The Alberta First Responders Radio Communication System (AFRRCS) initiative is being conducted by the Solicitor General and Public Security. This project will replace the existing Government of Alberta and RCMP province-wide radio communications systems by 2010. It will also extend the radio system to municipalities which will**

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[113] David Hodgins, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Hearing Transcript*, February 11, 2008, Issue 5, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.
[114] David Hodgins, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Hearing Transcript*, February 11, 2008, Issue 5, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.

> **enable communication between public safety agencies such as fire and ambulance.[115]**

While the project is still in its consultation stage, there is a firm date for implementation and a process to be followed. In addition, the project also aims to provide interoperability to all actors– regardless of jurisdictional boundaries – and the Government of Alberta is working with the RCMP to jointly implement this system.[116]

We are not suggesting that the Federal government should plan such strategies for the provinces, but rather, encourage and help fund such provincial initiatives. Public Safety Canada's *National Public Safety Radio Communications Strategy* is a start: but will it be interoperable with other orders of government? Will the strategy involve sitting down with first responders and provincial governments and agreeing on interoperable communications for everyone involved in an emergency?

Public Safety Canada's *Reports on Plans and Priorities* mentions (2008-2009) "a radio interoperability strategy to enhance first responders' capacity to communicate with each other,"[117] but this has been a one-paragraph promise in their departmental documents since 2006.[118] Compare this to Alberta, who, within 2 years of planning, already has an end date of 2010 for its radio communications system. When will the federal government get moving?

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[115] The Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties, *AAMDC YEAR IN REVIEW: 2007*, November 2007, pg 6. Available on the AAMDC website at: http://www.aamdc.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=301&Itemid=517

[116] Royal Canadian Mounted Police, "News Release - Alberta: RCMP to issue enhanced body armour in response to HRSDC report," March 5, 2007. Available at http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/ab/news/2007/Mayerthorpe_HRSDC_Mar05_e.htm

[117] Public Safety Canada, *2008-2009 Report on Plans and Priorities*, March 31, 2008, pg 62.

[118] The report states: "The Department is developing a framework for interoperability, including a long-term vision and strategic design to enable a fully coordinated approach to public safety and security that ensures effective information sharing while respecting the privacy of Canadians and the principle of accountability." Public Safety Canada, *2006-2007 Report on Plans and Priorities*, September 26, 2006, pg 30-31.

NEW RECOMMENDATIONS:

The Committee recommends that:

1. Public Safety Canada make first responder interoperability a specific item of discussion for the next iterations of the Federal Provincial Territorial Meeting of Ministers Responsible for Emergency Management.

2. Public Safety Canada involve provincial and municipal partners in the development and implementation of its *National Public Safety Radio Communications Strategy* within two years (by 2010).

Problem 9:
First Responders Ignored

Many first responders and local emergency managers believe that the federal government does not adequately consult them and does not understand what they need on the ground to do their jobs effectively.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATIONS (2004)

- **The Committee recommended that Public Safety Canada develop a greater sensitivity to the differing needs of the First Responders in communities across Canada**

- **The Committee recommended that the Minister of Public Safety Canada give direction to Public Safety Canada to restructure the national emergency preparedness system so that local concerns and needs form the core of preparedness planning and structures.**[119]

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE (2006)

Sensitivity Training or Wheel Spinning?

Regarding the Committee's recommendation that Public Safety develop a greater sensitivity to the differing needs of the First Responders in communities across Canada, Public Safety Canada wrote on August 30, 2006:

> "PSEPC recognizes that first-line responders play a critical role in emergency management in Canada, given that most emergencies in Canada are managed locally. PSEPC continues to work towards a better understanding of first responder challenges and needs. PSEPC officials will continue to build relationships and partnerships with national first responder organizations.

[119] Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, March 2004), pg 64. See Recommendation #16.

Information and support has proven beneficial in the development of a wide range of initiatives, ranging from funding for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) equipment to the development of a national urban search and rescue program (USAR). Dialogue with first responders on the subject of science and technology related to CBRN response occurs annually through a symposium led by the CBRN Research and Technology Initiative of Defence Research and Development Canada. Work to identify the most effective combination of emergency management tools such as national standards, best practices, and guidelines is on-going.[120]

Joint initiatives with the volunteer sector are also underway. On May 8, 2006, the Minister of Public Safety and Secretary General of the Canadian Red Cross signed memoranda of understanding (MOU) which formalized their collaboration in matters of emergency management. Additional MOUs with other organizations are planned for the coming year. In addition, a Domestic Group on Emergency Management is being established to discuss policy and operational issues of mutual interest that arise in complex domestic emergencies. Joint activities would be targeted, including public communications, training opportunities and drills and exercises. Membership includes Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police; Canadian Association of Fire Chiefs; Canadian Centre for Emergency Preparedness; Canadian Red Cross; Canadian Volunteer Fire Services Association; Federation of Canadian Municipalities; Mennonite Disaster Services; Paramedics Association of Canada; Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada; Public Health Agency of Canada; St. John Ambulance; Search and Rescue Volunteer Association of Canada; The Salvation Army, and will be expanded to include additional national voluntary and first responder associations.[121]

As well, several non-governmental organizations, such as the Search and Rescue Voluntary Association, receive departmental grants and contributions to address capacity and to fund innovative initiatives.

PSEPC and the RCMP will consult with Treasury Board and other departments to clarify the terminology for employees used by Treasury Board in announcements made to Public Service employees during an emergency. Utilization of terminology such as "essential and non-essential" which have very specific meanings under the labor relations act may create confusion for employees required by Departments and agencies to report to work during emergencies in order to sustain operations or support first responder roles. Language should be clarified and standardized within and across the Government of Canada and in

[120] Public Safety Canada, “Update on PSEPC/Portfolio on Reports from SCONSAD,” August 30, 2006, pg 15.
[121] Public Safety Canada, “Update on PSEPC/Portfolio on Reports from SCONSAD,” August 30, 2006, pg 15.

> relevant documents such as business continuity plans, standard operating procedures and employee emergency contact messaging lines.[122]

Everything the Department is *planning* makes sense. What doesn't make sense is how long it is taking to get a system in place that would funnel essential information from first responders to federal bureaucrats. In 2004, the Committee asked Public Safety Canada to start listening to first responders so as to deepen the federal government's understanding of what they need to properly do their jobs when Canadians are facing emergencies. What has happened in the ensuing four years? The Department has hosted a symposium, signed a MOU with the Red Cross, established a Domestic Group on Emergency Management and given a grant to the Search and Rescue Voluntary Association. And that's it. The one item clearly relevant to the Government's need to improve its capacity to 'listen to first responders' is the establishment of a Domestic Group on Emergency Management. But we have seen no evidence of any accomplishments on the part of this organization since it was allegedly founded in 2005.[123]

Where are the First Responders in National Emergency Planning & Response?

Regarding the recommendation that Public Safety Canada restructure the national emergency preparedness system so that local concerns and needs form the core of preparedness planning and structures, Public Safety Canada responded on August 30, 2006:

> "Public safety is a shared responsibility, which begins with the individual and moves through jurisdictional authorities. As outlined in the Emergency Preparedness Act and its successor, the proposed Emergency Management Act, the federal government works with, and through provincial/territorial governments to enhance local emergency preparedness and support these jurisdictions during an emergency. PSEPC is engaging provinces and territories to review and renew Canada's national emergency management system. This includes the modernization of the Emergency Preparedness Act (proposed Emergency Management Act), and the Federal, Provincial and Territorial (FPT)

[122] Public Safety Canada, "Update on PSEPC/Portfolio on Reports from SCONSAD," August 30, 2006, pg 16.

[123] The only official documentation of the Domestic Group on Emergency Management is found in a 2006 departmental performance report, which states: "consultations were held on the creation of a Domestic Group on Emergency Management (first responders and NGOs)." Public Safety Canada, *2005-2006 Departmental Performance Report*, November 23, 2006, pg. 30.

Emergency Management Action Plan, which aims to strengthen comprehensive emergency management across four interdependent functions of prevention and mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. In addition, to complement new federal legislation, the *Federal Policy for Emergencies* (1995) will be updated. New mechanisms to consult stakeholders at all levels, from local to international, are being considered to strengthen emergency management and national security in Canada.

Recognizing the need for enhanced emergency cooperation, Federal, provincial and territorial (FPT) Ministers responsible for emergency management agreed, in January 2005 that governments would work together to improve and enhance the emergency response framework. To this end, PSEPC has been leading the development of the National Emergency Response System (NERS), which will ensure a more responsive and harmonized federal and national response to all types of emergencies.

A core principle of the NERS is *concurrent jurisdictional response*, which acknowledges that emergency response can require action from all levels of government, and that these parties all have different areas of responsibility. The NERS facilitates the communication, cooperation, and coordination of actions by all parties involved, while at the same time ensuring that jurisdictional boundaries are respected and maintained.

To date, the focus has been on the development of the federal component of the NERS, the Federal Emergency Response System (FERS). A key element of the FERS is the development of a FPT standard interface and coordination mechanism to support common emergency response processes, such as joint FPT contingency planning, public communications, and operations.

Significant progress has been made through the development and implementation of regional concepts of operation to administer FERS at the regional and provincial/territorial level. The federal regional arrangements ensure a harmonized federal regional response of support and assistance that may be needed from the federal government during emergencies. They are designed to facilitate communication, cooperation, and coordination of actions by all parties involved, while at the same time ensuring that jurisdictional boundaries are respected and maintained.

The PSEPC Regional Offices provide coordination and support to regional federal families. The Regional Offices also provide a single point of contact for the provinces and territories for emergency management matters."[124]

[124] Public Safety Canada, "Update on PSEPC/Portfolio on Reports from SCONSAD," August 30, 2006, pg 18-19.

Library of Parliament researchers[125] followed up with Public Safety Canada on September 19, 2007 by asking: "What mechanisms does the National Emergency Response System (NERS) include for the federal government to delivery vital information to first responders in a timely fashion during an emergency?" Public Safety Canada responded on February 26, 2008:

> "The Public Safety Regional Director will provide appropriate representation in the provincial/territorial Emergency Operations Centre as required. The responsibilities of the Regional Director are to facilitate the interchange of information between the provincial and territorial Emergency Operations Centre, the Federal coordinating Centre and the Government of Canada Operations Centre; to coordinate regional federal response in collaboration with other federal regional representatives; and to support or enable provincial/territorial requests for assistance. The Government Operations Centre also plays a key role by communicating vital information simultaneously to the regional Director and the provincial/territorial Emergency Operations Centre.
>
> Provinces and territories support first responders during an emergency, while the federal government supports the province and/or territory.
>
> Provinces and territories are responsible for communications with first responders within their jurisdictions as are federal institutions responsible for communications with federal first responders."[126]

Planning Toward the Next Generation of Wheel Spinning

It's fine that "significant progress has been made through the development and implementation of regional concepts of operation to administer FERS [the Federal Emergency Response System] at the regional and provincial/territorial level," but again, how does that involve local first responders? The government response outlines a system of concurrent FPT jurisdictional response – which again, leaves municipalities (and first responders) out of the loop.

Our original recommendation prompted the question: how has the Government improved its delivery of what first responders say they need?

[125] See footnote #5.
[126] Public Safety Canada, "Follow UP Questions for Public Safety Canada regarding: Recommendations and PSEPC/Portfolio Responses to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence (SCONSAD)'(August 30, 2006)," February 26, 2008, pg 12.

For all the acronyms and lengthy statements in the Government response, we have yet to find an answer.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

If average, intelligent Canadians were asked what is required most in times of emergencies, they might respond:

- **Competent, well-equipped responders**
- **Timely responses**
- **Clarity of command**

They probably wouldn't respond: "What we really need when things get tough is a bureaucratic maze in which those responsible for emergency response systems are wandering around trying to avoid treading on one another's toes."

But that is what the priority seems to be in Public Safety Canada's 2008 response to the Committee's question as to what mechanisms are in place to ensure timely responses to emergencies.

The paucity of direct communication between the federal government and first responders is a recurring theme in every aspect of emergency management in Canada, including

- **The secretiveness over the location and contents of National Emergency Stockpile System (NESS) caches**

- **Lack of funding for ongoing maintenance of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE) and Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) response teams**

- **Lack of flexibility in Joint Emergency Preparedness Program (JEPP) funding**

- **The lack of leadership in formulating best practices**

It is revealing that the annual meeting of ministers responsible for emergency management does not include representatives from local governments. How can there be truly useful discussions about roles and responsibilities in emergency management without municipalities at the table? It is not surprising that our surveys show that municipal emergency managers are sometimes confused and frequently frustrated with federal government processes.

John Ash, Emergency Manager for the City of Ottawa, is one example. An excerpt from his testimony before the Committee:

> **Mr. Ash:** …We say, let us sit down and talk about what that expectation (sic). Let us throw the cards on the table to say, "This is what it costs us to provide this level of service." Perhaps there is a formula or some way we can equate added benefit to the city. We want to have that dialogue. We want to be frank and candid, throw the cards on the table and say this is where we are at, so we can close the gaps if necessary.
>
> **Senator Tkachuk:** Are you pushing for that dialogue now?
>
> **Mr. Ash:** Yes.
>
> **Senator Tkachuk:** Are they being helpful or are they stalling you? What is happening? Maybe we can help you.
>
> **Mr. Ash:** It was challenging for me, because I spent probably two years trying to find the right person to talk to.
>
> **Senator Nancy Ruth:** We have the same problem.
>
> **Mr. Ash:** I say that with some understanding of the complexity because there is each individual department. My issues are about the government and not individual departments. Whether it is a municipal pipe that comes into the various buildings, I need to know about the dependency on the water, because we are responsible for that. If we do not have that dialogue holistically, as the federal government to the City of Ottawa, it will be difficult for us to prioritize critical infrastructure and all those kinds of things.
>
> Coming back to your question, we understand clearly that there is a benefit. However, we want to ensure that we are both talking about apples

> and apples and that there is a clear expectation of what service will be provided and the cost for that service.[127]

The Committee agrees with the recommendation of the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM), who, in a February 2007 submission to Finance Minister Jim Flaherty wrote:

> "Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC) should commit to a process of consultation that provides municipal governments with the opportunity to participate in national emergency preparedness and management planning (FCM's inclusion on the Domestic Group on Emergency Management is a good first step), leading to a more thorough examination of responsibilities and funding for next year's federal budget. This should include, for example, increased funding to the Joint Emergency Preparedness Program (JEPP) for municipalities, as well as funding for protecting and hardening critical infrastructure and for modifications to the Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements (DFAA)."[128]

In the 2008 report *Benchmark: A Report on the Key Issues and Challenges Facing Canadian Municipalities*, a survey conducted by the Federation of Canadian Municipalities concluded that "overall, Canadians feel that there is a lack of co-operation between the levels of government regarding policing and emergency preparedness."[129]

That sentiment conforms with the input of municipal officials responding to our survey as well as witnesses appearing before the Committee. Sue O'Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Operations Support, Ottawa Police Service, lamented the lack of an integral and continuing relationship among governments on emergency preparedness:

> **Sue O'Sullivan, Deputy Chief, Operations Support, Ottawa Police Service:** When we talk about emergency planning — we talk about an all-hazards approach, be it terrorism or a natural disaster — when there is consequence-management required, every level of government,

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[127] John Ash, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, January 28, 2008, Issue 4, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.
[128] Federation of Canadian Municipalities, *Pre-Budget Submission*, February 13, 2007, pg 10. See Recommendation 3d. Available at http://www.lmp-pgt.fcm.ca/English/View.asp?mp=532&x=787
[129] Federation of Canadian Municipalities, *Benchmark: A Report on the Key Issues and Challenges Facing Canadian Municipalities*, April 15, 2008, pg 14.

> municipal, provincial and federal, has a mandate, and that is okay. We need to plan together strategically and leverage one another's assets and resources. The federal government has priorities in terms of that, but if they are not coordinated, there are limited assets. The reality is that in any crisis — be it natural disaster, terrorism or whatever the nature of the crisis is, Katrina or 9/11, for example — the first 24 to 48 hours will be local response. When we talk about preparing, Canada's capacity to respond is integrally connected to local and provincial capacity. When we look at how the three levels of government will respond, we need to be planning together. I do not want the federal government's mandate, but I want an integral and continual relationship.[130]

The Committee understands the constitutional division of responsibilities among jurisdictions. However, there is no jurisdictional impediment to sitting down with both municipal and provincial partners to hash out who does what, and how, nor should there be any impediment to having federal officials listening directly to municipal officials as to what their needs are on the ground. The provincial and territorial governments can sit in on the conversations if there is concern over jurisdictional niceties.

The Committee strongly recommends that Public Safety Canada – as the lead federal agency responsible for national emergency preparedness – become better acquainted with the day-to-day responsibilities, challenges and needs facing Canada's first responder community through direct contact with municipal representatives. All employees at Public Safety Canada responsible for emergency management policy should be exposed to a wide range of first responders in police, fire fighting and emergency medical services.

Public Safety Canada employees need to spend time with local police, firefighters, Tactical/Explosives Units, K-9 Police Service Dog Units, Public Order and Ground Search and Rescue Units, Watch Inspectors and everyone else involved in emergency responses, including communication centres.

[130] Sue O'Sullivan, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, January 28, 2008, Issue 4, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.

The leveraging of necessary assets and resources among all levels of government only makes sense. The burden is on federal leaders to make such coordination happens.

THE COMMITTEE REITERATES ITS 2004 RECOMMENDATION:

In 2004, the Committee recommended that Public Safety Canada develop a greater sensitivity to the differing needs of the first responders in communities across Canada.

To further assist Public Safety Canada develop that greater sensitivity, the Committee has two new recommendations.

NEW RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. The Committee recommends that in hiring new personnel for the formation and implementation of emergency management policy, Public Safety Canada give first priority to persons with field experience in the first responder community.

2. The Committee recommends that "hands on" experience with first responders be required as training for all current Public Safety Canada employees who work in the area of emergency management policy in Canada, starting with the Deputy Minister and working down the management hierarchy.

Problem 10:
Poor Federal Leadership on Critical Infrastructure Protection

Critical infrastructure includes all the essential nuts and bolts that Canadians require to keep their society functioning effectively – everything from power grids to computer networks, water systems to roads. Protecting this broad range of assets is not a simple matter.

Canada defines its national critical infrastructure (CI) as: "facilities, networks and assets which, if disrupted or destroyed, would have a serious impact on the health, safety, security or economic well-being of Canadians or the effective functioning of governments in Canada."[131]

Such a definition places critical infrastructure protection as a part of national security. The security and safety of Canadians is a fundamental responsibility of the federal government. As well, the passage of *The Emergency Management Act* in 2007 affirmed federal authority over critical infrastructure protection, adding a legal obligation for the federal government to play a leadership role.[132]

The Committee understands that critical infrastructure protection is a complex issue. Critical infrastructure is often jointly owned or at least shared by different levels of government inside and outside Canadian borders. Its protection may require input from numerous stakeholders, including several federal departments and agencies, provincial governments, municipal governments and private owner/operators. Approximately eighty-five percent of Canada's critical infrastructure is owned and operated by private industry or governments other than the federal government.[133]

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[131] Public Safety Canada, *National Critical Infrastructure Assurance Program*, Discussion Paper, 2002.
[132] Martin Rudner, "Protecting Canada's Energy Infrastructure Against Terrorism: Mapping a Proactive Strategy", *Critical Infrastructure Protection Policy Research Series, No. 1*, (Canadian Centre of Intelligence and Security Studies at Carleton University: March 2008).
[133] Canada, "National Critical Infrastructure Protection Program," *Emergency Preparedness Digest*, (Jan-March, 2002), pg. 4.

Given its minority standing in the ownership of critical infrastructure, why does the federal government have the lead role in protecting it? Because protecting critical infrastructure is a matter of national security. Other private and public players can own and maintain critical infrastructure, but protecting it requires coordination of all these interests. The federal government must conduct the orchestra if national interests are to be protected.

The Problem as we saw it in 2004: The federal government has no central clearinghouse for identifying Canada's critical infrastructure and for keeping all stakeholders informed and otherwise prepared to play their required roles in protecting it.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION (2004)

- **The Committee recommended that the Public Safety Canada be required to:**
    - **compile and maintain in cooperation with every municipality in Canada lists of the perceived vulnerabilities, emergency response assets, and shortfalls in assets and capabilities;**
    - **hold meetings with provincial / territorial counterparts to discuss the deficiencies revealed as a result of the recommendation above; and**
    - **conduct national emergency exercises in cooperation with other orders of government and prepare analyses on the "lessons learned".**[134]

[134] Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, March 2004), pg. 64. See recommendations #17 B, C and D.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS (2006 – 2008)

Regarding the first recommendation that Public Safety Canada compile and maintain lists of municipality perceived vulnerabilities, emergency response assets, and shortfalls, Public Safety Canada wrote to the Committee on August 30, 2006:

> "Under section 4(1) (f) of the proposed *Emergency Management Act* the Public Safety Minister would coordinate Government of Canada activities relating to emergency management with those of the provinces/territories and support the emergency management activities of the provinces/territories. Under section 4 (1) (r) the sharing of information with the federal government would be facilitated. Under section 6 (2) all federal ministers would include elements in their emergency plans that take into account any programs, arrangements or other measures to assist provincial/territorial government, and through, them municipal governments. FPT[135] regional plans would also be taken into account.
>
> Work is also underway through the National Critical Infrastructure Assurance Program (NCTAP) to address issues relating to vulnerability assessments and emergency management in partnership with the P/Ts[136] and the private sector. For example, New Brunswick, with funding from PSEPC, developed a provincial Critical Infrastructure Model Program that has been shared with other provinces and territories. This model provides methodologies for vulnerability assessments and security plans."[137]

What a Good Idea!

The Committee applauds the splendid idea that an Act was to be put in place that would direct the Public Safety Minister to take charge of coordinating emergency management of critical infrastructure with the provinces and territories (although we would have added the municipalities and the private sector).

[135] "FPT" refers to Federal/Provincial/Territorial
[136] "P/Ts" refers to Provinces/Territories
[137] Public Safety Canada, "Update on PSEPC/Portfolio on Reports from SCONSAD," August 30, 2006, pg. 17.

Which raises the question: How will the Minister do this?

There was no indication in this response that the Government had got on with compiling a list of perceived vulnerabilities, emergency assets, and shortfalls in cooperation with every other stakeholder connected to this problem. That doesn't require an Act.

Instead, the response informed us that the Act would take care of things, and that New Brunswick had gone ahead and developed a model program.

Fora is the Plural for Forum

Regarding the second recommendation that Public Safety Canada hold meetings with provincial / territorial counterparts to discuss the deficiencies revealed as a result of an assessment of gaps in the protection of critical infrastructure, Public Safety Canada wrote to the Committee on August 30, 2006:

> "Federal-Provincial-Territorial (FPT) fora have been established and meet regularly at the ministerial, deputy ministerial and senior official levels relating to emergency management.
>
> Through these fora, the federal government and provinces and territories are jointly addressing key issues relating to emergency response, disaster financial assistance, critical infrastructure protections, training and exercises, public alerting, and disaster mitigation."[138]

So the federal government, provinces and territories have met to discuss this issue. That answers the question the Committee asked. We should also have asked for assurances that there be input from the municipalities and private sector, who know a lot about how the nuts and bolts work and where the vulnerabilities are. But we did not. Our mistake.

[138] Public Safety Canada, "Update on PSEPC/Portfolio on Reports from SCONSAD," August 30, 2006, pg. 17.

Testing and Documenting Protective Capacity

Regarding the third recommendation that national emergency exercises be conducted in cooperation with other orders of government and prepare analyses on "lessons learned", Public Safety Canada wrote on August 30, 2006:

> "PSEPC's National Exercises Division is developing an overarching national exercise program. Regular meetings and briefings are held with federal, provincial and territorial partners, and several exercises have been successfully delivered. Development work on future exercises is ongoing.
>
> In addition, the division has sponsored two offerings of the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Master Exercise Practitioner Program, augmented with pertinent Canadian documentation. Approximately 70 federal government employees in key public safety departments and agencies, and selected individuals from provincial and municipal emergency management and first-responder communities have been trained to the same exercise methodology standard.
>
> Under sections 4 (1) (n) and (o) and 6 (1) (c) of the proposed *Emergency Management Act* (Bill C-12 tabled May 8, 2006), PSEPC would legislatively fulfill the provision to conduct exercises with other jurisdictions and promote a common approach to emergency management including the adoption of standards and best practices."[139]

This response was encouraging. Joint training exercises are essential to effective emergency responses.

Still Waiting on a Strategy

On September 19, 2007, regarding the National Critical Infrastructure Assurance Program (NCIAP), Library of Parliament researchers[140] asked: "What is the status of the NCIAP? How specifically are vulnerability assessments included in the Program?" Public Safety Canada wrote to the Committee on February 26, 2008 and said:

[139] Public Safety Canada, "Update on PSEPC/Portfolio on Reports from SCONSAD," August 30, 2006, pg.7-18.
[140] See footnote #5.

> "The National Critical Infrastructure Assurance Program (NCIAP) is an ongoing collaboration between private sector partners and Federal-Provincial-Territorial (FTP) governments. The goals of these partnerships are to provide a national infrastructure.
>
> The success of the NCIAP is being built upon by recent efforts by the Government of Canada working with its provincial/territorial and private sector partners to set a national direction for critical infrastructure protection in Canada. This national direction will be articulated in Canada's first National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure Protection. Tying together the need for coordinated action across all jurisdictions and sectors, the draft Strategy and its supporting action plan emphasize the central importance of a risk management approach to protect critical infrastructure and effectively responding to disruptions. This proposed approach goes beyond vulnerability assessments to recommend a broad consideration of the other essential risk elements - threats to critical infrastructure as well as impacts of critical infrastructure disruptions.
>
> To move forward with this comprehensive risk management approach, FPT governments will collaborate with their critical infrastructure partners to develop all-hazards risk analyses. While the Government of Canada, in cooperation with the provinces and territories, will promote a common approach to critical infrastructure protection, and will share tools, lessons learned and best practices, stakeholders are ultimately responsible for implementing a risk management approach appropriate to their situation.
>
> Public Safety Canada will be completing consultations with federal, provincial, territorial and other partners over the spring and summer, and hopes to finalize the strategy and action plan for consideration by FPT Ministers in early 2009."[141]

"Public Safety Canada . . . hopes to finalize the strategy and action plan for consideration by FPT Ministers in early 2009."

When those airliners hit the Twin Towers in Manhattan in 2001, awakening North Americans to their vulnerability, would anyone have guessed that it would take nearly a decade to produce a strategy to protect critical assets? And if it is going to take nearly a decade to get a strategy approved, how long will it take to translate that strategy into an action plan and put all the pieces in place to make it workable? Another decade?

[141] "Follow UP Questions for Public Safety Canada regarding: 'Recommendations and PSEPC/Portfolio Responses to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence (SCONSAD)' (August 30, 2006)," February 26, 2008, pg. 13.

The Answer to the Question on the Last Page is "Twelve"

On September 19, 2007, regarding the National Exercise Program, Library of Parliament researchers[142] asked: "When will the development of the national exercise program be complete? How many exercises have been held, where have they been held, and who were the actors involved?" Public Safety Canada replied on February 26, 2008:

> "The national exercise program target for "completion" is fiscal year 2008-2009. To date, a dozen exercises have been held across the country in British Columbia, Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Alberta (with participation of teams from British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario and Nova Scotia).
>
> Of these, four were focused on specific domestic emergency functions, three were related to Canada's support to humanitarian aid/consequence (emergency) management through NATO, two addressed military aid to civilian authorities concurrently in both the United States and Canada, two examined cross-border interdependencies and implications for critical infrastructure and one focused on Canadian domestic response to the expanding effects of attacks on the United States and the United Kingdom.
>
> The participants included federal departments and agencies, international counterparts, provincial government departments and agencies, critical infrastructure owner/operators and sector professional organizations, non-profit/charitable organizations, and first responders (police, fire and emergency medical services) -specifically Heavy Urban Search and Rescue teams."[143]

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

Lessons Learned?

Well, a dozen exercises is a good start.[144] The Committee would like to know whether anything was learned from these exercises, whether it has been documented, and – most importantly –

[142] See footnote #5.
[143] "Follow UP Questions for Public Safety Canada regarding: 'Recommendations and PSEPC/Portfolio Responses to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence (SCONSAD)' (August 30, 2006)," February 26, 2008, pg. 14.
[144] In response to a Request for Information submitted by the Library of Parliament, Public Safety Canada, in a reply dated June 20, 2008, provided a detailed list of exercises - *live, functional, table-top, drill* and *orientation* that have been held since 2004.

whether it has been shared with first responders across the country. There is no point in bureaucrats reaching conclusions about what works and what doesn't if they aren't shared by those most responsible for making emergency systems work: the people on the ground.

Where is the Governance?

The *Position Paper on a National Critical Infrastructure Protection Strategy* (2004) states: "The Government of Canada's position is that it will identify and assess its own [Critical Infrastructure]. In addition, the Government of Canada will *work with other levels of government and the private sector* to ensure that processes are in place to identify their critical infrastructures (or components thereof) as a measure to strengthen public safety."[145]

If the Government of Canada has indeed compiled a list of national critical infrastructure, there is no evidence that it has shared it with other levels of government or the private sector. Mr. Randy Hull, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator for the City of Winnipeg told the Committee that he received information from private industry, not the federal government, regarding what was deemed to be critical infrastructure.

> **Mr. Hull:** Certainly. I have learned from stakeholders, not government, about the critical infrastructure. By talking to MTS Allstream; Manitoba Hydro, which has major connections to the east, the west and the south; and the TransCanada Pipelines, for example, I have learned more about what those critical infrastructures are.
>
> Winnipeg has an aqueduct system that brings in the water for two thirds of the population. When I asked whether that critical infrastructure would be added to the national critical infrastructure list, I was told, no, because it did not meet the criteria. Nationally, it would be of issue because if Winnipeg loses its water supply, I am sure the people in Ottawa would

[145] Public Safety Canada, A *Position Paper on a National Critical Infrastructure Protection Strategy*, November 2004.

> have some issue with that. In the second go around, it has been added to the critical infrastructure.[146]

So the Government of Canada is clearly not consulting with the City of Winnipeg regarding what is on the "critical infrastructure" list. Who is it consulting with? The Committee's 2007 survey of Canadian municipalities indicated that the federal government had not approached many of them regarding critical infrastructure.

- **Only 16 percent of respondents said the federal government has identified federal critical infrastructure – even fewer believe they have any responsibility for protecting federal critical infrastructure.**

Asked what assistance the federal government has provided to protect federal critical infrastructure, respondent John Allain, Moncton's Director of Emergency Planning, replied:

> The nature of federal government offices throughout the country is to brief senior management as events develop. They have no ability to be part of any response and no resources to be a player. Emergency plans in local offices are based on the assumption that local authorities will assist. These have never been formalized. Only one Department, Transport Canada has forwarded their emergency response plan for review and comment.

Good for Transport Canada, but other departments play a role in critical infrastructure protection. All parties need to know what needs to be protected and what their responsibilities are. According to a recent study on critical infrastructure protection in Canada, this is not happening:

> "Although information sharing is usually considered to be of the utmost importance for dealing proactively and robustly with…threats, the Government of Canada has still not been able to establish a centralized, national clearinghouse for information pertaining to threats to critical national infrastructure for its own

[146] Randy Hull, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, March 3, 2008, Issue 6, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.

departments or agencies, or for sharing with provincial, territorial and municipal jurisdictions let alone private owner/operators."[147]

Public Safety Canada divides critical infrastructure into 10 key sectors. The lead for protecting each sector is assigned to one or more federal departments. (See following chart)

Sector		Department/Agency
1	Energy and Utilities	**Natural Resources Canada (NRCan)** Supported by: Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC), International Joint Commission (IJC), National Energy Board (NEB)
2	Communications and Information Technology	**Industry Canada (IC)** Supported by: Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (PSEPC)
3	Finance	**Finance Canada**
4	Health Care	**Health Canada (HC)**
5	Food	**Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC)** Supported by: Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Health Canada
6	Water	**Environment Canada (EC)** Supported by: Health Canada
7	Transportation	**Transport Canada (TC)** Supported by: CBSA
8	Safety	**Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (PSEPC)** Supported by: Health Canada / National Defence (DND)
9	Government	**Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (PSEPC) and Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS)**
10	Manufacturing	**Industry Canada** Supported by: National Defence, Natural Resources Canada, Environment Canada

This looks good on paper, but how well is the chart translating into anything useful on the ground? If National Resources Canada is any example . . . not too well.

[147] Martin Rudner, "Protecting Canada's Energy Infrastructure Against Terrorism: Mapping a Proactive Strategy", *Critical Infrastructure Protection Policy Research Series, No. 1* (Canadian Centre of Intelligence and Security Studies at Carleton University: March 2008).

The Committee has been told that Natural Resources Canada's *Energy Infrastructure Protection Division* was scheduled to hold classified briefings, twice a year, with private energy operators throughout the country, in collaboration with CSIS, the RCMP, the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC), and Public Safety Canada. But this Spring's (2008) meeting was cancelled. Informed of this, the Minister of Public Safety said he was unaware of the program's cancellation and would have it reinstated.[148] To the best of the Committee's knowledge, that hadn't happened at the time of the release of this report.

Why was what appeared to be a useful federal program to better protect critical national infrastructure cancelled? Why did the Minister of Public Safety not know about its cancellation? Is the chart real, or a myth?

Where is the Strategy?

The efforts of the Government of Canada to set a "national direction for critical infrastructure protection in Canada" hinge on the publication of Canada's first National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure Protection. In the Government's *National Security Policy*, released in April 2004, it was announced: "the Government will work with provinces, territories and the private sector to define the Critical Infrastructure Protection Strategy for Canada"[149]

The Committee notes the creation of Public Safety's National Critical Infrastructure Assurance Program (NCIAP) and its mandate to "provide a national framework for cooperative action and to build a resilient national critical infrastructure for all Canadians." The program's main tool for accomplishing this is "an ongoing forum" to be coordinated with other governments and private sector operators. Getting together is commendable, but why have Canadians had to wait for nearly a decade without

[148] Ian MacLeod, "Briefings cancelled without my knowledge…," *Ottawa Citizen*, April 15, 2008.
[149] Canada, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*, April 2004.

the federal government formulating its long-awaited National Critical Infrastructure Protection Strategy?

A Short Sad History of
Public Safety Canada's
National Critical Infrastructure Protection Strategy

2004: Public Safety states that the strategy will be released in spring 2005.[150]
2005: Public Safety states that the strategy will be released in fall 2005.[151]
2006: No comment on the strategy.[152]
2007: Public Safety will obtain private and public sector endorsement of the Critical Infrastructure Protection Strategy in 2008.[153]
2008: 'Ongoing development' of Critical Infrastructure Protection Strategy. [154]
2009: Ministers expected to consider strategy.

Now, fast-forward to the testimony of Scott Broughton, Assistant Deputy Minister, Emergency Management, National Security Branch at Public Safety Canada, who appeared before the Committee on January 28, 2008:

> **Senator Meighen:** Last April, the committee was told that the National Critical Infrastructure Protection Strategy was being finalized. Has it been? If not, when will it be finalized and made public?
>
> **Mr. Broughton:** The strategy is a significant one that has to be worked out carefully with the provinces and territories. The vast majority of critical infrastructure is owned either by the private sector or by provinces and territories. The federal government has some. The national strategy was always targeted at being a collaborative effort across all jurisdictions and with the private sector to

[150] Public Safety Canada, *2004-2005 Report on Plans and Priorities*, October 8, 2004, pg. 25.
[151] Public Safety Canada, 2005-2006 Report on Plans and Priorities, March 24, 2005, pg. 24.
[152] The 2006-2007 *Report on Plans and Priorities*, released by Public Safety Canada on September 26, 2006 made no reference to national critical infrastructure protection strategies or programs.
[153] Public Safety Canada, *2007-2008 Report on Plans and Priorities*, March 29, 2007, pg. 25.
[154] Public Safety Canada, *2008-2009 Report on Plans and Priorities*, March 31, 2008, pg 35.

> ensure that the things that needed to happen around the critical infrastructure would happen. We have been working on it with our provincial and territorial colleagues over the last while. The federal-provincial-territorial ministers, in their recent meeting in Halifax, reviewed what stage the strategy is at. We have agreed to do a concentrated, consultative effort with the private sector in the coming weeks. Once we have done that, we will try to finalize the strategy in the next few months.

The latest word was contained in the PSC reply cited earlier in this section:

> Public Safety Canada will be completing consultations with federal, provincial, territorial and other partners over the spring and summer, and hopes to finalize the strategy and action plan for consideration by FPT Ministers in early 2009."[155]

Once again, it's just going to be a plan for ministers to consider. Even if they do decide that it is the right way to proceed, putting everything into place to make the strategy workable is going to take more time – a lot more time, if the pace of implementation is anything like the place of planning.

[155] Public Safety Canada, "Update on PSEPC/Portfolio on Reports from SCONSAD," August 30, 2006, pg. 13.

NEW RECOMMENDATIONS:

The Committee recommends:

1. **That Public Safety Canada share "lessons learned" from its National Exercise Program with First Responders throughout the country.**

2. **The re-instatement of Natural Resources Canada's Classified Briefings for Energy Sector Stakeholders.**

3. **That models similar to Natural Resources Canada's Classified Briefings for Energy Sector Stakeholders be introduced throughout the 10 Critical Infrastructure Sectors.**

4. **The release of the National Critical Infrastructure Protection Strategy by the end of 2008.**

Problem 11:
Emergency Ad Hockery

The Problem as We Saw It in 2004: Six micro-organisms pose the greatest risk to Canadians: smallpox, anthrax, plague, botulism, tularemia and hemorrhagic fever. With the exception of smallpox, in 2004 Health Canada did not have a comprehensive emergency response plan in place to deal with any of them.

Four years later, the Committee is dismayed that Health Canada still hasn't developed anything that could be described as a reliable system for dealing with serious outbreaks of infectious diseases. This is a serious flaw in any country's emergency planning. Public Safety Canada, which has the responsibility of protecting Canadians, has not forced this issue with Health Canada to ensure the protection of Canadians in the event of an outbreak. Moreover, Public Safety Canada cannot get its own emergency response system in order.

Quite simply, ad hockery appears to be Canada's lead methodology for dealing with national emergencies.

COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION (2004)

- **The Committee recommended Health Canada develop a national plan to counteract potential outbreaks of anthrax, plague, botulism, tularemia and hemorrhagic fever[156] and that it report to Parliament and the public by 31 March 2005 that this is completed.[157]**

[156] Please see Appendix D, Dr. Plummer's disease chart, which presents greater detail on micro-organisms and disease.
[157] Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, March 2004), pg. 13. See recommendation #1.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS (2006 – 2008)

Toward a Standardized National Health Incident Management System

In response to the Committee's recommendation, Health Canada responded in August 2006:

> "Health Canada (through [Public Health Agency of Canada] PHAC) is developing its response capacity to deal with known and emerging infectious disease outbreaks. These diseases may occur either naturally or as a result of a malicious release of a biologic agent. PHAC has created specific response plans for smallpox and pandemic influenza, which are flexible enough to enable us to respond to any of the other five diseases on the Category A list, and the diseases on the Category B and C lists of threat agents.
>
> In addition to the development of response plans, PHAC has also developed and implemented a Tier 1 Laboratories[158] (hospital and clinic laboratories), Bioterrorism Recognition Training program. This training program is designed to help laboratory personnel to better recognize biological and viral agents of bioterrorism in a laboratory setting. To date, there are 35 trained instructors who have provided this program to 289 laboratory personnel across Canada. The on-line version of this training program was launched in February 2006.
>
> Table-top exercises for influenza and plague were conducted with international partners and laboratory diagnostic training for smallpox and tularemia, and electron microscopy was provided through the Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI) and its Global Health Security Action Group Laboratory Network (GHSAGLN). Additional international workshops are also scheduled. Furthermore, PHAC is working on the development of a generic emergency response system which would be used to respond to all kinds of health emergencies, including chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) terrorist incidents and new emerging infectious diseases. This generic response system, the National Health Incident Management System (NHIMS), will be supported by more specific contingency plans and/or, as deemed appropriate, by agent specific information sets.

[158] Containment levels (tiers) describe the minimum containment required for handling human pathogens safely in a laboratory setting. For a description of these levels, please see: Public Health Agency of Canada, Containment Facilities. Available at http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/ols-bsl/containment/index.html

> PHAC is also collaborating with Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada to develop and implement the National Emergency Response System (NERS). NERS is a generic response framework designed to ensure strategic coordination of federal mandates into a Government of Canada emergency response. NERS is based on the Incident Command System and Health Canada and PHAC are revising their own internal Emergency Response Plan to incorporate this approach and bring it in line with NERS. The development of the National Health Incident Management System is being done in collaboration with the provinces and territories and will incorporate the principles of the Incident Command System and be complementary to NERS. This new concept of operations will greatly enhance the health community's capacity to coordinate, communicate and manage during health emergencies, through the development of a comprehensive health emergency management policy and an integrated operational structure which will promote inter-operability and connectedness of jurisdictional systems during a health emergency.
>
> In addition, other initiatives are being pursued with the provinces and territories to improve emergency health and terrorism response capacity. These include the development of Health Emergency Response Teams, through the National Office for Health Emergency Response Teams, as well as Epidemiologic Emergency Response Teams. Work also continues on a federal/provincial/territorial agreement on mutual aid during a disaster or public health emergency, which is being overseen by the Pan-Canadian Public Health Network. As an interim measure, the Checklist of Best Practices to Facilitate the Sharing of Mutual Aid Among Provincial/Territorial and Federal Governments During a Disaster or Public Health Emergency has been developed to ensure jurisdictions have a working tool in place in the event of an emergency.
>
> From a national perspective, ensuring that authorities at all levels of government have a complementary framework for dealing with health emergencies is a key preparedness objective. This is essential to ensure an effective response, and pivotal to public confidence and international credibility. The development of the National Framework for Health Emergency Management has provided federal, provincial and territorial governments with common guidelines for program development in health emergency management."[159]

Library of Parliament Researchers[160] asked the Public Health Agency of Canada: How do the response plans for smallpox and pandemic influenza function in relation to the NHIMS? The Agency replied:

> "Once the NHIMS is operational, it will serve to complement the existing disease specific contingency plans such as smallpox and pandemic influenza.

[159] Health Canada, "Response to Committee Recommendations," August 2006, pg 1-2.
[160] See footnote #35.

> The NHIMS is an all-hazards system designed to enhance coordination across jurisdictions during all types of emergencies. The NHIMS is based on a flexible, scalable response structure which provides a common framework for communication, planning and decision-making for both natural and human-induced emergencies/disasters including infectious disease outbreaks like smallpox and pandemic influenza. Although specific contingency plans may call for specific actions to manage a particular emergency such as smallpox, the response structure and protocols for coordinating the response across organizations and jurisdictions (NHIMS) remains the same."[161]

Library of Parliament researchers[162] further asked: What is the status of the NHIMS? When will it be complete? They responded:

> "Currently, the National Health Incident Management System (NHIMS) is a conceptual framework that is being operationalized through the Public Health Agency of Canada and the provincial/territorial governments.
>
> NHIMS is intended to enhance coordination, communication and decision-making between jurisdictions during emergencies, taking into account potential differences in jurisdictional health and emergency management systems. Both federal and provincial/territorial jurisdictions are now adopting the incident management system to ensure a standardized, all hazards response capacity by which organizations can effectively coordinate. Federal and provincial/territorial jurisdictions are also participating in the development of standards for emergency management, as well as collaborative training courses which will further strengthen consistency in planning, response, and recovery protocols. Documents defining Canada's national health emergency management system and the National Health Incident Management System are expected to be completed in the spring of 2008."[163]

Conceptual framework? Four years after the Committee pointed out this huge weakness in Canada's emergency response capacity, and five years after the SARS outbreak in Toronto, Canada's management system for health emergencies remained a concept – still no working agreement between the federal government, the provinces and the territories.

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[161] Public Health Agency of Canada, "PHAC response to SCONSAD follow up questions," October 30, 2007, pg. 1-2.
[162] See footnote #35.
[163] Public Health Agency of Canada, "PHAC response to SCONSAD follow up questions," October 30, 2007, pg. 1.

The documents defining the system, as noted above, were due "in the spring of 2008." We watch and wait, but nothing has emerged from the cave. A new approach to hibernation, perhaps.

Public Safety Canada's National Emergency Response System

On September 19, 2007, Library of Parliament researchers[164] asked Public Safety Canada to describe the functioning of the National Emergency Response System (NERS). The Department replied on February 26, 2008:

> "The purpose of the NERS is to provide for the requisite linkages among the federal, provincial, and territorial emergency response management systems when a request for assistance has been submitted by a province or territory. Seven activities common to all F/P/T [Federal-Provincial-Territorial] emergency response management systems will be applied as the basis for supporting an integrated response. The seven common activities include: situational awareness, risk assessment, planning, logistics, public communications, liaison and, finance and administration.
>
> The linkages and interfaces between the Federal government and each of the provinces and territories systems will be the critical aspect that enables the National Emergency Response System to function effectively. These linkages and interfaces will be done through the positioning of the Public Safety Regional Director as the key federal liaison with provincial or territorial officials, regional federal departments and through effective communication between the Government Operations Centre and the Provincial/Territorial Emergency Operations Centres.
>
> It was developed over several years based on joint FPT emergency response activities and operational experience, including most recently the federal and provincial response to potential floods in British Columbia.
>
> NERS was presented to Senior Officials Responsible for Emergency Management (SOREM) in November 2007 for review and approved as an interim document to be validated by exercises beginning in 2008.
>
> NERS will be updated as required to remain consistent with evolving and changing federal, provincial and territorial emergency management priorities and operations."[165]

[164] See footnote #5.

We asked: When is NERS slated to be completed, and has it been tested yet? The Department replied:

> "The National Emergency Response System (NERS) described in the NERS document provides for the requisite linkages among the federal, provincial, and territorial emergency response management systems and formalizes what has been in practice in the last two years.
>
> The NERS document was drafted by the FPT Response Working Group under the direction of the Senior Officials Responsible for Emergency Management (SOREM) to implement Ministers' direction for greater coordination between federal, provincial and territorial response operations.
>
> NERS was presented to SOREM in November 2007 for review and approved as an interim document to be validated by exercises beginning in 2008. It is slated for approval by Ministers in January 2009.
>
> NERS will be updated as required to remain consistent with evolving and changing federal, provincial and territorial emergency management priorities and operations."[166]

In late June, 2008 – the week before this report went into its final draft – we asked the Department whether the 2008 exercises designed to validate the approved NERS interim document had commenced. They have. Public Safety Canada told us NERS is being exercised daily through events in real time, including during the recent floods in New Brunswick.[167] However, NERS is still an interim document, not scheduled for approval by ministers until January 2009. The Committee will watch this date.

Library of Parliament researchers[168] also asked the Public Health Agency of Canada: What is the status of NERS? When will it be complete, and how will NERS interact with NHIMS? Who will have authority? PHAC replied:

> "The NERS has recently been renamed FERP (Federal Emergency Response Plan). It integrates federal, regional, provincial, non-government organizations

[165] Public Safety Canada, "Follow UP Questions for Public Safety Canada regarding: 'Recommendations and PSEPC/Portfolio Responses to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence (SCONSAD)' (August 30, 2006)," February 26, 2008, pg 11.
[166] Public Safety Canada, "Follow UP Questions for Public Safety Canada regarding: 'Recommendations and PSEPC/Portfolio Responses to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence (SCONSAD)' (August 30, 2006)," February 26, 2008, pg 11-12.
[167] Email correspondence with Public Safety Canada, June 23, 2008.
[168] See footnote #35.

> and private sector efforts into a comprehensive federal approach to emergency response. The FERP is managed by Public Safety Canada. It is currently in the approval process.
>
> The FERP (formerly NERS) was developed to provide a common structure to be used by the Government of Canada to coordinate federal response to events of national importance, including support to provinces and territories and other federal departments and agencies.
>
> The NHIMS constitutes the emergency response system across federal/provincial/territorial jurisdictions within the health sector, and is closely aligned to FERP through internal jurisdictional mechanisms at both the federal and provincial/territorial levels. Both FERP and NHIMS are based on common incident management standards and protocols, thereby ensuring standardization and inter-operability of operational protocols."[169]

The reader will note that in the answers above, it is unclear "who has the authority"? NERS or NHIMS?" We still do not know.

NOTE TO CONFUSED READERS: The National Emergency Response System (NERS) was re-named Federal Emergency Response Plan (FERP), and then, as per Public Safety's 2008 documents, changed back to NERS. This report will refer to it as 'NERS' to maintain consistency.

Cooperation between Provinces

The Public Health Agency of Canada was also asked: When will this FPT agreement on mutual aid mentioned above be complete? What work has been done on this agreement so far? The reply:

> "The Federal/Provincial/Territorial Memorandum of Understanding on the Provision of Mutual Aid During a Public Health Emergency (MOU) has been completed and approved by both the Pan-Canadian Public Health Network and the Conference of Deputy Ministers of Health. The MOU is waiting for final approval by the F/P/T Ministers of Health, at which time it will become a formal mutual aid agreement between provinces and territories."[170]

[169] Public Health Agency of Canada, "PHAC response to SCONSAD follow up questions," October 30, 2007, pg. 2.
[170] Public Health Agency of Canada, "PHAC response to SCONSAD follow up questions," October 30, 2007, pg. 3.

That the provinces and federal government have signed an MOU for helping each other out during health crises is a step in the right direction in health emergency management. A small step – but any step that doesn't involve a treadmill has to be regarded as a triumph in context of Canadian emergency response capacity.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

We apologise for putting the reader through the last few pages, but it was necessary to demonstrate what we deal with when we try getting answers to important questions about emergency management.

National Health Emergency Ad Hockery

The Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) wrote to the Committee: "documents defining Canada's national health emergency management system and the National Health Incident Management System are expected to be completed in the spring of 2008." So far the Committee has not seen documentation or any announcements related to the proposed National Health Incident Management System (NHIMS).

In addition, after an overview of PHAC's (and Health Canada's) Departmental Performance Report as well as their Report on Plans and Priorities for the last 10 years, the Committee can find no evidence that the National Health Incident Management System (NHIMS) is a priority for either Health Canada or the Public Health Agency of Canada.[171] We can assume that the NHIMS is another example of a failed attempt to systematically respond to health crises across Canada. Given the severity of the SARs incident in Ontario in 2004, the Committee is disturbed that PHAC and Health Canada have not done more on this.

[171] The NHIMS was mentioned once in PHAC's *2006-2007 Departmental Performance Report*.

The Auditor General Agrees

Anyone wondering whether the Committee is over-dramatizing this situation should turn to the Auditor General's Report of May 6, 2008. Chapter 5 of that report is titled Surveillance of Infectious Diseases—Public Health Agency of Canada.[172] The report lists of litany of what it calls "long-standing weaknesses" in the federal government's ability to obtain and report surveillance information on the incidence and threat of infectious diseases in Canada. Many of these weaknesses were first pointed out by the Auditor-General's office in 1999 – a decade ago – and still have not been fixed.

Here is a brief synopsis of the failings that the Auditor General found in the Public Health Agency of Canada's capacity to gather and make use of information documenting cases of infectious diseases and to raise the alarm in the face of potential threats to public health raised by such cases.

The Auditor General's report found that:

1. The Agency has investigated some public health threats but "has not used these public health threat assessment results, or another consistently applied risk assessment, to set its objectives and priorities."

2. The Agency has supported a project to gather information on trends and predicted conditions which found that adjustments would have to be made based on new ways of researching and responding to infectious diseases, but that again the Agency "has not used the results of this exercise to set long-term objectives and priorities . . . "

3. The Agency responded to the Auditor-General's 2002 complaint that the Agency had not identified its surveillance priorities by setting up a working group five years later to

[172] Auditor General of Canada, "Chapter 5—Surveillance of Infectious Diseases—Public Health Agency of Canada", *2008 May Report of the Auditor General of Canada*, May 6, 2008. Available at http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/aud_ch_oag_200805_05_e_30701.html.

develop a strategic approach to priorities, but by November, 2007 that group had only produced "a plan for working toward a surveillance strategy."

4. The Agency still does not have "clear and up-to-date legislative authorities for its surveillance activities, either for data collection or when it needs to respond to emergency situations."

5. The Agency and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency have not done an integrated risk assessment to determine what the risks are of diseases caused by pathogens that pass from animals to humans (which account for an estimated 65-80 percent of newly-identified human diseases).

6. The Agency relies on the provinces and territories to voluntarily send useful and complete data on surveillance of infectious diseases, but that this data is sometimes not forthcoming, or incomplete.

7. The Agency has not been able to reach agreement with the provinces and territories on a set of surveillance standards that would insure that "infectious disease occurrences are defined, reported and recorded uniformly across the country."

8. The Agency has conducted three pilot projects to determine whether the quality of data that it is receiving is adequate to support public health actions, that one of them showed that less than half of the data received met applicable standards, but that necessary procedures for assessing and documenting data quality had not yet been put in place.

9. The Agency has yet to develop and implement a comprehensive approach and method for consistently measuring the Agency's systems to determine whether they accomplish what they are supposed to accomplish – one of the weaknesses the Auditor General first documented in 1999, nearly a decade ago.

10. The Agency has not demonstrated that its reports and analyses are meeting the needs of public health officials in Canada and other users – "with the exception of E. Coli, we found that the Agency has not determined how well its reports and analyses supplied the information required for anticipating, preventing, and responding to public health threats."

There is more, and the Auditor General makes a series of recommendations to rectify the many failings of this Agency to date. But at one point the report simply pauses and laments:

> **"We are concerned that a nationally standardized approach to disease reporting remains years away."**

National Emergency Response System: Theory or Reality?

In the "Government Response" section of Problem 9 of this report, "First Responders Ignored," Public Safety Canada wrote: "a core principle of the National Emergency Response System (NERS) is concurrent jurisdictional response, which acknowledges that emergency response can require action from all orders of government, and that these parties have different areas of responsibility."

Knowing this, Public Safety Canada began designing an all-encompassing system that they called the National Emergency Response System (NERS) which "integrates federal, regional, provincial, non-government organizations and private sector efforts into a comprehensive federal approach to emergency response." What a concept! And since this system is in the approval process, we can all rest at ease… or can we?

Is NERS a reality or is it just a concept? The Department's official documents point to the National Emergency Response System (NERS) being "in development" for the last 4 years.

There is no evidence that it has made the metamorphosis from concept to workable system.

No wonder the Auditor General believes that a nationally standardized system of infectious disease reporting is years away.

The following box gives the reader a concise history of what has not happened with NERS since its inception.

The Sorry History of Public Safety Canada's National Emergency Response System (NERS)

Public Safety Canada, *Report on Plans and Priorities* 2004-2005 - "…finalize the development and implementation of NERS…"

Public Safety Canada - Report on Plans and Priorities 2005-2006 – "Continued phased implementation and training of the National Emergency Response System" – by summer 2006

Public Safety Canada, *Departmental Performance Report* 2005-2006 – Focus of NERS was on the Federal Emergency Response Plan (FERP). FERP is described as an "umbrella plan" for other federal plans and will align with federal coordination structures.

Public Safety Canada - Report on Plans and Priorities 2006-2007- "PSEPC is leading the development of a new national emergency response framework, the National Emergency Response System (NERS)."

Public Safety Canada - Report on Plans and Priorities 2007-2008 – "The Department will implement FERP, the federal government's all-hazards approach to emergency response… FERP [will be] implemented by March 2008."

Public Safety Canada - Report on Plans and Priorities 2008-2009 – "…through the National Emergency Response System (NERS), the Department will develop a common model for emergency response among Canada's varied jurisdictional authorities."[173]

[173] Public Safety Canada's *Report on Plans and Priorities* (RPP) and its *Departmental Performance Reports* (DPR) may be found at the Treasury Board at: http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/est-pre/estimE.asp

When the Committee checked the Public Safety Canada website in April 2008, there was no mention of the status of the Federal Emergency Response Plan (FERP). As the above chronology indicates, the implementation date for FERP was supposed to be March 2008.

In 2005, the Auditor General released a report on emergency preparedness in Canada, in which the early development of NERS was examined. From the very beginning, the Auditor General pointed out the vagueness and lack of clarity in Public Safety Canada's leadership in spearheading the federal government's emergency response. The report stated:

> We found that departmental plans are vague on how they would link together to form a co-ordinated federal response. Section 7 of the *Emergency Preparedness Act* requires that departments prepare emergency response plans for areas within their mandates. We noted a potential, as emergencies develop and implicate more departments and agencies, for conflict between having to work together with other departments and supporting the line responsibilities of their own mandates.[174]

As a result, the Auditor General's report recommended to Public Safety Canada:

> **2.96 Recommendation.** Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada should work with the other federal agencies to clarify the command and control structure governing the federal response to emergencies.
>
> **Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada's response.** Leadership will be exercised through the command and control structure of the National Emergency Response System (NERS). In addition, changes to the *Emergency Preparedness Act* will reinforce the authority of the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to co-ordinate the actions of all federal players in emergencies of national significance.[175]

[174] Auditor General of Canada, "Chapter 2—National Security in Canada—The 2001 Anti-Terrorism Initiative—Air Transportation Security, Marine Security, and Emergency Preparedness", April 2005, Available at http://209.71.218.213/internet/English/aud_ch_oag_200504_2_e_14933.html

[175] Auditor General of Canada, "Chapter 2—National Security in Canada—The 2001 Anti-Terrorism Initiative—Air Transportation Security, Marine Security, and Emergency Preparedness", April 2005, Available at http://209.71.218.213/internet/English/aud_ch_oag_200504_2_e_14933.html

As we noted in Problem 1, "Lack of Emergency Management," the Emergency Management Act received royal assent on June 22nd, 2007.[176] The new act modifies the previous Emergency Preparedness Act and gives the Minister of Public Safety broad powers to direct emergency preparedness efforts across federal departments – so what's the problem now? With the Emergency Management Act in place, the Minister of Public Safety has the authority to establish federal government-wide emergency management policies and programs, yet, when it comes to the National Emergency Response System (NERS), nothing concrete has happened, other than planning and developing.

So, the Committee asks the Department of Public Safety: is the National Emergency Response System (NERS) a theory or a reality?

After reviewing their departmental responses and documents, and after reviewing the auditor general's reports we believe the reader will come to the same conclusion as the Committee – that the department is still unable to answer this question.

A national emergency response system – which outlines jurisdictional responsibility – is a necessity for our nation to respond to large scale disasters.

[176] Emergency Management Act, First Session, Thirty-ninth Parliament, 55-56 Elizabeth II, 2006-2007. For a text of the Act, please see http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?pub=bill&doc=C-12&parl=39&ses=1&language=E

NEW RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee recommends that:

1. Public Safety Canada complete and release the National Emergency Response System (NERS) not later than March 2009.

2. The Public Health Agency of Canada and Health Canada publicly release the National Health Incident Management System (NHIMS) not later than March 2009.

3. The Public Health Agency of Canada treat the 2008 Auditor General's report with the highest priority and that the agency report to Parliament as each recommendation is implemented. (For full list of the Auditor General's 2008 recommendations, see Appendix C).

4. The Auditor General conduct a follow-up to the 2005 audit of emergency preparedness, and in particular, examine and assess the status of NERS.

Problem 12(a): Emergency Preparedness and Canada's Police

In recent years the Committee has repeatedly made the case for dramatically increasing the number of police in Canada. Here are some results from a report on the RCMP in British Columbia by the Institute for Canadian Urban Research Studies and the University College of the Fraser Valley:[177]

- The population of Canada more than doubled (2.3 times) between 1962 and 2003 while the number of police increased by only 1.7 times, even as the number of crimes being reported to police increased seven-fold.

- On average, each British Columbia police officer was expected to handle almost three times as many crimes in 2005 as in 1962.

- Break and enter cases, drunk driving cases, and domestic assault all take much longer for police officers to process, restricting the time available for front line duties (details to follow).

Here are a few facts the Committee has learned from witnesses:

- The RCMP only have the resources to keep tabs on one-third of the organized crime organizations in Canada that *it knows exist.*

- To effectively police Canada's ports – which are riddled with corruption and vulnerable to terrorist attack – the RCMP would need another 900 officers.

- The U.S. Coast Guard polices the Great Lakes with 2,200 officers. Canada tries to do it with 14 Mounties.

[177] *A 30 Year Analysis of Police Service Delivery and Costing: "E" Division: Research Summary*, School of Criminology and Criminal Justice, University College of the Fraser Valley ad the Institute for Canadian Urban Research (2005). Note: "E" Division is the British Columbia RCMP office.

There is an obvious solution here: increase RCMP staff and funding. Our committee estimates that Canada needs an additional 5,000-7,000 Mounties.

The Prime Minister promised 1,000 additional Mounties in Budget 2006.[178] The force ended up getting 600 or so, but they went to fill vacant positions for a net increase of zero. The other 400 people hired were quietly absorbed into the federal law enforcement bureaucracy.

The Prime Minister does not seem to be particularly interested in restoring the capacity and pride of Canada's national police force, but he has committed himself to increasing the number of police in Canada by 2,500 over five years by funneling money through the provinces. Whether this implies a commitment to maintaining an increase in police funding after the five years are up, however, remains a moot point.

In the RCMP and in Canada's policing organizations across the country the central problem boils down to numbers, or lack of. There are simply not enough police officers in Canada to play a pivotal role in emergencies.

[178] Government of Canada, Budget 2006, http://www.fin.gc.ca/budtoce/2006/budliste.htm

Problem 12(b): Policing During Emergencies

While our 2004 report *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines* looked at agreements between different provinces in deploying police, the Committee did not explicitly look at the role of policing as a crucial component in emergency management itself.

Allow us to address the issue now.

The Role of Police

Michael Boyd, Police Chief of the Edmonton Police Service succinctly described the role of the police in our society in his testimony before the Committee in February 2008:

> **Chief Boyd:** Policing has a four-part mandate: crime prevention, maintenance of social order, enforcement of our laws and enhancing and addressing matters of public safety.[179]

Canadian police officers are front-line first responders whenever there is a human-induced or natural disaster in Canada. Policing is a cornerstone of successful emergency management. It is the police who are responsible for ensuring that civil order is maintained during emergencies, and that laws are still obeyed.

At no time is law and order more important than during emergencies. This is when the surge capacity of the nation's police forces is tested. Unfortunately, Canada simply does not have the number of police in place to offer significant surge capacity over any length of time.

During the 2004 SARS outbreak, police forces were responsible for stopping the spread of the virus by enforcing quarantine orders. Julian Fantino, now Commissioner of the Ontario Provincial Police but then Toronto's Chief of Police, told the Committee how difficult that turned out to be:

[179] Michael Boyd, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, February 25, 2008. Issue 5, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.

> **Senator Moore:** Let us talk about the SARS situation. When that epidemic broke, did some medical officer come to Chief Fantino and say, 'This is what we have. Your people cannot be exposed to this. You have to take these precautions.' How does that happen? How do you know how far you can go near a situation without endangering your people? Does someone tell you what you facing and what you have to wear? Does that coordination happen? Did it happen in the SARS situation?
>
> **Julian Fantino, Commissioner, Ontario Provincial Police:** It happened piecemeal. First of all, we did not know what we were facing. Chief Boyd was intimately involved as well, but when that first happened, I did not think for one moment that we, the police, were going to be impacted in any significant way at all. It was a health issue and that was how we saw it at the outset.
> Very quickly, it became a police issue because there were then quarantine orders that people were not obeying. Who enforces the quarantine orders? There was also the issue of kinds of equipment needed, keeping your people informed so as they will come to work and will continue doing their work. Then there were restrictions placed on hospital visits. People, of course, who had their loved ones in palliative care and in the last days of their lives were not about to be told they could not go and visit their loved ones in the hospital. Therefore, we had to put police officers at the hospitals, as well.
>
> Very quickly it became a huge problem for us. Then the thing that struck us significantly was when the source was identified at one local hospital and the 10-day quarantine was called. We had to identify every police officer that had contact with that hospital during whatever periods of time, and they had to be quarantined at home. Therefore, suddenly we were short 100 and some odd people basically on the turn of a dime.[180]

A successful cycle of response, management and recovery in any emergency situation is directly linked to the capability of police forces to play a central role in the process.

Challenges Facing Police Today

More With Less

The Committee has long voiced concern with the paucity of policing in Canada. Canada ranks 19th out of 23 members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in terms of police per

[180] Julian Fantino, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, February 25, 2008. Issue 5, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.

capita (2002 numbers).[181] Canada has 186 police per 100,000 citizens; England/Wales has 210; Australia 304; the United States 326. In other words, Canada's ratio of police-to-population is 43 percent lower than the United States, 39 percent lower than Australia's, and 11 per cent lower than England and Wales.[182]

To police at the level of England and Wales, Canada would need another 7,992 police officers. To police at Australia's level, Canada would require an additional 39,000 police officers. The Committee would be satisfied with England's level.

The Rights of the Accused Bring Increased Paperwork

Police work in Canada is changing. There are increasing demands. While the population of Canada more than doubled (2.3 times) between 1962 and 2003, the number of police increased only 1.7 times. During that period the number of crimes reported to police increased seven-fold. Because of increasingly onerous legislative requirements, police require much more time to prepare cases now than they used to.

A 30 year analysis of the RCMP's "E" Division in British Columbia found that break and enter cases require 5 to 10 police hours today compared to one hour in 1970. Drunk driving cases consume an average of five hours compared to one hour in 1970. Domestic assault cases take 10 to 12 hours compared to one hour in 1970.[183]

> Governments are providing Canadians with fewer police, on a per-capita basis, to do more complicated work in combating increasingly sophisticated variations of crime.

[181] 30 countries are members of the OECD, however, there are only policing numbers available for 23 countries. Most recent figures available are 2002. The Eighth United Nations Survey on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (2001 - 2002), http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/Eighth-United-Nations-Survey-on-Crime-Trends-and-the-Operations-of-Criminal-Justice-Systems.html

[182] Ibid.

[183] *A 30 Year Analysis of Police Service Delivery and Costing: "E" Division: Research Summary*, School of Criminology and Criminal Justice, University College of the Fraser Valley ad the Institute for Canadian Urban Research (2005).

If our police are over-stretched on a daily basis, we can't expect to get the kind of surge capacity that may be needed from them during emergencies.

> **Senator Tkachuk:** A DUI [Driving Under Influence] takes 250 per cent more time. Why is that?
>
> **Mr. Zaccardelli (former Commissioner of the RCMP):** That is because of what the police officer is required to do to comply with the various court decisions and policies in place to respect the Charter rights. We do not question that compliance; however, those decisions have a direct bearing upon us…Something that took a week ten years ago takes months now. You have to realize that officers are up to their ears in paperwork… Consider that over the last 10 years the average time it took to process a break and enter investigation increased by 58 per cent; an impaired driving charge increased 250 per cent; a domestic assault increased 964 per cent. No corresponding budget increases were given to the police every time a court decision or a new piece of legislation increased the processing time. All of this took place in a policing environment of more public oversight, more media scrutiny and more public expectations for an accountability bar set higher than any other profession.[184]

The Government, in *Budget 2008*[185], promised to provide funding for 2,500 new police officers across Canada through a $400 million Police Officers Recruitment Fund over five years, but there has not been an announcement about how this funding will be allotted, or about what guarantee there is that it will be sustained beyond five years. Will the investment be $80 million a year, each year, for five years, or will there be a low ramp-up and a lot of spending at the end, which is not unusual with these vague announcements. We simply don't know.

Will communities receiving money for additional police officers through the Fund have to match this funding? If so, this could present difficulties for smaller or financially strained communities. Any new funding is welcome, but specifics would be appreciated.

Roles Unclear During Emergencies

The roles federal, provincial and municipal police play during emergencies are not always clear, particularly if terrorism is involved. In the Committee's 2007 survey, we found that although 61 percent of the municipalities listed

[184] Mr. Zaccardelli, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, February 25, 2008. Issue 5, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.
[185] Government of Canada, Budget 2008, http://www.budget.gc.ca/2008/home-accueil-eng.asp

"a disaster or state of local emergency caused by an act of terrorism" as a concern for their community, only 36 percent had a counter-terrorism response plan in place.

Some emergency managers, like Kelly Gilday, Deputy Emergency Program Coordinator for the City of Prince George, said that in cases of terrorism the federal police would handle the emergency: "The RCMP do have a terrorism plan, the city does not." But other municipal managers, such as Larry Brassard, Fire Chief of the Town of Milton, pointed to municipal police as first responders. "…initial response is primarily a police function in so far as 'counter-terrorism' is concerned, and policing services are delivered on a regional basis."

Clearly, the federal police force, the RCMP, are responsible for national security. The *Security Offences Act* designates "primary responsibility" to RCMP peace officers when any alleged offence arises from conduct constituting a threat to the security of Canada.[186] However, in practical terms, local police are likely to be involved. A municipal police officer would probably arrive first at any crime scene, whether it involves national security or not.

The Federation of Canadian Municipalities, in their 2008 report *Towards Equity and Efficiency in Policing,* called for clearer lines of responsibility:

> As first responders, municipal governments are often left to enforce laws and provide services—border control, interdiction and enforcement on the Great Lakes, or combating cyber crime, for example—that fall squarely within federal jurisdiction. Federal compensation for such services is ad hoc and lacks a consistent practice governed by a set of transparent policies and procedures.
>
> … Police roles, responsibilities and resources have to be aligned and clarified so that each order of government is better able to perform those duties mandated within its jurisdiction. This is particularly true with respect to organized crime, drug-related operations, national security (including surveillance of possible terrorist targets), forensic identification, cyber crime, and border and port security, all areas in which municipalities appear to be underwriting federal policing costs.[187]

[186] See section 6(1) for the role of the RCMP regarding security offences. *Security Offences Act,* Department of Justice. Available at *http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/showdoc/cs/S-7/se:6/en*
[187] Federation of Canadian Municipalities, *Towards Equity and Efficiency in Policing*, May 29, 2008. Available at http://www.fcm.ca/English/View.asp?mp=1&x=878

For policing to function well during complex natural or human induced disasters, there must be a clearly-articulated delineation of responsibility that assigns command and control and lays out the interlocking responsibilities of each force likely to be involved.

NEW RECOMMENDATIONS:

- **The Committee recommends that the representatives of the federal, provincial and local police forces across Canada conduct national discussions in order to further clarify roles and responsibilities with regard to national security and emergency management.**

- **The Committee recommends that there be an increase in the number of police officers to reach England's level – approximately 8,000 more police, consistent with what the Committee has been proposing with regard to the RCMP (5,000 to 7,000 additional members), and with the Government's commitment to an additional 2500 police officers.**

Problem 12(c):
The State of the Mounties Today

The RCMP is unlike any other national police force in the world. It is involved in all aspects of policing in Canada, from helping to maintain the integrity of Canada's border, to national security investigations, to manning isolated and northern posts, to mentoring foreign police forces, to policing provincial, territorial, municipal and First Nations communities.

It is the constitutional obligation of the Government of Canada to provide its citizens with peace, order and good government, and the RCMP have played a proud role in delivering the first two components since 1874. But the RCMP have had increasing difficulty in recent years in maintaining that proud tradition.

It has become obvious that the RCMP face many challenges – some of their own making, some imposed upon them by outside forces. The RCMP's problems, unfortunately, become the problems of every Canadian community that they police – especially during emergencies.

Contract Policing Essential

Contract police services for the provinces, territories and municipalities absorb nearly half (approximately 47 percent) of the RCMP's uniformed personnel. Through contract policing, the RCMP perform a variety of functions involved in delivering police services at 652 locations in 10 provinces and 3 territories.[188] In these communities, as the provincial, territorial or municipal police, the RCMP assume the role of the local front line first responder, playing a lead role in emergency management through conducting search and rescue operations, responding to floods, etc.

[188] The RCMP provides community policing services under contract in all provinces and territories of Canada, except Ontario and Quebec. The structure of the RCMP in these two provinces is significantly different from the rest of Canada. See RCMP, Community, Contract and Aboriginal Policing, http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/ccaps/contract_e.htm

There have been arguments that the RCMP should get out of contract policing, but the Committee believes that would be counterproductive for the Force itself and for Canadians in general. Contract policing is where young officers come face to face with Canadians and learn to understand the human element that is so important to policing. Contract policing provides – or should provide – the personnel that can be called upon in national emergencies and for special situations like summit conferences and the Olympics. A national police force, with the surge capacity for national emergencies, is a critical asset.

David Brown's task force report, *Rebuilding the Trust: Report of the Task Force on Governance and Cultural Change in the RCMP* (referred to hereafter as '*The Brown Report*') published December 2007, pointed out that RCMP leadership caused some of the force's problems by adhering to outdated management practices, and called for better use of their human resources.[189]

However, *The Brown Report* criticized the federal government for limiting RCMP management by placing structural and financial decisions in the hands of Treasury Board and Public Works and Government Services Canada, rather than giving the RCMP the status of Separate Employer, like the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. In his testimony before the Committee in February 2008, former RCMP Commissioner Zaccardelli described what separate employer status would mean:

> **Mr. Zaccardelli (former Commissioner of the RCMP):** There are two important issues when talking about separate employer status: the ability to control your own finances and the flexibility that comes with that ability; and the ability to have your own [human resource] policies to give you the flexibility, given the unique nature of your organization.[190]

In the case of the RCMP, decisions on how the organization should manage itself lie in the hands of Treasury Board (for personnel policies and funding approval) and Public Works and Government Services Canada (for acquisitions). The requirement that the RCMP work through these two

[189] *Rebuilding the Trust: Report of the Task Force on Governance and Cultural Change in the RCMP*, Submitted to the Minister of Public Safety and President of the Treasury Board, (December 14, 2007), http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/rcmp-grc/report-rapport-eng.aspx

[190] Mr. Zaccardelli, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, February 25, 2008. Issue 5, 39th Parliament, 2nd Session.

government departments significantly complicates management of the Force. This is something the Committee would like to see changed.

Understaffing

The Brown Report depicted an RCMP that is greatly understaffed. Unfortunately, it neglected to advise the government to do the obvious: increase staff and funding.

The Prime Minister promised 1,000 additional Mounties and federal prosecutors in Budget 2006.[191] The Force ended up getting about 600 new officers, while the other 400 became civilian support staff.[192] In reality, most or all of the new officers simply filled already vacant positions, which still left the RCMP well below their authorized strength.

Our Committee has done the math based on findings from our previous reports[193] and we believe that that Canada needs an additional 5,000-7,000 Mounties (see chart in the Appendix E to this report).

We need more Mounties in normal times, and we certainly need them available in times of emergency.

[191] Government of Canada, Budget 2006, http://www.fin.gc.ca/budtoce/2006/budliste.htm
[192] Office of the Prime Minister, Media Centre, http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1298
[193] See Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *Canadian Security Guidebook 2007: Coasts, Border Crossings, Airports and Seaports*, all available at: http://www.parl.gc.ca/common/Committee_SenRep.asp?Language=E&Parl=39&Ses=2&comm_id=76

Staffing Challenges Facing the RCMP as Outlined in the *The Brown Report*:

Cadets Paid Little – *The Brown Report* criticized the RCMP for not paying cadets for their 24 weeks training at Depot.[194] Ontario Provincial Police cadets are paid $32,436,[195] and Ottawa Police trainees are paid $39,000 annually. However, in June 2008 the government announced that they will begin paying RCMP cadets $500 per week for training at Depot.[196] Adjusted to annual rates, this is the equivalent of $26,000 a year – nearly a third less than that of the OPP or Ottawa police. It could be argued that this is fair given that Mounties are provided room and board during training. But trainees with families living elsewhere still have to bear the burden of supporting them, and that can't be easy on these skimpy stipends.

Northern Posts: The RCMP does contract policing in isolated and northern communities such as Hudson Bay or Reindeer Lake, Saskatchewan. *The Brown Report* stressed the importance of ensuring that those serving in those isolated communities are paid fair allowances. As well, most Northern Posts are seriously understaffed.[197]

Unpaid 'Voluntary' Overtime: In many remote communities, RCMP officers are never really 'off duty', and they find themselves doing overtime out of necessity. Overworked officers who have spent little time with family are likely to be stressed, fatigued and suffer impaired judgment.[198]

New Backup Policy Needs More Officers: A new policy announced on December 19, 2007 requires multiple member responses to calls involving weapons, violence, or in remote areas not accessible by communications.[199] Unless there are more personnel, this policy will simply add responsibility to already overworked officers.

Changing Demographics and Mentors: There aren't enough RCMP mentors for cadets in the field. This is partly due to the changing demographics of the force, but also due to the limitations on officers due to understaffing.[200]

RCMP Officers are mired in Administration: The administrative burden imposed on regular members of the RCMP, including legal developments and technological changes, has seriously restricted the time available for front-line police work.[201]

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[194] *Rebuilding the Trust (Brown Report)*, pg. 36
[195] Ontario Provincial Police, O.P.P. Benefits and Pay, http://www.opp.ca/Recruitment/opp_000582.html
[196] Office of the Prime Minister, Media Centre, http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=2168
[197] *Rebuilding the Trust (Brown Report)*, pg. 24-25.
[198] *Rebuilding the Trust (Brown Report)*, pg. 26-27.
[199] RCMP, Statement from D/Commr Sweeney on RCMP Backup Policy: "In adopting a national backup policy, there will be resource implications. We could see the redeployment of existing resources as well as more rigorous residency requirements." http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/news/2007/2007_12_05_backup_e.htm
[200] *Rebuilding the Trust (Brown Report)*, pg. 27.
[201] *Rebuilding the Trust (Brown Report)*, pg. 25.

These shortfalls show what Canada's Mounties are up against. For more fulsome details, *The Brown Report* is well worth reading in its entirety.

NEW RECOMMENDATIONS:

The Committee recommends that:

1. The Government grant the RCMP separate employer status.

2. The Government fund annual increases to the RCMP budget to permit a growth of at least 700 personnel per year for each of the next 10 years.

3. The RCMP provide a schedule of implementation for each of the recommendations in *The Brown Report.*

4. The RCMP table a quarterly report to Parliament on whatever progress has been made on (a) separate employer status (b) increases in personnel (c) implementation of the various recommendations of *The Brown Report*.

Conclusion

Anyone who has waded through the huge piles of documentation contained in this report – as well as the Committee's attached comments and recommendations – will be well aware that members do not believe that Canadian governments have been doing their job in preparing for the kinds of major national emergencies that are bound to confront Canadians in the coming years.

When we say "governments," we refer to politicians and bureaucrats in all orders of government, federal, provincial and territorial. There must be some government people involved in this file who have been trying exceedingly hard at doing their job. Unfortunately their efforts are getting lost in the quagmire of lethargy that seems to be the hallmark of emergency preparedness in this country. Committee members know that it isn't easy making progress on any file that crosses jurisdictional lines, particularly when some provinces are openly antagonist about having their jurisdictions invaded no matter how serious the issue.

Nonetheless, we are talking about the possibility of widespread physical and economic disaster to Canadians here, and *somebody* has to cut the Gordian Knot.

In recognition of the fact that the Committee has harped on this theme *ad nauseam*, allow us to quit the scene by focusing on what Canadians themselves can do to ready themselves for difficult, life-threatening situations. The Committee recognizes that it has focused almost entirely on what governments should be doing. In future we will broaden our focus to determine whether the Canadian public might be able to muster more energy and savvy in gearing up to protect themselves, their families and their neighbours.

The Volunteer Component

To date the Committee has focused on how well – or poorly – Canada's governments have performed in recent years to improve the chances of ordinary Canadians to survive emergency situations. In the coming months

we intend to shift our focus to determine whether those ordinary Canadians are being provided with what they need to help themselves and to help their neighbours.

In most emergencies, experts will tell you that people are usually on their own for the at least the first 24 hours. The message Public Safety Canada is now sending to Canadians is that individuals and families should plan to sustain themselves for the first 72 hours while emergency workers help those in urgent need.[202] It usually takes at least that long to get help from other places.

This is when people need to come together to help themselves, and there are plenty of heroic stories of Canadians doing just that.

But are we doing enough in Canada to give volunteers what they need to perform effectively? In the United States, many observers have pointed out that there are worthwhile lessons to be learned by comparing community responses after Hurricane Katrina struck in New Orleans on August 29, 2005, and the community responses to the wildfires that hit the San Diego area in late October, 2007.

It didn't take long for New Orleans flood victims to learn how slow and inadequate outside help would prove to be. In fact, even many civil authorities with emergency responsibilities fled the scene.

The lesson, psychologist Terry Paulson wrote in the *Ventura (California) County Star* [January 7, 2008], was

> "Whether disasters come from Mother Nature or a terrorist attack, major disasters occur. Hurricane Katrina dashed all illusions that the cavalry will quickly show up to save the day . . . in an overwhelming disaster, the public must become part of the solution – be a resilient community."

The contrast in public response to the southern California wildfires could not have been more pronounced. Thousands of volunteers worked tirelessly to support public officials and non-governmental agencies in assisting people

[202] See Public Safety Canada's website on personal and family emergency preparedness at www.getprepared.ca

threatened by the wildfires. That made a huge impression on California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger. On February 11, 2008 the lead on a story in the *San Diego Union-Tribune* was this:

> SACRAMENTO – Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger was so impressed with the commitment and compassion shown by volunteer Paul Russo and others at the Del Mar Fairgrounds evacuation center during the October firestorms that he has directed aides to initiate plans to help improve emergency assistance programs across the state, using San Diego's response as inspiration.

The story went on to document not just how Mr. Russo had helped 300 frail and elderly people get to the Fairgrounds after flames forced them out of their nursing home, but how thousands of Californians pitched in through volunteer agencies, and as individuals, to help out.

Later, volunteer agencies pointed out that the government could encourage even more voluntary help if there were an identification system for volunteers (showing they had the skills needed to assist in dangerous situations, and proving them not to be imposters). Voluntary help would be enhanced if there were better insurance programs for volunteer groups so people wouldn't worry about stepping in to help. Another aid would be having coordination templates in place to assure volunteers are dispatched in a way that ensures they help, rather than hinder.

How would people in the average Canadian community respond? Like they did in New Orleans? Or, like they did in San Diego? What sort of preparations would ensure the average Canadian community could respond confidently, knowing that all Canadians would want to step up to the plate?

Are there measures the federal and provincial governments could take – like those being studied by Gov. Schwarzenegger – to improve Canada's volunteer capacity? The Committee promises to look into that. From everything the Committee has seen, our confused governments shouldn't be counted on to confront the multitude of potential disasters that could come down the pipe. An alert and prepared citizenry is going to have to be part of Canada's capacity to respond.

Listening to the People on the Front Lines

Emergency preparedness is jointly funded by federal, provincial, territorial and municipal governments. Funding initiatives such as the Joint Emergency Preparedness Program (JEPP) are central to the development of municipal programs to prevent and respond to all physical threats faced by communities, be they floods, earthquakes, chemical spills, terrorist attacks, or pandemics.

Municipalities – at least larger municipalities – know that the onus is on them – and probably them alone – to deal with emergencies in the early going. Tom Sampson, Chief of Emergency Medical Services for the City of Calgary, says senior levels of government make no secret of this, but underestimate what that really means:

> When we met recently with the federal government around pandemic preparation, their response was, 'YOYO 24.' I do not know whether you have heard that one before, but it means: 'You're on your own for the first 24 hours.'
>
> We have looked at the federal government preparedness capacity, and we think it is YOYO 7 days. Our concern right now is that the municipal authority must deal with the first five to seven days of any major event, at which time additional assistance will be available.[203]

92 Canadian Municipalities Set Out Their Major Emergency Preparedness Grievances

For the second time in four years the Committee connected with municipalities across Canada to find out how they assess their level of emergency preparedness. Committee members also wanted to know whether people on the front lines could point to flaws in the way Canada anticipates and deals with municipal and regional emergencies.

This type of questionnaire was first used for our 2004 report after

[203] Tom Sampson, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, Hearing Transcript, February 1, 2007, Issue 9, 39th Parliament, 1st Session.

Committee members discovered discrepancies in the kind of testimony we were getting from federal and provincial officials and what we were hearing from municipal officials and first responders themselves. We were getting a strong sense that government systems that might have seemed responsible on paper weren't always working in the field.

In the spring of 2007, the Committee sent questionnaires to officials holding responsibilities for emergency preparedness in 100 Canadian municipalities of all sizes and regions, broadly representing the population of Canada.

We received 92 detailed responses. The overall tone of the responses was mildly encouraging – with emphasis on the word 'mildly'. Some officials responsible for emergency preparedness did say there had been at least minimal improvements in the way the federal and provincial governments respond to municipal needs in the area of emergency preparedness and support during emergencies.

But there remains a perception that politicians and bureaucrats at the senior levels aren't listening to first responders about what the municipalities feel they need most to cope with emergencies. There are also complaints that the systems in place to provide assistance to the municipalities are cumbersome and under-funded.

While senior levels of government are prepared to tell municipalities that they must put emergency preparedness programs in place, they do not seem prepared to provide the funds needed to keep preparedness programs operational, or to make adjustments to these programs if situations change or flaws are perceived.

If the federal and provincial governments are not going to be on site for one to five days - depending on the nature of the emergency - an important question arises:

> ***Have they put the systems in place – and made the funds available – to minimize the risk that emergencies will turn into disasters?***

Is there a coherent national matrix in place offering every Canadian community the opportunity to significantly upgrade its capacity to respond to man-made or natural emergencies?

Many of the responses the Committee received point to two basic areas of weakness standing in the way of such a matrix:

(a) Inflexible funding systems

(b) Inadequate levels of funding

You KNOW More Emergencies are Headed Toward Us When Half of Canadian Municipalities Say They Have Already Had to Deal With One or More

Our questionnaire shows that most Canadian municipalities know that emergencies are not a question of *whether*, but of *when*. Fully 48 percent of respondents said that their municipality had already declared a state of emergency as a result of a natural or human-induced threat to the community. One out of three said that their emergencies had been designated as provincial emergencies.

Virtually every Canadian community recognizes that there should be some municipal official designated to prepare for emergencies and to take charge in the event of an emergency. Of the 92 respondents, 97 percent said that their municipality had an Emergency Management Organization (EMO) in place. Fully 100 percent told us that they had a dedicated emergency operations centre (64 percent) or a designated structure that can be used as an operations centre (36 percent).

Unless a community is content to deal with emergencies on an ad hoc basis, there wouldn't be much point in having an EMO if that office didn't conduct risk assessments. Canadian municipalities understand this: 95 percent of respondents said their communities conduct risk assessments, and 71 percent conduct these assessments as part of a federally standardized process (even though the Committee has determined that there is no uniform national standard for emergency planning or risk assessments).

While 61 percent cited 'terrorism as a concern' for their community, only 36 percent have a counter-terrorism response plan. This may be because smaller

communities do not see terrorism as a particular risk. As noted in Problem 12, It may also be because some municipalities seem to think that terrorism is a job for federal police, even though local police would likely be involved in responding to any incident.

Of those that put a time frame on how often they conduct such assessments, 45 percent said every year, 12 percent said every 3-5 years and 8 percent said five years or longer – suggesting perhaps that it has been done once in recent years.

Responding to Changes in Threat Assessments

The high percentage of communities that do risk assessments every year (including all of the larger cities) demonstrates that these communities clearly recognize that the nature and level of threats can change very quickly and need to be reassessed on a regular basis.

Of course, reassessment is worthless if it doesn't have the potential to lead to change. Consider a community that has received some funding from JEPP or from a provincial source in the past, and wishes to determine whether the emergency preparedness measures it has taken are adequate. It decides to do a reassessment for a number of good reasons. It . . .

- has upped its interest in emergency preparedness
- has hired someone trained in emergency preparedness
- has sent staff for training in emergency preparedness
- has recognized that it was ignoring a significant threat

Or it may simply be that something has happened within or near a municipality to change the nature or level of threat.

Municipalities are encouraged by senior levels of government to do risk assessment.

The problem is with the next step. If the community is going to come up with new insights into what it needs to respond to potential emergencies, surely the governments that pushed for the assessments should be standing

by ready to respond to the results.

If a municipality determines that there is either an urgent reason – or simply a legitimate, prudent reason – for investing more money in emergency preparedness, where can the municipality get the money to do that within months, rather than years?

From its own coffers? Canadian municipalities, creatures of the provinces, are notoriously tight for funds every year and come under intense pressure from homeowners to keep property taxes down. Councilors who ignore visible everyday issues like inadequate public transit, deteriorating roads, overflowing sewers and tardy snow clearing do so at their own peril.

Emergency preparedness is a vital issue for municipalities, but it is not one of these omnipresent issues. It is largely hidden in the shadows as people go about their everyday lives. Most municipalities are simply unlikely to siphon off their own budgets for major overhauls to emergency preparedness – even if a reassessment has shown that they should. Emergencies are low-probability, high-impact possibilities. Most homeowners purchase insurance for low-probability, high-impact events, which is the rational thing to do. But somehow that often doesn't translate into politics, and a lot of emergency prevention money doesn't get spent until *after* a disaster, when emotions, rather than reason, rules the day.

Unless a municipality can attract a timely injection of federal or provincial funds for emergency preparedness when a clear case can be made for improvements, those improvements will either not be made, or will not be made when they should be made.

What We Heard From Respondents About Rigid Systems and Inadequate Funding

Five out of every six Canadian municipalities (83 percent) that responded to the Committee's survey say they have applied for funding under the federal governments JEPP program. Only 22 percent expressed themselves satisfied with what the program has provided them, although 36 percent said they were at least "somewhat" satisfied, for a total of 58 percent.
Seven out of every ten Canadian municipalities (72 percent) have applied for

funding from their province. Of these, only 20 percent said they were satisfied with the funding, although 35 percent allowed that they were "somewhat" satisfied.

WIDESPREAD LACK OF SATISFACTION WITH FUNDING: You know that both federal and provincial governments have some work to do when only about one-fifth of municipalities across the country are fully satisfied with the way emergency preparedness is funded by both the federal government and their province.

Again, there were two main complaints about both federal and provincial programs – rigid funding systems and inadequate funds. Here are some of the comments respondents made in these two areas:

IN THEIR OWN WORDS, MUNICIPAL OFFICERS ADDRESS THEIR FRUSTRATIONS OVER FUNDING

No Sustaining Funding or Consultation

"Where the federal government has contributed, it has been in the form of one-off capital funds with no contingency for operating, maintenance, or life cycling . . . There is also a concern over lack of consultation at the municipal level over JEPP funding. The opportunity is frequently missed to focus funding programs such as JEPP on the sustainable development of regional resources to address critical emerging needs."

Bruce Burrell
Fire Chief and Head of Disaster Service
Calgary, Alberta

Money Allotted Unreasonable

"Allocate a reasonable amount of money – $5 million nationwide is pitiful. Raise the federal contribution percentage (75%) Change the philosophy to building resilient and responsive programs. Do not tie it to specific elements (i.e. not just communications or response vehicles, but include analysis and studies, salaries, anything that improves the level of

emergency management to that expected post 9/11, post Katrina). Align the administration to the municipal budget process."

Richard Kinchlea
Emergency Measures Coordinator
Hamilton, Ontario

Balancing Budgets Gives Emergencies Short Shrift

"Municipalities are required to submit balanced budgets and oftentimes emergency management funding is cut in order to allow the municipality to provide existing day-to-day services. Therefore there should be more emergency management-specific funding opportunities made available to municipalities by the provincial government to allow municipalities to attain a higher standard of preparedness."

Barry Manuel
Emergency Measures Organization Coordinator
Halifax, Nova Scotia

Responsibilities Legislated, but Not Funded

"Emergency management is one program amongst many that must compete for a share of the limited funds available on which the city operates. Increasing legislated requirements with respect to what municipalities must do in regards to emergency management without increasing the provision of funding assistance means that something possibly won't be done at the time and to the standard expected."

Bruce L. Griffin,
Community Emergency Planner
Barrie, Ontario

Provinces Ignore Need to Prepare

"Provincial legislation prescribes what municipalities must do with respect to emergency management. It monitors to ensure compliance with the legislation, but provides no funding and few resources to assist municipalities achieve and maintain the requisite level of emergency management, The provincial government provides funding for disaster relief assistance, but not for preparedness. There's nothing other than what we get from the federally-funded JEPP program."

"The limitations (e.g. funding only once every five years for coming up with emergency plans; once every three years for emergency exercises; or a $40,000 limit for specialized vehicles or equipment) are just not reasonable. Plans should be re-examined and exercises conducted yearly. It makes no sense that all work related to an emergency plan can only get funding once every five years. If a grant is provided to create an overall emergency plan in Year 1, then in Year 2 the community is not eligible for another grant for an evacuation plan, a dangers goods spill response plan, a recovery plan, a business continuity plan, etc. This limitation means a manic year trying to do all your planning at once, and then four years of limping along. It would be much more reasonable to be able to complete one or two plans each year, rather than get them all done at once. The cap of $40,000 for equipment is ridiculous. What can you get for $40,000? We would like to get a new mobile command vehicle, which would probably cost $500,000. Greater assistance is required. It's very difficult to try to wring $500,000 out of a municipal budget.'

Deborah Proctor
Manager of Emergency Programs
Richmond, British Columbia

Funding Templates Ignore Local Needs

"Funding programs are limited to federal/provincial initiatives and priorities . . . [the] needs of the municipality are kept to a strict set of criteria that often does not reflect the priorities of the municipality. The programs are templated rather than ' need assessment ' driven….

Funding should be based on needs assessments with the province taking leadership in key areas with resources to address programs. There are clearly common short falls in all regions of the province where a common policy and initiative would help.

These areas include:

(a) enhancing GIS capabilities and shared data (especially shared data)
(b) co-ordinating resources to maximize value for money.
(c) funding for enhanced training and response.
(d) flexibility to address costly conversions such as auxiliary power.
(e) regional structure for regional responses
(f) broader working groups to include provincial departments with little funding but important contributions."

John Allain
Director of Emergency Planning
Moncton, New Brunswick

Funds Difficult to Apply For

Funds are not always easy to access – excessive amounts of information are required in the application. Often our needs do not "qualify" for JEPP funding. The amount of JEPP monies allocated to the province is very small.

There is insufficient funding for

- ***planning resources (i.e., for evacuation plans, contingency plans, etc.)***
- ***the vast number of hazards in the community, including the pending arrival of liquefied natural gas***

Yvonne Huntington
Director, Emergency Management Organization
Saint John, New Brunswick

Local Hazards Ignored, Funding Skimpy

"It's not like [the City of Sarnia] abuses the system. I would say we have been constantly overlooked for hazmat funding when you consider that we represented over 80 percent of the chemical production in Ontario in a border city which could impact on First Nations, federal lands, federal waterways and on U.S. soil. Funding for Emergency Alerting Systems are our main funding concerns because there are no funding opportunities offered by federal or provincial governments, yet this is probably the most important aspect of emergency planning management – informing your citizens who may be in harm's way. We have applied twice [for emergency preparedness funding] since 1998. We were turned down by the Province of Ontario in 1998 because we submitted our application a day late, even though we had received verbal permission. We submitted a JEPP application in 2006 and were granted $2,959.11 toward two new radios for the E.O.C., with the city having to contribute 55 percent of the cost."

Calvin Gardner
Community Emergency Management Coordinator
Sarnia, Ontario

Onerous Application Process

"Federal and provincial governments regularly introduce programs in a manner that necessitates a tremendous waste of local taxpayers' money and resources. They are introduced in a manner that requires each individual municipality to dedicate staff, resources and legal fees to study, interpret the requirements, seek legal opinion, and prepare their individual programs. Downloaded programs should come with clear and definitive minimum requirements, easily applied templates, and funding to make it happen."

Gordon Gazeley
Fire Chief
Belleville, Ontario

"We received no funding towards our EOC when we were led to believe it was almost a sure thing . . . [one of our main concerns is] getting council to allocate us enough money to accomplish the goals we have set for our program."

Tim Lindsay
Emergency Management Coordinator
Brantford, Ontario

Reacting to Disasters Rather Than Preparing

"There is money available for response and, to a lesser degree, recovery. Where there is a distinct lack of funding is on the preparedness portion. There is no funding available for public education and this is precisely where the funding is most needed . . . Our main concerns remain public education (including establishing neighbourhood programs) and the funding (cost sharing) needed to establish stockpiles of emergency supplies."

Emergency Management Officials
Chilliwack, British Columbia

Money for Hazard Assessments, None for Following Up

"The City of Coquitlam greatly appreciates the funds that have been provided by JEPP for the completion of projects. However, the criteria however for the projects is limiting and should be reconsidered. Under Section 2.2 of the JEPP Guidelines, the projects that are eligible for funding include Emergency Plans – or updating Emergency Plans – once every five years). A hazard, risk and vulnerability analysis is considered as part of this section. If a community conducts a hazard, risk and vulnerability analysis and receives funding, the next year it is not eligible to receive funds to write plans. In Coquitlam, we wrote our own disaster response plan in house, received money to conduct a hazard, risk and vulnerability analysis and then applied to get funding two years later to complete detailed evacuation plans using the highest identified hazards. Unfortunately, the application was rejected because we had received

money to conduct the HRVA. I would greatly appreciate a review of the project eligibility and a consideration to decrease the length of time between eligible applications for plan writing."

Dorit Mason
Manager of Emergency Programs
Coquitlam, British Columbia

Ignoring Specific Community Needs

"Criteria for the purchase of equipment do not satisfy the needs of the community."

Ken Neilson
Emergency Coordinator
Victoria, British Columbia

Insufficient Funding

"Emergency management budgets are minuscule. It is difficult to obtain funding for potential disasters when communities have to deal with urgent problems and insufficient funds on a daily basis" [translation]

Jacques Rathwell
Responsable sécurité civile
Gatineau, Québec

One-Off Funding, No Infrastructure Model

"[Our community's] main concerns/challenges regarding funding for emergency management is that there is no base funding for ongoing processes. Funding continues to be focused on individual projects rather than encouraging regional approaches. There is no infrastructure model for key components (communication, training, management tools,

software and hardware).”

Bill Walker
Fire Chief and Protective Services Director
Grande Prairie, Alberta

Money Needed for Training

“[Our main requests would be] that major costs be supported and that legislated requirements that are driven down to the municipal level – like training – be supported.”

Harry Dunning
Community Emergency Management Coordinator
Guelph, Ontario

No Training Money for Smaller Communities

“Funding for training is limited to communities under 20,000 people. We don’t qualify. And yet if there was an allowance for a wide spread [emergency], people would come to us for help because we’re a regional capital.”

Brian Cornforth
Chief of Fire and Emergency Services
Lethbridge, Alberta

Funds Needed to Test Plans

“Funding for additional training at the local level would be an improvement. Communities need to practice their disaster plan. However, budgets are restricted and agencies are reluctant to cover costs for their organization. Additional funding at the local area would alleviate this.”

Randy Crashley
Emergency Measures Coordinator / Deputy Fire Chief
Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan

Backup Power Required

"Funding for suitable back-up hydro generation to mitigate ice storm or major blackout is needed, but is cost prohibitive."

Ted McCullough
Community Emergency Management Coordinator / Fire Chief
North Bay, Ontario

Ignoring Community's Real Needs

"There should be more emphasis put into projects that reflect the real need of communities . . . There has been to much emphasis given to HUSAR and PERT and those types of entities with the focus on terrorism. It has come abundantly clear over the past few years that the real threat to municipalities is the weather. If you look at the costs associated with disasters within the country it has not been terrorism but mother nature. This is not to say that we cannot be diligent in our efforts towards terrorism but to many people are profiting from it and to much money is being spent on it when the real killer has been the weather."

Trent Elyea
Community Emergency Management Coordinator
Orillia, Ontario

Risk Assessment Should Drive Grant Structure

"The time to process funding is significant (in some cases 2–3 years) although it is understood that steps are being taken to establish a 6-month turnaround time. The Federal government has the opportunity to work with the Provinces and Municipalities to establish a grant process that is based on building geographical specific emergency management capacity and capability. Risk assessments should drive grant structure and eligibility with the goal of addressing local provincial and federal capacity and capability. Emergency management goes beyond the need for equipment to respond. Federal/Provincial funding should contribute to the

building of activity along the full spectrum of emergency management: prevention/mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery (including continuity of operations)."

John Ash
Manager of the Office of Emergency Management
Ottawa, Ontario

Funding Ignores Need for Maintenance, Training

"Maintaining adequate training needed for these new initiatives is a concern because it is expensive. The assistance with the initial expense is important and appreciated but the maintenance is a real challenge in areas like HUSAR and CBRN."

Ray Unrau
Emergency Measures Coordinator
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan

Emergency Costs Downloaded

"Costs/responsibilities for emergency preparedness have been all downloaded to the municipality without any associated funding …Basically no funding available for planning or preparedness from either the Federal or Provincial Government in spite of the demands and expectations placed upon the municipality to prepare for emergencies by both levels of government."

Lee Campbell
Sgt. Planning and Research, Sault Ste Marie Police Service / Community Emergency Management Coordinator
Sault Ste Marie, Ontario

High costs, low funding

"Is the investment really necessary? Given that we have to pay for new technologies so that crisis situations can be better handled and that

specialized equipment like a mobile command post is very expensive to buy, governments must contribute financially" [translation]

Michel Houde
Conseiller en sécurité civile
Saguenay / Chicoutimi – Jonquière, Québec

Need for Predictable, Stable Funding

"Funding from the provincial government for emergency management per se is not available. There are funds for assistance after a disaster has occurred (e.g. for SARS). The Province of Ontario facilitates our applications for JEPP funds . . . There should be base funding available that is predictable and stable to enable us to engage in multi-year planning for emergency plan development, exercises and corrective actions. Funding for correction action is often overlooked as the focus tends to remain on the response phase. Some corrective actions may involve changes to procedures, others may require capital expenditures, specialised multi-agency responder training, technology upgrades, stockpiling, recovery, public alerting, public education etc. Some of these initiatives have to be repeated and continual e.g. public education. We constantly compete for funding."

Warren Leonard
Manager of the Office of Emergency Management
Toronto, Ontario

Hard to Stay Up to Date

"We could use funding to help offset cost of an expanded EOC with more modern amenities. The existing EOC is growing inadequate to meet current needs."

David T. Fields
Commissioner of Fire Services / Fire Chief
Windsor, Ontario

No Money for Public Warning Systems

"We have been attempting to establish a siren warning system for our community but JEPP funding is not applicable to equipment used for alerting and the expense is not manageable for us at this time."

Brian Kayes
Director of Emergency Coordination
Brandon, Manitoba

Major centres need to support smaller neighbouring communities

"Upgrading the local action plan to meet national objectives requires significant investment, especially in human resources.

A new expense for municipalities. Major centres in regions required to do more than their share." [translation]

Claude Proulx
Coordonateur des mesures d'urgence / Directeur Général
Drummondville, Quebec

Outdated, Minimal Management Funding

"Historically, [the provincial funding program] was created to meet specific needs in the early 1990s. But now the program budgets do not reflect risk – just what is the minimal requirement."

Randy Hull
Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
Winnipeg, Manitoba

No Regional Plans to Coordinate Needs

"There are too many limitations to access funding. There is no provincial or regional plan to coordinate funding needs."

Dwight Osbaldeston
Fire Chief
County of Strathcona, Alberta

Municipal Perceptions of Provincial and Federal Responsiveness to Their Needs

Ideally, emergency risk management funding would always be based on need assessments conducted by the municipalities. Two factors make this impossible in the real world. First, smaller municipalities do not always have the resources to do anything more than cursory risk assessment. Secondly, no provincial or federal government is going to provide unlimited funds for any kind of spending, lest municipalities with overblown assessments of their needs unnecessarily drain the public purse.

Our survey found that 64 percent of respondents said they received funding that was at least to some degree based on their own assessment of their needs. But the comments above make it clear that there is often a huge gap between what kind of investment in emergency preparedness makes sense to municipalities and what makes sense to the senior governments that fund them.

Non-Funding Issues

While financing issues were a hot topic with our responders, the questionnaire also dealt with a number of other issues on which the Committee also received helpful responses. Here are brief synopses of some of the general responses we received in relation to those issues. **A complete list of findings of the 2007 survey of emergency preparedness can be found in Appendix A.**

Help from Neighbouring Communities

The more Canadian communities can come together to assist one another during emergencies, the better for all concerned, particularly since help will often be needed in minutes rather than days. It was therefore heartening to see that many neighbouring communities across Canada have put their heads together on emergency preparation.

Fully 80 percent of surveyed municipalities said they have had agreements in place with surrounding communities to provide assistance in the event of an emergency. A complementary 79 percent felt that "such agreements are necessary.''

Self-Sustainability

How long can municipalities sustain themselves before provincial or federal help arrives during a major disaster? The estimates that the Committee received varied: 10 percent said 24 hours; 14 percent said 48 hours; 37 percent said 72 hours; 15 percent said 96 hours; and 23 percent said what the reader is probably thinking: "it depends on the disaster."

Computers Particularly Vulnerable

One might guess that nothing makes a municipality fret more than the prospect of a CBRNE disaster (involving intentional or accidental misuse of chemicals, biological organisms, radiation, nuclear devices, or explosives).

One would be wrong.

Respondents were divided over whether their municipality had the capacity to manage a CBRNE incident – 47 percent said yes; 50 percent said no.

They were far less divided as to whether their municipal computer systems could manage a cyber attack: only 27 percent said yes and 60 percent said no.

Stockpiled Supplies

Many Canadian communities do not appear to be depending on the federal government's emergency stockpiles to get them through a disaster (see NESS, Problem 4). Only 23 percent of municipalities said that they regard the NESS caches as their emergency stockpiles. While 60 percent said they knew of the NESS program, only 31 percent said they have access to a cache and believe its contents would be useful.

Community Awareness

A critical aspect of emergency management is communication with the public, both before a disaster (to help optimize preparation) and during and following a disaster (to help optimize survival and recovery).

Before an Emergency: Proactive communication can save lives. Do members of the public know if there are designated shelters that can be used during a tornado? Does the average person in a municipality know what protection and basic supplies they will need to keep their family safe in the event of a flood?

The majority of respondents said that their municipalities have ways of getting through to the public as to what citizens should do in case of an emergency. More than three out of four Canadian communities – 77 percent – have used one means or another to educate their citizens on what to do in case of a disaster, but 22 percent have not.

During or After an Emergency: Reactive communications are obviously key to surviving a disaster, but Canadian communities fall short in this area.

While 76 percent of respondents said they had some ability to interrupt television and radio broadcasts, most acknowledged that they must first receive the consent of the broadcasters. Only 23 percent of municipalities say they have the ability to unilaterally interrupt local television or radio broadcasts.

As officials from the municipality of Chatham-Kent, Ontario wrote:

> "We work with the constraints of the private contractors. If they choose to interrupt the broadcasts they will. If not it will wait until the usual news reports."

Ginger Sherlock, Emergency Planning Coordinator for Langley, British Columbia, saw little point in having arbitrary control to interrupt local broadcasters:

> "We would communicate to our local media, and if the emergency is local only, but important enough, we would have all the media one could handle already here, in the way. I know what you refer to, yet with satellite dishes and cable channels, very few individuals watch local stations for something to do, and satellite does not allow local stations on it – I have tried. As a notification system – I would find this inadequate; much coordination for very few notified."

First Responders: (a) Equipment and (b) Training

In the midst of a disaster, any community wants its first responders to be well equipped and well trained. Our questionnaire produced mixed results on these issues.

(a) For instance, 62 percent of municipalities have interoperable first responder communications (fire, police, paramedics, etc.); only 36 percent are based on federal standards. Only 17 percent responded that their local systems are interoperable with provincial, federal (or American) authorities. In two-thirds of cases (66 percent) they were not.

(b) Canada's main centre for emergency management training is the Canadian Emergency Management College (CEMC) in Ottawa, run by Public Safety Canada. Originally established in 1954 to provide programs in wartime civil defence planning, the College provides training for emergency management officials from all levels of government.

Only 58 percent of respondents said that first responders from their municipality had received training at the CEMC, and only 18 per percent of surveyed municipalities said the training offered to municipal officials at the CEMC is sufficient.

Role of the Canadian Forces

The role of the military is vital to responding to emergencies, as we noted in discussing Problem 2. Our survey found that awareness of the Canadian Forces' role in emergency management and response is improving, with plenty of room to improve more.

Fully 85 percent of municipalities expect the Canadian Forces to provide assistance to their community in the event of a disaster, and 75 percent of respondents said they were aware of the existence of Canadian Forces Canada Command, the entity in charge of all domestic Forces operations. On the other hand, only 46 percent had actually liaised with Canada Command.

61 percent of respondents said there is a Canadian Forces Reserve Unit located in their community, but only 45 percent knew what role the Reserves could be expected to play in an emergency. Only 32 percent had involved the Reserves in emergency planning.

Urban Search and Rescue

Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) capacity comes in handy during emergencies. But 82 per cent of respondents said their municipality does not have an USAR team based in their community. At the time the survey was taken, Ottawa, Thunder Bay and Victoriaville were developing an USAR capability. Only12 other communities we surveyed currently have some Urban Search and Rescue capability – either light, medium or heavy.

Of the 12 USAR teams, eight of them do have agreements in place calling on their team to provide regional support to neighbouring municipalities.

In terms of USAR funding, municipalities are looking in all directions: 20 percent believed that the provincial government should provide funding for USAR; 26 percent believed that it should be the federal government; 36 per cent say USAR should receive three-way funding from provincial, federal and local coffers.

Critical Infrastructure Protection

If infrastructure is of critical national importance, the Canadian government should be involved in protecting it. As discussed in Problem 10, this is an area in which the federal government has not been sufficiently proactive, and our survey results reflect this.

While 84 percent of municipalities can point to critical infrastructure within their boundaries, only 58 percent of communities have a plan in place to protect this infrastructure. Moreover, there appears to be considerable confusion as to whose responsibility it is to protect it. Most of our respondents didn't even want to take a guess – 10 percent thought they were responsible; 20 per cent guessed they weren't; and the rest threw up their hands and did not respond.

Appendix A: Complete Findings of 2007 Emergency Management Survey

Of the 100 emergency preparedness questionnaires sent out to municipalities in 10 provinces, we received completed surveys from 92 communities. Each survey contains 94 questions and sub-questions.

This section outlines the key quantitative findings[204] of the survey of emergency preparedness conducted by the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence between the spring and fall of 2007.

The findings of the 2007 Survey are organized according to the format of the emergency preparedness questionnaire. Each section displays aggregate survey results followed by the Committee's key findings in that section. Where appropriate, the Committee compares the findings of the 2007 survey to the Committee's 2003 survey.

THE COMMITTEE WOULD LIKE TO THANK ALL EMERGENCY MANAGERS AND FIRST RESPONDERS WHO COMPLETED THE SURVEY.

The Committee also takes this opportunity to ask first responders: what did you think of our survey? Is there anything that could be improved upon for next time? Your input is most valued by members of the Committee.

Please send all feedback about the survey to the Clerk of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence at DEFENCE@SEN.PARL.GC.CA

Clerk of the Standing Senate Committee on
National Security and Defence
40 Elgin Street, 10th floor
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0A4

[204] Non-quantitative survey questions were omitted from the survey results displayed in this section. To gain a full appreciation of a community's response to the survey, please see volumes 2, 3 and 4 of this report.

1. Emergencies and Communities

SURVEY RESULTS

1	YOUR COMMUNITY	Percentage	No. of Community Responses
1b	In your community		
	Rural	0%	**0**
	Urban	37%	**34**
	Mixed	63%	**58**
1c	is your community near/include		
	Major industrial facility	82%	**60**
	Border crossing	20%	**3**
	Port/Airport, or transportation Hub	82%	**60**
	All of the Above	16%	**15**
1d	does your community have an EMO		
	Yes	98%	**90**
	No	2%	**2**
1e	have you ever declared a state of emergency as a result of a natural or human induced incident?		
	Yes	48%	**44**
	No	51%	**47**
1f	Has your province declared a state of emergency as a result of a declaration in your community of a state of local emergency?		
	Yes	17%	**16**
	No	79%	**73**

FINDINGS

- The Committee found from responses to **Questions 1E and 1F**, of the 44 municipalities which declared an emergency, 16 municipalities (36%) had their local emergency turn into a provincial emergency. *This means over a third of respondents who experienced emergencies have been the starting site of a provincially recognized disaster.*

2. Risk Assessments & Standards

SURVEY RESULTS

2	RISK ASSESSMENT	Percentage	No. of Community Responses
2a	Does your community conduct a risk assessment to determine the likelihood that its citizens will be affected by a natural or human-induced disaster or state of local emergency?		
	Yes	95%	**87**
	No	5%	**5**
	If yes, is this risk assessment based on:		
	A provincially standardized process?	71%	**65**
	A federally standardized process?	4%	**4**
2b	How often does your community conduct a risk assessment?		
	5 + years	8%	**7**
	every 3-5 years	12%	**11**
	every 2 years	8%	**7**
	Yearly	43%	**40**
	more than once a year	2%	**2**
	ongoing basis/no set time period	15%	**14**
2c	Which departments, agencies or organizations are involved in conducting your community's risk assessment?		
	Police	25%	**23**
	Fire	33%	**30**
	Paramedic	7%	**6**
	Public Health	13%	**12**
	Local EMO	27%	**25**
	Municipal Government	30%	**28**
	All of the above	52%	**48**
	The Province is consulted	60%	**55**
	The Federal Government is consulted	14%	**13**

2d	Does your community involve industry when conducting its risk assessment?		
	Yes	65%	**60**
	No	32%	**29**
2e	Is a disaster or state of local emergency caused by an act of terrorism a concern for your community?		
	Yes	61%	**56**
	No	38%	**35**
	If yes, does your community have a counter-terrorism response plan?		
	Yes	36%	**33**
	No	30%	**28**

FINDINGS

Risk Assessment Practices

- From responses to **Questions 2A and 2B**, the Committee found that the vast majority of communities conduct risk assessments (95%). Nearly half (43%) conduct yearly risk assessments, and for the rest, there is substantial variation regarding the frequency of risk assessments.

- Responses to **Question 2C and 2D** indicated that over half (52%) of the municipalities surveyed consulted all the main emergency actors during their risk assessment (Police, Fire, Paramedic, Public Health, Local EMO, Municipal Government), while the rest consulted some but not all. The majority of communities also consulted the province (60%) and private industry when conducting risk assessments (65%).

Terrorism as a Risk

- The answers to **questions 2E** are somewhat contradictory: while 61 % of municipalities cite ‘terrorism as a concern’ for their community, only 36 % have a counter-terrorism response plan. There are a number of reasons for this disparity.

As discussed in Problem 12, one of the reasons for the lack of a local counter-terrorism plan is that there is confusion surrounding the roles of federal and local police. Another reason is that some cities do not think the probability of a terrorist attack is large.

As Mike Ross, Deputy Fire Chief and Coordinator of Disaster Service for Lethbridge, Alberta wrote in his municipality's survey response:

> "We are a mid sized City in rural Southern Alberta, while we understand the potential of a terrorist act; our assets are such that it would be of limited value for publicity."

Or, as Michael Gornyiczki, Deputy Fire Chief and Community Emergency Management Coordinator for Stratford, Ontario wrote in his municipality's survey response:

> "At this point it is presumed that we would be much more susceptible to a natural disaster vs. an act of terrorism."

3. Community Response Capability

SURVEY RESULTS

3	Response Capability	Percentage	No. of Community Responses
3a	How prepared is your community to respond to a major emergency or disaster?		
	Prepared	59%	**54**
	somewhat prepared	40%	**37**
	Unprepared	1%	**1**
	do not know	0%	**0**
3b	How well prepared do you think the federal government is to respond to a major disaster such as Hurricane Katrina?		
	prepared	15%	**14**
	somewhat prepared	52%	**48**
	unprepared	24%	**22**
	do not know	9%	**8**

3c	How confident are you that the provincial government will support municipal emergency response efforts in the event of a disaster or declaration of a state of local emergency?		
	very confident	45%	**41**
	confident	45%	**41**
	no confidence	7%	**6**
	do not know	7%	**6**
3d	Does your community have a dedicated emergency operations centre?		
	yes	64%	**59**
	no	36%	**33**
	if no, is there a designated structure to be used as an EMC		
	yes	36%	**33**
	no	0%	**0**
3e	Has your community established an incident command structure/incident management structure (ICS/IMS) which would be utilized in case of a disaster or state of local emergency?		
	yes	85%	**78**
	no	15%	**14**
3f	Does your community have agreements in place with surrounding communities to provide assistance or request assistance in the event of a disaster or state of local emergency?		
	Yes	80%	**74**
	No	16%	**15**
	Do you think such agreements are necessary?		
	Yes	79%	**73**
	No	9%	**8**

3g	If a disaster was to occur in your community, how long could your community sustain itself before outside help is required?		
	24 hrs	10%	**9**
	48 hrs	14%	**13**
	72 hrs	37%	**34**
	96 hrs	15%	**14**
	Depends on disaster	23%	**21**



3h[205]	Which agencies are involved in the decision making process?		
	public health	49%	**45**
	paramedic	38%	**35**
	fire	43%	**40**
	police	36%	**33**
	local EMO	54%	**50**
	provincial EMO	35%	**32**
	all the above	16%	**15**

[205] While the first part of the original question 3H asked "Has your community identified and stockpiled supplies that could be used in case of an emergency?" follow up question 2A replaces the original responses, due to the greater precision (number of responses) of the latter.



	FOLLOW UP QUESTIONS		
2a	Has your community identified and/or stockpiled supplies that could be used in case of an emergency?		
	Yes	74%	**62**
	Provincial emergency supplies have been identified and agreements are in place on when and how they will be used in an emergency	20%	**17**
	Local Private sector suppliers have been identified and agreements have been made regarding their role during an emergency	27%	**23**
	Stockpiled supplies	56%	**47**
	Specialized Emergency Equipment	25%	**21**
	Medical Supplies	30%	**25**
	Shelter Supplies (cots and beds)	44%	**37**
	Food and Water	13%	**11**
	Other - Please specify	13%	**11**
	None of the Above	24%	**20**



2b	Are these stockpiled supplies the federal caches from the National Emergency Stockpile System (NESS)?		
	Yes	23%	**19**
	No	57%	**48**
2c	Health Canada informed the Committee that there are about 1, 600 National Emergency Stockpile System (NESS) caches strategically located across Canada. Do you know of this program and do you have access to a cache?		
	yes, I know of the NESS program	60%	**50**
	I have access to a NESS cache	31%	**26**
	I have access to a cache and can confirm its usefulness	14%	**12**
	I was consulted on what supplies should be stockpiled in the caches	1%	**1**
	No	40%	**34**

FINDINGS

This section of the questionnaire surveyed a broad range of topics related to municipal response capabilities including perception of preparedness, perception of provincial aid, stockpiled supplies and the National Emergency Stockpile System (NESS).

Level of Preparedness

- In responses to **Question 3A**, 59% of municipalities write that they are "prepared to respond to a major disaster or emergency". *This is a substantial increase from the responses of the 2003 survey, in which only 5.5% of survey respondents listed themselves as "prepared for a major emergency."* There was also a corresponding decrease in the number of communities "somewhat prepared" for a major emergency, from 49% in 2003 to 40% in 2007.[206]

- Answers to **Question 3B** indicate municipalities' lukewarm confidence in the federal government's ability to respond to a large crisis. Only a small minority of communities believes the federal government is "prepared" to respond to a large disaster (15%); 52% believe the government to be "somewhat prepared" and 24% believe them to "unprepared". *This resembles results of our 2003 survey*, when 29% of respondents were "not confident" of the federal government's ability to "coordinate the national-level response to a major disaster or emergency"; 55% "did not know" and 13% were "confident" that the federal government could handle a major disaster.[207]

- Responses to **Question 3D** indicated that *all communities* either have a designated Emergency Operations Center (64%) or have designated a space for one (36%).

[206] It should be noted that the 2003 survey defined "prepared" as having the "necessary plans, personnel and equipment ready" and "somewhat prepared" as having "plans in development" (see Appendix I pg. 116). In the 2007 survey the Committee offers no definition of "prepared" or "somewhat prepared." This may account for some discrepancy between the numbers. Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, March 2004), pg. 86.

[207] Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, March 2004), pg. 103.

Provincial and Mutual Aid:

- The Committee found that, from responses to **Question 3C,** the vast majority (90%) of responding communities are either confident (45%) or very confident (45%) that they can count on provincial support during an emergency.

- The Committee found that, from answers to **Question 3F,** the majority of communities believe that mutual assistance between neighbouring communities is an important part of the emergency management framework. 80% having signed mutual aid agreements with neighbouring communities and 79% believe such agreements are important.

Stockpiled Supplies and the National Emergency Stockpile System (NESS):

- The Committee found that the majority of municipalities had independently stockpiled supplies unrelated to the NESS. Responses to **Follow Up Questions 2A and 2B** show that while 74% of communities stockpiled supplies, less than a third (23%) indicate that these are part of the NESS.

Regarding NESS, the Committee's key finding is that more communities are aware of the NESS program and have access to NESS caches.

- From answers to **Follow Up Question 2C**, 60% of communities surveyed knew about the NESS. *This is a dramatic increase from the findings of the 2003 survey, where only 23% of respondents claimed knowledge of the caches*.[208] In the 2007 survey, about a third of responding municipalities reported having access to the cache (31%), compared to only 10% in 2003.

[208] Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, March 2004), pg. 93.

4. Funding for Emergency Management

SURVEY RESULTS

4	Funding	Percentage	No. of Community Responses
4a	Who serves as your community's chief resource for funding for emergency management?		
	municipal	98%	**90**
	provincial	12%	**11**
	federal	5%	**5**
4b	Are your communities funding needs for emergency management based on a needs/risk assessment?		
	Yes	64%	**59**
	No	34%	**31**
4c	Is your community aware of the funding mechanisms for emergency management provided by your provincial government?		
	Yes	95%	**87**
	No	4%	**4**
4d	Has your community applied for funding for emergency management from the provincial government?		
	Yes	72%	**66**
	No	26%	**24**
	if yes for what purpose		
	training	45%	**41**
	establish EMO	15%	**14**
	purchase emergency response equipment	50%	**46**
	To build CBRNE-specific response capacity	27%	**25**
	To build HUSAR-specific response capacity	8%	**7**
	To build a cyber attack-specific response capacity	0%	**0**
	Other	14%	**13**



4e	How satisfied is your community with provincial funding mechanisms for emergency management		
	satisfied	20%	**18**
	somewhat satisfied	35%	**32**
	not satisfied	33%	**30**
4f	Is your community aware of the funding mechanisms for emergency management provided by the federal government?		
	Yes	74%	**68**
	No	21%	**19**
4g	Has your community applied for funding for emergency management from the federal government through the Joint Emergency Preparedness Program (JEPP)?		
	Yes	84%	**77**
	No	15%	**14**

	if yes, how satisfied is your community with JEPP		
	Satisfied	22%	**20**
	somewhat satisfied	38%	**35**
	not satisfied	21%	**19**

FINDINGS

4(a) Provincial Funding

- From responses to **Questions 4C and 4D**, the Committee found that the vast majority of municipalities are aware of provincial emergency management funding. 94% of communities surveyed are aware of funding mechanisms provided by the provincial government, and 72% have applied for this funding.

- Responses to **Question 4E** indicate that only 20% of communities were "satisfied" with provincial funding while 35% were "somewhat satisfied" and 33% were "not satisfied".

This variance in the survey response data can be explained by the written responses that the Committee received. For example, in his municipality's survey response Bruce L. Griffin, Community Emergency Planner for Barrie, Ontario points to the gap between delegated emergency management responsibilities versus funding levels.

> "Emergency management is one program amongst many that must compete for a share of the limited funds available on which the city operates. Increasing legislated requirements with respect to what municipalities must do in regards to emergency management without increasing the provision of funding assistance means that something possibly won't be done at the time and to the standard expected."

> "…Provincial legislation prescribes what municipalities must do with respect to emergency management, monitors to ensure compliance with the legislation, but provides no funding and few resources to assist municipalities achieve and maintain the requisite level of emergency management."

4(b) Federal Funding – JEPP (Joint Emergency Preparedness Program)

- In answers to **Question 4G**, the Committee found that 74% of municipalities are aware of funding mechanisms for emergency management provided by the federal government, while 84% had applied for funding under JEPP.[209]

- From responses to **Question 4G**, the Committee found that the levels of satisfaction with federal and provincial funding are similar. 22% of municipalities are "satisfied" with federal funding, while 20% are "satisfied" with provincial funding.

While many municipal emergency managers believe JEPP is a useful tool, many also found the funding scheme inadequate for three reasons.

The first reason that can explain these responses is the lack of continuous or "evergreening" funding for capabilities that are expensive to maintain. Bruce Burrell, Fire Chief and Head of Disaster Service for the City of Calgary wrote in his municipality's survey response:

> "Where the federal government has contributed, it has been in the form of one-off capital funds with no contingency for operating, maintenance, or life cycling . . . There is also a concern over lack of consultation at the municipal level over JEPP funding. The opportunity is frequently missed to focus funding programs such as JEPP on the sustainable development of regional resources to address critical emerging needs."

Bill Walker, Fire Chief and Protective Services Director of Grande Prairie, Alberta wrote in his municipality's survey response:

> "Our community's main concerns/challenges regarding funding for emergency management is that there is no base funding for ongoing processes. Funding continues to be focused on individual projects rather than encouraging regional approaches. There is no infrastructure model for key components (communication, training, management tools, software and hardware)."

[209] Readers will notice the discrepancy of communities who applied for federal funding versus those who are aware of federal funding. JEPP is federally funded but provincially administered; some communities may have considered JEPP to be provincial funding.

A second reason is the problems caused by the funding cycle of JEPP. Bruce L. Griffin, Community Emergency Planner for Barrie, Ontario wrote in his municipality's survey response:

> "Timelines and process is too stringent. As a federal program, JEPP operates according to the federal fiscal year whereas municipalities budget and operate by the calendar year. This difference can be a significant hurdle when prosecuting a project that must be completed in one year yet spending is not to begin until the project has been accepted and funding authorized."

Several emergency managers were unsatisfied with the very limited scope of emergency programs eligible for JEPP funding. Some pointed to limitations that were imposed on JEPP preparedness funding as opposed to response funding. As emergency management officials from Chilliwack, British Columbia wrote in their municipality's survey response:

> "There is money available for response and, to a lesser degree, recovery. Where there is a distinct lack of funding is on the preparedness portion. There is no funding available for public education and this is precisely where the funding is most needed . . . Our main concerns remain public education (including establishing neighbourhood programs) and the funding (cost sharing) needed to establish stockpiles of emergency supplies."

The third reason is the JEPP eligibility criteria. For example, Dorit Mason, Manager of Emergency Programs for Coquitlam, British Columbia, noted in her municipality's survey response:

> "The City of Coquitlam greatly appreciates the funds that have been provided by JEPP for the completion of projects. However, the criteria however for the projects is limiting and should be reconsidered. Under Section 2.2 of the JEPP Guidelines, the projects that are eligible for funding include Emergency Plans – or updating Emergency Plans – once every five years). A hazard, risk and vulnerability analysis is considered as part of this section. If a community conducts a hazard, risk and vulnerability analysis and receives funding, the next year it is not eligible to receive funds to write plans.
>
> In Coquitlam, we wrote our own disaster response plan in house, received money to conduct a hazard, risk and vulnerability analysis and then applied to get funding two years later to complete detailed evacuation plans using the highest identified hazards. Unfortunately, the application was rejected because we had received money to conduct the HRVA. I would greatly appreciate a review of the project eligibility and a consideration to decrease the length of time between eligible applications for plan writing."

Ken Neilson, Emergency Coordinator for Victoria, British Columbia puts it even more simply in his community's survey response:

> "Criteria for the purchase of equipment do not satisfy the needs of the community."

5. Community Awareness[210]

SURVEY RESULTS

5	Community Awareness	Percentage	No. of Community Responses
5a	Does your local government have a program in place to educate its citizens on what to do in case of a disaster?		
	Yes	77%	**71**
	No	22%	**20**
1a	**FOLLOW UP QUESTIONS**		
	Does your community have the unilateral ability to interrupt television and radio broadcasts in order to transmit emergency-related updates or instructions?		
	Yes	23%	**19**
	local radio	20%	**17**
	local TV	15%	**13**
	national radio	2%	**2**
	national TV	2%	**2**

[210] Questions 5A and follow-up questions 1A and 1B form the basis for this section. The original questions regarding emergency public communications, Question 5B and 5C were disregarded due to the greater precision in the follow-up responses 1A and 1B.



	No, not unilaterally, media cooperation is needed	76%	**64**
	No, this is not necessary for my community	1%	**1**
1b	If yes, please indicate if the authority to unilaterally interrupt radio and television broadcasts has been officially granted to your community and through which mechanism:		
	Provincial Legislation	6%	**5**
	Local Legislation	1%	**1**
	Other: Please elaborate	12%	**10**
	No official authority needed	7%	**6**

FINDINGS

Our survey touched on two aspects of a community's capability to communicate with the public: proactive and reactive emergency communications.

Proactive emergency communication is what the public has been told *before* an emergency. Do members of the general public know if there are designated shelters in the event of a tornado? Does the average person in a municipality know what basic supplies/plans they will need to keep their family safe in the event of a flood?

- **Question 5A:** We found that the majority of municipalities (77%) have some mechanism in place to proactively inform their public what they should in do in case of an emergency.

The second type of emergency communication is reactive – it is needed in a situation where a disaster is impending or is occurring and emergency officials need the public to seek shelter immediately or take other specific action. A particularly important type of reactive emergency communication are emergency public broadcast systems – systems designed to override all television broadcasts during an emergency and display emergency messages to citizens.

In reality, very few municipalities have the power to do this – a topic explored in Problem 7: Emergency Public Communications. The Committee believes the most optimal system would be one that allows emergency managers *unilaterally interrupt* local, national or international television and radio broadcasts.

- **Follow Up Questions 1A and 1B:** From responses to these questions, the Committee found that fewer than a quarter (23%) of municipalities have the ability to *unilaterally* interrupt television or radio broadcasts to transmit emergency messages. Of these 19 communities, only 2 communities – Richmond, BC and Peterborough, Ontario – say they have the ability to interrupt local and national radio/TV broadcasts.

- 76% of surveyed municipalities indicate that they have gained the *consent* of local television stations to broadcast emergency messages. However, this means the control of the medium is with the broadcaster, not the EMO.

6. First Responder Communications & Training

SURVEY RESULTS

6	First Responders	Percentage	No. of Community Responses
6a	Do the first responders in your community have interoperable communications systems?		
	Yes	62%	**57**
	No	38%	**35**
	if yes, are the systems based on federal standards?		
	Yes	36%	**33**
	No	17%	**16**
6b	Are your communications systems interoperable with all departments and agencies in your province, other levels of government, and U.S. authorities where applicable?		
	Yes	17%	**16**
	No	66%	**61**
6c	Does your community have the capacity to manage a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear or Explosive (CBRNE) incident?		
	Yes	47%	**43**
	No	50%	**46**
6d	Does your community have the capacity to manage a cyber attack?		
	Yes	27%	**25**
	No	60%	**55**

6e	Have the emergency management personnel in your city received training at the Canadian Emergency Management College?		
	Yes	58%	**53**
	No	38%	**35**
	Is the amount of training received sufficient?		
	Yes	18%	**17**
	No	52%	**48**

FINDINGS

In this section of the survey, the Committee dealt with issues specifically related to perceptions surrounding the quality of the communications equipment, first responder ability to cope with CBRNE (Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Explosive) incidents and cyber attacks, and the training of first responders.

- Regarding first responder communication (**Questions 6A and 6B**) the Committee's key finding is that the majority of communities have interoperable municipal communications (62% of municipalities), but very few are interoperable with provincial and federal levels (17%).

- Regarding CBRNE, the responses to **Question 6C** show that almost half (47%) of communities have some in-house capacity to manage a CBRNE event. This is an improvement from our 2003 survey, in which 82% of responding municipalities "would rely on federal and provincial aid in the event of a CBRN emergency."[211]

The main centre of emergency management training in Canada is the Canadian Emergency Management College (CEMC) located in Ottawa and operated by Public Safety Canada. Originally established in 1954 to provide programs in wartime civil defence planning, the College provides training

[211] Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, March 2004), pg. 96.

for emergency management officials from all levels of government across the country.[212]

- The key finding for responses to **Question 6E** is that the vast majority of municipalities feel that there needs to be more CEMC training. While 58% of surveyed municipalities said that emergency management personnel in their community have trained at the CEMC, only 18% think this amount of training is sufficient.

Many emergency managers attribute a lack of sufficient training at CEMC to insufficient funding, internal and external, allocated specifically for training. As Randy Crashley, Emergency Measures Coordinator and Deputy Fire Chief of Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan wrote in his community's survey response:

> "Funding for additional training at the local level would be an improvement. Communities want and need to practise their disaster plan. However, budgets are restricted and agencies are reluctant to cover costs for their organization. Additional funding at the local area would alleviate this."

Others blame training shortages on inadequate eligibility criteria for training at the CEMC. As Brian Cornforth, Chief of Fire and Emergency Services of Lethbridge, Alberta wrote in his community's survey response:

> "Funding for training is limited to communities under 20,000 people. We don't qualify. And yet if there was an allowance for a wide spread [emergency], people would come to us for help because we're a regional capital."

In his community's survey response, Bruce Burrell, Fire Chief and Head Disaster Services for Calgary, Alberta pointed to disparities that exist in the allocation of training seats to municipalities:

> "Capacity for City of Calgary staff to attend training at CEMC does not meet demand. The current process of large municipalities applying for vacancies/seats for courses through the provincial EMO is not working. There is disparity between the allocation of seats between small communities and large urban centres. Despite the creation of the Granville courses (specifically designed for small communities), small communities in Alberta continue to be allocated seats

[212] Public Safety Canada, "About the College", January 25, 2008. Available at http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/em/cemc/03abt-eng.aspx

in the Collegeville course designed for these large urban centres, thereby displacing available opportunities for larger municipalities such as Calgary."

7. Role of the Canadian Forces

SURVEY RESULTS

7	ROLE OF THE CANADIAN FORCES	Percentage	No. of Community Responses
7a	Is there an expectation in your community that the Canadian Forces will provide assistance to your community in the event of an emergency or disaster if necessary?		
	Yes	85%	**78**
	No	14%	**13**
7b	Are community leaders or is your communities emergency management organization/ or person(s) charged with emergency preparedness aware of the existence of the Canadian Forces Canada Command?		
	Yes	75%	**69**
	No	24%	**22**
	if yes, has your community liaised with Canada Command about emergency preparedness?		
	Yes	46%	**42**
	No	24%	**22**
7c	Is there a Canadian Forces Reserve Unit located in your community?		
	Yes	61%	**56**
	No	30%	**28**
	if yes, does your EMC aware of role provided by Reserves in an emergency?		
	Yes	45%	**41**
	No	15%	**14**

	if yes, as CF Reserves been included in emergency planning process?		
	Yes	32%	**29**
	No	22%	**20**

FINDINGS

When reviewing the "Role of the Canadian Forces" section of the survey, the Committee's key finding was that while there was generally a high awareness of the role the Canadian Forces play during emergency management and response, communications between cities and the military could be improved.

- Responses to **Question 7B** indicate that 75% of municipalities were aware of the existence of Canadian Forces Canada Command, the entity in charge of all domestic force operations. Yet, only 46% have actually liaised with Canada Command.

- From answers to **Question 7C,** 61% of municipalities told us there is a Canadian Forces Reserve unit located in their community, but only 45% are aware of the role provided by the Reserves in an emergency. Even fewer (32%) have involved the Canadian Forces Reserve in emergency planning.

The lack of time and resources were among the reasons that more municipalities have not been in contact with the Forces regarding emergency planning.

Elaborating on why his municipality has not liaised with the Canadian Forces, Scott C. Tegler, Fire Chief & Community Emergency Management Coordinator for the City of Woodstock wrote in his community's survey response:

> [I] have not had the opportunity. In most municipalities, including mine, the role of Emergency Management Coordinator has been the addition of a full time job on top of the existing full time job I was currently responsible. Therefore, many of these details or regular duties fall by the [wayside], as there is not enough time in the day to appropriately accomplish. Some municipalities have created a full or part time position to directly deal with this position locally, however most have

not. There was no direct funding afforded municipalities to help offset the compensation for municipalities to hire such, and those who had it added to there portfolio, quite frankly are getting burnt out with all of the demands, and with trying to fulfill requirements through their own personal values.

8. Heavy Urban Search and Rescue

SURVEY RESULTS

8	HEAVY URBAN SEARCH AND RESCUE (HUSAR)	Percentage	No. of Community Responses
8a	Does your community have HUSAR capability?		
	Yes	13%	**12**
	No	82%	**75**
	Developing[213]	3%	**3**
8b	At what level is your HUSAR deployment capability ranked?		
	Category 1	17%	**2**
	Category 2	8%	**1**
	Category 3	33%	**4**
	Category 4	8%	**1**
	Category 5	17%	**2**
	No defined category[214]	17%	**2**
8d	Are there agreements in place for your HUSAR team to provide regional support in case of disasters or emergencies?		
	Yes	67%	**8**
	No	25%	**3**
8e	Is the goal of your HUSAR program to reach Category 5 deployment capability?		
	Yes	17%	**2**
	No	58%	**7**

[213] The choice "developing" was originally not available as a survey option, but upon closer examination of responses it was concluded that Ottawa, Thunder Bay and Victoriaville were developing a capability that was not fully operational.
[214] The choice "no defined category" was originally not available as a survey option, but two municipalities, Halifax and Winnipeg, did not specify a deployment category for their USAR team.

8f	Whose responsibility should it be to provide funding for HUSAR? (more than one can be selected)		
	Municipal	1%	**1**
	Provincial	20%	**18**
	Federal	26%	**24**
	all three	36%	**33**

FINDINGS

As noted earlier in the body of this report, there are 5 national and federally supported Heavy Urban Search and Rescue (HUSAR) teams. On top of this, there are a number of small Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) teams with varying capabilities. USAR is split into 5 deployment categories, from category 1 to 5. Category 1 is only capable of local deployment and Category 5 being able to deploy internationally. Category 5 teams are considered HUSAR.

- **Question 8A:** 82% of municipalities do not have an USAR team based in their community. At the time the survey was conducted (spring to fall 2007); Ottawa, Thunder Bay and Victoriaville were developing USAR capability.

- Responses to **Question 8D** indicate that 12 of the communities we surveyed have some Urban Search and Rescue capability. Of these teams, 8 have agreements in place for their team to provide regional support to neighbouring municipalities.

Of the 12 USAR teams, only 2 responded that their goal was to reach Category 5 deployment capability.

9. Critical Infrastructure Protection

SURVEY RESULTS

9	CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (CIP)	Percentage	No. of Community Responses
9a	Has your community identified critical infrastructure within its boundaries?		
	Yes	84%	**77**
	No	12%	**11**
9b	Does your community have a plan in place to protect critical infrastructure?		
	Yes	58%	**53**
	No	37%	**34**
9c	Has the federal government identified federal critical infrastructure in your community?		
	Yes	16%	**15**
	No	61%	**56**
	if yes, is your community responsible for protecting federal critical infrastructure?		
	Yes	10%	**9**
	No	20%	**18**
9d	Has your provincial government identified provincial critical infrastructure in your community?		
	Yes	34%	**31**
	No	40%	**37**
	if yes, is your community responsible for protecting provincial critical infrastructure?		
	Yes	16%	**15**
	No	24%	**22**

FINDINGS

A high percentage of municipalities have identified critical infrastructure as part of their general risk analysis. In many cases, critical infrastructure is built into a community's standardized risk assessment. As Barry Manuel, Emergency Measures Coordinator for the City of Halifax wrote in his community's survey response: "The 2007 HRVA [a standardized risk assessment tool] will be used to determine ownership of critical infrastructure, its relationship to the municipality and its citizens and the pathway needed to ensure its continued provision."

- Responses to **Questions 9A and 9B** indicate a disparity between identifying and protecting critical infrastructure. While 84% of municipalities have identified critical infrastructure within their boundaries, 58% of communities have a plan in place to protect it.

- Responses to **Question 9C and 9D** show low percentages of municipalities have provincial or federal critical infrastructure identified in their community (16% and 34% respectively).

While one reason may be that only a relatively low percentage of municipalities contain federal or provincial critical infrastructure, a closer examination of survey responses from large cities (which house important regional infrastructure) such as Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, Edmonton and Calgary shows that federal/provincial engagement regarding identification of infrastructure has been inconsistent.

Moreover, many municipalities responded that they simply did not know whether the federal/provincial governments had identified critical infrastructure in their city or town, and just neglected to tell them.

Appendix B: Complete List of New and Old Committee Recommendations

Problem 1: Lack of Emergency Management

2008 Recommendations

1. The Committee recommends that Public Safety Canada table an annual report in Parliament documenting the Business Continuity Plan of each government department and agency, and provide evidence whether they have been implemented and tested, and that the results be made available publicly.

2. The Committee recommends that if Public Safety Canada is unable or unwilling to table such a report, a third party national security auditor be appointed to do so.

2004 Recommendations

- The Committee recommended that Public Safety Canada conduct evaluations to ensure that all federal departments and agencies are able to continue to operate during a crisis and that their preparedness plans are in effect.[215]

Problem 2: Use of the Canadian Forces for Domestic Emergencies

2008 Recommendations

No new recommendations

[215] Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy, (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, March 2004), pg. 64. See recommendation 17 A - This sub-recommendation is a part of a larger recommendation that is dealt with below. The sub-recommendation is separated here because of its importance.

2004 Recommendations

- The Committee recommended that the Canadian Forces should enhance their capabilities to respond to national emergencies by:
    - Ensuring that the Regular Forces are equipped and trained to deal with significant emergencies in Canada and that they are involved in regional emergency planning;
    - Expanding the role of the Militia to be a civil defence force capable of quickly aiding local authorities in the event of a national emergency;
    - Involving the Militia in emergency planning and training in conjunction with municipalities across the country;
    - Equipping and training the Militia for emergency preparedness operations.
- The Committee recommended that the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (PSEPC) should:
    - Include the CF Militia in the national inventory of emergency preparedness resources; and provide first responders with details of the Militia's assets and capabilities.[216]

Problem 3: Hidden Emergency Caches

2008 Recommendations

3. The Committee recommends that for perishable supplies, Health Canada develop a tracking system, accessible to all orders of government, which would identify available providers throughout the provinces/territories.

[216] Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, March 2004), pg. 35, 47. See recommendation #3 and recommendations #10, 11.

4. The Committee recommends that regular live exercises, and a budget to support the live exercises, are established in order to test the new emergency supply tracking system.

5. The Committee recommends that First Responders have a greater say in the stockpiling of non-perishable emergency supplies, including where the inventories are held, whether there is duplication and how they are accessed.

2004 Recommendations

- The Committee recommended that Health Canada overhaul the way it administers and manages the emergency caches it controls, with the aim of more efficiently and effectively aiding first responder agencies to help Canadians across the country. The overhaul should ensure, among other things, that local officials are:
    - Made aware of the locations of any caches in their vicinity;
    - Advised how to access the caches in emergencies;
    - Given a role in determining caches' contents; and
    - Encouraged to include the caches in their planning and training.[217]

<u>Problem 4: Lack of Funding for Equipment & Training</u>

2008 Recommendations

6. The Committee recommends that the government should establish an evergreening fund dedicated to:

    a. Maintaining current Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) and CBRNE capabilities, including equipment purchase, maintenance,

[217] Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, March 2004), pg. 35. See recommendation #5.

and training for all relevant emergency workers, based on a negotiated funding formula;

b. Allow smaller municipalities attempting to set up USAR facilities to receive funding;

7. The Committee recommends that the government design a HUSAR kit that would fit into a Hercules aircraft (or C-17) enabling the Canadian Forces to transport USAR teams to emergency sites across Canada, or internationally, in a timely manner.

2004 Recommendations

- The federal government should provide four additional years of funding ($5 million per year) for the purchase of CBRN protection equipment.[218]

Problem 5: Poor Collaboration Among Governments

2008 Recommendations

8. The Committee recommends that the federal government identify municipal emergency officers across the country who require security clearances to receive federal information, ensure that they are checked out and given security clearances if they pass.

9. The Committee recommends that Public Safety Canada communicate directly with municipal emergency officers at any time that the department has information or other resources that could improve the emergency response capacity of these municipalities.

10. The Committee recommends that the federal government conduct a "value for money" audit of Public Safety Canada.

[218] Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, March 2004), pg. 36. See recommendation #6.

2004 Recommendations

The Committee recommended that:

- Public Safety Canada negotiate memoranda of understanding between the federal government and the provinces and territories that detail inter-jurisdictional responsibilities for both emergency preparedness and response.[219]

- The Minister of Public Safety Canada ensure that new effective data-sharing protocols and mutual assistance agreements between federal, provincial, territorial and municipal governments be implemented.[220]

Problem 6(a): Lessons Learned Not Remembered

2008 Recommendations

None

2004 Recommendations

- Public Safety Canada must structure its "lessons learned" archive so that it is:
    - Up to date and historically deep; and
    - Accessible and helpful to First Responders.[221]

- Public Safety Canada should act as a clearinghouse to assist other orders of government by distributing provincial / territorial and municipal "lessons learned" to other jurisdictions as required; and

- Public Safety Canada should also prepare and publish a preliminary public report within sixty (60) days of the emergency followed by a

[219] Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, March 2004), pg. 40. See recommendation #9.
[220] Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, March 2004), pg. 77. See recommendations #18 B.
[221] Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, March 2004), pg. 36. See recommendation #7.

formal public report within one year of any national emergency outlining "lessons learned" from the emergency and various responses to it.[222]

Problem 6(b): Lack of Leadership on Best Practices

2008 Recommendations

11. The Committee recommends that the government should call for tenders from Canadian universities and institutions involved in dealing with emergencies and transfer funding from Public Safety Canada to one such institution that will:

    a. Develop and maintain an online catalogue of "lessons learned" and "best practices" from past emergencies in Canada and around the world and share that catalogue with all Canadian first responders;

    b. Provide any Canadian municipality requesting it an audit of that municipality's emergency measures response capacity;

    c. Report to Parliament annually on any deficiencies it the institution might find in Canada's system of preparing for, and responding to, emergencies;

    d. Formulate a protocol to consult the emergency managers of different orders of governments & first responders for the purposes of determine how to best assemble national standards for best practices.

12. The Committee recommends that after each meeting of the Domestic Group on Emergency Management, the government should compile a list on topics discussed, information shared, and to convert this list into materials (i.e. workbooks, CDs, web content) that can be disseminated and used by first responders across the country.

[222] Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, March 2004), pg. 78. See recommendation #18 G (i).

2004 Recommendations

- The Committee recommended that the Minister and the Department of Public Safety Canada:

    - Ensure that Canadian communities are fully informed about the availability of training programs and other resources to help them prepare to respond to emergencies;

    - Facilitate and finance a peer review system among emergency managers and first responders to ensure that "best practices" are being implemented and to foster greater interoperability;

    - Ensure that all agreements to provide funds to provincial and territorial governments disclose what percentage of those funds will be given to first responders in the municipalities;

    - Prepare and publish reports annually to Parliament on its activities. This report should emphasize the measures that Public Safety Canada has taken to upgrade Canada's capacity to respond to national emergencies and the perceived shortfalls between assets and capabilities of first responders;[223]

    - Public Safety Canada, in cooperation with municipal emergency response units, provincial and federal governments, and relevant federal departments, develop a set of "best practices" for potential natural and man-made disasters.[224] (March 2004)

<u>Problem 7: Emergency Public Communications</u>

2008 Recommendations

None

[223] Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, March 2004), pg. 77, 78. See recommendations #18 A, D, E, F, and Recommendation G(ii). Parts B, C, and G(i) of recommendation #18 are addressed elsewhere in this chapter.

[224] Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, March 2004), pg. 77. See recommendation #18 C.

2004 Recommendations

- In order to ensure that authorities have the power and the capability to interrupt radio and television broadcasts during emergencies:
    - Public Safety Canada design standards for the establishment of emergency public warning systems for all provinces and territories;
    - the Governor in Council, by order, direct the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) to introduce such regulations as necessary to ensure that all public and private broadcasters are required to cooperate in the establishment of provincial / territorial and national public warning systems; and
    - a national emergency website with links to provincial and territorial emergency websites be established so that emergency information and instructions can quickly be communicated via the Internet during a national emergency.
- Public Safety Canada encourage the installation of a system like "Reverse 911®" in all municipalities, funding at least a third of the cost, with remaining costs to be divided between the provinces / territories and municipalities.[225]

Problem 8: Lack of First Responder Interoperability

2008 Recommendations

13. The Committee recommends that Public Safety Canada make first responder interoperability a specific item of discussion for the next iterations of the FPT Meeting of Ministers Responsible for Emergency Management.

[225] Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, March 2004), pg. 63. See recommendations #12 and 13.

14. The Committee recommends that Public Safety Canada involve provincial and municipal partners in the development of its National Public Safety Radio Communications Strategy within two years (by 2010).

2004 Recommendations

- Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (PSEPC) should enter into negotiations to equip the entire first responder community nationwide with handheld communications devices, with the federal government funding at least a third of the cost, with remaining costs to be divided between the provinces / territories and municipalities.

- Each order of government should create the capacity to communicate with its first responders, within itself and with other orders of government. All systems should have wireless back-ups.[226]

<u>Problem 9: First Responders Ignored</u>

2008 Recommendations

15. The Committee recommends that in hiring new personnel for the formation and implementation of emergency management policy, Public Safety Canada give first priority to persons with field experience in the first responder community.

16. The Committee recommends that "hands on" experience with first responders be required as training for all current Public Safety Canada employees who work in the area of emergency management policy in Canada, starting with the Deputy Minister and working down the management hierarchy.

[226] Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, March 2004), pg. 63-64. See recommendations #15.

2004 Recommendations

- The Committee recommended that Public Safety Canada develop a greater sensitivity to the differing needs of the First Responders in communities across Canada.

- The Committee recommended that the Minister of Public Safety Canada give direction to Public Safety Canada to restructure the national emergency preparedness system so that local concerns and needs form the core of preparedness planning and structures.[227]

Problem 10: Poor Federal Leadership on Critical Infrastructure Protection

2008 Recommendations

17. The Committee recommends that Public Safety Canada share "lessons learned" from its National Exercise Program with First Responders throughout the country.

18. The Committee recommends the re-instatement of Natural Resources Canada's Classified Briefings for Energy Sector Stakeholders.

19. The Committee recommends that models similar to Natural Resources Canada's Classified Briefings for Energy Sector Stakeholders be introduced throughout the 10 Critical Infrastructure Sectors.

20. The Committee recommends the release of the National Critical Infrastructure Protection Strategy by the end of 2008.

2004 Recommendations

- The Committee recommended that the Public Safety Canada be required to:

[227] Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, March 2004), pg. 64. See Recommendation #16.

- compile and maintain in cooperation with every municipality in Canada lists of the perceived vulnerabilities, emergency response assets, and shortfalls in assets and capabilities;

- hold meetings with provincial / territorial counterparts to discuss the deficiencies revealed as a result of the recommendation above; and

- conduct national emergency exercises in cooperation with other orders of government and prepare analyses on the "lessons learned".[228]

Problem 11: Emergency Ad Hockery

2008 Recommendations

21. The Committee recommends that Public Safety Canada complete and release the National Emergency Response System (NERS) not later than March 2009.

22. The Committee recommends that the Public Health Agency of Canada and Health Canada publicly release the National Health Incident Management System (NHIMS) not later than March 2009.

23. The Committee recommends that the Public Health Agency of Canada treat the 2008 Auditor General's report with the highest priority and that the agency report to Parliament as each recommendation is implemented. (For full list of the Auditor General's 2008 recommendations, see Appendix C).

24. The Committee recommends the Auditor General conduct a follow-up to the 2005 audit of emergency preparedness, and in particular, examine and assess the status of NERS.

[228] Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, March 2004), pg. 64. See recommendations #17 B, C and D.

2004 Recommendations

- The Committee recommended Health Canada develop a national plan to counteract potential outbreaks of anthrax, plague, botulism, tularemia and hemorrhagic fever and that it report to Parliament and the public by 31 March 2005 that this is completed.[229]

Problem 12(b): Policing During Emergencies

2008 Recommendations

25. The Committee recommends that the representatives of the federal, provincial and local police forces across Canada conduct national discussions in order to further clarify roles and responsibilities with regard to national security and emergency management.

26. The Committee recommends that there be an increase in the number of police officers to reach England's level – approximately 8,000 more police, consistent with what the Committee has been proposing with regard to the RCMP (5,000 to 7,000 additional members), and with the Government's commitment to an additional 2500 police officers.

No previous recommendations

Problem 12(c): The State of the Mounties Today

2008 Recommendations

27. The Committee's recommends that the Government grant the RCMP separate employer status.

28. The Committee's recommends that the Government fund annual increases to the RCMP budget to permit a growth of at least 700 personnel per year for each of the next 10 years.

[229] Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines – An Upgrade Strategy*, (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, March 2004), pg. 13. See recommendation #1.

29. The Committee's recommends that the RCMP provide a schedule of implementation for each of the recommendations in *The Brown Report.*

30. The Committee's recommends that the RCMP table a quarterly report to Parliament on whatever progress has been made on (a) separate employer status (b) increases in personnel (c) implementation of the various recommendations of *The Brown Report*.

No previous recommendations

Appendix C: List of Auditor General's Recommendations

List of recommendations taken from the *May 2008 Report of the Auditor General*, Chapter 5—Surveillance of Infectious Diseases—Public Health Agency of Canada, pp 32-35.

Recommendation	Response
Strategic directions	
5.22 To ensure effective management of risks posed by existing and emerging infectious diseases, the Public Health Agency of Canada should use public health threat assessments to set objectives and priorities for its national surveillance activities. **(5.15–5.21)**	**The Public Health Agency's response.** Agreed. The Agency is assessing, on a daily basis, public health risks to Canadians posed by existing and emerging infectious diseases, which are recorded in its Daily Intelligence Report. The Agency has written its Surveillance Strategy Framework, initiated its implementation process, and is committed to complete its implementation over the next three years. This will include a formalized decision process using health threat risk assessments to address priorities and objectives. The Agency's Integrated Risk Assessment Framework will be in place by December 2009.
5.28 To help clarify its roles and responsibilities, ensure that it receives relevant and timely surveillance information, and ensure that it has adequate legislative and regulatory authorities for the collection, use, and disclosure of public health information, the Public Health Agency of Canada should, with Health Canada, complete the legislative review and, if necessary, should seek the additional authorities for the Agency to carry out surveillance. **(5.23–5.27)**	**Health Canada and the Public Health Agency's response.** Agreed. The Agency and Health Canada will continue to work together to develop legislative and regulatory authorities for the collection, use, and disclosure of public health research and surveillance information.

5.33 To improve their ability to anticipate and control zoonotic diseases, the Public Health Agency of Canada and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency should jointly assess the possible risks to human and animal health, clarify how the responsibilities will be divided, and act on joint surveillance objectives and priorities. **(5.29–5.32)**	**The agencies' response.** Agreed. To further ensure collaboration and coordination, including clarification of roles and responsibilities for issues surrounding zoonotic diseases and the potential impacts on human and animal health, the Public Health Agency, CFIA, and Health Canada are currently finalizing a Memorandum of Understanding. In addition, the Public Health Agency addresses issues related to diseases transmitted via food and water through the Foodborne and Waterborne Issue Group, a federal-provincial-territorial committee of the Public Health Network. Also, a newly established Issue Group of the Communicable Disease Expert Group has been created to deal with issues related to animal-to-human infections that are not typically transmitted through food and water. This federal-provincial-territorial committee, as well as forums such as the annual National West Nile Virus and Other Non-Enteric Zoonotic Diseases meetings, provides the Public Health Agency a platform for discussion with stakeholders and the CFIA. CFIA and the Public Health Agency will implement a risk assessment by spring 2009 and enhancements will be made to the surveillance zoonotic alert module.
Existing infectious diseases	
5.39 The Public Health Agency of Canada should establish data-sharing agreements to ensure that it receives timely, complete, and accurate surveillance information from all provinces and territories. In collaboration with its partners, the Agency should set timelines for putting these agreements in place. **(5.34–5.38)**	**The Public Health Agency's response.** Agreed. The Agency recognizes the importance of sharing data in a timely, complete, and accurate fashion. Over the last three years, the Agency has worked with provinces and territories to put in place data-sharing agreements. It also participated in a number of provincial and territorial forums to address issues of surveillance information, such as the Public Health Network and the Committee of Chief Medical Officers of Health. Furthermore, the Agency is in the process of

	developing a Privacy Framework for the management of privacy issues, such as record information sharing and managed information sharing agreements, with an expected completion date of March 2009. During the 2008–09 fiscal year, the Agency will continue its partnership work with provinces and territories on information sharing and complete the portion of data-sharing agreements that is under its jurisdiction, while engaging provincial and territorial partners to complete their respective portions.
5.43 The Public Health Agency of Canada should work with its partners to implement agreed-on standards for the data it receives from provinces and territories. Steps should include finalizing agreements with all provinces and territories on the data to be provided for each infectious disease. **(5.40–5.42)**	Agreed. The standards for notifiable diseases were agreed to and signed by one province as of September 2007. The Agency will continue working toward finalizing more of these data-sharing agreements with provinces and territories. Additionally, the revised case definitions for notifiable diseases will be finalized and published by December 2009.
5.46 To ensure adequate data quality to support public health actions, the Public Health Agency of Canada should put in place the necessary procedures for assessing and documenting its data quality, and should work with its partners to address deficiencies. **(5.44–5.45)**	Agreed. The Agency has been working and will continue its work to formalize the data quality checks that it has already undertaken. A data quality process has been piloted within the Agency and is expected to be completed by March 2009. As outlined in the Surveillance Strategy Framework, the Agency will continue to strengthen its existing activities to formalize procedures internally, and will work with partners to address any deficiencies that become apparent.
5.50 The Public Health Agency of Canada should periodically evaluate its surveillance systems to ensure that they are working as intended, and it should report the results publicly. **(5.47–5.49)**	Agreed. During the 2008–09 fiscal year, the Agency will finalize and implement the existing Evaluation Framework for Surveillance Systems throughout the organization. This Framework will be used to perform regular evaluations of surveillance systems.
5.51 To regularly measure the performance of its surveillance systems, the Public Health Agency of Canada should establish indicators	Agreed. In conjunction with current work being done on revising and detailing its Strategic Outcome and Program Activities, the Agency will work to establish required

with targets and report the results against those targets. **(5.47–5.49)**	indicators and subsequent reporting in the 2009–10 fiscal year.
5.54 To ensure that its surveillance systems for HIV, the West Nile virus, and the influenza virus are best meeting the needs of the users, the Public Health Agency of Canada should systematically assess and document the user needs. **(5.52–5.53)**	Agreed. The Agency will implement a user needs assessment program for surveillance systems by December 2008.
New international commitments	
5.88 To ensure that it can meet its obligations under the *International Health Regulations*, the Public Health Agency of Canada should ensure that its internal systems for managing information about significant public health events are comprehensive and well-documented. **(5.74–5.87)**	Agreed. In the 2008–09 and 2009–10 fiscal years, the Agency will formalize comprehensive and well-documented internal systems for managing information during a significant public health event. This will be accomplished through strengthening existing daily briefings of executive management, and responsible officers of data systems laboratories, and relevant surveillance systems.
5.89 To ensure that it can meet its obligations under the *International Health Regulations*, the Public Health Agency of Canada should work with its partners to establish an action plan with clear and realistic deadlines for implementing the memorandum of understanding on the sharing of information during a public health emergency. **(5.74–5.87)**	Agreed. The Agency continues to work on a comprehensive plan to ensure that it meets its obligations under the *International Health Regulations*. This includes finalizing the Memorandum of Understanding on Information Sharing during a Public Health Emergency developed by the Public Health Network's Surveillance and Information Expert Group, and, during the 2008–09 fiscal year, supporting and participating in the collaborative action plan for its implementation. Also, as required by the World Health Organization, the Agency will work with partners to develop a comprehensive action plan by December 2009 that will outline how Canada intends to meet its obligations under the Regulations. The Agency believes that Canada's public health systems are in a much better position than in 2003 to deal with an infectious disease threat of national importance. For example, the

	agreements that have been concluded between the Agency and its partners since 2004 and the experience of events that have occurred since SARS demonstrate the ability of the Agency and its partners nationally and internationally to address public health threats effectively.
5.91 To comply with Treasury Board Secretariat requirements and aid negotiations with the provinces and territories, the Public Health Agency of Canada should take steps to complete a privacy impact assessment that covers the information-sharing requirements outlined in the memorandum of understanding on the sharing of information during a public health emergency. **(5.90)**	

Appendix D: Infectious Diseases Threats

Infectious Disease Threats

Dr Frank Plummer, PhD

Scientific Director General

Public Health Agency of Canada
NATIONAL MICROBIOLOGY LABORATORY

Agent	Disease Syndrome	Mortality	Specific Prevention/ Treatment	Methods of dissemin-ation	Possible human to human transmission	Area of endemicity	Research on weaponiz-ation in the past	Used as a bioweapon in the past
Category A								
Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis)	Pneumonia and skin infection	Approaching 100%	Preventable and treatable with antibiotics. Vaccine available for the military	Aerosol	no	Ubiquitous in soil including in Canada	yes	yes, dissemination of weaponized anthrax via the US postal system in 2001
Botulism (*Clostridium botulinum* toxin)	Paralytic neurologic syndrome	10%	Treatment is primarily supportive (respiratory support)	Food or water	no	Ubiquitous in the environment including in Canada	yes	no
Plague (Yersinia pestis)	Pneumonia	Approaching 100%	Preventable and treatable with antibiotics. Vaccines available for the military	Flea bites, aerosol	yes	Worldwide in rodents	yes	yes, used by the Japanese in China during World War II and in medieval times
Smallpox (Variola major)	Fever, severe pustular rash, multiple organ failure	30% in the era when smallpox was circulating and the population	Vaccine available (stockpiled) but no specific treatment	Aerosol, trans-cutaneous	yes	Only known to exist in 2 laboratories in the US and Russia	yes	yes, used by English colonists against First Nations in

		was highly vaccinated						North America
Agent	Disease Syndrome	Mortality	Specific Prevention/ Treatment	Methods of dissemin-ation	Possible human to human transmission	Area of endemicity	Research on weapon-ization in the past	Used as a bioweapon in the past
Tularemia (*Francisella tularensis*)	Pneumonia	<2%	Preventable and treatable with antibiotics	Aerosol, trans-cutaneous	no	Ubiquitous in nature including in Canada	yes	no
Viral hemorrhagic fevers (e.g., Ebola, Marburg, Lassa, Machupo viruses)	Fever, multiple organ failure, bleeding	50-80%	No specific treatment or vaccines	Trans-cutaneous, mucous membrane exposure	yes	Endemic in animals (bats and others) in Africa, Asia and South America	yes	no
Category B								
Brucellosis (*Brucella* species)	Recurrent fever and involvement of multiple organs	Less than 2%	Preventable and treatable with antibiotics.	Aerosol, consumption of cheese or milk	no	Ubiquitous in ruminant animals including in Canada	yes	no
Epsilon toxin of *Clostridium perfringens*	Diarrhea, abdominal cramping	Rare	No specific treatment	Food or water, aerosol	no	Ubiquitous throughout the world including in Canada	no	no

INFECTIOUS DISEASES THREATS

Agent	Disease Syndrome	Mortality	Treatment	Methods of dissemin-ation	Possible human to human transmission	Area of endemicity	Research on weaponiz-ation in the past	Used as a bioweapon in the past
Food safety threats (e.g., *Salmonella*, *Escherichia coli* O157:H7, *Shigella*)	Mild to severe diarrhea, rarely kidney failure	Unusual	No specific treatment for most	Food and water		Ubquitous in food animals and soil	no	yes, deliberate contamination of a salad bar with Salmonella by an Oregon religious sect
Glanders (*Burkholderia mallei*)	Skin infection, pneumonia, bloodstream infection	High for pulmonary and blood stream infection	Preventable and treatable with antibiotics.	Aerosol, trans-cutaneous	rarely	Endemic in horses in Africa, Asia, Middle East, Central and South America	Yes	Yes, used in World War I by the Germans against Allied horses
Meliodosis (*Burkholderia pseudomallei*)	Skin infection, pneumonia, bloodstream infection	Bloodstream infections are occassionally fatal	Preventable and treatable with antibiotics.	Ingestion of contaminated water, aerosol,	rarely	Endemic in soil and water in South East Asia	no	no
Psittacosis (*Chlamydia psittaci*)	Pneumonia	Mortality is relative low	Preventable and treatable with antibiotics.	Aerosol	no	Ubiquitous in wild and domestic birds world wide	no	no

Agent	Disease Syndrome	Mortality	Treatment	Methods of dissemin-ation	Possible human to human transmission	Area of endemicity	Research on weaponiz-ation in the past	Used as a bioweapon in the past
Q fever (*Coxiella burnetii*)	Pneumonia	Mortality is relatively rare	Preventable and treatable with antibiotics.	Aerosol	rarely	Endemic world wide in ruminants including in Canada	no	no
Ricin toxin from *Ricinus communis* (castor beans)	Respiratory failure, nausea, vomiting and diarrhea	Approaching 100%	No specific treatment	Aerosol, ingestion of contaminated food or water, trans-cutaneous	no	Castor beans are grown world wide	yes	Yes, used to poison a Bulgarian dissident in 1978. The UK detected a ricin manufacturing plot by an Islamic terrorist cell in 2003. There have been several ricin containing letters in the US
Staphylo-coccal enterotoxin B	Severe nausea and vomiting	Very rare	No specific treatment	Ingestion of contaminated food	no	Ubiquitous throughout the world including in Canada	no	no

Agent	Disease Syndrome	Mortality	Treatment	Methods of dissemin-ation	Possible human to human transmission	Area of endemicity	Research on weaponiz-ation in the past	Used as a bioweapon in the past
Typhus fever (*Rickettsia prowazekii*)	Fever, cough, muscle aches and pains, rash,	<5%	Preventable and treatable with antibiotics.	Louse bites, aerosol	no	Endemic in Africa, Central Asia, Central and South America	no	no
Viral encephalitis (alphaviruses [e.g., Venezuelan equine encephalitis, eastern equine encephalitis, western equine encephalitis]	Fever, headache, neurologic symptoms	<5%	No specific treatment	Mosquito bites, aerosol	no	Endemic in North and South America including in Canada	no	no
Water safety threats (e.g., *Vibrio cholerae*, *Cryptosporidium parvum)*	Moderate to severe diarrhea	rare		Contaminated water	no	Except for cholera, ubiquitous throughout the world including in Canada	no	no

Agent	Disease Syndrome	Mortality	Treatment	Methods of dissemin-ation	Possible human to human transmission	Area of endemicity	Research on weaponiz-ation in the past	Used as a bioweapon in the past
Category C								
Emerging infectious diseases such as Nipah virus, hantavirus, pandemic influenza	various	aerosol	No specific treatment	Varies with the agent		Available in natural reservoirs (birds, bats, rodents) through out the world	no	no

Appendix E: RCMP Personnel Levels

The following is the Committee's view of appropriate levels of RCMP personnel, broken down into the different national security issues the Committee has explored in previous reports and recommendations. "Personnel" refers to full time uniformed RCMP officers.

Security File	Current RCMP Staffing Level	Committee's Proposed Personnel Level	Committee's Justification for Proposed Personnel Level
Airports	100	600-800	• The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada increase the size of the RCMP by between 600 and 800 full-time equivalents (FTEs) in order to provide the RCMP with the capacity to: o Execute a new mandate of oversight and responsibility for security at airports and, o Expand its investigative and analytical capabilities at airports within the National Airport System. Source: Canadian Security Guide Book: 2007 Edition: Airports Page 14, Recommendation #A1
Sea Ports	29	1300-1500	• The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada increase the size of the RCMP National Port Enforcement Teams by between 1,300 and 1,500 full-time equivalents (FTEs) in order to provide the RCMP with the capacity to: o Combat organized crime at the 19 ports in the National Ports System; o Prevent and respond to threats to the national security of Canada that originate from Canada's marine ports; and o Increase, through joint force operations with provincial and local police forces, the number of waterside police in marine

			ports situated on the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway System and on major rivers. Source: Canadian Security Guide Book: 2007 Edition: Seaports Page 24, Recommendation v
Great Lakes	14 (to 30 in 2008)	1200-1400	• The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada increase the size of the RCMP Marine and Ports Branch by between 1,200 and 1,400 full-time equivalents (FTEs) in order to provide the RCMP with the capacity to: o Provide sufficient coverage and patrol capacity to effectively enforce federal statutes on the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway (GL/SLS); o Gain better situational awareness of activities on the GL/SLS; o Maintain interdiction capacity on the GL/SLS on a 24-7 basis; o Have the capacity to become an effective partner to the USCG in securing the GL/SLS. Source: Canadian Security Guide Book: 2007 Edition: Coasts Page 43, Recommendation #C9
Land Border	145	2200-2800	This estimate is based on the following calculations: • that the existing program of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams needs to grow nationwide and each team needs to expand its investigative and analytical capabilities (approximately 100-120 personnel per IBET to a total of **1500-1800** personnel); • that the RCMP must increase its situational awareness of activity along the border by expanding its use of innovative technologies like UAVs and helicopters (total number of personnel **100-200**); and

			• that the RCMP must increase its capacity to protect the 8,891 km border with the United States and 24 rail crossings. This includes: providing protection and safety for the CBSA personnel working at Canada's 119 land border crossings, and the 716 maritime facilities serviced by CBSA through strengthening existing IBETs, RCMP detachments and co-location with CBSA (total approx **600-800** personnel).
Total	**288**	**5300-6500**	

Appendix F: Canadian Forces Attrition Numbers

The following document was obtained through a Request for Information sent by the Parliamentary Information and Research Service on 27 June 2008 to the Department of National Defence.

The Department of National Defence issued the following reply in July 2008.

The Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence
Request for Information – Recruitment and Attrition Numbers

Question: Please provide the recruitment and attrition numbers for the CF in the current fiscal year (2007-08).

Answer: 31 March 2008 the CF has recruited 6,716 personnel in fiscal year 2007-2008. During that same period the attrition number for the CF was 6,088 personnel. This resulted in a net increase of 628 people.

Appendix G: Glossary of Terms

BCP – Business Continuity Plan
CANCOM – Canada Command (located in DND)
CBRNE – Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive
CEMC – Canadian Emergency Management College (located in PSC)
CEPR – Center for Emergency Preparedness and Response (located in PHAC)
CNS – Community Notification System
EMA – Emergency Management Act
EMO – Emergency Management Organization
EOC – Emergency Operations Centre
FEMA – (United States) Federal Emergency Management Agency
FERP – Federal Emergency Response Plan (located in PSC)
FERS – Federal Emergency Response System (located in PSC)
FTP (or F/T/P) – Federal/Territorial/Provincial
GHSI – Global Health Security Initiative (located in PHAC)
GHSAGLN – Global Health Security Action Group Laboratory Network (located in PHAC)
GOC – Government Operations Centre (located in PSC)
GSP – Government Security Policy
HUSAR – Heavy Urban Search and Rescue
HERT – Health Emergency Response Team (located in PHAC)
ITAC – Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (located in PSC)
JEPP – Joint Emergency Preparedness Program (located in JEPP)
LFRR – Land Force Reserve Restructure (located in DND)
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NED – National Exercise Division (located in PSC)
NCIAP – National Critical Infrastructure Assurance Program (located in PSC)
NOHERT – National Office of Health Emergency Response Teams (located in PHAC)
NERS – National Emergency Response System (located in PSC)
NESS – National Emergency Stockpile System (located in PHAC)
NHIMS – National Health Incident Management System (located in PHAC)
NSP – National Security Policy
MOU – Memorandum of Understanding
OECD – Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OERS – Office of Emergency Response Services (located in PHAC)

PS&S – Public Safety and Security
PT (or P/T) – Province and Territories
SARS – Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
SOREM – Senior Officials Responsible For Emergency Management
USAR – Urban Search and Rescue

FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS/AGENCIES

CF – Canadian Forces
CSIS – Canadian Security Intelligence Service
CRTC – Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission
DND – Department of National Defence
HC – Health Canada
PHAC – Public Health Agency of Canada
PSC – Public Safety Canada
RCMP – Royal Canadian Mounted Police

LA PROTECTION CIVILE AU CANADA

Comment le bel art de la langue de bois et de la procrastination entrave les gens qui voudront vous aider quand le pire surviendra …

Rapport du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense

<u>Membres du comité</u>

Sén. Colin Kenny – Président
Sén. David Tkachuk – Vice-président
Sén. Tommy Banks
Sén. Joseph A. Day
Sén. Grant Mitchell
Sén. Michael A. Meighen
Sén. Wilfred P. Moore
Sén. Nancy Ruth
Sén. Rod A. A. Zimmer

Volume 1
Deuxième session
Trente-neuvième législature
2008

Le rapport *La protection civile au Canada* comprend quatre volumes.
Le premier volume contient les observations et recommandations du comité.
Les volumes 2, 3 et 4 regroupent les réponses fournies par 92 des 100 municipalités sondées par le comité.

Les quatre volumes sont disponibles en ligne à www.sen-sec.ca.
Des copies papier sont disponibles sur demande.

Pour tout renseignement :
Site Web du comité : www.sen-sec.ca
Greffières du comité : defence@sen.parl.gc.ca
1-800-267-7362 (numéro sans frais)

This document is available in English

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LE COMITÉ SÉNATORIAL PERMANENT DE LA SÉCURITÉ NATIONALE ET DE LA DÉFENSE
39e législature, 2e session

L'honorable Colin Kenny
Président

L'honorable David Tkachuk
Vice-président

et

Les honorables sénateurs :

Tommy Banks
Joseph A. Day
Michael A. Meighen
Grant Mitchell
Wilfred P. Moore
Nancy Ruth
Rod A.A. Zimmer

*L'honorable Marjory Lebreton, C.P. (ou l'honorable Gerald Comeau)
*L'honorable Céline Hervieux-Payette, C.P.
(ou l'honorable Claudette Tardif)
*Membres d'office

Autres sénateurs qui ont participé au travail du comité à ce sujet :
Les honorables sénateurs Dallaire, Downe, Massicotte, Nolin, Peterson et Segal

Conseillers spéciaux du comité :
MGen (ret) Keith McDonald et Barry Denofsky

Personnel de recherche de la Bibliothèque du Parlement :
Melissa Radford, Maureen Shields, Jason Yung et Steven James

Greffières du comité :
Shaila Anwar et Gaëtane Lemay

Extrait des *Journaux du Sénat*, le mardi 20 novembre 2007 :

L'honorable sénateur Kenny propose, appuyé par l'honorable sénateur Banks,

Que le Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense soit autorisé à mener une étude et à faire rapport sur la politique de sécurité nationale du Canada. Le comité sera en particulier autorisé à examiner:

a) la capacité du ministère de la Défense nationale de défendre et de protéger les intérêts, la population et le territoire du Canada et sa capacité de réagir à une urgence nationale ou à une attaque et de prévenir ces situations, ainsi que la capacité du ministère de la Sécurité publique et de la Protection civile de remplir son mandat;

b) les relations de travail entre les divers organismes participant à la collecte de renseignements, comment ils recueillent, colligent, analysent et diffusent ces renseignements, et comment ces fonctions pourraient être améliorées;

c) les mécanismes d'examen de la performance et des activités des divers organismes participant à la collecte de renseignements;

d) la sécurité de nos frontières et de nos infrastructures essentielles;

Que les documents reçus, les témoignages entendus, et les travaux accomplis par le comité sur ce sujet depuis le début de la première session de la trente-septième législature soient renvoyés au comité;

Que le comité fasse rapport au Sénat au plus tard le 31 mars 2009 et qu'il conserve tous les pouvoirs nécessaires pour diffuser ses conclusions pendant les 90 jours suivant le dépôt de son rapport final.

La motion, mise aux voix, est adoptée.

Le greffier du Sénat
Paul C. Bélisle

Les urgences nationales

Encore une fois, un comité alarmiste tente de terrifier les Canadiens!

C’est faux. Nous n’essayons pas de terrifier qui que ce soit.

Mais il y a des choses qui arrivent, des situations d’urgence qui surviennent. Pas assez pour que les Canadiens restent continuellement sur le qui-vive et soient prêts à courir aux abris au pied levé, mais quand même assez pour que des personnes intelligentes exploitent une partie de leurs vastes ressources pour se préparer à faire face à des situations tragiques ou à se défendre en pareilles circonstances.

Mais se préparer à quel genre de situations?

Un tremblement de terre, une panne de courant, une explosion, une épidémie de maladie infectieuse, une fuite de gaz, la contamination de l’approvisionnement en eau, un attentat terroriste, une panne des grands réseaux informatiques, la fusion du cœur d’un réacteur nucléaire, un tsunami, un tireur fou, un incendie de forêt, une inondation, pour n’en nommer que quelques-unes.

Ce ne sont pas des situations très fréquentes, surtout au Canada, mais nous ne sommes pas entièrement à l’abri. Certaines peuvent être prévenues, d’autres pas, mais dans tous les cas, on peut se préparer et réduire les risques qu’elles ne tournent à la catastrophe.

Le Comité sénatorial de la sécurité nationale et de la défense tient à établir deux choses. Premièrement, le ciel n’est pas en train de nous tomber sur la tête. Deuxièmement, le ciel n’est peut-être pas en train de nous tomber sur la tête, mais nous aurons bientôt l’impression que c’est le cas au Canada, et les gouvernements canadiens ne sont pas pressés de limiter les dégâts.

Des années se sont écoulées depuis les sonneries d’alarme qui se sont fait entendre le 21 juillet 1987 (la tornade à Edmonton), le 20 juillet 1996 (les

inondations au Saguenay), le 29 avril 1997 (la crue de la rivière Rouge, au Manitoba), le 9 janvier 1998 (la tempête de verglas dans l'est de l'Ontario et l'ouest du Québec), le 11 septembre 2001 (les attentats terroristes à Manhattan et à Washington), le 5 mars 2003 (l'épidémie de SRAS à Toronto), le 14 août 2003 (la plus grosse panne de courant de l'histoire en Amérique du Nord), le 28 septembre 2003 (l'ouragan Juan, en Nouvelle-Écosse) et ainsi de suite.

Dans l'intervalle, divers ordres de gouvernement ont fait des efforts, que l'on pourrait qualifier de minuscules, en vue d'améliorer la coordination nationale des secours en cas de catastrophe.

Dans les pages qui suivent, le Comité s'intéresse aux efforts accomplis par le gouvernement pour mieux préparer le Canada à des catastrophes et accroître sa capacité de réaction en pareille situation, notamment dans les domaines suivants :

- le maintien des services essentiels en situation d'urgence;
- l'aide que peuvent offrir les Forces canadiennes en situation d'urgence;
- l'utilité de dépôts d'urgence aménagés à différents endroits au pays;
- l'attribution de fonds aux municipalités pour l'acquisition d'équipement et la formation à son usage;
- la collaboration entre les gouvernements fédéral, provinciaux, territoriaux et municipaux;
- l'archivage des leçons apprises et des pratiques exemplaires;
- les communications publiques d'urgence;
- les services de police dans des situations d'urgence.

Pour l'étude de ces questions, le Comité a reçu le concours de plus de 110 témoins qui ont comparu devant lui entre 2001 et 2008, à Ottawa et ailleurs, et examiné deux études sur la protection civile – la première réalisée en 2003, et la seconde en 2007. Le présent rapport s'inspire principalement de cette deuxième étude à laquelle ont participé 92 coordonnateurs municipaux des mesures d'urgence qui ont répondu à nos questions concernant leur capacité de faire face aux urgences, leur perception du rendement des paliers supérieurs de gouvernement en ce qui a trait à la préparation aux urgences, et les lacunes à combler, selon eux, pour améliorer la capacité du Canada de réagir aux urgences.

Le rapport porte essentiellement sur les mesures prises par le gouvernement au cours des dernières années pour nous préparer à la prochaine grande catastrophe.

Ce n’est malheureusement pas très glorieux dans l’ensemble comme effort.

Protection civile

Problème n° 1 :
Manque de gestion des urgences

Le problème, tel que nous l'avons vu en 2004 : Les ministères fédéraux n'étaient pas soumis à des évaluations afin de s'assurer que les activités essentielles du gouvernement puissent être maintenues efficacement en temps de crise. Apparemment, les pannes qui se sont produites lorsque le centre et l'Est du Canada ont été plongés dans le noir en août 2003 n'ont pas servi de leçon. On ne devrait permettre à aucun politicien ou bureaucrate d'oublier que durant cette crise, alors que le Cabinet du Premier ministre aurait dû fonctionner avec une efficacité maximale, il s'éclairait aux chandelles.

RECOMMANDATION DU COMITÉ (2004)

- **Le Comité a recommandé que Sécurité publique Canada effectue des évaluations pour s'assurer que tous les ministères et organismes fédéraux sont en mesure de maintenir leurs activités en temps de crise et que leurs plans d'intervention sont effectifs[1].**

RÉPONSES DU GOUVERNEMENT AUX RECOMMANDATIONS DU COMITÉ (2006-2008)

Deux ans et demi plus tard, le 20 août 2006, Sécurité publique Canada[2] répondait par écrit à la recommandation de 2004 du Comité :

> « Aux termes des alinéas 4(1)*a*), *b*), *c*) du projet de loi C-12 (la nouvelle *Loi sur la gestion des urgences*), le ministre de la Sécurité publique établirait des principes, programmes et autres mesures et conseillerait relativement à

[1] Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Les urgences nationales : Le Canada, fragile en première ligne – Stratégie de renforcement*, Ottawa, Sénat du Canada, mars 2004, p. 66. Voir la recommandation 17 A – Cette sous-recommandation fait partie d'une plus vaste recommandationqui est abordée ci-après; elle est présentée séparément ici en raison de son importance.
[2] Sécurité publique Canada était appelé Sécurité publique et protection civile Canada (SPPCC) jusqu'en 2007. Dans le présent rapport, le Comité utilisera le nouveau nom, mais ne modifiera pas les textes externes qui font référence à l'ancien SPPCC.

> l'élaboration, la mise à jour, la mise à l'essai et la mise en œuvre des plans de gestion des urgences du gouvernement du Canada[3]. »

La *Loi sur la gestion des urgences* a été adoptée le 22 juin 2007[4] et conférait au ministre de la Sécurité publique le pouvoir d'établir des politiques et des programmes, de prendre d'autres mesures et de fournir des conseils relativement à l'élaboration, la mise à jour, la mise à l'essai et la mise en œuvre des plans de gestion des urgences du gouvernement du Canada. Qu'a-t-on fait au juste?

Le 19 septembre 2007, les attachés de recherche de la Bibliothèque du Parlement[5] ont effectué un suivi avec Sécurité publique Canada en lui demandant : « Quel travail a été réalisé à l'égard des " plans de gestion des urgences " que le ministre de la Sécurité publique est habilité à établir? » Voici la réponse reçue cinq mois plus tard, le 26 février 2008 :

> Sécurité publique Canada (SP) a créé une Division planification de la gestion des mesures d'urgence, qui fournit une perspective stratégique à l'égard des activités de planification. La première activité de la Division consistait à animer la négociation du Plan nord-américain contre l'influenza aviaire et la pandémie d'influenza avec le Mexique et les États-Unis.
>
> D'après l'alinéa 6(2)*c*) de la *Loi sur la gestion des urgences* (LGU), tout plan de gestion des urgences prévoit « les programmes, dispositions et autres mesures visant à assurer la continuité des activités de l'institution fédérale advenant une urgence ». Au gouvernement du Canada, ces plans sont couramment appelés « Plan de continuité des opérations » (PCO). Outre la LGU, la Politique du gouvernement sur la sécurité (PGS) et la Politique de sécurité nationale (PSN) exigent des ministères qu'ils disposent de PCO visant à faire en sorte que le gouvernement fédéral puisse maintenir la prestation des services essentiels pour les Canadiens en cas de perturbation. Ces deux politiques sont à la disposition du public.

---

[3] Sécurité publique du Canada, « Réponse de SPPCC et du Portefeuille aux rapports du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense (CSPSND) », 30 août 2006, p. 18.

[4] La *Loi sur la gestion des* urgences, Première session, trente-neuvième législature, 55-56 Elizabeth II, 2006-2007. Pour le texte de la loi, voir http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?pub=bill&doc=C-12&parl=39&ses=1&language=F&File=32.

[5] La correspondance du 19 septembre 2007 avec Sécurité publique Canada s'est déroulée durant une période de prorogation (du 14 septembre 2007 au 16 octobre 2007). Or, pendant une prorogation, la Chambre et le Sénat (et leurs comités) sont dissous. La correspondance liée au présent rapport concernant cette période a été faite par la Bibliothèque du Parlement à la demande du sénateur Colin Kenny, le président actuel du Comité.

> En ce qui concerne les PCO, la PSN [Politique de sécurité nationale] confie à SP la tâche d'effectuer « un examen des plans de continuité des opérations des ministères fédéraux afin d'assurer leur capacité de continuer de gérer leurs opérations en situation d'urgence ».
>
> La PGS [Politique du gouvernement sur la sécurité] mentionne que : « Les ministères doivent établir un programme de planification de la continuité opérationnelle pour permettre la disponibilité continue des services et des biens essentiels, et de tout autre service ou bien dont la disponibilité est jugée importante selon une évaluation des menaces et des risques[6]. »

LE DÉFI POUR LE GOUVERNEMENT (2008)

Toujours aucune garantie que le gouvernement fédéral fonctionnera en cas de crise

Un plan nord-américain contre la pandémie était nécessaire, et le Comité félicite la Division planification de la gestion des mesures d'urgence pour avoir joué un rôle prépondérant dans la mise en place de ce plan.

Maintenant, en ce qui concerne la recommandation du Comité : Sécurité publique Canada a-t-il effectué des évaluations pour s'assurer que tous les ministères et organismes fédéraux sont en mesure de maintenir leurs activités en temps de crise et que leurs plans d'intervention sont effectifs? A-t-il vérifié les Plans de continuité des opérations des autres ministères afin de s'assurer qu'ils disposent de systèmes leur permettant de faire face à une urgence?

La réponse de 2008 de Sécurité publique Canada indique qu'il est *exigé* que chaque ministère dispose d'un Plan de continuité des opérations; elle indique aussi que Sécurité publique Canada a la *tâche* d'effectuer un examen de ces plans. Mais est-ce que chaque ministère en a vraiment un, et est-ce que chaque ministère a été évalué par Sécurité publique Canada afin de s'assurer que son plan est effectif?

[6] Sécurité publique Canada, « Questions de suivi à l'intention de Sécurité publique Canada relativement aux : Recommandations et réponses du Portefeuille/SP au Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense (CSPSND) (30 août 2006) », 26 février 2008, p. 1.

Nous n'avons pas les réponses à ces questions, mais comme la vérificatrice générale l'a écrit en examinant les plans d'intervention en cas d'urgence de Sécurité publique Canada en avril 2005 :

> **L'article 7 de la *Loi sur la protection civile*[7] exige que les ministères élaborent un plan d'intervention lié à leur secteur de responsabilité. À mesure que les situations d'urgence évolueront et exigeront l'intervention d'un nombre accru de ministères et d'organismes, nous sommes d'avis qu'il pourrait y avoir un conflit, pour les ministères mobilisés, entre la nécessité de collaborer avec d'autres ministères et le respect du secteur de responsabilité correspondant à leur mandat.**
>
> **Les représentants de SPPCC n'ont pas été en mesure de nous soumettre une liste des plans d'intervention d'urgence ministériels qui pourraient être appliqués en cas d'une attaque terroriste CBRN. Nous n'avons par ailleurs pas pu obtenir de leur part une analyse expliquant la manière dont les plans pourraient être coordonnés pour mener une intervention fédérale uniforme s'il se présentait une situation d'urgence complexe nécessitant la mobilisation de plusieurs ministères[8].**

À l'instar de la vérificatrice générale, le Comité n'a pas obtenu de preuve attestant l'existence même de plans d'intervention d'urgence fédéraux.

Aucun plan théorique n'a de valeur si ses éléments n'ont pas été mis en place. Et même si le plan a été mis en place, on ne peut

---

[7] La *Loi sur la gestion des urgences* de 2007 remplace certaines parties de la *Loi sur la protection civile* de 1985 afin de renforcer « la capacité du gouvernement du Canada d'intervenir lors d'urgences grâce à une meilleure planification, effectuée au moyen d'un cadre normalisé, et grâce à un partage clair des rôles et des responsabilités des ministres fédéraux ». La *Loi sur la protection civile* reste le principal texte législatif régissant la gestion des urgences. Pour de plus amples renseignements sur les deux lois, voir Sécurité publique Canada, « FAQ – Dépôt de la *Loi sur la gestion des urgences* », site http://www.securitepublique.gc.ca/media/nr/2006/nr20060508-3-fra.aspx.

[8] Vérificateur général du Canada. « Chapitre 2 – La sécurité nationale au Canada -- L'initiative de 2001 en matière d'antiterrorisme — Sûreté du transport aérien, sécurité maritime et protection civile », dans *Rapport du vérificateur général du Canada*, Bureau du vérificateur général du Canada, avril 2005, p. 28, voir site http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/Francais/aud_ch_oag_200504_2_f_14933.html.

s'y fier tant qu'il n'a pas été testé. Le Comité présume que si des systèmes étaient en place et qu'ils avaient été testés, les réponses en feraient mention. Ce qui n'est pas le cas. Nous ne possédons aucune preuve que la mise en place a été faite et que les tests ont eu lieu. Cela signifie que les Canadiens n'ont aucune garantie que les activités essentielles du gouvernement fonctionneront durant les urgences.

NOUVELLES RECOMMANDATIONS :

Le Comité recommande :

1. Que Sécurité publique Canada dépose un rapport annuel au Parlement établissant les détails du Plan de continuité des opérations de chaque ministère et organisme gouvernemental et qu'il fasse la preuve que celui-ci a été mis en place et testé, et que les résultats soient rendus publics.

2. Dans le cas où Sécurité publique Canada est incapable de déposer un rapport de ce genre ou est réticent à le faire, que cette tâche soit confiée à un tiers vérificateur de la sécurité nationale.

Problème n° 2 :
Le recours aux Forces canadiennes pour les situations d'urgence intérieures

Le problème, tel que nous l'avons vu en 2004 : La Force régulière et la Force de réserve des Forces canadiennes n'ont pas de rôle attitré dans la protection civile. Rien ne garantit que les Forces répondront à un appel en cas d'urgence nationale, même si nombre de Canadiens croient qu'elles le feraient. Le lieutenant-colonel Blair McGregor a dit au Comité durant une visite à Vancouver en 2003 que les « Canadiens [...] nous considèrent comme des unités de secours immédiat en cas de désastre naturel. [...] Nous ne sommes pas formés ni financés pour intervenir dans les situations d'urgence. »

RECOMMANDATIONS DU COMITÉ (2004)

- **Le Comité a recommandé que les Forces canadiennes augmentent leur capacité de réponse aux situations d'urgence nationale par les moyens suivants :**
    - **faire en sorte que les Forces régulières soient équipées et formées pour répondre aux urgences graves au Canada et qu'elles participent à la planification d'urgences régionales;**
    - **élargir le rôle de la milice pour en faire une force de défense civile capable d'aider rapidement les autorités locales en cas d'urgences nationales;**
    - **faire participer la milice à la planification et à la formation des mesures d'urgence de concert avec les municipalités de tout le pays;**
    - **équiper et former la milice pour l'intervention d'urgence.**

- **Le Comité a recommandé que Sécurité publique Canada :**
  - **inclue la milice des Forces canadiennes dans les ressources fédérales d'intervention d'urgence et que les premiers intervenants connaissent dans les détails l'effectif et les moyens de la Milice[9].**

RÉPONSE DU GOUVERNEMENT (2006)

En réponse à la recommandation que les Forces régulières « soient équipées et formées pour répondre aux urgences graves au Canada et qu'elles participent à la planification d'urgences régionales », le ministère de la Défense nationale (MDN) a écrit le 14 août 2006 :

> Le ministère de la Défense nationale et les Forces canadiennes travaillent d'arrache-pied avec d'autres ministères et organismes afin d'aider à assurer la sécurité du Canada et de sa population et de les protéger. Le gouvernement dispose de plans et de capacités d'intervention afin de protéger le Canada et ses habitants – la Défense nationale et les Forces canadiennes se tiennent prêtes à aider d'autres ministères et organismes qui en font la demande.

Mais il faut ajouter le geste à la parole

Cette réponse a au moins été un peu encourageante. Il est clair que des progrès ont été réalisés dans l'établissement d'un rôle pour les Forces canadiennes dans les situations d'urgence nationale. Et les communications entre les Forces et les municipalités se sont améliorées quant à ce à quoi on peut s'attendre dans les situations d'urgence.

L'amélioration des communications entre les Forces et les municipalités est un point de départ : 85 p. 100 des municipalités qui ont répondu au sondage du Comité ont dit s'attendre à l'aide des militaires, bien que seulement 46 p. 100 d'entre elles aient dit s'être entretenues avec les Forces au sujet de ce à quoi elles devaient s'attendre. Il est évident que cela ne constitue pas un bilan parfait sur le plan des communications, mais il reste que c'est une énorme amélioration par rapport à la situation d'il y a cinq ans, où il n'y avait presque aucune liaison.

[9] Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Les urgences nationales : Le Canada, fragile en première ligne – Stratégie de renforcement*, Ottawa, Sénat du Canada, mars 2004, p. 37 et 49. Voir les recommandations 3, 10 et 11.

La question, évidemment, est de savoir si les Forces se sont dotées d'une *capacité* de beaucoup améliorée pour répondre aux situations d'urgence intérieures. Nous en parlerons davantage dans les pages qui suivent.

RÉPONSE DU GOUVERNEMENT (2006) (suite)

À notre recommandation que le MDN « élargisse le rôle de la milice pour en faire une force de défense civile capable d'aider rapidement les autorités locales en cas d'urgences nationales », le ministère a répondu le 14 août 2006 :

> Pour contrer les nouvelles menaces à la sécurité, les Forces canadiennes continuent d'examiner des moyens d'établir au sein de la Réserve des capacités bivalentes, par exemple dans le domaine de la défense chimique, biologique, radiologique et nucléaire. Ces capacités nous aideront également à faire face aux menaces qui pèsent sur la sécurité intérieure. Les Governor General's Foot Guards et le Régiment de Hull ont mis à l'essai le concept des capacités élargies de la Réserve de l'Armée de terre dans le domaine de la défense chimique, biologique, radiologique et nucléaire, et dans le domaine de la défense du territoire en novembre 2004, avec une bonne mesure de succès.
>
> Il faut procéder à d'autres travaux pour renforcer la capacité au point où elle peut être mise sur pied de façon permanente et répartie à l'échelle du pays. L'on élabore cette capacité dans le cadre du processus de développement des capacités de l'Armée de terre, et elle fait l'objet d'une étude en parallèle au besoin global des Forces canadiennes d'offrir une telle capacité. Outre ces travaux, chaque Groupe-brigade du Canada de la Réserve a créé une organisation mixte ayant la taille d'une compagnie et capable de réagir aux situations régionales, au besoin, et à la demande des autorités compétentes qui passent par les canaux de communication reconnus.
>
> Néanmoins, compte tenu de la disponibilité des réservistes et de leurs conditions d'emploi, il est fort probable que les organisations de la Force régulière seront les premières à intervenir quelle que soit la situation. Dans le cadre de la stratégie de défense « Le Canada d'abord », le gouvernement a annoncé son intention de renforcer la capacité des Forces canadiennes à intervenir en cas d'urgence nationale. Le Budget 2006 comprenait des fonds visant à enclencher l'établissement de bataillons territoriaux[10].

[10]Ministère de la Défense nationale, « Mise à jour 2006 sur les recommandations du CSPSND », 14 août 2006, p. 11-12.

Derrière tout le charabia, qu'en est-il en réalité?

Le Comité se méfie toujours des énoncés comme « les Forces canadiennes continuent d'examiner des façons... » qui signifient, en jargon bureaucratique, que rien n'a encore été trouvé. Puis, il y a des phrases comme celle-ci, qui concerne la question de savoir si la Réserve se verra confier un rôle dit CBRN[11] :

> « Cette capacité est en voie d'élaboration par l'armée dans le cadre de son processus de développement des capacités et elle est examinée de concert avec l'obligation générale des FC de fournir une telle capacité. »

Avez-vous bien compris? Peut-être bien qu'une telle capacité est en train d'être constituée ou étudiée. Et il faut se réjouir que la réponse reconnaisse le besoin de cette capacité. Cependant, rien ne nous dit que des progrès ont été vraiment réalisés dans *l'établissement* de cette capacité, mis à part l'exercice qui s'est tenu dans la capitale nationale en 2004. C'était il y a quatre ans.

RÉPONSE DU GOUVERNEMENT (2006) suite

En réponse à la recommandation du Comité que le MDN « fasse participer la milice à la planification et à la formation des mesures d'urgence de concert avec les municipalités de tout le pays », le ministère a répondu le 14 août 2006 :

> Lorsqu'elle sera achevée, la Restructuration de la Réserve de la Force terrestre (RRFT) aidera à garantir la pertinence et l'efficacité à long terme de la Réserve de l'Armée de terre et des Forces canadiennes dans leur ensemble. L'objectif du projet de RRFT vise à développer la Réserve de l'Armée de terre non seulement pour qu'elle soit efficace et crédible, mais aussi pour qu'elle complète et augmente les effectifs de la Force régulière. L'Armée de terre examine des moyens d'établir au sein de la Réserve des capacités bivalentes, par exemple dans le domaine de la défense chimique, biologique, radiologique et nucléaire. Ces capacités nous aideront également à faire face aux menaces qui pèsent sur la sécurité intérieure. En outre, l'Armée de terre a commencé à

[11] CBRN désigne les capacités visant les matériaux de nature chimique, biologique, radiologique, nucléaire.

> déployer des officiers de planification des contingences pour les collectivités aux quartiers généraux des unités et des formations. Ces officiers se familiarisent avec les organisations de planification d'urgence de leur zone de responsabilité, établissent des rapports hiérarchiques régionaux, éduquent les autorités civiles et gèrent les attentes quant à ce que les Forces canadiennes peuvent faire et facilitent la planification du recours au soutien militaire s'il y a lieu. De plus, les unités doivent élaborer des plans afin de former des groupes de la taille d'un peloton (pelotons de sécurité) qui pourront fournir de l'aide humanitaire à bref délai. Les réservistes formés pour la coopération civilo-militaire lors d'opérations expéditionnaires seront très utiles à la coordination du soutien que l'Armée de terre apporte aux autorités civiles dans le cadre d'opérations nationales[12].

L'utilisation de la Force de réserve est une bonne idée, mais celle-ci compte trop peu de membres

Cette réponse semble très constructive et, comme il a été dit plus tôt, il apparaît évident que les communications avec les municipalités se sont vraiment améliorées. Mais les échanges de mots ne suffisent pas. Si l'on veut que les Forces canadiennes soient appuyées par une Force de réserve crédible et efficace servant de complément à la Force régulière lorsque surviennent des urgences, il va falloir alors que quelqu'un envoie des gens formés et équipés sur le terrain dans les situations d'urgence.

RÉPONSE DU GOUVERNEMENT (2006) suite

En ce qui concerne la recommandation que la Réserve soit formée aussi pour les opérations de la protection civile, le ministère a répondu le 14 août 2006 :

> Le gouvernement a récemment annoncé une augmentation de l'effectif de la Réserve. Cela signifie que des ressources supplémentaires seront disponibles en vue de la protection civile, ce qui comprend une intensification de la capacité à faire face aux catastrophes naturelles et aux urgences locales. L'Armée de terre prévoit que les besoins en personnel militaire les plus pressants dans le secteur de la sécurité nationale seront du côté des effectifs disciplinés, organisés; il ne sera peut-être pas nécessaire d'assurer une

[12] Ministère de la Défense nationale, « Mise à jour 2006 sur les recommandations du CSPSND », 14 août 2006, p. 12.

> formation accrue en prestation d'aide humanitaire, et les niveaux d'équipement actuels sont jugés suffisants[13].

Certes, le gouvernement a annoncé en 2006 qu'il prévoyait une augmentation marquée du personnel : Force régulière, 13 000 membres, Force de la Réserve, 10 000 membres. Par suite de cette augmentation, la Force régulière compterait 75 000 membres, et la Force de réserve primaire, 35 000 membres payés, la première phase consistant à porter l'effectif de la Force régulière à 70 000 membres, et l'effectif de la Force de réserve à 30 000 membres sur cinq ans. Grâce à cette augmentation proposée, la Réserve aurait peut-être eu la capacité d'intervenir dans les situations d'urgence nationale, ce que le Comité a recommandé.

Dans le discours du Trône d'octobre 2007, le gouvernement a pris l'engagement suivant :

> Cette volonté de donner au Canada les moyens de défendre sa souveraineté ici et à l'étranger est au cœur des efforts du gouvernement pour rebâtir les Forces canadiennes. Nos militaires, hommes et femmes, sont prêts à défendre leur pays au péril de leur vie. Ils méritent de bénéficier de l'équipement et de la formation nécessaires à une force armée moderne de premier ordre. Notre gouvernement modernisera l'appareil militaire du Canada afin d'assurer efficacement la surveillance et la protection de l'ensemble de notre pays, de coopérer à la défense de l'Amérique du Nord et d'assumer nos responsabilités internationales à l'égard des Nations Unies et de nos alliés[14].

Toutefois, deux semaines plus tard, dans le Rapport ministériel sur le rendement[15] pour la période prenant fin le 31 mars 2007, le gouvernement a annoncé à mots feutrés que la poursuite de la mission en Afghanistan, la préparation pour les Jeux olympiques de 2010 et le soutien de la transformation des FC avaient obligé le ministère à revoir ses plans d'expansion, ramenant l'effectif de la Force régulière à 68 000 membres, et celui de la Force de réserve primaire à 26 000 membres d'ici 2011-2012. Apparemment, « revoir » signifie « diminuer l'augmentation projetée et ajouter un an au programme ».

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[13] Ministère de la Défense nationale, « Mise à jour 2006 sur les recommandations du CSPSND », 14 août 2006, p. 13.

[14] La Gouverneure générale du Canada. *Un leadership fort. Un Canada meilleur* – Discours du Trône, 16 octobre 2007.

[15] Ministère de la Défense nationale, « Rapport ministériel sur le rendement 2006-2007 », novembre 2007, p. 13.

L'objectif annoncé d'augmenter de 13 000 membres l'effectif de la Force régulière pour le faire passer à 75 000 a été réduit de moitié, la cible actuelle étant de 7 000. L'augmentation projetée pour la Réserve (de 25 000 à 35 000) a été réduite de 90 p. 100. Cela représente une augmentation de 1 000 réservistes seulement.

RÉSULTAT : baisse de 54 p. 100 de l'augmentation annoncée de l'effectif de la Force régulière et de 90 p. 100 de celle de l'effectif de la Force de la réserve.

Enfin, le plus récent document à donner des précisions sur le plan de recrutement – la Stratégie de défense « Le Canada d'abord » – a été rendu public le 19 juin 2008. Dans ce plan, le gouvernement est revenu à la première phase initiale annoncée dans le budget de 2006, soit l'augmentation de l'effectif des Forces canadiennes portant à 70 000 l'effectif de la Force régulière et à 30 000 celui de la Force de réserve. Cependant, plutôt que d'effectuer ces augmentations d'ici cinq ans, comme le prévoyait le Budget de 2006, le gouvernement a l'intention d'y parvenir d'ici 2028, rajoutant un peu plus de 20 ans au programme d'origine.

Des augmentations plus faibles, sur une plus longue période

Toutes ces annonces ne seront guère utiles pour les situations d'urgence si l'effectif réel est insuffisant. Il est clair que les Forces canadiennes projetaient vraiment de mettre en œuvre la Stratégie de défense « Le Canada d'abord ». Mais avec un engagement d'accroître l'effectif d'ici vingt ans seulement, à quoi cela sert-il?

RÉPONSE DU GOUVERNEMENT (2006) suite

En ce qui concerne la recommandation du Comité que Sécurité publique Canada inclue la Réserve dans les ressources fédérales d'intervention d'urgence et que les premiers intervenants connaissent dans les détails l'effectif et les moyens de la Réserve, le ministère a répondu comme suit le 30 août 2006 :

> Tant la Force régulière que la Réserve des Forces canadiennes (FC) jouent un rôle important dans la gestion des urgences au Canada. Sur demande, les FC apportent

leur aide aux autorités civiles. La nature de l'intervention des FC est fonction de l'étendue de leurs pouvoirs. Comme les récents déploiements l'ont démontré, l'intervention comprend la participation des membres réguliers ainsi que des membres de la Réserve. Les FC, avec la participation de SPPCC, étudient les situations où la Réserve serait en meilleure position pour aider les autorités civiles en matière de protection civile.

Les FC mettent en œuvre une nouvelle structure de commandement pour mieux gérer leur façon de répondre aux menaces au Canada et à l'étranger. Le volet national, Commandement Canada, améliorera la capacité des FC de répondre aux menaces et aux urgences. Commandement Canada et ses six bureaux régionaux seront étroitement liés aux organisations provinciales et territoriales de gestion des urgences au sein de leurs régions respectives.

SPPCC et le ministère de la Défense nationale (MDN) ont élaboré une interface entre le Centre des opérations du gouvernement, faisant partie de SPPCC, et la nouvelle structure de commandement des FC, qui comprend l'état-major interarmées stratégique et Commandement Canada. SPPCC et le MDN/FC continueront de travailler en étroite collaboration à la planification du recours aux FC en situation d'urgence. Les deux ministères se sont engagés à entretenir un dialogue ouvert avec les administrations provinciale et territoriales concernant l'aide apportée par les FC en cas d'urgence[16].

LE DÉFI POUR LE GOUVERNEMENT (2008)

De bonnes communications ne peuvent suppléer à un manque de capacité

L'existence de meilleures communications entre les Forces canadiennes et les autorités locales responsables des situations d'urgence est une bonne chose. Mais il faut ajouter le geste à la parole. Voici la situation : selon le sondage réalisé par le Comité, 85 p. 100 des municipalités sondées s'attendent à ce que les Forces canadiennes jouent un rôle chez elles en cas de grave désastre. Mais seulement 32 p. 100 d'entre elles ont inclus la Réserve des Forces canadiennes dans leurs plans d'intervention d'urgence. Pourquoi? Les sondages ont révélé que, trop souvent, les représentants municipaux, qui ont l'habitude de traiter avec leur gouvernement provincial, hésitent à approcher

[16] Sécurité publique Canada, « Réponse de SPPCC et du Portefeuille aux rapports du CSPSND », 30 août 2006, p. 13.

les autorités militaires fédérales. Il n'y a généralement pas de liens de communication directs entre les municipalités et le gouvernement fédéral – toutes les communications doivent donc passer par les gouvernements provinciaux.

Au moins, notre sondage nous dit que les Forces canadiennes ont bien pris l'initiative de contacter les municipalités pour qu'elles sachent à quel genre de soutien s'attendre de leur part dans les situations d'urgence.

Encore une fois, le problème ne semble plus être un manque de communication. C'est plutôt un manque de capacités d'intervention. Dans le deuxième paragraphe de la réponse de Sécurité publique Canada, on lit que la composante intérieure, Commandement Canada, améliorera la capacité des Forces canadiennes de réagir aux menaces et aux situations d'urgence au Canada. Cependant, le Comité montrera dans les pages qui suivent que Commandement Canada semble dépourvu d'une capacité d'intervention territoriale.

Une dizaine de bataillons (fantômes)

Dans le Rapport sur les plans et les priorités 2006-2007 du MDN, on lit :

> Dans le cadre de l'expansion globale des FC, quatre nouveaux **bataillons d'intervention rapide** verront le jour. Les autorités militaires répartiront stratégiquement ces unités sur notre territoire, soit à Comox, à Trenton, à Bagotville et à Goose Bay, afin d'assurer la présence de la Force régulière et une intervention efficace en cas de catastrophes naturelles ou d'attaques terroristes. Les Forces canadiennes organiseront ces unités en fonction de capacités clés pouvant servir localement ou être transportées rapidement pour appuyer les opérations des Forces canadiennes. Leur constitution commencera en 2006[17].

Le Comité n'a pu trouver d'information sur la question de savoir si ces « pelotons de sécurité[18] » ou ces bataillons d'intervention

[17] Ministère de la Défense nationale, *Rapport sur les plans et les priorités 2006-2007*, p. 17.
[18] Le ministère de la Défense nationale a parlé de « pelotons de sécurité » dans sa réponse du 14 août 2006 aux recommandations du CSPSND, à la page 13 du présent rapport.

rapide sont bien réels ou ne sont que le fruit de l'imagination optimiste de quelqu'un.

Plus loin, dans le même document, le ministère dit que :

> Afin de réagir plus adéquatement aux urgences nationales, la Force terrestre créera aussi une capacité d'intervention territoriale dans un minimum de 13 centres urbains, c'est-à-dire Vancouver, Calgary, Edmonton, Regina, Winnipeg, Niagara-Windsor, Toronto, Ottawa, Montréal, Québec, Saint John, Halifax et St John's. En outre, la Force terrestre, en collaboration avec le COM Canada, recensera les principales capacités de chaque région qui pourraient servir en cas d'urgence nationale.
>
> La capacité d'intervention territoriale qui sera mise sur pied ultérieurement comprendra du personnel à temps plein et à temps partiel dans chaque emplacement. Afin d'assurer l'efficacité et l'efficience de cette capacité, la Force terrestre examinera la structure actuelle des unités de la Réserve pour chacun des emplacements mentionnés en vue de regrouper ou d'amalgamer certaines de ces unités s'il y a lieu. Selon les circonstances et suivant les instructions du COM Canada, les bataillons territoriaux pourraient également recevoir le soutien d'autres composantes de la Réserve[19].

Dans le Rapport ministériel sur le rendement de 2006-2007 du MDN, le ministère informe le public de ce qui suit :

> Le noyau des groupes-bataillons de défense territoriale a été établi à l'échelle du Canada[20].

Un an plus tard, dans le Rapport sur les plans et les priorités 2007-2008 du MDN, on trouve l'énoncé suivant :

> Les travaux de développement de la force à l'appui d'un concept de groupes-bataillons de défense territoriale répartis à l'échelle du pays donneront lieu à l'établissement de cadres initiaux dans six centres urbains, cette année, ainsi qu'à un élargissement de la capacité à l'année financière 2007-2008. Cette initiative appuiera la politique du gouvernement canadien appelée « Le Canada d'abord » grâce à la création d'une capacité d'intervention nationale coordonnée à l'échelle du pays[21].

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[19] Ministère de la Défense nationale, *Rapport sur les plans et les priorités 2006-2007*, p. 17.
[20] Ministère de la Défense nationale, *Rapport sur le rendement pour l'exercice se terminant le 31 mars 2007*, p. 27.
[21] Ministère de la Défense nationale, *Rapport sur les plans et les priorités 2007-2008*, p. 26.

Le ministère mentionne les « bataillons territoriaux » une fois dans son Rapport sur les plans et les priorités 2008-2009, sans toutefois donner d'indication récente sur leur état actuel[22].

Et enfin, bien que la Stratégie de défense « Le Canada d'abord », publiée le 19 juin 2008, précise que « répondre à une attaque terroriste importante » et « appuyer les autorités civiles en cas de crise au Canada, par exemple en cas de catastrophe naturelle » constituent deux missions essentielles des Forces canadiennes, elle ne mentionne aucunement les pelotons de sécurité, les bataillons d'intervention rapide ou les groupes-bataillons territoriaux de défense.

Réalité ou fiction?

Lorsqu'il a d'abord annoncé le concept de groupes-bataillons territoriaux, l'ex-ministre de la Défense Gordon O'Connor a dit qu'ils seraient établis dans 12 villes canadiennes. Chaque bataillon serait composé d'un cadre de 100 soldats réguliers qui seraient appuyés par des réservistes. Ces groupes constitueraient l'essence du concept « Le Canada d'abord », et défendraient les Canadiens contre toute attaque venant de l'extérieur, mais ils interviendraient aussi dans les situations d'urgence causées par des désastres naturels.

Malgré l'engagement pris, ces bataillons n'ont pas été créés.

Or, aucune unité permanente n'a encore été établie. Pourquoi? Le 22 février 2008, le lieutenant-général Andrew Leslie[23] a déclaré lors de la Conférence des associations de la défense que les écoles des Forces canadiennes avaient besoin de 200 employés et qu'elles souffrent énormément du rythme actuel de

[22] Le Rapport précise que : « Pour ce qui est des opérations nationales, la Première réserve continuera de mener des opérations côtières et des opérations aériennes, en plus de fournir du personnel aux bataillons territoriaux. » Voir ministère de la Défense nationale, *Rapport sur les plans et les priorités 2008-2009*, février 2008, p. 52.

[23] Le lieutenant-général Andrew Leslie est le commandant de la Force terrestre (CFT) et responsable de la constitution de la force armée.

formation[24]. Le lieutenant-général Leslie a aussi expliqué au Comité le 2 juin 2008 que les Forces canadiennes ont besoin de 1 000 sous-officiers, des caporaux-chefs en fait[25]. Or, on ne peut établir de nouvelles unités sans officiers commissionnés pour les commander. Le Comité a également appris que les officiers et autres gradés doivent cumuler deux fonctions[26] dans divers endroits au Canada et qu'ils pourraient, à l'occasion, être appelés à exercer des fonctions dans les situations d'urgence ailleurs au Canada.

L'incapacité de l'armée à donner suite à l'annonce de M. O'Connor au sujet de la formation d'une dizaine de bataillons permanents n'est qu'une autre preuve du manque de personnel qui sévit toujours au sein des Forces canadiennes. Cela nous amène directement à la question du financement et du maintien et de la formation de l'effectif. Dans le discours du Trône et le Rapport ministériel sur le rendement subséquent, le constat était pourtant clair : l'effectif des Forces canadiennes est à peine suffisant pour leur permettre de remplir leur mission en Afghanistan, et c'est sans parler de l'élargissement de leurs responsabilités à l'intérieur du pays.

L'effectif des Forces est pratiquement le même – soit quelque 64 000 membres – qu'en novembre 2002 lorsque le Comité a recommandé une pause dans les déploiements à l'étranger parce que les troupes étaient mobilisées au maximum[27]. Notre recommandation a été écartée à l'époque parce qu'une telle pause aurait été embarrassante pour le Canada. Néanmoins, embarrassante ou non, cette pause a été faite 20 mois plus tard[28] lorsque tous les intéressés ont enfin reconnu que les militaires canadiens étaient au bout du rouleau.

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[24] Lieutenant-général Andrew Leslie dans un discours prononcé à la Conférence des associations de la défense le 22 février 2008. La version intégrale du discours est disponible sur le site suivant http://www.cpac.ca/forms/index.asp?dsp=template&act=view3&pagetype=vod&lang=f&clipID=983.

[25] Lieutenant-général Andrew Leslie, Délibérations du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 2 juin 2008, 39e législature, 2e session.

[26] C'est-à-dire que certains officiers doivent exercer les fonctions de deux postes.

[27] Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Pour 130 dollars de plus… Mise à jour sur la crise financière des Forces canadiennes, Une vue de bas en haut*, Sénat du Canada, novembre 2002, p. 20. Voir la recommandation 2.

[28] La pause opérationnelle dans les déploiements outremer des Forces canadiennes a duré d'août 2004 à février 2006.

Le Canada ne peut évidemment annuler maintenant les déploiements à l'étranger. Le Parlement vient de prolonger jusqu'en 2011 la mission en Afghanistan, de sorte qu'une pause de reconstruction est impossible. Cependant, personne ne devrait prétendre que les Forces canadiennes ne souffrent pas du même problème de surutilisation qui les a tellement affaiblies à l'époque des deux gouvernements précédents.

Le Commandement Canada ne réussira pas à remplir la totalité de son mandat tant qu'un gouvernement canadien n'accordera pas aux Forces canadiennes le financement leur permettant de venir au secours des Canadiens à l'intérieur du pays tout en servant leurs intérêts à l'étranger. En conséquence, les premiers intervenants ne peuvent avoir la certitude que les Forces canadiennes seront prêtes à leur venir en aide dans les situations de crise.

C'est une question de chiffres

Comme il a déjà été dit, le Comité croit fermement que les Forces canadiennes manquent dangereusement de personnel. Par exemple, elles ont recruté 6 716 personnes durant l'exercice en cours (2007-2008), selon les données recueillies jusqu'en décembre 2007. Malheureusement, elles avaient aussi perdu à ce moment-là 6 088 membres, ce qui s'est traduit par une augmentation nette de 628 personnes[29]. D'après le Rapport sur les plans et les priorités du ministère de la Défense nationale (2008-2009), les Forces vivent des taux d'attrition plus élevés que la norme traditionnelle[30]. Le document souligne aussi que « malgré une réussite du recrutement par rapport aux dernières années, le taux d'attrition supérieur a entravé la croissance des FC».

[29] Données sur le recrutement et l'attrition durant l'exercice 2007-2008 fournies par le ministère de la Défense nationale jusqu'en décembre 2007.

[30] D'après le Rapport, « L'an dernier, le taux d'attrition était de 7,9 p. 100 comparativement aux taux habituels qui se situent entre 6,2 et 6,4 p. 100. » Voir ministère de la Défense nationale, *Rapport sur les plans et les priorités 2008-2009*, février 2008, p. 45.

De plus, on a signalé au Comité que les taux de recrutement et d'attrition prévus pour les années à venir sont désespérants. Lors des audiences, les témoins ont souligné que, parmi les éléments qui font obstacle au maintien en poste des membres des Forces armées, figurent la situation démographique et la solidité de l'économie canadienne[31]. Cependant, ce n'est qu'en privé que certains ont informé le Comité et son personnel de la gravité de la situation. Des sources ont expliqué ne pas pouvoir parler publiquement de ces détails, puisqu'on leur avait clairement indiqué de respecter certaines limites dans leurs propos aux parlementaires. Beaucoup craignent de mettre en jeu leur carrière s'ils font preuve de franchise.

Durant ses déplacements dans tout le pays, le Comité a aussi entendu les récits tragiques des conséquences du surmenage des troupes : ruptures familiales, occasions de perfectionnement et d'avancement personnel ratées et épuisement professionnel, autant de facteurs qui ont mené à d'autres départs volontaires.

La situation financière du ministère ne fera qu'empirer du fait de l'adoption de la comptabilité d'exercice. On croit que la comptabilité d'exercice permet mieux que la comptabilité de trésorerie d'aplanir les excroissances budgétaires que créent parfois les dépenses excessives dans les équipements militaires. Par exemple, les répercussions de l'acquisition d'équipement sur les budgets du MDN sont réparties sur toute la vie utile de l'équipement.

Le problème, c'est que tout budget bien planifié devrait offrir la marge de manœuvre voulue pour faire face aux imprévus. Les militaires du Canada ne disposent jamais de cette marge de manœuvre parce qu'ils manquent toujours de fonds. Avec la comptabilité d'exercice, l'argent est immobilisé et si des surprises surviennent, les commandants doivent puiser dans le budget de portefeuilles déjà sous-financés, comme ceux du personnel, ainsi que des opérations et de l'entretien (O et E).

[31] Lieutenant-général W.J. Natynczyk, Délibérations du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 2 juin 2008, 39e législature, 2e session.

Ce n’est pas en comptant l’argent différemment que l’on va modifier le rendement d’une organisation sous-financée.

Les Forces canadiennes exercent un certain nombre de fonctions et d’activités intérieures et internationales complexes. Le gouvernement a-t-il visé trop haut quand il a annoncé de nouvelles initiatives intérieures dans le cadre du concept très attrayant qui consiste à accorder la priorité à la défense des Canadiens chez eux au moyen de Commandement Canada?

Il semble bien que oui.

Alors que ces nouveaux engagements semblent si illusoires, les premiers intervenants n’ont absolument aucun moyen de savoir à ce quoi ils doivent s’attendre de la part des Forces canadiennes en temps de crise.

Problème n° 3 :
Dépôts d'urgence cachés

Le Système de la réserve nationale d'urgence (SRNU) de Santé Canada est composé d'un dépôt central à Ottawa, de huit entrepôts et de 1 300 centres d'approvisionnement prépositionnés stratégiquement situés partout au Canada, dont la gestion est assurée conjointement par les provinces et le gouvernement fédéral[32].

Santé Canada affirme que les dépôts contiennent de nombreux articles qui devraient se trouver dans un hôpital : lits, draps, réserve de produits pharmaceutiques et gamme d'antibiotiques. Il y a 165 « hôpitaux de campagne » ou hôpitaux mobiles, comprenant 200 lits chacun et situés dans plusieurs endroits au pays. Les unités peuvent être déployées dans un court délai (moins de 24 heures) et être installées dans des bâtiments existants, comme des écoles ou des centres communautaires.

Le Système comporte également des fournitures permettant d'établir des stations de premiers soins et de triage. Les centres de fournitures mis en place possèdent une combinaison de fournitures qui dépend de leur emplacement et des urgences qui pourraient survenir.

Le problème, tel que nous l'avons vu en 2004 : Souvent, les premiers intervenants ne savaient pas où se situaient les dépôts, ou ce qu'ils contenaient. Les premiers intervenants n'avaient pas été consultés à savoir si le contenu des dépôts correspondait à leurs besoins ou s'il reproduisait en double ce qu'ils avaient déjà. Certains coordonnateurs des mesures d'urgence qui avaient vu les dépôts nous ont dit qu'une bonne partie de leur contenu était désuet.

RECOMMANDATION DU COMITÉ (2004)

- **Le Comité a recommandé que Santé Canada revoie en profondeur la façon dont il administre et gère les dépôts d'urgence qui relèvent de lui, afin d'aider de façon plus efficace et plus efficiente les corps d'intervention de première ligne à**

[32] Agence de la santé publique du Canada, La réserve nationale de secours, http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/ep-mu/ness-fra.php.

protéger les Canadiens partout au pays. Cette révision devrait notamment faire en sorte que les responsables locaux :

soient informés de l'emplacement de tout dépôt se trouvant à proximité;

soient informés de la façon d'y accéder en cas d'urgence;

se voient confier un rôle à cet égard;

soient encouragés à inclure les dépôts dans leur planification[33].

RÉPONSES DU GOUVERNEMENT AUX RECOMMANDATIONS DU COMITÉ (2006-2007)

En réponse aux recommandations de 2004 du Comité, Santé Canada a écrit en août 2006 :

Santé Canada (par l'entremise de l'ASPC [Agence de la santé publique du Canada]) a pris les mesures qui suivent.

- Coordination et coopération avec les provinces et territoires. Les provinces et les territoires nous font toujours parvenir des mises à jour annuelles des responsables des sites et nous tiennent au courant des déplacements des unités. Il incombe alors aux directeurs des services de santé d'urgence des provinces ou des territoires (PT) de demeurer en communication constante avec les autorités locales et le personnel d'intervention.

- Des protocoles et des accords fédéraux, provinciaux et territoriaux (FPT) sont établis depuis un certain temps déjà avec nos homologues des services de santé d'urgence des PT afin de faciliter et d'accélérer l'accès au Système de la réserve nationale d'urgence (SRNU).

- Tous les directeurs des services de santé d'urgence des PT qui sont autorisés à utiliser le SRNU en connaissent bien le contenu.

- Un groupe de travail FPT a entrepris l'examen stratégique du SRNU et les responsables du système feront les achats de fournitures et d'équipement

[33] Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Les urgences nationales : Le Canada, fragile en première ligne – Stratégie de renforcement*, Ottawa, Sénat du Canada, mars 2004, p. 37. Voir la recommandation 5.

médicaux requis pour soutenir les composantes actuelles du SRNU en fonction des recommandations que le groupe de travail formulera.

- Trois cours d'orientation sur le déploiement et le fonctionnement de l'hôpital d'urgence de 200 lits ont été organisés en novembre 2004 et en octobre et novembre 2005. Deux cours d'orientation et d'identification des boîtes des unités du SRNU ont été offerts en janvier 2005 et en février 2006. Les cours de formation de base pour les Services de santé d'urgence et les Services sociaux d'urgence ont été élaborés en consultation avec les provinces et territoires et comportent de l'information sur le SRNU, des discussions sur le contenu du SRNU et de l'information sur les modalités d'accès au SRNU dans leur province ou leur territoire respectif. Le cours peut se donner en ligne; on prévoit que le programme d'apprentissage en ligne débutera en 2006.

- Le Bureau national des équipes d'intervention sanitaire d'urgence (BNEISU) collabore avec le SRNU afin de coordonner le stockage de l'équipement et des fournitures pour nos équipes d'intervention sanitaire (EISU). Les EISU pourront disposer de l'équipement et des fournitures désignés du SRNU lorsque les autorités provinciales et territoriales demanderont leur déploiement[34].

De quelle façon les premiers intervenants trouvent-ils les sites?

Le 19 septembre 2007, les attachés de recherche de la Bibliothèque du Parlement[35] ont effectué un suivi avec l'Agence de la santé publique du Canada en lui demandant : Quels sont les procédures ou les protocoles officiels que doivent respecter les représentants locaux pour accéder au site SRNU le plus près? Quels sont les protocoles que doivent respecter les représentants provinciaux? Le 30 octobre 2007, Santé Canada a répondu ceci :

> Si l'urgence devait requérir une intervention immédiate, les autorités locales et provinciales ont l'approbation préalable d'accéder aux fournitures du SRNU mises en place dans leur province ou leur territoire et de contacter le Bureau des services d'urgence (BSU) de l'ASPC, au Centre de mesures et d'interventions d'urgence (CEPR) [ou CMIU], dans les plus brefs délais possibles. Conformément à leur plan local de mesures en cas de catastrophe, les représentants locaux, en collaboration avec les gestionnaires des mesures d'urgence et les premiers

[34] Santé Canada, « Réponse aux recommandations du Comité », août 2006, p. 4.
[35] La correspondance du 19 septembre 2007 avec l'Agence de la santé publique du Canada s'est déroulée durant une période de prorogation (du 14 septembre 2007 au 16 octobre 2007). Or, pendant une prorogation, la Chambre et le Sénat (et leurs comités) sont dissous. La correspondance liée au présent rapport concernant cette période a été faite par la Bibliothèque du Parlement à la demande du sénateur Colin Kenny, le président actuel du Comité.

> intervenants, assureront la livraison des fournitures du SRNU aux centres d'intervention appropriés.

Nous avons également demandé à Santé Canada : Comment l'information liée au contenu et à l'emplacement est-elle transmise au niveau des premiers intervenants advenant une urgence? Combien de temps faut-il pour transmettre une telle information? Voici la réponse :

> Des protocoles au niveau local sont en place lorsqu'une situation d'urgence a dégénéré au point où il est probable que les intervenants locaux n'auront pas la capacité suffisante pour la maîtriser. Advenant une telle situation, il est entendu que les représentants locaux contacteraient les directeurs des services de santé d'urgence ou des services sociaux d'urgence pour obtenir l'autorisation d'accéder au Système de la réserve nationale d'urgence (SRNU).
>
> Les directeurs provinciaux et territoriaux des services de santé d'urgence ou des services sociaux d'urgence, après avoir reçu une demande d'accéder à un centre d'approvisionnement du SRNU d'une communauté, contacteraient à leur tour le directeur ou une autre personne responsable au BSU du CEPR [ou CMIU] pour obtenir l'autorisation d'accéder à un centre d'approvisionnement du SRNU.

Quelle sera la participation des premiers intervenants?

Nous avons également demandé : Quand prévoit-on terminer cet examen du SRNU? Comment le contenu ultérieur du SRNU sera-t-il déterminé? Les premiers intervenants pourront-ils participer à ce processus? Voici la réponse :

> Un groupe de travail a terminé un examen stratégique complexe du Système de la réserve nationale d'urgence (SRNU) en décembre 2006. Le groupe de travail était composé de représentants fédéraux et provinciaux. Dans le cadre du processus, une évaluation des systèmes de réserve a été effectuée par des professionnels de la santé (premiers intervenants). Un examen du contenu et de la fonctionnalité du SRNU ainsi qu'une analyse des besoins et des lacunes visant à accroître la capacité du SRNU de venir en aide aux responsables locaux, provinciaux et territoriaux lorsqu'ils sont dépassés par un événement donné ont également été effectués. Le rapport comprend aussi une analyse des risques et des menaces qui a été effectuée par le groupe de travail en collaboration avec le Centre intégré d'évaluation des menaces (CIEM), SP et les provinces et territoires. Ce document sert de cadre pour concevoir et planifier une réserve d'urgence moderne basée sur 64 scénarios précisant la menace et le nombre de victimes en cas de catastrophes d'origine naturelle ou humaine. Il sera utilisé comme guide pour la stratégie d'approvisionnement du SRNU. Le rapport final contient des recommandations

devant servir de cadre pour améliorer la préparation aux situations d'urgence et les moyens d'intervention en cas d'urgence.

LE DÉFI POUR LE GOUVERNEMENT

Progrès à ce jour : aucun

D'après les renseignements que le Comité a recueillis à partir des réponses au sondage envoyé aux municipalités et du témoignage de Santé Canada, il est évident qu'aucun progrès n'a été accompli, et ce pour aucune des recommandations du Comité. En particulier, peu de progrès ont été accomplis par le gouvernement fédéral en ce qui concerne la mise à jour du contenu des dépôts, ou les efforts accomplis pour mieux informer les premiers intervenants sur le contenu des dépôts et leur emplacement. De plus, les premiers intervenants n'ont pratiquement aucun mot à dire sur le contenu de ces dépôts vitaux.

Contenu désuet

Les réponses de Santé Canada aux questions du Comité portent à croire qu'il y a eu beaucoup de consultations, d'analyses, de coopération et de coordination entre les fonctionnaires des gouvernements fédéral, provinciaux et territoriaux, déterminés à revoir en profondeur le système national de fournitures d'urgence. Mais il manque des éléments dans les réponses du gouvernement. Lorsque le Comité a entrepris de combler ces lacunes en posant des questions aux témoins durant les audiences et en distribuant un sondage aux municipalités, il a découvert ce qu'il considère comme les trois principales failles du système :

1. **au moins une partie du contenu des dépôts semble désuet, ou n'est pas ce que les gestionnaires municipaux des services d'urgence estiment nécessaire pour répondre aux urgences, ou les deux;**

2. **de nombreux gestionnaires municipaux des services d'urgence ne connaissent pas le contenu des dépôts, ou l'emplacement des dépôts;**

3. **en dépit des affirmations selon lesquelles les municipalités sont consultées sur le contenu souhaitable des dépôts, un seul des 92 répondants au sondage adressé aux municipalités a indiqué que la municipalité avait été consultée.**

Malgré l'avertissement qu'avait émis le Comité en 2004, selon lequel au moins une partie du contenu des dépôts semblait désuet ou incorrect, le témoignage du Dr David Butler-Jones, administrateur en chef de la santé publique du Canada, le 4 février 2008, a révélé que le processus de leur mise à jour ne fait que commencer à être mis en branle, quatre ans plus tard :

> **Le sénateur Banks :** Que trouve-t-on dans les réserves en ce moment?
>
> **Dr David Butler-Jones, administrateur en chef de la santé publique, Agence de la santé publique du Canada :** Nous commençons à les mettre à jour. Nous nous sommes débarrassés de certaines choses superflues. C'est un processus qui va être permanent. Il a également fallu réévaluer ce qui est nécessaire aujourd'hui, par rapport à ce qui l'était il y a 10, 15 ou 20 ans[36].

En réponse au sondage que le Comité a envoyé aux municipalités, certains responsables des services d'urgence qui avaient vu les dépôts ont dit que leur contenu correspondait plus à l'époque de la guerre de Corée qu'aux besoins des premiers intervenants de notre époque. Par exemple, Trent Elyea, coordonnateur de la gestion des situations d'urgence locales pour la Ville d'Orillia, a écrit en 2007 dans sa réponse au sondage du Comité sur la gestion des urgences :

> Si les caches dont vous parlez sont celles qui comportent des hôpitaux de campagne, elles seront de peu d'utilité pendant une situation d'urgence. La complexité et l'âge du matériel causeront des problèmes de logistique, et les fournitures qu'il y a dans la cache datent de la guerre de Corée et de la guerre du

[36] David Butler-Jones, Délibérations du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 4 février 2008, fascicule 4, 39e législature, 2e session.

Viêt-Nam. Certains articles seraient peut-être utiles, mais ils sont si vieux et dépassés qu'ils ne feront vraisemblablement pas l'affaire.

Linley Biblow, coordonnateur des services d'urgence pour la Ville de Calgary, a écrit dans le sondage :

Les représentants de l'ASPC qui font des démonstrations dans le cadre du Programme de formation CBRN pour les premiers intervenants (cours de niveau intermédiaire donné au Collège canadien de gestion des urgences à Ottawa) continuent de se faire sérieusement contester par leurs étudiants. Bien qu'ils prétendent pouvoir offrir 150 hôpitaux de campagne et disent que les fournitures nécessaires existent bel et bien, tout semble indiquer que les dites fournitures sont vieilles de plusieurs décennies. Par exemple, certains appareils de succion dateraient de la guerre de Corée.

Dépôts cachés

Il semble évident pour le Comité que les premiers intervenants devraient savoir exactement de quelles fournitures d'urgence ils disposent, et où elles sont situées. Le Dr Butler-Jones n'est pas de cet avis. L'échange qui suit a eu lieu pendant le témoignage du 4 février 2008 du Dr Butler-Jones devant le Comité :

Le sénateur Banks : […] Je crois savoir que votre organisation a effectué un examen en décembre 2006 de ces réserves nationales de secours dans les différentes régions du pays. Si nous devions inspecter ces réserves aujourd'hui, qu'y trouverions-nous? C'est une question à deux volets : les intervenants locaux à qui elles seraient le plus utiles sauraient-ils où elles se trouvent ou comment y accéder? Les réserves sont-elles bonnes et contiennent-elles maintenant des choses utiles?

Dr David Butler-Jones, administrateur en chef de la santé publique, Agence de la santé publique du Canada : Pour ce qui est de la première partie de votre question, les intervenants locaux ne sauraient pas nécessairement où les réserves se trouvent.

Le sénateur Banks : Ne devraient-ils pas le savoir?

Dr Butler-Jones : Je dirais que non. Vous ne serez peut-être pas d'accord. Ce ne sont pas des intervenants locaux qui décident quand il faut utiliser la réserve. Ce sont les responsables des urgences à l'échelle provinciale. Nous offrons l'accès à ces réserves lorsque les responsables provinciaux des urgences nous le demandent. Les choses fonctionnent ainsi : si la situation est impossible à gérer localement, c'est la province qui s'en occupe. Si la province ne peut la gérer seule,

> alors on fait appel à nous, à l'échelon fédéral. Ces réserves se trouvent un peu partout au pays. Certains des intervenants locaux savent peut-être où se trouvent les réserves, mais l'idée, c'est que, ce qu'ils doivent savoir, c'est qu'ils doivent parler avec le coordonnateur des urgences, qui s'adresse aux responsables de la province, et les choses arrivent rapidement sur place[37].

La suggestion selon laquelle les responsables municipaux des services d'urgence n'ont pas besoin de savoir où les dépôts sont situés, qu'ils ne devraient que savoir avec quels fonctionnaires provinciaux communiquer en cas d'urgence pour le savoir, est pour le moins renversante.

Oui, le Canada est doté d'une constitution qui fait que les municipalités dépendent des provinces. Mais les urgences, de par leur nature, provoquent souvent chaos et catastrophes. Les communications peuvent être interrompues. Des représentants clés du protocole bureaucratique peuvent se retrouver complètement hors circuit.

Comment peut-on suggérer que les responsables municipaux des services d'urgence ne devraient pas être tenus informés du contenu des dépôts et de leur emplacement? Les intervenants municipaux sont les premiers à arriver en cas d'urgence et ils travaillent sans l'aide de la province ou du gouvernement fédéral jusqu'à ce qu'ils leur demandent leur soutien. S'ils ne peuvent compter que sur eux-mêmes, ils devraient savoir exactement de quelles ressources ils disposent en cas de crise et comment y accéder rapidement.

Voici ce que dit la réponse du 19 septembre 2007 de l'Agence de la santé publique du Canada :

> Si l'urgence devait requérir une intervention immédiate, les autorités locales et provinciales ont l'approbation préalable d'accéder aux fournitures du SRNU mises en place dans leur province ou leur territoire et de contacter le Bureau des services d'urgence (BSU) de l'ASPC, au Centre de mesures et d'interventions d'urgence (CEPR) [ou CMIU], dans les plus brefs délais possibles.

[37] David Butler-Jones, Délibérations du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 4 février 2008, fascicule 4, 39e législature, 2e session.

Les autorités locales ont donc l'approbation préalable d'accéder aux fournitures du SRNU. Bien, c'est logique. Mais bon nombre d'entre elles ne savent pas où se situent les SRNU, ou ce qu'ils contiennent. Une approbation préalable pour accéder à quelque chose n'est pas très utile si on ne sait pas ce qu'est cette chose ni où elle se trouve.

Pourquoi est-ce qu'on ne considère pas comme impératif d'amener chaque responsable en chef des services d'urgence du pays au dépôt le plus près afin qu'il puisse examiner ce qu'il pourrait utiliser durant une urgence et faire des suggestions quant aux éléments qui pourraient y être ajoutés?

Comment le gouvernement fédéral peut-il reconnaître que les urgences se produisent *localement,* puis cacher aux premiers intervenants locaux des outils essentiels comme le SRNU?

S'il s'agit de la question d'obtenir des attestations de sécurité pour ces responsables, est-ce que ce serait si difficile pour la GRC de vérifier quelques centaines d'employés municipaux, sur lesquels on compte pour sauver leurs collectivités en cas de situation d'urgence? Il est peu probable que ces personnes puissent représenter un risque pour la sécurité, mais si une vérification de sécurité est nécessaire pour qu'elles aient accès à l'information, pourquoi ne pas la faire?

Carl Shaw, coordonnateur des mesures d'urgence pour la Ville de Colchester, en Ontario, a écrit ce qui suit :

> Je ne connais rien du système de la Réserve nationale de secours […] S'il y a une cache dans ma région, je n'en ai nullement connaissance, je n'ai aucune idée de l'endroit où elle se trouve ni de ce qu'elle contient.

Manque de consultation sur le contenu

Plusieurs gestionnaires des services d'urgence municipaux qui ont vu les dépôts ont dit au Comité qu'il est peu probable que certains éléments du contenu correspondent aux besoins de la collectivité en cas d'urgence. Le président du Comité a demandé ceci au Dr Butler-Jones lors de l'audience du 4 février 2008 :

Le président : Quel rôle les municipalités jouent-elles, lorsqu'il s'agit de déterminer ce qu'on place dans les réserves situées à proximité?

Dr David Butler-Jones, administrateur en chef de la santé publique, Agence de la santé publique du Canada : Nous consultons les coordonnateurs provinciaux, qui, je présume, consultent [...] nous les encourageons à consulter les municipalités pour déterminer ce qui leur serait le plus utile. Ça dépend[38].

La présomption du Dr Butler-Jones ne concorde pas avec les résultats du sondage que le Comité a envoyé aux municipalités. Sur les 92 répondants, un seul des responsables de la gestion des services d'urgence, celui de la Ville de Québec, a répondu qu'il y avait eu consultation sur le contenu.

Randy Hull, coordonnateur des préparatifs d'urgence à la Ville de Winnipeg, a témoigné le 3 mars 2008 :

Le sénateur Day : Vous avez parlé tout à l'heure du matériel dont on doit disposer advenant une urgence. Pendant l'enquête à laquelle nous vous avons invité à répondre, nous avons demandé si vous étiez au courant de l'existence du système fédéral de réserve nationale pour les cas d'urgence. Pendant notre tournée, nous avons découvert que, dans certains cas, les gens n'étaient pas au courant de l'existence de cette réserve et que le matériel stocké n'était pas à jour. Pouvez-vous nous parler de la réserve nationale de secours? À quoi ressemble-t-elle? L'avez-vous vue? Serait-il utile de la voir? Vient-elle compléter le matériel dont dispose la Ville de Winnipeg?

M. Hull : Je sais où se trouve le système de réserve fédérale à Winnipeg. Je ne l'ai pas vu, mais je connais l'emplacement et le bâtiment, devant lesquels j'ai souvent passé en voiture. Je sais que, depuis quelques années, la Province du Manitoba s'essaie à utiliser un hôpital « démontable », qu'elle trime dur à essayer d'assembler. J'ai entendu dire que c'est une affaire désuète avec laquelle il est difficile de travailler. Je connais davantage la réserve que nous avons nous-mêmes, à nos installations, pour la Croix-Rouge. À mes yeux, c'est là un but qu'il serait plus simple d'atteindre[39].

Les premiers intervenants ont souvent des idées très intéressantes concernant les dépôts, non seulement sur leur contenu souhaitable, mais sur la façon dont le gouvernement devrait s'y prendre pour ce qui est du stockage. Barry Manuel,

[38] David Butler-Jones, Délibérations du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 4 février 2008, fascicule 4, 39e législature, 2e session.
[39] Randy Hull, Délibérations du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 3 mars 2008, fascicule 6, 39e législature, 2e session.

coordonnateur des mesures d'urgence pour la Ville de Halifax, a écrit ceci :

> Il existe énormément de ressources dans notre pays qui peuvent être utilisées lors d'une situation d'urgence. Il faut faire attention de ne pas entreposer des ressources qui sont déjà disponibles. Une fois des ressources entreposées, elles doivent être entretenues pour s'assurer qu'elles demeurent opérationnelles. Il y a peu de valeur à disposer d'une ressource sur papier qui est périmée ou inutilisable. Avec les lois actuelles sur les situations d'urgence, les gouvernements ont la capacité de réquisitionner les ressources lors de crises et de les déployer pour le bien public. Il faut parvenir à un équilibre entre la nécessité d'entreposer et le résultat final d'avoir des réserves. Un meilleur système serait de cerner les ressources essentielles et d'avoir un système de repérage en place qui indiquerait où elles se trouvent dans la province (et, éventuellement, au pays) en tout temps. Tous les paliers de gouvernement et ONG auraient accès à ce système pour y effectuer des recherches et aussi maintenir leurs segments. Il s'agirait là d'une utilisation plus efficace des ressources plutôt que d'entreposer des matériaux que l'on laisse vieillir.

Le Comité réitère sa recommandation de 2004 que Santé Canada revoie en profondeur la façon dont il administre et gère les dépôts d'urgence, afin qu'ils servent mieux nos premiers intervenants.

NOUVELLES RECOMMANDATIONS SUR LA FAÇON D'Y PARVENIR :

Le Comité recommande :

1. **Que, pour les biens périssables, Santé Canada conçoive un système de repérage, accessible à tous les ordres de gouvernement, qui identifierait les ressources essentielles des provinces et territoires.**
2. **Que des exercices réels soient tenus régulièrement, accompagnés d'un budget de soutien, afin de tester le nouveau système de repérage des fournitures d'urgence.**
3. **Que les premiers intervenants puissent participer plus activement au système de fournitures d'urgence non périssables, notamment en ce qui concerne le quoi, le où et le comment : quelles fournitures d'urgence devraient en faire partie, où les stocks sont situés, et de quelle façon on peut y accéder.**

Problème n° 4 :
Le manque de fonds pour l'acquisition d'équipement et la formation

Le problème, tel que nous l'avons vu en 2004 : On n'a pas de mal à imaginer les souffrances incroyables et la dévastation qu'entraînerait une catastrophe chimique, biologique, radiologique, nucléaire ou explosive. Des incidents aussi disparates et horribles que la catastrophe nucléaire de Tchernobyl en 1986, la fuite de gaz toxiques à Bhopal, en Inde, en 1984, l'attentat au sarin dans le métro de Tokyo en 1995 et l'attentat terroriste contre le World Trade Center en 2001 nous rappellent le genre de problèmes que l'on peut rencontrer dans tous les pays du monde.

Dans le premier budget fédéral suivant les événements du 11 septembre 2001, le gouvernement de l'époque avait prévu des fonds sur une période de six ans destinés à aider les municipalités à se doter de la capacité de faire face à des incidents impliquant des agents chimiques, biologiques, radiologiques, nucléaires ou explosifs (CBRNE)[40]. Mais les achats d'équipement à grande échelle ne sont qu'un début; il faut aussi prévoir le coût de la capacité de les entretenir et de la formation nécessaire pour s'en servir, ce qui coûte très cher, et le gouvernement n'a rien prévu à cet effet. Par conséquent, les municipalités se retrouvent à assumer les frais d'entretien d'un équipement coûteux.

RECOMMANDATION DU COMITÉ (2004)

- **Le Comité a recommandé que le gouvernement fédéral accorde quatre autres années de crédits (5 millions de dollars par an) pour l'achat d'équipement de protection contre les menaces chimiques, biologiques, radiologiques et nucléaires[41] .**

[40] L'acronyme CBRN (armes chimiques, biologiques, radiologiques, et nucléaires) est généralement remplacé maintenant par CBRNE (armes chimiques, biologiques, radiologiques, nucléaires et explosives).
[41] Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Les urgences nationales : Le Canada, fragile en première ligne – Stratégie de renforcement*, Ottawa, Sénat du Canada, mars 2004, p. 38. Voir la recommandation 6.

RÉPONSES DU GOUVERNEMENT AUX RECOMMANDATIONS DU COMITÉ (2006-2008)

Équipement et financement pour se protéger contre les menaces CBRN

En réponse à la recommandation mentionnée ci-dessus, Sécurité publique Canada a écrit au Comité, le 30 août 2006 :

> Le budget fédéral de 2001 a alloué la somme de 10 millions de dollars, répartie sur une période de deux ans, pour acquérir du matériel chimique, biologique, radiologique et nucléaire (CBRN) destiné aux premiers intervenants de tout le pays. Ces fonds ont tous été distribués aux provinces et aux territoires, qui s'en sont servi pour accroître leur capacité d'intervention dans les centres urbains les plus importants et établir des capacités relativement uniformes dans des centres stratégiques afin d'assurer une réponse partout dans leur territoire de compétence. Le Programme conjoint de protection civile (PCPC) a servi à gérer ces fonds.
>
> SPPCC reconnaît que des fonds additionnels, alloués sur une base continue, sont nécessaires pour permettre aux premiers intervenants d'acquérir de nouvelles technologies, de maintenir et de remplacer les équipements existants et de développer de nouvelles capacités.
>
> SPPCC a proposé aux provinces et aux territoires de constituer un groupe de travail CBRN fédéral-provincial-territorial pour coordonner les efforts en vue de contrer le terrorisme CBRN, en plus d'évaluer de manière plus approfondie le besoin et les priorités concernant le nouveau financement de matériel CBRN destiné aux premiers intervenants[42].

Constituer un groupe de travail pour évaluer le besoin de nouveaux crédits pour l'acquisition d'équipement de protection contre les menaces CBRNE représentait certes un début. Les attachés de recherche de la Bibliothèque du Parlement[43], prenant la balle au bond, ont demandé à Sécurité publique Canada, le 19 septembre 2007, quel était le statut de ce groupe de travail, combien de fois il se réunissait et ce qu'il avait accompli jusqu'à présent.

[42] Sécurité publique Canada, « Réponses de SPPCC et du Portefeuille aux rapports du CSPSND », 30 août 2006, p. 11-12.
[43] Voir la note 5.

Cinq mois plus tard, le 26 février 2008, le ministère répondait :

> En avril 2007, les responsables fédéraux, provinciaux et territoriaux de la gestion des urgences ont convenu de former un sous-groupe sur les incidents CBRN relevant du Groupe de travail sur l'intervention des cadres supérieurs responsables de la gestion des urgences. Ce sous-groupe de travail est coprésidé par Sécurité publique Canada et un représentant provincial ou territorial.
>
> Jusqu'ici, le sous-groupe a réalisé diverses activités, dont la sollicitation des membres et des participants, ainsi que la rédaction du mandat et d'un aperçu du plan de travail pour examen.
>
> On imagine que le sous-groupe travaillera en collaboration à des questions comme l'échange d'information, la détermination des lacunes en matière de capacités, l'élaboration d'une stratégie nationale future, la mise à jour des ententes d'aide mutuelle intergouvernementales et à la mise en place de liens de collaboration entre le gouvernement, le monde universitaire, l'industrie et le public et, en dernier lieu, le renforcement des initiatives de recherche et de développement en matière d'incidents CBRN[44].

Ces sables mouvants qui continuent de tout engloutir

Deux ans après que le Comité eut noté l'insuffisance du financement, Sécurité publique Canada a proposé de créer un groupe de travail en vue d'examiner le besoin reconnu de nouvel équipement, et près de deux ans plus tard, Sécurité publique Canada avait établi un sous-groupe de travail dans le but de déterminer s'il se pouvait qu'on ne dispose pas de capacités suffisantes, même si le Comité avait déjà relevé une très grosse lacune de ce côté : **l'absence de fonds pour mettre à jour l'équipement!**

Sécurité publique Canada continue d'affirmer que les activités du sous-groupe consistaient à : a) solliciter l'adhésion et la participation des intéressés et b) tracer les grandes lignes d'un mandat et d'un plan de travail aux fins d'étude.

Aucune mesure concrète n'a encore été prise et aucune ne semble poindre à l'horizon. Pendant qu'attendent les premiers intervenants et que les

[44] Sécurité publique Canada, « Questions de suivi à l'intention de Sécurité publique Canada relativement aux : Recommandations et réponses du Portefeuille/SP au Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense (CSPSND) (30 août 2006) », 26 février 2008, p. 2.

Canadiens sont en danger, des groupes de bureaucrates continuent de demander des avis, de noircir du papier et de réfléchir.

LE DÉFI POUR LE GOUVERNEMENT

Besoins en matière de RSMU et de protection contre les menaces CBRNE

Premièrement, le Comité réitère les propos qu'il avait tenus au sujet des menaces CBRN en 2004 :

Les incidents CBRN sont maintenant désignés sous le nom d'incidents CBRNE, c'est-à-dire des incidents impliquant des agents chimiques, biologiques, radiologiques, nucléaires ou explosifs. Il faut se doter des moyens nécessaires pour faire face aux menaces CBRNE occasionnées par des accidents industriels, des catastrophes naturelles ou des actes terroristes qui pèsent sur les Canadiens.

Le gouvernement doit veiller à ce que les premiers répondants disposent de suffisamment de fonds pour acheter et entretenir l'équipement CBRNE et former le personnel à son usage. Il faut aussi que les fonds accordés pour l'équipement soient proportionnels à ceux destinés à la formation.

La formation des premiers intervenants à l'usage de l'équipement CBRNE doit demeurer une des priorités du gouvernement. Il ne faut pas laisser tarir les fonds accordés à cette fin, sinon la capacité d'intervention durement acquise des premiers intervenants risque de s'en ressentir. Financement et formation doivent aller de pair avec l'entretien : acheter, former, entretenir.

Deuxièmement, le Comité ajoutera un élément qu'il avait omis en 2004, Recherche et sauvetage en milieu urbain (RSMU).

RSMU désigne « un ensemble de compétences spécialisées en matière de sauvetage, auxquelles s'ajoutent des moyens de recherche et des ressources d'évaluation médicale et structurale au sein d'une équipe mobile et hautement intégrée[45] ». Les équipes RSMU remplissent différentes fonctions, comme se porter à la rescousse des victimes de l'effondrement d'un immeuble. Il existe cinq équipes de recherche et sauvetage en milieu urbain à l'aide d'équipement lourd (RSMUEL) au pays, une dans chacune des villes suivantes : Vancouver, Calgary, Brandon, Toronto et Halifax[46].

S'il n'y en pas davantage, c'est que ces équipes coûtent cher et sont composées de premiers intervenants à plein temps. Elles peuvent cependant être déployées par le gouvernement fédéral n'importe où au Canada. Comme il s'agit d'équipes *nationales*, le gouvernement fédéral doit jouer un rôle de premier plan, par son soutien financier et son leadership, pour maintenir une capacité de RSMUEL à l'échelle du pays.

Un niveau de financement insuffisant

Le 1er février 2007, le chef des pompiers Bruce Burrell, directeur des Services en cas de catastrophes de la ville de Calgary, a souligné à quel point les équipes canadiennes de RSMUEL manquent de fonds par rapport aux équipes américaines.

> **M. Burrell :** […] Selon un rapport de vérification du Department of Homeland Security, aux États-Unis, les équipes américaines de recherche et de sauvetage en milieu urbain sont sous-financées. Pour une période de quatre ans, les équipes en question ont reçu chacune environ 7,4 millions de dollars américains. Les équipes

[45] Sécurité publique Canada, « Guide de classification canadien de recherche et de sauvetage en milieu urbain (ERMSU), http://www.securitepublique.gc.ca/prg/em/usar/usar-guide-fra.aspx.

[46] En réponse à une « Question prise en note » faisant suite à la comparution de Scott Broughton, de Sécurité publique Canada, devant le Comité le 28 janvier 2008, Sécurité publique Canada a exposé les raisons pour lesquelles il n'y a pas d'équipe fédérale de RSMUEL au Québec à l'heure actuelle : « En 2004, la ville de Montréal a demandé environ 2 millions de dollars au PCPC pour accroître ses capacités en matière de RSMUEL, mais elle a retiré sa demande en 2005. » [traduction]

canadiennes, pour une période de cinq ans, ont reçu environ 2,4 millions de dollars canadiens chacune. Le Department of Homeland Security affirme que, à 7,4 millions de dollars américains, les équipes américaines conçues selon les mêmes normes sont sous-financées[47].

Le budget fédéral de décembre 2001 allouait une somme de 20 millions de dollars sur six ans (2001-2002 à 2006-2007) pour la mise en place d'une capacité nationale de recherche et de sauvetage en milieu urbain (RSMU)[48]. Cependant, selon les rapports ministériels sur le rendement déposés par Sécurité publique Canada depuis 2001, à peine 2,4 millions de dollars avaient été accordés aux cinq équipes nationales de RSMUEL en 2003-2004[49]. Une autre somme de 3 millions de dollars a été annoncée par le vice-premier ministre en 2005, mais le Comité n'a pas pu vérifier, dans les rapports ministériels sur le rendement, si cette somme a bel et bien été distribuée aux équipes de RSMUEL. L'équipe de Toronto s'est vu promettre une somme de 2 millions de dollars en 2007[50]. Le Comité prévoit vérifier si elle l'a reçue.

Des fonds pour l'entretien de l'équipement

Les premiers intervenants faisant usage d'équipement de RSMU ont fait face à peu près au même genre de problèmes que leurs homologues se spécialisant dans les incidents CBRNE. Le gouvernement fédéral a accordé des crédits pour l'achat d'équipement élémentaire de RSMU pour deux ans seulement, oubliant apparemment qu'on aura besoin de ce genre d'équipement pour longtemps. Les municipalités qui n'ont pas

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47 Bruce Burrell, Délibérations du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 1er février 2007, fascicule 9, 39e législature, 1re session.

48 Sécurité publique Canada, « Le gouvernement du Canada fournit plus de 1 million de dollars pour l'achat d'équipement de recherche et de sauvetage en milieu urbain », 2 septembre 2002, http://ww2.ps-sp.gc.ca/publications/news/2004/20040902_f.asp.

49 Parmi les rapports sur le rendement ministériel de Sécurité publique Canada, de 2001 à 2006, un seul mentionne des fonds destinés précisément aux mesures de RSMU. « La capacité de recherche et de sauvetage en milieu urbain à l'aide d'équipement lourd du Canada a été renforcée en 2003-2004, grâce à la collaboration permanente d'un Comité consultatif multisectoriel et multidisciplinaire de recherche et de sauvetage en milieu urbain et à l'affectation de fonds fédéraux de 2,4 millions de dollars à cinq municipalités du Canada. » Sécurité publique Canada, *Rapport ministériel sur le rendement 2003-2004*, http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rma/dpr/03-04/PSEPC-SPPCC/PSEPC-SPPCCd3401_f.asp, p. 7.

50 Centre des nouvelles du Canada, « Le ministre Day lance la Semaine de la protection civile en annonçant l'octroi de 5 millions de dollars pour la préparation en cas d'urgence au Canada », http://news.gc.ca/web/view/fr/index.jsp?articleid=396579.

reçu d'équipement au départ ne disposent pas des fonds nécessaires pour s'équiper maintenant, et celles qui veulent moderniser ou remplacer leur équipement n'ont pas les moyens financiers de le faire elles non plus.

Dans son *Rapport ministériel sur le rendement 2006-2007*, Sécurité publique Canada reconnaît que le financement des équipes de RSMUEL est insuffisant et promet une « revue des modalités du PCPC pour tenir compte des dépenses relatives à l'exploitation et à l'entretien des équipes de recherche et de sauvetage en milieu urbain à l'aide d'équipement lourd d'ici la fin de 2007-2008[51] ».

Lorsque nous avons demandé à Sécurité publique Canada si les critères de financement des activités de RSMU avaient été modifiés, on nous a répondu que le Conseil du Trésor a récemment approuvé une modification des modalités du PCPC afin que les dépenses relatives à l'exploitation et à l'entretien des équipes de recherche et de sauvetage en milieu urbain soient admissibles au partage des coûts dès le 1er avril 2008. C'est une bonne nouvelle, mais le Comité suivra le dossier auprès des premiers intervenants pour vérifier s'ils bénéficient des retombées.

Troisièmement, les municipalités ont désespérément besoin d'argent pour former le personnel de RSMU et de lutte contre les incidents CBRNE.

Tous les premiers intervenants devraient au moins avec reçu une formation élémentaire en matière d'intervention en cas d'incident CBRNE. Le Comité a appris que le coût d'une telle formation peut atteindre 1 million de dollars par année dans les grandes municipalités.

Le 29 janvier 2007, le Comité a entendu Patricia Dodge, directrice de la Gestion du risque et des urgences de la ville de Vancouver :

[51] Sécurité publique Canada, *Rapport ministériel sur le rendement 2006-2007*, 1er novembre 2007, http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/dpr-rmr/2006-2007/inst/psp/psp02-fr.asp.

Mme Dodge: Nous avons besoin de financement pour la formation des premiers intervenants. Je pense que tous les premiers intervenants devraient avoir un niveau élémentaire de formation CBRN, même les répartiteurs et ceux qui répondent aux appels, parce qu'il est extrêmement important qu'ils posent les bonnes questions[52].

Le 1er février 2007, c'était au tour du chef des pompiers Bruce Burrell de comparaître devant le Comité. Voici ce qu'il avait à dire au sujet de la formation CBRNE dans les petites comme dans les grandes municipalités :

M. Burrell : La ville de Calgary a besoin d'un plus grand nombre d'intervenants dûment formés pour lutter contre les incidents CBRNE. Encore une fois, nous avons un problème quant à la formation dispensée par le Collège canadien de gestion des urgences, qui attribue un nombre limité de places aux provinces pour essayer d'accorder à tous au pays le même niveau de formation, qu'ils aient ou non à leur disposition le matériel, les ressources ou une équipe d'intervention prête à entrer en scène.

À leur tour, les provinces déterminent les places attribuées aux municipalités, de sorte qu'il est difficile pour les municipalités de se donner la capacité nécessaire pour mettre en place une équipe qui soit efficace.

Le programme fédéral ne comporte pas le niveau de formation voulu pour que les petites municipalités assimilent le niveau d'intervention qui se situe dans leurs limites.

Le cours intermédiaire de lutte contre les incidents CBRNE au Collège canadien de gestion des urgences pourrait être dispensé dans les provinces ou les grandes villes du pays, pour maximiser le nombre de personnes formées.

Pour former les premiers intervenants de la ville d'après les normes que propose le CCGU [Collège canadien de gestion des urgences], la ville de Calgary aurait à dépenser environ un million de dollars[53].

Si, dans les petites municipalités, on a besoin de plus de fonds pour la formation en matière de lutte contre les incidents CBRNE, il en va de même pour la formation en RSMUEL. Des petites unités de recherche et de sauvetage en milieu urbain sont en train de voir le jour à différents endroits au pays. Elles

[52] Patricia Dodge, Délibérations du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 29 janvier 2007, fascicule 9, 39e législature, 1re session.
[53] Bruce Burrell, Délibérations du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 1er février 2007, fascicule 9, 39e législature, 1re session.

viennent s'ajouter aux cinq grandes équipes de RSMUEL qui existent déjà. Le 29 janvier 2007, Tim Armstrong, chef adjoint des Opérations spéciales, Services des incendies et de sauvetage de Vancouver, avait déclaré ce qui suit au Comité :

> **Le sénateur Day :** Je ne savais pas que les équipes de recherche et de sauvetage en milieu urbain à l'aide d'équipement lourd n'existaient que dans quatre ou cinq villes. Que se passe-t-il dans le reste des régions urbaines qui n'ont pas d'équipes comme celles-là?
>
> **M. Armstrong :** Au départ, SPPCC avait accepté trois équipes : des équipes légères, moyennes et lourdes. Les cinq équipes ont utilisé la majeure partie des fonds, ce qui a défavorisé les petites municipalités. Je considère que de plus petites équipes régionales sont nécessaires[54].

Treize pour cent des répondants à un sondage effectué par le Comité auprès des municipalités ont dit que leur municipalité avait déjà une équipe de RSMU ou était en train d'en former une. Parmi les villes qui s'étaient déjà dotées d'une équipe de RSMU ou qui étaient sur le point de le faire, notons : Saskatoon (Sask.), Victoria (C.-B.), Halton Hills (Ont.), Campbell River (C.-B.), Alma (Qc), Saint-Georges (Qc), Strathcona County (Alb.), Thunder Bay (Ont.) et Victoriaville (Qc).

Il est clair pour le Comité que les collectivités canadiennes, grandes et petites, ne reçoivent pas du Programme conjoint de protection civile du Canada tous les fonds dont elles ont besoin pour se protéger contre les menaces chimiques, biologiques, radiologiques, nucléaires ou explosives (CBRNE) ou pour les opérations de recherche et de sauvetage en milieu urbain (RSMU).

[54] Tim Armstrong, Délibérations du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 29 janvier 2007, fascicule 9, 39e législature, 1re session.

NOUVELLES RECOMMANDATIONS :

1. Le Comité recommande que le gouvernement crée un *fonds permanent* pour :

a) maintenir les capacités actuelles de recherche et de sauvetage en milieu urbain (RSMU) et de lutte contre les incidents CBRNE, y compris pour l'achat et l'entretien d'équipement et la formation de tous les intervenants d'urgence, suivant une formule de financement négociée par les parties en cause;

b) aider financièrement les petites municipalités qui cherchent à se doter de moyens de RSMU.

2. Le Comité recommande que le gouvernement réunisse une trousse de RSMUEL qui pourrait être transportée à bord d'un appareil (Hercules ou C-17) afin que les Forces canadiennes puissent emmener rapidement les équipes de RSMU sur les lieux des situations d'urgence partout au Canada ou à l'étranger.

Problème no 5 :
Une piètre collaboration entre les gouvernements

Le problème, tel que nous l'avons vu en 2004 : Le niveau de collaboration, de coopération et de partage de l'information entre les divers paliers de gouvernement au Canada en situation d'urgence n'était pas suffisant. Les provinces, les territoires et les collectivités n'étaient pas suffisamment inclus dans la planification stratégique et la gestion des mesures d'urgence.

RECOMMANDATION DU COMITÉ (2004)

Le Comité a recommandé :

- **Que Sécurité publique Canada négocie des protocoles d'entente liant les gouvernements fédéral, provinciaux et territoriaux et prescrivant en détail leurs responsabilités respectives en matière de préparation aux situations d'urgence autant que d'intervention en pareille éventualité[55].**

- **Que le ministre de Sécurité publique du Canada s'assure que de nouveaux protocoles efficaces de partage de données et des ententes d'aide mutuelle soient mis en place entre les paliers fédéral, provincial, territorial et municipal de gouvernement[56].**

[55] Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Les urgences nationales : Le Canada, fragile en première ligne – Stratégie de renforcement*, Ottawa, Sénat du Canada, mars 2004, p. 43. Voir la recommandation 9.
[56] Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Les urgences nationales : Le Canada, fragile en première ligne – Stratégie de renforcement*, Ottawa, Sénat du Canada, mars 2004, p. 81. Voir la recommandation 18B.

RÉPONSES DU GOUVERNEMENT AUX RECOMMANDATIONS DU COMITÉ (2006-2008)

Ententes de partage de données et d'aide mutuelle

Le 30 août 2006, Sécurité publique Canada écrivait, à propos de la recommandation du Comité concernant la mise en place de nouveaux protocoles efficaces de partage de données et d'ententes d'aide mutuelle :

> Le Centre d'évaluation intégrée des menaces (CEIM) a été établi en 2004. Son principal objectif est d'effectuer des évaluations complètes des menaces ayant trait au terrorisme dont les résultats sont communiqués en temps opportun au milieu du renseignement, aux autres ministères, aux provinces, aux municipalités, aux partenaires internationaux et aux intervenants de première ligne pertinents, comme les organismes d'application de la loi.
>
> Par ailleurs, en 2005, un protocole d'entente sur l'échange d'information entre SPPCC et le ministère de la Sécurité publique du Nouveau-Brunswick a été conclu. Il est à souhaiter que ce protocole serve de modèle à l'élaboration de protocoles d'entente similaires avec d'autres provinces et territoires.
>
> Par ailleurs, le Centre canadien de réponse aux incidents cybernétiques de SPPCC a élaboré un Cadre de coopération opérationnelle en collaboration avec les administrations provinciales, territoriales et municipales. Il s'agit d'un plan d'action axé sur la coopération qui fait état des engagements opérationnels de chaque secteur de compétence dans le domaine de la sécurité cybernétique[57].

La création du Centre d'évaluation intégrée des menaces (CEIM), placé sous la responsabilité du SCRS, était une heureuse initiative. Il est bien, également, que le CEIM partage l'information sur les menaces terroristes potentielles non seulement avec les provinces et les territoires, mais aussi avec les municipalités et les « intervenants de première ligne pertinents ».

Si le CEIM met réellement dans le coup les autorités locales, alors il transcende les pratiques bureaucratiques usuelles qui font que, même dans des situations d'urgence, le gouvernement fédéral est réticent à s'adresser directement aux municipalités.

[57] Sécurité publique Canada, « Réponse de SPPCC et du Portefeuille aux rapports du CSPSND », 30 août 2006, p. 21-22.

Si c'est réellement ce qui se produit – et plusieurs chefs de police à qui a parlé le Comité disent que c'est le cas – alors mille bravos! C'est une grande première!

Ce que le CEIM semble avoir compris, contrairement à d'autres composantes de Sécurité publique Canada, c'est que pour réunir l'information dont il besoin, il doit tendre l'oreille et la main aux forces de police locales. Les contacts directs et les échanges d'information avec ces forces sont essentiels.

Les autres composantes de Sécurité publique Canada ont pour principe que les ministères fédéraux doivent traiter avec les leurs homologues provinciaux, lesquels font ensuite affaire avec les municipalités.

Or, Sécurité publique Canada, qui administre des programmes de financement comme le Programme conjoint de protection civile (PCPC), devrait s'adresser directement aux responsables municipaux des mesures d'urgence. Comme le fait le CEIM avec les services de police locaux, ce ministère devrait les tenir au courant et les écouter.

Sécurité publique Canada pourrait ainsi connaître rapidement les priorités des municipalités et concevoir des programmes pour contribuer financièrement à y répondre. S'il avait fait cela il y a plusieurs années, il aurait peut-être su depuis longtemps quoi mettre et ne pas mettre dans ses dépôts d'urgence.

Il n'y a rien, dans la réponse ci-dessus, à propos de la mise en œuvre des protocoles de partage de données.

Le Plan d'action fédéral-provincial-territorial en huit points

Le 19 septembre 2007, les attachés de recherche de la Bibliothèque du Parlement[58] ont posé les questions suivantes à Sécurité publique Canada à propos du plan d'action en huit points dont il était question dans sa réponse : « Quelles sont les particularités du plan d'action FPT en huit points? » et « Quel est l'état d'avancement du plan? » Voici ce que le ministère a répondu, le 26 février 2008 :

[58] Voir la note 5.

1. Cadre d'intervention en cas d'urgence — Collaboration des gouvernements visant à harmoniser le système fédéral de sorte qu'il soit complémentaire à chaque système provincial ou territorial en matière d'intervention en cas d'urgence.

2. Aide en cas de catastrophe — Discussion continue visant à renforcer les Accords d'aide financière actuels en cas de catastrophe (AAF) et élaboration des options d'aide financière en cas de catastrophe non prévues dans les AAFCC existants.

3. Répertoire des programmes d'aide en cas de catastrophe — Création d'un répertoire des programmes d'aide financière en cas de catastrophe avec l'intégration des programmes provinciaux et territoriaux dans le répertoire fédéral existant.

4. Atténuation des catastrophes — Préparation des options en vue d'élaborer une stratégie nationale d'atténuation des catastrophes.

5. Formation — Révision et mise à jour du plan d'action de la stratégie de formation pour 2005-2010.

6. Calendrier des exercices — Établissement d'un calendrier d'exercices conjoints FPT d'intervention en cas d'urgence.

7. Alertes publiques — Accélération de l'élaboration et de la mise en œuvre de la Stratégie nationale d'alertes publiques.

8. Stratégie de protection des infrastructures essentielles — Élaboration d'un plan de travail pour une stratégie nationale de protection des infrastructures essentielles.

Le 10 janvier 2007, il a été question du plan d'action en huit points à la réunion des ministres fédéraux, provinciaux et territoriaux (FPT) responsables de la gestion des urgences. *Un cadre de sécurité civile pour le Canada* a été approuvé; il soutient la conception, la mise en œuvre et l'amélioration continue de la gestion des urgences au Canada. La *Stratégie de formation en matière de gestion des urgences au Canada* a également été approuvée; elle contribue à faire progresser les objectifs communs de formation en matière de gestion des urgences de l'ensemble des provinces et territoires[59].

[59] Sécurité publique Canada, « Questions de suivi à l'intention de Sécurité publique Canada relativement aux : Recommandations et réponses du Portefeuille/SP au Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense (CSPSND) (30 août 2006) », 26 février 2008, p. 6.

Le plan d'action a été approuvé en janvier 2005 et bon nombre des mesures qu'il comprenait étaient censées être apportées avant l'été 2005. Or, mis à part l'approbation d'une « Stratégie de formation en matière de gestion des urgences au Canada » et l'établissement d'un « Cadre d'intervention en cas d'urgence », il semble que tout ce que renferme le plan d'action reste à faire.

Nous préférerions que tout soit fait d'ici peu.

Protocole d'entente

En réponse à la recommandation du Comité concernant l'établissement de protocoles d'entente avec les provinces et les territoires, Sécurité publique Canada a écrit, le 30 août 2006 :

> Des protocoles d'entente relatifs à la gestion des urgences fédéraux-provinciaux-territoriaux (FPT) ont déjà été conclus avec la plupart des provinces et territoires (à l'exception du Québec, de l'Alberta et du Nunavut). Il existe un besoin continu d'assurer que les pratiques en matière de gestion des urgences sont actualisées et coordonnées. SPPCC est déterminé à collaborer avec les provinces et les territoires afin de réaliser d'autres progrès.
>
> Les ministres responsables de la gestion des urgences se sont réunis en janvier 2005 pour discuter de plans visant à renforcer le système canadien de gestion des urgences. Les ministres se sont mis d'accord sur un plan d'action FPT[60] en 8 points concernant les initiatives prioritaires en matière de gestion des urgences. Les sous-ministres responsables de la gestion des urgences se sont réunis en septembre 2005 et en mai 2006. À la prochaine réunion ministérielle, prévue en septembre 2006, les ministres feront le point sur le plan d'action FPT et prendront de nouvelles priorités en considération.
>
> Avec la pleine participation des gouvernements fédéral et provinciaux, des groupes de travail FPT ont été mis sur pied pour aborder le plan d'action en 8 points. Les membres des groupes ont réalisé des travaux considérables dans des domaines comprenant l'amélioration du cadre fédéral d'intervention d'urgence qui viendra compléter ceux des provinces et des territoires, l'aide financière aux provinces, les stratégies d'atténuation, les infrastructures essentielles, les alertes publiques et les communications, ainsi qu'un plan d'action sur la formation et un calendrier des exercices.
>
> Un groupe de travail FPT des opérations est en train de définir activement l'intervention des différentes administrations en matière de gestion des urgences et de questions de sécurité.

[60] FPT signifie fédéral-provincial-territorial.

> Les hauts fonctionnaires et les sous-ministres FPT travaillent en étroite collaboration à l'élaboration d'un Cadre de gestion des urgences pour le Canada, qu'ils devront faire approuver par les ministres FPT responsables de la gestion des urgences. Les représentants FPT considèrent ce cadre comme la pierre angulaire d'un système national de gestion des urgences. Le cadre aborde également la résolution prise par les membres du Conseil de la fédération lors de leur réunion de juillet 2004, où les premiers ministres ont convenu de demander à leurs ministres responsables de la gestion des urgences de travailler avec le gouvernement fédéral à l'élaboration d'une stratégie coordonnée sur les interventions d'urgence au Canada qui tiendrait compte des lois et des plans provinciaux et territoriaux déjà en place[61].

Rappelons cette vieille règle bureaucratique : *Dans le doute, suffoquez-les de paroles.*

Sécurité publique Canada admet dans sa réponse qu'aucun protocole d'entente n'a été signé avec le Québec, l'Alberta et le Nunavut, qui représentent à peu près le tiers du pays. Il est difficile d'imaginer qu'un plan national de gestion des urgences puisse fonctionner avec un trou énorme au milieu.

Un cadre de gestion des urgences

Le 19 septembre 2007, les attachés de recherche de la Bibliothèque du Parlement[62] ont posé les questions suivantes à Sécurité publique Canada à propos du Cadre de gestion des urgences susmentionné : « Quels sont les principes généraux de ce cadre? » et « De quelle manière le cadre sera-t-il mis en œuvre et quel est son lien avec le Système national d'intervention d'urgence (SNIU)? » Voici ce qu'a répondu le ministère, le 26 février 2008 :

> Le *Cadre de sécurité civile pour le Canada* et le Système national d'intervention d'urgence (SNIU) relèvent des responsables fédéraux, provinciaux et territoriaux, qui ont convenu, en janvier 2008, de « travailler ensemble pour améliorer et renforcer le cadre d'intervention en cas d'urgence afin d'harmoniser le système fédéral de sorte qu'il soit complémentaire à chaque système provincial et territorial ».
>
> Les responsables fédéraux, provinciaux et territoriaux ont approuvé le Cadre en janvier 2007. Il s'agit d'un document stratégique définissant les quatre dimensions interdépendantes de la gestion des urgences — prévention et

[61] Sécurité publique Canada, « Réponse de SPPCC et du Portefeuille aux rapports du CSPSND », 30 août 2006, p. 12-13.
[62] Voir la note 5.

> atténuation, préparation, intervention et rétablissement. Il décrit les objectifs sous-jacents de la gestion des urgences au Canada et permet d'établir une approche commune et un glossaire pour le milieu de la gestion des urgences.
>
> Neuf principes étayent le Cadre : responsabilité, approche globale, partenariats, cohérence d'action, approche axée sur la gestion des risques, tous risques, résilience, communications claires et amélioration continue. Ils fournissent un cadre stratégique visant à soutenir la conception, la mise en œuvre et l'amélioration continue des politiques, procédures, programmes et activités de gestion des urgences[63].

Il n'est nulle part indiqué que le Québec, l'Alberta et le Nunavut se sont joints aux autres provinces et territoires. On doit supposer qu'ils ne l'ont pas fait.

S'il faut en croire la réponse, les autres provinces et territoires ont « un cadre stratégique visant à soutenir la conception, la mise en œuvre et l'amélioration continue des politiques, procédures, programmes et activités de gestion des urgences ».

Ainsi donc, sept ans après les attentats du 11 septembre, le Canada a un cadre à l'intérieur duquel huit provinces et deux territoires peuvent tâcher d'améliorer la coopération entre gouvernements à l'occasion d'urgences majeures. Mais pour ce qui est d'améliorer vraiment la coordination des interventions en cas d'urgence, on repassera.

LE DÉFI POUR LE GOUVERNEMENT (2008)

Que manque-t-il, à part à peu près tout?

Dans toutes ces réponses, il n'est jamais question du Centre des opérations du gouvernement (COG), qui, d'après son site, est :

> […] le cœur d'un réseau de centres des opérations gérés par différents ministères et organismes fédéraux, notamment la GRC, Santé Canada, les Affaires étrangères, le SCRS et la Défense nationale. Le COG entretient également des liens avec les provinces et territoires ainsi qu'avec des partenaires internationaux

[63] Sécurité publique Canada, « Questions de suivi à l'intention de Sécurité publique Canada relativement aux : Recommandations et réponses du Portefeuille/SP au Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense (CSPSND) (30 août 2006) », 26 février 2008, p. 6.

> comme les États-Unis et l'OTAN. Il est opérationnel jour et nuit, sans interruption, recueillant des renseignements généraux ou classifiés auprès d'autres centres et d'une multitude de sources de partout dans le monde. Le COG assure la protection civile en s'occupant de tout ce qui représente une menace à la sécurité des Canadiens et des Canadiennes ou à l'intégrité des infrastructures essentielles du Canada, que cette menace soit réelle ou perçue, imminente ou effective, une catastrophe naturelle ou une activité terroriste[64].

Si le Centre des opérations du gouvernement entretient réellement des liens avec les provinces et les territoires, quelqu'un peut-il dire au Comité à quoi servent ces liens?

On en revient à la substance. Il est une chose d'avoir un cadre; il en est une autre, et c'est d'ailleurs la plus importante, d'avoir des politiques, des procédures, des programmes et des activités de meilleure qualité. La seule chose que demande le Comité, c'est qu'on lui fournisse la preuve que tous les gouvernements au Canada partagent une quantité importante d'information afin que chacun puisse se préparer comme il faut à des situations d'urgence, et que des systèmes sont en place pour offrir une aide concrète et pratique pendant et après une situation d'urgence.

Le Comité a surveillé à cette fin l'élaboration du Système national d'intervention d'urgence (SNIU), le prétendu système interministériel et intergouvernemental de gestion des urgences de Sécurité publique Canada. Mais le SNIU est en cours d'élaboration depuis 2003 et, cinq ans plus tard, nul ne sait quand il sera prêt. On reviendra sur le SNIU et son successeur au problème n° 11.

La bonne nouvelle jusqu'à présent, c'est que le Centre d'évaluation intégrée des menaces (CEIM) tient les premiers intervenants au courant des menaces terroristes. Après cela, c'est plutôt mince comme progrès.

Il existe un cadre national qui, malgré une grosse lacune, est rempli de bonnes intentions, mais qui ne semble avoir produit aucun résultat jusqu'à présent. Puis, il y a un Centre des

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[64] Sécurité publique Canada, « Centre des opérations du Canada », 1er février 2008, voir site http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/em/goc/index-fra.aspx.

opérations que l'on a passé sous silence dans les réponses et qui pourrait communiquer de l'information utile à divers gouvernements, mais nous n'en avons pas la certitude.

Puisque des règlements du Conseil du Trésor empêchant le partage d'information fédérale avec quiconque n'a pas une habilitation sécuritaire du fédéral constitueraient un obstacle au partage d'information utile avec les municipalités, le Comité présente les nouvelles recommandations qui suivent.

NOUVELLES RECOMMANDATIONS

Le Comité recommande :

1. Que le gouvernement fédéral désigne des responsables municipaux des mesures d'urgence partout au pays qui auront besoin d'une habilitation sécuritaire pour recevoir de l'information fédérale, et veille à ce qu'ils soient soumis à une vérification de sécurité et à ce qu'ils obtiennent l'habilitation exigée s'ils sont en règle.

2. Que Sécurité publique Canada communique directement avec les responsables municipaux des mesures d'urgence chaque fois qu'il a de l'information ou d'autres ressources susceptibles d'améliorer la capacité d'intervention en cas d'urgence des municipalités.

3. Que le gouvernement fédéral vérifie si Sécurité publique Canada fait une utilisation optimale de ses ressources.

Problème n° 6(a) :
Leçons apprises oubliées

La façon de réagir rapidement et de façon pertinente dans des situations chaotiques est au cœur de l'intervention en cas de sinistre. La connaissance des « leçons apprises » à l'occasion d'autres sinistres est essentielle pour éviter les retards et les erreurs dans la réponse aux urgences et la gestion de celles-ci. Les leçons apprises doivent servir de pratiques exemplaires convenues qui peuvent ensuite devenir des normes.

Les problèmes, tels que nous les avons vus en 2004 : Les témoins gouvernementaux ont reconnu que les archives des « leçons apprises » étaient presque inexistantes. Un point faible frappant : elles ne contenaient pas les leçons tirées des grands sinistres. En outre, les renseignements contenus dans les archives n'ont pas été communiqués aux premiers intervenants – les gens qui en ont le plus besoin. Lorsque le contenu autant que la transmission sont problématiques, il y a quelque chose qui cloche.

RECOMMANDATION DU COMITÉ (2004)

- **Sécurité publique Canada doit organiser ses archives sur les « leçons tirées du passé » pour qu'elles soient :**
  - **à jour et rétrospectives;**
  - **accessibles et utiles aux premiers intervenants[65].**

- **Sécurité publique Canada doit agir comme centre de répartition pour venir en aide aux autres niveaux de gouvernement, en communiquant au besoin à d'autres administrations les « leçons apprises » par les provinces, les territoires et les municipalités.**

- **Sécurité publique Canada doit également établir et publier, dans les soixante (60) jours de la situation d'urgence nationale, un rapport préliminaire public suivi, moins d'un an après la situation**

[65] Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Les urgences nationales : Le Canada, fragile en première ligne – Stratégie de renforcement*, Ottawa, Sénat du Canada, mars 2004, p. 36. Voir la recommandation 7.

d'urgence, d'un rapport public officiel faisant état des leçons apprises et des diverses interventions effectuées[66].

RÉPONSES DU GOUVERNEMENT AUX RECOMMANDATIONS DU COMITÉ (2006-2008)

Ne pas enregistrer les leçons apprises

En réponse aux recommandations du Comité de créer des archives des « leçons apprises », le ministère de la Sécurité publique a écrit ce qui suit le 30 août 2006 :

> La division des exercices nationaux (DEN) de SPPCC a conçu et met à l'essai un site Web sécurisé qui permet aux partenaires fédéraux, provinciaux et territoriaux d'échanger sur un portail des informations sur les exercices, les leçons apprises et les pratiques exemplaires.
>
> Par l'entremise du Comité interministériel de coordination des exercices (CICE), la DEN fournit un forum aux organismes et ministères fédéraux pour les mettre régulièrement au courant des conclusions des exercices. Le Comité mettra sur pied une équipe qui prendra en charge les principaux aspects d'un développement futur d'un répertoire des leçons apprises et d'un accès élargi pour les différentes administrations. SPPCC est en train de modifier la structure d'intervention nationale pour prendre note des leçons apprises au cours des opérations et incorporer ces leçons à ses procédures opérationnelles, ce qui lui permettra de déterminer les améliorations possibles et de continuer à réaliser des progrès[67].

Relativement au processus des leçons apprises, les attachés de recherche de la Bibliothèque du Parlement[68] ont demandé **:** « Quand ce processus officialisé de « leçons retenues » sera-t-il fonctionnel? Les évaluations des progrès seront-elles rendues publiques? » Sécurité publique Canada a répondu ce qui suit :

> La Division des exercices nationaux consulte actuellement d'autres gouvernements, nationaux et internationaux, au sujet de modèles actuels et nouveaux de systèmes pour les leçons retenues et les processus connexes. Le

[66] Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Les urgences nationales : Le Canada, fragile en première ligne – Stratégie de renforcement*, Ottawa, Sénat du Canda, mars 2004, p. 78. Voir la recommandation 18 G (i).
[67] Sécurité publique Canada, « Réponse de SPPCC et du Portefeuille aux rapports du CSPSND », 30 août 2006, p. 12.
[68] Voir la note 5.

> processus sera fonctionnel au printemps de 2009. En raison de la nature délicate du contenu des évaluations des progrès, il n'est pas prévu de les rendre publics.

Qu'est-ce que les leçons apprises et les meilleures pratiques ont de si délicat? S'il y a des composantes qui comportent des technologies ou des techniques sensibles que les terroristes ne devraient pas connaître, il est certainement possible de les désigner ainsi et de les mettre à la disposition uniquement des personnes ayant l'habilitation de sécurité la plus élevée. Sinon, pourquoi ne pas mettre l'information à la disposition des premiers intervenants, soit ceux qui en ont le plus besoin?

Il est bien possible que le caractère délicat de cette question ne soit que le résultat d'une autre lutte de compétence entre fonctionnaires fédéraux et provinciaux. On s'attendrait à plus de rigueur de leur part quant il s'agit de la prévention de désastres nationaux.

Transmettre les leçons apprises aux premiers intervenants

Relativement à la recommandation du Comité du Sénat que Sécurité publique Canada agisse comme centre de répartition pour l'ensemble du gouvernement, Sécurité publique Canada a écrit ce qui suit le 30 août 2006 :

> La division des exercices nationaux (DEN) de SP a mis au point et pilote un site web protégé grâce auquel ses partenaires fédéraux, provinciaux et territoriaux peuvent échanger de l'information concernant les exercices, les leçons retenues et les pratiques exemplaires.
>
> De plus, certains rapports publics faisant état des leçons apprises, ainsi que d'autres articles ayant trait à la gestion des urgences et d'autres rapports ont maintenant été ajoutés à la section des ressources du site web élargi du Collège canadien de gestion des urgences, lancé en mai 2006[69].

En ce qui concerne le site web consacré aux leçons retenues et aux meilleures pratiques, les attachés de recherche de la Bibliothèque du Parlement[70] ont posé la question suivante le 19 septembre 2007 : « Quand ce site web sera-t-il entièrement fonctionnel? » Ce à quoi Sécurité publique Canada a répondu le 26 février 2008 :

[69] Sécurité publique Canada, « Réponse de SPPCC et du Portefeuille aux rapports du CSPSND », 30 août 2006, p. 20.
[70] Voir la note 5.

> Le site web fait actuellement l'objet d'une mise au point plus poussée en tandem avec le processus des leçons retenues, et la date cible est le printemps 2009.
>
> Le site est déjà fonctionnel et accessible aux provinces et aux territoires, mais il est en train d'être mis à niveau. Dans le cadre de ce processus, nous avons l'intention d'utiliser les éléments du futur forum sur les pratiques exemplaires et les leçons retenues tenu avec les provinces et les territoires (une initiative du Groupe de travail sur la préparation des CSRGU [cadres supérieures responsables de la gestion des urgences]), ce qui nous permettra de consulter de nouveau les provinces, les territoires, des universitaires et nos homologues américains sur la conception et la mise en œuvre conjointe d'un processus d'apprentissage plus officiel, qui contribuera à la gestion du savoir à grande échelle et l'amélioration continue du site.

Sur quel ton devrait-on le dire? Les Canadiens ont subi l'inondation dévastatrice du Saguenay (au Québec) en juillet 1996, celle de la rivière Rouge (en Alberta) en 1997 et la tempête de verglas en 1998 – pour ne nommer que quelques sinistres. La sonnette d'alarme retentit depuis un certain temps et le catalogue commun des leçons apprises devrait paraître au **printemps 2009**. Mince consolation, il y a au moins une date prévue. Si la préparation des mesures d'urgence était vraiment prise au sérieux dans notre pays, la date cible serait appelée *date limite* – et il y aurait des conséquences si elle était dépassée.

Rapports annuels de Sécurité publique Canada

Enfin, relativement à notre recommandation que Sécurité publique Canada publie des rapports annuels, le ministère a répondu ce qui suit le 30 août 2006 :

> SPPCC modifie actuellement sa structure nationale d'intervention visant à saisir les leçons retenues tirées des événements et des exercices pour les intégrer aux procédures opérationnelles. La version officielle du processus amélioré permettant de tirer des leçons apprises comportera des évaluations régulières des progrès[71].

Nous avons demandé à Sécurité publique de présenter des rapports réguliers sur les leçons retenues, mais rien ne semble se produire. On imagine aisément pourquoi – son site web sûr destiné aux leçons retenues et aux

[71] Sécurité publique Canada, « Réponse de SPPCC et du Portefeuille aux rapports du CSPSND », 30 août 2006, p. 24.

meilleures pratiques est en cours d'élaboration depuis des années, et Sécurité publique Canada semble consulter sans jamais parvenir à un produit final**.**

LE DÉFI POUR LE GOUVERNEMENT

Transmettre aux personnes qui comptent l'information dont elles ont besoin

Trois années se sont écoulées depuis que le Comité a recommandé un catalogue national des pratiques exemplaires en cas d'urgence. D'après les réponses reçues, une autre année aura passé avant que le catalogue électronique voie vraiment le jour.

Lorsque le catalogue paraîtra finalement, rien n'indique que les premiers intervenants des municipalités pourront le consulter. La liste devra d'abord passer du gouvernement fédéral aux provinces, desquelles relèvent les municipalités. Le catalogue *pourrait* alors être mis à la disposition des responsables des interventions d'urgence dans les municipalités.

S'il est transmis éventuellement, combien de temps faudra-t-il avant que toutes les provinces et tous les territoires passent ce type d'information vitale à leurs premiers intervenants? Le Comité craint que cela prenne trop de temps.

Les bureaucrates ont créé au fil des ans tant de termes qui ne se retrouvent pas dans le dictionnaire pour communiquer les uns avec les autres que même les initiés appellent ce langage, poli, voilé, parsemé d'acronymes, le « bureaucratien ».

L'échange suivant est intervenu entre les membres du Comité et Scott Broughton, sous-ministre adjoint principal dans le Secteur de la gestion des mesures d'urgence et de la sécurité nationale, Sécurité publique Canada, le 28 janvier 2008 :

> **Le président :** Ne conservez-vous pas un catalogue, un modèle de séance d'information de 20 minutes, de deux heures ou de deux jours sur la façon de renseigner les gens quant aux mesures à prendre en cas de tempête de verglas, de

panne majeure de courant, d'inondation, et cetera, de façon que les gens n'aient pas chaque fois à réinventer la roue?

M. Broughton : Comme toutes les organisations de protection civile à l'échelle du pays, on prépare de nombreux rapports dans la foulée des exercices et des événements. De ce point de vue, il existe un processus d'apprentissage au sein des organisations. Pourrions-nous disposer, au bon endroit et au bon moment, d'un spécialiste versé dans la question des tempêtes de verglas? Probablement que non. Il existe peut-être suffisamment de gens qui ont l'expertise nécessaire. Je crois que le Centre des opérations du gouvernement pourrait dispenser des conseils généraux utiles. Toutefois, pourrait-on recourir à du personnel préparé pour chaque type d'intervention? Je n'en suis pas persuadé.

Le président : Pourquoi pas?

M. Broughton : L'intervention immédiate incombe aux provinces et aux territoires.

Le président : Êtes-vous heureux à l'idée que l'information demeure l'apanage des provinces et que vous pouvez diriger les personnes vers les ressources du Québec?

M. Broughton : Pas nécessairement. Si nous n'avions pas l'information, je crois que nous pourrions rapidement la trouver.

Qu'il y ait ou non un spécialiste à notre centre des opérations du gouvernement ou ailleurs, qui sache exactement ce qu'il convient de faire en cas de tempête de verglas, je pense que l'on saurait quoi faire. Toutefois, en ce qui a trait à la séance d'information de 20 minutes, je devrais me renseigner auprès des responsables. Il ne fait aucun doute qu'ils ont appris grâce à ces processus, et que leur concours s'avérerait utile. En revanche, en ce qui me concerne, je ne saurais dire si un tel outil existe vraiment. Il faudrait que je pose la question[72].

Il semblerait qu'il n'y ait pas de mot en bureaucratien pour traduire « urgent » ou « situation d'urgence » ou « crise ». Mais comme l'inuit – qui a une multitude de mots pour décrire la neige – la bureaucratie peut trouver des centaines de façons de dire lentement.

[72] Scott Broughton, Délibérations du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, fascicule 4, 28 janvier 2008, 39e législature, 2e session.

Problème n° 6(b) :
Absence de leadership en matière de pratiques exemplaires

Le problème, tel que nous l'avons vu en 2004 : Le gouvernement fédéral est grandement déconnecté des premiers intervenants et ne joue pas un rôle de chef de file pour établir un catalogue des « pratiques exemplaires », catalogue qui serait naturellement établi après l'examen des « leçons apprises » pour servir de guide (dont il a été question dans le problème n° 6 (a).

RECOMMANDATION DU COMITÉ (2004)

- **Le Comité a recommandé que Sécurité publique Canada :**
  - **veille à ce que les collectivités canadiennes soient bien informées des programmes de formation et des autres ressources mis à leur disposition pour les aider à se préparer aux situations d'urgence;**
  - **encourage et finance la mise en place d'un système d'examen par les pairs parmi les gestionnaires des situations d'urgence et les premiers intervenants afin de s'assurer qu'ils appliquent les meilleures pratiques et de favoriser leur interopérabilité [73];**
  - **s'assure que tous les accords prévoyant le versement de fonds aux gouvernements provinciaux et territoriaux fassent état du pourcentage des fonds destinés aux premiers intervenants municipaux;**
  - **présente au Parlement un rapport annuel de ses activités. Ce rapport doit mettre l'accent sur les mesures prises par le Bureau pour améliorer la capacité d'intervention du Canada dans les situations d'urgence et faire état des écarts**

[73] L'interopérabilité est la capacité que possède un produit ou un système à fonctionner avec d'autres produits ou systèmes.

perçus entre les ressources et les capacités des premiers intervenants[74].

- **en coopération avec les services municipaux d'intervention d'urgence et les gouvernements provinciaux et territoriaux, élabore des « pratiques exemplaires » pour faire face à d'éventuelles catastrophes naturelles ou causées par l'homme[75].**

RÉPONSES DU GOUVERNEMENT AUX RECOMMANDATIONS DU COMITÉ (2006-2008)

Relativement à la recommandation que Sécurité publique Canada veille à ce que les collectivités canadiennes soient bien informées des programmes de formation et des autres ressources mis à leur disposition pour les aider à se préparer aux situations d'urgence, le ministère a écrit ce qui suit le 30 août 2006 :

> La formation en matière de gestion des urgences au Canada est une responsabilité partagée qui fait appel à tous les secteurs de compétence et, de plus en plus, aux établissements de formation privés, aux collèges et aux universités. À titre de point central de la formation en matière de gestion des urgences du gouvernement fédéral, le Collège canadien de gestion des urgences (CCGU) travaille en étroite collaboration avec les provinces et les territoires pour bien faire connaître les possibilités de formation et les ressources connexes.
>
> Parmi les points traités par le CCGU et ses partenaires provinciaux et territoriaux, mentionnons le regroupement et l'examen du matériel de formation portant sur la planification de la continuité des opérations, la gestion des mesures de rétablissement, l'information publique et la conception d'exercices.
>
> SPPCC et ses partenaires offrent aux premiers intervenants un programme de formation chimique, biologique, radiologique et nucléaire (CBRN) en quatre volets, qui a été élaboré en partenariat avec des ministères et organismes fédéraux et des spécialistes du domaine. Les cours de sensibilisation et les cours de base

[74] Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Les urgences nationales : Le Canada, fragile en première ligne – Stratégie de renforcement*, Ottawa, Sénat du Canada, mars 2004, p. 77 et 78. Voir les recommandations 18 A, D, E, F et la recommandation G(ii). Les parties B, C et G(i) de la recommandation 18 sont également traitées dans ce chapitre.

[75] Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Les urgences nationales : Le Canada, fragile en première ligne – Stratégie de renforcement*, Ottawa, Sénat du Canada, mars 2004, p. 77. Voir la recommandation 18 C.

> CBRN en ligne sont offerts depuis le mois de mai 2006 et le nombre de cours CBRN intermédiaires et avancés a augmenté.
>
> Le premier volet du site Web élargi du CCGU a été lancé au printemps 2006, ce qui a permis de diffuser une plus vaste gamme de renseignements sur la formation et les autres ressources d'apprentissage à l'intention de tous les intervenants. Le site web continue de se développer et devra comporter une base de données sur la formation en gestion des urgences qui permettra de faire des recherches sur la formation offerte dans ce domaine au Canada.
>
> En collaboration avec d'autres partenaires, SPPCC s'efforce de renforcer la capacité des intervenants canadiens en gestion des urgences en enrichissant la base de connaissances sur la gestion des urgences et en favorisant le développement du milieu éducatif en gestion des urgences. Ainsi, en novembre 2005, SPPCC a organisé une réunion nationale à laquelle ont participé des fonctionnaires, des représentants du milieu universitaire et d'autres personnes pour discuter de la formation en gestion des urgences; il offrira un autre atelier de formation sur la gestion des urgences à l'automne 2006[76].

Faire participer chaque premier intervenant

Relativement à la recommandation que Sécurité publique Canada encourage et finance la mise en place d'un système d'examen par les pairs parmi les gestionnaires des situations d'urgence et les premiers intervenants afin de s'assurer qu'ils appliquent les meilleures pratiques et de favoriser leur interopérabilité, le ministère a répondu ce qui suit le 30 août 2006 :

> SPPCC fait régulièrement appel à des intervenants appropriés pour élaborer de nouveaux produits et outils afin d'aider les premiers intervenants. Un groupe national sur la gestion des urgences est en train d'être formé pour offrir une tribune aux associations nationales de bénévoles et de premiers intervenants pour discuter des interventions d'urgence au Canada durant les quatre étapes de la gestion des urgences (prévention/atténuation, préparation, intervention et rétablissement). Des représentants de la Croix-Rouge canadienne, de l'Association canadienne des chefs de pompiers, de la Canadian Volunteer Fire Services Association, de l'Armée du Salut, des Mennonite Disaster Services et de l'Ambulance Saint-Jean formeront un groupe officiel pour discuter des questions stratégiques et opérationnelles d'intérêt mutuel dont il faut tenir compte pendant les situations d'urgence nationales complexes. Parmi les activités pouvant être mises conjointement en œuvre, mentionnons les communications publiques, la

[76] Sécurité publique Canada, « Réponse de SPPCC et du Portefeuille aux rapports du CSPSND », 30 août 2006, p. 22-23.

> formation et les exercices. La prochaine réunion du groupe devrait avoir lieu à l'automne 2006[77].

Le Comité croit qu'il s'agit là d'un progrès. Mais chaque coordonnateur des situations d'urgence devrait être invité à ces séances. Et un matériel tangible, utile pour les premiers intervenants de tout le pays (c.-à-d. des manuels, des CD et un contenu de site web) devrait être produit durant ces rencontres à l'intention de ceux qui ne peuvent pas y être. Ce n'est pas tout le monde qui peut assister à ce type de rencontres, mais ceux qui n'y assistent pas doivent avoir accès à tout matériel valable émanant de ces rencontres.

Relativement à la recommandation que Sécurité publique Canada s'assure que tous les accords prévoyant le versement de fonds aux gouvernements provinciaux et territoriaux fassent état du pourcentage des fonds destinés aux premiers intervenants municipaux, le ministère a répondu :

> Les provinces et les territoires doivent indiquer la façon dont sont alloués les fonds fournis dans le cadre des programmes d'aide existants comme le Programme conjoint de protection civile (PCPC) ou les fonds qui proviennent du Budget de 2001 pour la sécurité publique et l'antiterrorisme. Même si les fonds du PCPC sont destinés aux provinces et aux territoires, plus de 90 % des projets financés dans le cadre de ce programme sont dirigés par les municipalités. En vertu du PCPC, les provinces et les territoires doivent établir l'ordre de priorité en matière de financement après avoir évalué l'ensemble de leurs besoins[78].

C'est bien. L'obligation de la divulgation provinciale d'où va l'argent est exactement ce que le Comité a recommandé.

Rapports trop succincts

Relativement à la recommandation que Sécurité publique Canada établisse et publie des rapports pour mettre l'accent sur les mesures qu'il a prises pour améliorer la capacité d'intervention du Canada dans les situations d'urgence et faire état des écarts perçus entre les ressources et les capacités des premiers intervenants, le ministère a écrit :

[77] Sécurité publique Canada, « Réponse de SPPCC et du Portefeuille aux rapports du CSPSND », 30 août 2006, p. 23.
[78] Sécurité publique Canada, « Réponse de SPPCC et du Portefeuille aux rapports du CSPSND », 30 août 2006, p.23.

> SPPCC rend compte chaque année au Parlement dans son Rapport sur les plans et les priorités et dans le Rapport ministériel sur le rendement[79].

Le Comité voulait que le ministère examine honnêtement la capacité de la nation d'intervenir dans les situations d'urgence, y compris aux paliers provincial et local. Le rapport sur les plans et priorités n'est pas utile à cette fin. Mais peut-être que le Comité s'attaquait au mauvais problème. Il en sera question plus loin.

Relativement à l'établissement des « pratiques exemplaires », Sécurité publique Canada a écrit ce qui suit le 30 août 2006 :

> SPPCC continue à élaborer et à promouvoir des pratiques exemplaires et des rapports sur les urgences à l'intention de ses partenaires. Le Ministère élabore donc de nombreux produits pour permettre aux praticiens de comprendre comment et pourquoi les urgences se produisent et quelle est la meilleure façon d'y faire face, d'en atténuer les conséquences et de favoriser le rétablissement. Ces produits sont disponibles dans le site web de SPPCC[80].

Travailler dans le bon sens

En consultant le site web de Sécurité publique Canada, on se rend compte qu'il contient vraiment ce type d'information, même si elle n'est pas toute regroupée au même endroit :

- *Preparez-vous.ca* est un site secondaire de Sécurité publique Canada et il s'agit d'une source utile d'information pour le public sur la gestion des situations d'urgence.

- Sécurité publique Canada offre également deux manuels pour les praticiens sur la planification de la continuité des activités et sur les techniques de sauvetage de base.

- Le site web de Sécurité publique Canada comprend une page sur les pratiques exemplaires relatives à la fiabilité des infrastructures essentielles.

[79] Sécurité publique Canada, « Réponse de SPPCC et du Portefeuille aux rapports du CSPSND », 30 août 2006, p. 25.
[80] Sécurité publique Canada, « Réponse de SPPCC et du Portefeuille aux rapports du CSPSND », 30 août 2006, p. 22.

- Le site web présente également une section intitulée *Gestion des urgences, articles et rapports*, qui contient des liens avec 15 rapports de leçons retenues des situations d'urgences partout dans le monde, y compris l'ouragan Katrina en 2005, la panne généralisée de courant en 2003 et la tempête de verglas en 1998.

C'est bien, mais pas extraordinaire – l'information est éparpillée dans tout le site web. L'information est bien disponible dans certaines parties du site web, mais elle n'est pas organisée ni systématique. En plus, elle est loin de présenter un ensemble global des « leçons retenues » et des « pratiques exemplaires » aux premiers intervenants de tout le pays. Sécurité publique Canada est sur la bonne voie, mais ce n'est pas une voie rapide. Il se heurte également à des problèmes de compétence. Quelle est la difficulté d'établir ce type de catalogue et de l'enrichir par la suite après avoir affronté une situation d'urgence grave?

Le rôle de Sécurité publique Canada consiste à aider les premiers intervenants à se retrouver hors des sentiers battus. Pourquoi fournir une carte vague et incomplète?

LE DÉFI POUR LE GOUVERNEMENT

Un investissement rentable

Le concept d'une source unique de transmission des « pratiques exemplaires » aux intervenants d'urgence des quatre coins du pays est vraiment essentiel. Comment peut-on parler de préparation en cas d'urgence sans tout faire en son pouvoir pour assurer que les premiers intervenants sont aussi prêts que possible? Ils ont besoin de matériel et de formation. Les deux coûtent cher. Mais la transmission de l'information sur les pratiques exemplaires serait relativement peu coûteuse.

L'échange suivant tiré d'une audience du Comité qui s'est tenue le 28 janvier 2008 illustre comment il peut être frustrant de voir un organisme fédéral si préoccupé par le protocole intergouvernemental et si déconnecté de la possibilité d'une tragédie :

Le président : Quel est le rôle du ministère pour ce qui est de mettre au point des pratiques exemplaires et de servir de mémoire institutionnelle pour les provinces et les municipalités au Canada?

M. Broughton, sous-ministre adjoint principal, Gestion des urgences et Sécurité nationale : En ce qui a trait à la protection civile, nous jouons un rôle important au sein du gouvernement fédéral. Pour la planification de la continuité des opérations, les exercices et la façon de gérer les situations d'urgence, nous aurions un rôle important à jouer. Je ne crois pas que nous établissions des normes ou des méthodes liées aux opérations; notre travail consiste à collaborer avec les provinces et territoires. Notre système national est en fait la somme des différents systèmes mis en place au pays. Chaque province ou territoire dispose d'un système très élaboré, et organise différemment les services de ses centres. Nous n'aurions pas de normes en tant que tel pour assurer la continuité des opérations ou gérer un centre des opérations.

Le président : Par exemple, toutes les provinces n'ont pas connu la tempête du verglas, mais la situation pourrait se présenter partout. Serait-il indiqué de communiquer avec votre organisme si l'on prévoyait une tempête de verglas quelque part? Seriez-vous en mesure de donner les conseils et l'orientation qui s'imposent?

M. Broughton : La réponse à cette question comporte deux volets. D'une part, je dirais que c'est possible, mais ce qui est plus important, c'est que, si nous n'étions pas en mesure de dispenser nous-mêmes l'information sur les mesures à prendre, nous ferions en sorte d'obtenir l'aide et les conseils nécessaires.

……

Le sénateur Mitchell : Il existe certaines parties de ce processus pour lesquelles vous pouvez croire que des normes fédérales cohérentes, même si elles ne sont pas nécessaires, pourraient être utiles. Par exemple, dans le domaine de l'évaluation du risque. Quand on procède à une évaluation du risque dans une municipalité ou dans une province, on se fonde sur la notion des pratiques exemplaires.

Êtes-vous d'avis que les normes et paramètres fédéraux pourraient jouer un rôle dans la définition des paramètres et des processus et de la planification en matière d'évaluation du risque, et déploie-t-on des efforts au niveau du gouvernement fédéral et auprès des provinces pour créer certaines normes nationales que l'on pourrait appliquer à cet égard ou dans d'autres secteurs?

M. Broughton : Je ne veux pas jouer sur les mots, mais il y aurait une différence entre les normes fédérales et les normes nationales. Je dirais « non » aux normes fédérales. Je ne pense pas qu'on ait besoin ou envie de nous voir mettre en place des normes fédérales et les imposer.

Quant aux normes nationales, si nous travaillons avec nos collègues et que nous nous entendons sur leur signification, nous pourrions certainement en tirer des avantages. Nous essayons de travailler en étroite collaboration avec nos collègues des provinces et territoires de plusieurs façons différentes, afin d'y parvenir. Étant donné le nombre de fois que nous travaillons ensemble, nos approches finissent par se ressembler en ce qui concerne de nombreuses opérations, notre façon d'aborder les choses et notre mode d'intervention.

Pour ce qui est de la définition de normes spécifiques, nous serions heureux d'en discuter, mais à notre avis, ce n'est pas quelque chose qu'il appartient au gouvernement fédéral de créer seul ou de façon arbitraire. L'intérêt de ces normes serait variable. Si vous avez l'occasion de discuter avec certains représentants des provinces et des territoires, ils vous diront que le principe des normes nationales est tout à fait logique. Quand on regarde l'essentiel, on en arrive aux différences de fonctionnement, et on ne peut pas comparer une petite communauté du nord du Québec avec n'importe quel autre endroit. Vous entrez dans une dynamique, et la définition d'une norme nationale devient plus difficile. Cela dépend vraiment de quoi on parle. En principe, nous dirions tous que c'est une idée valable.

Le président : Nous recherchons la clarification des termes utilisés dans la *Loi sur la gestion des urgences* pour promouvoir une démarche commune en matière de gestion des urgences, notamment l'adoption de normes et de pratiques exemplaires.

M. Broughton : Le terme clé est « promouvoir ». Cela ne pose pas de problème particulier. Nous sommes prêts à parler à nos collègues provinciaux et territoriaux d'interopérabilité, de la communication entre les centres d'opérations d'urgence et de la façon dont nous réagissons aux événements, ainsi qu'à faire la promotion de toutes ces questions dans la mesure où nous pourrions les normaliser.[81].

M. Broughton ne veut pas jouer sur les mots. Il vaut mieux que Sécurité publique Canada arrête de jouer à graduer l'urgence rattachée à des situations d'urgence potentielles.

C'est une chose que le gouvernement fédéral sente qu'il doit passer par les provinces et les territoires pour transmettre le matériel et la formation aux premiers intervenants. Mais de leur transmettre l'information? De les renseigner sur ce que les gens d'expérience ont découvert sur la meilleure façon de traiter divers types d'urgences? Si le gouvernement fédéral ne peut pas trouver une façon de communiquer ce type d'information

[81] Scott Broughton, Délibérations du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 28 janvier 2008, fascicule 4, 39e législature, 2e session.

aux coordonnateurs municipaux des situations d'urgence à l'échelle du pays, il devrait commencer à financer un établissement pour le faire.

Le témoignage suivant de John Ash, gestionnaire du Bureau de gestion des mesures d'urgence d'Ottawa, entendu le 28 janvier 2008, est un excellent exemple de la frustration que peut éprouver un coordonnateur municipal des mesures d'urgence cherchant à obtenir de l'information sur la meilleure façon de procéder :

> **M. Ash :** Qu'arriverait-il s'il y avait une situation d'urgence causée par une bombe sale qui toucherait la Colline? S'attend-on à ce que les députés, les membres du Sénat, « et cetera », bénéficient d'un traitement de faveur pour ce qui est de la décontamination?
>
> **Le sénateur Nancy Ruth :** Nous posez-vous la question?
>
> **Le sénateur Tkachuk :** Je n'en ai aucune idée.
>
> **M. Ash :** Je n'en ai aucune idée moi-même, mais j'ai posé la question à certaines personnes au gouvernement fédéral et on présume que ce serait le cas. Si des centaines de personnes ont besoin d'être décontaminées, vous attendez-vous à recevoir des services?
>
> Ce que nous disons, c'est qu'il faudrait parler de ces attentes. Mettons cartes sur table et disons ce qu'il nous en coûte pour fournir ce niveau de service. Peut-être y a-t-il une formule ou une façon pour calculer l'avantage ajouté pour la ville. Nous voulons tenir cette discussion. Nous voulons être francs et honnêtes, mettre cartes sur table et dire où nous en sommes afin de combler les lacunes si nécessaire.
>
> **Le sénateur Tkachuk :** Prônez-vous la tenue de cette discussion maintenant?
>
> **M. Ash :** Oui.
>
> **Le sénateur Tkachuk :** Est-ce qu'ils vous aident ou ils vous bloquent? Qu'est-ce qui arrive? Peut-être pouvons-nous vous aider.
>
> **M. Ash :** Le défi était grand pour moi, parce que j'ai essayé pendant deux ans de trouver la bonne personne à qui parler.
>
> **Le sénateur Nancy Ruth :** Nous avons le même problème.
>
> **M. Ash :** Je dis cela avec une certaine compréhension de la complexité parce qu'il y a aussi chacun des ministères. Mes questions concernent le gouvernement et

non les ministères individuellement. Si on parle d'une conduite d'eau municipale qui alimente les divers édifices, j'ai besoin de connaître la dépendance à l'égard de l'eau, parce que nous en sommes responsables. Si nous ne tenons pas cette discussion globalement, entre le gouvernement fédéral et la ville d'Ottawa, il nous sera difficile d'établir les priorités concernant l'infrastructure essentielle et toutes les autres choses du genre.

Pour en revenir à votre question, nous comprenons clairement qu'il y a un avantage. Toutefois, nous devons nous assurer que nous parlons tous deux de la même chose et que nous avons une bonne idée du service qui sera fourni et de ce qu'il en coûtera[82].

Ce type de frustration est réitéré dans le témoignage présenté au Comité par Randy Hull, coordonnateur des préparatifs d'urgence à la Ville de Winnipeg, le 3 mars 2008 :

Le sénateur Day : Tout à l'heure, vous avez dit avoir parlé à une personne qui a joué un rôle très actif au moment de l'inondation causée par l'ouragan Katrina en Nouvelle-Orléans et vous avez demandé si on avait consulté les responsables du Dakota du Nord. Pouvez-vous nous raconter cette histoire? Je crois qu'elle illustre l'importance de la coordination globale du travail.

M. Hull : Notre agence de la santé publique et nos fournisseurs des soins de santé ont tenu une conférence à laquelle il y avait notamment un médecin venu de la Nouvelle-Orléans. C'est un des médecins qui avait dû évacuer l'hôpital Tulane et qui était également responsable de rassembler tous les hôpitaux de nouveau. Je lui ai demandé s'il avait déjà parlé aux gens de Grand Forks. Là-bas, ils ont aussi perdu près de 80 p. 100 de la ville. Bien que de moindre taille, leur programme de rétablissement comportait une structure unique. La Ville de Winnipeg a établi son plan de rétablissement en s'inspirant d'un plan australien et du plan de la Ville de Grand Forks. J'ai présenté un exposé là-dessus à la conférence mondiale sur la gestion des opérations en cas de catastrophe en 2002. Nous voulions livrer ce message.

Le médecin de la Nouvelle-Orléans a dit : « Grand Forks, dans le Dakota du Nord? Pourquoi les aurais-je appelés? » Je suis sûr qu'il y a en Louisiane des gens qui ne savent pas où se trouve Grand Forks. Il n'y a pas de mer en vue. Je lui ai dit que Grand Forks avait vécu la même situation, bien qu'à moindre échelle, et que son plan de rétablissement était exhaustif, unique, qu'il avait si bien fonctionné que la Ville s'était rétablie en cinq ans, alors que la Nouvelle-Orléans était toujours en graves difficultés après deux ans.

[82] John Ash, Délibérations du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 28 janvier 2008, fascicule 4, 39e législature, 2e session.

Je lui ai donné le nom de trois contacts à Grand Forks. Un des trois m'a appelé un mois plus tard et m'a dit : « Je vais passer trois mois en Nouvelle-Orléans. »

Il a fallu que quelqu'un de la Nouvelle-Orléans parle à quelqu'un de Winnipeg pour apprendre l'histoire de Grand Forks. Pourquoi la Federal Emergency Management Agency aux États-Unis, la FEMA, ne dit-elle pas : « Voici le scénario parfait. C'est ce qui s'est passé dans une autre ville américaine. Vous devriez suivre cela »? De même, ici au Canada, il serait bien d'en apprendre davantage sur les autres régions. J'ai entendu parler des incendies de forêt en Colombie-Britannique et des évacuations qui y ont été faites en 2003, mais ce sont mes homologues de la Colombie-Britannique qui me l'ont dit; jamais je n'ai vu un document fédéral à ce sujet, par exemple une liste exhaustive des leçons apprises en Colombie-Britannique ou des leçons apprises à la suite des inondations survenues au Québec.

Je ne sais pas ce que font les responsables des politiques et les planificateurs à Ottawa, à l'échelle fédérale; nous ne diffusons pas cette information aussi bien que nous pourrions le faire.

Le président : Pouvez-vous résumer cela? Vous avez soulevé quelques questions, dont l'idée d'avoir une banque de pratiques exemplaires à Ottawa. De votre point de vue municipal, que devrait faire autrement Ottawa?

M. Hull : J'aimerais qu'il y ait des pratiques exemplaires et des informations utiles sur les tendances nouvelles, à l'échelle nationale aussi bien qu'internationale. Je suis tout à fait étonné de constater ce que j'arrive à tirer de mes contacts en Australie. Ce sont souvent des intervenants clés des conférences sur la gestion des opérations en cas de catastrophes qui ont lieu à Toronto. De même, j'aimerais qu'il y ait des matrices uniformes pour une saine gestion des situations d'urgence. Ce serait bien qu'Ottawa et les provinces adoptent une consigne du genre : « Si la ville compte plus de 50 000 habitants, il faut deux responsables des urgences; si la ville en compte 300 000, il en faut trois. » Ce serait de bon augure à mes yeux, cela dit du point de vue d'une ville qui compte un seul et unique planificateur pour les situations d'urgence[83].

Peut-être le temps est-il venu pour les membres du Comité de cesser de se frapper la tête contre les murs dans l'espoir que le gouvernement prendra l'initiative éventuellement d'instruire les premiers intervenants municipaux sur la meilleure façon de se préparer aux situations d'urgence.

[83] Randy Hull, Délibérations du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 3 mars 2008, fascicule 6, 39e législature, 2e session.

Une meilleure marche à suivre relativement aux pratiques exemplaires?

Le témoignage suivant révèle que – même au sein d'un *seul* gouvernement provincial – la collecte des « leçons apprises » et des « pratiques exemplaires » peut s'avérer un exercice épuisant qui ne mène nulle part. Le Comité a écouté attentivement les solutions à ce problème proposées dans le témoignage de Mark Egener, directeur général, Gestion d'urgence de l'Alberta, le 30 janvier 2007 :

> **Mark Egener, directeur général, Gestion d'urgence de l'Alberta, gouvernement de l'Alberta :** Nous avons connu récemment un certain nombre d'importantes catastrophes en Alberta; le déraillement de Wabamun, qui a eu lieu il y a un an et demi, en est un exemple, et la page 7 porte sur cet accident. Personne n'a été tué, mais il y a eu déversement de 41 wagons de combustible de soute C et d'un lubrifiant infect dans le lac Wabamun, ce qui a été une catastrophe pour la collectivité et pour l'environnement.
>
> À la suite de cet incident, le gouvernement albertain a créé la Commission de protection de l'environnement, présidée par Eric Newell, l'ancien directeur de Syncrude, qui est maintenant chancelier de l'Université de l'Alberta. La Commission comptait six autres membres tous faisant aussi partie des meilleurs spécialistes de la gestion des urgences à l'échelle nationale et tirait parti de l'expertise d'un certain nombre de conseillers. Le rapport de la Commission, dont vous avez un exemplaire, je pense, comportait dix recommandations de renforcement du système de gestion des urgences de l'Alberta en vue de le transformer en un système de classe mondiale pour la protection de la sûreté et de la sécurité des Albertains. Nous sommes en train d'appliquer ces dix recommandations.
>
> […] La Commission a aussi recommandé la création d'un institut chargé de soutenir l'ensemble de la fonction en Alberta. Il s'agit probablement de sa recommandation la plus novatrice. La Commission a constaté que les gouvernements n'étaient pas prêts ou en bonne position pour faire plusieurs choses, par exemple effectuer des recherches, évaluer les incidents et recueillir les leçons apprises un peu partout dans le monde. Par conséquent, elle a recommandé la création d'un institut à partir d'un grand établissement d'enseignement ou de recherche, comme l'Université de l'Alberta, afin de soutenir l'ensemble de la fonction[84].

[84] Mark Egener, Délibérations du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 30 janvier 2007, fascicule 9, 39e législature, 2e session.

Si un gouvernement comme l'Alberta a le bons sens de se rendre compte qu'il n'est ni prêt à faire certaines choses ni en position de les faire – par exemple effectuer des recherches, évaluer les incidents et recueillir les leçons apprises un peu partout dans le monde et sous-traiter ce qu'il faut à des établissements tiers – pourquoi le Comité continue-t-il de prétendre que le ministère fédéral – qui dépend de l'intervention des dix provinces et des trois territoires – peut gérer cette tâche? Le Comité croit que les Canadiens seraient mieux servis si le gouvernement du Canada avait le courage de sortir de ses cloisons pour s'attaquer finalement à cette tâche importante.

En fait, tout ce qui se rapproche le plus de normes canadiennes nationales a été formulé par des entités non gouvernementales. Par exemple, les normes de préparation en cas d'urgence, de gestion et de rétablissement qu'utilisent beaucoup de gestionnaires de situations d'urgence au Canada aujourd'hui ont été établies par la National Fire Protection Association des États-Unis et par l'Association canadienne de normalisation[85].

Vu les difficultés constitutionnelles à long terme dans toute démarche faisant intervenir les trois ordres de gouvernement, peut-être qu'un établissement indépendant, extérieur à tout palier de gouvernement, pourrait contourner les limites constitutionnelles et, au lieu de perdre du temps à des batailles de compétence, simplement prendre le temps d'étudier vraiment le type de pratiques exemplaires qui pourraient être utiles aux premiers intervenants de la nation.

[85] De nombreux gestionnaires des situations d'urgence du Canada au niveau local ont utilisé la norme 1600 (américaine) de la National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). Le 29 février 2008, l'Association canadienne de normalisation a publié la norme CSA Z1600 pour la planification en cas d'urgence qui, selon elle, est une version adaptée au Canada et meilleure que la NFPA 1600. Pour plus de précisions sur les deux séries de normes, voir : Association canadienne de normalisation, « CSA OHS Matters - CSA Z1600: Setting a new standard for emergency management and business continuity in Canada », 29 février 2008. Voir le site: http://ohs.csa.ca/news/dsp_Z1600.asp.

NOUVELLES RECOMMANDATIONS :

1. Le Comité recommande que le gouvernement fasse un appel d'offres auprès des universités et des établissements du Canada s'occupant des situations d'urgence et finance à même des fonds de Sécurité publique Canada un tel établissement pour :

- **Élaborer et tenir à jour un catalogue en direct des « leçons » et des « pratiques exemplaires » découlant de situations d'urgence passées au Canada et de par le monde, et le partager avec tous les premiers intervenants du Canada;**

- **Effectuer pour toute municipalité canadienne qui le demande une vérification de sa capacité d'intervenir en cas d'urgence;**

- **Faire rapport annuellement au Parlement de toute lacune décelée dans le système canadien de préparation et d'intervention en cas d'urgence;**

- **Formuler un protocole pour consulter les gestionnaires des situations d'urgence des différents ordres de gouvernement et les premiers intervenants afin de déterminer la meilleure façon d'établir des normes nationales et des pratiques exemplaires.**

2. Le Comité recommande qu'après chaque réunion du Groupe national sur la gestion des urgences, le gouvernement dresse une liste des sujets traités et des renseignements échangés et que cette liste soit convertie en matériel (c.-à-d. des manuels, des CD, un contenu Web) qui peut être diffusé, et utilisé par les premiers intervenants de tout le pays.

Problème n° 7 :
Communications publiques d'urgence

Le problème, tel que nous l'avons vu en 2004 : Aucune province ni aucun territoire n'est autorisé par la loi à insister pour que les médias du secteur privé diffusent de l'information relative aux situations d'urgence immédiatement aux citoyens qui relèvent de sa compétence.

RECOMMANDATION DU COMITÉ (2004)

- **Que, pour assurer que les autorités ont le pouvoir et la capacité d'interrompre des émissions de radio et de télévision en cas d'urgence :**
    - **Sécurité publique Canada prépare des normes pour l'établissement de systèmes d'avertissement de la population en cas d'urgence s'appliquant à toutes les provinces et tous les territoires;**
    - **le gouverneur en conseil, par décret, ordonne au Conseil de la radiodiffusion et des télécommunications canadiennes de préparer la réglementation qui s'impose pour obliger tous les diffuseurs publics et privés à collaborer à l'établissement de systèmes provinciaux, territoriaux et national d'avertissement de la population;**
    - **un site web national sur les situations d'urgence proposant des liens avec des sites web provinciaux et territoriaux soit mis sur pied pour communiquer par Internet de l'information et des instructions en cas d'urgence nationale.**
- **Que Sécurité publique Canada favorise l'implantation d'un système semblable au « Reverse 911® »[86] dans toutes les municipalités en finançant au moins le tiers du coût, le reste**

[86] Selon le site Web de l'entreprise, la technologie « Reverse 911® » permet à l'utilisateur de cibler rapidement un secteur géographique précis et de le saturer à raison de milliers d'appels par heure. La technologie interactive du système permet une interaction immédiate avec les répondants et aide à répondre rapidement à des besoins précis. Pour plus d'information, voir le site http://www.reverse911.com/index.php.

devant être partagé entre les provinces/territoires et les municipalités[87].

RÉPONSES DU GOUVERNEMENT AUX RECOMMANDATIONS DU COMITÉ (2006-2008)

Vers un système d'alerte public national standardisé?

En réponse à la recommandation du Comité que Sécurité publique Canada prépare des normes pour l'établissement de systèmes d'avertissement de la population en cas d'urgence, le ministère a écrit ce qui suit le 30 août 2006 :

> Industrie Canada et Patrimoine canadien ont le savoir-faire voulu et la responsabilisation pour les projets de télécommunications et de diffusion, y compris leur adaptation et leur utilisation en situation d'urgence. SPPCC collabore étroitement avec ces ministères en ce qui a trait aux questions liées aux alertes au public. Industrie Canada a réalisé une évaluation et un examen complets des technologies et options liées aux alertes au public grâce à des fonds tirés du budget de décembre 2001.
>
> Industrie Canada, en étroite collaboration avec SPPCC, mène un projet visant à mettre en place un système d'alerte publique à la grandeur du pays, appelé CANALERTE, afin de fournir une capacité réelle à tous les ordres de gouvernement pour qu'ils puissent émettre des alertes et des avertissements concernant des situations urgentes imminentes auprès des populations qui risquent d'être affectées. CANALERTE permettrait au personnel autorisé de gestion des urgences d'émettre des avertissements de situations urgentes auprès du public à l'aide de technologies de communications telles que la radio, la télévision, les téléphones conventionnels, les appareils sans fil et Internet.
>
> Les responsables d'industrie Canada et de SPPCC ont informé (le 31 mai 2006) les sous-ministres fédéraux-provinciaux-territoriaux (FPT) responsables de la gestion des urgences de l'état du projet CANALERTE. Une démonstration du concept et des capacités de CANALERTE a également été faite. Les sous-ministres FPT ont reconnu le besoin de travailler ensemble pour élaborer une

[87] Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Les urgences nationales : Le Canada, fragile en première ligne – Stratégie de renforcement*, Ottawa, Sénat du Canada, mars 2004, p. 63. Voir les recommandations 12 et 13.

> analyse de rentabilisation solide concernant une stratégie nationale d'alertes au public et obtenir le financement[88].

Le 19 septembre 2007, relativement à CANALERTE, les attachés de recherche de la Bibliothèque du Parlement[89] ont posé une question de suivi à Sécurité publique Canada: « Quel est l'état d'avancement du système CANALERTE? Depuis quand s'affaire-t-on à la mise au point du système et à quelle date sera-t-il achevé? » Le 26 février 2008, le ministère a répondu :

> Le besoin de créer un système national d'alerte au public a été mis de l'avant en 2002 dans le cadre d'une initiative fédérale-provinciale-territoriale (FPT) coordonnée. En 2007, les responsables FPT se sont mis d'accord sur les principales composantes et exigences du système national d'alerte au public et ils ont présenté leurs recommandations aux ministres FPT responsables de la gestion des urgences le 9 janvier 2008. Les ministres ont approuvé les recommandations et ils ont donné comme consignes aux responsables de continuer à travailler avec l'industrie de la radiodiffusion pour établir un système canadien d'alerte au public, qui devrait être opérationnel en 2010.
>
> Le système proposé permettrait aux responsables FPT autorisés de créer des messages d'alerte et de les communiquer aux fournisseurs de services de télécommunications, qui les transmettraient ensuite au public. Jusqu'ici, notre intention était d'utiliser la radio et la télévision pour diffuser les messages d'alerte au public, puis d'utiliser Internet et des dispositifs sans fil en temps et lieu. La participation de l'industrie au système national d'alerte au public se ferait de façon volontaire, conformément aux décisions de février 2007 du Conseil de la radiodiffusion et des télécommunications canadiennes (CRTC).

Le Comité en a assez d'avoir à composer avec ce thème, mais, plus de deux ans après que notre rapport eut attiré l'attention sur ce problème – et cinq longues années après que des fonds eurent été prévus au budget pour un examen des systèmes visant à alerter le public, il semble bien qu'Industrie Canada ait compris et fixé des délais précis pour la création d'un système d'alerte public national, qui s'appellerait CANALERTE ou non, mais nous en reparlerons ci-dessous dans la section « Le défi pour le gouvernement ».

[88] Sécurité publique Canada, « Réponse de SPPCC et du Portefeuille aux rapports du CSPSND », 30 août 2006, p. 14.
[89] Voir la note 5.

Les radiodiffuseurs seront-ils forcés de collaborer?

En réponse à la recommandation du Comité que le gouverneur en conseil, par décret, ordonne au Conseil de la radiodiffusion et des télécommunications canadiennes de préparer la réglementation qui s'impose pour obliger tous les diffuseurs publics et privés à collaborer à l'établissement de systèmes provinciaux, territoriaux et national d'avertissement de la population, le CRTC a affirmé ce qui suit le 13 juillet 2006:

> Le gouverneur en conseil ne nous a pas demandé d'adopter de nouveaux règlements depuis ma dernière lettre datée du 7 octobre 2004.
>
> Toutefois, en 2005, nous avons reçu une demande d'autorisation de fournir un service d'alertes multicanaux aux entreprises de distribution de radiodiffusion de tout le Canada. Compte tenu de la nature, de la portée et des répercussions nationales de la proposition, le Conseil a décidé de faire un appel d'offres et a publié un avis public[90].

C'est bien. En 2006, le CRTC traitait déjà cette question avec une certaine détermination. L'intervention du CRTC à cet égard est appréciée. Il a été difficile de constater quelque progrès au sein de la bureaucratie fédérale depuis 2001.

« Reverse 911® » Avertir rapidement le public

Relativement à la recommandation que Sécurité publique Canada favorise l'implantation d'un système semblable au « Reverse 911® » dans toutes les municipalités, le ministère a répondu ce qui suit le 30 août 2006 :

> Le système « Reverse 911® » est un des nombreux services commerciaux d'avis offerts sur le marché qui utilisent le système téléphonique à composition automatique. En raison du temps requis, en tenant compte du coût des lignes spéciales multiples, cette technologie pourrait ne pas être aussi efficace que d'autres. Une utilisation plus efficace du téléphone (quoique plus intrusive et plus dispendieuse) nécessite un récepteur préconfiguré spécial dans chaque maison ou lieu de travail qui peut être activé numériquement, de manière simultanée. Cette

[90] Conseil de la radiodiffusion et des télécommunications canadiennes, « Response to Committee Recommendations », 13 juillet 2006. [traduction]

> technologie est actuellement mise à l'essai par plusieurs grandes compagnies de téléphone.
>
> Une des faiblesses majeures communes à tous les systèmes d'alerte utilisant le téléphone est le manque de banques de numéros de téléphone mises à jour régulièrement. De telles bases de données existent (par exemple celles du service 911) mais elles sont hautement protégées et exclues d'un accès extérieur commuté par les compagnies de téléphone en raison d'impératifs de confidentialité (relatifs aux numéros confidentiels). Industrie Canada a travaillé avec des collectivités pilotes, le CRTC et le Commissaire à la protection de la vie privée, en vue de déterminer des conditions et des critères d'accès à la base de données du service 911[91].

Relativement à la base de données qui permettrait l'utilisation du système « Reserve 911® », le 19 septembre 2007, les attachés de recherche de la Bibliothèque du Parlement[92] ont demandé à Sécurité publique Canada: « Quels progrès ont été réalisés dans la définition de ces « conditions et critères », et à quel moment un système de notification automatique devrait-il être fonctionnel? De quelle manière ce système fonctionnera-t-il avec CANALERTE? » Le 26 février 2008, le ministère a répondu ce qui suit :

> De nos jours, les services d'avis à la communauté (SAC) sont offerts dans le commerce, et des municipalités l'emploient actuellement pour informer les résidents au sujet des situations d'urgence. Dans la Décision de télécom CRTC 2007-13 en date du 28 février 2007, le CRTC a établi qu'il était dans l'intérêt public de permettre aux autorités publiques d'utiliser les numéros de téléphone et les adresses qui y sont associées contenus dans les bases de données 911, afin d'améliorer l'efficacité du SAC. Depuis, le CRTC a établi le Comité directeur du CRTC sur l'interconnexion pour aider les parties à établir des normes communes en matière de sécurité, de protection de la vie privée et de responsabilisation à l'égard du SAC évolué.
>
> Dans le cadre du travail préparatoire pour la mise au point d'un système national d'alerte au public, les intervenants publics et privés élaborent un format type d'alerte (profil canadien du protocole d'alerte commun) pouvant être utilisé au moyen de diverses technologies, y compris le SAC[93].

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[91] Sécurité publique Canada, « Réponse de SPPCC et du Portefeuille aux rapports du CSPSND », 30 août 2006, p. 15.
[92] Voir la note 5.
[93] Sécurité publique Canada, « Questions de suivi à l'intention de Sécurité publique Canada relativement aux : Recommandations et réponses du Portefeuille/SP au Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense (CSPSND) (30 août 2006) », 26 février 2008, p. 7-8.

Le CRTC a assoupli les restrictions touchant l'utilisation des bases de données du 911, conférant aux gestionnaires des services d'urgence la capacité d'accéder à une liste exacte et à jour de numéros de téléphone s'ils doivent communiquer avec le public en situation de crise. Il s'agit là d'un important progrès dans la mise en œuvre d'un système d'alerte en cas d'urgences.

LE DÉFI POUR LE GOUVERNEMENT

Le CRTC à la rescousse

Dans son témoignage devant le Comité, Serge Beaudoin, directeur général, Préparation et rétablissement des activités, Sécurité publique et Protection civile Canada, a affirmé que les bureaucraties fédérale, provinciales et territoriales travaillaient à mettre en place un système national pour alerter le public d'ici 2010. Le Comité a admis qu'il était sceptique au début quant à cette prétention en raison de son expérience, au fil des ans, de nombreuses promesses de programmes non tenues. Toutefois, le Comité a eu la surprise de constater que cette promesse avait des chances de se matérialiser – grâce au Conseil de la radiodiffusion et des télécommunications canadiennes (CRTC).

Le Comité a été enchanté d'entendre le témoignage de Scott Hutton, directeur exécutif adjoint du CRTC, qui nous a déclaré que si l'industrie privée ne réussit pas à mettre en place un système national d'alerte du public d'ici l'an prochain, le CRTC agira unilatéralement pour la forcer à se mettre à l'œuvre. Voici son témoignage :

> **Scott Hutton, directeur exécutif adjoint, Radiodiffusion, CRTC :** En février 2007, le Conseil a lancé un défi aux représentants du secteur de la gestion des mesures d'urgence, aux radiodiffuseurs et aux fournisseurs de services de radiodiffusion comme les câblodistributeurs et les entreprises de diffusion par satellite. Il leur a demandé de travailler ensemble sur une base volontaire en vue d'établir, de mettre sur pied et de gérer un système d'alerte en cas d'urgence.
>
> Ce défi était assorti d'un délai de deux ans. Nous avons donc donné à l'industrie jusqu'au 1er mars 2009 pour nous soumettre un système exploitable. À la suite de cette décision, nous avons agi rapidement pour

abolir un obstacle réglementaire de taille à la mise en œuvre d'un système d'alerte en cas d'urgence. En effet, nous avons modifié le *Règlement sur la distribution de radiodiffusion* pour permettre aux entreprises qui distribuent des services de radiodiffusion d'ajouter des messages d'alerte à leurs émissions sans avoir à obtenir au préalable le consentement du réseau.

Nous espérons que l'industrie saura faire preuve d'un esprit de collaboration et que l'échéance sera respectée. Cependant, nous n'hésiterons pas à agir si, d'ici le 1er mars 2009, les radiodiffuseurs et les fournisseurs de services de radiodiffusion ne sont pas parvenus à s'entendre sur la mise sur pied et l'exploitation d'un système national d'alerte en cas d'urgence. Le Conseil a le pouvoir de nommer une entité unique qui serait chargée de servir de pivot et de veiller à ce que le système soit financé par l'industrie[94].

Or, un des dirigeants du CRTC ne vient-il pas de témoigner que si le secteur privé ne met pas sur pied un système d'alerte public national d'ici le 1er mars 2009, le CRTC l'obligerait unilatéralement à le faire? C'est bien ce qui semble être le cas en effet. À preuve :

Scott Hutton, directeur exécutif adjoint, Radiodiffusion, CRTC : Au nom du CRTC, permettez-moi de répéter ceci. Si un système national d'alerte en cas d'urgence n'a pas été mis sur pied sur une base volontaire d'ici le 1er mars 2009, le Conseil utilisera ses pouvoirs pour nommer une entité unique qui serait chargée d'exploiter le système et pour assurer son financement adéquat.

Ce projet est d'une importance cruciale pour la sécurité et la protection de tous les Canadiens. Nous ferons tout en notre pouvoir pour assurer la pleine mise en œuvre d'un système fiable. Certaines municipalités canadiennes, privées d'un système national d'alerte en cas d'urgence, ont instauré des services d'avis par téléphone pour prévenir le public en cas de danger imminent ou pour communiquer avec le public en cas d'urgence[95].

Le Comité entend rarement des prises de position aussi fermes de la part d'organismes gouvernementaux et nous prendrons le CRTC au mot sur cette importante question.

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[94] Scott Hutton, Délibérations du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 4 février 2008, fascicule 4, 39e législature, 2e session.
[95] Scott Hutton, Délibérations du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 4 février 2008, fascicule 4, 39e législature, 2e session.

Trois fonctions principales

En plus, les fonctionnaires de Sécurité publique Canada, du CRTC et d'Industrie Canada qui ont témoigné devant le Comité le 4 février 2008 ont également promis aux Canadiens trois fonctions clés de ce système national d'alerte du public :

Première fonction : Le système pourrait passer de la détection d'une menace à la notification publique en trois minutes.

> **Serge Beaudoin, directeur général, Préparation et rétablissement des activités, Sécurité publique et Protection civile Canada :** « Le système que nous essayons de bâtir nous permettra de diffuser un message à la population en deux ou trois minutes, peu importe où les gens se trouvent[96]. »

Deuxième fonction : Le système serait accessible aux premiers intervenants locaux.

> **Le sénateur Tkachuk :** S'il y a une urgence à Prince Albert, vous voulez que les gens de Prince Albert soient au courant; peu importe si je suis au courant, moi qui me trouve à Ottawa. Pourquoi dites-vous que vous voulez que tout le monde soit au courant, peu importe où les gens se trouvent?
>
> **Serge Beaudoin, directeur général, Préparation et rétablissement des activités, Sécurité publique et Protection civile Canada :** Permettez-moi de préciser. Nous voulons mettre en place un système d'alerte publique national, mais qui sera surtout utilisé à l'échelle locale. Par national, nous entendons un système qui fonctionnera partout au pays; cependant, grâce à des géocodes, il sera possible de choisir la région dans laquelle sera donnée l'alerte[97].
>
> ……
>
> **Le sénateur Day :** Qui va décider que le message d'alerte émis par les municipalités doit passer par le système?
>
> **Chaouki Dakdouki, directeur des Politiques et de la planification en matière de réglementation à Industrie Canada :** C'est la raison pour laquelle nous avons constitué ce groupe de travail. Dans une situation d'urgence, nous n'allons pas nous réunir pour créer un comité chargé de discuter de cette responsabilité. Nous

[96] Serge Beaudoin, Délibérations du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 4 février 2008, fascicule 4, 39e législature, 2e session.
[97] Serge Beaudoin, Délibérations du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 4 février 2008, fascicule 4, 39e législature, 2e session.

devons régler ces questions à l'avance. La décision que nous avons prise, c'est que quiconque est chargé de gérer la situation d'urgence pourra donner l'alerte[98].

……

Le sénateur Day : Parlons des autorisations. Disons que je suis le maire d'une ville où une urgence survient. À qui dois-je m'adresser pour obtenir l'autorisation d'utiliser les systèmes?

Serge Beaudoin, directeur général, Préparation et rétablissement des activités, Sécurité publique et Protection civile Canada : Pour utiliser le système, vous devez d'abord vous adresser à votre bureau provincial de gestion des urgences. Si la province vous donne l'accréditation, alors vous avez directement accès au système par la suite. Si vos activités ont lieu 24 heures sur 24 et sept jours sur sept, et que vous respectez certains critères, vous êtes en mesure de diffuser le message d'avertissement directement auprès de vos citoyens[99].

Troisième fonction : Le système utiliserait des appareils de radio, de télévision, sans fil et Internet.

Serge Beaudoin, directeur général, Préparation et rétablissement des activités, Sécurité publique et Protection civile Canada : Une précision : ce sera un processus automatisé. Il relèvera du Centre des opérations du gouvernement, de façon qu'il puisse s'assortir d'un soutien technique 24 heures sur 24, mais il s'agira d'un processus automatisé. Le message va passer par le système, qui comportera les outils technologiques nécessaires pour vérifier l'identité de l'émetteur, et le système va diffuser le message dans tous les médias : la radio, la télévision, le sans-fil et Internet. L'idée, c'est d'envoyer le message aux différentes sources et de laisser le secteur privé s'occuper directement de ses abonnés, c'est-à-dire la population canadienne[100].

C’est un début. Mais un système fiable exigerait une participation de 100 p. 100. Le terme « volontaire » ne devrait pas faire partie de l’équation, à moins que chaque entreprise canadienne qui diffuse au public canadien ne participe. En bout de ligne, les radiodiffuseurs pourraient être obligés de participer.

[98] Chaouki Dakdouki, Délibérations du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 4 février 2008, fascicule 4, 39e législature, 2e session.
[99] Serge Beaudoin, Délibérations du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 4 février 2008, fascicule 4, 39e législature, 2e session.
[100] Serge Beaudoin, Délibérations du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 4 février 2008, fascicule 4, 39e législature, 2e session.

Le sénateur Banks : J'espère que le CRTC a le pouvoir d'appliquer les recommandations que le comité a formulées il y a des années, bien longtemps après que d'autres aussi ont recommandé de faire ce qu'il faut faire. J'espère qu'on va obliger les organisations de radiodiffusion et d'autres moyens de communication du pays.

Monsieur Hutton, avez-vous le pouvoir de faire cela?

M. Hutton : Oui, nous l'avons.

Le sénateur Banks : Allez-vous le faire?

M. Hutton : Oui[101].

L'année 2004 aurait été mieux que 2009 ou 2010, mais le Comité félicite tout de même le CRTC d'être passé à l'action à cet égard.

De plus en plus, le défi consistera à établir un système d'alerte en cas d'urgence fiable qui transmet les avertissements de diverses façons, notamment les médias électroniques, le téléphone et Internet.

Il y a des obstacles juridiques et techniques à surmonter, mais le Comité a l'intention d'entendre d'autres témoignages présentant de meilleurs moyens d'atteindre ces objectifs.

[101] Scott Hutton, Délibérations du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense. *Témoignages*, 4 février 2008, fascicule 4, 39e législature, 2e session.

Problème n° 8 :
Interopérabilité déficiente des premiers intervenants

> **M. Mike Boyd, chef de police d'Edmonton :** Il y a aussi la question de l'interopérabilité des communications qui revient constamment. Nous ne sommes pas encore en mesure de parler les uns avec les autres lorsque nous avons besoin de travailler ensemble, en particulier en cas d'urgence[102].

Il n'existe pas de stratégie ou de système fiable pour doter les premiers intervenants du Canada d'appareils de communication interopérables qu'ils pourraient utiliser en cas d'urgence. De tels systèmes doivent être mis en place par tous les paliers gouvernementaux, le leadership venant du palier fédéral.

RECOMMANDATIONS DU COMITÉ (2004)

- **Que Sécurité publique Canada entame des négociations pour doter l'ensemble des équipes de premiers intervenants d'appareils de télécommunication portables, le gouvernement fédéral finançant au moins le tiers du coût et le reste devant être partagé entre les provinces/territoires et les municipalités.**

- **Que chaque niveau de gouvernement se dote de la capacité de communiquer avec les premiers intervenants sur son territoire et les autres niveaux de gouvernement. Tous les systèmes devraient être assortis d'une capacité de télécommunication sans fil de secours[103].**

[102] Mike Boyd, Délibérations du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 25 février 2008, fascicule 5, 39e législature, 2e session.
[103] Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Les urgences nationales : Le Canada, fragile en première ligne – Stratégie de renforcement*, Ottawa, Sénat du Canada, mars 2004 p. 63-64. Voir la recommandation 15.

RÉPONSES DU GOUVERNEMENT AUX RECOMMANDATIONS DU COMITÉ (2006-2008)

Appareils de communication portatifs

Relativement à la recommandation que Sécurité publique Canada dote l'ensemble des équipes de premiers intervenants d'appareils de télécommunication portables, Sécurité publique Canada a écrit le 30 août 2006 :

> Le ministère de la Sécurité publique reconnaît l'importance pour les premiers intervenants d'être capables de communiquer entre eux afin de réduire au maximum les pertes de vie et d'assurer la sécurité des Canadiens lorsqu'un sinistre majeur, prévu ou non, se produit.
>
> L'élaboration d'un environnement de radiocommunication à interopérabilité sans interruption à l'échelle nationale requiert la collaboration intergouvernementale de tous les organismes de sécurité publique. De telles communications permettraient aux premiers intervenants des différentes disciplines et administrations de communiquer au moyen de systèmes de radiocommunication, avec au besoin des communications voix-données sur demande, en temps réel, en fonction des autorisations.
>
> Il est reconnu que la question de l'interopérabilité des radiocommunications ne peut être résolue par une seule entité; cette question demande la collaboration de tous les organismes de sécurité publique. On met actuellement sur pied un groupe de travail FPT composé de partenaires engagés dans la gestion des urgences afin d'intégrer les données de toutes les administrations et d'aider à déterminer comment des communications interopérables peuvent être réalisées[104].

Les groupes de travail ne fonctionnent tout simplement pas

Un groupe de travail est sur le point d'être établi. Ces quelques mots devraient être taillés dans la pierre en face des bureaux de Sécurité publique Canada à Ottawa. Un signe certain que rien n'est fait, c'est l'établissement d'un autre groupe de travail.

[104] Sécurité publique Canada, « Réponse de SPPCC et du Portefeuille aux rapports du CSPSND », 30 août 2006, p. 15-16.

Communication intergouvernementale

Relativement à la recommandation qu'une capacité de communiquer avec les premiers intervenants sur son territoire et les autres niveaux de gouvernement soit créée (assortie d'une capacité de télécommunication sans fil de secours), Sécurité publique Canada a écrit ce qui suit le 30 août 2006 :

> Le ministère de la Sécurité publique a des plans de continuité des opérations, assortis de politiques et de règles de gouvernance. Des services essentiels ont été déterminés, et des systèmes de redondance connexes sont en place autant pour l'énergie que pour les communications. Ces systèmes comprennent des génératrices pour alimenter les systèmes informatiques essentiels ainsi que des téléphones cellulaires et satellites. Les téléphones satellites sont avec ou sans fil. Une analyse des répercussions sur les activités est actuellement en cours. Elle vise à mettre à jour et confirmer l'information sur les services essentiels, tels qu'ils figurent sur les listes. Étant donné que la planification de la continuité des opérations est un processus continu, le Ministère continue de l'améliorer, de le mettre à jour et de le tester pour déterminer s'il est entièrement conforme à la Politique du gouvernement sur la sécurité (PGS), y compris les plans de continuité des opérations et les normes relatives à la Gestion de la sécurité des technologies de l'information (GSTI)[105].
>
> Le gouvernement travaille dans d'autres domaines afin d'améliorer la communication entre les ministères et d'autres ordres de gouvernement. Par exemple, le ministère de la Sécurité publique est responsable de l'interopérabilité et de l'intégration de l'information relative à la sécurité publique entre les ministères et organismes du Canada. Ce travail vise à améliorer l'échange d'information entre diverses organisations liées à la sécurité publique, cela dans le respect des dispositions de la *Loi sur la protection des renseignements personnels* et de la *Charte canadienne des droits et libertés.*
>
> Concernant cette responsabilité, on envisage d'adopter une Stratégie nationale sur l'interopérabilité de la radiocommunication, telle qu'énoncée dans la recommandation n° 14, en consultation avec le secteur de la sécurité publique. Cette initiative permettrait aux organismes de sécurité publique des différentes disciplines et administrations de communiquer au besoin les uns avec les autres, cela sur demande, en temps réel et en fonction des autorisations[106].

Le 19 septembre 2007, relativement au groupe de travail fédéral, provincial et territorial (FTP) de partenaires de la gestion des urgences, les attachés de

[105] Sécurité publique du Canada, « Réponse de SPPCC et du Portefeuille aux rapports du CSPSND », 30 août 2006, p. 16.
[106] Sécurité publique du Canada, « Réponse de SPPCC et du Portefeuille aux rapports du CSPSND », 30 août 2006, p. 16.

recherche de la Bibliothèque du Canada[107] ont demandé à Sécurité publique Canada: « Quel est le statut de ce groupe de travail FPT et quelles sont ses réalisations pour ce qui est de l'amélioration de l'interopérabilité des communications pour les premiers intervenants du Canada? » En février 2008, Sécurité publique Canada a répondu :

> Le ministère poursuit ses discussions avec les provinces à ce sujet, particulièrement avec celles qui prévoient améliorer ou remplacer leurs réseaux de radiocommunication dans un avenir rapproché. Il facilite également les discussions avec les provinces, ainsi qu'entre les représentants des provinces et ceux des organisations fédérales présentes qui opèrent au sein de ces sphères de compétences[108].

Le langage de la lassitude

Sécurité publique Canada « cherche un forum FTP formel », « poursuit des discussions avec les provinces » et « facilite les discussions avec les provinces ». En réalité, cette question n'a fait l'objet *d'aucune* discussion à une réunion annuelle fédérale-provinciale-territoriale des ministres responsables de la gestion des situations d'urgence ces dernières années[109]. Si cette question est aussi importante que le laisse croire la réponse du gouvernement, pourquoi alors ne peut-elle pas être incluse dans un ordre du jour formel? Qu'est-ce que l'on cherche à faciliter ou à engager?

Le 19 septembre 2007, sur la question de l'intégration et de l'interopérabilité, les attachés de recherche de la Bibliothèque du Parlement[110] ont demandé à Sécurité publique Canada: « Quels sont les organismes particuliers dans la « gamme d'organismes » mentionnée ci-dessus? Quel est l'état d'avancement des travaux touchant l'interopérabilité et l'intégration? » Sécurité publique Canada a répondu le 26 février 2008 :

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[107] Voir la note 5.

[108] Sécurité publique Canada, « Questions de suivi à l'intention de Sécurité publique Canada relativement aux : Recommandations et réponses du Portefeuille/SP au Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense (CSPSND) (30 août 2006) », 26 février 2008, p. 8.

[109] Rien n'indique que l'interopérabilité des premiers intervenants ait été à l'ordre du jour officiel d'une réunion FPT des ministres responsables de la gestion des situations d'urgence aux séances de 2002 et de 2004-2008. (Il n'y a pas eu de réunion FPT des gestionnaires des mesures d'urgence en 2003.) Voir le site du Secrétariat des conférences intergouvernementales canadiennes à l'adresse http://www.scics.gc.ca/menu_f.html.

[110] Voir la note 5.

Au nombre des organisations faisant partie des « diverses organisations » dont il est question ci-dessus, mentionnons les suivantes :

1. Administration canadienne de la sûreté du transport aérien (ACSTA)
2. Agence des services frontaliers du Canada (ASFC)
3. Centre canadien de la statistique juridique (CCSJ)
4. Agence canadienne d'inspection des aliments (ACIA)
5. Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité (SCRC)
6. Citoyenneté et Immigration Canada (CIC)
7. Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications (CST)
8. Service correctionnel Canada (SCC)
9. Ministère des Pêches et des Océans (MPO)
10. Ministère de la Défense nationale (MDN)
11. Environnement Canada (EC)
12. Centre d'analyse des opérations et déclarations financières du Canada (CANAFE)
13. Affaires étrangères Canada (AEC)
14. Justice et sous-procureur général (Justice)
15. Commission nationale des libérations conditionnelles (CNLC)
16. Ressources naturelles Canada (RNCan)
17. Commissariat à la protection de la vie privée du Canada (CPVP)
18. Bureau des passeports (BP)
19. Bureau du Conseil privé (BCP)
20. Agence de santé publique du Canada (ASPC)
21. Sécurité publique Canada (SP)
22. Travaux publics et Services gouvernementaux Canada (TPSGC)
23. Gendarmerie royale du Canada (GRC)
24. Statistique Canada (SC)
25. Transports Canada (TC)
26. Secrétariat du Conseil du Trésor du Canada (SCT)

Sécurité publique Canada peaufine actuellement un cadre stratégique et un plan d'action sur l'interopérabilité en consultation avec le Bureau du Conseil privé (BCP) et la Direction du dirigeant principal de l'information du Secrétariat du Conseil du Trésor (SCT)[111].

Faire participer les utilisateurs

Relativement à l'interopérabilité des communications radio nationales, le Comité à demandé : « Quel est l'état d'avancement de la stratégie nationale sur l'interopérabilité des communications radio? Vers quel ensemble de

[111] Sécurité publique Canada, « Questions de suivi à l'intention de Sécurité publique Canada relativement aux : Recommandations et réponses du Portefeuille/SP au Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense (CSPSND) (30 août 2006) », 26 février 2008, p. 9.

programmes ou de mesures cette stratégie mènera-t-elle? » Sécurité publique Canada a répondu le 26 février 2008 :

> Un comité fédéral composé de représentants de ministères et organismes clés (Gendarmerie royale du Canada, ministère de la Défense nationale, Agence des services frontaliers du Canada, Garde côtière canadienne, Industrie Canada et Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada) a été mis sur pied sous la direction de Sécurité publique Canada afin de contribuer à la création de la Stratégie nationale sur l'interopérabilité de la radiocommunication. Ce comité examine maintenant en priorité les défis et les possibilités d'avenir liés à des initiatives précises, notamment :
>
> - la gestion du spectre des radiofréquences et la définition des exigences en matière de sécurité publique;
> - l'aide à l'élaboration de radiocommunications interopérables et transfrontalières;
> - la gestion de questions liées à la gouvernance, dont la multiplicité des administrations et des mandats; et
> - l'élaboration de politiques visant à orienter le milieu des premiers intervenants dans la planification, la mise en œuvre et l'utilisation de l'équipement de radiocommunication interopérable[112].

Si la Stratégie nationale sur l'interopérabilité de la radiocommunication doit, comme l'a indiqué Sécurité publique Canada, permettre « aux premiers intervenants de différentes disciplines et administrations de communiquer au moyen de systèmes de radiocommunication, avec au besoin des communications voix-données sur demande, en temps réel, en fonction des autorisations », *alors, pourquoi les bureaucrates fédéraux sont-ils les seuls à participer à son élaboration*?

LE DÉFI POUR LE GOUVERNEMENT

Il y a de bonnes et de mauvaises nouvelles.

Bonnes nouvelles : un peu moins des deux tiers des municipalités que nous avons sondées nous ont dit que leurs premiers intervenants avaient accès à une forme de communication interopérable (62 p. 100).

[112] Sécurité publique Canada, « Questions de suivi à l'intention de Sécurité publique Canada relativement aux : Recommandations et réponses du Portefeuille/SP au Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense (CSPSND) (30 août 2006) », 26 février 2008, p. 10.

Mauvaises nouvelles : moins du cinquième des municipalités sondées ont des communications interopérables avec leurs partenaires provinciaux et fédéraux (17 p. 100).

Trent Elyea, coordonnateur de la gestion des situations d'urgence locales, a écrit : « Notre service de police a un système provincial, le service des ambulances a un système à la mesure du comté et nous avons un système municipal. Les trois services fonctionnent avec des systèmes différents et ont des possibilités totalement différentes. »

L'interopérabilité durant une situation d'urgence peut être une question de vie ou de mort – une réalité cruciale qui est très bien comprise des responsables de la gestion des mesures d'urgence de l'Alberta. L'Alberta est une province qui comprend bien pourquoi les communications interopérables sont nécessaires pour les premiers intervenants et elle a pris des mesures à cet égard. Le 11 février 2008, David Hodgins, directeur général, Alberta Emergency Management Agency, a témoigné devant le Comité :

> **M. Hodgins : En ce qui concerne la sécurité de la population et du personnel de première intervention, les communications sont une priorité absolue. Je me permets, encore une fois, de poursuivre sur une note personnelle. J'ai participé à plusieurs situations d'urgence et exercices de préparation à des situations d'urgence, et après avoir effectué une analyse après l'intervention, le premier point que l'on soulignait était que les communications auraient pu ou auraient dû être meilleures. La police doit être plus en mesure de communiquer avec les pompiers et le personnel paramédical et, en règle générale, le système doit permettre une meilleure communication afin que les bonnes ressources soient dépêchées au bon endroit au bon moment[113].**

Non seulement l'Alberta reconnaît le problème, mais elle a un plan d'action pour atteindre le but et combler les lacunes. David Hodgins a déclaré ce qui suit au Comité le 11 février 2008 :

> **M. Hodgins : Un autre paradigme associé à la création d'un système unifié, c'est le projet de « First Responders Radio Communications**

[113] David Hodgins, Délibérations du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 11 février 2008, fascicule 5, 39e législature, 2e session.

> **System » de l'Alberta. Ce système proposé de plusieurs millions de dollars fournira de l'équipement de communication moderne pour permettre à la police, aux ambulanciers, aux pompiers, au personnel de recherche et de sauvetage, ainsi qu'à toute une gamme d'organismes de soutien et de ressources essentielles d'établir des liens et de communiquer les uns avec les autres au cours des événements quotidiens au besoin et, en particulier, au cours des situations d'urgence importantes[114].**

Ce projet dont David Hodgins parle est l'Alberta First Responders Radio Communications System (AFRRCS) et est décrit sur le site Web de l'organisme :

> **Le projet de l'Alberta First Responders Radio Communication System (AFRRCS) est mené par le solliciteur général et Sécurité publique de l'Alberta. Il remplacera le système de communications radio à l'échelle de la province de l'Alberta et de la GRC d'ici 2010. Il s'étendra aussi aux municipalités, ce qui permettra l'échange sans délai de renseignements exacts et pertinents entre les organismes de sécurité publique comme le service des incendies et le service ambulancier[115].**

Bien que le projet en soit toujours au stade de la consultation, une date ferme est fixée pour sa mise en œuvre et la marche à suivre est établie. En outre, le projet vise à assurer l'interopérabilité entre tous les acteurs – peu importe les limites administratives – et le gouvernement de l'Alberta travaille en collaboration avec la GRC pour mettre en œuvre ce système conjointement[116].

Nous ne suggérons pas que le gouvernement fédéral planifie de telles stratégies pour les provinces, mais plutôt qu'il encourage et aide à financer de telles entreprises provinciales. La *stratégie nationale de communications radio pour la sécurité publique* est un point de départ, mais sera-elle interopérable avec les autres

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[114] David Hodgins, Délibérations du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 11 février 2008, fascicule 5, 39e législature, 2e session.

[115] Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties, *AAMDC YEAR IN REVIEW: 2007*, novembre 2007, p. 6. Voir le site de l'AAMDC : http://www.aamdc.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=301&Itemid=517. [traduction]

[116] Gendarmerie royale du Canada, communiqué, Alberta, « La GRC fournira des gilets pare-balles renforcés à la suite du rapport de RHDSC », 5 mars 2007. Voir le site http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/ab/news/2007/Mayerthorpe_HRSDC_Mar05_f.htm.

paliers de gouvernement? Est-ce que la stratégie consiste à consulter les premiers intervenants et les gouvernements provinciaux et à s'entendre sur les communications interopérables pour toutes les personnes qui participent à une situation d'urgence?

Il est question dans le *Rapport sur les plans et priorités 2008-2009* de Sécurité publique Canada d'« une stratégie de radio interopérabilité pour accroître la capacité des premiers intervenants de communiquer entre eux[117] », mais c'est une rengaine qui se répète dans les documents du Ministère depuis 2006[118]. Comparons cela avec l'Alberta qui, après une période de planification de deux ans, a déjà établi une date, 2010, pour son système de communications radio. Quand le gouvernement fédéral se mettra-t-il à bouger?

NOUVELLES RECOMMANDATIONS :

Le Comité recommande :

1. Que Sécurité publique Canada inscrive l'interopérabilité des premiers intervenants à l'ordre du jour des prochaines réunions fédérales-territoriales-provinciales des ministres responsables de la gestion des urgences.

2. Que Sécurité publique Canada fasse intervenir les partenaires provinciaux et municipaux dans l'élaboration et la mise en œuvre de sa *stratégie nationale de communications radio pour la sécurité publique* dans un délai de deux ans (d'ici 2010).

[117] Sécurité publique Canada, *Rapport sur les plans et les priorités 2008-2009*, 31 mars 2008, p. 66.
[118] Selon le rapport : « Le Ministère prépare un cadre d'interopérabilité, qui comprend une vision et une conception stratégique à long terme, afin de disposer d'une approche entièrement coordonnée en matière de sécurité publique et d'assurer un échange efficace de renseignements, tout en protégeant les renseignements personnels des Canadiens et en respectant le principe de la responsabilisation. » Sécurité publique Canada, *Rapport sur les plans et les priorités 2006-2007*, 26 septembre 2006, p. 35.

Problème n° 9 : Non-reconnaissance des besoins des premiers intervenants

Un grand nombre de premiers intervenants et de gestionnaires locaux des mesures d'urgence estiment que le gouvernement fédéral ne les consulte pas adéquatement et ne comprend pas ce dont ils ont besoin sur le terrain pour effectuer efficacement leur travail.

RECOMMANDATIONS DU COMITÉ (2004)

- **Le Comité a recommandé que Sécurité publique Canada soit davantage à l'écoute des besoins des premiers intervenants dans l'ensemble des collectivités du pays.**

- **Le Comité a recommandé que le ministre de Sécurité publique Canada demande à son ministère de restructurer le système national de protection civile afin de s'assurer que les préoccupations et les problèmes des municipalités sont pleinement pris en compte dans les structures et la planification des mesures d'urgence[119].**

RÉPONSE DU GOUVERNEMENT (2006)

Sensibilité, formation ou surplace?

Pour donner suite à la recommandation que Sécurité publique soit davantage à l'écoute des besoins des premiers intervenants dans l'ensemble des collectivités du pays, Sécurité publique Canada a écrit ce qui suit le 30 août 2006 :

> SPPCC reconnaît que les intervenants de première ligne jouent un rôle clé dans la gestion des urgences au Canada, étant donné que la plupart des urgences au pays sont gérées à l'échelle locale, et c'est pourquoi il cherche à mieux connaître leurs besoins et les difficultés auxquels ils doivent faire face. Les fonctionnaires du

[119] Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Les urgences nationales : Le Canada, fragile en première ligne – Stratégie de renforcement*, Ottawa, Sénat du Canada, mars 2007, p. 64. Voir la recommandation 16.

SPPCC continueront d'établir des relations et des partenariats avec les organisations nationales de premiers intervenants. L'information et le soutien fournis grâce à ces partenariats avec les organisations nationales de premiers intervenants se sont avérés utiles dans l'élaboration d'un large éventail d'initiatives, allant du financement du matériel chimique, biologique, radiologique et nucléaire (CBRN) jusqu'à l'établissement d'un programme national de recherche et sauvetage en milieu urbain (RSMU). À chaque année, à l'occasion d'un symposium mené par l'Initiative de recherche et de technologie CBRN de Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada, on lance un dialogue avec les premiers intervenants sur la science et la technologie ayant trait aux interventions CBRN. Le travail en cours consiste à déterminer la combinaison la plus efficace d'outils de gestion des urgences (normes nationales, pratiques exemplaires, directives, etc.)[120].

Des initiatives conjointes avec le secteur des organisations bénévoles se poursuivent également. Le 8 mai 2006, le ministre de la Sécurité publique et le secrétaire général de la Croix-Rouge canadienne ont signé un protocole d'entente qui officialise leur collaboration en matière de gestion des urgences. On compte mettre en place des protocoles d'ententes additionnels avec d'autres organisations, dans l'année qui vient. De plus, on est en train de mettre sur pied un groupe national sur la gestion des urgences qui devra discuter des questions stratégiques et opérationnelles d'intérêt commun survenant en cas d'urgences complexes au pays et qui ciblera des activités communes, dont les communications publiques, des occasions de formation ainsi que des exercices. Le groupe serait composé de représentants de l'Association canadienne des chefs de police, de l'Association canadienne des chefs de pompiers, du Centre canadien des mesures d'urgence, de la Croix-Rouge canadienne, de la Canadian Volunteer Fire Services Association, de la Fédération canadienne des municipalités, des Mennonite Disaster Services, de l'Association des Paramédics du Canada, de Sécurité publique et Protection civile Canada, de l'Agence de santé publique du Canada, de l'Ambulance Saint-Jean, de l'Association bénévole de recherche et sauvetage du Canada et de l'Armée du Salut, et, plus tard, sera élargi pour comprendre des représentants d'autres associations nationales de bénévoles et de premiers intervenants[121].

En outre, plusieurs ONG tels que l'Association bénévole de recherche et sauvetage reçoivent des subventions et contributions gouvernementales qui les aideront à régler des questions relatives à la capacité et pour financer des initiatives innovatrices.

SPPCC et la GRC consulteront le Conseil du Trésor et d'autres ministères afin de clarifier la terminologie définissant les employés utilisée par le Conseil du Trésor dans les annonces faites auprès des employés de la fonction publique lors d'une

[120] Sécurité publique Canada, « Réponse de SPPCC et du Portefeuille aux rapports du CSPSND », 30 août 2006, p. 16.
[121] Sécurité publique Canada, « Réponse de SPPCC et du Portefeuille aux rapports du CSPSND », 30 août 2006, p. 17.

> urgence. Ainsi, l'utilisation de termes tels que « essentiel » et « non essentiel », lesquels ont des significations précises selon la *Loi sur les relations de travail*, peut créer de la confusion chez les employés des ministères et des organismes qui doivent se présenter au travail durant les urgences de façon à poursuivre les opérations ou à épauler les premiers intervenants. Le langage doit être clarifié et normalisé au sein du gouvernement du Canada et dans les documents pertinents comme les plans de continuité des opérations, les procédures normales d'exploitation et les messages aux employés en cas d'urgence[122].

Tout ce que *planifie* le ministère a du sens. Ce qui n'a pas de sens, c'est le temps qu'il prend pour mettre en place un système qui transférera de l'information essentielle des premiers intervenants jusqu'aux hauts fonctionnaires fédéraux. En 2004, le Comité a demandé à Sécurité publique Canada de se mettre à l'écoute des premiers intervenants afin de faciliter la compréhension du gouvernement fédéral à l'égard de leurs besoins pour leur permettre de faire adéquatement leur travail lorsque les Canadiens font face à des situations d'urgence. Que s'est-il passé dans les quatre années qui ont suivi? Le ministère a organisé un symposium, signé un protocole d'entente avec la Croix-Rouge, mis sur pied un Groupe national sur la gestion des urgences et donné une subvention à l'Association canadienne des volontaires en recherche et sauvetage. Rien de plus. Or, la mesure la plus évidente en vue d'améliorer la capacité du gouvernement à « être à l'écoute des premiers intervenants » était la création d'un Groupe national sur la gestion des urgences. Mais depuis sa prétendue fondation en 2005, rien n'atteste du travail accompli par l'organisation[123].

Quelle place occupent les premiers intervenants dans la planification et la mise en œuvre des mesures d'urgence nationales?

Pour donner suite à la recommandation que Sécurité publique Canada restructure le système national de protection civile de façon à ce que les préoccupations et les problèmes des municipalités soient pleinement pris en compte dans les structures et la planification des mesures d'urgence, Sécurité publique Canada a répondu ce qui suit le 30 août 2006 :

[122] Sécurité publique Canada, « Réponse de SPPCC et du Portefeuille aux rapports du CSPSND », 30 août 2006, p. 17.

[123] Le Groupe national sur la gestion des urgences n'est mentionné officiellement qu'une seule fois, soit dans un document ministériel sur le rendement de 2006 où il est question de la « tenue de consultations sur la création d'un groupe national sur la gestion des urgences (premiers intervenants et ONG) ». Sécurité publique Canada, *Rapport ministériel sur le rendement 2005-2006*, 23 novembre 2006, p. 34.

La sécurité publique constitue une responsabilité partagée qui commence chez la personne et passe par les autorités des administrations. Comme le précisent la *Loi sur la protection civile* et celle qui doit la remplacer, la *Loi sur la gestion des urgences* proposée, le gouvernement travaille en collaboration avec les gouvernements provinciaux et territoriaux et par l'entremise de ces gouvernements pour améliorer la protection civile à l'échelle locale et appuyer les secteurs de compétence visés en situation d'urgence. SPPCC incite les provinces et les territoires à participer à l'examen et au renouvellement du système national de gestion des urgences du Canada, par exemple en modernisant la *Loi sur la protection civile* et celle qui doit la remplacer, (*Loi sur la gestion des urgences* proposée), et le plan d'action fédéral-provincial-territorial (FPT) sur la gestion des urgences, qui a pour but de renforcer la gestion des urgences en général parmi quatre fonctions interdépendantes (prévention et atténuation, préparation, intervention et rétablissement). De plus, et afin de complémenter la nouvelle loi fédérale, la *Politique fédérale relative aux situations d'urgence* (1995) sera mise à jour. De nouveaux mécanismes qui permettront de consulter les intervenants de tous les niveaux, de l'échelle locale à l'échelle internationale, pourraient être mis en place pour renforcer la gestion des urgences et la sécurité nationale au Canada.

Reconnaissant la nécessité d'accroître la collaboration en matière de gestion des urgences, les ministres fédéraux, provinciaux et territoriaux (FPT) responsables de la gestion des urgences ont convenu, en janvier 2005, que les gouvernements allaient travailler ensemble pour améliorer le cadre de gestion des urgences. À cette fin, SPPCC a dirigé la mise au point du Système national d'intervention d'urgence (SNIU), pour assurer une intervention fédérale et nationale plus adaptée et concertée face à tous les types d'urgence.

L'un des principes de base du SNIU est l'*intervention simultanée de tous les secteurs*, qui reconnaissent qu'une intervention d'urgence peut exiger de faire appel à tous les ordres de gouvernement et que les différentes parties ont toutes différents secteurs de responsabilité. Le SNIU facilite la communication, la coopération et la coordination de toutes parties, tout assurant le respect et le maintien des limites de compétence.

À ce jour, l'accent a été mis sur le développement de la composante fédérale du SNIU, soit le Système fédéral d'intervention d'urgence (SFIU). Un élément clé du SFIU est l'élaboration d'une interface normalisée et d'un mécanisme de coordination FPT pour appuyer les processus d'intervention d'urgence communs, comme la planification d'urgence FPT, les communications publiques et les opérations conjointes.

Des progrès importants ont été réalisés grâce à l'élaboration et à la mise en place de concepts régionaux d'opérations visant l'administration du SFIU à l'échelle régionale et provinciale et territoriale. Les arrangements régionaux fédéraux permettent de mettre en place une intervention régionale fédérale harmonisée en matière de soutien et d'assistance, intervention qui peut être requise de la part du gouvernement fédéral en cas d'urgence. Ils sont conçus pour faciliter la

> communication, la coopération et la coordination des activités de toutes les parties en cause, tout en assurant le respect et le maintien de la limite de chaque secteur de compétence.
>
> Les bureaux régionaux de SPPCC offrent des services de coordination et de soutien aux familles régionales fédérales. Les bureaux régionaux servent aussi de point de contact unique aux provinces et aux territoires pour les questions concernant la gestion des urgences[124].

Les attachés de recherche de la Bibliothèque du Parlement[125] ont posé la question suivante à Sécurité publique Canada le 19 septembre 2007 : « Quels mécanismes comprend le Système national d'intervention d'urgence (SNIU) pour que le gouvernement fédéral puisse communiquer de l'information vitale aux premiers intervenants en temps opportun dans une situation d'urgence? » Sécurité publique Canada a répondu ce qui suit le 26 février 2008 :

> Le directeur régional de la sécurité publique assurera une représentation appropriée au sein du Centre des opérations d'urgence provincial ou territorial au besoin. Les responsabilités du directeur régional consistent à faciliter l'échange d'information entre le Centre des opérations d'urgence provincial ou territorial, le centre de coordination fédéral et le Centre des opérations du gouvernement du Canada; à coordonner l'intervention fédérale régionale en collaboration avec d'autres représentants régionaux fédéraux et à appuyer les demandes d'assistance provinciales et territoriales ou à y répondre. Le Centre des opérations du gouvernement joue également un rôle clé en communiquant des renseignements essentiels simultanément au directeur régional et au Centre des opérations d'urgence provincial ou territorial.
>
> Les provinces et les territoires appuient les premiers intervenants durant une urgence, tandis que le gouvernement fédéral appuie la province ou le territoire.
>
> Les provinces et territoires sont responsables des communications avec les premiers intervenants relevant de leur compétence tout comme les institutions fédérales sont responsables des communications avec les premiers intervenants fédéraux[126].

[124] Sécurité publique Canada, « Réponse de SPPCC et du Portefeuille aux rapports du CSPSND », 30 août 2006, p. 20-21.
[125] Voir la note 5.
[126] Sécurité publique Canada, « Questions de suivi à l'intention de Sécurité publique Canada relativement aux : Recommandations et réponses du Portefeuille/SP au Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense (CSPSND) (30 août 2006) », 26 février 2008, p. 13.

En route vers une autre période d'inaction

Certes, « des progrès importants ont été réalisés grâce à l'élaboration et à la mise en place de concepts régionaux d'opérations visant l'administration du SFIU [le Système fédéral d'intervention d'urgence] à l'échelle régionale et provinciale et territoriale », mais nous nous posons la même question : quelle est la place des premiers intervenants dans l'élaboration et la mise en œuvre de ces concepts? Dans sa réponse, le gouvernement décrit un système d'intervention commune dans les provinces et les territoires, lequel exclut les municipalités (et les premiers intervenants).

Notre recommandation initiale menait à la question suivante : qu'a fait le gouvernement pour mieux répondre aux besoins des premiers intervenants? Après tous ces acronymes et longues déclarations dans la réponse du gouvernement, nous attendons toujours une réponse.

LE DÉFI POUR LE GOUVERNEMENT

Si l'on demandait au Canadien moyen, doué d'une intelligence moyenne ce qui, selon lui, compte le plus au moment d'intervenir dans des situations d'urgence, on pourrait s'attendre à ce qu'il réponde :

- **Des intervenants compétents et bien équipés**
- **Une intervention rapide**
- **Des ordres clairs**

Il ne répondra sûrement pas : « Ce dont nous avons vraiment besoin, ce sont des méandres bureaucratiques dans lesquels les personnes qui ont la responsabilité des systèmes d'intervention d'urgence vont ça et là tout en s'efforçant de ne pas se marcher sur les pieds. »

Mais c'est, semble-t-il, la priorité déterminée par Sécurité publique Canada dans sa réponse donnée en 2008 à la question posée par le Comité au sujet des mécanismes qui doivent être en place pour assurer une intervention rapide lors de situations d'urgence.

La question du manque de communications directes entre le gouvernement fédéral et les premiers intervenants ne cesse de surgir dès qu'on aborde tout aspect de la gestion des urgences au Canada, dont :

- **La dissimulation de l'endroit et du contenu des dépôts du Système de la réserve nationale d'urgence (SRNU);**

- **Le manque de financement pour le maintien de la capacité d'intervention lors d'incidents de nature chimique, biologique, radiologique, nucléaire ou explosive (CBRNE) et des équipes d'intervention assurant la recherche et le sauvetage en milieu urbain (RSMU);**

- **Le manque de souplesse quant au financement du Programme conjoint de protection civile (PCPC);**

- **Le manque de leadership pour ce qui est de l'établissement des pratiques exemplaires.**

Le fait que les représentants des administrations locales ne participent pas à la réunion annuelle des ministres responsables de la gestion des urgences est révélateur. Comment peut-on croire que les discussions sur les rôles et responsabilités en matière de gestion des urgences soient vraiment utiles si les municipalités n'y prennent pas part? Nous ne sommes pas surpris des résultats de nos sondages, qui montrent que les gestionnaires des mesures d'urgence municipaux sont parfois perdus et souvent mécontents des processus du gouvernement fédéral.

Les commentaires de John Ash, gestionnaire des mesures d'urgence de la Ville d'Ottawa, en font foi, comme le montre cet extrait de son témoignage devant le Comité :

> **M. Ash** : Ce que nous disons, c'est qu'il faudrait parler de ces attentes. Mettons cartes sur table et disons ce qu'il nous en coûte pour fournir ce niveau de service. Peut-être y a-t-il une formule ou une façon pour calculer l'avantage ajouté pour la ville. Nous voulons tenir cette

discussion. Nous voulons être francs et honnêtes, mettre cartes sur table et dire où nous en sommes afin de combler les lacunes si nécessaire.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Prônez-vous la tenue de cette discussion maintenant?

M. Ash : Oui.

Le sénateur Tkachuk : Est-ce qu'ils vous aident ou ils vous bloquent? Qu'est-ce qui arrive? Peut-être pouvons-nous vous aider.

M. Ash : Le défi était grand pour moi, parce que j'ai essayé pendant deux ans de trouver la bonne personne à qui parler.

Le sénateur Nancy Ruth : Nous avons le même problème.

M. Ash : Je dis cela avec une certaine compréhension de la complexité parce qu'il y a aussi chacun des ministères. Mes questions concernent le gouvernement et non les ministères individuellement. Si on parle d'une conduite d'eau municipale qui alimente les divers édifices, j'ai besoin de connaître la dépendance à l'égard de l'eau, parce que nous en sommes responsables. Si nous ne tenons pas cette discussion globalement, entre le gouvernement fédéral et la ville d'Ottawa, il nous sera difficile d'établir les priorités concernant l'infrastructure essentielle et toutes les autres choses du genre.

Pour en revenir à votre question, nous comprenons clairement qu'il y a un avantage. Toutefois, nous devons nous assurer que nous parlons tous deux de la même chose et que nous avons une bonne idée du service qui sera fourni et de ce qu'il en coûtera[127].

Le Comité appuie la recommandation de la Fédération canadienne des municipalités qui, dans une présentation au ministre des Finances Jim Flaherty, écrit :

Sécurité publique et Protection civile Canada (SPPCC) devrait s'engager à amorcer un processus de consultation qui offre aux gouvernements municipaux la possibilité de participer à la protection civile et à la planification de la gestion des urgences (l'inclusion de la FCM dans le Groupe national sur la gestion des urgences est une bonne première étape), menant à un examen plus approfondi des responsabilités et à un financement dans le budget fédéral de l'an prochain. Il faudrait notamment prévoir un financement accru pour le Programme conjoint de protection

[127] John Ash, Délibérations du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 28 janvier 2008, fascicule 4, 28 janvier 2008, 39e législature, 2e session.

civile (JEPP) pour les municipalités ainsi qu'un financement pour la protection et le renforcement des infrastructures essentielles et pour les modifications apportées aux Accords d'aide financière en cas de catastrophe (AAFCC)[128].

Dans l'*Étude de référence 2008 : Rapport sur les principaux problèmes et défis auxquels sont confrontées les municipalités canadiennes,* les résultats d'un sondage réalisé par la Fédération canadienne des municipalités indiquent que « [e]n général, les Canadiens croient que les différents niveaux du gouvernement ne collaborent pas assez en ce qui a trait aux services de police et à la capacité d'intervention en cas d'urgence[129] ».

Ce sentiment concorde avec les commentaires livrés par les représentants municipaux qui ont répondu à notre sondage. Les témoins qui ont comparu devant le Comité ont tenu un discours semblable. Sue O'Sullivan, chef adjointe du Soutien aux opérations, a déploré l'absence d'une relation soutenue et entière au sein des gouvernements en ce qui a trait à la capacité d'intervention en cas d'urgence :

> **Mme Sue O'Sullivan, chef adjointe, Soutien des opérations, Service de police d'Ottawa** : Lorsque nous parlons de planification des mesures d'urgence — nous parlons ici d'une approche tous-risques, qu'il s'agisse d'un acte terroriste ou d'une catastrophe naturelle —, dans les cas où il faut gérer les conséquences de ces urgences, tous les ordres de gouvernement, soit municipal, provincial et fédéral, ont un mandat, et c'est très bien ainsi. Nous devons nous assurer ensemble d'avoir une planification stratégique et nous devons exploiter les biens et les ressources de chacun. Le gouvernement fédéral a des priorités à ce chapitre, mais si ces ressources ne sont pas coordonnées, elles restent limitées. Dans les faits, en cas de crise — qu'il s'agisse d'une catastrophe naturelle, d'un acte terroriste ou d'une crise de quelque nature que ce soit, comme l'ouragan Katrina ou le 11 septembre —, ce sont les services locaux qui interviendront pendant les premières 24 à 48 heures[130].

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[128] Fédération canadienne des municipalités, Mémoire prébudgétaire, 13 février 2007, p. 11. Voir la recommandation 3d sur le site http://www.lmp-pgt.fcm.ca/Francais/View.asp?mp=532&x=787.
[129] Fédération canadienne des municipalités, *Étude de référence 2008 : Rapport sur les principaux problèmes et défis auxquels sont confrontées les municipalités canadiennes*, 15 avril 2008, p. 14.
[130] Sue O'Sullivan, Délibérations du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 28 janvier 2008, fascicule 4, 39e législature, 2e session.

Le Comité comprend le partage constitutionnel des pouvoirs entre les gouvernements. Cependant, rien n'empêche le gouvernement fédéral de rencontrer ses partenaires des municipalités et des provinces afin de discuter du rôle et des pratiques de chacun en matière de gestion des urgences; rien n'empêche non plus les représentants du gouvernement de demander aux représentants des municipalités ce qu'ils ont à dire sur leurs besoins sur le terrain. Les gouvernements des provinces et des territoires pourraient prendre part aux échanges advenant que des subtilités de compétences suscitent de l'inquiétude.

Le Comité recommande fortement que Sécurité publique Canada, en tant que principal organisme fédéral chargé du maintien de la capacité d'intervention en cas d'urgence à l'échelle nationale, soit mieux informé des responsabilités quotidiennes, des défis et des besoins auxquels fait face la collectivité des premiers intervenants en entretenant des contacts directs avec les représentants municipaux. Tous les employés de Sécurité publique Canada chargés de la politique relative à la gestion des urgences devraient être en contact avec le personnel de première intervention des services de police et de lutte contre l'incendie ainsi que des services médicaux d'urgence.

Les employés de Sécurité publique Canada doivent passer du temps avec la police locale, les pompiers, les unités tactiques et les groupes d'enlèvement des explosifs, les unités canines de R-S, les groupes du maintien de l'ordre et les unités de recherche et sauvetage au sol, ainsi que les inspecteurs de garde et toute autre personne qui participe aux interventions d'urgence, y compris les centres de communications.

L'utilisation optimale des biens et des ressources nécessaires au sein de chaque ordre de gouvernement est tout à fait sensée. C'est aux dirigeants fédéraux que revient pareille coordination.

LE COMITÉ RÉITÈRE SA RECOMMANDATION DE 2004 :

En 2004, le Comité a recommandé que Sécurité publique Canada soit davantage à l'écoute des besoins des premiers intervenants dans l'ensemble des collectivités du pays.

Pour aider Sécurité publique Canada à être plus à l'écoute, le Comité fait deux nouvelles recommandations.

NOUVELLES RECOMMANDATIONS :

1. Le Comité recommande que, lors de l'embauche de nouveau personnel chargé de l'élaboration et de la mise en œuvre de la politique relative à la gestion des urgences, Sécurité publique Canada donne la priorité aux personnes qui ont une expérience sur le terrain dans la collectivité des premiers intervenants.

2. Le Comité recommande que tous les employés en poste à Sécurité publique Canada dont le travail touche la politique relative à la gestion des urgences – y compris le sous-ministre et les titulaires de postes de direction de niveaux inférieurs – soient tenus, en guise de formation, d'exécuter des exercices pratiques avec les premiers intervenants.

Problème n° 10 :
Leadership fédéral insuffisant au chapitre de la protection des infrastructures essentielles

On entend par infrastructures essentielles l'ensemble du matériel dont a besoin le Canada pour maintenir le fonctionnement efficace de la société; cela peut aller des réseaux électriques et informatiques jusqu'aux aqueducs et aux routes. La protection de ce vaste éventail de biens est complexe.

Le Canada définit ses infrastructures essentielles nationales (IEN) comme étant « les installations matérielles et informatiques, les réseaux, les services et les biens matériels dont la perturbation ou la destruction aurait de sérieuses conséquences pour la santé, la sécurité ou le bien-être économique des Canadiens et des Canadiennes ou pour le fonctionnement efficace des gouvernements au Canada[131] ».

Cette définition met en évidence l'importance de la protection des infrastructures essentielles pour la sécurité nationale. La sécurité des Canadiens relève du gouvernement fédéral. De plus, l'adoption de la *Loi sur la gestion des urgences* en 2007 a accordé les pouvoirs au gouvernement fédéral dans le domaine de la protection des infrastructures essentielles, lui imposant ainsi l'obligation juridique d'assurer le leadership à cet égard[132].

Le Comité reconnaît que la protection des infrastructures essentielles est une question complexe. Souvent, les infrastructures essentielles sont propriétés communes ou, à tout le moins, partagées par différents ordres de gouvernement à l'intérieur et à l'extérieur des frontières canadiennes. Il se pourrait que leur protection exige la contribution de nombreux intervenants, notamment plusieurs organismes et ministère fédéraux, les gouvernements provinciaux, les administrations municipales et les propriétaires exploitants privés. Environ 85 p. 100 des infrastructures essentielles du Canada

[131] Sécurité publique Canada, *Programme national de fiabilité des infrastructures essentielles*, document de travail, 2002.
[132] Martin Rudner, « Protecting Canada's Energy Infrastructure Against Terrorism: Mapping a Proactive Strategy », *Critical Infrastructure Protection Policy Research Series*, n° 1, Canadian Centre of Intelligence and Security Studies, Université Carleton, mars 2008.

appartiennent à l'industrie privée ou à un ordre de gouvernement différent du gouvernement fédéral[133].

Puisque le gouvernement fédéral possède une petite portion des infrastructures essentielles, pourquoi doit-il jouer un rôle de premier plan pour les protéger? Parce que la protection des infrastructures essentielles est une question de sécurité nationale. D'autres acteurs du secteur privé et public peuvent être propriétaires et voir à l'entretien de ces infrastructures, il n'en demeure pas moins qu'il faut coordonner tous les intérêts en présence. Pour protéger les intérêts nationaux, le gouvernement fédéral doit orchestrer les mesures à cet effet.

Le problème, tel que nous l'avons vu en 2004 : Le gouvernement fédéral ne détient aucun centre de répartition qui lui permettrait d'identifier les infrastructures essentielles du Canada et de tenir informés tous les autres intervenants, et autrement préparés à assumer le rôle qui leur est imparti pour protéger celles-ci.

RECOMMANDATION DU COMITÉ (2004)

- **Le Comité a recommandé que Sécurité publique Canada soit tenu de :**
    - **compiler et tenir à jour, en collaboration avec toutes les municipalités canadiennes, des listes des points faibles apparents, des moyens d'intervention d'urgence et des lacunes dans les moyens;**
    - **tenir des réunions avec ses homologues provinciaux et territoriaux pour discuter des lacunes décelées suite à la mise en application de la recommandation ci-dessus;**
    - **mener des exercices d'urgence nationaux en collaboration avec les autres niveaux de gouvernement et préparer des analyses sur les « leçons apprises »[134].**

[133] Canada, « Programme national de protection des infrastructures essentielles », *Revue de la protection civile*, janvier-mars 2002, p. 4.
[134] Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Les urgences nationales : Le Canada, fragile en première ligne – Stratégie de renforcement*, Ottawa, Sénat du Canada, mars 2004, p. 64. Voir les recommandations17B, C et D.

RÉPONSES DU GOUVERNEMENT AUX RECOMMANDATIONS DU COMITÉ (2006-2008)

Pour donner suite à la première recommandation voulant que Sécurité publique Canada soit tenu de compiler et tenir à jour une liste des points faibles apparents, des moyens d'intervention d'urgence et des lacunes de chaque municipalité, Sécurité publique Canada a adressé au Comité le 30 août 2006 la réponse suivante :

> Conformément a l'alinéa 4(1)*f*) de la *Loi sur la gestion des urgences* proposée, le ministre de la Sécurité publique coordonnerait les activités du gouvernement du Canada ayant trait a la gestion des urgences avec les provinces et territoires et soutiendrait les activités de gestion des urgences de ces derniers. En vertu de l'alinéa 4(1)*r*), le partage d'information avec le gouvernement fédéral serait facilité. Conformément au paragraphe 6(2), tous les ministres fédéraux incorporeraient des éléments dans leurs plans d'urgence qui tiennent compte de tout programme, arrangement ou autre mesure afin d'aider les gouvernements provinciaux et territoriaux et, par l'intermédiaire de ces derniers, les administrations municipales. Les plans régionaux fédéraux-provinciaux-territoriaux (FPT) [135]seraient également pris en compte.
>
> Des travaux sont aussi en cours dans le cadre du Programme national de fiabilité des infrastructures essentielles (PNFIE) en vue de régler les questions relatives aux évaluations de vulnérabilité et à la gestion des urgences en partenariat avec les provinces, les territoires[136]et le secteur privé. Par exemple, le Nouveau-Brunswick, grâce au financement de SPPCC, a conçu un programme modèle d'infrastructures essentielles (IE) provincial qui a été communiqué aux autres provinces et territoires. Ce modèle prévoit des méthodologies pour les évaluations de vulnérabilité et les plans de sécurité[137].

Quelle bonne idée!

Le Comité applaudit à l'excellente idée de mettre en place une loi qui obligera le ministre de la Sécurité publique à assumer la coordination de la gestion des urgences concernant les infrastructures essentielles avec les provinces et les territoires (bien

[135] « FPT » signifie fédéraux-provinciaux-territoriaux.
[136] « p/t » désigne les provinces et territoires.
[137] Sécurité publique Canada, « Réponse de SPPCC et du Portefeuille aux rapports du CSPSND », 30 août 2006, p. 18-19.

que nous aurions préféré que les municipalités et le secteur privé y prennent part eux aussi).

Une question se pose alors : comment le ministre s'y prendra-t-il?

Rien ne permet d'affirmer, à la lecture de sa réponse, que le gouvernement ait entrepris la compilation d'une liste des points faibles apparents, des moyens d'intervention d'urgence et des lacunes en collaboration avec chacun des intervenants visés par ce problème. Il n'est nul besoin d'une loi.

Au lieu de cela, la réponse du gouvernement nous a informés que la nouvelle loi réglerait cette question et que le Nouveau-Brunswick est allé de l'avant et a élaboré un programme-pilote.

Un forum, c'est discuter à plusieurs

Pour donner suite à la deuxième recommandation voulant que Sécurité publique Canada tienne des réunions avec ses homologues provinciaux et territoriaux pour discuter des lacunes révélées par une évaluation des lacunes en matière de protection des infrastructures essentielles, Sécurité publique Canada a adressé au Comité le 30 août 2006 la réponse suivante :

> Des forums fédéraux-provinciaux-territoriaux (FPT) relatifs la gestion des urgences ont été mis sur pied. Y participent régulièrement des ministres, des sous-ministres et des hauts fonctionnaires.
>
> Par l'entremise de ces forums, le gouvernement fédéral et les provinces et territoires abordent conjointement des questions clés ayant trait aux interventions d'urgence, à l'aide financière en cas de catastrophe, à la protection des infrastructures essentielles, à la formation et aux exercices, aux avertissements publics ainsi qu'à l'atténuation des catastrophes[138].

Ainsi, le gouvernement fédéral, les provinces et les territoires se sont réunis pour discuter de la question. C'est la réponse que SPPCC a donnée à la question du Comité. De plus, nous aurions dû obtenir l'assurance que les municipalités et le secteur privé connaissent bien le fonctionnement du matériel et savent où se trouvent les vulnérabilités. Mais nous ne l'avons pas fait, et ce fut une erreur.

[138] Sécurité publique Canada, « Réponse de SPPCC et du Portefeuille aux rapports du CSPSND », 30 août 2006, p. 19.

Mise à l'essai et documentation des mesures de protection

Pour ce qui est de la troisième recommandation, que le gouvernement mène des exercices d'urgence nationaux en collaboration avec les autres niveaux de gouvernement et prépare des analyses sur les « leçons apprises », Sécurité publique Canada a écrit ce qui suit le 30 août 2006 :

> La Division des exercices nationaux de SPPCC est en train d'élaborer un programme national global d'exercices. La Division tient régulièrement des réunions et séances d'information pour les partenaires fédéraux, provinciaux et territoriaux, et elle a réalisé plusieurs exercices. Des travaux d'élaboration de futurs exercices se poursuivent actuellement.
>
> De plus, la Division a parrainé deux offres issues du programme Master Exercise Practitioner de l'U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), enrichies de documentation canadienne pertinente. Environ 70 employés des principaux ministères et organismes fédéraux concernés par la sécurité publique et certains représentants d'administrations provinciales et municipales en matière de gestion des urgences et des collectivités de premiers intervenants ont été entraînés selon la même méthodologie d'exercices.
>
> En vertu des alinéas 4(1)*n*) et *o*) et 6(l)*c*) de la *Loi sur la gestion des urgences* proposée (projet de loi C-12 déposé le 8 mai 2006), SPPCC appliquerait la disposition législative prévoyant des exercices avec d'autres administrations et ferait la promotion d'une approche commune de la gestion des urgences, y compris l'adoption de normes et de pratiques exemplaires[139].

Cette réponse est encourageante. Des exercices d'entraînement communs sont primordiaux pour intervenir de façon efficace dans des situations d'urgence.

En attente d'une stratégie

Le 19 septembre 2007, les attachés de recherche de la Bibliothèque du Parlement[140] ont posé la question suivante, relativement au Programme national de fiabilité des infrastructures essentielles (PNFIE) : « Quel est l'état d'avancement du PNFIE? De quelle manière précise inclut-on les évaluations de la vulnérabilité dans le Programme? » Sécurité publique Canada a répondu ce qui suit au Comité, le 26 février 2008 :

[139] Sécurité publique Canada, « Réponse de SPPCC et du Portefeuille aux rapports du CSPSND », 30 août 2006, p. 19.
[140] Voir la note 5.

Le Programme national de fiabilité des infrastructures essentielles (PNFIE) est une collaboration soutenue entre les partenaires du secteur privé et les gouvernements fédéral, provinciaux et territoriaux. Le but de ces partenariats consiste à fournir un cadre national pour la coopération et à édifier des infrastructures nationales essentielles qui soient résistantes.

La réussite du PNFIE repose sur les initiatives récentes du gouvernement du Canada en collaboration avec ses partenaires provinciaux et territoriaux et du secteur privé en vue d'établir une orientation nationale pour la protection des infrastructures essentielles au Canada. Cette orientation nationale sera précisée dans la première Stratégie nationale pour la protection des infrastructures essentielles du Canada. Établissant un lien à l'égard du besoin d'une intervention coordonnée entre l'ensemble des provinces et territoires et des secteurs, le projet de Stratégie et son plan d'action à l'appui soulignent l'importance cruciale d'une approche de gestion des risques visant à protéger l'infrastructure essentielle et à intervenir efficacement en cas de perturbation. Cette approche proposée transcende les évaluations de la vulnérabilité visant à recommander la prise en compte générale des autres éléments de risque essentiels — les menaces pour les infrastructures essentielles de même que les répercussions des perturbations touchant les infrastructures essentielles.

Pour mettre de l'avant cette vaste approche de gestion des risques, les gouvernements fédéral, provinciaux et territoriaux collaboreront avec leurs partenaires des infrastructures essentielles afin d'élaborer des analyses tous risques. Tandis que le gouvernement du Canada, en collaboration avec les provinces et les territoires, fera la promotion d'une approche commune à la protection des infrastructures essentielles et qu'il partagera les outils, leçons retenues et meilleures pratiques, les intervenants sont responsables, en dernier ressort, de mettre en œuvre une approche de gestion des risques appropriée à leur situation.

Sécurité publique Canada mènera à terme les consultations avec les partenaires fédéraux, provinciaux, territoriaux et autres au cours du printemps et de l'été et espère achever la stratégie et le plan d'action qui seront soumis à l'examen des ministres fédéraux, provinciaux et territoriaux au début de l'année 2009[141].

« Sécurité publique Canada […] espère achever la stratégie et le plan d'action qui seront soumis à l'examen des ministres fédéraux, provinciaux et territoriaux au début de l'année 2009. »

[141] Sécurité publique Canada, « Questions de suivi à l'intention de Sécurité publique Canada relativement aux : Recommandations et réponses du Portefeuille/SP au Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense (CSPSND) (30 août 2006) », 26 février 2008, p. 14.

Lorsque les deux avions ont percuté les tours jumelles à Manhattan en 2001, et révélé aux Nord-Américains combien ils étaient vulnérables, qui aurait pu penser qu'il faudrait près de dix ans pour élaborer une stratégie en matière de protection des biens essentiels? S'il faut attendre près de dix ans pour faire approuver cette stratégie, combien de temps faudra-t-il pour qu'elle se traduise en un plan d'action et mette tous les mécanismes en place pour qu'elle soit réalisable? Dix ans de plus?

« Douze » : la réponse à la question se trouve à la dernière page.

Le 19 septembre 2007, les attachés de recherche de la Bibliothèque du Parlement[142] ont demandé ce qui suit, au sujet du programme national d'exercices : « Quand achèvera-t-on l'élaboration du programme national d'exercices? Combien d'exercices ont été réalisés, où ont-ils eu lieu, et qui étaient les protagonistes? » Sécurité publique Canada a fourni la réponse suivante le 26 février 2008 :

> La date cible d'« achèvement » du programme national d'exercices est l'exercice 2008-2009. À ce jour, une douzaine d'exercices ont été réalisés au pays en Colombie-Britannique, en Ontario, au Québec, au Nouveau-Brunswick, en Nouvelle-Écosse et en Alberta (avec la participation d'équipes provenant de la Colombie-Britannique, du Manitoba, de l'Ontario et de la Nouvelle-Écosse).
>
> Quatre d'entre elles portaient sur des fonctions particulières en matière d'urgence nationale; trois avaient trait au soutien du Canada à l'aide humanitaire ou à la gestion des répercussions (urgences) par l'entremise de l'OTAN; deux s'intéressaient à l'aide militaire offerte aux autorités civiles simultanément aux États-Unis et au Canada, deux examinaient les interdépendances transfrontalières et les répercussions pour l'infrastructure essentielle; et une autre était axée sur l'intervention nationale du Canada face aux effets croissants des attaques aux États-Unis et au Royaume-Uni.
>
> Les participants regroupaient des organismes et des ministères fédéraux, des homologues internationaux, des ministères et organismes des gouvernements provinciaux, des propriétaires ou exploitants d'infrastructures essentielles ainsi que des organisations professionnelles du secteur, des organismes sans but lucratif et organisations caritatives et des premiers intervenants (police, pompiers et

[142] Voir la note 5.

services médicaux d'urgence) — particulièrement les équipes de recherche et de sauvetage an milieu urbain à l'aide d'équipement lourd[143].

LE DÉFI POUR LE GOUVERNEMENT

Leçons retenues ou simulation?

Bien sûr, une « douzaine » d'exercices, c'est un bon début[144]. Le Comité veut savoir si ces exercices nous ont appris quelque chose, s'ils ont été documentés, et surtout, s'ils ont été partagés avec les premiers intervenants du pays. Les conclusions des bureaucrates sur ce qui fonctionne et ce qui ne fonctionne pas ne serviront à rien si elles ne sont pas communiquées aux personnes qui jouent le rôle le plus important pour ce qui est de l'efficacité des mesures d'urgence, c'est-à-dire celles qui travaillent sur le terrain.

Qu'en est-il de la gouvernance?

On peut lire, dans l'*Exposé de principe sur la stratégie nationale de protection des infrastructures essentielles* (2004), que « [le] gouvernement du Canada […] doit cibler et évaluer ses propres [infrastructures essentielles]. En outre, le gouvernement du Canada *collaborera avec d'autres ordres de gouvernement et le secteur privé* pour s'assurer que des processus sont en place pour cibler les infrastructures essentielles (ou leurs composantes) afin de renforcer la sécurité publique[145]. »

Bien que l'on sache que le gouvernement du Canada a compilé une liste des infrastructures essentielles nationales, rien ne nous permet d'affirmer qu'il l'a transmise aux autres ordres de gouvernement et au secteur privé. M. Randy Hull, coordonnateur des préparatifs d'urgence de la Ville de Winnipeg, a dit au Comité qu'il a reçu de l'information de l'industrie privée, et non

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[143] Sécurité publique Canada, « Questions de suivi à l'intention de Sécurité publique Canada relativement aux : Recommandations et réponses du Portefeuille/SP au Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense (CSPSND) (30 août 2006) », 26 février 2008, p. 15-16.

[144] En réponse à une demande d'information présentée par la Bibliothèque du Parlement, Sécurité publique Canada a fourni, le 20 juin 2008, une liste détaillée d'exercices – *réels, fonctionnels, théoriques, de formation et d'orientation* – tenus depuis 2004.

[145] Sécurité publique Canada, *Énoncé de principes sur la stratégie nationale de protection des infrastructures essentielles,* novembre 2004.

du gouvernement fédéral, sur ce qui est considéré comme une infrastructure essentielle.

> **M. Hull :** Certainement. J'ai appris des choses sur l'infrastructure critique en parlant avec des intervenants et non pas avec le gouvernement. En parlant à MTS Allstream; Hydro-Manitoba, qui cultive des liens majeurs avec l'est, l'ouest et le sud; et TransCanada Pipelines, par exemple. Cela m'a permis d'en savoir plus sur ce que sont ces éléments de l'infrastructure critique.
>
> Winnipeg compte un système d'aqueduc qui permet d'alimenter en eau les deux tiers de la population. Lorsque j'ai demandé aux responsables si cet élément d'infrastructure critique serait ajouté à la liste nationale à ce sujet, on m'a dit : non, parce que ça ne répond pas aux critères établis. À l'échelle nationale, si Winnipeg devait perdre son alimentation en eau, je suis sûr que cela poserait des problèmes aux gens à Ottawa. Au deuxième tour, on a intégré cela à la liste des éléments d'infrastructure critique[146].

Ainsi, il est évident que le gouvernement du Canada ne consulte pas la Ville de Winnipeg pour dresser la liste des « infrastructures essentielles ». Qui consulte-t-il? Le sondage de 2007 mené auprès des municipalités par le Comité a indiqué que le gouvernement fédéral n'avait pas communiqué avec un grand nombre d'entre elles pour discuter des infrastructures essentielles.

- **Seulement 16 p. 100 ont affirmé que le gouvernement fédéral avait déterminé qu'il se trouve des infrastructures fédérales dans la municipalité, et un nombre encore moins grand d'entre elles croient qu'elles ont un rôle à jouer dans la protection des infrastructures essentielles fédérales.**

À la question du sondage portant sur l'appui donné par le gouvernement fédéral pour protéger les infrastructures essentielles fédérales, John Allain, directeur de la planification des mesures d'urgence a répondu :

> Le rôle des bureaux du gouvernement fédéral dans tout le pays est d'informer les cadres supérieurs au fur et à mesure que les événements se développent. Ils n'ont pas la capacité requise pour participer aux interventions et n'ont aucune

[146] Randy Hull, Délibérations du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 3 mars 2008, fascicule 6, 39e législature, 2e session.

> ressource pour jouer un tel rôle. Les plans d'urgence dans les bureaux locaux tiennent pour acquis que les autorités locales les assisteront lors des interventions. Un seul ministère, Transports Canada, a acheminé son plan d'intervention d'urgence afin qu'il soit examiné et commenté.

Bravo à Transports Canada, mais d'autres ministères jouent un rôle crucial dans la protection des infrastructures essentielles. Toutes les parties doivent savoir ce qu'elles doivent protéger et en quoi consistent leurs responsabilités à cet égard. D'après une étude récente sur la protection des infrastructures essentielles au Canada, ce n'est pas le cas :

> Bien que l'on considère que le partage de l'information est d'une importance extrême pour réagir face aux menaces de manière proactive et énergique, le gouvernement du Canada n'est toujours pas arrivé à créer un centre de répartition national centralisé de renseignements relatifs aux menaces aux infrastructures essentielles nationales pour ses propres ministères ou organismes ou pour transmettre l'information aux gouvernements des provinces et des territoires et aux administrations municipales, et à plus forte raison aux propriétaires exploitants[147].

[147] Martin Rudner, « Protecting Canada's Energy Infrastructure Against Terrorism: Mapping a Proactive Strategy », *Critical Infrastructure Protection Policy Research Series*, n° 1, Canadian Centre of Intelligence and Security Studies, Université Carleton, mars 2008. [traduction]

Sécurité publique Canada divise les infrastructures essentielles en dix secteurs principaux. La responsabilité de protéger chaque secteur est attribuée à un ou à plusieurs ministères fédéraux. (Voir le tableau ci-dessous)

Secteur		Ministère/organisme
1	Énergie et services publics	**Ressources naturelles Canada (RNCan)** Soutenu par : Commission canadienne de sûreté nucléaire (CCSN), Commission mixte internationale (CMI), Office national de l'énergie (ONE)
2	Communications et technologie de l'information	**Industrie Canada (IC)** Soutenu par : Sécurité publique et Protection civile (SPPCC)
3	Finances	**Finances Canada**
4	Soins de santé	**Santé Canada (SCan)**
5	Alimentation	**Agriculture et Agroalimentaire Canada (AAC)** * Soutenu par : Agence canadienne d'inspection des aliments (ACIA), Agence des services frontaliers du Canada (ASFC), Santé Canada
6	Eau	**Environnement Canada (EC)** Soutenu par : Santé Canada
7	Transports	**Transports Canada (TC)** Soutenu par : ASFC
8	Sécurité	**Sécurité publique et Protection civile (SPPCC)** Soutenu par : Santé Canada/Défense nationale (MDN)
9	Gouvernement	**Sécurité publique et Protection civile (SPPCC) et Secrétariat du Conseil du Trésor (SCT)**
10	Fabrication	**Industrie Canada** Soutenu par : Défense nationale, Ressources naturelles Canada, Environnement Canada

Tout cela est bien beau sur papier, mais dans quelle mesure cette structure réussit-elle à fournir des informations utiles sur le terrain? L'exemple de Ressources naturelles Canada (RNCan) en dit long.

On a dit au Comité que la *Division de la protection des infrastructures énergétiques* de Ressources naturelles Canada avait prévu tenir deux fois par année des briefings classifiés avec les exploitants d'installations énergétiques privés de l'ensemble du pays, en collaboration avec le SCRS, la GRC, le Centre intégré d'évaluation des menaces (CIEM) et Sécurité publique Canada. Mais la réunion de ce printemps (2008) a été annulée. Lorsqu'il l'a appris, le ministre de la Sécurité publique a

dit qu'il n'était pas au courant que le programme avait été annulé et qu'il voulait que celui-ci soit réinstauré[148]. Selon ce qu'en sait le Comité, le rétablissement du programme n'avait toujours pas eu lieu au moment de publier le présent rapport.

Pour quelles raisons un programme fédéral censé être utile pour la protection des infrastructures essentielles nationales a-t-il été annulé? Pourquoi le ministre de la Sécurité publique n'était-il pas au courant de cela? La structure existe-t-elle vraiment ou est-ce un mythe?

Où en est-on avec la stratégie?

Les initiatives récentes du gouvernement du Canada en vue d'établir « une orientation nationale pour la protection des infrastructures essentielles au Canada » tournent autour de l'annonce de la première Stratégie nationale pour la protection des infrastructures essentielles du Canada. Dans la *Politique de sécurité nationale* du gouvernement, rendue publique en avril 2004, on annonçait que « le gouvernement s'emploiera, avec les provinces, les territoires et le secteur privé, à arrêter une stratégie visant à protéger les infrastructures essentielles du Canada[149] ».

Le Comité constate la création du Programme national de fiabilité des infrastructures essentielles (PNFIE) de Sécurité publique Canada et son mandat de « fournir un cadre national pour la coopération et d'édifier des infrastructures nationales essentielles qui soient résistantes pour tous les Canadiens ». Le principal outil qu'offre le programme pour remplir ce mandat est un « forum continu » coordonné par les autres gouvernements et les exploitants du secteur privé. La création d'un forum mérite des éloges, mais pour quelle raison les Canadiens ont-ils dû attendre près de dix ans pour que le gouvernement fédéral

[148] Ian MacLeod, « Briefings cancelled without my knowledge… », *Ottawa Citizen*, 15 avril 2008.
[149] Canada, *Protéger une société ouverte : la politique canadienne de sécurité nationale*, avril 2004.

formule sa stratégie nationale de protection des infrastructures essentielles tant attendue?

Histoire triste et brève de la Stratégie nationale de protection des infrastructures essentielles de Sécurité publique Canada

2004 : Sécurité publique Canada indique que la stratégie sera annoncée au printemps 2005[150].
2005 : Sécurité publique Canada indique que la stratégie sera annoncée à l'automne 2005[151].
2006 : Il n'est fait aucune mention de la stratégie[152].
2007 : Sécurité publique Canada recevra l'appui des secteurs privé et public à l'égard de la stratégie nationale de protection des infrastructures essentielles en 2008[153].
2008 : « Mise à jour constante » de la Stratégie nationale de protection des infrastructures essentielles[154].
2009 : Les ministres sont censés examiner la stratégie.

À présent, faisons un bond en avant et lisons le témoignage de Scott Broughton, sous-ministre adjoint, Gestion des urgences, Secteur de la sécurité nationale de Sécurité publique Canada, qui a comparu devant le Comité le 28 janvier 2008 :

> **Le sénateur Meighen :** En avril dernier, on a informé le comité de l'achèvement de la Stratégie nationale de protection des infrastructures essentielles. Est-elle effectivement terminée? Dans la négative, quand sera-t-elle prête et rendue publique?
>
> **M. Broughton :** Cette stratégie est de grande envergure et doit être planifiée soigneusement avec les provinces et les territoires. La grande majorité des infrastructures essentielles sont la propriété du secteur privé ou des provinces et territoires. Le gouvernement fédéral en possède quelques-unes. La stratégie nationale a pour but de favoriser la collaboration entre toutes les entités et avec le secteur privé pour que rien ne soit laissé au hasard en matière d'infrastructures essentielles. Nous travaillons là-dessus avec nos collègues des provinces et des

[150] Sécurité publique Canada, *Rapport sur les plans et les priorités 2004-2005*, 8 octobre 2004, p. 28.
[151] Sécurité publique Canada, *Rapport sur les plans et les priorités 2005-2006*, 24 mars 2005, p. 27.
[152] Il n'est pas question de stratégies ou de programmes nationaux de protection des infrastructures essentielles dans le *Rapport sur les plans et les priorités 2006-2007*, déposé par Sécurité publique Canada le 26 septembre 2006.
[153] Sécurité publique Canada, *Rapport sur les plans et les priorités 2007-2008*, 29 mars 2007, p. 29.
[154] Sécurité publique Canada, *Rapport sur les plans et les priorités 2008-2009*, 31 mars 2008, p. 37.

> territoires depuis quelque temps. À leur dernière réunion à Halifax, les ministres fédéraux-provinciaux-territoriaux se sont penchés sur l'état d'avancement de la stratégie. Nous avons décidé de faire un effort intense de consultation avec le secteur privé au cours des prochaines semaines. Par la suite, au cours des mois à venir, nous essayerons de mettre au point la stratégie.

Le dernier mot était inclus dans la réponse de SPC mentionnée plus haut dans la présente section :

> Sécurité publique Canada mènera à terme les consultations avec les partenaires fédéraux, provinciaux, territoriaux et autres au cours du printemps et de l'été et espère achever la stratégie et le plan d'action qui seront soumis à l'examen des ministres fédéraux, provinciaux et territoriaux au début de l'année 2009[155].

De nouveau, la Stratégie nationale de protection des infrastructures essentielles n'est rien qu'un point qui sera étudié par les ministres. Même s'ils décident que c'est la meilleure façon de procéder, il demeure que la préparation de la stratégie afin qu'elle soit réaliste prendra plus de temps – beaucoup plus de temps, surtout si le rythme de la phase de mise en œuvre est le même que celui de la phase de planification.

[155] Sécurité publique Canada, « Questions de suivi à l'intention de Sécurité publique Canada relativement aux : Recommandations et réponses du Portefeuille/SP au Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense (CSPSND) (30 août 2006) », 26 février 2008, p. 14.

NOUVELLES RECOMMANDATIONS :

Le Comité recommande :

1. **Que Sécurité publique Canada fasse profiter les premiers intervenants de tout le pays des « leçons apprises » dans le cadre de son programme d'exercices national.**

2. **Que soient rétablis les briefings classifiés de Ressources naturelles Canada à l'intention des intervenants du secteur de l'énergie.**

3. **Que soient mis en place des processus semblables aux briefings classifiés de Ressources naturelles Canada pour les intervenants du secteur de l'énergie dans l'ensemble des 10 secteurs des infrastructures essentielles nationales.**

4. **Que soit annoncée la Stratégie nationale de protection des infrastructures essentielles d'ici la fin de 2008.**

Problème n° 11 :
Mesures d'urgence improvisées

Le problème, tel que nous l'avons vu en 2004 : Six micro-organismes posent le plus grand risque pour le Canada : la variole, la fièvre charbonneuse, la peste, le botulisme, la tularémie et la fièvre virale hémorragique. En 2004, Santé Canada ne disposait pas d'un plan d'intervention d'urgence complet pour faire face à l'un ou l'autre de ces micro-organismes.

Quatre ans plus tard, le Comité trouve aberrant que Santé Canada n'ait encore rien élaboré qui se rapproche d'un système fiable pour traiter les éclosions graves de maladies infectieuses. C'est une faille importante dans toute planification d'urgence au pays. Sécurité publique Canada, qui a la responsabilité de protéger les Canadiens, n'a pas exercé de pressions auprès de Santé Canada à cet égard pour assurer la protection des Canadiens en cas d'éclosion. De plus, Sécurité publique Canada ne réussit pas à mettre de l'ordre dans son propre système d'intervention en cas d'urgence.

Il semble tout simplement que l'improvisation soit la principale méthodologie utilisée par le Canada pour traiter les situations d'urgence nationales.

RECOMMANDATION DU COMITÉ (2004)

- **Le Comité a recommandé que Santé Canada élabore un plan national pour contrer une flambée possible de fièvre charbonneuse, de peste, de botulisme, de tularémie et de fièvre virale hémorragique [156] et qu'il en fasse rapport au Parlement et à la population d'ici le 31 mars 2005[157].**

[156] Veuillez consulter le tableau des maladies du Dr Plummer à l'annexe D, qui donne plus de précisions sur les micro-organismes et sur les maladies.
[157] Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Les urgences nationales : le Canada fragile en première ligne – Stratégie de renforcement*, Ottawa, Sénat du Canada, mars 2004, p. 13. Voir la recommandation 1.

RÉPONSES DU GOUVERNEMENT AUX RECOMMANDATIONS DU COMITÉ (2006-2008)

Vers un système national normalisé de gestion des incidents sanitaires

En août 2006, Santé Canada a répondu comme suit aux recommandations du Comité :

> Santé Canada (par l'entremise de l'Agence de santé publique du Canada) met actuellement en place des ressources d'intervention pour faire face aux épidémies de maladies infectieuses connues et émergentes. Ces maladies peuvent être d'origine naturelle ou être déclenchées par la libération délibérée d'un agent biologique. L'Agence a élaboré des plans d'intervention particuliers pour la variole et la grippe pandémique, qui sont suffisamment souples pour nous permettre de faire face à l'une ou l'autre des cinq maladies sur la liste de la catégorie A, et aux maladies des listes des catégories B et C des agents de menace.
>
> En plus de ces plans d'intervention, l'Agence de santé publique du Canada a élaboré et mis en place un programme de formation sur la reconnaissance du bioterrorisme destiné aux laboratoires de palier 1[158] (laboratoires d'hôpital et de clinique). Ce programme de formation vise à aider le personnel des laboratoires de palier 1 à mieux reconnaître les agents biologiques et viraux dans le contexte du laboratoire. Il y a actuellement 35 instructeurs formés qui ont offert ce programme à 289 membres du personnel des laboratoires dans tout le Canada. La version du programme de formation est accessible sur Internet depuis février 2006
>
> Des exercices sur table pour l'influenza et la peste ont été réalisés avec des partenaires internationaux et une formation en laboratoire sur le diagnostic de la variole, de la tularémie et de la microscopie électronique a été offerte par le biais de l'Initiative de protection de la santé mondiale [IPSM] et de son Réseau mondial de laboratoires-groupes d'action pour la sécurité et la santé [RMLGASS]. D'autres ateliers internationaux sont également prévus. L'Agence s'emploie également à élaborer un système de réaction d'urgence général qui servirait à répondre à tout genre d'urgences sanitaires, notamment les attaques terroristes chimiques, biologiques, radiologiques et nucléaires (CBRN) et les nouvelles maladies infectieuses émergentes. Ce système d'intervention général, appelé le Système national de gestion des incidents en santé, sera appuyé par des

[158] L'objectif des niveaux de confinement (paliers) est de décrire le niveau de confinement minimum approprié à une manipulation d'organismes anthropopathogènes sans dangers dans un laboratoire. Pour une description de ces niveaux, prière de consulter : Agence de la santé publique du Canada, Laboratoires de confinement, à l'adresse http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/ols-bsl/containment/index-fra.php.

plans d'urgence spécifiques ou, selon le cas, par des ensembles d'information par agent.

L'Agence collabore également avec Sécurité publique et Protection civile Canada à l'élaboration et à la mise en œuvre du Système national d'intervention en cas d'urgence (SNIU). Le SNIU est un cadre d'intervention général qui vise la coordination stratégique des divers ministères concernés au sein d'une intervention d'urgence du gouvernement du Canada. Le SNIU s'inspire du Système de commandement des interventions et Santé Canada ainsi que l'Agence révisent actuellement leur propre Plan d'intervention d'urgence interne pour y intégrer cette approche et l'harmoniser avec le SNIU. Le système national de gestion des incidents en santé, dont l'élaboration se fait en collaboration avec les provinces et les territoires, intégrera les principes du Système de commandement des interventions et viendra compléter le SNIU. Ce nouveau concept de fonctionnement permettra aux divers intervenants de la santé de beaucoup mieux coordonner leurs actions, de communiquer ensemble et de gérer leur intervention en cas d'urgence grâce à l'élaboration d'une politique complète de gestion des urgences en santé et à une structure de fonctionnement intégrée favorisant l'interopérabilité et la connectivité des systèmes des différentes administrations durant une urgence sanitaire

D'autres initiatives se déroulent également avec les provinces et les territoires afin d'améliorer notre capacité d'intervention en cas d'urgence sanitaire et d'attaque terroriste. Il s'agit entre autres de la mise sur pied des équipes d'intervention sanitaire d'urgence, chapeautée par le Bureau national des équipes d'intervention sanitaire d'urgence, et de la création d'équipes d'intervention épidémiologique d'urgence. Le travail d'élaboration se poursuit sur l'entente fédérale-provinciale-territoriale d'entraide mutuelle en cas de catastrophe ou d'urgence de santé publique, sous les auspices du Réseau pancanadien de santé publique. Entre-temps, le document *Liste de contrôle des meilleures pratiques pour faciliter l'échange d'aide réciproque entre les administrations fédérale, provinciales et territoriales en cas de catastrophe ou d'urgence en santé publique* a été élaboré pour donner aux diverses autorités publiques un outil de travail temporaire pour intervenir en cas d'urgence.

Sur le plan national, s'assurer que les autorités de tous les ordres de gouvernement possèdent un cadre complémentaire pour faire face aux urgences sanitaires constitue un objectif primordial de sécurité publique. Il s'agit là d'un pré-requis essentiel à une réponse efficace et au maintien de la confiance de la population et de la crédibilité du Canada à l'échelle internationale. La formulation du Cadre national de gestion des situations d'urgence en santé a doté les gouvernements fédéral, provinciaux et territoriaux de directives communes pour l'élaboration de programmes en matière de gestion des urgences sanitaires[159].

[159] Santé Canada, « Réponse aux recommandations du Comité », août 2006, p. 1-2.

Les attachés de recherche de la Bibliothèque du Parlement[160] ont demandé à l'Agence de la santé publique du Canada : Comment fonctionnent les plans d'intervention pour la variole et la grippe pandémique dans le cadre du SNGIDS? Le ministère a répondu :

> Lorsque le SNGIDS sera opérationnel, il servira à compléter les plans d'urgence actuels conçus en fonction d'une maladie précise, comme la variole et la grippe pandémique.
>
> Le SNGIDS est un système « tous risques » destiné à accroître la coordination dans l'ensemble des provinces et des territoires lors de tout type d'urgences. Le SNGIDS est fondé sur une structure d'intervention flexible et évolutive qui fournit un cadre commun pour la communication, la planification et le processus décisionnel en cas d'urgences et de catastrophes naturelles ou causées par l'homme, y compris les éclosions de maladies infectieuses comme la variole et la grippe pandémique. Bien que des plans d'urgence précis puissent exiger des mesures précises pour gérer une urgence particulière comme la variole, la structure et les protocoles d'intervention pour coordonner l'intervention dans l'ensemble des organismes et des provinces et territoires (SNGIDS) restent les mêmes[161].

Les attachés de recherche de la Bibliothèque du Parlement[162] ont aussi posé la question suivante : Quel est l'état du SNGIDS? Quand sera-t-il terminé? Le ministère a répondu :

> À l'heure actuelle, le Système national de gestion des incidents dans le domaine de la santé (SNGIDS) est un cadre conceptuel qui est en train d'être opérationnalisé par le biais de l'Agence de la santé publique du Canada ainsi que par les gouvernements provinciaux et territoriaux.
>
> Le SNGIDS a pour but d'améliorer la coordination, la communication et le processus décisionnel entre les provinces et les territoires lors d'urgences. Il tient compte des différences possibles entre les systèmes de gestion sanitaire et de gestion des urgences des provinces et des territoires. Les instances fédérales, provinciales et territoriales adoptent maintenant le système de gestion des incidents pour assurer une capacité d'intervention normalisée « tous risques » qui permettra aux organismes de coordonner efficacement les interventions. Les instances fédérales, provinciales et territoriales participent également à l'élaboration de normes pour la gestion d'urgences ainsi qu'à des cours de formation collaborative qui permettront de renforcer encore davantage l'uniformité des protocoles en matière de planification, d'intervention et de

[160] Voir la note 35.
[161] Agence de la santé publique du Canada, « Réponses de l'ASPC aux questions de suivi du CSPSND », 30 octobre 2007, p. 1-2.
[162] Voir la note 35.

> rétablissement. Les documents définissant le système national de gestion des situations d'urgence sanitaire du Canada et le Système national de gestion des incidents dans le domaine de la santé devraient être finalisés au printemps 2008[163].

Cadre conceptuel? Quatre ans après que le Comité a souligné cette grande faiblesse dans la capacité d'intervention d'urgence du Canada et cinq ans après l'éclosion du SRAS à Toronto, le système de gestion des urgences sanitaires du Canada reste un concept; aucune entente n'a encore été passée entre le gouvernement fédéral, les provinces et les territoires.

Les documents définissant le système, comme il est indiqué ci-dessus, devaient être finalisés au printemps 2008. Nous attendons, nous surveillons, mais rien ne sort de la caverne. Peut-être s'agit-il d'une nouvelle façon d'hiberner.

Système national d'intervention d'urgence de Sécurité publique Canada

Le 19 septembre 2007, les attachés de recherche de la Bibliothèque du Parlement[164] ont demandé à Sécurité publique Canada de décrire le fonctionnement du Système national d'intervention d'urgence (SNIU). Le ministère a répondu le 26 février 2008 ce qui suit :

> Le SNIU a pour but de fournir les liaisons requises entre les systèmes fédéraux, provinciaux et territoriaux de gestion des interventions d'urgence lorsqu'une demande d'aide est présentée par une province ou un territoire. Les sept activités suivantes, communes à tous les systèmes FPT de gestion des interventions d'urgence, seront alors mises en œuvre pour favoriser une intervention intégrée : connaissance de la situation; évaluation des risques; planification; logistique; communications publiques; liaison et finances et administration.
>
> Les liaisons et les interfaces entre le système du gouvernement fédéral et les systèmes des provinces et des territoires constitueront l'élément fondamental qui permettra au SNIU de fonctionner efficacement. Ces liaisons et ces interfaces seront établies grâce à l'affectation du directeur régional de la sécurité publique au poste d'agent de liaison fédéral principal auprès des responsables provinciaux ou territoriaux et des ministères fédéraux régionaux et grâce aux communications

[163] Agence de la santé publique du Canada, « Réponses de l'ASPC aux questions de suivi du CSPSND », 30 octobre 2007, p. 1.
[164] Voir la note 5.

> efficaces entre le Centre des opérations du gouvernement et les Centres des opérations d'urgence provinciaux et territoriaux.
>
> Le SNIU a été élaboré sur plusieurs années; il repose sur les activités FPT conjointes d'interventions d'urgence et l'expérience opérationnelle, y compris tout récemment, l'intervention fédérale et provinciale concernant les inondations potentielles en Colombie-Britannique.
>
> Il a été soumis à l'examen des cadres supérieurs responsables de la gestion des urgences (CSRGU) en novembre 2007 et il a été approuvé à titre de document provisoire devant être validé par les exercices qui commenceront en 2008.
>
> Le SNIU sera mis à jour au besoin pour demeurer conforme aux priorités et opérations fédérales, provinciales et territoriales qui sont en constante évolution en matière de gestion des urgences[165].

Nous avons demandé : Quand prévoit-on l'achèvement du SNIU, et a-t-il déjà fait l'objet d'une mise à l'essai? Le ministère a répondu :

> Le Système national d'intervention d'urgence (SNIU) décrit dans le document sur le SNIU fournit les liaisons requises entre les systèmes fédéraux, provinciaux et territoriaux de gestion des interventions d'urgence et officialise les procédures qui ont été mises en pratique au cours des deux dernières années.
>
> Le document sur le SNIU a été préparé par le groupe de travail FPT relevant des cadres supérieurs responsables de la gestion des urgences (CSRGU) chargé de mettre en œuvre les instructions des ministres visant à garantir une coordination accrue entre les opérations d'intervention fédérale, provinciale et territoriale.
>
> Le SNIU a été soumis à l'examen des CSRGU en novembre 2007 et il a été approuvé à titre de document provisoire devant être validé par les exercices qui commenceront en 2008. Il devrait être soumis à l'approbation des ministres en janvier 2009.
>
> Il sera mis à jour au besoin pour demeurer conforme aux priorités et opérations fédérales, provinciales et territoriales qui sont en constante évolution en matière de gestion des urgences[166].

[165] Sécurité publique Canada, « Questions de suivi à l'intention de Sécurité publique Canada relativement aux : Recommandations et réponses du Portefeuille/SP au Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense (CSPSND) (30 août 2006) », 26 février 2008, p. 12.
[166] Sécurité publique Canada, « Questions de suivi à l'intention de Sécurité publique Canada relativement aux : Recommandations et réponses du Portefeuille/SP au Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense (CSPSND) (30 août 2006) », 26 février 2008, p. 12-13.

À la fin de juin 2008, la semaine précédant l'ébauche finale du présent rapport, nous avons demandé au ministère si les exercices de 2008 visant à valider le document provisoire approuvé du SNIU avaient commencé. La réponse a été affirmative. Sécurité publique Canada nous a affirmé que le SNIU est mis en pratique quotidiennement dans le cadre d'événements en temps réel, y compris durant les inondations récentes au Nouveau-Brunswick[167]. Toutefois, le SNIU reste un document provisoire dont l'approbation par les ministres n'est pas prévue avant janvier 2009. Le Comité se rappellera de cette date.

Les attachés de recherche de la Bibliothèque du Parlement[168] ont également demandé à l'ASPC : Quel est l'état du SNIU? Quand sera-t-il terminé et comment le SNIU interagira-t-il avec le SNGIDS? Qui aura l'autorité? L'ASPC a répondu :

> Le SNIU a récemment été renommé PIUF (Plan d'intervention en cas d'urgence fédéral). Il tient compte des efforts déployés par les organismes fédéraux, provinciaux et non gouvernementaux ainsi que de ceux du secteur privé dans le cadre d'une approche fédérale globale aux interventions d'urgence. Le PIUF est géré par Sécurité publique Canada. Le Plan est en train d'être approuvé.
>
> Le PIUF (antérieurement appelé SNIU) a été créé pour fournir une structure commune devant être utilisée par le gouvernement du Canada pour coordonner les interventions fédérales lors d'événements d'importance nationale, y compris l'appui aux provinces et aux territoires ainsi qu'à d'autres ministères et organismes fédéraux.
>
> Le SNGIDS constitue le système d'intervention d'urgence à l'échelle des administrations fédérales-provinciales-territoriales du secteur de la santé. Ce système est étroitement aligné sur le PIUF par le biais des mécanismes interadministrations aux échelons fédéral, provincial et territorial. Le PIUF et le SNGIDS sont fondés sur des normes et des protocoles communs en matière de gestion des incidents, assurant ainsi la normalisation et l'interopérabilité des protocoles opérationnels[169].

Le lecteur remarquera qu'on n'a pas répondu à la question « Qui aura l'autorité? » Le SNIU ou le SNGIDS? Nous ne le savons toujours pas.

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[167] Échange de courriels avec Sécurité publique Canada, 23 juin 2008.
[168] Voir la note 35.
[169] Agence de la santé publique du Canada, « Réponses de l'ASPC aux questions de suivi du CSPSND », 30 octobre 2007, p. 2.

NOTE AUX LECTEURS QUI NE S'Y RETROUVENT PLUS : Le Système national d'intervention d'urgence (SNIU) a été renommé Plan d'intervention en cas d'urgence fédéral (PIUF) et ensuite, d'après les documents de 2008 de Sécurité publique Canada, a repris de nouveau le nom de SNIU. Dans le présent rapport, l'acronyme utilisé sera « SNIU » pour maintenir l'uniformité.

Coopération entre les provinces

La question qui suit a aussi été posée à l'Agence de la santé publique du Canada : À quel moment l'entente FPT sur l'aide mutuelle mentionnée ci-dessus sera-t-elle finalisée? Quels sont les travaux qui ont été accomplis jusqu'à présent relativement à cette entente? La réponse :

> Le Protocole d'entente fédéral-provincial-territorial sur l'offre d'aide réciproque en cas de catastrophes ou de situations d'urgence en santé publique (PE) a été finalisé et approuvé par le Réseau pancanadien de santé publique et la Conférence des sous-ministres de la Santé du Canada. Le PE est en instance d'une approbation finale par les ministres FPT de la Santé. Une fois cette approbation obtenue, le protocole deviendra un accord d'aide mutuelle officiel entre les provinces et les territoires[170].

Le fait que les provinces et le gouvernement fédéral aient signé un PE pour s'entraider en cas de crise sanitaire est un pas dans la bonne direction en matière de gestion des urgences sanitaires. Un petit pas, mais tout pas qui ne s'accompagne pas de bureaucratie excessive doit être considéré comme un triomphe dans le contexte de la capacité d'intervention d'urgence du Canada.

LE DÉFI POUR LE GOUVERNEMENT

Nous regrettons d'avoir imposé au lecteur ces dernières pages, mais c'était nécessaire pour démontrer ce que nous devons affronter lorsque nous tentons d'obtenir des réponses à une question importante relativement à la gestion des urgences.

[170] Agence de la santé publique du Canada, « Réponses de l'ASPC aux questions de suivi du CSPSND », 30 octobre 2007, p. 3.

Improvisation en matière d'urgence sanitaire nationale

L'Agence de la santé publique du Canada (ASPC) a écrit au Comité : « Les documents définissant le système national de gestion des situations d'urgence sanitaire du Canada et le Système national de gestion des incidents dans le domaine de la santé devraient être finalisés au printemps 2008. » Jusqu'à présent, le Comité n'a vu aucune documentation ni aucune annonce relativement au Système national de gestion des incidents dans le domaine de la santé (SNGIDS).

En outre, après la lecture des rapports ministériels sur le rendement et les rapports sur les plans et les priorités de l'ASPC (et de Santé Canada) des dix dernières années, le Comité n'a rien vu qui prouve que le Système national de gestion des incidents dans le domaine de la santé (SNGIDS) est une priorité pour Santé Canada ou pour l'Agence de la santé publique du Canada[171]. Nous pouvons présumer que le SNGIDS est un autre exemple de l'échec de la tentative de répondre systématiquement aux crises sanitaires à l'échelle du Canada. Vu la gravité de l'incident du SRAS en Ontario en 2004, le Comité est renversé de constater que l'ASPC et Santé Canada n'aient pas fait davantage à cet égard.

La vérificatrice générale est d'accord

Ceux qui se demandent si le Comité exagère cette situation devraient consulter le rapport de la vérificatrice générale paru le 6 mai 2008. Le chapitre 5 de ce rapport est intitulé *La surveillance des maladies infectieuses – Agence de la santé publique du Canada*[172]. Une longue liste de ce qu'elle appelle les « faiblesses présentes depuis longtemps » quant à la capacité

[171] Le SNGIDS a été mentionné une fois dans le *Rapport ministériel sur le rendement 2006-2007* de l'ASPC.

[172] Bureau du Vérificateur général du Canada, « Chapitre 5 – La surveillance des maladies infectieuses – Agence de la santé publique du Canada », *Mai 2008 – Rapport de la vérificatrice générale du Canada*, 6 mai 2008. Disponible à l'adresse http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/aud_ch_oag_200805_05_f_30701.html.

du gouvernement fédéral d'obtenir et de communiquer des données de surveillance sur la menace de maladies infectieuses au Canada, est présentée dans ce rapport. Bon nombre de ces faiblesses avaient été soulignées par le Bureau du vérificateur général en 1999 – il y a une décennie – et n'ont toujours pas été corrigées.

Voici un bref synopsis des failles que la vérificatrice générale a relevées quant à la capacité de l'Agence de la santé publique du Canada de recueillir et d'utiliser l'information sur les cas de maladies infectieuses et de donner l'alarme face aux menaces potentielles à la santé publique que présentent de tels cas.

D'après le rapport de la vérificatrice générale :

1. L'Agence a fait enquête sur quelques menaces à la santé publique, mais « n'a pas utilisé les résultats de l'évaluation des menaces pour la santé publique ni effectué toute autre forme d'évaluation continue des risques pour fixer ses objectifs et établir ses priorités ».

2. L'Agence a appuyé un projet visant à regrouper les données sur les tendances et les conditions prévues dans le cadre duquel il a été constaté que des ajustements devaient être faits à l'égard de l'orientation de la recherche sur les maladies infectieuses et des interventions connexes, mais là encore, l'Agence « n'a pas utilisé les résultats de son projet pour fixer ses objectifs et établir ses priorités à long terme. . . ».

3. L'Agence a répondu à la plainte de la vérificatrice générale en 2002 qu'elle n'avait pas cerné ses priorités en matière de surveillance parce qu'elle avait créé un groupe de travail cinq ans plus tard chargé d'établir une approche stratégique en matière de priorités, mais en novembre 2007, ce groupe n'avait produit qu'un « plan de travail en vue de l'élaboration d'une stratégie de surveillance ».

4. L'Agence ne dispose toujours pas « de pouvoirs législatifs clairs et à jour pour exercer une surveillance, soit dans le cadre

de la collecte courante de données ou pour ce qui est d'intervenir en situation d'urgence. »

5. L'Agence et l'Agence canadienne d'inspection des aliments n'ont pas effectué une évaluation intégrée du risque pour déterminer quels sont les risques de maladies causées par des pathogènes qui passent des animaux aux humains (qui représentent selon les estimations de 65 à 80 p. 100 des maladies humaines nouvellement reconnues).

6. L'Agence compte sur les provinces et les territoires pour envoyer des données utiles et complètes sur la surveillance des maladies infectieuses, mais parfois, ces données ne sont pas envoyées ou sont incomplètes.

7. L'Agence n'a pas été en mesure de conclure des accords avec les provinces et les territoires sur un ensemble de normes de surveillance qui « permettent de définir, de déclarer et de documenter de façon uniforme les cas de maladies infectieuses au pays ».

8. L'Agence a mené trois projets pilotes pour déterminer si la qualité des données qu'elle recevait est adéquate pour soutenir les mesures prises en matière de santé publique et l'un d'entre eux a permis de constater que moins de la moitié des données reçues respectaient les normes applicables, mais que les procédures nécessaires pour évaluer et documenter la qualité des données n'étaient pas encore en place.

9. L'Agence n'a pas encore élaboré et mis en œuvre une approche et une méthode complète pour mesurer de façon uniforme les systèmes de l'Agence pour déterminer si elle s'acquitte de ses responsabilités – une faiblesse que le Bureau du vérificateur général a documentée pour la première fois en 1999, il y a presque une décennie.

10. L'Agence n'a pas démontré que ses rapports et ses analyses répondent aux besoins des fonctionnaires chargés de la santé publique au Canada et à ceux des autres utilisateurs - « À

l'exception de l'infection due à la bactérie *E. coli*, nous avons constaté que l'Agence n'avait pas déterminé dans quelle mesure ses rapports et ses analyses fournissaient les données permettant de prévoir et de prévenir les menaces pour la santé publique, et d'y réagir. »

Et ce n'est pas tout; la vérificatrice générale fait une série de recommandations visant à rectifier les nombreux échecs de l'Agence jusqu'à présent. Mais à un point du rapport, elle s'arrête pour déplorer simplement :

> **« Nous nous inquiétons du fait que l'adoption d'une approche nationale normalisée en matière de déclaration des cas de maladies infectieuses prendra encore quelques années. »**

Le Système national d'intervention en cas d'urgence : théorie ou réalité?

Dans la section « Réponse du gouvernement » du problème n° 9 du présent rapport, « Non-reconnaissance des besoins des premiers intervenants », Sécurité publique Canada a écrit : « L'un des principes de base du SNIU est l'intervention simultanée de tous les secteurs, qui reconnaissent qu'une intervention d'urgence peut exiger de faire appel à tous les ordres de gouvernement et que les différentes parties ont toutes différents secteurs de responsabilité. »

Sachant cela, Sécurité publique Canada a commencé à concevoir un système universel que l'organisme appelle le Système national d'intervention en cas d'urgence (SNIU) qui intègre les efforts des paliers fédéral, provincial et régional et ceux des organismes non gouvernementaux et du secteur privé dans une approche fédérale globale en matière d'intervention d'urgence. Quel concept! Et puisque ce système suit le processus d'approbation, il n'y a pas de quoi se préoccuper... ou est-ce bien le cas?

Le SNIU est-il une réalité ou seulement un concept? D'après les documents officiels du ministère, le Système national d'intervention en cas d'urgence (SNIU) est en voie d'élaboration depuis quatre ans. Rien n'indique que le passage d'un concept à un système pratique a été réalisé.

Il n'est pas surprenant que la vérificatrice générale croit qu'un système normalisé à l'échelle nationale de communication sur les maladies infectieuses ne verra pas le jour avant plusieurs années.

L'encadré suivant présente au lecteur un historique concis de ce qui s'est passé relativement au SNIU depuis le début.

La triste histoire du Système national d'intervention en cas d'urgence (SNIU) de Sécurité publique Canada

Sécurité publique Canada, *Rapport sur les plans et priorités* 2004-2005 - «… Mettre la dernière main à l'élaboration et à la mise en œuvre du Système national d'intervention en cas d'urgence (SNIU)… »

Sécurité publique Canada, *Rapport sur les plans et priorités* 2005-2006 – « Poursuivre la mise en œuvre progressive du Système national d'intervention en cas d'urgence ainsi que la formation connexe » – été 2006

Sécurité publique Canada, *Rapport ministériel sur le rendement* 2005-2006 – Le SNIU s'appuyait sur le Plan d'intervention en cas d'urgence fédéral (PIUF). Le PIUF est décrit comme un « plan-cadre » à l'intention d'autres plans d'action fédéraux, qui incorporera les structures fédérales de coordination.

Sécurité publique Canada - *Rapport sur les plans et priorités* 2006-2007- « SPPCC dirige actuellement l'élaboration d'un nouveau cadre national d'intervention en cas d'urgence, le Système national d'intervention d'urgence (SNIU). »

Sécurité publique Canada - *Rapport sur les plans et priorités* 2007-2008 –« Le Ministère mettra le PFIU en œuvre, soit l'approche tous risques en intervention d'urgence du gouvernement fédéral … Mise en œuvre du PFIU d'ici mars 2008. »

Sécurité publique Canada - *Rapport sur les plans et priorités* 2008-2009 – «… par l'intermédiaire du Système national d'intervention d'urgence (SNIU), le Ministère établira un modèle d'intervention d'urgence commun aux diverses compétences administratives du Canada. »[173]

Lorsque le Comité a vérifié le site Web de Sécurité publique Canada en avril 2008, il n'y avait aucune mention de l'état du Plan d'intervention en cas d'urgence fédéral (PIUF). Comme

[173]Les *rapports sur les plans et priorités* (RPP) et les *rapports ministériels sur le rendement* (RMR) de Sécurité publique Canada peuvent être consultés sur le site du Conseil du Trésor à l'adresse http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/est-pre/estimf.asp.

l'indique la chronologie ci-dessus, le PIUF devait être mis en œuvre en mars 2008.

En 2005, la vérificatrice générale a publié un rapport sur les mesures d'urgence au Canada dans lequel le début de l'élaboration du SNIU est examiné. Dès le tout début, la vérificatrice générale a souligné le caractère vague du leadership de Sécurité publique Canada et son manque de clarté pour assumer l'intervention en cas d'urgence du gouvernement fédéral. En effet, d'après le rapport :

> Nous avons constaté que les plans ministériels restent vagues sur la manière dont ils seraient intégrés pour permettre une intervention coordonnée de l'administration publique fédérale. L'article 7 de la *Loi sur la protection civile* exige que les ministères élaborent un plan d'intervention lié à leur secteur de responsabilité. À mesure que les situations d'urgence évolueront et exigeront l'intervention d'un nombre accru de ministères et d'organismes, nous sommes d'avis qu'il pourrait y avoir un conflit, pour les ministères mobilisés, entre la nécessité de collaborer avec d'autres ministères et le respect du secteur de responsabilité correspondant à leur mandat[174].

Par conséquent, dans son rapport, la vérificatrice générale recommandait à Sécurité publique Canada :

> **2.96 Recommandation.** Sécurité publique et Protection civile Canada devrait travailler de concert avec d'autres organismes fédéraux en vue de préciser la chaîne de commandement et de contrôle lors des interventions menées par le gouvernement fédéral.
>
> **Réponse de Sécurité publique et Protection civile Canada.** Le leadership s'exercera dans le cadre de la structure de commandement et de contrôle du Système national d'intervention en cas d'urgence. En outre, des changements à la *Loi sur la protection civile* permettront d'accentuer le pouvoir du ministre de la Sécurité publique et de la Protection civile en ce qui a trait à la coordination des interventions de tous les participants fédéraux en cas d'urgence de portée nationale[175].

[174] Bureau du vérificateur général du Canada, « Chapitre 2— La sécurité nationale au Canada — L'initiative de 2001 en matière d'antiterrorisme — Sûreté du transport aérien, sécurité maritime et protection civile », avril 2005, disponible à l'adresse http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/Francais/aud_ch_oag_200504_2_f_14933.html.

[175] Bureau du vérificateur général du Canada, « Chapitre 2— La sécurité nationale au Canada — L'initiative de 2001 en matière d'antiterrorisme — Sûreté du transport aérien, sécurité maritime et

Comme il est indiqué au problème n° 1, « Manque de gestion des urgences », la *Loi sur la gestion des urgences* a reçu la sanction royale le 22 juin 2007[176]. La nouvelle loi modifie la *Loi sur la protection civile* existante et donne au ministre de la Sécurité publique de larges pouvoirs pour diriger les efforts de préparation en cas d'urgence des divers ministères fédéraux; donc, en quoi consiste le problème maintenant? La *Loi sur la gestion des urgences* étant en vigueur, le ministre de la Sécurité publique a le pouvoir d'établir des programmes et des politiques de gestion des interventions en cas d'urgence à l'échelle du gouvernement fédéral et pourtant, en ce qui concerne le Système national d'intervention en cas d'urgence (SNIU), rien de concret n'est survenu, à part la planification et l'élaboration.

Le Comité demande donc au ministère de la Sécurité publique si le Système national d'intervention en cas d'urgence (SNIU) est une théorie ou une réalité.

Après avoir lu les réponses et documents ministériels et les rapports de la vérificatrice générale, nous croyons que le lecteur en arrivera à la même conclusion que le Comité, c'est-à-dire que le ministère est incapable de répondre à cette question.

Un système national d'intervention en cas d'urgence – qui délimite les responsabilités administratives – est nécessaire pour permettre à notre nation d'agir en cas de sinistre à grande échelle.

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protection civile », avril 2005, disponible à l'adresse http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/Francais/aud_ch_oag_200504_2_f_14933.html.

[176] *Loi sur la gestion des urgences*, Première session, trente-neuvième législature, 55-56 Elizabeth II, 2006-2007. Le texte de la loi peut être consulté à l'adresse http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?pub=bill&doc=C-12&parl=39&ses=1&Language=F.

NOUVELLES RECOMMANDATIONS

Le Comité recommande :

1. Que Sécurité publique Canada termine et publie le Système national d'intervention en cas d'urgence (SNIU) d'ici mars 2009.

2. Que Sécurité publique Canada et Santé Canada rendent public le Système national de gestion des incidents dans le domaine de la santé (SNGIDS) d'ici mars 2009.

3. Que l'Agence de la santé publique du Canada accorde la plus haute priorité au rapport du Bureau du vérificateur général de 2008 et qu'elle fasse rapport au Parlement à mesure que chaque recommandation est mise en œuvre. (Une liste complète des recommandations de la vérificatrice générale pour 2008 est présentée à l'annexe C.)

4. Que la vérificatrice générale assure le suivi de la vérification de 2005 de la protection civile, et en particulier, qu'elle examine et évalue l'état du SNIU.

Problème n° 12(a) : Planification d'urgence et forces policières canadiennes

Ces dernières années, le Comité n'a cessé de réclamer une augmentation considérable des forces policières au Canada. Voici quelques résultats d'un rapport sur la GRC en Colombie-Britannique, réalisé par l'Institute for Canadian Urban Research Studies et l'University College of the Fraser Valley[177] :

- La population du Canada a plus que doublé (2,3 fois) entre 1962 et 2003, alors que le nombre de policiers n'a augmenté que d'un facteur de 1,7, même si le nombre de crimes signalés à la police a septuplé.

- Chaque policier de la Colombie-Britannique s'est vu confier en moyenne près de trois fois plus de crimes en 2005 qu'en 1962.

- Les cas d'entrée par effraction, de conduite en état d'ébriété et de violence familiale exigent des policiers beaucoup plus de temps, ce qui leur en laisse moins pour les interventions de première ligne (détails ci-après).

Voici quelques faits dont le Comité sénatorial de la sécurité nationale et de la défense a pris connaissance lors des témoignages :

- La GRC n'a de ressources que pour suivre le tiers des organisations criminelles au Canada dont *elle connaît l'existence*.

- Pour bien maintenir l'ordre dans les ports canadiens – où sévit la corruption et qui sont vulnérables aux attaques terroristes – la GRC aurait besoin de 900 agents additionnels.

[177] *A 30 Year Analysis of Police Service Delivery and Costing: "E" Division: Research Summary*, School of Criminology and Criminal Justice, University College of the Fraser Valley and the Institute for Canadian Urban Research (2005). Note : La Division E est le bureau de la GRC en Colombie-Britannique.

- La Garde côtière américaine patrouille les Grands Lacs avec des effectifs de 2 200 agents. Le Canada essaie d'en faire autant avec 14 agents de la GRC.

La solution saute aux yeux : augmenter les effectifs et le budget de la GRC. Le Comité est d'avis que le Canada a besoin de 5 000 à 7 000 agents additionnels.

Le premier ministre a promis à la GRC 1 000 agents additionnels dans le Budget de 2006[178]. La GRC a fini par en obtenir 600 et quelques, mais comme elle a dû doter des postes vacants, son bilan net est nul. Les 400 autres personnes embauchées ont été doucement absorbées dans la bureaucratie fédérale chargée de l'application de la loi.

Le premier ministre ne semble pas être particulièrement intéressé à rétablir la capacité et la fierté de la force nationale de police du Canada, mais il s'est engagé à augmenter le nombre de policiers canadiens de 2 500 en cinq ans en répartissant les fonds entre les provinces. Il reste à savoir si cet engagement sera suivi par une augmentation du budget de la force policière au terme des cinq ans.

À la GRC et dans les forces policières partout au pays, le nœud du problème, c'est le nombre, ou le manque, de policiers. Le Canada ne compte tout simplement pas assez de policiers pour qu'ils puissent jouer le premier rôle dans les situations d'urgence.

[178] Gouvernement du Canada, Budget de 2006, http://www.fin.gc.ca/budtocf/2006/budlistf.htm.

Problème n° 12(b) :
Services de police en cas d'urgence

Dans son rapport de 2004 intitulé *Les urgences nationales: le Canada, fragile en première ligne*, le Comité s'est penché sur les ententes conclues entre provinces en matière de services policiers, mais il n'a pas examiné explicitement le rôle des services de police comme facteur intrinsèque de la gestion des urgences.

Permettez-nous d'aborder maintenant la question.

Le rôle de la police

Michael Boyd, chef de police, Service de police d'Edmonton, a décrit succinctement le rôle de la police dans notre société lorsqu'il a témoigné devant le Comité en février 2008 :

> **Chef Boyd :** Les services de police ont un mandat comportant quatre volets : la prévention du crime, le maintien de l'ordre social, l'application de nos lois et l'amélioration de la sécurité publique[179].

Des policiers canadiens sont toujours les intervenants de première ligne en cas de catastrophe naturelle ou d'origine humaine au Canada. Les services de police constituent une des pierres angulaires d'une bonne gestion des urgences. C'est à la police qu'il revient de maintenir l'ordre social et de veiller au respect de la loi dans les situations d'urgence.

En aucun temps la loi et l'ordre ne sont-ils plus importants qu'en cas d'urgence. C'est alors que la capacité d'appoint des forces policières de la nation est mise à l'épreuve. Malheureusement, le Canada manque de policiers pour maintenir une capacité d'appoint suffisante pendant une longue période.

Durant l'éclosion du SRAS de 2004, les forces policières étaient chargées de stopper la propagation du virus en faisant respecter les ordres de quarantaine. Julian Fantino, chef de police de Toronto et aujourd'hui

[179] Michael Boyd, Délibérations du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 25 février 2008, fascicule 5, 39e législature, 2e session.

commissaire de la Police provinciale de l'Ontario, a dit au Comité combien cela s'était avéré difficile :

> **Sénateur Moore :** Parlons de la situation du SRAS. Lorsque l'épidémie a explosé, est-ce que les autorités médicales sont venues dire au chef Fantino « Voici le problème. Vos gens ne peuvent pas être exposés à cette maladie. Vous devez prendre ces précautions ». Comment les choses se font-elles? Comment savez-vous jusqu'où vous pouvez aller sans mettre vos gens en danger? Est-ce que quelqu'un vous dit à quoi vous vous exposez et ce que vous devez porter? Cette coordination existe-t-elle? A-t-elle existé dans le cas du SRAS?
>
> **Julian Fantino, commissaire, Police provinciale de l'Ontario :** Elle s'est faite peu à peu. Tout d'abord, nous ne savions pas ce qui nous attendait. Le chef Boyd a été mis à contribution également, mais au début, je n'ai jamais cru que la police allait être très touchée par cette situation. C'était une affaire de santé et c'est ainsi que nous avons vu la chose au début.
> Très rapidement, le problème est devenu une affaire policière parce qu'il y avait des ordonnances de quarantaine que les gens ne respectaient pas. Qui fait respecter ces ordonnances? Il y a eu aussi la question des équipements requis, et il fallait tenir nos gens au courant pour qu'ils viennent travailler et continuent de faire leur travail. Puis les visites dans les hôpitaux ont été limitées. Évidemment, vous n'allez pas dire à des personnes dont un être cher se trouve aux soins palliatifs et est mourant qu'elles ne peuvent plus lui rendre visite. Par conséquent, nous avons dû poster des policiers dans les hôpitaux également.
>
> Très rapidement, la situation est devenue un énorme problème pour nous. Ce qui a été un dur coup, c'est lorsque la source a été identifiée dans un hôpital local et qu'une quarantaine de dix jours a été imposée. Nous devions identifier tous les policiers qui avaient été en contact avec cet hôpital durant une certaine période de temps, et tous ces policiers ont été mis en quarantaine à leur domicile. Du jour au lendemain, il nous manquait une centaine de policiers[180].

Dans toute situation d'urgence, pour bien intervenir, gérer et rétablir la situation, les forces policières doivent être capables de jouer un rôle déterminant dans le processus.

[180] Julian Fantino, Délibérations du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 25 février 2008, fascicule 5, 39e législature, 2e session.

Défis que doivent relever les forces policières aujourd'hui

Faire plus avec moins

Le Comité a souvent souligné l'insuffisance des services de police au Canada. Le Canada se classe au 19e rang des 23 membres de l'Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques (OCDE) pour ce qui est du nombre de policiers par habitant (données de 2002)[181]. Le Canada compte 186 policiers par 100 000 habitants, l'Angleterre et le Pays de Galles, 210, l'Australie, 304, et les États-Unis, 326. Autrement dit, le rapport des forces policières à la population au Canada est de 43 p. 100 inférieur à ce qu'il est aux États-Unis, de 39 p. 100 inférieur à ce qu'il est en Australie et de 11 p. 100 inférieur à ce qu'il est en Angleterre et au Pays de Galles[182].

Le Canada aurait besoin de 7 992 policiers additionnels pour se comparer à l'Angleterre et au Pays de Galles, et de 39 000 pour se comparer à l'Australie. Le Comité se contenterait d'une comparaison avec l'Angleterre.

Augmentation de la paperasse due aux droits de l'accusé

Le travail des policiers au Canada évolue. Les demandes se multiplient. Alors que la population du Canada a plus que doublé (2,3 fois) entre 1962 et 2003, le nombre de policiers n'a augmenté que d'un facteur 1,7. Durant cette période, le nombre de crimes signalés à la police a septuplé. À cause des exigences législatives de plus en plus lourdes, les policiers doivent consacrer beaucoup plus de temps maintenant qu'auparavant à la préparation de dossiers.

Selon une analyse de 30 ans de la Division E de la GRC en Colombie-Britannique, les cas d'entrée par effraction exigent aujourd'hui de 5 à 10 heures-policiers contre une heure en 1970, les cas de conduite en état

[181] L'OCDE compte 30 pays membres, alors que seulement 23 pays disposent de données sur leurs effectifs policiers. Les derniers chiffres disponibles sont de 2002. *The Eighth United Nations Survey on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (2001 - 2002)*, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/Eighth-United-Nations-Survey-on-Crime-Trends-and-the-Operations-of-Criminal-Justice-Systems.html.
[182] *Ibid*.

d'ébriété, cinq heures en moyenne contre une heure en 1970, et les cas de violence familiale, de 10 à 12 heures contre une heure en 1970[183].

> Les gouvernements mettent à la disposition des Canadiens moins de policiers par habitant pour effectuer du travail plus compliqué afin de combattre une criminalité de plus en plus diversifiée.

Si nos policiers sont surutilisés quotidiennement, on ne peut s'attendre d'eux qu'ils aient la capacité d'appoint voulue dans les situations d'urgence.

> **Le sénateur Tkachuk :** Il faut deux fois et demie plus de temps pour s'occuper d'une infraction de conduite avec facultés affaiblies. Pourquoi donc?
>
> **M. Zaccardelli (ex-commissaire de la GRC)** : C'est à cause de ce que le policier doit faire pour se conformer aux différentes décisions du tribunal et aux politiques en place pour respecter les droits garantis par la Charte. Nous ne remettons pas en question ce respect, mais ces décisions ont des conséquences directes pour nous... ce qui prenait une semaine il y a dix ans prend aujourd'hui des mois. Il faut réaliser que les policiers sont pris avec la paperasse… Imaginez qu'au cours des 10 dernières années, le temps moyen d'une enquête pour une introduction par effraction a augmenté de 58 p. 100; de 250 p. 100 pour une accusation de conduite avec facultés affaiblies; de 964 p. 100 pour une accusation de voie de fait sur un membre de la famille. Les services de police n'ont pas reçu des augmentations budgétaires pour compenser le fait que le temps de traitement augmente chaque fois qu'une loi est adoptée ou qu'un tribunal rend une décision. Tout cela s'est fait dans un environnement policier soumis à une plus grande surveillance du public et des médias. Et les citoyens attendent un plus haut degré de responsabilité chez la police que chez tout autre métier[184].

Le gouvernement a promis, dans le *Budget de 2008*[185], de fournir un budget pour recruter 2 500 nouveaux agents de police dans l'ensemble du Canada, grâce à un fonds de recrutement de policiers de 400 millions de dollars en cinq ans, mais aucune annonce n'a été faite pour indiquer comment les fonds seront répartis ou pour garantir leur maintien au delà des cinq ans. Les fonds s'élèveront-ils à 80 millions par année, chaque année, pour cinq ans, ou

[183] *A 30 Year Analysis of Police Service Delivery and Costing: "E" Division: Research Summary*, School of Criminology and Criminal Justice, University College of the Fraser Valley and the Institute for Canadian Urban Research (2005).
[184] M. Zaccardelli, Délibérations du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 25 février 2008, fascicule 5, 39e législature, 2e session.
[185] Gouvernement du Canada, Budget 2008, http://www.budget.gc.ca/2008/home-accueil-fra.asp.

seront-ils échelonnée jusqu'à un maximum à la fin, ce qui n'est pas rare dans ce genre d'annonce? Nous ne le savons tout simplement pas.

Les collectivités qui recevront des fonds pour recruter de nouveaux agents devront-elles contribuer à hauteur égale pour s'en prévaloir? Si oui, cela pourrait présenter des difficultés pour les petites localités ou les collectivités qui sont serrées financièrement. Tout financement additionnel est bienvenu, mais il serait utile d'avoir des précisions.

Rôles mal définis dans les situations d'urgence

Les rôles que les forces policières fédérales, provinciales et municipales jouent durant les situations d'urgence ne sont pas toujours bien définis, particulièrement s'il est question de terrorisme. Dans son étude de 2007, le Comité a constaté que, même si 61 p. 100 des municipalités ont déclaré qu'une catastrophe ou un état d'urgence local causé par un acte de terrorisme constituait une préoccupation pour leur collectivité, à peine 36 p. 100 d'entre elles disposaient d'un plan d'intervention antiterroriste.

Des gestionnaires de situations d'urgence, tel Kelly Gilday, coordonnateur adjoint du programme d'urgence de la ville de Prince George, ont affirmé qu'en cas de terrorisme, la police fédérale prendrait la situation en charge : la GRC a un plan antiterroriste, la ville non. Par ailleurs, d'autres gestionnaires municipaux, tel Larry Brassard, chef du service d'incendie de la ville de Milton, ont indiqué que les policiers municipaux sont les premiers intervenants, que l'intervention de première ligne est une fonction qui relève d'abord de la police en ce qui concerne la lutte antiterroriste et que les services de police sont assurés sur une base régionale.

Il est clair que la force policière fédérale, la GRC, est responsable de la sécurité nationale. La *Loi sur les infractions en matière de sécurité* attribue la « responsabilité première » aux agents de la paix de la GRC quand l'infraction présumée découle d'activités constituant des menaces pour la sécurité du Canada[186]. Toutefois, dans la pratique, le service local de police interviendra selon toute vraisemblance. Un agent de police municipal sera probablement le premier à se rendre sur la scène du crime, que la sécurité nationale soit en cause ou non.

[186] Voir le paragraphe 6(1) concernant le rôle de la GRC à l'égard d'infractions en matière de sécurité. *Loi sur les infractions en matière de sécurité*, ministère de la Justice, http://laws.justice.gc.ca/fr/showdoc/cs/S-7/se:5::se:6/en/fr?page=3.

La Fédération des municipalités canadienne, dans son rapport de 2008, *Services policiers : l'équité, gage d'efficacité*, a demandé qu'on précise les responsabilités :

> Les gouvernements municipaux sont des intervenants de première ligne, et sont souvent appelés à assurer l'application des lois et à offrir des services dans des domaines – surveillance frontalière, interventions sur les Grands Lacs, lutte à la cybercriminalité, etc. – qui relèvent clairement du gouvernement fédéral. Les compensations que verse le gouvernement fédéral pour ces services sont ponctuelles et ne sont pas régies par des procédures claires et transparentes.
>
> … Les rôles, les responsabilités et les ressources des services policiers doivent être clarifiés et rendus cohérents afin que chaque ordre de gouvernement puisse bien s'acquitter des mandats qui lui sont conférés par ses champs de compétence. C'est particulièrement vrai dans les domaines de la lutte au crime organisé, du trafic de stupéfiants, de la sécurité nationale (dont la surveillance de cibles potentielles d'attaques terroristes), de l'identité judiciaire, de la cybercriminalité, ainsi qu'en matière de surveillance des ports et des frontières – autant de domaines où les municipalités paraissent assumer des responsabilités fédérales[187].

Pour que les services de police fonctionnent bien lors d'une catastrophe naturelle ou d'origine humaine complexe, il faut bien départager les responsabilités en matière de commandement et de contrôle, et définir les responsabilités communes des forces appelées à intervenir.

[187] Fédération des municipalités canadiennes, *Services policiers : l'équité, gage d'efficacité*, 29 mai 2008, http://www.fcm.ca/Francais/View.asp?mp=1&x=878.

NOUVELLES RECOMMANDATIONS :

- **Le Comité recommande que les représentants des forces policières fédérales, provinciales et municipales partout au Canada tiennent un débat national pour clarifier les rôles et les responsabilités en matière de sécurité nationale et de gestion des urgences.**
- **Le Comité recommande que le nombre de policiers soit augmenté à hauteur des effectifs de l'Angleterre – soit quelque 8 000 agents additionnels, conformément à ce que le Comité a proposé pour la GRC (5 000 à 7 000 agents supplémentaires) et à l'engagement du gouvernement d'ajouter 2 500 policiers.**

Problème n° 12(c) :
L'état actuel des effectifs de la GRC

La GRC diffère de toute autre force policière nationale dans le monde. Elle fournit toutes sortes de services de police au Canada : elle contribue à maintenir l'intégrité des frontières du Canada, mène des enquêtes en matière de sécurité nationale, maintient des effectifs dans les régions isolées et dans le Nord, forme des forces policières à l'étranger et maintient l'ordre dans les collectivités provinciales, territoriales, municipales et autochtones.

Le gouvernement du Canada est tenu par la Constitution d'assurer à ses citoyens la paix, l'ordre et un bon gouvernement, et la GRC joue un rôle enviable en s'acquittant des deux premières fonctions depuis 1874. Mais la GRC a de plus en plus de difficulté depuis quelques années à maintenir cette fière tradition.

Il ressort que la GRC doit relever de nombreux défis – certains lui appartiennent en propre, d'autres lui sont imposés par des forces extérieures. Les problèmes de la GRC deviennent malheureusement les problèmes de chaque collectivité canadienne où elle est chargée de maintenir l'ordre – particulièrement dans les situations d'urgence.

Services de police contractuels essentiels

La GRC affecte près de la moitié de ses agents en uniforme à des services de police contractuels destinés aux provinces, aux territoires et aux municipalités. Elle assume en sous-traitance diverses fonctions liées à la prestation de services de police dans 652 collectivités réparties dans dix provinces et trois territoires[188]. Dans ces collectivités, à titre de force policière provinciale, territoriale ou municipale, la GRC assume le rôle d'intervenant de première ligne; elle prend en charge la gestion des urgences en menant des opérations de recherche et de sauvetage, en intervenant en cas d'inondation, etc.

[188]La GRC fournit des services de police communautaires dans toutes les provinces et les territoires, à l'exception de l'Ontario et du Québec. La structure de la GRC dans ces deux provinces diffère sensiblement de ce qu'elle est ailleurs au Canada. Voir Services de police communautaires, contractuels et autochtones, http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/ccaps/contract_f.htm.

Certains soutiennent que la GRC devrait se retirer de toute sous-traitance de services policiers, mais le Comité est d'avis que le résultat ne serait pas productif ni pour la Force elle-même ni pour les Canadiens en général. C'est en fournissant des services de police contractuels que les jeunes agents rencontrent les Canadiens et se familiarisent avec l'aspect humain qui est si important dans le travail d'un policier. C'est par la voie de services de police contractuels que du personnel peut ou devrait être fourni en cas d'urgence nationale et dans des situations spéciales comme les conférences au sommet et les Jeux olympiques. Une force policière nationale, dotée d'une capacité d'appoint en cas d'urgence nationale, est un atout essentiel.

Dans son rapport *Rétablir la confiance : rapport du Groupe de travail sur la gouvernance et le changement culturel à la GRC* (le *Rapport Brown*), publié en décembre 2007, le groupe de travail de David Brown a souligné que la direction de la GRC était à la source de certains des problèmes de la force en adhérant à des pratiques de gestion dépassées et devrait faire meilleur usage de ses ressources humaines[189].

Toutefois, les auteurs du *Rapport Brown* ont reproché au gouvernement fédéral de limiter la capacité de gestion de la GRC en confiant les décisions d'ordre structurel et financier au Conseil du Trésor et à Travaux publics et Services gouvernementaux Canada plutôt que d'accorder à la GRC le statut d'employeur distinct, comme c'est le cas du Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité. Dans son témoignage devant le Comité en février 2008, M. Zaccardelli, ex-commissaire de la GRC, a expliqué ce qu'il entendait par statut d'employeur distinct :

> **Mr. Zaccardelli (ex-commissaire de la GRC) :** Lorsque nous parlons du statut d'employeur distinct, il y a deux questions importantes : la capacité de contrôler vos propres finances et la flexibilité qui accompagne cette capacité, et celle d'avoir vos propres politiques de [ressources humaines] pour vous donner de la flexibilité, étant donné la nature unique de votre organisation[190].

Dans le cas de la GRC, les décisions quant à la façon dont l'organisation devrait se gérer elle-même sont prises par le Conseil du Trésor (politiques en matière de ressources humaines et autorisation des fonds) et par Travaux

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[189] *Rétablir la confiance : rapport du Groupe de travail sur la gouvernance et le changement culturel à la GRC*, présenté au ministre de la Sécurité publique et au président du Conseil du Trésor, 14 décembre 2007, http://www.securitepublique.gc.ca/rcmp-grc/report-rapport-fra.aspx.

[190] M. Zaccardelli, Délibérations du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 25 février 2008, fascicule 5, 39e législature, 2e session.

publics et Services gouvernementaux Canada (acquisitions). Le fait que la GRC doit travailler par l'entremise de ces deux instances fédérales complique considérablement la gestion de la Force. Et le Comité aimerait que cela change.

Sous-dotation

Le *Rapport Brown* décrit la GRC comme étant fortement sous-dotée. Malheureusement, on y omet de recommander au gouvernement ce qui saute aux yeux : augmenter les effectifs et le budget.

Le premier ministre a promis 1 000 agents de la GRC additionnels et des procureurs fédéraux dans le Budget 2006[191]. La Force a fini par obtenir quelque 600 agents additionnels, alors que les 400 autres sont devenus des employés de soutien civils[192]. En fait, la plupart, sinon la totalité, des nouveaux agents se sont tout simplement retrouvés dans des postes déjà vacants, laissant à la GRC un grand manque à gagner par rapport au niveau autorisé.

Après analyse des constatations de ses rapports antérieurs[193], le Comité estime que le Canada a besoin de 5 000 à 7 000 agents de la GRC additionnels (voir le tableau de l'annexe E du présent rapport).

Nous avons besoin de plus d'agents de la GRC en temps normal, et nous avons d'autant plus besoin d'eux dans les situations d'urgence.

[191] Gouvernement du Canada, Budget de 2006, http://www.fin.gc.ca/budtocf/2006/budlistf.htm
[192] Cabinet du premier ministre, Centre des médias, http://pm.gc.ca/fra/media.asp?id=1298.
[193] Voir Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Manuel de sécurité du Canada 2007 - Côtes, Passages frontaliers, Aéroports et Ports maritimes*, http://www.parl.gc.ca/common/Committee_SenRep.asp?Language=F&Parl=39&Ses=2&comm_id=76.

Problèmes de dotation auxquels fait face la GRC selon le *Rapport Brown :*

Cadets mal rémunérés – Selon le *Rapport Brown*, la GRC ne rémunère pas les cadets inscrits à la formation de 24 semaines à la Division Dépôt[194]. Les cadets de la police provinciale de l'Ontario touchent 32 436 $ par année[195], et les stagiaires de la police d'Ottawa, 39 000 $. Toutefois, en juin 2008, le gouvernement a annoncé qu'il rémunérerait les cadets de la GRC à hauteur de 500 $ par semaine durant leur formation à la Division Dépôt[196], soit l'équivalent d'un traitement annuel de 26 000 $ – presque un tiers de moins qu'offrent la PPO et la police d'Ottawa. On pourrait penser que c'est un traitement juste étant donné que les agents de la GRC sont logés et nourris pendant leur formation. Mais il reste que les stagiaires qui ont une famille qui vit ailleurs doivent la soutenir, ce qui est difficile avec un revenu aussi maigre.

Postes dans le Nord : La GRC offre des services contractuels de police à des collectivités isolées et des collectivités du Nord comme celles de la baie d'Hudson ou de Reindeer Lake, en Saskatchewan. Les auteurs du *Rapport Brown* ont souligné l'importance de verser aux agents affectés dans ces collectivités isolées une allocation équitable. De plus, la plupart des postes dans le Nord sont cruellement sous-dotés[197].

« Bénévolat » non rémunéré : Dans bien des collectivités éloignées, les agents de la GRC ne sont jamais vraiment en congé et doivent, par nécessité, faire des heures supplémentaires. Les agents surchargés, qui passent peu de temps dans leur famille, risquent de souffrir de stress, de fatigue, et s'exposent à des erreurs de jugement[198].

Il faut plus d'agents dans le cadre de la politique sur les renforts : Une nouvelle politique, annoncée le 19 décembre 2007, exige l'intervention de plusieurs membres en cas d'appels impliquant des armes ou de la violence, ou provenant d'endroits éloignés coupés de toutes communications[199]. Faute d'effectifs additionnels, cette politique ne fera qu'ajouter aux responsabilités des agents déjà surchargés.

Évolution démographique et mentors : Il n'y a pas assez de mentors de la GRC pour le nombre de cadets sur le terrain. Cela tient en partie à l'évolution démographique de la force, mais aussi à l'insuffisance des effectifs pour cause de sous-dotation[200].

Les agents de la GRC sont aux prises avec l'administration : Le fardeau administratif imposé aux membres réguliers de la GRC, dont les dossiers juridiques et les changements technologiques, a sérieusement grevé le temps disponible pour les interventions de première ligne[201].

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[194] *Rétablir la confiance (Rapport Brown*), p. 56.
[195] Police provinciale de l'Ontario, Salaires et avantages sociaux, http://www.opp.ca/Recrutement/opp_000781.html.
[196] Cabinet du premier ministre, Centre des médias, http://pm.gc.ca/fra/media.asp?id=2168.
[197] *Rétablir la confiance (Rapport Brown)*, p. 25.
[198] *Rétablir la confiance (Rapport Brown)*, p. 26-27.
[199] « L'adoption d'une politique nationale sur les renforts a des répercussions sur les ressources. Le redéploiement des ressources actuelles ou le resserrement des critères de résidence sont des options. » Pour en savoir plus, voir : http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/news/2007/2007_12_05_backup_f.htm.
[200] *Rétablir la confiance (Rapport Brown)*, p. 27.
[201] *Rétablir la confiance (Rapport Brown)*, p. 25.

Ces problèmes montrent à quel point le travail des agents de la GRC est difficile. Pour plus de détails, consultez le texte complet du *Rapport Brown*.

NOUVELLES RECOMMANDATIONS :

Le Comité recommande :

1. Que le gouvernement accorde à la GRC le statut d'employeur distinct.

2. Que le gouvernement finance des augmentations annuelles du budget de la GRC, pour lui permettre d'augmenter ses effectifs d'au moins 700 employés au cours de chacune des dix prochaines années.

3. Que la GRC produise un calendrier de mise en œuvre de chacune des recommandations du *Rapport Brown.*

4. Que la GRC présente un rapport trimestriel au Parlement sur les progrès réalisés concernant a) son statut d'employeur distinct, b) l'augmentation de ses effectifs et c) la mise en œuvre des diverses recommandations du *Rapport Brown*.

Conclusion

Quiconque s’est donné la peine de lire la pile énorme de documents invoqués dans ce rapport – ainsi que les observations et les recommandations du Comité – aura compris que les membres estiment que les gouvernements au Canada n’ont pas fait leur travail en vue de se préparer à affronter le type d’urgences d’importance nationale auquel les Canadiens seront inévitablement confrontés dans les années à venir.

Par « gouvernements », nous entendons les politiciens et les bureaucrates de tous les ordres de gouvernement - fédéral, provincial et territorial. Il doit se trouver des fonctionnaires chargés de ce dossier qui travaillent d’arrache-pied pour faire bouger les choses. Malheureusement, leurs efforts se perdent dans le bourbier de la léthargie qui semble caractériser la planification d’urgence au Canada. Les membres du Comité savent qu’il n’est pas facile de faire avancer quelque dossier qui transcende les domaines de compétence, particulièrement lorsque certaines provinces sont ouvertement hostiles à l’envahissement de leurs champs de compétence, peu importe la gravité de la question.

Il n’en reste pas moins que nous parlons de la possibilité d’une crise matérielle et économique généralisée qui guette les Canadiens, et quelqu’un se doit de trancher le nœud gordien.

Compte tenu du fait que le Comité a rabâché ce thème *ad nauseam*, permettez-nous de vous laisser en mettant l’accent sur ce que les Canadiens eux-mêmes peuvent faire afin de se préparer à affronter des situations difficiles où leur vie est menacée. Le Comité reconnaît que son rapport est presque entièrement axé sur ce que les gouvernements devraient faire. À l’avenir, il élargira son étude afin de déterminer si les Canadiens pourraient trouver l’énergie nécessaire et faire preuve de plus d’initiative pour se protéger, ainsi que leurs familles et leurs voisins.

Le volet bénévole

Jusqu’ici, le Comité a surtout examiné dans quelle mesure les gouvernements au Canada s’étaient bien – ou mal – acquittés de leur obligation d’améliorer les chances qu’ont les Canadiens ordinaires de

survivre à des situations d'urgence. Dans les mois à venir, nous avons l'intention de nous concentrer davantage sur la question de savoir si les Canadiens ordinaires ont accès à ce dont ils ont besoin pour s'aider eux-mêmes et aider leurs voisins.

Dans la majorité des sinistres, les experts vous diront que les sinistrés doivent se débrouiller seuls pendant au moins les 24 premières heures. Le message que Sécurité publique Canada envoie aux Canadiens à l'heure actuelle est qu'ils doivent s'organiser pour qu'eux et leur famille soient autonomes pendant au moins 72 heures suivant un sinistre pendant que les travailleurs d'urgence portent secours aux personnes dans le besoin[202]. C'est habituellement le délai minimum requis pour permettre aux secouristes de se déplacer d'un endroit à un autre.

C'est pendant cette période que la population doit se serrer les coudes et s'entraider, et il ne manque pas de récits héroïques à propos de Canadiens se serrant les coudes et s'entraidant.

Or, en faisons-nous assez au Canada pour fournir aux bénévoles ce dont ils ont besoin pour fonctionner efficacement? Aux États-Unis, beaucoup d'observateurs ont indiqué qu'il y avait d'importantes leçons à tirer d'une comparaison entre l'intervention communautaire qui a suivi l'ouragan Katrina qui a frappé la Nouvelle-Orléans le 29 août 2005 et celle qu'ont suscitée les incendies de forêt qui ont ravagé la région de San Diego à la fin d'octobre 2007.

Les victimes des inondations en Nouvelle-Orléans se sont vite rendu compte à quel point l'aide de l'extérieur serait lente à arriver et insuffisante. En fait, de nombreux représentants des autorités civiles chargés d'organiser les secours d'urgence ont fui les lieux.

La leçon, comme l'a écrit le psychologue Terry Paulson dans le *Ventura (California) County Star* [7 janvier 2008], était :

> Que les catastrophes soient causées par dame Nature ou un attentat terroriste, elles se produisent. L'ouragan Katrina a dissipé toutes les illusions que la cavalerie allait rapidement venir à la rescousse […]

[202] Voir le site de Sécurité publique Canada pour aider les personnes et les familles à se préparer aux urgences, www.preparez-vous.ca.

> des victimes d'une catastrophe majeure. La population doit se prendre en main et faire partie de la solution.

Le contraste avec la réaction de la population relativement aux incendies de forêt qui ont dévasté le sud de la Californie n'aurait pu être plus prononcé. Des milliers de bénévoles ont travaillé sans relâche pour appuyer les autorités civiles et les agences non gouvernementales en venant en aide à la population menacée par les incendies. Leur intervention a produit une vive impression auprès du gouverneur de la Californie, Arnold Schwarzenegger. Le *San Diego Union-Tribune* en a fait la une de son édition du 11 février 2008 :

> SACRAMENTO – Tellement impressionné par l'engagement et la compassion manifestés par le bénévole Paul Russo et d'autres personnes au centre d'évacuation de Del Mar Fairgrounds durant les incendies d'octobre, le gouverneur Schwarzenegger a donné des instructions pour que l'on s'inspire de l'intervention de la population de San Diego pour améliorer les programmes de secours d'urgence de l'ensemble de l'État.

Le reste de l'article décrit non seulement la façon dont M. Russo a secouru 300 aînés frêles en les aidant à se rendre au Del Mar Fairgrounds après avoir été obligés de quitter leur centre d'hébergement à cause des incendies, mais également comment des milliers de Californiens, par l'intermédiaire d'organisations bénévoles et à titre individuel, avaient fait leur part.

Par la suite, les organisations bénévoles ont fait valoir que l'administration pourrait favoriser davantage le bénévolat en mettant sur pied un système d'identification (les bénévoles indiquant avoir les qualités requises pour répondre aux besoins d'une situation d'urgence et démontrant qu'ils ne sont pas des imposteurs). De meilleurs régimes d'assurance pour que les bénévoles ne craignent pas d'intervenir favoriseraient aussi le bénévolat, et il serait intéressant aussi d'adopter des modèles de coordination pour que la répartition des bénévoles se fasse de manière à ce qu'ils soient utiles et non une entrave.

Comment réagirait la collectivité moyenne au Canada? Comme en Nouvelle-Orléans ou comme à San Diego? Quels types de préparatifs garantiraient que la collectivité moyenne au Canada pourrait intervenir en toute confiance en sachant que tous les Canadiens seraient disposés à apporter leur aide?

Y a-t-il des mesures que les gouvernements fédéral et provinciaux pourraient prendre – comme celles qu'étudie le gouverneur Schwarzenegger – pour améliorer la capacité d'intervention des bénévoles au Canada? Le Comité s'engage à se pencher sur cette question. D'après ce que le Comité a vu, il ne faut pas compter sur nos gouvernements, où règne la confusion, pour faire face à la multitude de catastrophes éventuelles. La capacité d'intervention du Canada devra être assurée en partie par des citoyens alertes et préparés.

À l'écoute des intervenants de première ligne

La protection civile est financée conjointement par les gouvernements fédéral, provinciaux, territoriaux et municipaux. Les programmes de financement comme le Programme conjoint de protection civile (PCPC) sont essentiels à l'élaboration de programmes municipaux pour parer et réagir à tout ce qui peut représenter une menace physique pour les municipalités, qu'il s'agisse d'inondations, de séismes, de déversements de produits chimiques, d'attentats terroristes ou de pandémies.

Les municipalités — du moins les grandes — savent que la responsabilité des premières interventions en situation d'urgence leur revient à elles — et probablement à elles seules. Selon Tom Sampson, chef des Services médicaux d'urgence pour la ville de Calgary, les ordres de gouvernement supérieurs sont bien conscients de cet état de fait, mais ils sous-estiment ce que cela suppose en réalité :

> Nous avons rencontré récemment les responsables fédéraux de la préparation à la pandémie. Ils ont dit : « YOYO 24 ». Je ne sais pas si vous avez déjà entendu ça : ça veut dire : « You're on your own, débrouillez-vous, les 24 premières heures ».
>
> Nous avons étudié l'état de préparation du gouvernement fédéral, et nous croyons que c'est plutôt : débrouillez-vous pendant sept jours. En ce moment, nous craignons que l'autorité municipale doive prendre en charge l'intervention durant les cinq à sept premiers jours de tout incident majeur, jusqu'au moment où une aide additionnelle pourrait être offerte[203].

92 municipalités canadiennes exposent leurs principaux griefs relatifs à la protection civile

Pour la deuxième fois en quatre ans, le Comité a consulté les municipalités d'un bout à l'autre du Canada pour se faire une idée de la façon dont elles perçoivent leur degré de protection civile. Les membres du Comité ont aussi voulu savoir si, de l'avis des intervenants de première ligne, certains aspects laissaient à désirer dans la façon dont le Canada se prépare aux situations

[203] Tom Sampson, Délibérations du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Témoignages*, 1er février 2007, fascicule 9, 39e législature, 1re session.

d'urgence d'envergure municipale et régionale et y réagit.

Le Comité a eu recours à ce type de questionnaire pour la première fois au moment de la préparation de son rapport de 2004, après que ses membres eurent constaté que les témoignages des représentants fédéraux et provinciaux ne concordaient pas avec les observations recueillies auprès des représentants municipaux et des premiers intervenants. Nous avions alors nettement l'impression que les systèmes publics qui, en théorie, étaient censés assumer la responsabilité, ne fonctionnaient pas toujours en pratique.

Au printemps 2007, le Comité a envoyé des questionnaires aux responsables de la protection civile d'une centaine de municipalités canadiennes de diverses tailles et régions, de façon à avoir un échantillon assez représentatif de l'ensemble de la population canadienne.

Quatre-vingt-douze d'entre elles nous ont fourni des réponses détaillées. Le ton global des réponses est modérément encourageant — et nous insistons sur le mot « modérément ». Certains responsables de la protection civile reconnaissent effectivement qu'il y a eu, à tout le moins, quelques améliorations minimales dans la façon dont les gouvernements fédéral et provinciaux répondent aux besoins des municipalités en matière de protection civile et de soutien en cas d'urgence.

Une perception demeure cependant, à savoir que les élus et les fonctionnaires aux échelons supérieurs ne sont pas à l'écoute des premiers intervenants lorsque ceux-ci leur exposent ce qu'ils estiment être les besoins les plus pressants des municipalités pour faire face aux situations d'urgence. Certains se plaignent aussi du fait que les systèmes mis en place pour venir en aide aux municipalités sont lourds et sous-financés.

Les ordres de gouvernement supérieurs sont prêts à refiler aux municipalités la responsabilité de mettre en place des programmes de protection civile, mais ils ne semblent pas être disposés à leur fournir le financement nécessaire pour que ces programmes demeurent opérationnels ou puissent être revus lorsque la situation évolue ou que des lacunes sont perçues.

Si les gouvernements fédéral et provinciaux ne sont pas en mesure d'intervenir sur le terrain dans un délai d'un à cinq jours - selon la nature de la situation d'urgence - une question importante se pose :

Ont-ils prévu les systèmes — et les fonds nécessaires — pour réduire le risque que les situations d'urgence tournent à la catastrophe?

Y a-t-il un modèle national cohérent pouvant offrir à chaque collectivité canadienne la possibilité d'améliorer considérablement sa capacité de réagir aux situations d'urgence d'origine anthropique ou naturelle?

Bien des réponses reçues par le Comité font ressortir deux faiblesses fondamentales qui nuisent à l'établissement d'un tel modèle:

a) Rigidité des systèmes de financement

b) Insuffisance du financement

Lorsque la moitié des municipalités canadiennes affirment avoir déjà eu à faire face à une ou plusieurs situations d'urgence, il est NORMAL de s'attendre à ce qu'il y en ait d'autres

Notre questionnaire montre que la plupart des municipalités canadiennes savent qu'en situation d'urgence, il ne s'agit pas de savoir *si*, mais plutôt *quand*. Pas moins de 48 p. 100 des répondants ont affirmé que leurs municipalités avaient déjà déclaré un état d'urgence en raison d'une menace naturelle ou anthropique pesant sur elles. Dans un cas sur trois, l'urgence a été désignée d'envergure provinciale.

Pratiquement toutes les municipalités canadiennes reconnaissent qu'il devrait y avoir un représentant municipal désigné pour s'occuper des préparatifs d'urgence et prendre les commandes lors d'une situation d'urgence. Sur les 92 répondants, 97 p. 100 ont indiqué que leur municipalité était dotée d'une organisation de gestion des urgences (OGU). La totalité d'entre eux nous ont dit qu'ils pouvaient compter sur un centre de commandement en cas d'urgence (64 p. 100) ou sur une structure désignée pouvant servir de centre de commandement (36 p. 100).

À moins qu'une collectivité se contente de réagir aux urgences de façon ponctuelle, il ne lui servirait pas à grand-chose d'avoir une OGU, si cette

dernière ne se livrait pas à une évaluation des risques. Les municipalités canadiennes en sont conscientes puisque 95 p. 100 des répondants ont indiqué que leurs municipalités effectuaient des évaluations de risques. Dans 71 p. 100 des cas, ces évaluations s'inscrivent dans le cadre d'un processus fédéral normalisé (même si le Comité a constaté qu'il n'existe aucune norme nationale uniforme en matière de planification des mesures d'urgence ou d'évaluation des risques).

Même si 61 p. 100 des municipalités se disent préoccupées par le « terrorisme », seulement 36 p. 100 d'entre elles disposent d'un plan d'intervention antiterroriste. Ce faible pourcentage est peut-être attribuable au fait que les petites municipalités ne croient pas que le terrorisme représente un risque particulier pour elles. De même, comme nous le mentionnons à propos du problème n° 12, ce résultat n'est peut-être pas étranger au fait que certaines municipalités semblent penser que le terrorisme relève des forces policières fédérales, même si les forces policières locales seraient vraisemblablement appelées à intervenir de toute façon.

Parmi ceux qui ont indiqué à quelle fréquence ils effectuaient ces évaluations, 45 p. 100 ont répondu chaque année, 12 p. 100, tous les trois à cinq ans, et 8 p. 100, tous les cinq ans ou plus. Il y a donc lieu de croire qu'il y a eu au moins une évaluation dans les dernières années.

Réagir aux changements observés dans l'évaluation des menaces

Le fort pourcentage de municipalités (notamment toutes les grandes villes) qui affirment procéder à une évaluation des risques chaque année montre que celles-ci sont très conscientes que la nature et le niveau des menaces peuvent changer très rapidement et qu'il y a lieu d'en faire une réévaluation à intervalles réguliers.

Bien sûr, une réévaluation est inutile si elle n'est pas porteuse de changements. Prenez le cas d'une municipalité qui a reçu par le passé certains fonds du PCPU ou d'une source provinciale, et qui souhaite savoir si les mesures qu'elle a prises pour se préparer aux situations d'urgence sont suffisantes. Elle peut avoir un certain nombre de bonnes raisons pour procéder à une réévaluation. Par exemple :

- son intérêt à l'égard de la planification de mesures d'urgence s’est accru;
- elle a engagé quelqu’un qui possède une formation en protection civile;
- elle a envoyé des membres de son personnel recevoir une formation en protection civile;
- elle a pris conscience qu'elle faisait fi d'une menace importante.

Ou peut-être s'est-il simplement produit quelque chose sur son territoire ou à proximité, qui a changé la nature ou le niveau d'une menace.

Les ordres de gouvernement supérieurs encouragent les municipalités à procéder à des évaluations de risques.

C'est l'étape suivante qui pose problème. Si la municipalité se rend compte en cours de route que pour maintenir sa capacité de réagir aux situations d'urgence possibles, il lui faut combler de nouveaux besoins, il est certain que les gouvernements qui l'ont incitée à évaluer sa situation devraient se tenir prêts à donner suite aux résultats.

Si une municipalité estime qu'il est urgent — ou simplement légitime et prudent — d'investir davantage dans la protection civile, où peut-elle trouver l'argent pour le faire dans un délai de quelques mois plutôt que de quelques années?

Dans ses propres goussets? C'est bien connu, les municipalités canadiennes - qui sont des entités créées par les provinces - ont des budgets très serrés et subissent d'intenses pressions de la part des propriétaires de maisons pour maintenir les impôts fonciers au niveau le plus bas possible. Les conseillers municipaux qui font fi de problèmes courants manifestes comme l'insuffisance de transport en commun, la détérioration des routes, les débordements d'égouts et la lenteur des opérations de déneigement, le font à leurs propres risques.

La protection civile est un enjeu vital pour les municipalités, mais elle ne fait pas partie de cette catégorie de problèmes omniprésents. Les gens vaquent à leurs activités quotidiennes sans trop s'en préoccuper. La plupart des municipalités ne sont tout simplement pas prêtes à sacrifier les fonds

destinés aux grands projets de réfection pour les affecter à la protection civile — même s'il est démontré que c'est ce qu'elles devraient faire. Les situations d'urgence sont des possibilités qui risquent peu de se concrétiser, mais dont l'impact serait significatif. La plupart des propriétaires de maisons souscrivent une assurance en prévision d'incidents qui risquent peu de se produire, mais dont les conséquences seraient énormes; ce qui est la chose rationnelle à faire. Toutefois, pour une raison ou pour une autre, il est rare que les politiques témoignent d'une telle prudence, et une grande partie des fonds destinés à la prévention des urgences ne sont effectivement dépensés qu'*après* une catastrophe, lorsque les décisions sont davantage guidées par les émotions que par la raison.

À moins de pouvoir obtenir en temps utile des fonds fédéraux ou provinciaux pour investir dans la protection civile lorsqu'il est clair que des améliorations s'imposent à cet égard, une municipalité ne pourra mettre en œuvre lesdites améliorations au moment où elles devraient l'être.

Ce que nous ont dit les répondants à propos de la rigidité des systèmes et de l'insuffisance du financement

Cinq municipalités canadiennes sur six (83 p. 100), parmi celles qui ont répondu au sondage du Comité, affirment avoir présenté une demande de financement auprès du gouvernement fédéral par l'intermédiaire du PCPC. Seulement 22 p. 100 d'entre elles se disent satisfaites de ce qu'elles ont obtenu, tandis que 36 p. 100 affirment qu'elles sont au moins « quelque peu » satisfaites, pour un total de 58 p. 100.

Sept municipalités canadiennes sur dix (72 p. 100), parmi celles qui ont répondu, ont présenté une demande de financement auprès de leur province. De ce nombre, seulement 20 p. 100 se disent satisfaites du financement obtenu, tandis que 35 p. 100 admettent qu'elles sont « quelque peu » satisfaites.

L'INSATISFACTION À L'ÉGARD DU FINANCEMENT EST GÉNÉRALISÉE : Il est évident que les gouvernements fédéral et provinciaux ont encore du pain sur la planche, puisque seulement un cinquième des municipalités de tout le pays se disent entièrement satisfaites de la façon dont la protection civile est financée par le gouvernement fédéral et par leurs provinces.

Encore une fois, les plaintes formulées à propos des programmes fédéraux et provinciaux portent principalement sur deux aspects : la rigidité des systèmes de financement et l'insuffisance des fonds. Voici quelques-unes des observations formulées par les répondants à cet égard :

DANS LEURS PROPRES MOTS, LES RÉPRÉSENTANTS MUNICIPAUX ONT TOUR À TOUR EXPRIMÉ LEURS FRUSTRATIONS AU SUJET DU FINANCEMENT

Ni financement soutenu, ni consultation

« Quand le gouvernement fédéral consent du financement, c'est sous forme de versement unique sans modalités de fonctionnement, d'entretien ou de renouvellement. […] Nous nous inquiétons aussi du manque de consultation à l'échelle municipale au sujet des fonds du PCPC. On laisse ainsi passer des occasions de cibler des programmes comme le PCPC vers le développement durable de ressources régionales pouvant répondre à d'importants besoins émergents. » [traduction]

Bruce Burrell
Chef du service d'incendie et d'intervention en cas de catastrophe
Calgary (Alberta)

Les sommes allouées sont dérisoires

« Affecter une somme raisonnable - 5 millions de dollars pour le pays, c'est moins que rien. Augmenter le pourcentage de la contribution du

gouvernement fédéral (75 p. 100). Changer la philosophie pour mettre sur pied des programmes souples et adaptés, ne pas les rattacher à des éléments précis (c.-à-d. pas seulement des communications ou des véhicules d'intervention, mais inclure une analyse et des études, les salaires, tout ce qui améliore le niveau de gestion des situations d'urgence pour qu'il corresponde au niveau obtenu après les incidents du 11 septembre, après Katrina). Harmoniser l'administration avec le processus budgétaire municipal. » [traduction]

Richard Kinchlea
Coordonnateur des mesures d'urgence
Hamilton (Ontario)

L'établissement de budgets équilibrés se fait au détriment de la gestion des urgences

« Les municipalités sont tenues de présenter des budgets équilibrés et très souvent, le financement pour la gestion des situations d'urgence est réduit ou éliminé pour permettre à la municipalité de fournir les services quotidiens actuels. Par conséquent, il devrait y avoir plus de fonds affectés à la gestion des situations d'urgence mis à la disposition des municipalités par le gouvernement provincial afin de permettre aux municipalités d'atteindre un niveau de préparation plus élevé. » [traduction]

Barry Manuel
Coordonnateur de l'Organisation des mesures d'urgence
Halifax (Nouvelle-Écosse)

Les lois imposent des responsabilités, mais ne prévoient pas d'aide financière en conséquence

« La gestion des urgences est un programme parmi bien d'autres qui sont en concurrence pour l'obtention d'une part du financement limité dont la Ville dispose. Resserrer les exigences législatives des municipalités en matière de gestion des urgences sans augmenter leur financement signifie

que certaines mesures pourraient ne pas être à la hauteur des attentes. » [traduction]

Bruce L. Griffin
Planificateur des mesures d'urgence
Barrie (Ontario)

Les provinces font fi de la nécessité des préparatifs d'urgence

« Les lois provinciales prévoient ce que les municipalités doivent faire en matière de gestion des urgences et la province veille à ce que les lois soient observées, mais n'offre aucune aide financière et peu de ressources pour les aider à atteindre et à maintenir le niveau de gestion requis. Le gouvernement provincial offre de l'aide financière en cas de sinistre, mais pas pour la planification, sauf par l'entremise du Programme conjoint de planification d'urgence. »

« Les critères (plan de mesures d'urgence tous les cinq ans, exercices tous les trois ans ou 40 000 $ pour équipement et véhicules spécialisés, etc.) ne sont tout simplement pas raisonnables. Les plans et les exercices devraient se faire tous les ans. En plus, tout le travail lié aux plans d'urgence a la même échéance de cinq ans. Par conséquent, si on obtient une subvention pour un plan d'urgence l'an 1, on ne peut pas en obtenir une autre l'an 2 pour un plan d'évacuation, un plan d'intervention en cas de déversement de matières dangereuses, un plan de récupération ou un plan de maintien des activités des entreprises, etc. Cette restriction fait qu'on a une année de fou où on fait des tas de plans, suivie de quatre années où on se débrouille comme on peut. Ce serait plus rationnel de faire un ou deux plans par année au lieu d'essayer de tout faire en un an. Et puis le plafond de 40 000 $ est ridicule. Qu'est-ce qu'on peut avoir pour 40 000 $? On voudrait faire l'acquisition d'une unité mobile de secours qui coûte environ 500 000 $. Il nous faut plus d'aide. C'est très difficile de prendre 500 000 $ sur un budget municipal. » [traduction]

Deborah Proctor
Directrice de la gestion des urgences
Richmond (Colombie-Britannique)

Les modèles de financement ne tiennent pas compte des besoins des municipalités

« Les programmes de financement sont réservés aux initiatives et priorités fédérales/ provinciales. […] Nous répondons aux besoins de la municipalité selon des critères stricts qui n'ont souvent aucun rapport avec les priorités de la municipalité. Les programmes sont établis en fonction de gabarits plutôt qu'à la lumière d'une « évaluation des besoins […]

Les fonds accordés devraient être basés sur une évaluation des besoins, et la province devrait se charger des opérations dans les domaines clés et disposer des ressources voulues pour appliquer les programmes. Il est clair que les mêmes lacunes existent dans toutes les régions de la province et qu'une politique commune ou une action concertée serait utile.

Il faut :

a) rendre le GIS plus polyvalent et améliorer la mise en commun des données (et des données partagées en particulier);
b) coordonner les ressources de manière à en optimiser l'utilisation;
c) financer un accroissement des ressources en formation et en intervention;
d) assurer assez de souplesse pour permettre les conversions coûteuses, comme le passage à l'alimentation électrique auxiliaire;
e) établir une structure régionale pour les interventions régionales;
f) élargir les groupes de travail de manière à y intégrer des ministères provinciaux dont la contribution est importante même s'ils apportent peu de fonds. » [traduction]

John Allain
Directeur de la planification d'urgence
Moncton (Nouveau-Brunswick)

L'accès au financement est difficile

« Les fonds ne sont pas toujours facilement accessibles – il faut donner énormément d'information dans les demandes de subvention; souvent nos

besoins ne correspondent pas aux critères qui donnent droit aux fonds du PCPC; les sommes que distribue le PCPC dans la province sont faibles.

Le financement est insuffisant en ce qui concerne :

- ***les ressources de planification (p. ex., pour les plans d'évacuation, de mesures d'urgence, etc.);***
- ***le grand nombre de risques présents dans la collectivité, notamment l'arrivée imminente de gaz naturel liquéfié. »*** [traduction]

Yvonne Huntington
Directrice de l'Organisation de gestion des urgences
Saint John (Nouveau-Brunswick)

Les dangers propres à chaque municipalité ne sont pas pris en compte et le financement accordé est famélique

« On ne peut pas dire qu'on [la ville de Sarnia] a abusé du système. En fait, je dirais qu'on a été constamment oubliés dans le financement des mesures HAZMAT, compte tenu du fait qu'on représente 80 p. 100 des produits chimiques de l'Ontario dans une ville frontalière où un sinistre pourrait avoir des répercussions graves sur les Premières Nations, des terres fédérales, des eaux territoriales canadiennes et même des zones en territoire américain. Le financement de notre système d'alerte public est notre principale préoccupation puisqu'il n'y a plus de financement offert à cette fin ni au provincial ni au fédéral, alors que c'est probablement l'élément le plus important de la gestion des urgences - le moyen d'avertir la population qui est en danger. On a fait deux demandes [de financement au titre de la protection civile] depuis 1998. La province de l'Ontario a refusé notre première demande, en 1998, parce qu'on avait remis le formulaire un jour trop tard, malgré qu'on ait reçu une autorisation verbale. On a fait une autre demande en 2006 pour 2007 et on a obtenu 2 959,11 $, soit la part fédérale d'un achat de deux radios pour le centre de commandement d'urgence, la Ville de Sarnia assumant 55 p. 100 du coût de cette acquisition. » [traduction]

Calvin Gardner
Coordonnateur de la gestion communautaire des urgences
Sarnia (Ontario)

Lourdeur des formalités

« Les gouvernements fédéral et provincial créent régulièrement des programmes qui donnent lieu à un énorme gaspillage de ressources locales et de deniers publics. Ils sont créés de telle manière que chaque municipalité doit consacrer du personnel, des ressources, doit payer des avocats pour se faire interpréter les exigences, obtenir des avis juridiques, et mettre au point un programme individuel. Les programmes imposés devraient être assortis d'exigences minimales, claires et précises, de modèles d'application simple, et du financement nécessaire à leur mise en œuvre. » [traduction]

Gordon Gazeley
Chef du service des incendies
Belleville (Ontario)

« Nous n'avons rien reçu pour le centre de commandement alors qu'on nous avait laissé entendre que c'était une simple formalité. […] [L'une de nos principales préoccupations consiste à] obtenir du Conseil qu'il nous accorde assez d'argent pour atteindre les objectifs que nous nous sommes fixés dans notre programme. » [traduction]

Tim Lindsay
Coordonnateur de la gestion des urgences
Brantford (Ontario)

On réagit aux catastrophes plutôt que de s'y préparer

« Des fonds sont disponibles pour les interventions d'urgence et, dans une moindre mesure, pour le rétablissement. C'est du côté de la préparation que les fonds manquent clairement. Il n'y a pas de fonds de disponibles pour l'information du public, mais c'est pourtant là que les besoins sont les plus aigus. […] Notre principale préoccupation demeure l'éducation du public (notamment l'établissement de programmes de quartiers) et le financement (partage des coûts) nécessaire à l'acquisition de stocks de matériel d'urgence. » [traduction]

Responsables de la gestion des urgences
Chilliwack (Colombie-Britannique)

Il y a de l'argent pour financer l'évaluation des dangers, mais rien n'est prévu pour le suivi

« La Ville de Coquitlam est très reconnaissante des fonds qui ont été fournis par l'entremise du PCPC pour l'achèvement de projets. Cependant, les critères dans le cas des projets constituent une limite et devraient être réexaminés. En vertu de la section 2.2 des lignes directrices du PCPC, les projets admissibles à du financement comprennent les plans d'urgence — ou la mise à jour des plans d'urgence - une fois aux cinq ans. Une analyse des dangers, des risques et de la vulnérabilité est considérée faire partie de cette section. Si une collectivité mène une analyse des dangers, des risques et de la vulnérabilité et reçoit une aide financière, l'année suivante elle n'est pas admissible à des fonds pour rédiger des plans. À Coquitlam, nous avons rédigé à l'interne notre propre plan d'intervention en cas de catastrophe, nous avons reçu de l'argent pour effectuer une analyse des dangers, des risques et de la vulnérabilité, puis nous avons demandé du financement deux ans plus tard pour terminer des plans d'évacuation détaillés en nous servant des dangers les plus élevés qui avaient été cernés. Malheureusement, la demande a été rejetée parce que nous avions reçu de l'argent pour effectuer l'ADRV. J'aimerais beaucoup que l'on procède à un examen de l'admissibilité des projets et que l'on envisage de réduire la période entre les demandes d'admissibilité pour rédiger des plans. » [traduction]

Dorit Mason
Gestionnaire des programmes d'urgence
Coquitlam (Colombie-Britannique)

Les besoins précis des municipalités ne sont pas pris en compte

« Les critères d'approbation du financement ne répondent pas aux besoins actuels de la collectivité. » [traduction]

Ken Neilson
Coordonnateur suppléant des urgences
Victoria (Colombie-Britannique)

Les fonds ne sont pas suffisants

« Les budgets alloués à la gestion des urgences sont minimes. Il est très difficile d'obtenir des fonds pour se préparer à des sinistres potentiels alors que les municipalités doivent composer quotidiennement avec des problèmes urgents et une insuffisance de fonds. »

Jacques Rathwell
Responsable de la sécurité civile
Gatineau (Québec)

Financement ponctuel et pas de modèle d'infrastructure

« [Nos principaux soucis/défis en matière de financement concernant la gestion des urgences] sont les suivants : il n'y a pas de financement de base pour les processus en cours; le financement continue à être axé sur des projets individuels plutôt que pour encourager des approches régionales; il n'y a pas de modèle d'infrastructure pour les composantes principales (communications, formation, outils de gestion, logiciels et matériel). » [traduction]

Bill Walker
Chef des pompiers / directeur des Services de protection
Grande Prairie (Alberta)

Il faut de l'argent pour financer la formation

« [Notre principale demande serait] que le gros des coûts soit pris en charge et que les exigences prévues par la loi auxquelles les municipalités doivent se soumettre (comme la formation) fassent l'objet d'une aide financière. » [traduction]

Harry Dunning
Coordonnateur communautaire de la gestion des situations d'urgence
Guelph (Ontario)

Les petites municipalités ne reçoivent aucune aide pour financer la formation

« Il n'y a pas beaucoup d'argent pour la formation dans les municipalités de moins 20 000 habitants, mais en même temps, s'il survenait une catastrophe, on se tournerait vers nous en tant que capitale régionale. » [traduction]

Brian Cornforth
Chef des services d'incendie et d'urgence
Lethbridge (Alberta)

Il faudrait de l'argent pour mettre les plans à l'essai

« Il serait bon que nous obtenions des fonds pour faire de la formation sur place. Les collectivités veulent soumettre leurs plans d'intervention en cas d'urgence à des exercices et il faut qu'elles le fassent, mais les budgets sont limités et les employeurs hésitent à assumer seuls le coût de la formation au sein de leur organisation. Des fonds supplémentaires au niveau local atténueraient ce problème. » [traduction]

Randy Crashley
Coordonnateur des mesures d'urgence / chef adjoint des pompiers
Moose Jaw (Saskatchewan)

Besoin d'un système d'alimentation électrique d'appoint

« Nous avons besoin de fonds pour nous procurer un système d'alimentation électrique d'appoint convenable en cas de tempête de verglas ou de panne totale, et le coût de ces systèmes est prohibitif. » [traduction]

Ted McCullough
Coordonnateur de la gestion des situations d'urgence locales / chef des pompiers
North Bay (Ontario)

On fait fi des vrais besoins des municipalités

« On devrait mieux financer les projets qui répondent aux besoins réels des collectivités. […] On a accordé beaucoup d'importance à des choses comme le programme de RSMUL et l'Équipe provinciale d'intervention en cas d'urgence à cause de l'obsession du terrorisme, mais il est très clair depuis quelques années que le plus grand danger que courent les municipalités vient des conditions météorologiques. Quand on examine les dépenses occasionnées par les catastrophes au Canada, on voit que ce qui nous a coûté le plus cher, ce n'est pas le terrorisme, mais les colères de mère Nature. Cela ne veut pas dire qu'il ne faut pas se préparer tout de suite en cas d'actes de terrorisme, mais qu'on affecte trop d'argent à la menace terroriste et que trop de gens profitent de l'importance qu'on y accorde, alors que la météo tue beaucoup plus de monde. » [traduction]

Trent Elyea
Coordonnateur de la gestion des situations d'urgence locales
Orillia (Ontario)

L'évaluation des risques devrait orienter l'octroi de subventions

« Le temps de traitement des demandes est très long (dans certains cas jusqu'à 2-3 ans) bien que des mesures soient en cours pour ramener le délai autour de 6 mois. Le gouvernement fédéral a la possibilité de travailler avec les provinces et les municipalités à la création d'un programme de subventions qui permettrait de mettre en place de bons services de gestion des urgences axés sur les secteurs géographiques (les évaluations de risque devraient être les moteurs de l'admissibilité à ce programme dont le but devrait être d'accroître les moyens d'action à l'échelle locale, provinciale et fédérale). La gestion des urgences n'est pas une simple question de matériel d'intervention. Le financement provincial ou fédéral devrait contribuer à toute la gamme des activités de gestion des urgences : prévention/atténuation, protection civile, intervention et récupération (notamment le suivi des opérations). » [traduction]

John Ash
Directeur du Bureau de gestion des urgences
Ottawa (Ontario)

Le financement ne tient pas compte de l'entretien et de la formation

« Les nouvelles initiatives exigent une formation adéquate coûteuse, et c'est une source d'inquiétude pour nous. L'aide qu'on nous accorde au moment de la première mise de fonds est importante et appréciée, mais c'est l'entretien qui représente un réel défi, p. ex., SARMU, CBRN. » [traduction]

Ray Unrau
Coordonnateur des mesures d'urgence
Saskatoon (Saskatchewan)

La facture de la protection civile est refilée en douce

« Les coûts et responsabilités de la protection civile ont tous été refilés aux municipalités sans aucune compensation financière. […] Pour l'essentiel, il n'y a pas de financement provincial ou fédéral accordé à la planification ou à la protection civile, malgré que les deux paliers de gouvernement exigent des municipalités qu'elles soient prêtes à faire face aux situations d'urgence. » [traduction]

Sergent Lee Campbell
Planification et recherche, Service de police de Sault Ste Marie / coordonnateur de la gestion des urgences locales

Les coûts en hausse, les fonds en baisse

« Est-ce que l'investissement est réellement nécessaire? Considérant que nous devons investir dans de nouvelles technologies pour que les situations de crises soient mieux gérées et que l'acquisition d'équipement spécialisé comme un poste de commandement mobile représente des coûts très élevés, la participation financière du gouvernement est essentielle. »

Michel Houde
Conseiller en sécurité civile
Saguenay / Chicoutimi – Jonquière (Québec)

Besoin d'un financement prévisible et stable

« En tant que tel, le gouvernement provincial n'assure pas le financement de la gestion des urgences. Il débloque toutefois des fonds lorsqu'une catastrophe survient (p. ex. le SRAS). L'Ontario facilite nos demandes de fonds dans le cadre du PCPC. […] Nous devrions disposer d'un financement de base prévisible et stable qui nous permettrait d'effectuer une planification pluriannuelle pour l'élaboration des plans d'urgence, des exercices et des mesures correctives. On a tendance à négliger le financement des mesures correctives pour se concentrer sur les interventions. Certaines mesures correctives peuvent comprendre des changements de procédure, d'autres peuvent nécessiter des dépenses en capital, de la formation spécialisée pour les intervenants, une modernisation de la technologie, de l'accumulation de stocks, de la restauration, des alertes au public, des campagnes de sensibilisation du public, etc. Certaines de ces initiatives doivent être répétées et continues (p. ex., sensibilisation du public). Nous sommes toujours en concurrence pour obtenir du financement. » [traduction]

Warren Leonard
Directeur du Bureau des services d'urgence
Toronto (Ontario)

Il est difficile de se garder à la fine pointe

« Nous aimerions obtenir des fonds pour compenser les coûts de modernisation du COU. Le COU actuel répond de moins en moins aux besoins. » [traduction]

David T. Fields
Commissaire des services d'incendie / chef des pompiers
Windsor (Ontario)

Pas d'argent pour des systèmes d'avertissement publics

« Nous aurions aimé mettre en place un système de sirène d'avertissement dans notre collectivité, mais les subventions du PCPC ne s'appliquent pas à l'équipement qui sert à alerter la population, et ce genre de dépense est

actuellement au-dessus de nos moyens. » [traduction]

Brian Kayes
Directeur, Coordination des urgences
Brandon (Manitoba)

Les villes centres doivent supporter les autres

« La mise à niveau du plan d'intervention local au niveau des objectifs nationaux nécessite des investissements importants, notamment en termes de ressources humaines. [Nous avons besoin d'une] nouvelle source de dépenses pour les municipalités. Les villes centres seront appelées à supporter plus que leur part au niveau régional. »

Claude Proulx
Coordonnateur des mesures d'urgence / directeur général
Drummondville (Québec)

La formule de financement est périmée et ne permet qu'une gestion minimale

« Initialement prévu pour répondre à un besoin spécifique au début des années 1990, aujourd'hui le programme est fondé sur des budgets qui ne tiennent pas compte du risque, mais bien des exigences minimales. » [traduction]

Randy Hull
Coordonnateur de la protection civile
Winnipeg (Manitoba)

Pas de plans régionaux pour coordonner les besoins

« Trop d'obstacles à l'obtention de fonds. Ni le gouvernement régional ni le gouvernement provincial ne prévoient coordonner les besoins financiers. » [traduction]

Dwight Osbaldeston
Chef du service des incendies
Comté de Strathcona (Alberta)

Points de vue des municipalités quant à la façon dont les gouvernements provinciaux et fédéral répondent à leurs besoins

Idéalement, le financement de la gestion des risques et des urgences devrait toujours se fonder sur l'évaluation des besoins faite par les municipalités. En pratique, cela s'avère impossible pour deux raisons. D'abord, les petites municipalités n'ont pas toujours les moyens de faire davantage qu'une évaluation superficielle des risques. Ensuite, aucun gouvernement provincial ou fédéral n'est prêt à allouer des fonds illimités pour financer toutes sortes de dépenses, de peur que les municipalités ne surévaluent leurs besoins et ne drainent inutilement les fonds publics.

D'après notre sondage, 64 p. 100 des municipalités affirment recevoir un financement qui répond, dans une certaine mesure du moins, à l'évaluation qu'elles font de leurs besoins. À en juger par les observations qui précèdent, il est clair toutefois que l'écart entre le genre d'investissement que les municipalités trouvent logique de faire dans la protection civile et ce que les ordres de gouvernement supérieurs qui les financent jugent raisonnable, est énorme.

Questions portant sur d'autres aspects que le financement

Si les questions touchant le financement sont un sujet brûlant d'intérêt pour nos répondants, le questionnaire abordait aussi un certain nombre d'autres questions au sujet desquelles le Comité a aussi obtenu des réponses utiles. Voici un bref résumé de quelques-unes des réponses généralement formulées à propos de ces questions. **La liste complète des constatations faites à partir du sondage sur la protection civile réalisé en 2007 se trouve à l'annexe A.**

Aide des municipalités voisines

Plus il peut y avoir d'entraide entre les municipalités canadiennes en situation d'urgence, meilleure est l'efficacité de l'intervention, en particulier

parce que les municipalités touchées ont besoin d'aide dans les minutes plutôt que dans les jours qui suivent. Il est donc encourageant de constater que les préparatifs d'urgence font l'objet d'une concertation entre les municipalités voisines d'un bout à l'autre du Canada.

Pas moins de 80 p. 100 des municipalités qui ont répondu au sondage affirment avoir des ententes de collaboration avec des municipalités environnantes en cas d'urgence. Un autre 79 p. 100 d'entre elles estiment que « ces ententes sont nécessaires ».

Capacité d'autosuffisance

S'il se produit une catastrophe majeure, combien de temps les municipalités peuvent-elles subvenir à leurs propres besoins avant que l'aide provinciale ou fédérale ne leur parvienne? Les estimations recueillies par le Comité varient : 10 p. 100 ont répondu 24 heures; 14 p. 100, 48 heures, 37 p. 100, 72 heures, 15 p. 100, 96 heures et 23 p. 100 ont répondu ce que le lecteur a probablement en tête : « tout dépend de la nature de la catastrophe ».

Vulnérabilité des ordinateurs

Il est permis de penser que rien n'est plus inquiétant pour une municipalité que la perspective d'une catastrophe CBRNE (causée par la mauvaise utilisation intentionnelle ou accidentelle de produits chimiques, d'organismes biologiques, de radiations, d'appareils nucléaires ou d'explosifs).

Or il n'en serait rien.

Les répondants sont partagés lorsqu'on leur demande si leur municipalité a la capacité nécessaire pour gérer un incident de nature chimique, biologique, radiologique, nucléaire ou explosive — 47 p. 100 répondent oui, 50 p. 100 répondent non.

Ils le sont beaucoup moins lorsqu'on leur demande si leurs systèmes informatiques municipaux seraient en mesure de gérer une cyberattaque, puisque seulement 27 p. 100 répondent oui et 60 p. 100 répondent non.

Entreposage de fournitures

Bon nombre de municipalités canadiennes ne semblent pas dépendre des fournitures d'urgence du gouvernement fédéral pour les aider en cas de catastrophe (voir RNSU, problème n° 4).

Seulement 23 p. 100 des municipalités affirment qu'elles considèrent les caches de la RNSU comme leurs réserves de fournitures d'urgence. Soixante p. 100 d'entre elles affirment connaître l'existence du programme de RNSU, mais seulement 31 p. 100 disent qu'elles ont accès à une cache et croient que son contenu serait utile.

Sensibilisation du public

L'un des aspects névralgiques de la gestion des urgences réside dans la communication avec le public, avant le déclenchement d'une catastrophe (pour optimiser les préparatifs) de même que pendant et après une catastrophe (pour optimiser la survie et le rétablissement).

Avant une situation d'urgence : La communication proactive peut sauver des vies. Les membres du public savent-ils qu'il y a des abris désignés où ils peuvent se réfugier en cas de tornade? Le citoyen moyen d'une municipalité sait-il de quelle protection et de quelles fournitures de base il aura besoin pour assurer la sécurité de sa famille en cas d'inondation?

La majorité des répondants affirment que leurs municipalités disposent de moyens pour informer le public des mesures à prendre en cas d'urgence. Plus de trois municipalités canadiennes sur quatre — 77 p. 100 — ont eu recours à un quelconque moyen pour sensibiliser leur population aux mesures à prendre en cas de catastrophe, mais 22 p. 100 ne l'ont pas fait.

Pendant ou après une situation d'urgence : La communication réactionnelle est évidemment essentielle pour survivre à une catastrophe, mais les municipalités canadiennes affichent des lacunes à ce chapitre.

Soixante-seize p. 100 des répondants affirment qu'il leur est possible dans une certaine mesure d'interrompre la diffusion d'émissions de télévision et de radio, mais la plupart reconnaissent qu'ils doivent d'abord obtenir le consentement des radiodiffuseurs. Seulement 23 p. 100 des municipalités

disent qu’elles ont la capacité d'interrompre unilatéralement la diffusion d'émissions de télévision et de radio locales.

Comme l'ont indiqué des représentants de la municipalité de Chatham-Kent (Ontario) :

> « Nous composons avec les contraintes des entrepreneurs privés. S'ils choisissent d'interrompre les émissions, ils le feront. S'ils ne veulent pas le faire, ils attendront à la diffusion habituelle du bulletin de nouvelles. »

Ginger Sherlock, coordonnatrice de la gestion des urgences à Langley (Colombie-Britannique), ne voit pas en quoi il serait utile de pouvoir interrompre de façon arbitraire la diffusion des émissions locales :

> « On communiquerait avec les médias locaux et si le sinistre est local mais assez important, on aurait tous les médias qu'on veut dans les jambes. Je sais ce que vous voulez dire, mais avec le câble et le satellite, il n'y a plus grand monde qui regarde les stations de télé locales, et le satellite refuse de diffuser les stations locales — je le sais, j'ai essayé. Comme système d'alerte en cas d'urgence, je trouverais cela insuffisant; beaucoup de coordination pour bien peu de résultats. »

Premiers intervenants : a) équipement et b) formation

Lorsqu'une catastrophe survient, le vœu légitime de n'importe quelle municipalité est que ses premiers intervenants soient bien équipés et bien formés. Notre questionnaire a produit des résultats mitigés à cet égard.

a) Par exemple, 62 p. 100 des municipalités disposent de systèmes de communications interopérables pour les premiers intervenants (incendie, police, services paramédicaux, etc.), mais seulement 36 p. 100 respectent les normes fédérales. Seulement 17 p. 100 des répondants ont indiqué que leurs systèmes locaux étaient interopérables avec ceux des autorités provinciales, fédérales (ou américaines). Dans deux tiers des cas (66 p. 100), ils ne le sont pas.

b) Le principal centre canadien de formation en gestion des urgences est le Collège canadien de gestion des urgences (CCGU), à Ottawa, qui relève de Sécurité publique Canada. D'abord créé en 1954 pour offrir des programmes de planification de protection civile en temps de guerre, le Collège offre aujourd'hui différents cours à l'intention des responsables de la gestion des

urgences des divers ordres de gouvernement.

Seulement 58 p. 100 des répondants ont indiqué que les premiers intervenants de leurs municipalités avaient reçu une formation au CCGU, et seulement 18 p. 100 des municipalités interrogées ont indiqué que la formation offerte à leurs dirigeants est suffisante.

Rôle des Forces canadiennes

Comme nous l'avons déjà mentionné à propos du problème n° 2, l'intervention des militaires est essentielle en situation d'urgence. Notre sondage montre que la sensibilisation au rôle des Forces canadiennes dans la gestion des urgences et l'intervention en cas d'urgence s'améliore, mais qu'il reste encore beaucoup de travail à faire.

Pas moins de 85 p. 100 des municipalités s'attendent à ce que les Forces canadiennes leur viennent en aide en cas de catastrophe, et 75 p. 100 des répondants affirment qu'ils connaissent l'existence du Commandement Canada des Forces canadiennes, qui est l'entité responsable de toutes les opérations des Forces au pays. Par ailleurs, seulement 46 p. 100 ont effectivement communiqué avec le Commandement Canada.

Soixante et un p. 100 des répondants disent qu'il y a une unité de la Réserve des Forces canadiennes dans leurs municipalités, mais seulement 45 p. 100 sont au courant du rôle que peuvent jouer les unités de la Réserve en situation d'urgence. Seulement 32 p. 100 font intervenir les unités de la Réserve dans la planification de leurs mesures d'urgence.

Recherche et sauvetage en milieu urbain (RSMU ou SARMU)

Une capacité de recherche et de sauvetage en milieu urbain est très utile en situation d'urgence. Cependant, 82 p. 100 des répondants affirment que leur municipalité est dépourvue d'équipe de RSMU. Au moment du sondage, Ottawa, Thunder Bay et Victoriaville avaient entrepris de se doter d'une capacité de RSMU. Seulement douze autres municipalités interrogées ont actuellement une certaine capacité de recherche et de sauvetage en milieu urbain — soit légère, moyenne ou lourde.

Huit des douze équipes de RSMU existantes n'ont pas d'ententes de soutien à l'échelle régionale pour venir en aide aux municipalités voisines.

En ce qui concerne le financement des activités de RSMU, les avis sont partagés : 20 p. 100 des municipalités croient que le gouvernement provincial devrait financer les activités de RSMU; 26 p. 100 croient que ce devrait être la responsabilité du gouvernement fédéral; 36 p. 100 sont d'avis que ces activités devraient être financées par les trois ordres de gouvernement, soit provincial, fédéral et municipal.

Protection des infrastructures essentielles

Si les infrastructures revêtent une importance cruciale pour le pays, le gouvernement du Canada devrait contribuer à leur protection. Comme il est mentionné au sujet du problème n° 10, c'est un domaine où le gouvernement fédéral n'a pas été suffisamment prévoyant et les résultats de notre sondage le démontrent.

Quatre-vingt-quatre p. 100 des municipalités sont en mesure de signaler l'existence d'infrastructures essentielles sur leur territoire, mais seulement 58 p. 100 d'entre elles disposent d'un plan de protection de ces infrastructures. De plus, il semble y avoir considérablement de confusion quant à savoir à qui incombe la responsabilité de les protéger. La majorité de nos répondants ne se sont même pas hasardés à répondre — 10 p. 100 pensent que les municipalités sont responsables; 20 p. 100 estiment qu'elles ne le sont pas, tandis que le reste a tout simplement renoncé à se prononcer.

Annexe A : Résultats complets du sondage de 2007 sur la gestion des urgences

Quatre-vingt douze des 100 municipalités des dix provinces à qui nous avons envoyé un questionnaire sur la gestion des urgences y ont répondu. Le sondage comportait 94 questions et sous-questions.

La présente section donne un aperçu des principaux résultats quantitatifs[204] du sondage sur la protection civile mené par le Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense entre le printemps et l'automne 2007.

Les résultats du sondage de 2007 sont organisés selon la présentation du questionnaire. Chaque section présente les résultats globaux du sondage, suivis des principales constatations du Comité. Lorsqu'il le juge bon, le Comité compare les résultats du sondage de 2007 à ceux de son sondage de 2003.

LE COMITÉ TIENT À REMERCIER TOUS LES GESTIONNAIRES DES MESURES D'URGENCE ET LES PREMIERS INTERVENANTS QUI ONT RÉPONDU AU SONDAGE.

Le Comité souhaite aussi profiter de l'occasion pour demander aux premiers intervenants ce qu'ils ont pensé de son sondage. Des améliorations pourraient-elles y être apportées la prochaine fois? Votre contribution est inestimable pour les membres du Comité.

Veuillez s'il vous plaît faire part de tous vos commentaires au sujet du sondage à la greffière du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense à DEFENCE@SEN.PARL.GC.CA.

La greffière du Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense
40, rue Elgin, 10e Étage
Ottawa (Ontario) K1A 0A4

[204] Les résultats du sondage présentés ici n'englobent pas les réponses aux questions non quantitatives qui ont été posées. Pour une meilleure idée de la réponse au sondage d'une collectivité en particulier, le lecteur est prié de se reporter aux volumes 2, 3 et 4 du présent rapport.

1. Situations d'urgence et municipalités

RÉSULTATS DU SONDAGE

1	VOTRE MUNICIPALITÉ	Pourcentage	N^{bre} de municipalités qui ont répondu
1b	Votre municipalité est		
	Rurale	0 %	**0**
	Urbaine	37 %	**34**
	Rurale et urbaine	63 %	**58**
1c	Y a-t-il dans votre municipalité ou à proximité l'une des installations suivantes?		
	Installation industrielle importante	82 %	**60**
	Poste frontière	20 %	**3**
	Port/aéroport ou plaque tournante du transport	82 %	**60**
	Toutes ces réponses	16 %	**15**
1d	Votre municipalité possède-t-elle une organisation de gestion des urgences (OGU)?		
	Oui	98 %	**90**
	Non	2 %	**2**
1e	Avez-vous déjà déclaré un état d'urgence à la suite d'une catastrophe naturelle ou causée par l'homme?		
	Oui	48 %	**44**
	Non	51 %	**47**
1f	Votre province a-t-elle déjà déclaré l'état d'urgence après que votre municipalité eut déclaré un état d'urgence à l'échelle locale?		
	Oui	17 %	**16**
	Non	79 %	**73**

CONSTATATIONS

- À partir des réponses aux **questions 1E et 1F**, le Comité a constaté que sur les 44 municipalités qui ont déjà déclaré un état d'urgence,

16 (36 %) ont vu cet état d'urgence à l'échelle locale se transformer en un état d'urgence d'envergure provinciale. *Ce qui veut dire que dans au-delà du tiers des cas, les municipalités qui ont déclaré avoir déjà vécu un état d'urgence ont été le lieu d'origine d'une catastrophe reconnue à l'échelle provinciale.*

2. Évaluations des risques et normes

RÉSULTATS DU SONDAGE

2	ÉVALUATION DES RISQUES	Pourcentage	N^{bre} de municipalités qui ont répondu
2a.	Votre municipalité procède-t-elle à une évaluation des risques afin de déterminer la probabilité que ses citoyens soient touchés par une catastrophe naturelle ou causée par l'homme, ou un état d'urgence à l'échelle locale?		
	Oui	95 %	**87**
	Non	5 %	**5**
	Dans l'affirmative, cette évaluation est-elle fondée sur :		
	Un processus provincial normalisé?	71 %	**65**
	Un processus fédéral normalisé?	4 %	**4**
2b.	À quelle fréquence votre municipalité procède-t-elle à une évaluation des risques?		
	Au moins tous les 5 ans	8 %	**7**
	Tous les 3 à 5 ans	12 %	**11**
	Tous les 2 ans	8 %	**7**
	Chaque année	43 %	**40**
	Plus d'une fois l'an	2 %	**2**
	Sur une base permanente/pas d'intervalles fixes	15 %	**14**

2	ÉVALUATION DES RISQUES	Pourcentage	N^{bre} de municipalités qui ont répondu
2c.	Quels ministères, agences ou organismes participent à l'évaluation des risques de votre municipalité?		
	Service de police	25 %	**23**
	Service des incendies	33 %	**30**
	Ambulanciers	7 %	**6**
	Santé publique	13 %	**12**
	Organisation locale de gestion des urgences	27 %	**25**
	Administration municipale	30 %	**28**
	Tous les services susmentionnés	52 %	**48**
	La province est consultée	60 %	**55**
	Le gouvernement est consulté	14 %	**13**
2d.	Votre municipalité demande-t-elle aux industries de participer à l'évaluation des risques?		
	Oui	65 %	**60**
	Non	32 %	**29**
2e.	Votre municipalité est-elle préoccupée par la possibilité d'une catastrophe ou d'un état d'urgence causé par un acte de terrorisme?		
	Oui	61 %	**56**
	Non	38 %	**35**
	Dans l'affirmative, votre municipalité dispose-t-elle d'un plan d'intervention antiterroriste?		
	Oui	36 %	**33**
	Non	30 %	**28**

CONSTATATIONS

Méthodes d'évaluation des risques

- À partir des réponses données aux **questions 2A and 2B**, le Comité a constaté que la grande majorité des municipalités procèdent à des évaluations de risques (95 %). Près de la moitié (43 %) en font une

chaque année, et pour ce qui est des autres, la fréquence des évaluations de risques est très variable.

- Les réponses données aux **questions 2C et 2D** montrent que plus de la moitié (52 %) des municipalités interrogées consultent l'ensemble des principaux services appelés à intervenir en situation d'urgence au moment d'effectuer leur évaluation des risques (service de police, service des incendies, ambulanciers, santé publique, organisation locale de gestion des urgences, administration municipale), tandis que les autres n'en consultent que quelques-uns seulement. La majorité des municipalités consultent aussi la province (60 %) et les industries (65 %) au moment d'effectuer leur évaluation des risques.

Préoccupation concernant les actes de terrorisme

- Les réponses à la **question 2E** sont quelque peu contradictoires. Ainsi, 61 % des municipalités se disent « préoccupées » par le terrorisme, mais seulement 36 % d'entre elles disposent d'un plan d'intervention antiterroriste. Cet écart s'explique de plusieurs façons.

Comme il est mentionné à propos du problème n° 12, l'absence de plan d'intervention antiterroriste s'explique par le fait que les rôles respectifs des forces policières fédérales et des forces policières municipales sont parfois confondus. L'autre raison tient au fait que certaines villes ne croient pas que la probabilité d'un attentat terroriste est très élevée.

Comme l'a écrit Mike Ross, chef adjoint des services d'incendie et coordonnateur des services d'intervention d'urgence de Lethbridge (Alberta), dans sa réponse au sondage :

> « Nous sommes une ville de taille moyenne dans le sud rural de l'Alberta. Nous comprenons qu'il y a toujours un risque d'acte terroriste, mais nos biens ont une valeur limitée qu'il n'y a pas lieu de publiciser. »

De même, comme l'a écrit Michael Gornyiczki, chef adjoint du service des incendies et coordonnateur de la gestion communautaire des urgences de Stratford (Ontario), dans sa réponse au sondage :

> « Actuellement, nous présumons que nous risquons beaucoup plus d'être frappés par des catastrophes naturelles que de subir des attentats terroristes. »

3. Capacité d'intervention des municipalités

RÉSULTATS DU SONDAGE

3	Capacité d'intervention	Pourcentage	N^{bre} de municipalités qui ont répondu
3a.	Dans quelle mesure votre municipalité est-elle préparée à intervenir en cas d'urgence majeure ou de catastrophe?		
	Bien préparée	59 %	**54**
	Quelque peu préparée	40 %	**37**
	Pas préparée	1 %	**1**
	Ne sais pas	0 %	**0**
3b.	Dans quelle mesure pensez-vous que le gouvernement est préparé à réagir à une catastrophe semblable à celle causée par l'ouragan Katrina?		
	Bien préparé	15 %	**14**
	Quelque peu préparé	52 %	**48**
	Pas préparé	24 %	**22**
	Ne sais pas	9 %	**8**
3c.	Quelle confiance avez-vous dans l'appui du gouvernement provincial si votre municipalité déclare l'état d'urgence à l'échelle locale à la suite d'une catastrophe?		
	J'ai une grande confiance	45 %	**41**
	J'ai confiance	45 %	**41**
	Je n'ai pas confiance	7 %	**6**
	Je ne sais pas	7 %	**6**
3d.	Votre municipalité possède-t-elle un centre de commandement en cas d'urgence?		
	Oui	64 %	**59**
	Non	36 %	**33**

	Dans la négative, votre municipalité a-t-elle prévu d'utiliser un bâtiment, un bureau, etc. particulier comme centre de commandement en cas d'urgence?		
	Oui	36 %	**33**
	Non	0 %	**0**
3e.	Votre municipalité dispose-t-elle d'une structure de commandement en cas d'incident/structure de gestion des incidents (SCI/SGI) qui servirait en cas de catastrophe ou d'état d'urgence à l'échelle locale?		
	Oui	85 %	**78**
	Non	15 %	**14**
3f.	Votre municipalité a-t-elle conclu des ententes de collaboration avec des municipalités environnantes en cas de catastrophe ou d'état d'urgence à l'échelle locale?		
	Oui	80 %	**74**
	Non	16 %	**15**
	Pensez-vous que de telles ententes sont nécessaires?		
	Oui	79 %	**73**
	Non	9 %	**8**
3g.	Si une catastrophe venait à se produire, combien de temps votre municipalité pourrait-elle subvenir à ses propres besoins avant d'avoir besoin d'une aide extérieure?		
	24 heures	10 %	**9**
	48 heures	14 %	**13**
	72 heures	37 %	**34**
	96 heures	15 %	**14**
	Tout dépend de la catastrophe	23 %	**21**



3h.[205]	Quels organismes participent au processus décisionnel?		
	Santé publique	49 %	**45**
	Ambulanciers	38 %	**35**
	Service des incendies	43 %	**40**
	Service de police	36 %	**33**
	Organisation de mesures d'urgence locale	54 %	**50**
	Organisation de mesures d'urgence provinciale	35 %	**32**
	Tous les services susmentionnés	16 %	**15**

[205] Le premier volet de la question 3H était le suivant : « Votre municipalité a-t-elle déterminé et entreposé les fournitures dont elle aurait besoin en cas d'urgence? », mais la question de suivi 2A remplace les réponses obtenues à l'origine parce qu'elle est plus précise (nombre de réponses recueillies).



	QUESTIONS DE SUIVI		
2a	Votre collectivité a-t-elle établi et/ou stocké des fournitures qui pourraient servir en cas d'urgence?		
	Oui	74 %	**62**
	Les fournitures d'urgence provinciales ont été établies et des accords ont été conclus sur la façon et le moment de les utiliser en cas d'urgence	20 %	**17**
	Des fournisseurs du secteur privé locaux ont été trouvés et des ententes ont été conclues sur le rôle qu'ils joueraient en cas d'urgence	27 %	**23**
	Fournitures stockées	56 %	**47**
	Équipement d'urgence spécial	25 %	**21**
	Fournitures médicales	30 %	**25**
	Fournitures pour abris (lits de camp et lits)	44 %	**37**
	Aliments et eau	13 %	**11**
	Autres - Précisez	13 %	**11**
	Rien de ce qui est mentionné ci-dessus	24 %	**20**



2b	Est-ce que les fournitures stockées sont les caches fédérales du système de la Réserve nationale de secours (RNSU)?		
	Oui	23 %	**19**
	Non	57 %	**48**
2c	Santé Canada a informé le Comité qu'il y a environ 1 600 caches dans la Réserve nationale de secours (RNSU) qui sont situées de manière stratégique au Canada. Connaissez-vous ce programme et avez-vous accès à une cache?		
	Oui, je connais ce programme	60 %	**50**
	J'ai accès à une cache	31 %	**26**
	J'ai accès à une cache et peux en confirmer l'utilité	14 %	**12**
	On m'a consulté sur les fournitures à stocker dans ces caches	1 %	**1**
	Non	40 %	**34**

CONSTATATIONS

Cette partie du questionnaire aborde tout un éventail de sujets liés à la capacité d'intervention des municipalités, notamment l'idée qu'elles se font de leur état de préparation et la façon dont elles perçoivent l'aide provinciale, les fournitures stockées et le système de la Réserve nationale de secours (RNSU).

État de préparation

- En réponse à la **question 3A**, 59 % des municipalités affirment être « préparée[s] à intervenir en cas d'urgence majeure ou de catastrophe ». *C'est là une augmentation notable par rapport aux réponses au sondage de 2003, où seulement 5,5 % des répondants avaient déclaré être « prêts à faire face à une urgence grave »*. Le pourcentage de municipalités qui se disent « quelque peu préparée[s] » en cas d'urgence majeure a lui aussi diminué d'autant, passant de 49 % en 2003 à 40 % en 2007[206].

- Les réponses à la **question 3B** indiquent que les municipalités ont une confiance modérée dans la capacité du gouvernement fédéral de réagir en cas d'urgence majeure. Seule une petite poignée de municipalités croient que le gouvernement fédéral est « bien préparé » à réagir à une catastrophe d'envergure (15 %); 52 % croient que le gouvernement est « quelque peu préparé » et 24 % croient qu'il n'est « pas préparé ». *Ces résultats s'apparentent à ceux du sondage de 2003*, où 29 % des répondants disaient qu'ils n'avaient « pas confiance » dans la capacité du gouvernement fédéral de « coordonner une intervention nationale en cas de désastre ou d'urgence importante »; 55 % déclaraient ne pas connaître la réponse et 13 % se disaient « confiants » que le

[206] Il y a lieu de noter que lors du sondage de 2003, une municipalité était considérée comme « prête » si elle avait « les plans, le personnel et l'équipement nécessaires pour intervenir » et elle était considérée comme « à peu près prête » si elle avait des « plans en cours de préparation » (voir l'Annexe 1, page 123). Lors du sondage de 2007, le Comité n'a fourni aucune définition des termes « préparé » ou « quelque peu préparé ». Cela peut expliquer certains écarts observés dans les résultats. Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Les urgences nationales : Le Canada, fragile en première ligne – Stratégie de renforcement*, Ottawa, Sénat du Canada, mars 2004, p. 90.

gouvernement fédéral était en mesure de prendre les choses en mains en cas de catastrophe majeure[207].

- Les réponses à la **question 3D** indiquent que *toutes les municipalités* ont soit un centre de commandement en cas d'urgence (64 %), soit un endroit désigné qui en tient lieu (36 %).

Aide provinciale et entraide

- Le Comité a constaté, à partir des réponses à la **question 3C**, que la grande majorité (90 %) des municipalités qui ont répondu au sondage ont confiance (45 %) ou très confiance (45 %) qu'elles peuvent obtenir l'appui du gouvernement provincial en cas d'urgence.

- Le Comité a constaté, à partir des réponses à la **question 3F**, que la majorité des municipalités sont d'avis que l'entraide entre municipalités voisines est un élément important du cadre de gestion des urgences. Ainsi, 80 % d'entre elles ont signé des ententes de collaboration avec les municipalités voisines et 79 % croient que celles-ci sont importantes.

Fournitures stockées et système de la Réserve nationale de secours (RNSU)

- Le Comité a constaté que la majorité des municipalités avaient leurs propres stocks de fournitures en dehors de la RNSU. Les réponses aux **questions de suivi 2A et 2B** montrent que 74 % des municipalités ont des fournitures stockées, mais moins du tiers (23 %) précisent que celles-ci font partie du système de la Réserve nationale de secours.

En ce qui concerne la RNSU, la principale constatation du Comité est qu'un plus grand nombre de municipalités sont au courant de l'existence de la RNSU et ont accès à des caches de la RNSU.

- Selon les réponses à la **question de suivi 2C**, 60 % des municipalités interrogées sont au courant de l'existence de la RNSU. *C'est là une augmentation spectaculaire par rapport aux constatations faites à la suite du sondage de 2003, où seulement 23 % des répondants avaient*

[207] Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Les urgences nationales : le Canada, fragile en première ligne – Stratégie de renforcement*, Ottawa, Sénat du Canada, mars 2004, p. 108-109.

affirmé connaître l'existence des caches[208]. Lors du sondage de 2007, environ le tiers des municipalités participantes affirment avoir accès à une cache (31 %), comparativement à seulement 10 % en 2003.

4. Financement de la gestion des urgences

RÉSULTATS DU SONDAGE

4	Financement	Pourcentage	N^bre de municipalités qui ont répondu
4a.	Quelle est la principale source de financement de votre municipalité en matière de gestion des urgences?		
	La municipalité	98 %	**90**
	Le gouvernement provincial	12 %	**11**
	Le gouvernement fédéral	5 %	**5**
4b.	Les besoins de financement de votre municipalité en matière de gestion des urgences sont-ils fondés sur une évaluation des besoins/risques?		
	Oui	64 %	**59**
	Non	34 %	**31**
4c.	Votre municipalité connaît-elle les mécanismes de financement en matière de gestion des urgences offerts par votre gouvernement provincial?		
	Oui	95 %	**87**
	Non	4 %	**4**
4d.	Votre municipalité a-t-elle fait une demande de financement en matière de gestion des urgences auprès du gouvernement provincial?		
	Oui	72 %	**66**
	Non	26 %	**24**

[208] Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Les urgences nationales : Le Canada, fragile en première ligne – Stratégie de renforcement*, Ottawa, Sénat du Canada, mars 2004, p. 97.

	Dans l'affirmative, dans quel but?		
	Formation	45 %	**41**
	Créer une organisation de gestion des urgences	15 %	**14**
	Acheter du matériel d'intervention	50 %	**46**
	Constituer une capacité d'intervention CBRNE	27 %	**25**
	Constituer une capacité d'intervention SARMU	8 %	**7**
	Constituer une capacité d'intervention en cas de cyberattaque	0 %	**0**
	Autres	14 %	**13**



4e.	Quel est le degré de satisfaction de votre municipalité au sujet des mécanismes de financement du gouvernement provincial en matière de gestion des urgences?		
	Satisfaite	20 %	**18**
	Quelque peu satisfaite	35 %	**32**
	Pas satisfaite	33 %	**30**

4f.	Votre municipalité connaît-elle les mécanismes de financement en matière de gestion des urgences offerts par le gouvernement fédéral?		
	Oui	74 %	**68**
	Non	21 %	**19**
4g.	Votre municipalité a-t-elle fait une demande de financement en matière de gestion des urgences auprès du gouvernement fédéral par l'intermédiaire du Programme conjoint de protection civile (PCPC)?		
	Oui	84 %	**77**
	Non	15 %	**14**
	Dans l'affirmative, quel est le degré de satisfaction de votre municipalité relativement au PCPC?		
	Satisfaite	22 %	**20**
	Quelque peu satisfaite	38 %	**35**
	Pas satisfaite	21 %	**19**

CONSTATATIONS

4(a) Financement provincial

- À partir des réponses aux **questions 4C et 4D**, le Comité a constaté que la grande majorité des municipalités connaissent les mécanismes provinciaux de financement en matière de gestion des urgences. Ainsi, 94 % des municipalités interrogées savent que leur gouvernement provincial offre des mécanismes de financement, et 72 % ont présenté une demande de financement.

- Les réponses à la **question 4E** indiquent que seulement 20 % des municipalités sont « satisfaites » du financement provincial, tandis que 35 % se disent « quelque peu satisfaites » et 33 % « pas satisfaites » du tout.

Cette variation des données émanant des réponses au sondage peut s'expliquer par les réponses écrites qu'a reçues le Comité. Par exemple, lorsqu'il a répondu au sondage au nom de sa municipalité, Bruce L. Griffin,

planificateur des mesures d'urgence à l'emploi de la ville de Barrie (Ontario), a insisté sur l'écart existant entre les responsabilités déléguées en matière de gestion des urgences et les niveaux de financement.

> « La gestion des urgences est un programme parmi bien d'autres qui sont en concurrence pour l'obtention d'une part du financement limité dont la Ville dispose. Resserrer les exigences législatives des municipalités en matière de gestion des urgences sans augmenter leur financement signifie que certaines mesures pourraient ne pas être à la hauteur des attentes. »

> « […] Les lois provinciales prévoient ce que les municipalités doivent faire en matière de gestion des urgences et la province veille à ce que les lois soient observées, mais n'offre aucune aide financière et peu de ressources pour les aider à atteindre et à maintenir le niveau de gestion requis. »

4(b) Financement fédéral – PCPC (Programme conjoint de protection civile)

- À partir des réponses à la **question 4G**, le Comité a constaté que 74 % des municipalités sont au courant des mécanismes de financement de la gestion des urgences offerts par le gouvernement fédéral, tandis que 84 % ont déjà fait une demande de financement par l'intermédiaire du PCPC[209].

- À partir des réponses à la **question 4G**, le Comité a constaté que les niveaux de satisfaction à l'égard du financement fédéral et du financement provincial s'équivalent. Ainsi, 22 % des municipalités se disent « satisfaites » du financement fédéral, tandis que 20 % affirment être « satisfaites » du financement provincial.

Bon nombre de gestionnaires municipaux responsables de la gestion des urgences croient que le PCPC est un programme utile, mais plusieurs trouvent que le financement laisse à désirer pour trois raisons.

Premièrement, certains déplorent le manque de continuité ou de « renouvellement » du financement, étant donné les coûts exorbitants que suppose le maintien d'une capacité d'intervention. Voici ce qu'a écrit

[209] Les lecteurs remarqueront l'écart entre le pourcentage de municipalités qui ont présenté une demande de financement fédéral par rapport au pourcentage de municipalités qui sont au courant de l'existence de mécanismes fédéraux de financement. Le PCPC est financé par le gouvernement fédéral mais administré par les provinces; certaines municipalités pensaient peut-être que le PCPC était financé par les provinces.

Bruce Burrell, chef du service des incendies et des services d'intervention en cas de catastrophe de la ville de Calgary, dans sa réponse au sondage :

> « Quand le gouvernement fédéral consent du financement, c'est sous forme de versement unique sans modalités de fonctionnement, d'entretien ou de renouvellement […] Nous nous inquiétons aussi du manque de consultation à l'échelle municipale au sujet des fonds du PCPC. On laisse ainsi passer des occasions de cibler des programmes comme le PCPC vers le développement durable de ressources régionales pouvant répondre à d'importants besoins émergents. »

Bill Walker, chef des pompiers et directeur des Services de protection de Grande Prairie (Alberta), a écrit dans sa réponse au sondage :

> « Le principal souci/défi de notre municipalité est qu'il n'y a pas de financement de base pour les processus en cours. Le financement continue à être axé sur des projets individuels plutôt que pour encourager des approches régionales. Pas de modèle d'infrastructure pour les composantes principales (communications, formation, outils de gestion, logiciels et matériel). »

Deuxièmement, le cycle de financement du PCPC occasionne des problèmes. Voici ce qu'a écrit Bruce L. Griffin, planificateur des mesures d'urgence à l'emploi de la ville de Barrie (Ontario), dans sa réponse au sondage :

> « Les échéanciers et le processus sont trop stricts. En tant que programme fédéral, le Programme conjoint de planification d'urgence fonctionne selon le calendrier fiscal fédéral, alors que les budgets des municipalités fonctionnent selon le calendrier civil. Cette différence peut constituer un obstacle de taille lors de la mise en place d'un projet qui doit être mené à terme avant la fin de l'année, malgré le fait que le financement n'est pas versé tant que le projet n'a pas été accepté et le financement autorisé. »

Plusieurs gestionnaires responsables de la gestion des urgences se disent insatisfaits de la portée extrêmement limitée des programmes d'urgence admissibles au financement offert en vertu du PCPC. Certains ont pointé du doigt les restrictions applicables au financement des préparatifs d'urgence en vertu du PCPC alors que les interventions d'urgence, elles, sont abondamment financées. Comme l'ont écrit les responsables de la gestion des urgences de Chilliwack (Colombie-Britannique) dans leur réponse au sondage :

> « Des fonds sont disponibles pour les interventions d'urgence et, dans une moindre mesure, pour le rétablissement. C'est du côté de la préparation que les fonds manquent clairement. Il n'y a pas de fonds de disponibles pour l'information du public, mais c'est pourtant là que les besoins sont les plus aigus. […] Notre principale préoccupation demeure l'éducation du public (notamment l'établissement de programmes de quartiers) et le financement (partage des coûts) nécessaire à l'acquisition de stocks de matériel d'urgence. »

Troisièmement, certains trouvent à redire sur les critères d'admissibilité au PCPC. Par exemple, Dorit Mason, gestionnaire des programmes d'urgence pour la ville de Coquitlam (Colombie-Britannique), a souligné dans sa réponse au sondage :

> « La Ville de Coquitlam est très reconnaissante des fonds qui ont été fournis par l'entremise du PCPC pour l'achèvement de projets. Cependant, les critères dans le cas des projets constituent une limite et devraient être réexaminés. En vertu de la section 2.2 des lignes directrices du PCPC, les projets admissibles à du financement comprennent les plans d'urgence — ou la mise à jour des plans d'urgence (une fois aux cinq ans). Une analyse des dangers, des risques et de la vulnérabilité est considérée faire partie de cette section. Si une collectivité mène une analyse des dangers, des risques et de la vulnérabilité et reçoit une aide financière, l'année suivante elle n'est pas admissible à des fonds pour rédiger des plans. »
>
> À Coquitlam, nous avons rédigé à l'interne notre propre plan d'intervention en cas de catastrophe, nous avons reçu de l'argent pour effectuer une analyse des dangers, des risques et de la vulnérabilité, puis nous avons demandé du financement deux ans plus tard pour terminer des plans d'évacuation détaillés en nous servant des dangers les plus élevés qui avaient été cernés. Malheureusement, la demande a été rejetée parce que nous avions reçu de l'argent pour effectuer l'EDRV. J'aimerais beaucoup que l'on procède à un examen de l'admissibilité des projets et que l'on envisage de réduire la période entre les demandes d'admissibilité. »

Ken Neilson, coordonnateur des urgences à Victoria (Colombie-Britannique), l'a exprimé de façon plus directe encore dans sa réponse au sondage :

> « Les critères d'approbation du financement ne répondent pas aux besoins actuels de la collectivité. »

5. Sensibilisation du public[210]

RÉSULTATS DU SONDAGE

5	Sensibilisation du public	Pourcentage	N^{bre} de municipalités qui ont répondu
5a.	Votre gouvernement local dispose-t-il d'un programme pour sensibiliser les citoyens au sujet des mesures à prendre en cas de catastrophe?		
	Oui	77 %	**71**
	Non	22 %	**20**
1a.	**QUESTIONS DE SUIVI**		
	Votre collectivité est-elle unilatéralement capable d'interrompre une émission télédiffusée ou radiodiffusée pour transmettre des bulletins ou des instructions liés à un état d'urgence?		
	Oui	23 %	**19**
	À la radio locale	20 %	**17**
	À la télévision locale	15 %	**13**
	À la radio nationale	2 %	**2**
	À la télévision nationale	2 %	**2**

[210]La présente partie se fonde sur les réponses fournies à la question 5A et aux questions de suivi 1A et 1B. Les questions sur la communication avec la population en cas d'urgence prévues à l'origine, à savoir les questions 5B et 5C, n'ont pas été prises en considération en raison de la plus grande précision des réponses obtenues aux questions de suivi 1A et 1B.



	Non, pas unilatéralement, il faut la coopération des médias	76 %	**64**
	Non, cela n'est pas nécessaire pour ma collectivité	1 %	**1**
1b.	Dans l'affirmative, indiquez par quelle voie officielle votre collectivité a obtenu le pouvoir d'interrompre unilatéralement des émissions radiophoniques et télévisuelles :		
	Par législation provinciale	6 %	**5**
	Par législation locale	1 %	**1**
	Autre : expliquez	12 %	**10**
	Aucun pouvoir officiel n'est nécessaire	7 %	**6**

CONSTATATIONS

Notre sondage portait sur deux aspects de la capacité d'une municipalité de communiquer avec la population : la communication proactive et la communication réactionnelle.

La communication proactive en cas d'urgence fait référence à ce qu'on a dit à la population *avant* qu'une situation d'urgence ne se produise. Par exemple, les membres du public savent-ils qu'il y a des abris désignés où ils peuvent se réfugier en cas de tornade? Le citoyen moyen d'une municipalité

sait-il de quelle protection et de quelles fournitures de base il aura besoin pour assurer la sécurité de sa famille en cas d'inondation?

- **Question 5A** : Nous avons constaté que la majorité des municipalités (77 %) ont certains mécanismes en place pour informer proactivement leur population des mesures à prendre en cas d'urgence.

La deuxième catégorie de communication en cas d'urgence est celle dite réactionnelle – ce genre de communication est nécessaire dans une situation où une catastrophe est imminente ou en train de se produire et où les responsables de la gestion des urgences veulent que le public aille sans délai se réfugier quelque part ou prenne une quelconque autre mesure précise. L'un des aspects particulièrement importants de la communication réactionnelle est celui qui fait intervenir les réseaux de télédiffusion publique en cas d'urgence – de façon à interrompre la programmation télévisuelle lors d'une urgence afin d'afficher des messages d'urgence à l'intention des citoyens.

En réalité très peu de municipalités ont le pouvoir d'interrompre la diffusion d'émissions – ce sujet est abordé dans le chapitre traitant du problème n° 7 : Communications publiques d'urgence. Le Comité croit que le meilleur système serait celui qui permettrait aux gestionnaires responsables de la gestion des urgences *d'interrompre unilatéralement* les émissions de télévision et de radio locales, nationales ou étrangères.

- **Questions de suivi 1A et 1B** : À partir des réponses à ces questions, le Comité a constaté que moins du quart (23 %) des municipalités ont la capacité d'interrompre *unilatéralement* les émissions de télévision ou de radio pour transmettre des messages d'urgence. Sur ces 19 municipalités, seulement deux – en l'occurrence Richmond (C.-B.) et Peterborough (Ontario) – affirment avoir la capacité d'interrompre les émissions de radio/télévision locales et nationales.

- 76 % des municipalités interrogées indiquent avoir obtenu le *consentement* des stations de télévision locales pour diffuser des messages d'urgence. C'est donc que le contrôle des médias appartient aux radiodiffuseurs et non à l'organisation de gestion des urgences.

6. Systèmes de communication et formation des premiers intervenants

RÉSULTATS DU SONDAGE

6	Premiers intervenants	Pourcentage	N^{bre} de municipalités qui ont répondu
6a.	Les premiers intervenants de votre municipalité disposent-ils de systèmes de communication interopérables?		
	Oui	62 %	**57**
	Non	38 %	**35**
	Dans l'affirmative, ces systèmes de communication correspondent-ils aux normes provinciales ou fédérales?		
	Oui	36 %	**33**
	Non	17 %	**16**
6b.	Vos systèmes de communication sont-ils interopérables avec ceux des ministères et agences de votre province, des autres ordres de gouvernement et des autorités américaines, le cas échéant?		
	Oui	17 %	**16**
	Non	66 %	**61**
6c.	Votre municipalité est-elle en mesure de gérer un incident de nature chimique, biologique, radiologique, nucléaire ou explosive (CBRNE)?		
	Oui	47 %	**43**
	Non	50 %	**46**
6d.	Votre municipalité est-elle en mesure de gérer une cyberattaque?		
	Oui	27 %	**25**
	Non	60 %	**55**

6e.	Le personnel de gestion des urgences de votre municipalité a-t-il reçu une formation au Collège canadien de gestion des urgences?		
	Oui	58 %	**53**
	Non	38 %	**35**
	La formation reçue est-elle suffisante?		
	Oui	18 %	**17**
	Non	52 %	**48**

CONSTATATIONS

Dans cette partie du sondage, le Comité a abordé des questions expressément liées à la façon dont sont perçues la qualité du matériel de communication, la capacité des premiers intervenants de gérer des incidents CBRNE (c'est-à-dire mettant en cause des produits chimiques, des organismes biologiques, des radiations, des appareils nucléaires ou des explosifs) et des cyberattaques et la formation des premiers intervenants.

- En ce qui concerne les systèmes de communication des premiers intervenants (**questions 6A et 6B**), la principale constatation du Comité est que la majorité des municipalités ont des systèmes de communication interopérables (62 %), mais très peu de ces systèmes sont interopérables avec ceux des autorités provinciales et fédérales (17 %).

- En ce qui concerne les incidents CBRNE, les réponses à la **question 6C** montrent que près de la moitié (47 %) des municipalités ont une certaine capacité interne de gérer un incident CBRNE. C'est là une amélioration par rapport au sondage de 2003, où 82 % des municipalités interrogées disaient « compter sur l'aide fédérale et provinciale en cas d'urgence CBRN[211] ».

Le principal centre canadien de formation en gestion des urgences est le Collège canadien de gestion des urgences (CCGU), à Ottawa, qui relève de Sécurité publique Canada. D'abord créé en 1954 pour offrir des programmes de planification de protection civile en temps de guerre, le Collège offre

[211] Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Les urgences nationales : le Canada, fragile en premières lignes – Stratégie de renforcement*, Ottawa, Sénat du Canada, mars 2004, p. 101.

aujourd'hui différents cours à l'intention des responsables de la gestion des urgences des différents ordres de gouvernement[212].

- La principale constatation faite à partir des réponses à la **question 6E** est que la grande majorité des municipalités estime que la formation reçue au CCGU est insuffisante. Ainsi, 58 % des municipalités interrogées affirment que le personnel de gestion des urgences de leur municipalité a reçu une formation au CCGU, mais seulement 18 % estiment que cette formation est suffisante.

Bien des gestionnaires responsables de la gestion des urgences attribuent le manque de formation reçue au CCGU à l'insuffisance des fonds alloués, à l'interne et à l'externe, expressément à la formation. Comme l'a écrit Randy Crashley, coordonnateur des mesures d'urgence et chef adjoint des pompiers de Moose Jaw (Saskatchewan), dans sa réponse au questionnaire :

> « Il serait bon que nous obtenions des fonds pour faire de la formation sur place. Les collectivités veulent soumettre leurs plans d'intervention en cas d'urgences à des exercices et il faut qu'elles le fassent, mais les budgets sont limités et les employeurs hésitent à assumer seuls le coût de la formation au sein de leur organisation. Des fonds supplémentaires au niveau local atténueraient ce problème. »

D'autres imputent le manque de formation au peu de pertinence des critères d'admissibilité à la formation offerte au CCGU. Comme l'a écrit Brian Cornforth, chef des Services d'incendie et d'urgence de la ville de Lethbridge (Alberta), dans sa réponse au questionnaire :

> « Il n'y a pas beaucoup d'argent pour la formation dans les municipalités de moins 20 000 habitants, qui sont considérées comme non admissibles, mais en même temps, s'il survenait une catastrophe, on se tournerait vers nous en tant que capitale régionale. »

Dans sa réponse au questionnaire, Bruce Burrell, chef du Service des incendies/Services d'intervention en cas de catastrophe de la ville de Calgary (Alberta), a souligné l'existence d'un déséquilibre dans la façon dont les places de formation sont attribuées aux municipalités :

> « La capacité du CCGU d'accueillir le personnel de la Ville de Calgary désireux de recevoir une formation est inférieure à la demande. Le mécanisme actuel d'inscription pour les grandes villes, qui doivent réserver des places en

[212] Sécurité publique Canada, « À propos du Collège », 25 janvier 2008, accessible à http://www.securitepublique.gc.ca/prg/em/cemc/03abt-fra.aspx.

s'adressant à leur province, ne marche pas. Il y a déséquilibre entre les places réservées aux petites municipalités et celles des grands centres urbains. Malgré la création des cours de Granville (spécialement conçus pour les petites municipalités), les petites collectivités de l'Alberta continuent d'obtenir des places à Collegeville pourtant destiné aux grands centres, ce qui réduit les chances des grandes villes comme Calgary. »

7. Rôle des Forces canadiennes

RÉSULTATS DU SONDAGE

7	RÔLE DES FORCES CANADIENNES	Pourcentage	N^{bre} de municipalités qui ont répondu
7a.	Votre municipalité s'attend-elle à ce que les Forces canadiennes lui viennent en aide en cas d'urgence ou de catastrophe?		
	Oui	85 %	**78**
	Non	14 %	**13**
7b.	Les dirigeants de votre municipalité ou l'organisation de gestion des urgences de votre municipalité ou les personnes chargées de la préparation en cas d'urgence connaissent-ils l'existence du Commandement Canada des Forces canadiennes?		
	Oui	75 %	**69**
	Non	24 %	**22**
	Dans l'affirmative, votre municipalité a-t-elle communiqué avec le Commandement Canada au sujet des préparatifs en cas d'urgence?		
	Oui	46 %	**42**
	Non	24 %	**22**
7c.	Y a-t-il une unité de la Réserve des Forces canadiennes dans votre municipalité?		
	Oui	61 %	**56**
	Non	30 %	**28**

	Dans l'affirmative, l'organisation de gestion des urgences de votre municipalité connaît-elle les services que la Réserve peut offrir en cas d'urgence?		
	Oui	45 %	**41**
	Non	15 %	**14**
	Dans l'affirmative, la Réserve des FC fait-elle partie du processus de planification des mesures d'urgence?		
	Oui	32 %	**29**
	Non	22 %	**20**

CONSTATATIONS

La principale constatation qui ressort à la lecture de la partie du sondage consacrée au « rôle des Forces canadiennes » est que le rôle des Forces canadiennes dans la gestion des urgences et l'intervention en cas d'urgence est en général bien compris, mais les communications entre les villes et les forces militaires pourraient être améliorées.

- Les réponses à la **question 7B** indiquent que 75 % des municipalités connaissent l'existence du Commandement Canada des Forces canadiennes, qui est l'entité responsable de toutes les opérations des Forces au pays. Par contre, seulement 46 % ont effectivement communiqué avec le Commandement Canada.

- Selon les réponses obtenues à la **question 7C,** il semble que 61 % des municipalités ont une unité de la Réserve des Forces canadiennes dans leur municipalité, mais seulement 45 % sont au courant du rôle que peuvent jouer les unités de la Réserve en situation d'urgence. Une moins grande proportion encore (32 %) ont fait intervenir les unités de la Réserve dans la planification de leurs mesures d'urgence.

Le manque de temps et de ressources figure parmi les raisons invoquées pour expliquer que les municipalités sont plus nombreuses à ne pas avoir communiqué avec les Forces au sujet de leur planification d'urgence.

Pour expliquer pourquoi sa municipalité n'avait pas communiqué avec les Forces canadiennes, voici ce qu'écrit Scott C. Tegler, chef des pompiers et

coordonnateur de la gestion des urgences pour la ville de Woodstock, dans sa réponse au questionnaire :

> « [J]e n'en ai pas encore eu l'occasion. Dans la majorité des municipalités, y compris la mienne, le rôle de coordonnateur de la gestion des mesures d'urgence vient s'ajouter aux autres responsabilités d'une charge de travail déjà complète. Par conséquent, bon nombre de ces détails ou tâches courantes passent par-dessus bord et il n'y a pas assez de temps dans une journée pour les exécuter convenablement. Certaines municipalités ont créé un poste à temps partiel ou à temps plein pour s'occuper de ces questions au niveau local, mais ce n'est pas la majorité. Les municipalités n'ont reçu aucune aide financière directe pour recruter quelqu'un et celles qui ont créé le poste se font échauder à cause de toutes les exigences à satisfaire. »

8. Recherche et sauvetage en milieu urbain

RÉSULTATS DU SONDAGE

8	RECHERCHE ET SAUVETAGE EN MILIEU URBAIN (SARMU)	Pourcentage	N^{bre} de municipalités qui ont répondu
8a.	Votre municipalité dispose-t-elle de ressources de SARMU?		
	Oui	13 %	**12**
	Non	82 %	**75**
	En développement [213]	3 %	**3**
8b.	Quel est le niveau de déploiement de vos ressources de SARMU?		
	Niveau 1	17 %	**2**
	Niveau 2	8 %	**1**
	Niveau 3	33 %	**4**
	Niveau 4	8 %	**1**
	Niveau 5	17 %	**2**
	Aucun niveau précis [214]	17 %	**2**

[213] À l'origine, « en développement » ne faisait pas partie des choix de réponses proposés dans le sondage, mais après un examen plus approfondi des réponses, nous avons conclu qu'Ottawa, Thunder Bay et Victoriaville avaient entrepris de se doter d'une telle capacité, mais que celle-ci n'était pas pleinement opérationnelle encore.

[214] À l'origine, « aucun niveau précis » ne faisait pas partie des choix de réponses proposés dans le sondage, mais deux municipalités, en l'occurrence Halifax et Winnipeg, n'ont pas indiqué de niveau de déploiement précis pour leur équipe de SARMU.

8d.	Votre équipe de SARMU a-t-elle conclu des ententes de soutien à l'échelle régionale en cas de catastrophe ou d'urgence?		
	Oui	67 %	**8**
	Non	25 %	**3**
8e.	Votre programme de SARMU a-t-il comme objectif d'atteindre la capacité de déploiement de niveau 5?		
	Oui	17 %	**2**
	Non	58 %	**7**
8f.	Qui devrait assurer le financement du programme de SARMU? (Vous pouvez cocher plus d'une réponse)		
	Municipalité	1 %	**1**
	Gouvernement provincial	20 %	**18**
	Gouvernement fédéral	26 %	**24**
	Les trois premières réponses	36 %	**33**

CONSTATATIONS

Comme il est mentionné précédemment dans le corps du présent rapport, le gouvernement fédéral finance actuellement cinq équipes nationales de recherche et sauvetage en milieu urbain (SARMU) disposant d'équipement lourd. Un certain nombre de petites équipes de recherche et sauvetage en milieu urbain ayant chacune des capacités variables viennent s'y greffer. Il existe cinq niveaux de déploiement des ressources affectées à la recherche et au sauvetage en milieu urbain qui sont numérotées de 1 à 5. Le niveau 1 s'applique uniquement aux équipes qui peuvent être déployées localement tandis que le niveau 5 s'applique aux équipes qui peuvent être déployées à l'échelle internationale. Les équipes de niveau 5 sont considérées comme SARMU.

- **Question 8A :** 82 % des municipalités n'ont pas d'équipe de recherche et sauvetage en milieu urbain. Au moment où le sondage a été effectué (entre le printemps et l'automne 2007), Ottawa, Thunder Bay et Victoriaville étaient en voie de se doter d'une capacité de recherche et sauvetage en milieu urbain.

- Les réponses à la **question 8D** indiquent que 12 des municipalités interrogées disposent d'une certaine capacité de recherche et sauvetage en milieu urbain. De ce nombre, huit ont conclu des ententes de soutien à l'échelle régionale avec des municipalités voisines.

Sur les 12 équipes de recherche et sauvetage en milieu urbain, seulement deux ont répondu que leur objectif était d'atteindre une capacité de déploiement de niveau 5.

9. Protection des infrastructures essentielles

RÉSULTATS DU SONDAGE

9	PROTECTION DES INFRASTRUCTURES ESSENTIELLES	Pourcentage	N^{bre} de municipalités qui ont répondu
9a.	Votre municipalité a-t-elle déterminé qu'il y a des infrastructures essentielles sur son territoire?		
	Oui	84 %	**77**
	Non	12 %	**11**
9b.	Votre municipalité dispose-t-elle d'un plan de protection de ces infrastructures essentielles?		
	Oui	58 %	**53**
	Non	37 %	**34**
9c.	Le gouvernement fédéral a-t-il déterminé que des infrastructures fédérales essentielles se trouvent dans votre municipalité?		
	Oui	16 %	**15**
	Non	61 %	**56**
	Dans l'affirmative, votre municipalité est-elle responsable de la protection de ces infrastructures fédérales essentielles?		
	Oui	10 %	**9**
	Non	20 %	**18**

9d.	Le gouvernement provincial a-t-il déterminé que des infrastructures provinciales essentielles se trouvent dans votre municipalité?		
	Oui	34 %	**31**
	Non	40 %	**37**
	Dans l'affirmative, votre municipalité est-elle responsable de la protection de ces infrastructures provinciales essentielles?		
	Oui	16 %	**15**
	Non	24 %	**22**

CONSTATATIONS

Un fort pourcentage de municipalités ont relevé la présence d'infrastructures essentielles dans le cadre de leur analyse générale des risques. Dans bien des cas, les infrastructures essentielles sont intégrées à l'analyse normalisée des risques de la municipalité. Comme l'a écrit Barry Manuel, coordonnateur de l'Organisation des mesures d'urgence de la ville d'Halifax, dans ses réponses au sondage : « L'EDRV [un outil normalisé d'évaluation des risques] de 2007 sera utilisée pour déterminer à qui appartiennent les infrastructures essentielles, la relation avec la municipalité et ses citoyens et ce qu'il faut faire pour s'assurer que ses infrastructures demeurent en place. »

- Les réponses aux **questions 9A et 9B** indiquent un écart entre le pourcentage de municipalités qui disent avoir des infrastructures essentielles sur leur territoire et le pourcentage de celles qui disent avoir un plan de protection de ces infrastructures. Ainsi, 84 % des municipalités ont établi qu'elles avaient des infrastructures essentielles sur leur territoire, mais seulement 58 % d'entre elles disposent d'un plan pour les protéger.

- Les réponses aux **questions 9C et 9D** montrent que les pourcentages des municipalités qui abritent des infrastructures fédérales ou provinciales essentielles sont faibles (16 % et 34 % respectivement).

Le pourcentage relativement faible de municipalités qui ont des infrastructures fédérales ou provinciales essentielles sur leur territoire n'est

peut-être pas étranger à cette constatation, mais un examen plus approfondi des réponses au sondage données par les grandes villes (qui abritent d'importantes infrastructures régionales) comme Toronto, Montréal, Vancouver, Edmonton et Calgary, montre que le recensement des infrastructures par les gouvernements fédéral/provincial n'est pas systématique.

De plus, beaucoup de municipalités ont répondu qu'elles ne savaient tout simplement pas si les gouvernements fédéral ou provincial avaient recensé des infrastructures essentielles sur leur territoire et pouvaient avoir omis de les en informer.

Annexe B : Liste complète des recommandations nouvelles et antérieures du Comité

Problème n° 1 : Manque de gestion des urgences

Recommandations de 2008

1. Le Comité recommande que Sécurité publique Canada dépose un rapport annuel au Parlement établissant les détails du Plan de continuité des opérations de chaque ministère et organisme gouvernemental et qu'il fasse la preuve que celui-ci a été mis en place et testé, et que les résultats soient rendus publics.

2. Dans le cas où Sécurité publique Canada est incapable de déposer un rapport de ce genre ou est réticent à le faire, le Comité recommande que cette tâche soit confiée à un tiers vérificateur de la sécurité nationale.

Recommandation de 2004

- Le Comité a recommandé que Sécurité publique du Canada effectue des évaluations pour s'assurer que tous les ministères et organismes fédéraux sont en mesure de maintenir leurs activités en temps de crise et que leurs plans d'intervention sont effectifs[215].

Problème n° 2 : Le recours aux Forces canadiennes pour les situations d'urgence intérieures

Recommandations de 2008

Aucune nouvelle recommandation

[215] Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Les urgences nationales : Le Canada, fragile en première ligne – Stratégie de renforcement*, Ottawa, Sénat du Canada, mars 2004, p. 66. Voir la recommandation 17 A – Cette sous-recommandation fait partie d'une plus vaste recommandation qui est abordée ci-après; elle est présentée séparément ici en raison de son importance.

Recommandations de 2004

- Le Comité a recommandé que les Forces canadiennes développent leur capacité d'intervenir dans les urgences nationales par les moyens suivants :
    - faire en sorte que les Forces régulières soient équipées et formées pour répondre aux urgences graves au Canada et qu'elles participent à la planification d'urgences régionales;
    - développer le rôle de la milice pour en faire une force de défense civile capable d'aider rapidement les autorités locales en cas d'urgences nationales;
    - faire participer la milice à la planification et à la formation des mesures d'urgences de concert avec les municipalités de tout le pays;
    - équiper et former la milice pour l'intervention d'urgence.
- Le Comité a recommandé que Sécurité publique et Protection civile Canada (SPPCC) :
    - inclue la Milice des Forces canadiennes dans les ressources fédérales d'intervention d'urgence et que les premiers intervenants connaissent dans les détails l'effectif et les moyens de la Milice[216].

Problème n° 3 : Dépôts d'urgence cachés

Recommandations de 2008

3. Le Comité recommande que, pour les biens périssables, Santé Canada conçoive un système de repérage, accessible à tous les ordres de gouvernement, qui identifierait les ressources essentielles des provinces et territoires.

[216] Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Les urgences nationales : Le Canada, fragile en première ligne – Stratégie de renforcement*, Ottawa, Sénat du Canada, mars 2004, p. 37 et 49. Voir les recommandations 3, 10 et 11.

4. Le Comité recommande que des exercices réels soient tenus régulièrement, accompagnés d'un budget de soutien, afin de tester le nouveau système de repérage des fournitures d'urgence.

5. Le Comité recommande que les premiers intervenants puissent participer plus activement au système de fournitures d'urgence non périssables, notamment en ce qui concerne le quoi, le où et le comment : quelles fournitures d'urgence devraient en faire partie, où les stocks sont situés, et de quelle façon on peut y accéder.

Recommandations de 2004

- Le Comité a recommandé que Santé Canada revoie en profondeur la façon dont il administre et gère les dépôts d'urgence qui relèvent de lui, afin d'aider de façon plus efficace et plus efficiente les corps d'intervention de première ligne à protéger les Canadiens partout au pays. Cette révision devrait notamment faire en sorte que les responsables locaux :
    - soient informés de l'emplacement de tout dépôt se trouvant à proximité;
    - soient informés de la façon d'y accéder en cas d'urgence;
    - se voient confier un rôle à cet égard;
    - soient encouragés à inclure les dépôts dans leur planification[217].

Problème n° 4 : Le manque de fonds pour l'acquisition d'équipement et la formation

Recommandations de 2008

6. Le Comité recommande que le gouvernement crée un fonds permanent pour :

[217] Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Les urgences nationales : Le Canada, fragile en première ligne – Stratégie de renforcement*, Ottawa, Sénat du Canada, mars 2004, p. 37. Voir la recommandation 5.

a. maintenir les capacités actuelles de recherche et de sauvetage en milieu urbain (RSMU) et de lutte contre les incidents CBRNE, y compris pour l'achat et l'entretien d'équipement et la formation de tous les intervenants d'urgence, suivant une formule de financement négociée par les parties en cause;
b. aider financièrement les petites municipalités qui cherchent à se doter de moyens de RSMU.

7. Le Comité recommande que le gouvernement réunisse une trousse de RSMUEL qui pourrait être transportée à bord d'un appareil (Hercules ou C-17) afin que les Forces canadiennes puissent emmener rapidement les équipes de RSMU sur les lieux des situations d'urgence partout au Canada ou à l'étranger.

Recommandation de 2004

- Que le gouvernement fédéral accorde quatre autres années de crédits (5 millions de dollars par an) pour l'achat d'équipement de protection contre les menaces chimiques, biologiques, radiologiques et nucléaires[218].

Problème n° 5 : Une piètre collaboration entre les gouvernements

Recommandations de 2008

8. Le Comité recommande que le gouvernement fédéral désigne des responsables municipaux des mesures d'urgence partout au pays qui auront besoin d'une habilitation sécuritaire pour recevoir de l'information fédérale, et veille à ce qu'ils soient soumis à une vérification de sécurité et à ce qu'ils obtiennent l'habilitation exigée s'ils sont en règle.

9. Le Comité recommande que Sécurité publique Canada communique directement avec les responsables municipaux des mesures d'urgence chaque fois qu'il a de l'information ou d'autres ressources susceptibles d'améliorer la capacité d'intervention en cas d'urgence des municipalités.

[218] Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Les urgences nationales : Le Canada, fragile en première ligne – Stratégie de renforcement*, Ottawa, Sénat du Canada, mars 2004, p. 38. Voir la recommandation 6.

10. Que le gouvernement fédéral vérifie si Sécurité publique Canada fait une utilisation optimale de ses ressources.

Recommandations de 2004

Le Comité a recommandé :

- Que Sécurité publique Canada négocie des protocoles d'entente liant les gouvernements fédéral, provinciaux et territoriaux et prescrivant en détail leurs responsabilités respectives en matière de préparation aux situations d'urgence autant que d'intervention en pareille éventualité[219].

- Que le ministre de Sécurité publique Canada s'assure que de nouveaux protocoles efficaces de partage de données et des ententes d'aide mutuelle soient mis en place entre les paliers fédéral, provincial, territorial et municipal de gouvernement[220].

Problème n° 6(a) : Leçons apprises oubliées

Recommandations de 2008

Aucune

Recommandations de 2004

- Que Sécurité publique Canada organise ses archives sur les leçons tirées du passé de façon à ce que celles-ci :
  - soient à la fois à jour et remontent loin dans le passé;
  - soient accessibles et utiles aux premiers intervenants[221].

[219] Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Les urgences nationales : Le Canada, fragile en première ligne – Stratégie de renforcement*, Ottawa, Sénat du Canada, mars 2004, p. 43. Voir la recommandation 9.
[220] Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Les urgences nationales : Le Canada, fragile en première ligne – Stratégie de renforcement*, Ottawa, Sénat du Canada, mars 2004, p. 73. Voir la recommandation 18 B.
[221] Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Les urgences nationales : Le Canada, fragile en première ligne – Stratégie de renforcement*, Ottawa, Sénat du Canada, mars 2004, p. 36. Voir la recommandation 7.

- Que Sécurité publique Canada agisse comme centre de répartition pour venir en aide aux autres niveaux de gouvernement, en communiquant au besoin à d'autres administrations les « leçons apprises » par les provinces, les territoires et les municipalités;

- Que Sécurité publique Canada établisse et publie, dans les soixante (60) jours de la situation d'urgence nationale, un rapport préliminaire public suivi, moins d'un an après la situation d'urgence, d'un rapport public officiel faisant état des leçons apprises et des diverses interventions effectuées[222].

Problème n° 6(b) : Absence de leadership en matière de pratiques exemplaires

Recommandations de 2008

11. Le Comité recommande que le gouvernement fasse un appel d'offres auprès des universités et des établissements du Canada s'occupant des situations d'urgence et finance à même des fonds de Sécurité publique Canada un tel établissement pour :

    a. Élaborer et tenir à jour un catalogue en direct des « leçons » et des « pratiques exemplaires » découlant de situations d'urgence passées au Canada et de par le monde, et le partager avec tous les premiers intervenants du Canada;

    b. Effectuer pour toute municipalité canadienne qui le demande une vérification de sa capacité d'intervenir en cas d'urgence;

    c. Faire rapport annuellement au Parlement de toute lacune décelée dans le système canadien de préparation et d'intervention en cas d'urgence;

    d. Formuler un protocole pour consulter les gestionnaires des situations d'urgence des différents ordres de gouvernement et les

[222] Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Les urgences nationales : Le Canada, fragile en première ligne – Stratégie de renforcement*, Ottawa, Sénat du Canada, mars 2004, p. 74. Voir la recommandation 18 G (i).

premiers intervenants afin de déterminer la meilleure façon d'établir des normes nationales et des pratiques exemplaires.

12. Le Comité recommande qu'après chaque réunion du Groupe national sur la gestion des urgences, le gouvernement dresse une liste des sujets traités et des renseignements échangés que cette liste soit convertie en matériel (c.-à-d. des manuels, des CD, un contenu Web) qui peut être diffusé, et utilisé par les premiers intervenants de tout le pays.

Recommandations de 2004

- Le Comité a recommandé que Sécurité publique Canada :
    - veille à ce que les collectivités canadiennes soient bien informées des programmes de formation et des autres ressources mis à leur disposition pour les aider à se préparer aux situations d'urgence;
    - encourage et finance la mise en place d'un système d'examen par les pairs parmi les gestionnaires des situations d'urgence et les premiers intervenants afin de s'assurer qu'ils appliquent les meilleures pratiques et de favoriser leur interopérabilité;
    - s'assure que tous les accords prévoyant le versement de fonds aux gouvernements provinciaux et territoriaux fassent état du pourcentage des fonds destinés aux premiers intervenants municipaux;
    - présente au Parlement un rapport annuel de ses activités. Ce rapport doit mettre l'accent sur les mesures prises par le Bureau pour améliorer la capacité d'intervention du Canada dans les situations d'urgence et faire état des écarts perçus entre les ressources et les capacités des premiers intervenants[223].

[223] Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Les urgences nationales : Le Canada, fragile en première ligne – Stratégie de renforcement*, Ottawa, Sénat du Canada, mars 2004, p. 73, 74. Voir les recommandations 18 A, D, E, F et G ii). Les parties B, C et G i) de la recommandation 18 sont abordées ailleurs dans le chapitre.

- en coopération avec les services municipaux d'intervention d'urgence et les gouvernements provinciaux et territoriaux, élabore des « pratiques exemplaires » pour faire face à d'éventuelles catastrophes naturelles ou causées par l'homme[224].

Problème n° 7 : Communications publiques d'urgence

Recommandations de 2008

Aucune

Recommandations de 2004

- Que, pour assurer que les autorités ont le pouvoir et la capacité d'interrompre des émissions de radio et de télévision en cas d'urgence :

  - Sécurité publique Canada prépare des normes pour l'établissement de systèmes d'avertissement de la population en cas d'urgence s'appliquant à toutes les provinces et tous les territoires;

  - le gouverneur en conseil, par décret, ordonne au Conseil de la radiodiffusion et des télécommunications canadiennes de préparer la réglementation qui s'impose pour obliger tous les diffuseurs publics et privés à collaborer à l'établissement de systèmes provinciaux, territoriaux et national d'avertissement de la population;

  - un site Web national sur les situations d'urgence proposant des liens avec des sites Web provinciaux et territoriaux soit mis sur pied pour communiquer par Internet de l'information et des instructions en cas d'urgence nationale.

[224] Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Les urgences nationales : Le Canada, fragile en première ligne – Stratégie de renforcement*, Ottawa, Sénat du Canada, mars 2004, p. 73. Voir la recommandation 18 C.

- Que Sécurité publique Canada favorise l'implantation d'un système semblable au « Reverse 911 » dans toutes les municipalités, en finançant au moins le tiers du coût, le reste devant être partagé entre les provinces/territoires et les municipalités[225].

Problème n° 8 : Interopérabilité déficiente des premiers intervenants

Recommandations de 2008

13. Le Comité recommande que Sécurité publique Canada inscrive l'interopérabilité des premiers intervenants à l'ordre du jour des prochaines réunions fédérales-provinciales-territoriales des ministres responsables de la gestion des urgences.

14. Le Comité recommande que Sécurité publique Canada fasse intervenir les partenaires provinciaux et municipaux dans l'élaboration et la mise en œuvre de sa *stratégie nationale de communications radiopour la sécurité publique* dans un délai de deux ans (d'ici 2010).

Recommandations de 2004

- Que Sécurité publique entame des négociations pour doter l'ensemble des équipes de premiers intervenants d'appareils de télécommunication portables, le gouvernement fédéral finançant au moins le tiers du coût et le reste devant être partagé entre les provinces/territoires et les municipalités.
- Que chaque niveau de gouvernement se dote de la capacité de communiquer avec les premiers intervenants sur son territoire et les autres niveaux de gouvernement. Tous les systèmes devraient être assortis d'une capacité de télécommunication sans fil de secours[226].

[225] Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Les urgences nationales : Le Canada, fragile en première ligne – Stratégie de renforcement*, Ottawa, Sénat du Canada, mars 2004, p. 59. Voir les recommandations 12 et 13.
[226] Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Les urgences nationales : Le Canada, fragile en première ligne – Stratégie de renforcement*, Ottawa, Sénat du Canada, mars 2004, p. 59. Voir les recommandations 14 et 15.

Problème n° 9 : Non-reconnaissance des besoins des premiers intervenants

Recommandations de 2008

15. Le Comité recommande que, lors de l'embauche de nouveau personnel chargé de l'élaboration et de la mise en œuvre de la politique relative à la gestion des urgences, Sécurité publique Canada donne la priorité aux personnes qui ont une expérience sur le terrain dans la collectivité des premiers intervenants.

16. Le Comité recommande que tous les employés en poste à Sécurité publique Canada dont le travail touche la politique relative à la gestion des urgences – y compris le sous-ministre et les titulaires de postes de direction de niveaux inférieurs – soient tenus, en guise de formation, d'exécuter des exercices pratiques avec les premiers intervenants.

Recommandations de 2004

- Le Comité a recommandé que Sécurité publique Canada soit davantage à l'écoute des besoins des premiers intervenants dans l'ensemble des collectivités du pays.

- Le Comité a recommandé que le ministre de Sécurité publique Canada demande à son ministère de restructurer le système national de protection civile afin de s'assurer que les préoccupations et les problèmes des municipalités sont pleinement pris en compte dans les structures et la planification des mesures d'urgence[227].

[227] Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Les urgences nationales : Le Canada, fragile en première ligne – Stratégie de renforcement*, Ottawa, Sénat du Canada, mars 2004, p. 64. Voir la recommandation 16.

Problème n° 10 : Leadership fédéral insuffisant au chapitre de la protection des infrastructures essentielles

Recommandations de 2008

17. Le Comité recommande que Sécurité publique Canada fasse profiter les premiers intervenants de tout le pays des « leçons apprises » dans le cadre de son programme d'exercices national.

18. Le Comité recommande que soient rétablis les briefings classifiés de Ressources naturelles Canada à l'intention des intervenants du secteur de l'énergie.

19. Le Comité recommande que soient mis en place des processus semblables aux briefings classifiés de Ressources naturelles Canada pour les intervenants du secteur de l'énergie dans l'ensemble des 10 secteurs des infrastructures essentielles nationales.

20. Le Comité recommande que soit annoncée la Stratégie nationale de protection des infrastructures essentielles d'ici la fin de 2008.

Recommandations de 2004

- Le Comité a recommandé que Sécurité publique Canada soit tenu de :
    - compiler et tenir à jour, en collaboration avec toutes les municipalités canadiennes, des listes des points faibles apparents, des moyens d'intervention d'urgence et des lacunes dans les moyens;
    - tenir des réunions avec ses homologues provinciaux et territoriaux pour discuter des lacunes décelées suite à la mise en application de la recommandation ci-dessus;

- mener des exercices d'urgence nationaux en collaboration avec les autres niveaux de gouvernement et préparer des analyses sur les « leçons apprises »[228].

Problème n° 11 : Mesures d'urgence improvisées

Recommandations de 2008

21. Le Comité recommande que Sécurité publique Canada termine et publie le Système national d'intervention en cas d'urgence (SNIU) d'ici mars 2009.

22. Le Comité recommande que Sécurité publique Canada et Santé Canada rendent public le Système national de gestion des incidents dans le domaine de la santé (SNGIDS) d'ici mars 2009.

23. Le Comité recommande que l'Agence de la santé publique du Canada accorde la plus haute priorité au rapport du Bureau du vérificateur général de 2008 et qu'elle fasse rapport au Parlement à mesure que chaque recommandation est mise en œuvre. (Une liste complète des recommandations de la vérificatrice générale pour 2008 est présentée à l'annexe C.)

24. Le Comité recommande que la vérificatrice générale assure le suivi de la vérification de 2005 de la protection civile, et en particulier, qu'elle examine et évalue l'état du SNIU.

Recommandations de 2004

- Le Comité a recommandé que Santé Canada élabore un plan national pour contrer une flambée possible de fièvre charbonneuse, de peste, de botulisme, de tularémie et de fièvre virale hémorragique et qu'il en fasse rapport au Parlement et à la population d'ici au 31 mars 2005[229].

[228] Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Les urgences nationales : Le Canada, fragile en première ligne – Stratégie de renforcement*, Ottawa, Sénat du Canada, mars 2004, p. 66. Voir les recommandations 17 B, C et D.
[229] Comité sénatorial permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense, *Les urgences nationales : Le Canada, fragile en première ligne – Stratégie de renforcement*, Ottawa, Sénat du Canada, mars 2004, p. 13. Voir la recommandation 1.

Problème n° 12(b) : Services de police en cas d'urgence

Recommandations de 2008

25. Le Comité recommande que les représentants des forces policières fédérales, provinciales et municipales partout au Canada tiennent un débat national pour clarifier les rôles et les responsabilités en matière de sécurité nationale et de gestion des urgences.

26. Le Comité recommande que le nombre de policiers soit augmenté à hauteur des effectifs de l'Angleterre – soit quelque 8 000 agents additionnels, conformément à ce que le Comité a proposé pour la GRC (5 000 à 7 000 agents supplémentaires) et à l'engagement du gouvernement d'ajouter 2 500 policiers.

Aucune recommandation antérieure

Problème n° 12(c) : L'état actuel des effectifs de la GRC

Recommandations de 2008

27. Le Comité recommande que le gouvernement accorde à la GRC le statut d'employeur distinct.

28. Le Comité recommande que le gouvernement finance des augmentations annuelles du budget de la GRC pour lui permettre d'augmenter ses effectifs d'au moins 700 employés par année au cours de chacune des dix prochaines années.

29. Le Comité recommande que la GRC produise un calendrier de mise en œuvre de chacune des recommandations du *Rapport Brown*.

30. Le Comité recommande que la GRC présente un rapport trimestriel au Parlement sur les progrès réalisés concernant : a) son statut d'employeur distinct, b) la croissance de ses effectifs, c) la mise en œuvre des diverses recommandations du *Rapport Brown*.

Aucune recommandation antérieure

Annexe C : Liste des recommandations de la vérificatrice générale

Liste de recommandations tirées du *Rapport de la vérificatrice générale de mai 2008*, Chapitre 5—La surveillance des maladies infectieuses—Agence de la santé publique du Canada, p. 41-45.

Recommandation	Réponse
Orientations stratégiques	
5.22 Afin d'assurer une gestion efficace des risques que posent les maladies infectieuses émergentes et existantes, l'Agence de la santé publique du Canada devrait utiliser ses évaluations des menaces pour la santé publique afin de fixer ses objectifs et d'établir ses priorités dans le cadre de ses activités de surveillance à l'échelle nationale. **(5.15–5.21)**	**Réponse de l'Agence de la santé publique du Canada.** L'Agence est d'accord avec cette recommandation. Elle évalue quotidiennement les risques que posent, pour la santé publique des Canadiens, les maladies infectieuses, existantes ou nouvelles; ces risques sont ensuite consignés dans le bulletin de renseignements quotidien. L'Agence a rédigé son Cadre stratégique en matière de surveillance, a entamé le processus de mise en œuvre et s'est engagée à le mener à terme au cours des trois prochaines années. Un processus décisionnel formel prévoyant l'atteinte des priorités et des objectifs grâce à des évaluations des risques de menaces pour la santé publique fera partie de ce cadre stratégique. Le Cadre intégré d'évaluation du risque sera mis en place au plus tard en décembre 2009.
5.28 Pour clarifier ses rôles et ses responsabilités, recevoir en temps opportun des données utiles en matière de surveillance et être autorisée à recueillir, à utiliser et à communiquer des données sur la santé publique, l'Agence de la santé publique du Canada devrait, de concert avec Santé Canada, terminer l'examen de la législation en cours et demander, au besoin, les pouvoirs	**Réponse de Santé Canada et de l'Agence de la santé publique du Canada.** L'Agence et le Ministère sont d'accord avec cette recommandation. L'Agence et Santé Canada continueront de travailler ensemble en vue d'obtenir les pouvoirs législatifs et réglementaires nécessaires aux fins de la collecte, de l'utilisation et de la divulgation de l'information sur la surveillance et la recherche en santé publique.

additionnels dont elle a besoin pour exercer ses activités de surveillance. **(5.23–5.27)**	
5.33 Pour être davantage en mesure de prévoir et de prévenir les zoonoses, l'Agence de la santé publique du Canada et l'Agence canadienne d'inspection des aliments devraient évaluer conjointement les risques possibles pour la santé humaine et animale, clarifier le partage des responsabilités et donner suite aux objectifs et aux priorités de surveillance communs. **(5.29–5.32)**	**Réponse des agences.** Les agences sont d'accord avec cette recommandation. Afin d'assurer encore mieux la collaboration et la coordination de leurs activités, entre autres la clarification des tâches et des responsabilités relativement aux questions liées aux zoonoses et les répercussions potentielles sur la santé des humains et des animaux, l'Agence de la santé publique du Canada, l'Agence canadienne d'inspection des aliments et Santé Canada sont en voie de mettre la dernière main à un accord. De plus, l'Agence de la santé publique du Canada confie le soin de régler les problèmes liés aux maladies transmises par les aliments et l'eau au Groupe d'étude sur les maladies d'origine alimentaire ou hydrique, qui est un comité fédéral-provincial-territorial du Réseau de santé publique. En outre, le Groupe d'experts en contrôle des maladies transmissibles vient tout juste d'être formé pour traiter des questions liées aux maladies infectieuses transmises de l'animal à l'humain qui ne sont pas habituellement transmises par les aliments ou l'eau. Ce comité fédéral-provincial-territorial de même que d'autres forums comme les réunions annuelles portant sur le virus du Nil occidental et d'autres zoonoses non entériques donnent à l'Agence de la santé publique du Canada une tribune pour discuter avec les intervenants et des représentants de l'Agence canadienne d'inspection des aliments. L'Agence de la santé publique du Canada et l'Agence canadienne d'inspection des aliments mettront en œuvre une évaluation du risque d'ici au printemps 2009 et apporteront des améliorations à la surveillance exercée dans le cadre du module sur les zoonoses.

Maladies infectieuses existantes	
5.39 L'Agence de la santé publique du Canada devrait conclure des accords pour le partage de données requis pour obtenir en temps opportun des données de surveillance complètes et exactes de la part de toutes les provinces et de tous les territoires. De concert avec ses partenaires, elle devrait fixer des échéances pour la conclusion de ces accords. **(5.34–5.38)**	**Réponse de l'Agence de la santé publique du Canada.** L'Agence est d'accord avec cette recommandation. L'Agence reconnaît l'importance de communiquer des données exhaustives et exactes, et ce, en temps opportun. Au cours des trois dernières années, l'Agence a collaboré avec les provinces et les territoires à la mise en place d'ententes relatives au partage des données. Elle a également fait partie d'un certain nombre de forums provinciaux et territoriaux visant à discuter des questions relatives à l'information sur la surveillance, par exemple le Réseau de santé publique et le Comité des médecins hygiénistes en chef. De surcroît, l'Agence est en voie d'élaborer un Cadre de protection de la vie privée en vue de gérer les questions liées à celle-ci, par exemple les ententes relatives au partage de l'information versée dans les dossiers. Elle prévoit terminer l'élaboration de ce cadre en mars 2009. Durant l'année 2008-2009, l'Agence continuera de travailler en partenariat avec les provinces et les territoires en matière de partage de l'information et s'acquittera des obligations qui lui incombent en vertu des ententes, tout en incitant ses partenaires provinciaux et territoriaux à s'acquitter des leurs.
5.43 L'Agence de la santé publique du Canada devrait travailler de concert avec ses partenaires en vue de mettre en œuvre des normes, établies d'un commun accord, applicables aux données qu'elle reçoit des provinces et des territoires. Les mesures qu'elle prendra devraient notamment comprendre la conclusion d'accords avec toutes les provinces et tous les territoires sur les données que ces	L'Agence est d'accord avec cette recommandation. Les normes relatives aux maladies à déclaration obligatoire ont été acceptées et signées par l'une des provinces en septembre 2007. L'Agence poursuivra son travail en vue de finaliser d'autres ententes en matière de partage des données avec les provinces et les territoires. De plus, pour ce qui est des maladies à déclaration obligatoire, les définitions de cas révisées seront mises au point et publiées au plus tard en décembre 2009.

administrations fourniront au sujet de chacune des maladies infectieuses. **(5.40–5.42)**	
5.46 Pour disposer de données d'une qualité suffisante pour exercer ses activités en matière de santé publique, l'Agence de la santé publique du Canada devrait mettre en œuvre des procédures relatives à l'évaluation et à la documentation de la qualité de ses données et elle devrait travailler en collaboration avec ses partenaires pour combler les lacunes. **(5.44–5.45)**	L'Agence est d'accord avec cette recommandation. L'Agence s'efforce de donner un caractère officiel aux vérifications de la qualité des données qu'elle a déjà entreprises et elle poursuivra son travail en ce sens. La procédure expérimentale de vérification de la qualité des données menée au sein de l'Agence devrait prendre fin en mars 2009. Comme elle l'indique dans son Cadre stratégique en matière de surveillance, l'Agence continuera de renforcer ses activités existantes en vue d'officialiser les procédures internes et, en collaboration avec ses partenaires, de combler les lacunes cernées.
5.50 L'Agence de la santé publique du Canada devrait vérifier périodiquement si ses systèmes de surveillance fonctionnent comme prévu et rendre publics les résultats de ces évaluations. **(5.47–5.49)**	L'Agence est d'accord avec cette recommandation. Au cours de l'exercice 2008-2009, l'Agence finalisera et mettra en application dans l'ensemble de l'organisme le Cadre d'évaluation des systèmes de surveillance. Ce cadre sera utilisé pour mener des évaluations périodiques des systèmes de surveillance.
5.51 Pour mesurer régulièrement le rendement de ses systèmes de surveillance, l'Agence de la santé publique du Canada devrait établir des indicateurs assortis de cibles et rendre compte de ses résultats en fonction de celles-ci. **(5.47–5.49)**	L'Agence est d'accord avec cette recommandation. Parallèlement à la révision et à l'élaboration de son résultat stratégique et de ses activités de programme, l'Agence établira les indicateurs nécessaires et présentera des rapports sur ces derniers au cours de l'exercice 2009-2010.
5.54 Pour faire en sorte que ses systèmes de surveillance relatifs aux infections dues au VIH, au virus du Nil occidental et au virus de l'influenza répondent le mieux possible aux besoins des utilisateurs, l'Agence de la santé publique du Canada devrait systématiquement	L'Agence est d'accord avec cette recommandation. Elle mettra en œuvre un programme d'évaluation des besoins des utilisateurs relativement aux systèmes de surveillance d'ici décembre 2008.

évaluer et documenter les besoins des utilisateurs. **(5.52–5.53)**	
Nouveaux engagements internationaux	
5.88 Afin de veiller au respect de ses obligations au titre du *Règlement sanitaire international*, l'Agence de la santé publique du Canada devrait s'assurer que ses systèmes internes de gestion de l'information relative aux situations graves en matière de santé publique sont complets et bien documentés. **(5.74–5.87)**	L'Agence est d'accord avec cette recommandation. Au cours des exercices 2008-2009 et 2009-2010, l'Agence adoptera officiellement des systèmes internes complets et bien documentés aux fins de la gestion de l'information dans les situations graves en matière de santé publique. Pour ce faire, elle renforcera les séances d'information quotidiennes destinées aux cadres et aux responsables des systèmes de données, des laboratoires et des systèmes de surveillance pertinents.
5.89 Afin de veiller au respect de ses obligations au titre du *Règlement sanitaire international*, l'Agence de la santé publique du Canada devrait travailler avec ses partenaires à élaborer un plan d'action comportant des échéances claires et réalistes pour mettre en œuvre l'accord pour le partage des données pendant une urgence en matière de santé publique. **(5.74–5.87)**	**Réponse de l'Agence de la santé publique du Canada.** L'Agence est d'accord avec cette recommandation. Pour faire en sorte de pouvoir s'acquitter de ses obligations en vertu du *Règlement sanitaire international*, l'Agence poursuit l'élaboration d'un plan détaillé. Entre autres, elle met la dernière main à l'accord pour le partage des données pendant une urgence en matière de santé publique, élaboré par le Groupe d'experts sur la surveillance et l'information du Réseau de santé publique et, au cours de l'exercice 2008-2009, elle souscrira et participera au plan d'action coopératif en vue de la mise en œuvre de cet accord. En outre, comme l'exige l'Organisation mondiale de la Santé, l'Agence collaborera avec ses partenaires à la mise au point d'un plan d'action détaillé qui sera parachevé au plus tard en décembre 2009 et qui donnera un aperçu de la manière dont le Canada entend s'y prendre pour s'acquitter de ses obligations en vertu du *Règlement sanitaire international*. L'Agence est d'avis que les systèmes de santé publique du Canada sont en meilleure position qu'en 2003 pour faire face à une menace de maladie infectieuse qui toucherait l'ensemble

	du pays. Ainsi, des ententes ont été conclues entre l'Agence et ses partenaires depuis 2004 et, comme le démontrent les événements qui se sont produits depuis l'épidémie du syndrome respiratoire aigu sévère, l'Agence et ses partenaires, tant au pays qu'à l'étranger, peuvent contrer efficacement les menaces pour la santé publique.
5.91 Afin de se conformer aux exigences du Secrétariat du Conseil du Trésor et de faciliter les négociations avec les provinces et les territoires, l'Agence de la santé publique du Canada devrait effectuer une évaluation des facteurs relatifs à la vie privée qui tienne compte des exigences liées à l'échange d'information, décrites dans l'accord pour le partage des données, pendant une urgence en matière de santé publique. **(5.90)**	L'Agence est d'accord avec cette recommandation. Au cours de la prochaine année, l'Agence prévoit élaborer et mener des évaluations des facteurs relatifs à la vie privée, conformément à la politique du Secrétariat du Conseil du Trésor. L'Agence a le souci de protéger la vie privée des Canadiens et, en collaboration avec les provinces et les territoires, elle continuera d'évaluer et de gérer les répercussions sur la vie privée de tous les types de données communiquées dans le contexte de la santé publique.

Annexe D : Menaces que posent les maladies infectieuses

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MENACES QUE POSENT LES MALADIES INFECTIEUSES

Agent	Syndrome de la maladie	Mortalité	Prévention / traitement spécifique	Modes de dissémination	Contamination humaine possible	Foyer d'endémicité	Travaux de recherche sur l'utilisation à des fins militaires dans le passé	Utilisé comme arme biologique dans le passé
Catégorie A								
Anthrax (*Bacillus anthracis*)	Pneumonie et infection cutanée	Près de 100 %	Peut être évité et traité avec des antibiotiques. Vaccin accessible aux militaires	Aérosol	non	Omniprésent dans le sol, y compris au Canada	oui	oui, dissémination de l'anthrax transformé en arme par le biais du réseau postal des É.-U. en 2001
Botulisme (toxine *Clostridium botulinum*)	Syndrome neurologique paralysant	10 %	Traitement de soutien surtout (soutien respiratoire)	Nourriture ou eau	non	Omniprésent dans l'environnement, y compris au Canada	oui	non
Peste (*Yersinia pestis*)	Pneumonie	Près de 100 %	Peut être évité et traité avec des antibiotiques. Vaccins accessibles aux militaires	Piqûres d'insectes, aérosol	oui	À l'échelle mondiale dans les rongeurs	oui	oui, utilisé par les Japonais en Chine pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale et à l'époque médiévale
Variole (variole majeure)	Fièvre, rash pustuleux grave, défaillance d'organes multiples	30 % à l'ère où le virus de la variole circulait; la population a reçu plusieurs doses du vaccin	Vaccin disponible (réserve) mais pas de traitement spécifique	Aérosol, transcutané	oui	À notre connaissance, seulement dans deux laboratoires (États-Unis et Russie)	oui	oui, utilisé par des pionniers anglais contre des Premières nations de l'Amérique du Nord

Agent	Syndrome de la maladie	Mortalité	Prévention / traitement spécifique	Modes de dissémination	Transmission humaine possible	Foyer d'endémicité	Travaux de recherche sur l'utilisation à des fins militaires dans le passé	Utilisé comme arme biologique dans le passé
Tularémie (*Francisella tularensis*)	Pneumonie	<2 %	Peut être évité et traité avec des antibiotiques	Aérosol, transcutané	non	Omniprésent dans la nature, y compris au Canada	oui	non
Fièvres virales hémorragiques (p. ex. virus d'Ebola, de Marburg, de Lassa, de Machupo)	Fièvre, défaillance d'organes multiples, saignement	50 à 80 %	Pas de traitement ni de vaccins spécifiques	Transcutané, contact avec les muqueuses	oui	Endémique chez les animaux (chauves-souris et autres) en Afrique, en Asie et en Amérique du Sud	oui	non
Catégorie B								
Brucellose (espèces de *Brucella*)	Fièvre récidivante et organes multiples affectés	Moins de 2 %	Peut être évité et traité avec des antibiotiques.	Aérosol, consommation de fromage ou de lait	non	Omniprésent chez les ruminants, y compris au Canada	oui	non
Toxine epsilon du *Clostridium perfringens*	Diarrhée, crampes abdominales	Rare	Pas de traitement spécifique	Nourriture ou eau, aérosol	non	Omniprésent à l'échelle mondiale, y compris au Canada	non	non

MENACES QUE POSENT LES MALADIES INFECTIEUSES

Agent	Syndrome de la maladie	Mortalité	Traitement	Modes de dissémination	Transmission humaine possible	Foyer d'endémicité	Travaux de recherche sur l'utilisation à des fins militaires dans le passé	Utilisé comme arme biologique dans le passé
Menaces à la salubrité alimentaire (p. ex. *Salmonella*, *Escherichia coli* O157:H7, *Shigella*)	Diarrhée (bénigne à grave); insuffisance rénale (rarement)	Inhabituelle	Pas de traitement spécifique pour la plupart	Nourriture et eau		Omniprésent chez les animaux destinés à l'alimentation et dans le sol	non	oui, contamination délibérée à la salmonelle d'un buffet à salades par une secte religieuse de l'Oregon
Morve (*Burkholderia mallei*)	Infection cutanée, pneumonie, infection de la circulation sanguine	Élevée pour l'infection pulmonaire et l'infection de la circulation sanguine	Peut être évité et traité avec des antibiotiques.	Aérosol, transcutané	rarement	Endémique chez les chevaux de l'Afrique, de l'Asie, du Moyen-Orient, de l'Amérique centrale et du Sud	oui	Oui, utilisé lors de la Première Guerre mondiale par les Allemands contre les chevaux des Alliés
Mélioïdose (*Burkholderia pseudomallei*)	Infection cutanée, pneumonie, infection de la circulation sanguine	Les infections de la circulation sanguine sont parfois mortelles	Peut être évité et traité avec des antibiotiques.	Ingestion d'eau contaminée, aérosol	rarement	Endémique dans le sol et l'eau en Asie du Sud-Est	non	non
Psittacose (*Chlamydia psittaci*)	Pneumonie	La mortalité est relativement faible	Peut être évité et traité avec des antibiotiques.	Aérosol	non	Omniprésent chez les oiseaux sauvages et domestiques à l'échelle mondiale	non	non

Agent	Syndrome de la maladie	Mortalité	Traitement	Modes de dissémination	Transmission humaine possible	Foyer d'endémicité	Travaux de recherche sur l'utilisation à des fins militaires dans le passé	Utilisé comme arme biologique dans le passé
Fièvre Q (*Coxiella burnetii*)	Pneumonie	La mortalité est relativement rare	Peut être évité et traité avec des antibiotiques.	Aérosol	rarement	Endémique à l'échelle mondiale chez les ruminants, y compris au Canada	non	non
Toxine de ricin du *Ricinus communis*	Insuffisance respiratoire, nausées, vomissements et diarrhée	Près de 100 %	Pas de traitement spécifique	Aérosol, ingestion de nourriture ou d'eau contaminée, transcutané	non	Le ricin est cultivé à l'échelle mondiale	oui	Oui, utilisé pour empoisonner un dissident bulgare en 1978. Le R.-U. a découvert un complot visant la fabrication de ricin par une cellule terroriste en 2003. Il y a eu plusieurs lettres contenant du ricin aux É.-U.
Entérotoxine B staphylococcique	Nausées et vomissements graves	Très rare	Pas de traitement spécifique	Ingestion de nourriture contaminée	non	Omniprésent à l'échelle mondiale, y compris au Canada	non	non

MENACES QUE POSENT LES MALADIES INFECTIEUSES

Agent	Syndrome de la maladie	Mortalité	Traitement	Modes de dissémination	Transmission humaine possible	Foyer d'endémicité	Travaux de recherche sur l'utilisation à des fins militaires dans le passé	Utilisé comme arme biologique dans le passé
Typhus (*Rickettsia prowazekii*)	Fièvre, toux, douleurs musculaires et douleurs, rash	<5 %	Peut être évité et traité avec des antibiotiques.	Piqûres de poux, aérosol	non	Endémique en Afrique, en Asie centrale, et en Amérique centrale et du Sud	non	non
Encéphalite vitale (arborirus [p. ex. encéphalomyélite équine du Venezuela, encéphalite équine de l'Est, encéphalite équine de l'Ouest]	Fièvre, maux de tête, symptômes neurologiques	<5 %	Pas de traitement spécifique	Piqûres de moustiques, aérosol	non	Endémique en Amérique du Nord et du Sud, y compris au Canada	non	non
Menaces à la sûreté de l'eau (p. ex. *Vibrio cholerae*, *Cryptosporidium parvum)*	Diarrhée (modérée à grave)	rare		Eau contaminée	non	Sauf pour le choléra, omniprésent à l'échelle mondiale, y compris au Canada	non	non

Agent	Syndrome de la maladie	Mortalité	Traitement	Modes de dissémination	Transmission humaine possible	Foyer d'endémicité	Travaux de recherche sur l'utilisation à des fins militaires dans le passé	Utilisé comme arme biologique dans le passé
Category C								
Maladies infectieuses émergentes comme le virus Nipah, l'hantavirus, la grippe pandémique	divers	aérosol	Pas de traitement spécifique	Dépend de l'agent		Accessible dans les réservoirs naturels (oiseaux, chauves-souris, rongeurs) à l'échelle mondiale	non	non

Annexe E : Niveaux de l'effectif de la GRC

Voici le point de vue du Comité au sujet des niveaux qui conviennent pour l'effectif de la GRC, répartis entre les différentes questions de sécurité nationale que le Comité a examinées dans des rapports et des recommandations antérieurs. « Effectif » fait référence aux agents à temps plein de la GRC, en uniforme.

Dossier de sécurité	**Effectif actuel de la GRC**	**Niveau de l'effectif proposé par le Comité**	**Justification du niveau de l'effectif proposé par le Comité**
Aéroports	100	600-800	• Le Comité recommande que le gouvernement du Canada augmente l'effectif de la GRC d'environ 600 à 800 équivalents temps plein (ETP) afin de donner à la GRC la capacité d'accomplir les tâches suivantes : o exercer un nouveau mandat de surveillance et de responsabilité en vue d'assurer la sûreté dans les aéroports; o accroître ses capacités en matière d'enquête et d'analyse dans les aéroports du Réseau national des aéroports. Source : Manuel de sécurité du Canada : édition 2007 : Aéroports, page 14, recommandation A1.
Ports maritimes	29	1 300-1 500	• Le Comité recommande que le gouvernement du Canada ajoute entre 1 300 et 1 500 équivalents temps plein (ETP) à l'effectif total des Équipes nationales d'enquêtes portuaires de la GRC afin que celle-ci soit en mesure : o de lutter contre le crime organisé dans les 19 ports faisant partie du Réseau portuaire national; o de prévenir les menaces à la sécurité nationale du Canada

			venant des ports maritimes canadiens et d'y faire face; o d'augmenter, par l'entremise d'opérations conjuguées avec les services de police provinciaux et locaux, les effectifs côté eau dans les ports situés dans le Réseau des Grands Lacs et de la Voie maritime du Saint-Laurent et en bordure des principaux cours d'eau. Source : Manuel de sécurité du Canada : édition 2007 : Ports maritimes, page 26, recommandation S5.
Grands Lacs	14 (30 en 2008)	1 200-1 400	• Le Comité recommande que le gouvernement du Canada accorde 1 200 à 1 400 équivalents temps plein (ETP) supplémentaires à la Sous-direction de la marine et des ports de la GRC afin que celle-ci puisse : o se doter d'une capacité de couverture et de patrouille suffisante pour faire appliquer efficacement les lois fédérales dans le Réseau des Grands Lacs et la Voie maritime du Saint-Laurent (RGLVMSL); o acquérir une meilleure connaissance situationnelle du trafic dans le RGLVMSL; o disposer en permanence d'une capacité d'interdiction dans le RGLVMSL; o se poser comme un partenaire efficace de l'USCG dans ses efforts pour garantir la sécurité dans le RGLVMSL. Source : Manuel de sécurité du Canada : édition 2007 : Côtes, page 50, recommandation C9.

Frontière terrestre	145	2 200-2 800	Cette estimation est fondée sur les calculs suivants : • que le programme existant d’équipes intégrées de la police des frontières doit prendre de l’expansion à l’échelle du pays et que chaque équipe doit accroître ses capacités d’enquête et d’analyse (effectif de 100 à 120 environ par équipe, pour un effectif total de **1 500 à 1 800**); • que la GRC doit acquérir une meilleure connaissance situationnelle du trafic le long de la frontière en ayant davantage recours à des technologies innovatrices comme les véhicules aériens sans pilote et les hélicoptères (effectif total de **100-200**); • que la GRC doit améliorer sa capacité de protéger la frontière de 8 891 km avec les États-Unis et les 24 passages à niveau, entre autres : en assurant la protection et la sécurité du personnel de l’ASFC qui travaille aux 119 passages frontaliers terrestres et sur les 716 chantiers maritimes desservis par l’ASFC en renforçant les EIPF et les détachements de la GRC, et regroupant les services avec ceux de l’ASFC (effectif de **600-800**).
Total	**288**	**5300-6500**	

Annexe F : Attrition au sein des Forces canadiennes

Le document suivant a été obtenu suite à une demande de renseignements envoyée au ministère de la Défense nationale par le Service d'information et de recherche parlementaires, le 27 juin 2008.

Le ministère de la Défense nationale a fourni la réponse suivante en juillet 2008.

Le Comité permanent de la sécurité nationale et de la défense
Demande de renseignements – Recrutement et attrition

Question : Veuillez fournir des données sur le recrutement et l'attrition au sein des FC pour l'exercice en cours (2007-08).

Réponse : Au 31 mars 2008, les FC avaient recruté 6 716 personnes durant l'exercice 2007-2008. Au cours de la même période, 6 088 membres ont quitté l'effectif, ce qui donne une augmentation nette de 628 personnes.

Annexe G : Glossaire

ASPC – Agence de la santé publique du Canada
BNEISU – Bureau national des équipes d'intervention sanitaire d'urgence (relève de l'ASPC)
BSU – Bureau des services d'urgence (relève de l'ASPC)
CBRNE – chimique, biologique, radiologique, nucléaire et explosif
CCGU – Collège canadien de gestion des urgences (relève de SPC)
CEIM – Centre d'évaluation intégrée des menaces (relève de SPC)
CMIU – Centre de mesures et d'interventions d'urgence (relève de l'ASPC)
COG – Centre des opérations du gouvernement (relève de SPC)
COM Canada – Commandement Canada (relève de MDN)
COU – Centre des opérations d'urgence
CRTC – Conseil de la radiodiffusion et des télécommunications canadiennes
CSRGU – cadres supérieurs responsables de la gestion des urgences
DEN – Division des exercices nationaux (relève de SPC)
EISU – équipe d'intervention sanitaire d'urgence (relève de l'ASPC)
FC – Forces canadiennes
FEMA – Federal Emergency Management Agency (aux États-Unis)
FTP (ou F/T/P) – fédéral/territorial/provincial
GRC – Gendarmerie royale du Canada
GSTI – Gestion de la sécurité des technologies de l'information
IPSM (ou ISSM) – Initiative de protection de la santé mondiale (ou Initiative de sécurité sanitaire mondiale) (relève de l'ASPC)
LGU – *Loi sur la gestion des urgences*
MDN – Ministère de la Défense nationale

MINISTÈRES/ORGANISMES FÉDÉRAUX

OCDE – Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques
OGU – organisme de gestion des urgences
OTAN – Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord
PCO – Plan de continuité des opérations
PCPC – Programme conjoint de protection civile (relève du PCPC)
PE – Protocole d'entente
PGS – Politique du gouvernement sur la sécurité
PIUF – Plan d'intervention en cas d'urgence fédéral (relève de SPC)
PNFIE – Programme national de fiabilité des infrastructures essentielles (relève de SPC)

PSN – Politique de sécurité nationale
PT (ou P/T) – Provinces et territoires
RMLGASS (ou RMLPS) – Réseau mondial de laboratoires-groupes d'action pour la sécurité et la santé (ou Réseau mondial de laboratoires de protection de la santé) (relève de l'ASPC)
RRFT – Restructuration de la Réserve de la Force terrestre (relève de MDN)
RSMU – Recherche et sauvetage en milieu urbain
RSMUEL (ou SARMU) – Recherche et sauvetage en milieu urbain à l'aide d'équipement lourd
SAC – services d'avis à la communauté
SC – Santé Canada
SCRS – Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité
SFIU – Système fédéral d'intervention d'urgence (relève de SPC)
SNGIDS – Système national de gestion des incidents dans le domaine de la santé (relève de l'ASPC)
SNIU – Système national d'intervention d'urgence (relève de SPC)
SPC – Sécurité publique Canada
SRAS – Syndrome respiratoire aigu sévère
SRNU – Système de la réserve nationale d'urgence (relève de l'ASPC)

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