REPORT ON AIR SAFETY AND SECURITY
Report of the Subcommittee on Transportation Safety
Standing Senate Committee on Transport and Communications
SPECIFIC SAFETY ISSUES AFFECTING AIRPORT SAFETY AND SECURITY
Canada possesses a vast air infrastructure. There are 650 certified airports and 1,200 registered aerodromes. Of the 138 certified airports formerly owned and/or operated by Transport Canada, 105 have been transferred to local authorities under the National Airports Policy. These transfers include all eleven Arctic airports.
Local Airport Authorities own 17 of 26 airports handling at least 200,000 passengers annually, representing 94 percent of air travellers in Canada. Fifty-four out of seventy regional and local airports serving scheduled passenger traffic have been transferred as well as 23 of 31 smaller airports with no scheduled passenger service.
The Interim Report discloses concern over the ease by which persons may move from one position in an airport into a restricted part. There seems to be no daily screening of employees. Concern was also expressed that there is no systematic procedure whereby food placed on a plane is checked to ensure that each wrapped meal is totally secure.
When the original Subcommittee was in Europe it visited the security facilities at Schippol, Heathrow and De Gaulle Airports. As indicated in the Interim Report the intense level of security at these airports was impressive. From the scrutiny of baggage at Heathrow to the checking of air cargo at De Gaulle, the latest techniques for detecting explosives and other problems are in effect.
While Canada has remained relatively free of terrorist attacks, this does not mean we should be unprepared.
Evidence given to us by Mr. Pierre-Paul Pharand, Director, Airport Protection for Aéroports de Montréal, indicated that a narrow view placed by Transport Canada on the types of people who may be refused access to a restricted airport area has resulted in people with serious criminal records obtaining a security clearance and access to restricted areas, because they are not suspected terrorists.
We recommend that the Security Directors of the Airport Authorities in Canada serving more than 200,000 passengers per year seriously study the security systems in place at the major European Airports such as Heathrow and De Gaulle and develop a systematic plan for the implementation of similar security screening methods in their airports.
We recommend that Transport Canada review its interpretation of section 4(3) of the Aerodrome Security Regulations to give more flexibility to airports to limit access to restricted areas.
We recommend that Transport Canada allow spot searches to be conducted of persons belonging to the airport community when they enter a sterile area, notwithstanding the fact they possess a restricted area pass.
Aéroports de Montréal in its presentation to the Special Committee argued in favour of a limited number of airport security personnel being designated "peace officers" by Transport Canada. It was pointed out that this practice is widely used by other federal departments, such as Customs and Immigration, for security purposes.
It was stated by the Director of Airport Protection that:
"Present 24 hours a day, seven days a week, specially appointed persons are in a position to respond rapidly to any situation, to take appropriate action to stop the commission of an offence and to initiate legal procedures. This specially- appointed security personnel would allow the aerodrome operator to more easily respect his contractual and legal obligations with Transport Canada.
Better protection would be provided to the airport community by "first respondents" empowered to do more than "observe and report". Finally, peace officer status even limited in scope would provide security personnel with legal tools and protection in carrying out their duties."
We recommend that Transport Canada consider designating a certain number of airport security personnel as "peace officers" on an experimental basis.
The Director of Airport Protection at Aéroports de Montréal brought to the attention of the Special Committee an anomalous situation in respect of the airports ability to participate in emergency planning. The airport is expected by Transport Canada to develop an emergency plan in case an incident occurs that endangers the safety and security of the travelling public, airport employees or the airport facilities themselves. This is made difficult because a local airport authority has no official status within provincial emergency planning organizations. The protection of persons and goods falls within provincial jurisdiction and therefore the airport is obliged to leave certain aspects of emergency planning in the hands of other authorities, which makes developing an overall emergency plan for the airport difficult.
The situation which results was explained as follows:
"For example, the aerodrome operator, through his airport fire department, controls aircraft fire and rescue operations but not structural fire (e.g.: fire within the terminal). The aerodrome operator, through his security department, maintains public peace and order on airport grounds, including vehicular and pedestrian traffic, but must "expect" the municipal police department to develop and implement an adequate plan in case of a demonstration. In many cases, the aerodrome operator is left at the mercy of municipal or provincial public safety services, the activities of which have a direct and important impact on airport operations. Furthermore, because of the absence of status within the legal frame of public safety, the aerodrome operator does not have the capacity to sign a protocol with other agencies such as 9-1-1 Centres and ambulance services to officialise response procedures for airport emergencies."
We urge Transport Canada to review this situation and to use its best efforts to resolve this anomaly in the law so that coordinated emergency planning may take place.
The issue of cutbacks at certain airports of firefighting units and crash response teams was brought graphically to the publics attention by the Air Canada crash at the Fredericton Airport in December, 1997.
As explained by the Air Line Pilots Association, only 28 major airports in Canada are required to provide any on-site firefighting service. Airports no longer required to provide on-site firefighters can negotiate deals with their local municipal firefighters for services, when required. The problem with this approach is that most airports lie at the outside edge of municipalities, far away from regular firefighting services.
It is the position of the Pilots Association that any response time over three minutes in length will be ineffective.
While the Minister of Transport has recently announced a proposed set of regulations to cover non-designated airports this effort is in its early stages.
The Air Canada Pilots Association graphically described the situation they believe these reductions in emergency response teams have had on safety:
"Current regulations allow the operation of our largest airports, which service large aircraft such as the Boeing 747, with only three fire trucks, each manned by only one firefighter. Our regulations do not provide any requirement to rescue trapped passengers, not even at our largest airports. We fear that this country has exposed itself to the possibility of a catastrophic accident where lives may be unnecessarily lost because our regulators have not ensured that airports are sufficiently prepared for the accidents that will inevitably occur."
We recommend that Transport Canada reconsider its decision to reduce firefighting requirements at Canadas major airports and make available sufficient resources or through linkages with adjacent municipalities to ensure crash response units are available at all airports, major, regional and local.
The Special Committee heard from representatives of NAV CANADA on two occasions. The first was early in 1997 after it was formed and then in June, 1999. NAV CANADA has over 6,000 employees, including 2,200 licensed air traffic controllers. It has over 1,400 radio navigational aids, seven area control centres, 44 air traffic control towers, two terminal control units and 83 flight service stations.
At its first appearance, a discussion took place on the technology being used and assurances were given that all technology was due to be upgraded. At the later appearance it was indicated that this effort was well underway. While we congratulate NAV CANADA for being able to move quickly in this area we are concerned that by virtually skipping a generation of computerized technology there may be some safety repercussions.
The safety objectives of NAV CANADA were set out for our Committee:
"They include: integrating safety management into our business planning cycle; integrating safety management into new project planning; introducing supplemental procedures in the conduct of business and operations in engineering and human resources to ensure safety; and, finally, working with Transport Canada to reinforce the use of a safety management system as a basis for the regulatory framework."
In addition, NAV CANADA plans to deal with the human interface with technology from a safety perspective.
We are aware of the staffing problems at NAV CANADA and support the recruitment drive for additional air traffic controllers.
We share the concern expressed by the Air Canada Pilots Association that the hours of work of air traffic controllers be carefully monitored to ensure they are alert when on the job.
A positive contribution to the dialogue on how to keep airports in a good state of repair was presented by Mr. Kevin Psutka, President and CEO of the Canadian Owners and Pilots Association. He indicated that the present fund for airport improvements, the Airport Capital Assistance Program, is small in size and is simply not adequate to fund improvements at the number of airports that require upgrading.
His solution is to allocate either part or the whole of the excise tax on aviation fuel to aviation uses. He stated that "none of the millions of dollars collected for the 4 percent per litre excise tax on aviation turbine fuel and the 11 percent per litre excise tax on aviation gasoline is protected for use in the sector from which it was collected." In his view the lease payments and the excise taxes on fuel make aviation a cash cow for the government.
If the excise taxes or even a portion thereof were designated for airport infrastructure improvement then this would remarkably advance safety as well. It would help stop the deterioration of runways in our smaller airports, making take-off and landing much safer.
Mr. Psutka indicated that such a fund exists in the United States, called the United States Aviation Trust Fund. It ensures that money collected from aviation, including fuel taxes and airport revenues, is earmarked for spending on aviation.
We recommend that the federal government establish a fund for airport rehabilitation by setting aside a portion of the excise tax imposed on aviation fuel.
OUR REGULATORY SYSTEM
The legislative and regulatory process was described by Transport Canada. A comprehensive set of regulations, air navigation orders and policy letters were put in place in 1986 after much discussion with all parts of the air industry. Mr. Jackson of Transport Canada described the consultative process for the making of regulations known as the Canadian Air Regulations Advisory Committee (CARAC). It is a body of individuals from the aviation industry and unions, representing a full cross-section of aviation stakeholders who sit and work through the rules as they are developed.
As Mr. Jackson explained "we are not developing rules in isolation. The stakeholders are part of the process of developing the rules. As a consequence, we have a much better «buy-in» in most instances, on rules that are in force."
Once the rules or regulations are in place then they are applied through the issuance of approvals. These can be issued for such matters as licenses, aircraft or aeronautical products, facilities and services.
This process and many, if not most, of the regulations made have gained wide support in the airline community and from the Air Transport Association of Canada (ATAC) which is the national service organization for the Canadian commercial air transport industry.
However, this view of the regulation making process was not shared by the union representing air flight attendants. While recognizing that the 1986 codification brought together a "jumble of orders and regulations", the union is concerned about the lack of "meaningful performance objectives."
As well, certain issues can now be dealt with, without the use of gazetted regulations through a process controlled exclusively by Transport Canada under the heading of "enabled standards".
In addition to this method to get around the use of gazetted regulations, the union was concerned about the practice of "regulation by exemption". It is argued that Transport Canada continues to use its "sweeping powers" under section 4.9(2) of the Aeronautics Act to regulate by exemption.
It was explained that:
"...Whereas the CARs were originally intended to consolidate and codify all the industry practices in order to create a level safety playing field, Transport Canada continues to use its sweeping powers under section 4.9(2) of the Aeronautics Act to regulate by exemption. Under this section, an exemption may be granted by the minister with mitigating conditions if it is in the public interest and is not likely to affect aviation safety. Such exemptions have been used routinely by delegated Transport Canada officials to reduce the number of flight attendants on board aircraft, to allow aircraft to leave with an inoperative door/slide, to remove life preservers for a particular route to an island and to reduce survival equipment on board often with no meaningful or mitigating conditions."
We are concerned that "regulation by exemption" not be used by Transport Canada to circumvent the legitimate safety arguments advanced by participation in the airline industry.
The Air Line Pilots Association pointed out that in a number of areas which could relate directly to safety there are no regulations at all. They stated:
"We have no regulations at all in relation to wet runways or training of flight crews and controllers."
A further deficiency was developed by Dr. Marsters in his testimony. He dealt at length with the need for Transport Canada to develop regulations dealing with the design standards for planes. He elaborated:
"...on the regulation side of things, one of the things that concerns me somewhat is that Canada has emerged as a major nation in building air planes. Bombardier is the third largest builder of whole air planes in the world. The rules for building air planes, the standards for design and so on, are primarily written in the United States. Since Canada is now a major player in building fairly large jet transport air planes, it should also be a major player in the development of regulations, and it turns out that we are not. We are not because we do not have the capacity within the regulatory agency, that is Transport Canada, to be a major player. Along with everybody else, they have suffered from cutbacks."
We recommend that Transport Canada refrain from using the "regulation by exemption" provisions of the Aeronautics Act in cases which relate in any way to safety.
We recommend that sufficient resources be supplied to Transport Canada so that it can begin work on regulations establishing design standards for the construction of aeroplanes.
The Interim Report dealt in some detail with air navigation in Northern Canada. When the original Subcommittee visited the North in the first few months of its existence, its members were informed by the Government of the Northwest Territories that the air navigation was not to be compromised. There was no desire to move from the CARs system of reporting weather and clearance to the AWOS system until the AWOS technology is improved to provide the same information as CARs.
Witnesses at that time stressed that the North be considered as a separate entity for air regulation. The flying hours in the North need not be the same as they are for air crew in southern Canada especially in the summer months. The Subcommittee was also told of the need in the North to be able to carry cargo which could be considered dangerous as well as passengers on the same flight.
The Interim Report asked the question as to whether it was appropriate in a country as large as Canada to have regionally specific air navigation policies.
The evidence of Transport Canada was that a certain flexibility was acceptable. In fact, "northern operators welcomed the changes we made about one-and-a-half years ago, and they have accepted them."
With regard to the movement of dangerous goods in the north, Transport Canada stated that the new update to the transportation of dangerous goods regulations will address some of the concerns expressed by those who fly in the North.
We recognize the opposition to any special allowances for flying times in the North advanced by Air Line Pilots Association. The Association made the point that pilots in the north are not really "supermen in uniforms."
Senator Willie Adams, the Deputy Chair of the Subcommittee, from Canadas new territory of Nunavut argued strenuously that the North be accepted for the unique place that it is and not be subject to the same regulations as govern the rest of Canada.
We recommend that Transport Canada revisit the duty time regulations for air crew and develop criteria which respond to the unique conditions of Northern Canada, provided, always, that safety is not compromised.
The Canadian Aeronautics Act was originally brought into being in 1937. While it has been amended from time to time, it has never been the subject of a complete parliamentary review and revision.
Most witnesses point with satisfaction to the publication of the new Canadian Air Regulations in 1986 as being of particular importance. These regulations and the process put in place for their review have satisfied the needs of most witnesses, so there is no overwhelming desire to review the Act itself.
However, as some witnesses critically noted regulations are subject to change, change which can occur with little or no consultation.
It is the view of the Subcommittee that the time has come to completely review the Aeronautics Act. In this review, it is quite possible that some of the regulations may be changed into statutory form. There should also be an easily accessible consolidation of the new Act and its regulations.
We recommend that the government initiate a comprehensive review of the Aeronautics Act and its attendant regulations.
We recommend that upon completion of this departmental review that the matter be referred to the Standing Senate Committee on Transport and Communications prior to the drafting of the new Act and Regulations.
We recommend that the government, after the Senate review cause a new Act and Regulations to be drafted and introduced in the Senate for review.
CANADAS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS FOR AIR SAFETY
The last chapter of the Interim Report we dealt in some depth with the Special Committees view as to Canadas role in international aviation safety. Air safety has become a global concern and responsibility. We believe what was said in the Interim Report bears repeating here.
"...No longer is it sufficient for the developed nations of the world to be concerned only with safety within their borders. In other words, we should ensure that not only may Canadians travel safely within Canada, but that global travel is as safe as possible for Canadians.
A report from the European Commission to the European Parliament and Council addressed the problem of sub-standard carriers from third world countries operating to and from the European Union area. It contained the following recommendations to its member countries:
a)Establish measures to enable the assessment of the safety of individual freight carriers as well as the capabilities of their State of registration to ensure compliance with international safety standards.
b)Encourage ICAO to take a more active stance in safety bilateral agreements to include safety clauses, right to audit foreign carriers. This could be done through ramp checks at European airports.
c)Could move towards establishing "foreign air operators certificates"
d) Simply assessing safety deficiencies is not sufficient it is also necessary to offer technical assistance to foreign authorities.
It was also pointed out in Delft, that banning airlines from states whose civil aviation authorities do not perform satisfactorily may yield some short term results, but it ignores the causes and creates economic, political and social disturbance. A better approach is to accept that many states need external support and this should be considered a global responsibility. Responsibility for aviation safety is not solely a task for national authorities it is an international responsibility.
International Safety Programs are Linked
Through Commercial Aviation Safety Team
Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST)
|Aerospace Industry Association||Department of Defense|
|Airbus||Federal Aviation Administration F FAA Safer Skies|
|Air Line Pilots Association||National Aeronautics and Space Station Administration|
|Allied Pilots Association||International Civil Aviation Organization F ICAO Global Aviation Safety Plan|
|Air Transport Association||Joint Aviation Authority F JAA Safety Strategy Initiatives|
Pratt and Whitney
Regional Airline Association
Flight Safety Foundation
International Air Transport Association
Boeing Commercial Airplanes Group
Transport Canada testified as to Canadas efforts in the international community. We support the International Civil Aviation Organization and the United Nations international body known as ICAO. As well, Camada gives direct assistance to developing nations and Transport Canada operates programs designed to harmonize our rules with those of other countries.
ICAO has adopted a process for assessing civil aviation regulations in various countries in order to determine their adequacy. Canada is a strong supporter of this venture. As well, Transport Canada has a foreign inspection division which conducts safety audits of foreign airlines operating in Canada. Therefore, before a foreign country provides service in or out of Canada with its air carrier, we ensure that that carrier is safe and is operating up to certain standards.
The task of bringing countries that are less safe up to an acceptable standard is shared by the air carriers and IATA. With regard to security, Transport Canada does send security inspectors abroad to ensure that the security at international airports is such that it is safe for Canadians to utilize the airport. If the security measures are substandard, Transport Canada prohibits the departure of planes from these airports to Canada.
Mr. Jackson of Transport Canada was quite candid on this matter. He stated:
"...There are two problems that these countries have. First, they have a problem with infrastructure: they do not have the kind of technology necessary for air traffic control; second, and more important, they do not have a safety framework in place. They do not have inspectors or training programs for their aviation personnel. Where we can provide cost-effective assistance is in establishing those frameworks, which will then let them help themselves once the frameworks are up and running. That, it is fair to say, is where we have been putting our focus.
We did some groundwork on this two years ago when, as a consequence of the APEC conferences, we established a group of aviation experts with the 18 APEC countries, essentially to try to improve the level of safety frameworks in those countries. It is all really a matter of common sense. Establishing regulations is generally the first step, because many of the countries do not have any. Next, we establish an academy to train aviation experts, and inspectors and so on. Those are all very easy steps to recommend; they may be difficult to implement, but they are very common-sense oriented in terms of how to improve the safety record."
Monitoring safety and security in the international air community is extremely important if Canadians are to be safe as they travel by air throughout the world. As Dr. Marsters has pointed out, civil aviation infrastructure in high-risk regions of the world must be upgraded. We believe it is the duty of countries such as Canada to take the lead in such endeavours and ensure that ICAO has the resources and sanctions necessary to raise safety levels significantly.
The Special Committee learned during its visit to the Boeing Aircraft Manufacturing Plant that a number of major players in the world aviation community have come together to form the Commercial Aviation Safety Team which links international safety programs worldwide. Representatives of manufacturers, pilots associations, IATA and the Air Transport Association have joined with government agencies such as NASA, the FAA and the Joint Aviation Authority to work together to increase air safety and security on a worldwide basis.
We recommend that Transport Canada explore the possibility of becoming involved as a member of the International Commercial Aviation Safety Team as explained to us by Boeing.
We recommend that Transport Canada continue with its practice of mandatory safety audits of countries that wish to have their planes fly into Canada as well as security audits of air terminals from which planes depart to Canada and that these audits take the form of due diligence in that Transport Canada not only reviewing the regulations of the country, but complete on-site inspections to ensure safety and security compliance.
Part of the mandate of the former Special Committee and the Subcomittee is to look into the future and identify safety issues, which, while not readily apparent today will become of great importance in perhaps ten years and should be addressed now.
Most witnesses who ventured to speculate in this area believed the problems of the future are with us now, but will only be compounded in the future by the increase in air travel. The most common problem seen by witnesses is the human interface with advanced technology. As Ken Johnson of the Transportation Safety Board stated there will be a continued struggle for those involved in the air crew to master the technology that they see around them.
And Dr. Marsters said: "I see in the future, the challenges that are already facing us." He listed these as controlled flight into terrain, training, the ability to record and share information on incidents and accidents and a permeation of a culture of safety throughout the industry. In addition, there are the problems which result from the global nature of the flying community. Certain countries and airlines of certain countries are less safe than others. The challenge for the future as we have pointed out in the previous chapter faces those countries with well developed air industries to bring less developed countries up to an acceptable safety standard.
The major problems remain and must be addressed the installation of advanced technology in the flight deck and how the air crew is to deal with it. Firstly, as Boeing pointed out: "for safety related technology to be effective, it must be implemented broadly." The majority of planes which will be flying ten or fifteen years from now are flying today. As new technology is developed, retrofitting existing fleets becomes a major issue. Safety technology to be effective must be installed across the entire fleet, but the costs of retrofitting could in some instances be virtually prohibitive. Ways will have to be found as new technology is developed to incorporate it simply and easily into existing fleets. Safety technology will not prevent accidents if it is not capable of being used.
Strategy for achieving our goal:
50% reduction in the worldwide accident rate by 2007
- Focus on CFIT, LOC and Approach and Landing accident rate reduction
- Promote implementation of available interventions through:
- Worldwide leaders
- Regional Programs
- Participate in development of new high leverage interventions through:
- CAST - JSATs and JSITs for CFIT, LOC, ALAR
- Regional Programs
- Promote better utilization of features already on our products
- Identify, develop and apply accident prevention features on our products
Boeing Commercial Airplanes Group
Finally, we return to the issue we raised in the Interim Report as explained by Charles Heuttner, Director of Aviation Safety and Research for NASA. The Special Committee had the pleasure of meeting Dr. Heuttner again in Washington, D.C., in January 1999 and he reiterated the advice given in 1997.
His thesis is compelling in its simplicity. With the technological advances that are predicted for the flight deck, safety can no longer be the responsibility of one person. "Safety must be viewed as a shared responsibility." Crew Resource Management Training is perhaps the most important safety innovation for the next decade. Under this regime it is quite acceptable, if not mandatory for the second officer to speak up when the most senior captain could be making an error. Decision making becomes a shared responsibility among all those who have an interest in the outcome of the decision. The theory is that through shared responsibility safety problems can be identified and addressed before they result in accidents.
We recommend that Transport Canada mandate and then ensure that Crew Resource Management Training or as Dr. Heuttner calls it "collegiality on the flight deck" be incorporated into flight instruction so that it becomes as accepted as teaching such things in flight instruction as meteorology and aerodynamics.
We recommend that the Government of Canada through Transport Canada give consideration to the establishment and funding of centres of excellence for air safety studies in conjunction with certain universities in Canada.
Answers to questions submitted to the Committee following the
appearance of Officials from Transport Canada
before the Special Senate Committee on Transportation Safety and Security
Questions 1 and 11 are related.
1. We are still at a parliamentary stage in our work. It would help us greatly if you could identify for us three major safety issues in the air transportation industry.
11. Recent reports indicate that as air traffic increases, and if the accident rate remains the same, there will be an aircraft falling out of the sky weekly in the near future. What can we, as a Committee, recommend that will address the problem ?
- The reduction in the number of accident/incidents in the midst of an increase in traffic requires progress in many areas simultaneously.
- Safety Management Practices
- continued integration of organizational and human factors into the aviation environment
- managing the potential impact of the Year 2000 computer issue
- improve the worldwide collection, storage, analysis and dissemination of safety-related information including the reporting of accident/incident data
- moving to performance-based and harmonized safety regulations and standards
- continued development of educational and consultative efforts to complement Regulations e.g. fatigue countermeasures, unruly passengers, bird strike reporting
- enhancing safety through shared industry and government responsibility for safety improvements.
- The accelerated development and increased introduction of safety related technology such as:
- continuation of the controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) prevention programme, including the introduction of predictive terrain hazard warning functions (such as enhanced ground proximity warning systems (EGPWS) and minimum safe altitude warning (MSAW) systems)
- the introduction of procedures for non-precision approaches based on global navigation satellite system (GNSS)
- the introduction of requirements for the implementation of airborne collision avoidance systems (ACAS)
- introduction of global satellite-based air traffic management and communications systems
- Safety Oversight
The improvement of the worldwide safety oversight including developing countries, that do not have the skills, financial and other resources required to assure civil aviation safety for which they have jurisdiction. ICAO assessments and audits have indicated serious deficiencies in the developing countries safety oversight programs. This is in the interest of Canadians as well. While abroad, Canadian aircraft need safe airspace in which to operate; Canadians themselves need reliable air carriers when travelling on foreign registered aircraft and when these aircraft operate in our domestic airspace.
- initiating and actively supporting ICAO activities that promote the development and adoption of international safety standards, through participation in ICAO working groups and panels and by strongly supporting ICAOs Safety Oversight and Audit program
- participating in regional organizations, such as the North American Aviation Trilateral
- assisting , through ICAO, developing States in the rectification of safety deficiencies
Questions 2, 3 and 4 relate to the impacts of increased competition and deregulation on aviation safety
2. We are now approximately 10 years into airline deregulation and two years into "open skies" with the United States. Have these two developments, when their effects are combined, contributed to a negative effect on safety ?
3. Are you concerned that, with increased competition once again in the airline industry, our carriers will be cutting back on maintenance and repairs in order to cut costs ? Could this lead to safety concerns ?
4. How do you satisfy yourself that the airline industry is not cutting back on costs that will affect safety ?
- The safety data does not show any link to deregulation and reduced safety. In fact, the
safety record has steadily improved since deregulation.
- Transport Canada is cognizant of the increased competition that the airline industry is faced with; however, this increase in competition should not result in the airline industry cutting back on maintenance, repairs or areas affecting operations. This is principally due to the on-going inspections and audits performed by Transport Canadas Civil Aviation Safety Inspectors.
Maintenance and Manufacturing Activities
- The maintenance and manufacturing inspectors/specialists oversee a system to ensure that
all registered aircraft built or maintained in Canada meet all required national and
international airworthiness standards. Their inspections and audits are part of a broad
based regulatory program that includes company inspections, on-the-spot checks of aircraft
maintenance documents, approval of maintenance manuals and programs, training operations,
and maintenance personnel.
- Furthermore, delegation of regulatory authority by the department to select aviation industry personnel charged with specific and limited monitoring and inspection functions ensures that safety is a responsibility shared by everyone involved in the aviation industry including the regulator and operators
Commercial and Business Aviation Activities
- The Canadian Aviation Regulations require that an air operators training program,
operations manual, standard operating procedures and maintenance program be approved by
Transport Canada. Any changes that an operator proposes to these key safety related areas
are reviewed by Transport Canada Inspectors to ensure that the changes are in accordance
with the applicable regulations and that there is no reduction in the level of safety.
This applies not only to training and standard operating procedures for pilots but for
Flight Dispatchers and Flight Attendants as well.
- Transport Canada Inspectors regularly monitor training sessions for pilots, dispatchers
and flight attendants, and conduct or monitor Pilot Proficiency Checks on line pilots and
company check pilots. Inspectors conduct in-flight inspections of crew performance during
revenue flights throughout each operators route structure. These monitors and
inspections are part of a surveillance plan based on a risk analysis of the carriers
operation, to ensure that training and operations are conducted in accordance with the TC
approved procedures and to identify areas where changes may be required.
- Periodically, Transport Canada conducts a formal audit of all facets of such carriers operations. Subject matter experts from all fields of expertise are included (dangerous goods, cabin safety, flight watch and dispatch, airworthiness and maintenance, and flight operations). The company is provided with a copy of all audit findings and then must produce a corrective action plan that addresses any shortcoming to Transport Canadas satisfaction.
Questions 5, 8 and 16 relate to airport issues
5. With the devolution of airports to Local Airport Authorities, what steps are being taken to ensure safety standards are maintained ?
8. What effect do the new fire fighting regulations for airports have on aviation safety?
16. At the recent ICAO Directors General Conference in Montreal it was agreed to recommend to the ICAO Council that safety assessments (audits) of member States be expanded to include aerodomes and auxiliary services and to make the audits mandatory. Question: Are you satisfied with the present system of airport and service screening at airports in Canada (aircraft ground handling, food service contractors, etc....).
Local Airport Authorities (LAAs)
- The LAAs are certified by Transport Canada and are subject to an ongoing inspection
program to confirm they continue to operate in accordance with all applicable standards
and regulations, including those recently enacted for aircraft fire fighting.
- The current standards used by Transport Canada have been in place for a number of years
and are largely based on ICAO international standards and recommended practices for
airport design and operation.
- A review of the regular post-transfer inspection reports for all the LAAs indicated that
the LAAs continue to maintain an acceptable level of compliance with applicable aerodrome
regulations and safety standards.
- Based on the review of the airport certification inspection reports Transport Canada has concluded that the LAA post-transfer level of compliance with aerodrome safety standards has remained the same as during the pre-transfer period.
Aircraft Firefighting Regulations
- The regulations require that Canadas largest and busiest airports, which handle
almost 95% of all passenger traffic, maintain specific levels of fire fighting services on
site. The amount and type of resources required is commensurate with the volume and type
of traffic at the airport.
- To ensure a continued and consistent level of safety service at airports, Transport
Canada has implemented regulations to tie the provision of on-site fire fighting service
to the level and type of air traffic, and not the ownership of the airport.
- The regulations ensure that on-site fire fighting services are available for scheduled
and chartered airline flights at designated airports, regardless of the time of arrival or
- The Minister has directed departmental officials to begin the regulatory process to improve emergency response services at non-designated airports.
Aviation Security Screening
- Canada has an effective and responsive aviation security screening program.
- Comprehensive security measures are in place at Canadian airports for the screening of
passengers and their belongings, controlling access to airport restricted areas and
securing baggage, cargo and mail.
- These measures meet or exceed the standards of the International Civil Aviation
- Persons who possess an airport restricted area pass (i.e. aviation services personnel)
must have an Airport Restricted Area Access Clearance issued on the basis of background
checks or be subject to security control measures, such as screening.
- Passengers and their carry-on baggage are searched by trained security officers using
state-of-the-art security screening equipment.
- Security measures at Canadian airports will be enhanced in the coming years by the
introduction of explosive detection systems.
- Transport Canada monitors the security measures carried out by the air carriers and airport operators to ensure regulatory compliance.
Question 6 relates to NAV CANADA
6. What changes with regard to air traffic control have taken place with the advent of NAV CANADA ? Do any of these changes have an impact on safety ?
- There has been no material change to the provision of air traffic control since the
advent of NAV CANADA, November 1, 1996, in that service is provided is in accordance with
the same standards that were in place prior to the transfer of responsibility for the
provision of air traffic control services. While not in the context of a material change
in the provision of air traffic control services, they are provided on a cost recoverable
basis (user charges) by NAV CANADA with costs being borne directly by the users.
- There have been some changes with respect to the allocation of airspace and the location from which air traffic control services are provided. The following changes (internal to NAV CANADA) have taken place:
- the terminal control unit at Calgary was relocated to the Edmonton Area Control Centre (ACC) in 1997 and while the service is now provided from Edmonton, it is transparent to the user;
- the responsibility for the provision of en-route air traffic control services in the high level airspace (29,000 feet and above) in the eastern and northern parts of the Moncton flight information region was transferred from Moncton ACC to Gander ACC in February 1998. The change was transparent to the user with respect to the type and level of service provided.
- Compliance with technical standards incorporated by reference in Part VIII of the
Canadian Aviation Regulations is monitored by Transport Canada on a day-to-day basis.
Periodic audits and inspections are also conducted based on identified risk. Should
contraventions to the regulations be found, NAV CANADA is obliged to take immediate
corrective action or face enforcement action. At no time, will operations be allowed to
continue if safety is compromised.
- Key air navigation system issues are discussed and actioned through a joint Transport
Canada/NAV CANADA Safety Oversight Committee. This committee meets regularly and provides
a focal point for the resolution of issues between Transport Canada and NAV CANADA.
- There has been no impact on aviation safety with respect to the provision of air traffic control service with the advent of NAV CANADA.
Questions 7, 9 and 18 relate to flight duty times and crew fatigue
7. What effect does the flight and duty time regulations for pilots and crew have on safety and what role does Transport Canada play in this issue ?
9. What studies have you done to determine the impact of fatigue on pilot effectivess? Boeing has recently conducted fatigue research. They concluded that pre-planned cockpit naps, assigned relief crew members to a flight, and the interaction of the crew with electronic crew activity monitors are measures that have been found successful to combat air-crew fatigue. Have you studied any of these measures ?
18. The committee has been told (by the FAA and other agencies) that a lot of studies have been undertaken of air crew fatigue. Question: Do you see any potential changes to regulations in Canada on this subject or do you believe that changes are necessary ?
- Transport Canada understands that fatigue can present a serious threat to flight safety.
For this reason, Canada has one of the worlds most comprehensive and up-to-date
packages of flight and duty time regulations.
- The flight and duty time regulations, in general, restrict the amount of time a pilot
can spend on duty, on call, or performing work in support of aviation activities. These
rules vary by the type of operation, number of pilots and number of passengers carried.
- Crew rest following the completion of a regulated activity is also controlled. These
regulations compensate for shifting time zones, disruption to circulation rhythm and other
conditions that may accentuate the effects of fatigue.
- Regulations, however, represent a minimum standard and must be complimented by
educational and consultative efforts. So much about fatigue and effective countermeasures
is still poorly understood, from the scientific perspective, that our ongoing research
efforts and are vital to the continuing development of our program.
- The Civil Aviation Directorate is currently conducting research to determine the feasibility of measuring fatigue which may impair performance. This project is described below:
- The purpose of the project is to explore the potential of a multitasking computer protocol and EEG to give flight deck crew members a measure of their own level of alertness, arousal and attention.
- The research is based on the belief that when you are alert, aroused and attentive, you operate at a frequency level of a particular activity given off from the brain which can be measured by EEG. When you are not so alert, aroused and attentive, you begin to work a little harder at the task you are doing. The baseline brain wave frequency we measured, begins to increase in its frequency, and the difference between the two can be measured. Again, if this extra effort that you put in is a measure of fatigue, then you can manage it, at least in theory you should be able to. Results to date are promising, but refinement is required before the findings can have any practical application.
- We are not aware of Boeing doing research in the area of flight crew fatigue, but we do
have a report published by Airbus entitled "Coping With Long-Range Flying:
Recommendations for Crew Rest and Alertness".
- The most active and productive research group in the area of flight crew fatigue is the
Fatigue Countermeasures Group at NASAs Ames Research Centre. Several TC employees
have attended the Fatigue Countermeasures Training Programme. We monitor the research from
NASA and from other research laboratories in Canada and around the world to ensure that
our regulations and the guidance we provide the industry are based on the best scientific
evidence available. NASA has found that controlled rest on the flight-deck and the use of
on-board sleep facilities are beneficial in optimizing flight crew performance in long
haul operations. The CARS allow Canadian operators to develop controlled rest programmes.
- Fatigue effects on human performance are complex and are influenced by factors that are not subject to regulation such as individual characteristics and needs, lifestyle, domestic demands, and unforeseeable circumstances. Regulation, therefore can never be totally effective in ensuring safety. Transport Canada is pursuing a comprehensive response including education, research and the sharing of best practices to compliment our regulatory efforts.
- Transport Canadas regulations addressing pilot fatigue are already world-leading.
We are not content to rest there, however, and are partners with industry in a study whose
goal is to increase our knowledge of, and options for dealing with, the causes and effects
- At this time there are no regulations governing flight attendant flight and duty times. Transport Canada has established a Flight Attendant Flight Time and Duty Time Limitations and Rest Periods Working Group. The report of the working group will likely be tabled at Technical Committee VII in the fall of 1999. In the meantime, the vast majority of Flight Attendants already have flight and duty limitations established in their collective agreement.
Question 10 and 20 relate to safety oversight audits
10. Are there comprehensive safety audits, and if so, what happens to the information gathered ? Is it given to Transport Canada ?
20. The FAA or US Government conducts its own safety oversight assessments in foreign countries, and rates the country A, B or C with the worst grading unacceptable to the United States. This is, of course, when air carriers in that country wishes to operate into the United States. Question: What does Canada do in this area and what is Canada doing to help increase air safety around the world, especially in developing countries ?
- In 1998, the 32nd Session of the ICAO Assembly endorsed the establishment of
a Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme comprising regular, mandatory, systematic and
harmonized safety audits, to be carried out by ICAO in all of its 185 Contracting States.
- Canada is a strong supporter of this Programme and had been one of the first countries
to volunteer for an assessment before the programme was officially endorsed. The
assessment was carried out in 1998. An interim report for the assessment was given to
Transport Canada for comment. The conclusions of the interim report were that Canada has
"a regulatory system which is almost fully compliant; only minor differences from
ICAO standards" and "an implementation system which is efficient and can be
given as an example for other States to follow." Once the Confidential final report
is completed, ICAO will release only a summary of the report. It is Transport
Canadas intention to release the entire report.
- The differences between the Canadian Aviation Regulations and ICAO
standards are minor and do not have an impact on aviation safety.
- While Transport Canada takes cognisance of the Federal Aviation Administrations grading of foreign Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs), the Canadian approach has been to consider both the effectiveness of the safety oversight provided by the regulatory authority and the manner in which the foreign air operator meets international Standards. Foreign Air Operators must meet stringent requirements to qualify for a Canadian Foreign Air Operating Certificate (FAOC), if they envision flying into and out of Canada.
- To qualify for a FAOC, registry activities may include: comprehensive documentation reviews; operator base inspections; in-flight inspections; and ramp inspections - to confirm that certification standards are met. In short, the foreign air operator must be adequately equipped and able to conduct a safe air operation. This safety oversight is applied regardless of registry/country of origin.
- Canada contributes to air safety in developing countries through the provision of technical experts to international safety oversight audit teams of ICAO. As well, some of those experts are released from the Department under leave without pay when they are approached by a foreign CAA for a contract to increase their abilities into regulating their carrier.
- Inspectors (Operations, Cabin Safety and Airworthiness) of the Foreign Inspection Division provide, where appropriate, expert advice to foreign air operators. Further, all Transport Canada Civil Aviation guidance documents are made available when requested by foreign air operators or foreign civil aviation authorities. As well, safety related information is exchanged with other regulatory authorities.
Question 12 relates to the transportation of dangerous goods
12. A subcommittee of the U.S. Senate held hearings during April/May of last year on the subject of the transportation by air of hazardous materials. This became a subject of concern following the ValuJet accident. Question: Have there been any changes in hazardous material regulations or procedures in Canada since the accident ? Would you give us some background on existing regulations and procedures ?
- Legislative Background
- The Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act, 1992 governs the movement of dangerous goods by all modes of transport to, from and within Canada.
- The Act gives the Governor-in-Council the power to make regulations.
- These regulations are developed and maintained by Transport Canada and are called the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Regulations (TDGR).
- For domestic and international air transport of dangerous goods, the TDGR adopts by reference the International Civil Aviation Organization Technical Instructions.
- Impact of ValuJet Accident
- Immediately following the ValuJet accident, Transport Canada issued a Protective Direction pursuant to Section 32 of the Act placing strict conditions on the transport of oxygen generators (the dangerous goods believed to have contributed to the crash of the ValuJet flight) to, from and within Canada.
- The provisions of the Protective Direction were officially incorporated into the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Technical Instructions as an addendum issued August 11, 1997, effective immediately.
Questions 13 and 14 were related to fire suppression systems
13. The same U.S. Senate subcommittee heard evidence on the subject of fire and/or smoke detection systems in the belly-hold of passenger aircraft. Question: Can you update this Committee on the present regulations in Canada regarding belly-hold fire and smoke warning systems in passenger aircraft. For example, can you tell us if regulations have been changed to provide for the retrofit of older aircraft or the update of requirements for new aircraft ?
14. We understand the system for extinguishing a fire in the engine of an aircraft. First the warning light and then the activation of the fire extinguisher system from the flight deck. Question: What is the possibility of a similar system in the belly-hold of all passenger aircraft and, of interest to us, what is the system now and is it different between older and newer aircraft ?
- Cargo compartments on transport category aeroplanes must be equipped with means to control fires therein. The two main types of compartments used in the lower-lobe (under-floor) area of larger transport category aeroplanes are:
- Class C: which are equipped with a fire/smoke detection system and a fire suppression system (indication and activation in the cockpit)
- Class D: which control fires by restricting the supply of air (oxygen starvation), and containing them using fire-resistant liners
- In the late 1980s, as a result of accidents and further to full-scale tests which
showed that fires could rapidly burn through certain types of liners, thereby compromising
the integrity of the fire control mechanisms of the Class D and Class C cargo
compartments, the FAA adopted Rules to incorporate a liner fire-penetration test criteria
for Class C and Class D cargo compartments on new transport category aeroplane type
designs, and to implement same on (the majority of) in-service commercially-operated
transport category aeroplanes.
- In 1998, further to additional accidents/incidents and full-scale tests and analysis, which demonstrated the inadequacy of oxygen starvation/fire containment in controlling certain types of fires, the FAA adopted Rules which essentially:
- eliminated the option of Class D cargo compartments for the certification of new transport category aeroplane type designs, and
- required that, within 3 years, Class D compartments on the majority of in-service passenger-carrying transport category aeroplanes used in air carrier or commercial operations, meet the standards applicable to Class C cargo compartments.
- Transport Canada has participated in, and endorsed the subject FAA actions, and:
- has incorporated both the subject liner fire penetration and the fire detection/suppression criteria in the design standards for new transport category aeroplane type designs, and
- is in the process of implementing regulations that will require that, within 3 years of promulgation, cargo compartment liners comply with the new fire penetration criteria, and cargo compartments be equipped with smoke/fire detection systems (with indication in the cockpit) and fire suppression systems (controllable from the cockpit), on the majority of aeroplanes operated under CAR Part VII (- the subject proposed regulation has already been the object of technical consultation with industry, and is expected to be published in Canada Gazette Part I in the Spring of 1999).
Questions 15 and 17 relate to technical issues
15. There has been a lot of publicity, in the Aviation press, relating to older aircraft in the worlds passenger aircraft fleet. We refer to the number of cycles on an airframe.
Question: Would you explain to the Committee your understanding of this issue ?
- The reference to "number of cycles on an airframe" relates to the age of the
aircraft. Each cycle can be interpreted as one aircraft flight, i.e.: one take-off and
landing. It is a convenient way to measure the age of the aircraft.
- Each flight subjects the airframe to structural loading. As far as the fuselage is
concerned, during this flight the fuselage is pressurized (where pressurization is
applicable). The pressurization puts stress on the related structural elements. Equally,
during each flight, the wings must carry the appropriate aerodynamic flight loads and
therefore these flight loads put stress on the related wing structural elements.
- The cumulative affect of a large number of flight cycles (loading and unloading)
subjects the airframe to structural fatigue. The larger the number of airframe cycles the
greater the risk of fatigue cracks being generated in the structure.
- To continue to insure structural integrity and airworthiness of the airframe as it ages,
a system is put in place to pro-actively predict and manage the increased risk of fatigue
- As long as aircraft are maintained in accordance with their approved maintenance
program, they will remain airworthy indefinitely. However the reality is that the
maintenance requirements on aircraft structures and systems become more onerous as the
aircraft ages and it becomes more economical to retire the aircraft and replace them with
- Transport Canada monitors the safety of Canadian aircraft through inspections and
approved company maintenance programs and since 1990, TC inspectors and engineers have
been inspecting aircraft on a random basis as they undergo major inspections.
- Transport Canada has been working with industry and other airworthiness authorities to ensure a coordinated effort is undertaken to address the aging of both structural and non-structural components. Any developments internationally will be implemented similarly in Canada, as appropriate.
17. There have been a lot of discussions in the aviation community about CFIT (controlled flight into terrain) and warning systems to advise the flight deck in these emergencies.
Question: Would you bring the Committee up to date on this issue in the airline and manufacturing industry ?
- In June of 1999, Transport Canada will present a package of regulations aimed at reducing the number of accidents associated with controlled flight into terrain (CFIT). It is part of a tri-national effort with the United States and Mexico. Additionally, Canadian regulations will specifically motivate operators to implement Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems (TAWS) in advance of proposed regulations in the United States. TAWS cannot be required by regulation at this time as the equipment is not yet available widely enough to permit compliance.
Question 19 relates to substance abuse
19. You may be aware that Canadian truckers now operating in the United States are now subject to random and mandatory drug tests. We understand that alcohol and drug testing in the surface transportation industry is a controversial subject with opinions pro and con.
Questions: Are you contemplating any changes to the law in this area for air carriers ?
- Transport Canada has not studied any of these measures because it has found Section
602.03 of the Civil Aviation Regulations to be an effective deterrent re: substance abuse.
The Department is not contemplating further action at this time.
- Under the CARs, no person shall act as a crew member of an aircraft within eight hours
after consuming an alcoholic beverage, while under the influence of alcohol, or while
using any drug that impairs the persons faculties to the extent that the safety of
the aircraft or of persons on board the aircraft is endangered in any way.
- The designated provisions for enforcement action include monetary penalties up to a
maximum of $5,000 for an individual and $25,000 for a company. Canadian Aviation Documents
may also be suspended.
- In addition to legal challenges regarding human rights legislation, a mandated program
through regulations for random substance use testing in all modes of transportation
would also require considerable new resources, and the introduction for such an
enforcement strategy requires compelling evidence. To date, such evidence is not
- Safety is of the utmost importance to the department and it will continue to support efforts by industry to use whatever means feasible to ensure a safe workplace, such as maintaining zero-tolerance policies for substance use while respecting human rights.
A-1What percentage of CAIs are ex-military ?
- Nationally, there are approximately 397 AO-CAIs of which 23.9% have come to Transport Canada with recorded military service. This number includes personnel that currently have pensionable military service time to their superannuation credit. Not included are those who have opted for a return of contributions upon leaving the military. The regional complement of AO-CAIs with a military service background varies from 41.5% in the NCR to 6.25% in the Québec Region.
A-2Provide copies of the Boeing Fatigue Study
- We are not aware of Boeing doing research in the area of flight crew fatigue. However, we can provide copies of a briefing on the subject prepared by NASA and given during their Fatigue Countermeasures Programmes. Its title is Crew Factors in Flight Operations X: Alertness Management in Flight Operations. Also provided are abstract of the NASA report Crew Factors in Flight Operations IX: Effects of Planned Cockpit Rest on Crew Performance and Alertness in Long-Haul Operations and the Airbus Coping With Long-Rane Flying: Recommendations for Crew Rest and Alertness.
A-3Issue of Parachutes on Ultra-Lights
- Ballistic Recovery Systems (BSR) are available for use on aircraft. They may be
installed on powered parachutes, ultra-light aeroplanes or certified aircraft such as a
- There is only one major manufacturer of ballistic recovery systems it is an
American company called BRS. This manufacturer feels a BRS is an excellent safety device
and is enthusiastic about having them used on aircraft.
- Many Canadian ultra-light aeroplane distributors and pilots do not recommend the
installation of a BRS. While aircraft manufacturers agree that a BRS has and could save
some lives, they are quick to point out that this advantage applies only if the BRS is
installed and used properly and if the "right" emergency situation is
encountered. A BRS could offer safety advantages in cases where no landing area is
available or as a "last resort" measure, for in-flight structural failure. A BRS
can ONLY be used when the aircraft engine is not running, otherwise, the propellers
could tangle in the shroud lines.
- Situations in which the BRS offers significant benefits are a very small portion of
ultra-light aeroplanes accidents in Canada and elsewhere. Ultra-light aeroplane
manufacturers and operators prefer to increase safety for all flight situations by using
stronger and more effective components to enhance the overall structure of the aircraft,
than to add weight in the form of a BRS that may be helpful in only a small portion of
potential emergency situations.
- A BRS adds weight to an already weight-restricted ultra-light aeroplane. Ballistic
Recovery Systems cost between $1,600 to $4,000 U.S. They must be re-packed every 2 years,
adding to maintenance costs. Aircraft manufacturers and distributors caution that if used
or installed improperly, a ballistic recovery system could have severe negative results
- Transport Canada does not mandate the carriage of ballistic recovery systems and have no statistical data or proven documentation to indicate that using a Ballistic Recovery System would improve safety or save lives.
Letter of July 8, 1999 from Air Canada Pilots Association
July 8, 1999
The Honourable J. Michael Forrestall
Special Senate Committee on
Transportation Safety and Security
SENATE OF CANADA
Dear Senator Forrestall:
On behalf of Captain Sowden and the Air Canada Pilots Association, we would like to thank you for the opportunity to meet in your office June 9th, to further discuss issues raised during this Associations presentation to the Committee during the previous week.
During our meeting, we were asked if we could assist the Committee by researching British and American Flight Duty Time regulations and to provide a comparison with the Canadian Aviation Regulations (CARs). Please find enclosed copies of the pertinent British and American regulations. We apologise for taking some time to do so; the British rules were not readily accessible on the Internet and we had to secure our copy the old-fashioned way; by mail.
FLIGHT DUTY SUMMARY
It is often difficult to compare one countrys flight duty regulations to the next, as there are many differences in approach, philosophy and interpretation. Nevertheless, I have assembled a skeletal comparison between the three sets of rules on key flight duty issues. Note that we are led to believe the British rules can be considered as fairly typical of Europe as a whole.
UK - maximum 14 hours Flight Duty Period (time at the controls, includes provision for one hour for check-in / planning), progressively reduces to 8 hours based on time of departure, number of sectors flown, and acclimatisation to time zone.
USA - a maximum of 8 hours at the controls, with a maximum 14 hour duty day (includes all duties for the employer).
CARs - maximum 14 hours flight duty (any combination of flying and other duties), no provision for start time, sectors flown, or time zone changes.
Extension of Duty Day due to Operational Delay
UK - 3 hours, reduces with number of sectors flown.
USA - allowance for operational delay, no specific limit.
CARs - up to 3 hours with concurrence of the crew.
Minimum Rest Period
UK - at least as long as the proceeding duty period, or 12 hours (whichever is greater).
USA - minimum 9 hours, rising to 11 hours rest after 9 hours flight duty.
CARs - opportunity for 8 hours prone rest, usually interpreted as 9.5 hours.
UK - can work regular flight duty day after 6 hours of stand-by; if stand-by exceeds 6 hours that excess over 6 hours must be subtracted off the flight duty day.
USA - stand-by and subsequent duty period cannot exceed 18 hours.
CARs - work full duty period if called in before 10 PM, reduces to 10 hours if called in between 10 PM 6 AM.
Total Flight Time 7 day period
UK - 55 hours duty (flying duty plus any other duties performed for the operator).
USA - maximum 30 hours flight time (at the controls).
CARs - maximum 40 hours flight time (at the controls), extendable to 43 for operational delays.
Total Flight Time 30 day period
UK - maximum 100 hours flight time (at the controls).
USA - maximum 100 hours flight time (at the controls).
CARs - maximum 120 hours flight time (at the controls), extendable to 123.
Long haul flying
UK - maximum 18 hours with provision of a relief pilot and rest bunk.
USA - 8 hours at the controls per pilot (implies one or more relief pilots).
CARs maximum 20 hours with provision of a relief pilot and rest bunk.
We trust the above is useful, and would be pleased to answer any further questions.
Air Canada Pilots Association
Peter W. Foster
Manager, Technical & Safety Division
c.c. Mr. Tonu Onu, Clerk Committee on Transportation Safety and Security Captain Richard Sowden, Chair ACPA Technical and Safety Division
36TH Parliament - First Session
|December 2, 1998||From the Transportation Safety Board of Canada :
Mr. Kenneth A. Johnson, Executive Director.
|March 4, 1999||From Transport Canada :
Mr. Ron Jackson, Assistant Deputy Minister
Safety and Security Group;
Mr. Art Laflamme, Director General
Civil Aviation; and
Mr. Bob Shuter, Senior Policy Advisor
|June 2, 1999||From the Air Canada Pilots Association :
Captain Richard Sowden, Chair
Technical and Safety Division; and
Mr. Peter Foster, Manager
Technical and Safety Division.
From the Canadian Owners and Pilots Association :
|June 3, 1999||From the Airline Division of the Canadian Union of Public
Ms. Denise Hill, Division President; and
Mr. Richard Balnis, Research Officer.
|June 9, 1999||From NAV CANADA :
Ms. Kathy Fox, Director
Safety and Quality.
From the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) :
From the Transportation Safety Board of Canada :
|June 10, 1999||As an individual :
Mr. Gerald F. Marsters, President, AeroVations Inc.
36th Parliament First Session
|FIELD TRIP TO CALGARY|
|March 8, 1999||From Corporate Affairs and Communications :
Mr. Steve Shaw
Greater Toronto Airports Authority
|March 9, 1999||From Trimac Corporation :
Ms. Kim Miller
Vice President, Human Resources
Mr. Barry Davy
Vice-President, Quality Assurance
|From Alberta Trucking Association :
Mr. Collin Heath
|From West Jet Airlines :
Mr. Clive Beddoe
Chairman of the Board
|Mr. Tim Morgan
Senior Vice President, Operations
|Mr. Frank Harbour
Co-ordinator, Corporate Security
|Mr. Sandy Campbell
Chief Financial Officer
|FIELD TRIP TO VANCOUVER|
|March 10, 1999||From Canadian Airlines International :
Captain Bob Weatherly
Vice-President Flight Operations and Chief Pilot
|From Pacific Coastal Airways :
Mr. Darryl Smith
|From Harbour Air Seaplanes :
Mr. Peter Evans
|From Helijet :
Mr. Gordon Jones
Director, Flight Operations
Mr. Guy Smith
|March 11, 1999||From the British Columbia Lightkeepers :
Mr. John Abrams
Mr. Peter Wallbridge
|From the British Columbia Aviation Council :
Mr. Jerry Lloyd
President and Chief Executive Officer
|FIELD TRIP TO SEATTLE|
|March 11, 1999||From the Boeing Company :
Ms. Linda Ransom
Executive Operations Manager
Government and Community Relations
|March 12, 1999||Meeting Officials from Boeing|
|From the Canadian Consulate:
Mr. Roger Simmons
Consul General to Seattle
|FIELD TRIP TO MONTREAL|
|June 11, 1999||Meeting with Bombardier Aerospace :
Mr. John P. Holding
Executive Vice President
Engineering and Product Development
|Mr. John A. Taylor, Vice President
|Mr. Chris Watkiss
Chief Airworthiness Engineer
|Mr. Wally Remington
Senior Advisor, Airworthiness Engineer and Regulating Affairs
|Mr. Tony Lively
Accident Investigation and Product Integrity
|Ms. Julie Rheault
|Mr. François Caza
|June 11, 1999||Meeting Montreal Airport :
Mr. Michel L. Latour
Executive Vice President and Head of Airports Oper.
|Mr. Normand Boivin
Montreal Internation Airport
|Mr. Pierre-Paul Pharand