

## Reforming the Canadian Foreign Service:

### Submission of the Canadian Foreign Service Alumni Forum to Global Affairs Canada and to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

17 November, 2022

#### Summary:

To ensure that Global Affairs Canada can be fit for purpose for the next few decades, we urge a major reform effort, carried out over the next five years, with a regularized reporting system involving ministers, deputy ministers and a group outside the Department.

As first steps, we recommend larger intakes of new recruits, aiming at “over-recruitment,” to allow for known factors leading to attrition. To ensure that these new recruits can be integrated successfully, we also urge the re-initiation of a career management capacity in GAC, involving an emphasis on linguistic capabilities and expertise.

To manage GAC’s personnel more successfully, we recommend the return to “pool management” for rotational foreign service officers, and the creation of a new “non-rotational FS officer” pool, that would amalgamate some positions now classified in the AS, PM, EC, CO and other occupational groups, for which there is currently no career-management plan. For both of these pools, we also recommend a sharp increase in training, focussing on training in difficult languages, as well as professional training for greater geographic and functional expertise. The EX cadre also requires increased training, both for issue management and personnel issues.

We urge GAC to look at numbers: the number of rotational officers abroad and the need to re-balance its headquarters and international staff, now skewed disproportionately towards headquarters assignments; the number of officers required on training (possibly between 10 and 20 %); and the numbers to be assigned to a new non-rotational FS pool. Numbers matter if the leaders of tomorrow are to be recruited today.

GAC also needs to boost the tools required to carry out successful diplomatic activities, in the form of programs in the areas of communications, culture, and development assistance. Without these programs at the sharp end, GAC lacks the instruments to carry out effective diplomatic activity.

GAC requires major re-structuring to reduce its enormous and unwieldy senior management complement at headquarters and to focus its energies on priority issues and priority missions abroad. Reducing the numbers of senior managers, increasing delegation of authority and enhancing internal communications would also streamline the Department in ways that would free up resources for other requirements.

The current situation in GAC is dire. It requires a strong, concerted response, with a plan put into place quickly and sustained over time, possibly with new resources.

## Réforme du service extérieur canadien:

### Mémoire du Forum des anciens du service extérieur canadien à Affaires mondiales Canada et au Comité sénatorial permanent des affaires étrangères et du commerce international

17 novembre, 2022

#### Résumé:

Pour faire en sorte qu’Affaires mondiales Canada puisse être adapté à ses objectifs pour les prochaines décennies, nous demandons instamment un effort de réforme majeur, mené au cours des cinq prochaines années, avec un système de rapports régularisés impliquant les ministres, les sous-ministres et un groupe extérieur au Ministère.

Dans un premier temps, nous recommandons des apports plus importants de nouvelles recrues, visant un «sur-recrutement», pour tenir compte des facteurs connus conduisant à l'attrition. Pour s'assurer que ces nouvelles recrues puissent être intégrées avec succès, nous demandons également la remise en place d'une capacité de gestion de carrière au sein de GAC, mettant l'accent sur les capacités et l'expertise linguistiques.

Pour mieux gérer le personnel d'AMC, nous recommandons le retour à la « gestion du bassin » pour les agents du service extérieur permutants, et la création d'un nouveau bassin « d'agents FS non permutants », qui fusionnerait certains postes maintenant classifiés dans les AS, PM, EC, CO et autres groupes professionnels, pour lesquels il n'existe actuellement aucun plan de gestion de carrière. Pour ces deux bassins, nous préconisons également une forte augmentation des formations, privilégiant les formations en langues difficiles, ainsi que des formations professionnalisantes pour une plus grande expertise géographique et fonctionnelle. Le cadre EX a également besoin d'une formation accrue, à la fois pour la gestion des problèmes et les problèmes de personnel.

Nous demandons instamment à GAC d'examiner les chiffres : le nombre d'officiers en rotation à l'étranger et la nécessité de rééquilibrer son siège et son personnel international, désormais orientés de manière disproportionnée vers les affectations au siège ; le nombre d'officiers requis en formation (éventuellement entre 10 et 20 %) ; et les numéros à attribuer à un nouveau groupe FS non rotatif. Les chiffres comptent si les dirigeants de demain doivent être recrutés aujourd'hui.

GAC doit également renforcer les outils nécessaires pour mener à bien des activités diplomatiques, sous la forme de programmes dans les domaines de la communication, de la culture et de l'aide au développement. Sans ces programmes à la pointe, GAC manque d'instruments pour mener une activité diplomatique efficace.

GAC a besoin d'une restructuration majeure pour réduire son effectif énorme et lourd de cadres supérieurs au siège et pour concentrer ses énergies sur les questions prioritaires et les missions prioritaires à l'étranger. La réduction du nombre de cadres supérieurs, l'augmentation de la délégation de pouvoirs et l'amélioration des communications internes rationaliseraient également le Département de manière à libérer des ressources pour d'autres besoins.

La situation actuelle au GAC est désastreuse. Elle nécessite une réponse forte et concertée, avec un plan mis en place rapidement et soutenu dans le temps, éventuellement avec de nouvelles ressources.

## Report:

### The Challenge Ahead:

This report to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade and to Global Affairs Canada has been prepared by members of the Canadian Foreign Service Alumni Forum, or CFSAF, an organization formed in 2021 to represent the interests and views of retired members of Canada's foreign service, from all occupational groups and streams.

We do not believe that the Canadian foreign service can meet the demands of the next two to three decades without major change. In the past two decades, it has experienced a serious decline in its capacities and capabilities. If it is to meet the challenges ahead, at a time when the international arena will be critical to the prosperity and security of Canadians, a rigorous reform exercise is essential.

This report looks at these issues within GAC and offers potential solutions. It is primarily about the "foreign service officer" or "FS group" within Global Affairs Canada (GAC), a cadre of "rotational" officers whose careers involve assignments in Canada and regular postings abroad. However, this report will refer to other occupational groups as well. It builds on a report prepared more than forty years ago, *The Report of the Royal Commission on Conditions of Foreign Service (1981)*. Much has changed in that time, but too much has remained the same. Other more recent critiques of the foreign service address newer issues of concern to a different generation of Canadians.

The current situation is sufficiently serious that it requires a frank, clear and comprehensive plan of recovery and rejuvenation. It also requires a plan backed up by numbers and data. Such a plan would need to be put into place quickly under deputy-ministerial authorities and sustained with full government support, with strict discipline, for a period of at least five years to assess its success in effecting real change and adapting to evolving realities. The case for additional resources needs to be made to Treasury Board, the Department of Finance and the Cabinet.

The process of adaptation will be challenging for both the government and for many people in the current foreign service. In this report we suggest some lines of inquiry for the Committee and the main elements of what we consider to be a comprehensive plan of recovery and rejuvenation, based upon the limited data available to those outside GAC.

### The Nature of the Problems:

The issue of reforming and rejuvenating the Canadian foreign service is an important one. Canada is inherently internationalist, and our security and prosperity are dependent upon the successful functioning of a global society, anchored in international trade agreements and international law, with a strong commitment to the search for rules-based solutions to complex global problems.

The Canadian foreign service has been a powerful instrument enabling Canada to emerge as a sovereign state with full control over our foreign policy. It performs a large number of important tasks for the Government of Canada in meeting its international obligations and advancing Canadian interests and values. At a time of convulsive change, with conflict, natural disasters and pandemics adding complexity to our search for stability and prosperity, the Canadian foreign service must be able to look ahead, advance our interests and values, and provide a voice for Canada and Canadians in troubled

times. Canadians should know more about what GAC does and why it's important to Canada. (For a short list of what Canada's foreign ministry does, see Annex A.)

The difficulties now experienced by GAC rest in two different situations, which have combined to create a perfect storm of adversity for the foreign service of today.

The first set of problems relates to the resource squeeze experienced by GAC over the past two to three decades. Reductions were made to both departmental programs and to personnel resources. At the same time, GAC was forced to expand its scope and geographic reach with the creation of new programs and the opening of many new missions, in effect taking on additional burdens with commensurately fewer resources. Although asked to do "more with less", GAC has little flexibility over much of its budget. Mandated reductions therefore affected disproportionately the human resources sector of GAC, including its capacity to train and deploy employees abroad, as well as its programs. It would be useful for GAC to present to the Committee relevant budgetary information about its evolution over the past 20 to 30 years.

Reductions in program funds, combined with an expansion in obligations, have now led to an untenable resource situation. Although Canada seems to have substantial capabilities, with almost 180 missions abroad, many of these missions have little or no program funding. Canada now has a large number of "small" or "micro-missions", some with no Canadians, or with one or two Canadian staff members. They exist to show the Canadian flag, but are so thinly staffed and poorly supported that they are incapable of meeting anything but minimal obligations. Much of Canada's diplomatic presence is a Potemkin village. We rank last among our G7 colleague nations in the size and scope of our diplomatic representation.

The second problem exacerbating this situation has been an ill-considered attempt by GAC's professional HR specialists to shoe-horn the public service's normal recruitment and placement process into a totally different system, namely, the traditional FS "pool system." The results have been chaotic. Members of the FS group have been disadvantaged against their other colleagues in terms of promotion and assignments. Training regimes have been upset and career-management has disintegrated. GAC has been unable to keep up with promotion boards for the FS group, leading to substantial attrition in the group. GAC can only recover from this legacy by changing its approach to human resources.

A core problem has been inadequate and inconsistent recruitment policies over the past twenty years. The government's most historically-successful recruitment effort (the annual foreign service entrance system) was put on hold almost continually over the past twenty years in favour of ad hoc arrangements. These have fallen well short, both numerically in replacing foreign service vacancies, and qualitatively in hiring persons with specific skill sets needed for foreign service work. One of the consequences has been a notable decline in GAC's bilingualism capabilities, formerly one of the strengths of the Canadian foreign service. The Committee may wish to ask for data on departmental hiring practices over the past two decades and how those practices met GAC's needs.

GAC needs a significant annual FS recruitment at a time of major attrition and personnel vacancies through various forms of leave, and when retirements have reduced the cadre of experienced officers. Only an annual recruitment exercise can bring in the numbers of new recruits needed to fill vacancies and replace the older generation, over time building up the numbers of experienced senior managers. GAC also lost sight of the need to "over-recruit" in terms of new entries each year, allowing for known variables: attrition, secondments, training, and maternity and paternity leave. Without an annual recruitment of sufficient size and scope, including over-recruiting, no rejuvenation exercise can be successful.

Patchy recruitment efforts over the past two decades led to another serious problem for GAC. To compensate for vacancies in the foreign service group over the past two decades, GAC began the practice of reclassifying FS positions at headquarters, in order to find quick replacements (the much denigrated but also highly-valued “gap-fillers”). These reclassifications were from rotational FS positions into other occupational groups, and they were so numerous across the entire Department that GAC lost track of their numbers.

Most geographic divisions in GAC, for example, formerly consisted almost entirely of rotational foreign service officers, with experience in the regions they managed. Now, they have large numbers of non-rotational officers, many with little first-hand knowledge of the geographic region on which they are working. A mix of rotational and non-rotational officers may be appropriate in program or operational terms in certain divisions. But the current situation was the result of human resource errors rather than careful thought. GAC needs to examine its geographic and functional bureaux to assess the best mix of its rotational and non-rotational personnel, and to obtain a firm fix as to the numbers needed in each group. Without this type of foundational work, which has not been done in GAC, no review of the foreign service is possible. The Committee can assist GAC by asking basic questions about numbers and balances.

GAC has suffered one important, additional adverse consequence of inadequate recruitment and reclassification from the FS group into non-rotational positions. GAC now has a large body of non-rotational personnel in various occupational groups (AS, PM, CO, EC, etc.), for whom there is no clearly-articulated and satisfying career structure nor any career management system, with its associated training and assignments. Thus, the recruitment failure in GAC’s HR policies and practices over the past two decades has given the Department the worst of two worlds: an inadequate foreign service contingent, and a large non-rotational group that lacks satisfactory long-term career prospects.

There is one simple but potentially thorough solution to the current dilemma: the creation of two “pool” systems in GAC for the foreign service. The current FS “pool” of rotational officers is already established. GAC should now look at the possibilities of a strong non-rotational contingent in GAC, consolidated into another “pool” system. It would replace the current ad hoc approach of having non-rotational employees occupying different, seemingly unrelated occupational groups (AS, PM, CO, EC, etc.). It could be managed along the lines of the rotational FS pool, with sub-divisions into appropriate streams relevant to their assignments, and with a career management structure. The advantage of this arrangement for the non-rotational officer contingent is that it would facilitate the management of career development, and offer the prospect of training and other steps that could lead to advancement to the executive level. Not all occupational groups in GAC would be appropriate for the non-rotational FS pool, but it would undoubtedly be large in size.

The creation of two distinct “pools,” managed via a pool system, would recognize what other foreign ministries have recognized years ago, namely, that there are numerous positions in any foreign ministry that are inherently non-rotational (i.e., they do not require staffing by someone with experience on a posting). There are many individuals who can contribute to the success of the foreign service, but who have personal or professional reasons for not wanting a rotational career involving postings abroad. Both of these pools, rotational and non-rotational, could be represented by the same union (the Professional Association of Foreign Service Officers), or they could be represented by different organizations, as they may choose.

The two pools could have similarities in career management and training structures, and there would need to be “on-ramps” and “off-ramps” that link them together (allowing for movement due to evolving career aspirations). Although the rules as to assignments would be somewhat different, a

“pool” organization makes it easy to arrange assignments, promotions, secondments, etc. without the onerous (and superfluous) rules of the normal public service.

The personnel issues now bedeviling GAC are the strongest argument in favour of designating the entire Department as a special operating agency rather than a normal department of the Public Service. (See the submission to the Senate Committee by Amb. (ret’d) Doreen Steidle, of 20 September, 2022.) If GAC’s requirements for recruitment, staffing, retention, and terms and conditions of service cannot be met, then the designation of Global Affairs Canada as a “special agency”, with its own governance and management arrangements, may be a necessary and desirable option for the Government to pursue. Clearly, the current HR system in GAC does not work.

Perhaps the two greatest deficiencies in GAC’s HR system in the past twenty years have been the absence of career management and the diminishing resources devoted to specialized training. Career management was once the key to turning “generalist” recruits into more specialized FS officers with linguistic skills and regional and functional expertise. A recent report by Ulric Shannon, “Competitive Expertise and Future Diplomacy: Subject-Matter Specialization in Generalist Foreign Ministries”, published in August, 2022, by the Centre for International Policy Studies, University of Ottawa, covers this topic capably with numerous fresh insights and comparisons with other countries.

Yet GAC’s former career management system was also subtle and unique, probably nowhere described comprehensively in administrative documents. Career management was not a centralized function of the HR branch; each FS officer was expected to have his/her own career plan, discussed occasionally with HR staffing officers and managed in consultation with others. This system meant that each FS officer had to identify a regional specialization, generally with a foreign language to accompany it, and pursue postings abroad and assignments in Canada consistent with that plan. For those aspiring to Middle East specializations, for example, Arabic language training was highly desirable. The Eastern European specialization was generally anchored in knowledge of Russian. Career progression involved an initial and perhaps second posting in that region, honing linguistic skills, and then returning to headquarters to work on regional and functional issues.

Foreign ministries have one intrinsic “value-added” for their governments. It’s in the word “foreign”. Led by the Director-General in each relevant geographic branch, GAC should track its own needs in terms of requirements for foreign-language competencies. Between 10 and 20 percent of foreign service officers should be on foreign language training at any given time, if GAC is to produce enough officers to staff missions with personnel with linguistic competence, and build a pool of competence for headquarters assignments. Without adequate language competencies, it is impossible to have a foreign service that can claim expertise in foreign cultures and knowledge of other countries and regions.

In addition, officers were expected to have at least one or possibly two “functional” specializations, like international security, or trade promotion, thereby taking headquarters assignments in those areas and building expertise over time. Secondments to other departments or even outside the government were useful additions to a professional career profile. Career management was not practiced in the same ways in all FS streams. CIDA was merged into GAC (or Foreign Affairs, as it was then titled) in 2013, and its personnel arrangements were much different than GAC’s; GAC’s administrative and consular officers have only recently been integrated into the FS group, a process years in the making. Career management, however, has traditionally been an especially vital component in the political and trade streams in GAC.

GAC's foreign service officers have been pulled in contradictory directions over the past twenty years. The promotion system was clogged and dysfunctional. Specialization in languages and regional expertise was discouraged. Postings came to be regarded as interruptions in career advancement, while those outside GAC were able to enter the executive ranks of the department with little or no knowledge of international affairs or foreign policy. The career trajectory of GAC became out of sync with the regular public service, making it seem advantageous to leave the Department to secure promotion. Over time, these considerations, combined with lack of recruitment years earlier, led to thinning of expertise at the senior levels of GAC.

The decline of GAC's expertise in the past few decades can be most clearly seen in the diminishing linguistic capabilities of the Canadian foreign service. This has mainly been a function of the squeeze on GAC's training resources. Rather than confront more difficult choices in budget-reduction exercises, GAC chose to cut training. It has reached the point where it has minimal numbers of FS officers trained in Mandarin, Russian, Arabic, etc., in effect, numbers insufficient for effective rotationality. It has woeful numbers of officers who speak Korean, Turkish, Farsi, German, Urdu, etc. Because of the training requirements of difficult languages, those with these skills are the most difficult to replace when the attrition rate is high. The linguistic capacities of Canadian heads of mission, after two decades of under-training, are woeful. The Committee may wish to secure from GAC relevant data about linguistic capacities, and what requirements need to be met to secure rotational expertise at missions in Russia, China, South Korea, etc.

The intricacies of building expertise through career management are not easily appreciated. But they might most usefully be explained in a case study of the foreign service lawyers in GAC. (See the separate submission on GAC's Legal Branch by John Holmes et al.) GAC's lawyers have had a substantial global impact in shaping international law and in building a Canadian foreign service capability that has delivered for Canadians. GAC's international lawyers were major contributors to the achievement of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and had a dynamic role in the creation of the International Criminal Court. The difficulties of maintaining a cadre of FS lawyers illustrate the importance of recruitment, training, career management and assignments abroad in building a capacity that can continue to serve Canadian foreign policy objectives.

The starting point is in recruiting sufficient numbers of lawyers, followed by a flexible assignment policy to ensure that the Legal Branch within GAC can make the most of the lawyers recruited into any of the FS group's streams. The Legal Branch then needs a number of "legal positions abroad", at key embassies or missions, where departmental lawyers can build their expertise. The solutions to strengthening GAC's Legal Bureau are relatively straightforward, and short-cuts cannot be taken. Most of all, GAC has to recognize the importance of the Legal Branch's role and the disadvantages that would accrue to both GAC and to Canada by devolving responsibility for international law to others in the Canadian government.

GAC faces other HR issues that should be tackled vigorously. The question of dealing with Canada's "Locally-Engaged Staff" (LES) at each mission is fundamental, since these locally-hired persons constitute the majority of employees at our missions abroad. Canada has attracted some of the best LES in the world over the past decades, but recent policies have eroded our reputation as a good employer. Changes are essential. GAC should also look at the longstanding issue of simplifying a broken appraisal system. Appraisals are too time-consuming, while not yielding results commensurate with the effort. Based on the experiences of the past few years, GAC also has to beef up its counselling services, especially for employees serving in the severest hardship posts. In a broken HR system, it is difficult to

pin down all of the issues requiring attention. Consultation with every level in GAC will help supply some of the answers and inspiration.

#### Program Issues:

GAC now suffers from an unsustainable triangle of conflicting aspirations and capabilities: a foreign policy reach aiming to be global, comprehensive and effective; budgetary resources that adequately sustain only a core group of missions, with limited activities because of a shortage of program funding; and a disproportionately high number of headquarters officers chasing a diminishing and insufficient number of assignments abroad, supervised by an extraordinarily large number of largely-inexperienced senior managers. Many things require change after years in which GAC's senior management avoided the tough decisions needed to restore its effectiveness.

Canada's representatives abroad do not work in a vacuum. They require support, generally in terms of "programs" that make Canada a participant and player in international affairs. Much of this "program funding" has disappeared or diminished substantially in the past two decades. The Committee may wish to ask about this difficulty in GAC, as program reductions have removed too much muscle from the Department's capabilities. While we cannot examine each program in depth, the following is short overview.

In the area of communications and public affairs, GAC has only the most minuscule capacities, and therefore has difficulty in getting its messages out to audiences abroad. It works mainly in English and French, and its capabilities in other languages are highly constrained, at a time when a communication capability in key foreign languages is precisely what is required abroad. The quality of GAC's websites is uneven, at a time when a mature web presence is essential. There is a lack of clarity about the issues of importance to Canada and where we stand on key issues of the day, at a time when clarity is essential. This entire area requires serious attention by communications experts and IT specialists.

GAC has essentially dropped out of the area of cultural diplomacy, and Canada's role in this area is inadequate when compared to virtually any of our peer countries. The government has yet to implement the core ideas of a valuable 2019 Senate study. The significance of cultural affairs in building and sustaining our diplomatic presence abroad has yet to be reflected in GAC's capabilities, especially at our major missions. This area needs to be re-visited with consultations with those outside of GAC.

Partnerships are fundamental to having influence abroad, and partnerships with people interested in Canadian history, politics and economics further the Canadian national interest. GAC should seek to reverse the decisions taken years ago to reduce and then eliminate Canada's financial support to its "Understanding Canada" program, which helped to sustain more than 7000 scholars in 50 countries under the aegis of Canadian studies. At very modest cost, this program supported the work and networking of researchers who were important partners with Canada and who acted as important interlocutors throughout the world. It was a cost-effective program with abundant returns to Canada; GAC can easily move to restore this partnership at relatively small cost.

The Canada Fund for Local Initiatives was once a small but useful source of development funding for a wide range of missions, especially at missions not in countries of concentration for Canadian development assistance. With the number of countries of concentration now reduced, the fund should have become more important in other states. But it has been reduced in latitude, and its administration has been increased in complexity and centralization. Given the importance of this fund in acting quickly

and responsively to local needs and interests, GAC needs to increase its size and range, and use simple IT solutions to make its administration as de-centralized and simple as possible. It is a particularly powerful tool in smaller missions without access to other development assistance programs.

#### Structural Issues:

GAC has major structural problems, some of which have come to light recently in its handling of basic issues. In this report, we focus on only one of its most critical issues: its unwieldy senior management complement.

GAC has the largest senior management complement in the Government of Canada, much larger than the Canadian Forces, although it manages less than a tenth of DND human resources on a much smaller budget. The structure is now sprawling and unmanageable, with dozens of priorities, very few focal points of accountability, and numerous programs in which authorities seem unclear. Communication within and among this group is poor, because the group is too large. The concepts of strategic thinking and tactical implementation have been lost, and delegation of authority is rarely practiced.

GAC needs another look at its basic structure. The objectives of this exercise would be: to reduce the senior management cadre in GAC by at least one half, or possibly to thirty to forty percent of its current numbers; to provide a philosophical and managerial foundation to job functions at the DM, ADM and DG levels; and to enhance communication and speed of decision-making at the top. This is critical to success at a complex time when clarity of purpose is essential. From the point of view of resource management, this exercise would also help to free up the personnel and other resources necessary to implement other reforms within GAC.

Along with massive stream-lining must come the introduction of key management tenets that now appear to be missing in GAC. One of the most important is “delegation of authority”. The top management level of the Department, i.e., the three deputy-ministers responsible for foreign policy, trade, and developmental assistance, have to work at the “strategic level” and delegate the implementation of operations to their subordinates. In other words, they have to get out of the business of everyday issue-management.

The Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) level of GAC should be where strategic direction set by deputies meets up with plans for operationalization. The ADM cadre should be significantly smaller. We suggest in Annex B a plan for 11 or 12 ADMs in place of the current 18 or so now in GAC. Most importantly, most of the ADMs would have a subsidiary title appropriate to their responsibilities, adding clarity to their areas of authority, which would be broader than they are now are. For example, the ADM in charge of trade policy would be the Chief Trade Negotiator. The ADM in charge of international security affairs and international organizations would be the Political Director of the foreign ministry, as well as ADM for International Security Affairs. This chart will assert the importance of the Legal Adviser as an ADM, in charge as well of Consular Affairs. We can provide suggestions as to how some bureaux might be amalgamated, and how their titles should evolve to become more general and generic. Inevitably, however, this is an exercise that can only be done internally, by GAC senior officials, working their way through their list of responsibilities.

With some effort, GAC can move towards a dramatic reduction from 90 or so Directors-General (DGs) to a more manageable, coherent number in the range of 30. For the geographics, the DG level will essentially be the “top level” for every region, leaving the ADM level free for dealing with the most

important strategic questions in that branch. In other words, the DG for Latin America and the Caribbean would be the senior officer in GAC responsible for managing Canada's relationships with every country south of the US border with Mexico. The DG for the Maghreb and Middle East will perform a similar role for Canada's relations with that region. Functional bureaux would be headed by DGs with substantial delegation of authority, particularly in programs, where delegation should speed up decision-making. As GAC now has numerous programs in many different offices, it should seek to consolidate some of its smaller programs into larger, flexible programming units.

There will be a continuing need, as there is in virtually every foreign ministry, for the appointment of "senior coordinators" or even Canada-based "ambassadors", for certain issues at what is now the ADM or DG level. These positions are generally created because of crisis situations, or important ad hoc tasks, that require senior leadership. Sometimes, the priorities in a geographic branch may be so diffuse that another senior position is required to handle a second or third time-consuming issue. In these cases, the appointment of senior coordinators in a branch is generally to manage GAC's internal machinery, coordinate with other Departments in the Canadian government, and to represent Canada at international meetings. (It was traditional, for example, to have a "coordinator" for Middle East peace negotiations; for many years, there was a senior coordinator for Afghanistan.) Senior officers will continue to be required for these positions, and the numbers required are inherently unpredictable.

One perceived issue in GAC has been calculating the numbers of officers required in senior positions. All foreign ministries share this issue, which stems from the problems of seniority in a rotational service. In general terms, a surplus at the senior levels is desirable and essential, in order to have the experienced staff to second to other departments, to act in emergency situations, to loan to UN or other international agencies, or to assign to provincial and other governments or the NGO community or the think-tank world. The current problem in GAC is now almost the reverse. The one-time surplus of experienced senior foreign service officers has disappeared, while many persons now serving in the GAC senior ranks have little or no experience in international affairs.

#### Other Mandate and Program Issues:

There will be other structural issues for which there is no easy solution. An appropriate reporting responsibility will need to be found for a new Communications bureau, capable of working with all three deputy ministers. The Policy Branch will need reconfiguration in similar fashion. Lines of accountability have to be established for several management units that function at the DG level, like the Office of Protocol, or Inspector General. GAC must resist the expansionist impulse to create new branches at the ADM level for each departmental priority or program, or for each new issue. While that practice seems to highlight the importance of an issue, over time it exacerbates difficulties of internal communication and obscures accountability.

Similarly, in the interests of synergies and simplicity, GAC should not try to duplicate the skills and capabilities that exist in the many other departments that have highly capable, experienced staff working on international affairs (for example, in the area of international environmental issues, or agriculture.) GAC needs a cooperative approach with other departments to work towards common governmental objectives. If a program of cultural relations takes hold in GAC, there are opportunities for partnership with others that will ease the organizational and personnel burden in GAC.

Over time, it may be possible to visualize a wider FS rotational and non-rotational group of employees, with a common management structure, working in several government departments. This

arrangement might simplify recruitment, training and assignments and offer new opportunities to both rotational and non-rotational staff. The current priority, however, should be on the process of de-cluttering GAC's senior management and establishing clarity of purpose and lines of responsibility.

Conclusion:

The objective of this report is to urge the creation of a Canadian foreign service that is fit for purpose. Consultations with current foreign service officers are essential, and engagement with the Department of Finance and Treasury Board on many issues will be essential. Organizational priorities will also have to be established, because several of these reforms can be instituted quickly, while some will require years of effort.

Because a work plan is essential, we urge the creation of a stand-alone working group, reporting directly to the Deputy Ministers, to draft priorities, prepare a work program, track progress, and ensure communication to the Deputies and Ministers on a regular basis. This group might also usefully advise on how new technologies could help streamline GAC's work and facilitate both de-centralization and accountability. Above all, we urge the importance of clear, timely communications to all stake-holders about the road ahead and how a future plan will be implemented.

Even prior to the finalization of a work program, GAC can move on obvious problems. GAC needs to confirm an annual recruiting program of sufficient size, and launch a major commitment to more training opportunities, including at the EX level. It can also begin work on an incremental shift in personnel resources from headquarters into the field, to end its disproportionate concentration on headquarters. Some of these resources should be committed to small missions, which are now especially weak. Some programs, such as the issue of re-funding Canadian studies, can be re-initiated almost immediately. More long-term work will be needed on other resource questions implicit in re-building program capacities. The difficulty for GAC will be that all of this transformational activity needs to be accomplished while the normal day-to-day process of running Canadian foreign policy takes place.

It took GAC almost two decades to reach the point at which those outside the department finally recognized that it was no longer fit for purpose. It will take some time to change its current directions and set it on a new course. A Canadian foreign service fit for purpose will be an essential asset for Canada at critical times. We offer this report to ensure that we can achieve this goal. We would be pleased to engage with the Committee and the Department on any points raised in this report.

Annex A:

What do Foreign Ministries do?

The following are the main roles of Canada's foreign ministry:

1. Canada's communicator to the global community and Canada's advocate on key international issues
2. the interpreter of global events to the Canadian government and the internal "think tank" of the government on foreign policy
3. the principal "advisers" of the Canadian government on responding to events abroad consistent with Canadian interests and values and in urgent situations
4. the representative of Canadian interests and values in global forums and the provider of a framework for our diplomatic activities and our relationships with other states
5. Canadian negotiators in global negotiating forums
  - a. chief trade negotiator
  - b. legal adviser
  - c. on everyday events in international organizations like the UN and the OAS
6. the program delivery agencies for a variety of programs
  - a. consular
  - b. trade commissioner service
  - c. development assistance programs
  - d. humanitarian aid programs
  - e. public diplomacy and "soft power" programs
  - f. post-conflict reconstruction programs
7. the paymaster for Canada's membership in global institutions
  - a. assessed contributions to the UN, NATO, OAS, etc.
  - b. voluntary contributions to the UNHCR, WHO, etc.
8. the providers of the international platform which enables most government departments to function abroad
  - a. chanceries, official residences, staff quarters, other real property abroad
  - b. electronic systems
  - c. security systems

Annex B:

GAC's Senior Management:

We would recommend reducing the current complement of senior management in GAC to the following offices:

1. Three current deputy ministers:
  - a. foreign affairs, trade and development
  - b. There is a need for one additional senior official, either as the Associate Deputy Minister rank or as an ADM, with specific management and budget responsibilities for many bureaux with government-wide or departmental responsibilities (such as the Office of the Chief of Protocol; the Inspector General; bureaux of communications; physical resources bureau, etc.)
  - c. There is also merit in designating the Associate Deputy Minister position as the Chief Operating Officer (COO) of the Department, "acting" when one of the deputies is away.
2. The following eleven Assistant Deputy Ministers:
  - a. Three geographics, which report in different ways to all three deputies:
    - i. Western Hemisphere branch
    - ii. Europe, Africa and Middle East branch
    - iii. Asia and Pacific branch
  - b. Legal and Consular Branch, headed by the Legal Adviser
    - i. Bureaux of legal affairs
    - ii. Bureaux of trade law
    - iii. Consular affairs bureau, headed by a DG who is the Chief Consular Officer
  - c. Five functional bureaux:
    - i. Trade Policy branch; Chief Trade Negotiator
    - ii. Trade promotion branch, Chief Trade Commissioner
    - iii. Development policy and programs branch
    - iv. International political and security affairs branch, the Political Director
    - v. Peace and security operations branch
  - d. Human resources branch
  - e. Financial Services branch; Chief Financial Officer

There have been futile, unsuccessful efforts in the past to reduce the numbers of geographic ADMs. But the geographics lead on too many prominent issues, and one or two offices at the ADM level are not sufficient. There have also been past efforts to eliminate ADMs for human resources and finance. These would be unwise steps at this time, although the time may come when there could be one ADM for management, with broad responsibilities for Human Resources, Finance and the Platform branch. This would involve significant delegation of authority to the DG level.