Canadian Troops in Afghanistan: 
Taking a Hard Look 
at a Hard Mission

An Interim Report of the Standing Senate Committee 
on National Security and Defence

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MEMBERSHIP

39th Parliament – 1st Session

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The Honourable Michael A. Meighen, Deputy Chair

and

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37th Parliament – 1st Session

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Afghans have been both battered by foreign occupiers and tyrannized by extreme elements of their own countrymen for as long as its citizens can remember. The Russians bludgeoned Afghanistan in the ‘80s. The Americans helped drive the Russians out in 1989 and then largely abandoned the Afghans in the ‘90s. The Taliban moved into the void and ruled with merciless fervor until overpowered by the Americans and their Northern Alliance allies in 2001.

An election in 2004 brought a new president to power in Kabul and, just under a year later, a new government was elected. But the Taliban continue to resist, particularly in three southern provinces, including Kandahar. While efforts are being made to eliminate corruption and solidify democratic institutions throughout the country, real power resides largely in the hands of warlords from various tribes. Any attempts to centralize control are complicated by the fact that Afghanistan’s economy is almost totally dependent on the sale of opium, and the opium marketplace is controlled by the warlords and, increasingly, the Taliban.

Tens of thousands of innocent people have died during the struggle for power in Afghanistan. More are being lost every day.

Canada’s Involvement in Afghanistan

Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan has expanded dramatically since it first participated in the International Security Assistance Force (mandated by the United Nations in late 2001). While Canada did participate in the war on terror in Afghanistan during the first part of 2002, our first deployment under ISAF occurred in the summer of 2003. That mission, Operation Athena as named by the Canadian Forces - was largely undertaken within the relatively safe confines of the capital city of Kabul, and attracted little attention in Canada.

Canada began expanding our forces in Afghanistan in the summer of 2005, preparing for combat in the far more dangerous province of Kandahar, home of the Taliban. For the past year, approximately 2,500 members of the Canadian Forces have taken a lead combat role in Kandahar Province under Operation Archer, aided and augmented primarily by troops from Britain and the Netherlands, who are
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conducting operations in adjoining southern provinces. In August 2006, a new NATO command assumed responsibility for operations in this part of Afghanistan while still working in close conjunction with the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom. These NATO allies are often called upon to provide air support for Canadian troops on the ground. Since Operation Archer began, 44 Canadian troops and one diplomat have been killed in Afghanistan; about 200 soldiers have been wounded.

In February 2006, Canada and 40 other countries including Afghanistan, signed “The Afghanistan Compact.” The Compact sets out detailed outcomes, including benchmarks and timelines, and commits Canada to contributing to the rehabilitation of Afghanistan until February 1st 2011.¹

The Rationale Behind Canada’s Involvement in Afghanistan

Canada is deeply involved in attempting to stabilize Afghanistan, for very good reasons.

Firstly, looking at Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan from a humanitarian point of view, only a very callous person would deny that the Afghan people need help.

Secondly, looking at Canada’s involvement from a strategic point of view, only a very naive person would deny that western countries are threatened by religious extremists – some of the most venomous of whom currently make their home in Afghanistan – and that neither Canada nor its allies should acquiesce to that threat.

Members of our Committee are neither callous nor naive. We have been studying Canada’s overall military capacity, and the Afghanistan situation in particular, for more than five years now. We believe that we understand both the humanitarian and strategic motives behind Canada’s military deployment in Afghanistan, and associated efforts to improve the life of Afghans through development projects and diplomatic initiatives.

On the Committee’s second visit to Afghanistan shortly before Christmas 2006, five of our members met Canadians on the Kandahar base and, thanks to the cooperation of the Canadian commander Brigadier-General T. Grant and the U.S.

¹ The Afghanistan Compact is the result of the London Conference on Afghanistan, which took place on January 31st –February 1st, 2006.
Army’s helicopters, we visited members of Canada’s Provincial Reconstruction team in the countryside. We were impressed by the commitment and bravery of the soldiers, commanders, and support personnel we met there. Like other Canadians, we want our troops to succeed, and we want them to return home safely.

We would not, however, be acting in the interests of Canadians in Afghanistan or at home if we did not proceed beyond the realm of emotional patriotism into the realm of intellectual patriotism, which means taking a hard look at what Canada is up against in Afghanistan.

To help determine whether the Afghanistan mission – as currently constituted – makes sense, we believe that Canadians should have access to all the information at the Government’s disposal necessary to help them formulate their own answers to essential questions. Since Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan comes at a huge cost – in both lives, and in billions of dollars – Canadians need answers to the following five questions:

- What precisely is Canada’s role in Afghanistan?
- What will define success for Canada in Afghanistan?
- What are the realistic chances of achieving that kind of success in Afghanistan?
- What costs\(^2\) are Canadians willing to pay to achieve success?
- Is Canada’s mission to Afghanistan currently being deployed in a way that gives Canada the best chance of achieving success?

\textbf{Looking for Answers}

Does our Committee have definitive answers to these questions? We do not. But we have studied the key issues related to Canadian security and defence for several years now. We have asked questions of thousands of people – including military leaders, enlisted personnel, academics, bureaucrats, politicians, journalists, and Canadians from all walks of life about those issues. We have studied Afghanistan,

\(^2\) The Committee was advised by Brigadier-General Tim Grant that the monetary cost of the operation in Kandahar is $30 million per month exclusive of salaries.
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and some of us have been there – albeit all too briefly. So Committee members believe that we have a contribution to make in what should be a national discussion on Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan. Such a discussion, replete with clear answers, has been sorely lacking.

Our troops deserve more than patriotic bumper stickers. They deserve thoughtful assessments from honest and impartial observers as to why Canada is in Afghanistan, what we can expect to achieve there, what we cannot expect to achieve there, and how best to proceed to try to ensure that the benefits of this deployment – both to Canada and Afghanistan – end up outweighing the costs.

The Challenges

The word “challenges” is widely used by politicians, bureaucrats and other sleight-of-hand artists as a euphemism for “problems.” There are all kinds of problems to be solved if the Canadian deployment to Afghanistan is to achieve what any reasonable person would define as “success.”

Allow us to list some of these problems first, and wrestle later in this Report with what might constitute a successful outcome.

Problem 1: Warrior Culture

Afghans have, over centuries, proven themselves to be fierce fighters particularly when confronting invaders from outside cultures. They repeatedly defeated the British during the 19th century “Afghan Wars” when Britain was the world’s dominant military power, and they routed the Soviets during the 1980s when the Soviet Union was the world’s second most dominant military power. Superior military technology does not always win the day, particularly in an era when suicide bombing and Improvised Explosive Devices have proven themselves to be very effective tools in this kind of war. Afghans are used to killing and being killed. Their society has been in a state of war for most of the last two centuries.

Problem 2: Home Team Advantage

NATO troops see themselves as defenders of the majority of Afghans versus powerful minority groups – the Taliban and regional warlords – who are the true enemies of the Afghan people. But how do Afghans see us? Do residents of
Kandahar province – home of the Taliban – see the situation our way? The harsh and sadistic Taliban government was repugnant to westerners, and to many Afghans. But are the Taliban more repugnant than foreign troops, who have been despised each and every time they have come to Afghanistan over the past two centuries?

We think we’re the good guys. What do Afghans think?

**Problem 3: Away Team Disadvantage**

The Taliban have no trouble identifying village elders and other influential Afghans. Identifying those people is far more difficult for a foreign army, including ours. We were informed that there have been cases when Canadian authorities thought they were talking to impartial “elders,” when they were actually talking to members of the Taliban. Furthermore, the Taliban are far more capable of finding out who they can trust in any given location – they have eyes and ears everywhere. Some Canadians we talked to strongly suggested that Afghans will always tell foreigners what they want to hear, which may have nothing to do with reality. Put simply, the side that speaks the language and knows the culture will always have the advantage when it comes to knowing what’s really going on.

**Problem 4: Geography and Time**

The Taliban have time and geography on their side. Invading armies can only spend so much time on foreign soil before patience and money run out at home. The Taliban have forever. Are Canadians willing to commit themselves to decades of involvement in Afghanistan, which could cost hundreds of Canadian lives and billions of dollars with no guarantee of ending up with anything like the kind of society that makes sense to us? If we aren’t willing to hang in for the long haul, what will have been the point of five years of Canadian lives and Canadian money disappearing?³

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³ If one were to look at this problem in strictly military terms (which one obviously cannot), tying up so many of the personnel and resources of the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, Canada’s combat role is hardening troops on the battlefield – a painful and perilous experience, but an important one for any military. On the other hand, the Forces’ involvement in Afghanistan not only precludes other missions at home and abroad that may prove to be important, it ties up resources that the Forces could be using to transform and grow after years of neglect.
Problem 5: Can we win, given how the map is drawn?

In the 1890s, the British Empire arbitrarily demarcated the border between Afghanistan and then British India (Pakistan since 1947), known as the Durand Line, taking into account physical geography not human geography. Tribes, including the Pashtun, therefore have roots on both sides of the Afghanistan and Pakistan border. Local Taliban members have found ways to gain virtually free passage across the border and have used this to their advantage - hiding out in Pakistan. This is a wild and independently-minded region over which Pakistan has little control. Most analysts believe that even if it actually wanted to (a prospect that many believe is wishful thinking) the Government of Pakistan would find it nearly impossible to exert meaningful control in this unruly border region.

This gives the Taliban a safe haven in which to hide and plan their attacks on our troops; and to plan their return to oppression of the Afghan people.

Problem 6: Change Comes Slowly in Medieval Societies

Some Canadians may think of all Middle East countries in similar terms, but countries like Iraq and Iran are far more sophisticated than Afghanistan. Afghanistan is only remotely connected to the modern world. Only one out of three Afghans is literate, and the country’s economy is almost entirely dependent on the growth of poppies and the sale of opium. The country’s only brief experience with democracy ended in a coup in 1973. The three primary forces in Afghan politics are armed power, tribal loyalties and corruption. Anyone expecting to see the emergence in Afghanistan within the next several decades of a recognizable modern democracy capable of delivering justice and amenities to its people is dreaming in Technicolor.

Chris Alexander, when he was Canada’s Ambassador to Afghanistan, told members of the Committee in his living room in Kabul that it would take 5 generations of effort to make a difference in Afghanistan. Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, currently Commander of Land Forces said on a number of occasions, that the mission would take two decades to complete. People outside Kabul are generally far more dependent on their traditional Sharia courts and systems of government than they are on the central government. Not only is the government’s justice system as corrupt as other components of the government, most police are untrained, illiterate, and don’t even know what the law is. This
makes the law difficult to enforce. While NATO is proud of the fact that national elections have taken place, these elections have proven to be all but irrelevant to Afghans in places like Kandahar.

**Problem 7: The Enemy is Rich**

Much of the lucrative opium trade is controlled by the Taliban. Villagers who join the Taliban’s fighting forces earn a significantly larger amount of money than Afghan police officers, who earn $70 a month. Cutting down poppies isn’t the answer – unless we offer alternatives to the abject poverty that would only get worse without the poppy crop. Unless that situation changes, most Afghans won’t have much trouble deciding which side to snuggle up to: the rich guys who aren’t foreigners, who can hide in the mountains for years or decades or centuries if need be, and who pay big bucks; versus the foreign guys who can’t hide, who will eventually run out of time and patience, and who don’t pay big bucks.

**Problem 8: The Society We are Trying to Rebuild is Corrupt**

Afghan government officials are notoriously corrupt at all levels, including those within the police and many regional governments. Since police and bureaucrats earn relatively low salaries and some state governors (all of whom are appointed by the President) are notorious for skimming those salaries, the police and other officials are known for shaking down ordinary citizens on a regular basis. The Taliban were known for their excessive moral indignation when in power. There were often brutal consequences. The good news is that the current government is not known for moral excess. The bad news is that the word moral is probably the last word that comes to an ordinary Afghan’s mind when describing the new government. Nearly everyone we talked to in Afghanistan – Canadians and Afghans - mentioned the high degree of corruption as a problem. It would be much easier to win hearts and minds if ordinary Afghans had respect for public officials. Higher salaries for police and other officials would undoubtedly help lessen corruption. But it is a pipe dream to believe that this deep-seated tradition will go away overnight.

**Problem 9: Too Many Innocent People Killed**

Collateral damage does not win the hearts and minds of Afghans. This damage results from air support, suicide attacks, Improvised Explosive Devices etc. The
death of many innocent people and the destruction of property are undermining efforts to portray our troops as “the good guys.” The Committee is impressed by the concerns that our troops have in attempting to minimize collateral effects during their operations. However, when the Committee was outside of the Kandahar base, we met one Afghan police colonel who, after he said all the proper things in a speech he had clearly memorized, became more animated and more frank when he claimed that Canada has no chance of winning the support of the people of Kandahar as long as so many innocent Afghans were dying as a result of NATO air strikes. He said that the local population will simply wait until we disappear; that siding with the Canadians is a bad bet the way things are going; and that the incentives aren’t there to risk annoying those people up in the hills.

**Problem 10: We Don’t Have a (Visible) Development Program**

The province of Kandahar is where the Canadians are. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) insists that it has a number of development projects underway in the province, but no one was able to show us. Canada did contribute to the building of a road that makes military forays less dangerous; but building one kilometer of road, no matter how strategically-important, isn’t going to win any hearts and minds. Journalists say they have seen some evidence of useful programs, but these appear to be limited. It appears obvious to us that the kind of widespread development and aid that is said to be winning hearts and minds in other regions of the country can happen in Kandahar only if and when Kandahar, which is now essentially a war zone, is militarily stabilized.

There is a chicken-and-egg element here, however. Unless Canada can gain credit for some useful and prominently-seen development efforts in Kandahar, it will remain difficult to gain the support of Afghans in that province, and therefore to stabilize the region. If our troops are to be seen as liberators rather than invaders, their image needs all the help it can get. That is why the Committee believes that CIDA should be funneling significant amounts of development money through our military, and doing so in Kandahar. At present, CIDA’s focus is on improving the institutional strength of the central Government of Afghanistan in Kabul; to make it more workable and therefore more relevant and appealing to its citizens. Whenever the issue of development came up, nearly every Canadian official we talked to emphasized the importance of stabilizing Afghanistan’s central institutions – Parliament, the justice system, the health care system, etc.
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This is a necessary and worthy long-term goal. Even in the short term, institutions like the police, the army and the courts need to be strengthened and reformed. But in places like Kandahar, if Canadian and other NATO troops are to have any hope of creating the kind of peaceful conditions that would enable foreign and Afghan NGOs to bring in improvements at the village level, then Canada needs to focus on showing what can be done on the ground now.

There seems to be a mantra that only if the central government’s institutions can be reformed will the people get assistance from the centre; and that only then will they respect and support their federal government. There is some truth and logic in this. But one wonders if Canada isn’t too fixated on making Afghan institutions work like ours, which is going to take a very long time, if it ever happens. In the meantime in Kandahar, Canada should be connecting directly to the people whose needs are immediate, and who are unlikely to buy in to our efforts unless they are offered something more rewarding than another chance to live in a war zone. We may have something more and better to offer than the Taliban, but we don’t have much time to prove it.

The process of reforming Afghan institutions will take a long, long time. Meanwhile, since peace is not in sight in Kandahar or in neighbouring provinces, the Government of Canada should be funneling money through the Canadian military so that our soldiers can be seen to be the sponsors of very visible, helpful projects at the grass roots. Only when our military is seen to be there to assist rather than conquer, is there any hope that we can start being seen as a positive alternative to the Taliban.

In normal times, the best way to deliver aid is not through the military. But these are not normal times.

**Problem 11: The Perception That Life for People in Kandahar is More Fraught with Peril Because We are There**

The bottom line is that we say we are in Afghanistan to make things better for Afghans. Things may be improving in some parts of the country, but where Canada is trying to have its biggest impact – in Kandahar – life is clearly more perilous because we are there. That doesn’t mean that Canada shouldn’t be there, or that we should not be engaging the Taliban. We need to do that to help create the stability needed to work toward long-term solutions. But it does mean that the ordinary
citizen of Kandahar is living in a war zone that he or she wouldn’t be living in if NATO troops weren’t there. The combination of too many innocent lives being lost and too little development assistance coming through the pipeline contributes to making life bleak and dangerous in the Kandahar region. We need to do everything possible to make the short term more livable while we are trying to improve prospects for the long term.

Problem 12: If This is a Litmus Test for the New NATO, the Results Aren’t Impressive So Far

Some NATO allies (other than the U.S., the U.K., and the Netherlands) have shown themselves to be unwilling to serve on the battlefield in Afghanistan. If the Afghans are going to take over their own defence against the Taliban, they need to be trained and they need to develop military leadership. The current NATO contingent doesn’t have enough troops to go toe-to-toe with the Taliban, to get involved in defending development projects, and at the same time to train Afghan troops and leaders. Any other NATO countries that get involved in such training will have to join the Afghan troops in action over the early years of producing an effective Afghan fighting force. Since NATO countries like Germany and France don’t want to engage in battle, how will this training get done? NATO came together to defend Europe against the Soviet threat. That role is history. If NATO is to have a meaningful new role, it is likely to be that of like-minded countries working in common cause against what all of them perceive to be a common threat. At the moment, violent religious extremism with roots in places like Afghanistan and Pakistan is at the top of the threat list. Some of our allies are doing a lot of saluting, but not much marching. So what does that say about the future of NATO?

Problem 13: Afghanistan Does Not Want to be Rebuilt in Canada’s Image

There are all kinds of pressure from home to provide the kind of aid that Canadians believe in because they would reflect the kind of society we treasure: no corruption, free and fair elections, girls being treated equally with boys in terms of education and other matters. Afghanistan is considerably more backward than other difficult areas like Iraq, Iran and Palestine. Whatever changes are made here are going to take many generations to effect, and any early reforms are unlikely to
present Canadians with the kinds of successes that might easily be seen to justify our involvement in Afghanistan.

**So, Why Are We Still Over There?**

Firstly, we have international allies that we need to support. Following the attacks on 9/11, Canada made a commitment to its fellow NATO member-states to assist in securing and re-building Afghanistan not only for the sake of international peace and security, but also for the safety and security of Canadians. Secondly, as one of the richest countries in the world, we cannot stand idly by and fail to help one of the poorest countries in the world. As the Committee has said repeatedly, we cannot succeed in Afghanistan at the point of a bayonet. Afghanistan needs infrastructure – a viable economy not centered on the poppy fields; and a government, courts, police force and military that are trusted in all provinces and by local Afghans.

Thirdly, Afghanistan was a training ground for terrorists whose actions disrupted our lives and economy. We cannot let instability abroad ruin the prosperity of our country.

Canada has accepted the responsibility of stabilizing and re-building the most dangerous part of Afghanistan. Now that the problems or “challenges” facing our troops in Kandahar and Afghanistan as a whole have been outlined, what should be our description of success?

**Proof of Success**

The Committee believes that any proof of Canadian success in Afghanistan will be built on progress in the following areas:

1. **STABILITY**: Our mission needs to create sufficient stability in Kandahar and neighbouring southern provinces to allow the economic and political development of this impoverished region to begin.

2. **GOVERNANCE**: Our mission needs to help improve the governance of Afghanistan without expecting that we will recreate this country’s institutions and behaviour patterns in anything like a Canadian image.
3. **CORRUPTION**: Eliminating corruption in a place like Afghanistan is probably a pipe dream. Even reducing corruption to the point that most development assistance actually gets to ordinary people will qualify as a huge success. Building an army and police force that offered protection to citizens instead of shaking them down for money will constitute a huge step forward.

4. **GEOGRAPHY**: Until now the Afghanistan-Pakistan Border has proven to be an insurmountable challenge. As long as the Taliban have access to hideouts beyond the reach of our forces, our mission has little hope of success. The Government of Canada has put pressure on the Pakistan Government to patrol and take control of its border with Afghanistan, but there is still disagreement over how this should be done. Canada’s opposition to the very existence of landmines, for example, runs counter to the Pakistani proposal to use landmines in securing the border. Is it time for Canada, in partnership with other nations and international organizations, to explore with Afghanistan radical new solutions?

Canadian Foreign Minister Peter MacKay, in his recent visit to Pakistan, offered to put together a group of experts with vast experience in managing the North American border to make concrete suggestions to Pakistan. According to Mr. MacKay, the government had also tasked the Army to come forward with suggestions on how to deal with the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. In the context of enhanced border monitoring and security, Mr. MacKay and his Pakistani counterpart exchanged views on selective fencing, aerial surveillance, and the use of modern technology like biometrics in border movement. In addition, Mr. MacKay agreed to extend technological assistance to help Pakistan strengthen border controls.4

Although the Committee is looking forward to hearing these suggestions and potential solutions, the Committee is concerned about the complexities of implementing 21st century biometrics in a 16th century environment, and the timeframe it would take to accomplish such a feat.

It is clear that in the interim, robust action needs to be taken in order to prevent the Taliban from undermining Canadian efforts in the region. For

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4 Qudssia Akhlaque, “Pakistan-Afghanistan border mining being reviewed: Canadian FM holds talks” January 9th, 2007, DAWN Group of Newspapers and Relief Web International.
example, one alternative would be to establish a defensible no-go zone on the Afghan side of the border that would effectively stop Taliban infiltration into Afghanistan from the traditional Pashtun territory.

The Committee’s Perception

The Committee was impressed by the optimism of Canadian troops and their leaders to bring about positive change in Afghanistan. But when Committee members listened closely to both military people and diplomats, both Afghan and Canadian, we found it hard to square that with reality. Huge and complex set problems confront any foreign interests attempting to give ordinary Afghans access to an even perfunctory combination of peace, democracy, justice and prosperity.

It is in our view doubtful that this mission can be accomplished given the limited resources that NATO is currently investing in Afghanistan. The kind of collateral damage and lack of developmental progress that has marked NATO’s effort in the Kandahar region to date, and the Taliban’s ability to retreat to and redeploy from the mountains of Pakistan makes success even more doubtful.

To have any chance of success, Canada and our allies must make real progress in solving the problems listed above. We can never solve all of them at once, but will have to make a sizable dent, and we will have to make it soon.

Ours is an enormously difficult task. Meanwhile, the task of our enemy - the Taliban and some regional warlords – is relatively easy. They don’t have to win major battles. They only need to keep attracting disaffected people to their cause; use those people to disrupt reform; and persist for as many years as it takes for Canada and our allies to lose heart.

If our only mission is to distract the Taliban while our allies and other progressive forces make progress on other fronts, historians may some day describe Canada’s deployment to Afghanistan as a success. But if the goals of the Government of Canada are this modest, that hasn’t been properly explained to Canadians. It is said that Canada is giving Afghans a better chance to live decent lives. In the words of the Department of National Defence website:
“The Afghan people are relying on the international community to help them rebuild their lives and their country after having suffered through decades of instability, oppression and insurgency.

By supporting the rebuilding of institutions such as independent courts, police and an army, Canada is on the ground laying the foundation for Afghans to govern themselves and secure a better future.

Canada has shown leadership by committing troops, resources, development and political effort to help the Afghan government secure a better future for its people. We have made a commitment to the Afghan people and we will stand by that commitment.”

If that is Canada’s goal – obviously joined to the goal of inflicting significant damage to radical forces that pose a threat to western society – then Canada and NATO must deploy more resources in Afghanistan and use those resources in a better way than we have done to this point. If this proves impossible, Canada should be prepared to consider withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan as soon as our current commitment ends.

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Recommendations

The Committee Recommends That:

1. The Government of Canada continue to apply pressure on its NATO allies to provide additional troops to assist in the training of the Afghan National Army through the use of Operational Mentor Liaison Teams.

2. The Government of Canada send up to 250 additional Canadian Forces instructors when an increase in the number of Afghan National Army trainees in Kandahar requires an expansion of the Canadian Operational Mentor Liaison Teams.

3. The Government of Canada provide up to 60 Canadian police trainers in addition to its current contingent of approximately 6 officers (soon to be 10) to help train the Afghan National Police and its Auxiliary.

4. The Government of Canada significantly augment the $10 million contribution announced by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in January 2007 to provide uniforms and, for future years, to improve benefits and salaries for the Afghan National Police.

5. The Government of Canada, in order to minimize civilian casualties, continue with the “gentle approach” of providing advance warning to civilians of forays against Taliban fighters, as successfully used in Operation Baa’z Tsuka.

6. The Government of Canada should announce that while it understands that Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan is long
term, it will be forced to reconsider its commitment unless NATO, within the next 12 months, puts into place in Kandahar a significantly larger and fully-engaged stability force.

7. In the next year and in subsequent fiscal years, until NGOs are able to safely function in Kandahar, CIDA provide from its budget $20 million directly to the Canadian Forces for their use in local development projects by Afghans.

8. The Government of Canada advise the Karzai government that it must, within the next 12 months, present to NATO a comprehensive, transparent and effective plan to reduce corruption as a condition of Canada’s continued long term commitment in Afghanistan.

9. To effectively stop Taliban infiltration, the Government of Canada, with its NATO partners and Afghanistan, establish a defensible buffer zone in Afghanistan on the Afghan side of its border with Pakistan.

10. The Government of Canada increase agricultural and commercial assistance to help Afghan farmers in their transition from growing poppies to cultivating legitimate alternative crops.

11. The Government of Canada, in conjunction with Afghan authorities, should engage our special forces and RCMP intelligence gathering expertise in an accelerated program of interdiction, targeting drug lords and their distribution systems in order to quell the trade of narcotics.
Extract from the *Journals of the Senate*, Thursday, April 27, 2006:

It was moved by the Honourable Senator Kenny, seconded by the Honourable Senator Moore:

That the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence be authorized to examine and report on the national security policy of Canada. In particular, the Committee shall be authorized to examine:

(a) the capability of the Department of National Defence to defend and protect the interests, people and territory of Canada and its ability to respond to and prevent a national emergency or attack, and the capability of the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to carry out its mandate;

(b) the working relationships between the various agencies involved in intelligence gathering, and how they collect, coordinate, analyze and disseminate information and how these functions might be enhanced;

(c) the mechanisms to review the performance and activities of the various agencies involved in intelligence gathering; and

(d) the security of our borders and critical infrastructure.

That the papers and evidence received and taken during the Thirty-seventh and Thirty-eighth Parliaments be referred to the Committee; and

That the Committee report to the Senate no later than March 31, 2007 and that the Committee retain all powers necessary to publicize the findings of the Committee until May 31, 2007.

After debate,

The question being put on the motion, it was adopted.

Paul C. Bélisle
*Clerk of the Senate*
APPENDIX II
Biographies of Committee Members

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Biographies of Committee Members

The Honourable NORMAN K. ATKINS, Senator

Senator Atkins was born in Glen Ridge, New Jersey. His family is from Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, where he has spent a great deal of time over the years. He is a graduate of the Appleby College in Oakville, Ontario, and of Acadia University in Wolfville, Nova Scotia, where he studied economics and completed a Bachelor of Arts programme in 1957. Senator Atkins subsequently received an Honourary Doctorate in Civil Law in the Fall of 1999 (DLC), from Acadia University, his old “alma mater”.

A former President of Camp Associates Advertising Limited, a well-known Toronto-based agency, Senator Atkins has also played an active role within the industry, serving, for instance, as a Director of the Institute of Canadian Advertising in the early 1980’s.

Over the years, Senator Atkins has had a long and successful career in the field of communications – as an organizer or participant in a number of important causes and events. For instance, and to name only a few of his many contributions, Senator Atkins has given of his time and energy to Diabetes Canada, the Juvenile Diabetes Foundation, the Dellcrest Children’s Centre, the Federated Health Campaign in Ontario, the Healthpartners Campaign in the Federal Public Service as well as the Chairperson of Camp Trillium-Rainbow Lake Fundraising Campaign.

Senator Atkins was also involved with the Institute for Political Involvement and the Albany Club of Toronto. It was during his tenure as President in the early 1980’s that the Albany Club, a prestigious Toronto private club, and one of the oldest such clubs across the country, opened its membership to women.

Senator Atkins has a long personal history of political involvement. In particular, and throughout most of the last 50 years or so, he has been very active within the Progressive Conservative Party – at both the national and the provincial levels. Namely, Senator Atkins was National Campaign Chair in the federal elections of 1984 and 1988 and has held senior organizational responsibility in a number of Provincial election campaigns and he has served as an advisor to both the Rt. Hon.
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Brian Mulroney and the Rt. Hon. Robert L. Stanfield, as well as the Hon. William G. Davis Premier of Ontario.

Norman K. Atkins was appointed to the Senate of Canada on June 29, 1986. In the years since, he has proven to be an active, interested, and informed Senator. In particular, he has concerned himself with a number of education and poverty issues. As well, he has championed the cause of Canadian merchant navy veterans, seeking for them a more equitable recognition of their wartime service. Senator Atkins served in the United States military from September 1957 to August 1959.

Currently, Senator Atkins sits as an independent Progressive Conservative member, and is on the National Security and Defence Committee and the Veterans Affairs Subcommittee. He is also the Honourary Chair of the Dalton K. Camp Endowment in Journalism at Saint-Thomas University in Fredericton, New Brunswick and Member of the Advisory Council, School of Business at Acadia University.
The Honourable TOMMY BANKS, Senator

Tommy Banks is known to many Canadians as an accomplished and versatile musician and entertainer. He is a recipient of the Juno Award, the Gemini Award and the Grand Prix du Disque.

From 1968 to 1983 he was the host of The Tommy Banks Show on television. He has provided musical direction for the ceremonies of the Commonwealth Games, the World University Games, Expo ’86, the XV Olympic Winter Games, various command performances and has performed as guest conductor of symphony orchestras throughout Canada, the United States, and in Europe.

He was founding chairman of the Alberta Foundation for the Performing Arts. He is the recipient of an Honourary Diploma of Music from Grant MacEwen College, and Honourary Doctorate of Laws from the University of Alberta, and of the Sir Frederick Haultain Prize. He is an officer of the Order of Canada, and a Member of the Alberta Order of Excellence.

Tommy Banks was called to the Senate of Canada on 7 April 2000. On 9 May 2001, Senator Tommy Banks was appointed Vice-Chair of the Prime Minister's Caucus Task Force on Urban issues.

He is currently a member of the Committee on National Security and Defence, Chair of the Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources, and chair of the Alberta Liberal Caucus in the Parliament of Canada.

A Calgary-born lifelong Albertan, he moved to Edmonton in 1949 where he resides with Ida, as do their grown children and their families.
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The Honourable JOSEPH A. DAY, Senator

Appointed to the Senate by the Rt. Honourable Jean Chrétien, Senator Joseph Day represents the province of New Brunswick and the Senatorial Division of Saint John-Kennebecasis. He has served in the Senate of Canada since October 4, 2001.

He is currently a Member of the following Senate Committees: National Security and Defence; the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs, National Finance and Internal Economy Budgets and Administration. Areas of interest and specialization include: science and technology, defence, international trade and human rights issues, and heritage and literacy. He is a member of many Interparliamentary associations including the Canada-China Legislative Association and the Interparliamentary Union. He is also the Chair of the Canada-Mongolia Friendship Group.

A well-known New Brunswick lawyer and engineer, Senator Day has had a successful career as a private practice attorney. His legal interests include Patent and Trademark Law, and intellectual property issues. Called to the bar of New Brunswick, Quebec, and Ontario, he is also certified as a Specialist in Intellectual Property Matters by the Law Society of Upper Canada, and a Fellow of the Intellectual Property Institute of Canada. Most recently (1999-2000) he served as President and CEO of the New Brunswick Forest Products Association. In 1992, he joined J.D. Irving Ltd., a conglomerate with substantial interests in areas including forestry, pulp and paper, and shipbuilding, as legal counsel. Prior to 1992 he practiced with Gowling & Henderson in Kitchener-Waterloo, Ogilvy Renault in Ottawa, and Donald F. Sim, Q.C. in Toronto, where he began his career in 1973.

An active member of the community, Senator Day recently chaired the Foundation, and the Board of the Dr. V.A. Snow Centre Nursing Home, as well as the Board of the Associates of the Provincial Archives of New Brunswick. Among his many other volunteer efforts, he has held positions with the Canadian Bar Association and other professional organizations, and served as National President of both the Alumni Association (1996) and the Foundation (1998-2000) of the Royal Military Colleges Club of Canada.

Senator Day holds a Bachelor of Electrical Engineering from the Royal Military College of Canada, an LL.B from Queen’s University, and a Masters of Laws from Osgoode Hall. He is a member of the bars of Ontario, Quebec and New Brunswick.
The Honourable COLIN KENNY, Senator

Career History
Sworn in on June 29th, 1984 representing the Province of Ontario. His early political career began in 1968 as the Executive Director of the Liberal Party in Ontario. From 1970 until 1979 he worked in the Prime Minister's Office as Special Assistant, Director of Operations, Policy Advisor and Assistant Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Pierre Trudeau.

Committee Involvement
During his parliamentary career, Senator Kenny has served on numerous committees. They include the Special Committee on Terrorism and Security (1986-88) and (1989-91), the Special Joint Committee on Canada’s Defence Policy (1994), the Standing Committee on Banking Trade and Commerce, the Standing Committee on National Finance, and the Standing Committee on Internal Economy, Budgets and Administration.

He is currently Chair of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. The Senator is also currently a member of the Steering Committee of the Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources.

Defence Matters
Senator Kenny has been elected as Rapporteur for the Defence and Security Committee of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Prior to that he was Chair of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Subcommittee on the Future Security and Defence Capabilities and Vice-Chair of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Subcommittee on the Future of the Armed Forces.

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The Honourable MICHAEL A. MEIGHEN, Q.C., Senator

Appointed to the Senate in 1990, the Honourable Michael Meighen serves on various Senate Standing Committees including Banking Trade and Commerce, Fisheries, National Security and Defence, and chairs the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs. He has also served on the Special Joint Committee on Canada’s Defence Policy and the Special Joint Committee on a Renewed Canada.

In his private career, Senator Meighen practiced litigation and commercial law in Montreal and Toronto. He is Counsel to the law firm Ogilvy Renault, and was Co-Legal Counsel to the Deschênes Commission on War Criminals. He sits on the Boards of Directors of Paribas Participations Limited, J.C. Clark Ltd. (Toronto), and Sentry Select Capital Corp. (Toronto).

Senator Meighen’s present involvement in community service includes the Salvation Army (Past Chair), Stratford Festival (past Chair), Atlantic Salmon Federation - Canada (Chair), University of King’s College (Chancellor), McGill University (Chair, McGill Fund Council and Governor).

Senator Meighen is a graduate of McGill University and Université Laval and was awarded Honorary Doctorates in Civil Law from Mount Allison University in 2001 and from University of New Brunswick in 2002. He lives in Toronto with his wife Kelly and their three sons.
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Biographies of Committee Members

The Honourable WILFRED P. MOORE, Q.C., Senator

Senator Moore was appointed to the Senate on September 26th, 1996 by the Right Honourable Jean Chrétien and represents the province of Nova Scotia (Stanhope St./Bluenose). The Senator graduated from Saint Mary’s University with a Bachelor of Commerce degree in 1964 and in 1968, with a Law degree, from Dalhousie University.

The Senator was a Halifax Alderman from 1974 to 1980 and served as Deputy Mayor from 1977 to 1978. He was Chairman of the Halifax Metro Centre as well as the Social Assistance Appeal Board for Halifax and Dartmouth. He served as a member of the Board of Governors of Saint Mary’s University for 10 years, including the Advisory Committee to the President.

Senator Moore served as a member of the Economic Committee of the Atlantic Liberal Caucus. This Committee was responsible for the policy paper for the Atlantic Provinces entitled “Catching Tomorrow’s Wave.” This initiative became government policy in 2000 under the program name of “Atlantic Investment Partnership” which committed $700 million into research (including post-secondary education), community economic development, small communities investment, trade and investment, entrepreneurship and business skills development, and tourism.

In March, 2001, the Senator commenced an Inquiry in the Senate on the role of the federal government in the financing of deferred maintenance costs in Canada’s post-secondary education institutions. This inquiry, after being considered by the Senate Standing Committee on National Finance, resulted in the federal government providing assistance of $200 million in its 2002 budget for Canada’s post-secondary education institutions for the indirect costs of research, which included maintenance of the buildings of those institutions. This financial assistance has continued in every subsequent federal budget.

Currently, the Senator sits as a member of the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence, Banking Trade and Commerce, as well as the Joint Committee on Scrutiny of Regulations. He is vice-chair of the Canada-United States Inter-Parliamentary Group and is chair of the Senate’s internal Artwork.
Advisory Working Group. He is also a member of the Liberal Party’s Post-Secondary Education and Research Caucus.

He has sat on both the Standing Senate Committee on National Finance (1996-2003) and Legal and Constitutional Affairs (1996-2003). He is a Vice-Chairman of the Canada-United States Interparliamentary Group, and is a member and director of the Canada-Ireland Interparliamentary Friendship Group.

The Senator’s community and volunteer involvement is wide-ranging. In particular, from 1994 until 2006, Senator Moore was volunteer chairman of the Bluenose II Preservation Trust Society, a not-for-profit registered charity organization, whose fundraising efforts over the winter of 1994-95 enabled the restoration and full operational and sailing status of the historic schooner, Bluenose II, one of Canada’s beloved national icons. More recently, the Senator, along with the then President of the Nova Scotia College of Art and Design (NSCAD) and the Town of Lunenburg, initiated a studio residency program, in Lunenburg, for NSCAD. This facility will give graduates of the University an opportunity to gain professional experience, develop their work for an exhibit or graduate school, or make preparations for an entrepreneurial endeavour.” Concurrently, this initiative strengthens the existing artistic community in Lunenburg.

Senator Moore was born in Halifax, Nova Scotia on January 14th, 1942. He lives with his wife Jane and their two children, Nicholas and Alexandra in Chester, Nova Scotia.
The Honourable GERRY ST. GERMAIN, Senator

Appointed to the Senate on June 23, 1993, the Honourable Gerry St. Germain represents the province of British Columbia and the Senatorial Division of Langley – Pemberton - Whistler. He is Chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples, and also sits on Scrutiny of Regulations and National Security and Defence.

Senator St. Germain has had a long career in Parliament, having first been elected to the House of Commons in a 1983 by-election. He was subsequently re-elected in 1984. He was sworn to the Queen’s Privy Council when appointed Minister of State (Transport) on March 31, 1988. He was appointed Minister of Forestry in October 1988.

In his life outside of Parliament, Senator St. Germain has worked as a commercial pilot, building contractor and cattle rancher.
The Honourable DAVID TKACHUK, Senator

Appointed to the Senate on June 8, 1993, the Honourable David Tkachuk represents the province of Saskatchewan. He is Deputy Chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Transport and Communications, and also sits on the Senate Committees of Agriculture and Forestry; Banking, Trade and Commerce; National Security and Defence; and the Selection Committee.

Senator Tkachuk holds a Bachelor of Arts from the University of Saskatchewan and a Teaching Diploma from the College of Education in Saskatoon. In his life outside of Parliament, he has worked as a teacher and a businessman.
The Honourable ROD A.A. ZIMMER, CM, Senator

With a long and distinguished career in business and philanthropy, Rod Zimmer is one of Winnipeg’s most recognized community leaders. His roots stem from Kuroki Saskatchewan, where he was born. He acquired a Bachelor of Commerce from the University of Saskatchewan in Saskatoon.

Since 1993, he has been the President of The Gatehouse Corporation. From 1995 to 1998, he served as Vice President of Festivals for the Pan American Games Society Inc. From 1985 to 1993, he was the Director of Marketing and Communications for the Manitoba Lotteries Foundation and was also the Director of Project Management for the Canadian Sports Pool Corporation in Ottawa in 1984. From 1979 to 1983, he was Vice-President of Corporate Communications for CanWest Capital Corporation. In 1973 he became Special Assistant to the Hon. James Richardson, Minister of National Defense, in Ottawa and served in that position until 1979.

Rod Zimmer is an extremely active player within his community, volunteering his services for countless charitable causes and organizations including serving as President of the Royal Winnipeg Ballet from 1989 to 1991 and as a Member of the Board of Directors for the Winnipeg Blue Bombers Football Club from 1981 to 1993.

Throughout his career, he has co-chaired and coordinated appeals for various charitable groups, arts and sport organizations and universities, including, B’nai Brith, Hebrew University, Manitoba Métis Federation, First-Nations, Universities of Winnipeg and Manitoba, Winnipeg Chinese Cultural Centre, Hellenic Society, East Indian Culture Centers, Saskatchewan Association of Rehabilitation Centres, Para and Special Olympics, and recently Gold Medal Plates (Manitoba)/ 2010 Winter Olympics (Vancouver).

Recently, Rod Zimmer was asked to be the Senate Caucus Liaison for the Young Liberals of Canada. A role that will allow him to mentor youth from across the country through his position as a Senator, an illustration that merely reflects his countless years of dedication to youth within the Liberal Party.
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Major-General (Ret’d) G. Keith McDonald, Senior Military Advisor

MGen McDonald grew up in Edmonton, attended College Militaire Royal in St. Jean and Royal Military College in Kingston (RMC), graduating in 1966 and being awarded his pilot wings in 1967.

MGen McDonald operationally flew the Tutor, T-33, CF5, CF104 and CF18 aircraft accumulating over 4000 hours of pilot in command throughout his 37-year career in the Air Force, Canadian Forces.

He held staff positions at the Royal Military College, in Baden Soellingen Germany, at National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa and at the North American Aerospace Command in Colorado Springs. Command positions include CF18 Squadron Commander, Base and Wing Commander in Baden Soellingen, Germany.

Major General McDonald ended his military career as the Director of Combat Operations at Headquarters North American Aerospace Defence Command at Colorado Springs, USA.

After leaving the military in 1998, General McDonald served a period of “conflict of interest” prior to joining BMCI Consulting as a Principal Consultant in the Aerospace and Defence Division. He left BMCI in 2002 to set up his own consulting company, KM Aerospace Consulting.

Major General McDonald has a degree in Political and Economic Science (Honours Courses) from the Royal Military College. He has completed Canadian Forces staff school, the Royal Air Force (England) Staff College, the National Security studies course, Post Graduate Courses in Business at Queens University, Electronic Warfare Courses at the University of California Los Angeles, the Law of Armed Conflict at San Remo, Italy, and numerous project management courses.

General McDonald is married to the former Catherine Grunder of Kincardine, Ontario, and they have two grown daughters, Jocelyn and Amy.
Barry A. Denofsky, National Security Advisor

Barry Denofsky recently retired after having completed 35 years with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). Mr. Denofsky joined the RCMP in January 1969 and worked as a peace officer in Saskatchewan, Alberta, and Quebec. In 1972, he was transferred to the RCMP Security Service where he was involved in a variety of national security investigations. With the creation of CSIS in 1984, Mr. Denofsky maintained his interest and involvement in matters of national security with the new Service.

Mr. Denofsky held a variety of operational and senior management positions with CSIS which have included the following: Chief, Counter Intelligence, Quebec Region, Deputy Director General Operations, Ottawa Region, Deputy Director General Counter Terrorism, Headquarters, Ottawa, and Director General Counter Intelligence, Headquarters, Ottawa. On retirement from CSIS, Mr. Denofsky was the Director General, Research, Analysis and Production, Headquarters, Ottawa. In that capacity, he was responsible for the production and provision to government of all source analytical products concerning threats to the security of Canada.

Mr. Denofsky also represented CSIS for many years at meetings of the NATO Special Committee in Brussels, Belgium. The Special Committee is an organization of security and intelligence services representing all member nations of NATO. In 2002, Mr. Denofsky was the Chair of the NATO Special Committee Working Group.

Mr. Denofsky is a graduate of the University of Toronto, and holds a graduate Diploma in Public Administration from Carleton University in Ottawa. He is a member of the Council of Advisors, the Canadian Centre of Intelligence and Security Studies, (CSIS), Carleton University. He is married and has two children.
Steven James, Analyst


Mr. James received his Bachelor of Arts (Psychology and Sociology) from the University of Alberta and a Masters in Military and Strategic Studies from the Center for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary.

Mr. James' recent studies have focused on Canada's counter-terrorism framework, specifically, federal, provincial and municipal responses to and prevention of terrorist-related incidents.

Previous to joining the Committee, Mr. James served as a Police Officer for the both the Ontario Provincial Police (1994 - 1998) and the Toronto Police Service (1998 - 2001).
Jodi Turner, Committee Clerk

Jodi Turner joined the Committees Branch of the Senate in January 2005. She serves as the Co-clerk for the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence.

Ms. Turner received a *cum laude* Double Honours Bachelor of Arts (French and Political Studies) and a *cum laude* Masters in Public Administration (specialization in Canadian Politics), from the University of Manitoba.

Previous to joining the Committee, she served as Chief of Staff to the Speaker of the Senate from 2002 – 2005; and was Vice-President of Research for Western Opinion Research in Winnipeg, Manitoba from 2000 – 2002.
Barbara Reynolds, Committee Clerk

Barbara Reynolds has worked with Canadian parliamentarians for 30 years in various capacities. Trained as a sociologist, she worked for 10 years as a research officer for the Library of Parliament, assisting committees involved in the area of social affairs. During this time she served for three years as Director of Research for the House of Commons Committee on Disabled Persons that produced the landmark report entitled Obstacles.

An associate of the Parliamentary Centre for 15 years, she organized fact-finding visits for legislators to and from the United States as well as study tours to Canada for legislators from African and Southeast Asian countries. She coordinated professional development programs for legislators and their staff, and wrote guidebooks on the operation of parliamentarians’ offices in Ottawa and in their constituencies. In addition, she served as the director of the Parliament, Business and Labour Trust, a program under which legislators spend up to a week with major corporations and trade unions.

From 1985 to 2000 she also served as adviser to the Canadian Group of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the worldwide organization of legislators that serves as the parliamentary wing of the United Nations.

In April 1998, she joined the Senate Committees Directorate as a Committee Clerk. Her committee assignments have included: Security and Intelligence; Boreal Forest, Fisheries; Transportation Safety; Veterans Affairs; and National Security and Defence. In June 2002, she received the Speaker’s Award of Excellence for her work in the Senate.