Canadian Security Guide Book

2005 EDITION

An Update of Security Problems in Search of Solutions


CHAPTER 4

Canadian Forces

Problem 1:  Budget Cuts                    

HIGH PRIORITY  

The Canadian Forces budget was cut by approximately 30% between 1988 and 2000; many of the cuts occurred between 1994 and 1998. This year Canada will spend around 1.2 per cent of its GDP on defence. Despite NATO’s recent expansions, Canada remains mired third last among the twenty-six member countries, ahead of only Luxembourg and Iceland (which has no armed forces).[1]

Over the same time frame, the operational tempo of the Canadian Forces has increased (see Chapter 4 Problem 3, page 71). The budgetary cuts have had severe consequences. All the services are now short of personnel. Capital purchases have been delayed. Older equipment – most notably the Sea King Helicopters and the Hercules Transport Aircraft – is becoming increasingly unusuable. Large-scale training has been postponed.

Recent studies by the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, the Auditor General of Canada, the Conference of Defence Associations and the Defence Management Program at Queen’s University have all called for budget increases that correlate over time to significant sustained resource commitments to the Canadian Forces.


COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee recommended an immediate increase to the Department of National Defence baseline budget of $4 billion and future annual budget increases adjusted for inflation. (Report: Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #2 and #3)

Nine months later, the Committee reiterated that the $4 billion dollar increase in defence spending recommended in the earlier report was the MINIMUM required, and that the full increase was required immediately. (Report: For an Extra 130 Bucks…Update on Canada’s Military Financial Crisis, A View from the Bottom Up, November 2002, #1)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The Department of National Defence’s 2004 budget was approximately $13.28 billion according to the Government’s Main Estimates for 2004-2005. That budget is approximately $1.45 billion more than the Department’s budget when the Committee made its first recommendation on the subject.[2] However, that is not to say that the Goverment is almost half way to meeting the Committee’s recommendation of a $4 billion increase.

The Budget 2004 number is slightly misleading because it reflects additional funds committed to the Department for deployed operations (Afghanistan and Haiti) and does not take into account the $144 million taken away from the Department as part of the government-wide reallocation initiative.

Moreover, had the Government raised the Department’s baseline budget by $4 billion when the Committee recommended, and then followed up that increase with subsequent inflation-based increases, the Department’s budget would now be approximately $17.3 billion. This would still only raise Canada’s level of military spending as a percentage of its GDP to 21st out of the 26 NATO member countries. The government notes that, in terms of raw military expenditures, Canada ranks 6th on the list of NATO countries, but many of the countries on that list have far smaller GDPs.

Since December 2003, the government has pledged to spend more than $7.7 billion on equipment for the Canadian Forces, including:

The vast majority of the promised capital money will not be spent for five years, or in the case of the Joint Support Ship, ten years. Experience has shown, however, that money promised frequently does not materialize. Moreover, the only new money the Department of National Defence is getting is for the Fixed Wing Search and Rescue budget.  The funds for the other three projects are going to have to be scraped out of the current DND budget.

The government’s limited funding increases have not been enough to stop the deterioration of the Forces’ equipment and the wear and tear on the personnel.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

The budget of the Department of National Defence should be increased by $4 billion for fiscal year 2005-2006.  There should be increases each year thereafter tied to inflation.


Problem 2:  Capital Acquisitions Falling Behind

A decade of cuts to the Canadian Forces has postponed critical military acquisitions. Not only does the Department of National Defence need a cash infusion (as described in Problem 1 above), it needs yearly funding increases to allow it to create a reliable capital acquisition process that will put an end to recurring equipment crises.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended future annual budget increases [that] were realistic, purpose-driven and adjusted for inflation. (Report: Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #3)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government has not announced any plans for sustained budget increases to ensure that the funding going forward maintains its purchasing power. It did promise funding for specific new projects such as new Search and Rescue aircraft, Joint Support Ships, Maritime Helicopters, and Mobile Gun Systems.

Currently, capital expenditures account for around 15% of the Department of National Defence’s budget.[4] The government has done little to increase to capital expenditures to a level sufficient to guarantee properly equipped Forces.

The Minister of National Defence wrote to one of the Committee’s members in November 2004 in response to this recommendation that “it is premature to speculate on the level of funding that Defence requires” until the government’s International Policy Review is completed.[5]


CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

Because of the aging nature of the military’s equipment and the large capital expense of the Department, Defence will require inflation-based increases every year regardless of the outcome policy review. It is wrong to hold back this necessary commitment any longer.

Boosting National Defence’s baseline budget was only Step 1 in solving the military’s financial problems. Without inflation-based increases in subsequent budgets, there can be no sustained commitment to revitalization. Had the Government raised the Department’s budget by $4 billion and then followed it with subsequent inflation-based increases as recommended, the Department’s budget would now be where it should be approximately $17.3 billion.

The capital expenditure account must be moved higher on the list of priorities for National Defence. It cannot continue to be the fund made up of what’s left over. Budgeting 15% of the DND budget for capital expenses for the next five years will not address rust out of current capital equipment, let alone provide funds for new emerging capabilities.  The Department must ensure that a minimum amount of its budget is earmarked for capital expenditures.  That amount should be between $2 and $2.5 billion per year.


Problem 3:   Overheated Operational Tempo

The number of tasks demanded of the Canadian Forces increased significantly during the 1990s, despite deep budget cuts. The combination of cuts and increased operations created an as yet unresolved three-fold crisis: too few effective personnel are being ordered to do too many tasks with too little training and obsolescent or non-existent equipment. A budget increase alone will not fix this problem.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended healing time – that all Canadian military forces be withdrawn from overseas duty when current tours expired.[6] The Committee recommended that no forces be deployed overseas for a minimum of 24 months thereafter. This amounted to a recommendation for a 30-month moratorium on deployments.  (Report: For an Extra 130 Bucks…Update on Canada’s Military Financial Crisis, A View from the Bottom Up, November 2002, #2 A and B)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government, in its October 2002 official response to the Committee’s first report, stated that it had addressed the impact of operational tempo by limiting the duration of some foreign deployments and reducing overseas commitments.[7] One of the commitment reductions the government’s response highlighted was its decision not to replace the Canadian Battle Group in Afghanistan.

In fact, the government kept up the pace of deployments until recently. Canadian troops were, for example, back in Afghanistan in August 2003 on another significant mission. The Government has also deployed large forces to Haiti and to the waters off Southwest Asia, and maintained standing commitments, including those in the Golan Heights and (until recently) in Bosnia. 

The pace has taxed the Forces. Between 2001 and 2003, for example, the Navy deployed 15 of its 18 major warships, and 95 percent of all its 4,100 sailors, into the Arabian Sea on 16 deployments (one ship went twice).[8]

However, over time, it became clear to the government that its policies were unsustainable and since 2003, senior military and political leaders have begun conceeding the need for a significant pause. A de facto pause is now underway.

February 23, 2004 Committee proceedings excerpt

Senator Atkins:

So considering our international obligations, we are just stretched too thin?

LGen. MacDonald: 

We have been over the last few years, yes.[9]

Lieutenant General MacDonald, then Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, told the Committee in February that starting in August 2004, the Canadian Forces would be entering “a period of recuperation, a strategic pause, as you would say, to ensure that we can ultimately return to a steady state level of deployment in the subsequent year.”

As of October 15, 2004, the government has withdrawn all but 1,633 of the 4,500 military personnel that were overseas a year ago.

The Department of National Defence describes the current situation as an “operational pause.”[10]

However, some deployments continue. In August, another rotation of almost a thousand personnel headed out to Afghanistan. In May, approximately 80 Canadian Forces personnel deployed to the Golan Heights for the 80th consecutive rotation of Canada’s mission there. Yes, we have been in the Golan Heights for 30 years, representing generations of soldiers. Then, as recently as early October,

Canada deployed two Aurora Maritime Patrol aircraft and approximately sixty-five personnel to Italy to aid in a NATO operation as part of the Campaign Against Terrorism.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

The decision to slow the pace of deployments was a politically difficult decision, but a sound one.  But if Canada’s military is going to focus on the retraining, rehabilitation and re-equipping that will be needed to create modern, effective armed forces, the government needs to stay the course and continue to slow the tempo of overseas deployments.[11]

The government must resist the inevitable calls over the next few months for new or additional deployments before the soldiers, sailors, and air and ground crews are rested, retrained and augmented with new recruits.

There will always be demands for deployment of Canadian troops somewhere in the world – from our allies, from NATO, from the U.N., and from political constituencies within Canada. It will take a very astute and courageous federal government to say “No – we are going to stay off the merry-go-round to fix this.” The challenge: muster the courage, and get on with the job.

How long the government must continue to resist those calls is dependent on how many of the troops are brought home.  If the government is not going to bring home all the troops – and there are still 1,633 personnel overseas – then the reduced tempo is going to have to last longer than the 24 months first recommended. This is particularly true in light of the need to train 5,000 Regular and 3,000 Reserves Forces personnel promised by the government.


Problem 4:   Too Few Personnel – Too High Tempo

HIGH PRIORITY  

The Canadian Forces’ strength declined from almost 90,000 in 1990-91, to 73,219 in 1994-95, to 62,145 in October 2004. Meanwhile, the operational tempo increased.[12] Of the 62,145 personnel that make up the total current force strength, the heavy burden of fulfilling the government’s commitments falls to just 53,183 effective personnel.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that to sustain the level of tasking required of them over the last eight years, the Canadian Forces need at least 75,000 trained effective personnel. (Report: Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #1)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

As of 4 October 2004, the Canadian Forces Regular Force strength was 62,145, the trained effective strength was 53,183, and the number available for tasks was 51,615.[13]

The government has committed to increase the size of the regular force by 5,000 personnel. According to the Minister of National Defence, “the increase will go a long way toward alleviating the problems associated with the high operational tempo of our military in recent years.”[14]

The details of the force expansion are unclear. Rumours persisted in the early fall that the new personnel would be trained for a niche role such as peacekeeping.  It was also rumoured that, while new personnel would be recruited, the government would not provide new money to pay their salaries. This seems far-fetched, given the pledge of the Minster of National Defence, “the Government is committed to giving the Canadian Forces the resources required to do their jobs.”[15]

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

The government’s promise of more personnel constituted a step in the right direction, but only a small step. First, the government needs to follow through by providing sufficient additional resources to pay for the new personnel, and by training them to be completely combat capable.

Secondly, the government must commit to expanding the Forces for each of three subsequent years until the Forces reach a level of 75,000 trained effective, as recommended by the Committee, and as outlined in the following chart: 

 

Net Increase

to be added

Total -
Canadian Forces Trained Effective Personnel

Current

n/a

53,183

2004 – 2005

5,000

58,183

2005 – 2006

5,000

63,183

2006 – 2007

6,000

69,183

2007 – 2008

6,000

75,183

The Committee proposal is for a “net increase” of personnel, which does not account for normal attrition through retirement, nor for possible training releases. Thus, the number of recruits to be taken into the Canadian Forces each year must be closer to 9,000 to end up with our net numbers above.

  • Accept the scope of the problem ahead

The challenge is far greater than simply adding the additional personnel. The government will have to tackle the aging demographic problem facing the military in the coming years at the same time it is increasing the size of the Forces.

  • Create innovative solutions to retain specialized skill sets

The problem is further complicated by the need for personnel with specialized skills. The government will have to fund innovative incentive programs to retain a number of trades longer than they would normally stay in the service in order to allow the new recruits to acquire necessary competencies.

  • Continue to decrease deployments and over all operational tempo until manpower shortage is resolved

Training so many new recruits will be a large undertaking. The government must ensure that it has experienced troops on hand to train the new recruits. This will require a significant long term commitment. The training of these troops will have implications for deployments through at least 2008.


Problem 5:  Overdue Defence Policy Review

Canada’s defence policy as outlined in the 1994 White Paper on Defence is irrelevant and outdated. It became irrelevant and outdated when the federal government failed to provide the funding necessary to allow the Canadian Forces to fulfil the roles as defined in the policy. 

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the government conduct a defence policy review as soon as possible, but since defence policy is predicated on foreign policy, it not do so without first reviewing Canada’s foreign policy. (Report: Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #4)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The Government has been promising a comprehensive review of foreign and defence policy for years. There have been suggestions that elements of it will be released for comment by Parliament later this fall. The review itself will not be completed until the fall of 2005.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

  • Table clear defence policy, based on clear foreign policy

Foreign policy and defence policy reviews are long overdue. In the weeks preceding the publication of this report, the expected delivery date for the International Policy Review was pushed back by a month. Further, even at this late stage, it is not clear whether the review will consist of a Green Paper, providing options for debate, or a White Paper, stating a definitive policy. 

It is time to get on with the process. The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence and the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs have undertaken to get on with their own reviews and will consider the government’s paper, if and when it is made public.


Problem 6:  Lack of Large-Scale Training Exercises

The Canadian Forces has had to set aside most collective, joint and large-scale training due to lack of money and personnel. Training occurs principally at the individual and small unit level. This is to the detriment of military effectiveness and the safety of Canadian Forces personnel.

As Colonel Jocelyn P.P.J. Lacroix, then Commander of the 5th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, testified to the Committee in September 2003, “We have had to spread out and often do less collective training, which was conducted annually at all levels. So it is harder to build cohesion now than it was previously…we lack the resources to build that cohesion through collective training.”[16]

It is difficult to fault National Defence for not providing appropriate training when its resources are so over-stretched in the field.

It is not difficult to blame National Defence’s political masters.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that battalion or battle group-level exercises – particularly those permitting Canadian and American troops to function jointly – be re-instituted as quickly as possible to permit Canada’s army to work in harmony with the armies of its allies. (Report: Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility, September 2002, #1)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The Canadian Army has not engaged in any combined or joint brigade or battalion-level exercises with U.S. military since September 2002 because of the high operational tempo of both militaries, according to the Minister of National Defence.[17]

The Canadian Forces did conduct its own brigade-level exercise in April 2003 under the title of Exercise Resolute Warrior. The 27-day exercise brought together over 4400 Canadian troops, and fighters from the Montana Air National Guard. Resolute Warrior was DND’s largest training exercise since 1992. It cost the Army 45% of its 2003 training budget.

According to National Defence, Exercise Resolute Warrior “marked the Army’s return to combined arms training at the formation level.”[18]

The Canadian Forces did not undertake a similar-sized exercise in 2004. The Forces are planning to conduct a Brigade Training Event in Fall 2005.  National Defence estimates that the exercise, referred to as Phoenix Ram, will involve approximately 4,000 soldiers and take place at the Land Force Western Area Training Centre Wainwright.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

  • Conduct more frequent large-scale training  exercises

The Canadian Forces cannot expect to maintain cohesiveness and interoperability while undertaking only one large-scale training exercise every two years.


Problem 7:  The Slow Move to Wainwright

The establishment of the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre at Canadian Forces Base Wainwright has been painfully slow. The Centre should be up and running by now.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended in 2002 that the construction of the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre at Wainwright – then not even contracted and far behind schedule – be expedited and that the facility be prepared for large-scale training exercises of Canadian Forces troops no later than the summer of 2004.
(Report: Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility, September 2002, #2)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government failed to meet the Committee’s Summer 2004 deadline for completion. The stand-up of the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre will be phased in through 2005. Training is scheduled to commence at Wainwright in 2006. According to National Defence, this opening date is consistent with the original timeline for the creation of the centre.[19]

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

  • Ensure the Centre is operational in 2006

The Canadian Forces cannot train adequately without the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre. This should have been a greater priority. All that is left now is to try to ensure that “slow” doesn’t become “slower yet.”


CHAPTER 5

Structure and Coordination of Government

Problem 1:   Need for Muscle at the Top

National Security issues are important enough to demand full day-to-day attention of someone very senior in the cabinet, someone capable of driving the government’s agenda across multiple departments and with a powerful voice at the cabinet table.  

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the position of Deputy Prime Minister become a permanent component of the federal political structure and that the Deputy Prime Minister be assigned permanent responsibility for Canada’s U.S. file, borders, national security issues, natural and man-made disasters and coasts. (Report: Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, October 2003, #5.2)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Overall

The new government went a long way toward filling this void when it followed the Committee’s recommendation and made the new Deputy Prime Minister responsible for public safety and emergency preparedness.

The government centralized the responsibility for most of national security and emergency preparedness portfolios in the hands of the Deputy Prime Minister in December 2003, clearly making the position the lead Minister of a strong department with broad duties and responsibilities (though not broad enough).


The Canada-U.S. File

The current Deputy Prime Minister no longer has the same responsibility for managing the Canada-U.S. file that former Deputy Prime Minister John Manley did. However, not only was she not given the U.S. file, but the Prime Minister’s Office does not even list her as a member of the Cabinet Committee on Canada-U.S. relations.[20]

Responsibility for the Canada-U.S. file is now more complex than it was under Deputy Prime Minister Manley. The Prime Minister has engaged in the file through the creation of a cabinet committee on Canada-U.S. relations which he chairs; as has the centre of government, through the creation of a Canada-U.S. Privy Council Office Secretariat; and on top of that, there have been two successive Parliamentary Secretaries to the Prime Minister appointed with special emphasis on Canada-U.S. relations.[21]

The government has not demonstrated that there is a clear effective lead on this critical file.

 

Coastal Security

The government announced in its April 2004 National Security Policy that it was “clarifying and strengthening accountability for marine security.”[22] In the policy it then assigned lead roles for different aspects of marine security to three Ministers: Transport (marine safety and security policy co-ordination), National Defence (co-ordination of on-water response to a marine threat or a developing crisis), and the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (enforcement and policing of marine security).[23]

Furthermore, the Coast Guard still reports to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. Transport Canada also retains responsibility for the Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group.


Making the Position Permanent

The government introduced legislation in October 2004 to formalize the creation of the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness.[24] It does not permanently tie the new Department to the position of Deputy Prime Minister.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

Good progress has been made, but there is work left to be accomplished.

  • Give the Deputy Prime Minister the U.S. file

The Deputy Prime Minister should be given the U.S. file, should be brought on board the Cabinet Committee on Canada-U.S. relations and should, in fact, chair that Committee.

  • Give the Deputy Prime Minister the tools needed to do the job

The Deputy Prime Minister should also be given additional tools in order to round out her portfolio’s responsibility for Canada’s security infrastructure, including oversight of:

  • An armed Coast Guard with constabulary authority

  • Canadian Air Transport Security Authority

  • Canadian Food Inspection Agency

  • Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group

 

  • Make the position permanent

The legislation creating the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness should tie the position to the role of Deputy Prime Minister.


Problem 2:  Need for a Strong Team

The Deputy Prime Minister does not receive adequate support to perform her security functions.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the Deputy Prime Minister be provided with adequate bureaucratic support within a branch of the Privy Council Office to fund and direct a structure for maritime security, in addition to other responsibilities (which the Committee recommended include the Canada-U.S. file, borders, national security issues, and natural and man-made disasters in Recommendation #5.2, Chapter 5, Problem #1 above).  (Report: Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, October 2003, #5.3)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Deputy Prime Minister McLellan was not given responsibility for either coastal security or the Canada-U.S. file as part of her portfolio.

Minister McLellan receives senior level support support for her national security responsibilities from within the Privy Council Office from the Prime Minister’s National Security Advisor, Robert Wright, who serves as one of her Deputy Ministers.[25]  Wright’s position was created as part of the same set of changes to the structure of government that created Minister McLellan’s portfolio.

No structure dedicated to maritime security has been created within the Privy Council Office.

A new Canada-United State Privy Council Secretariat was established to support the Cabinet committee on Canada-U.S. relations. Minister McLellan is not a member of that committee.


CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

  • Concentrate responsibility for maritime security

Responsibility for Canadian maritime security is diffused among various federal agencies and departments, meaning that the responses to crises are unlikely to be crisp and focused.  The Deputy Prime Minister should be put in charge of coordinating maritime security efforts among the many departments involved. Some departments should get out of the security business.

  • Get Transport Canada out of security

Transport Canada has responsibility for marine safety and security policy co-ordination, including the Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group.[26]  It should not.

The Deputy Prime Minister’s department should take over leadership of the Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group and the government should get on with important reforms like moving the Canadian Coast Guard out of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and giving it a constabulary role in defending our coasts.


Problem 3:  Coordination at the Top

HIGH PRIORITY  

Lack of Cabinet-level coordination and oversight of national security issues has in the past undermined the government’s ability to drive its security agenda and guarantee the safety of Canadians.  A more focused and coordinated structure was required to ensure implementation of priority policies.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that a national security structure containing the following be established:

  • A permanent Cabinet committee chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister

  • The Cabinet Committee would include the following ministers:

    • Foreign Affairs

    • Defence

    • Solicitor General

    • Health

    • Finance

    • Justice

    • Immigration

    • Others as required  

  • An additional Secretary to the Cabinet as its senior official.  

  • A permanent Secretariat within PCO dedicated to national security issues  

  • The Secretariat within PCO would include sufficient senior officials who have a good understanding of government capabilities, together with a grasp of issues and interests of importance to Canada.  

  • A restructuring of current procedures to permit this Secretariat to address issues of national security and common US/Canada security issues.

(Report: Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, October 2003, #5.4)


GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government responded by creating a variation of this structure two months after the Committee made its recommendation.

The most important component of the structural changes was the formation of a permanent Cabinet Committee on Security, Public Health, and Emergencies, chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister and including all the ministers recommended above (with the exception of Finance). It also includes additional members the Committee did not think were necessary, namely the Ministers of the Environment, Agriculture and Agri-Food, and Fisheries and Oceans, and the Ministers of State for Multiculturalism and Public Health.[27]

The Prime Minister also appointed Rob Wright, a senior public servant, to serve as his National Security Advisor and as secretary to that committee. Wright described the creation of his position, and the structural changes to government as part of an attempt to, “ensure that all the arms of government, the spaghetti, were connected toward that common purpose.”[28]

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

The government should be commended for adopting a variation of the Committee’s recommendation.  The Committee will continue to investigate as to whether personnel shortages in this vital area have been adequately addressed.


Problem 4:  The Missing National Security Policy

Canada has long been in need of a comprehensive and integrated national security policy. Without a coherent road map, programs get muddled in their planning and execution. Without a policy, it is all but impossible to evaluate whether programs are meeting the government’s goals.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

Given the importance of issues of national security, and the need to have policies and procedures in place when crises arise, the Committee recommended that a study be undertaken to develop a National Security Policy, a study that would examine the proper roles of all levels of government, their departments and agencies. (Report: Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #19)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

In April 2004 the government announced a National Security Policy proposing a government-wide framework for responding to threats to Canada and outlining the integrated security system the government will build.[29]

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

The National Security Policy is in place and it represents a positive step forward.

  • Flesh out the plan further with more detailed goals and timelines

There are over fifty projects that come out of the National Security Policy.[30] The Committee believes that the next step in the process is to outline the deliverables for each of those priorities in a way that gives Canadians a clear sense of what has been accomplished, and what is left to be done.


  • Undertake further departmental and agency responsibilities shifts

The policy is a constructive starting point but it missed key changes to the national security responsibilities of three parts of the government that the Committee believes are necessary, including: Transport Canada (which should have a reduced role), the Privy Council Office (which should have a greater role), and the Canadian Coast Guard (which should have a constabulary role, be armed and be moved into the Deputy Prime Minister’s portfolio).


Problem 5:  Need for Crisis Command Centres

The Privy Council Office and the Prime Minister’s Office lack adequate facilities – including redundant backup power and communications systems – to manage national crises.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the government immediately begin work on creating a National Operations Centre. Recommendations included:

  • The establishment of a permanent secretariat to support the Deputy Prime Minister within two months, with operations to be set up in a temporary government facility until the permanent national operations centres could be built.

  • The construction of a National Operations Centre, with redundant power supplies and communications systems, easily accessible by the Privy Council Office, with a senior level "situation room" that would permit a permanent secretariat to continuously monitor international and national events.

  • The construction of an alternate, identical operations centre utilizing different power and communications systems.

  • The design and construction schedule be such that these operations centres be fully operationally capable by 1 February 2005.

(Report: Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, October 2003, #5.5, 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government announced in the April 2004 National Security Policy that it would create a Government Operations Centre which would “provide stable, round-the-clock co-ordination and support across government and to key national players...and will provide leadership in emergencies of national importance.”[31]  It allocated $15 million to establish and operate the centre.

The Government Operations Centre described in the policy has been established and is housed at Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada. It is fully operational and conducts operations on a 24/7 basis, 365 days a year, according to its Director Craig Oldham.[32]  The Centre is undergoing further developments to enhance its capabilities.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

The government’s decision to create a Government Operations Centre signals progress.

However, the time between the statement of the government’s intent to create the centre and its Director’s contention that it is “fully operational” is remarkably short. The Committee is skeptical about what “fully operational” means. The centre is a significant ways from completion in terms of having all the infrastructure, procedures and personnel it needs in place to match the government’s pledge.

  • Paint a realistic picture about what is left to be done

The Committee will focus on the Government Operations Centre’s actual capabilities in the future.


Problem 6:   Need for Canada-U.S. Coordination

HIGH PRIORITY  

Canada and the United States share a duty to defend North America. They have jointly monitored and defended North America’s airspace through the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) for decades. No comparable formal structure exists for maritime and land defence.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee recommended the establishment of a Canadian-U.S. joint operational planning group that would include representatives of the Canadian Navy, the Canadian Coast Guard, the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard. The Committee said this unit of approximately 50 people should be located at Colorado Springs, in proximity to NORAD planning staff. (Report: Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility, September 2002, #1)

The Committee recommended that a joint Canada-U.S. land force planning unit be established to allow the armies of the two neighbouring countries to plan for potential disasters – natural or otherwise – that jointly threaten the two countries. This unit of approximately 25 people would also be located at Colorado Springs, in proximity to NORAD facilities and the recommended Maritime planning staff.

 (Report: Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility, September 2002, #3)

The Committee recommended that both U.S. and Canadian governments address the work of the planning groups seriously and provide the necessary personnel to do it. (Report: Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, October 2003, #6.1)

 GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

In 2002, Canada and the United States established the Bi-National Planning Group with the responsibility for exploring ways of enhancing military-to-military land and civil contingency planning, decision-making and intelligence sharing arrangements, and maritime surveillance.[33]

The group is staffed with approximately 50 people (including 29 Canadian Forces officers and one representative from the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness). It is co-located with North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) headquarters in Colorado Springs.

Defence officials have repeatedly emphasized to the Committee the importance of the Planning Group in modernizing continental security and defence structures.[34]

The Bi-National Planning Group provided a set of recommendations on its future to the Permanent Joint Board on Defence in March 2004, which have not been made public.[35]

The Bi-National Planning Group’s original two-year mandate was extended until May 2006 in late November 2004. [36]

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

  • Create a permanent land, maritime, and civil defence coordination structure

The government’s recent extension of the Bi-National Planning Group’s mandate was a sound decision. However, the Bi-National Planning Group does not represent an adequate permanent structure for Canada-U.S. land, maritime and civil defence cooperation. The government should replace Bi-National Planning Group with a permanent structure for land, maritime and civil defence coordination that builds on the experience of NORAD and the Bi-National Planning Group.

  • Incorporate the new structure into the NORAD treaty renewal process in 2006

The government should replace the Bi-National Planning Group with a more robust and more permanent structure before the 2006 NORAD treaty renewal and incorporate it into the renewal process.

 

Problem 7:   Slow Progress at Information-Sharing

The government has many maritime assets, including ships, satellites, and fisheries patrols, but it has not developed a comprehensive way of integrating the information these assets collect.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the government treat the quick introduction of the Maritime Information Management & Data Exchange Study (MIMDEX) information-sharing system as a priority. (Report: Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, October 2003, #3.4)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group named the Maritime Information Management & Data Exchange (MIMDEX) Study project one of its priority initiatives. MIMDEX accounts for almost half of the funds in the Maritime Security Coordination Fund, and it is moving forward.[37] According to Defence officials, MIMDEX is tentatively scheduled to become fully operational in March 2007.[38]

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

  • Complete the Maritime Information Management & Data Exchange (MIMDEX) Study project sooner than 2007



Problem 8: Lack of Surveillance Coordination

Departments that track vessels approaching Canada’s coasts have not adequately coordinated their frontline efforts with one another and with our American allies. If a country is trying to defend its coasts, it needs to know what vessels are out there. Officials do not yet have a clear picture of what vessels are sailing off of Canada’s coasts at any given time.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee recommended the coordination and utilization of the government’s numerous monitoring resources, including a shipping position reporting system, Canadian Navy assets, satellite tracking resources, Aurora flights, Department of Fisheries and Oceans patrols and intelligence, Canadian Coast Guard patrols and intelligence, and RCMP patrols and intelligence. (Report: Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility, September 2002, #2)

The Committee recommended the creation of multi-departmental operations centres capable of collecting and analyzing maritime intelligence at Halifax and Esquimalt. These would provide a combined operational picture for all government agencies that deal with incoming vessels to help them address coastal threats to North America and design procedures to deal with all anticipated threats. (Report: Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility, September 2002, #3)

The Committee expanded on its recommendation that multi-departmental operations centres be established, by further recommending in October 2003 that the U.S. government be invited to place liaison officers at East Coast, West Coast and Great Lakes multi-departmental operations centres where intelligence is fused and analyzed if and when the Government of Canada sees fit to establish those centres. (Report: Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, October 2003, #6.2)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

In its April 2004 National Security Policy, the government acknowledged that effective multi-departmental cooperation on the coasts was important. It announced its intention to establish one Marine Security Operations Centre on each coast to improve coastal security efforts, especially data sharing and resource coordination.[39]

It is moving to create those centres. However, no fully integrated multi-departmental operational picture exists yet. Only a basic capability to share data about the coasts has been accomplished thus far.

The government plans to complete the operations centres by co-locating a limited number of personnel from the RCMP, Transport Canada, the Canadian Coast Guard, and Canadian Border Services Agency at existing Canadian Forces naval facilities, Trinity in Halifax, N.S., and Athena in Esquimalt, B.C.[40]

Data from commercial vessels on the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence Seaway contributes to the Maritime Forces Atlantic surveillance picture maintained in Halifax.[41]

The government’s new multi-departmental Marine Security Operations Centre on the East Coast will continue to receive Canadian Coast Guard data from the Great Lakes / St. Lawrence Seaway. The information the Committee has received from the Department of National Defence does not make it clear that this centre will be responsible for on-water operations on the Great Lakes / St. Lawrence Seaway in the medium and long-term.

Discussions are under way between the Canadian Forces and the U.S. Coast Guard to create reciprocal Liaison Officer positions at each others’ operations centres.[42]

Implementation of the Marine Security Operations Centres’ full operational capabilities will take about five years.[43]


CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

  • Accelerate the development of the Marine Security Operations Centres

The government’s commitment to develop better awareness of activity on Canada’s coasts and the establishment of multi-departmental Marine Security Operations Centres represents progress. However, the centres should be completed before 2009.

The Committee will examine the centres and the quality of operating picture as they develop.

  • Incorporate Marine Security Coordination into the 2006 renewal of NORAD treaty

The government needs to continue its efforts to improve marine security coordination through the Bi-National Planning Group. However, it should also use seize NORAD treaty renewal process in 2006 to integrate marine security coordination into the formal continental defence structures either through a permanent NORAD-like structure, or an expanded NORAD.



Problem 9:   Intelligence Community Understaffed

HIGH PRIORITY

The government reduced the size of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service between 1993 and 2002 by approximately 25%, as part of a wave of cuts that affected most actors in the intelligence community. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service has started to expand again and new hiring will raise personnel levels to an estimated 2,397 persons in 2007.[44] However, even then it will still be smaller than it was in 1992 when it had approximately 2,760 personnel.[45]

Given that intelligence is at the heart of Canada’s national security efforts, and given the length of time it takes to train intelligence officers, the cuts of the 1990s were unwise.

The Canadian intelligence community is understaffed for the post 9/11 security environment. It needs more people. The next generation of recruits needs more education and must come from a more diverse set of backgrounds than is traditional for the Service.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee recommended that the government expand its cadre of intelligence analysts in the wake of reports that too few people have been assigned to do too much critical work.

The Committee also recommended that the government move immediately to upgrade its recruitment of intelligence officers from Canadian universities and other institutions outside the public service, and that those universities and institutions make wider use of instructors from outside Canada with insights into other cultures.

Finally, the Committee recommended that the government increase funding for the training of people with the kinds of language and cultural skills that the Canadian intelligence community needs to draw from. (Report: Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, October 2003, #3.1, 3.2, and 3.3)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The April 2004 National Security Policy pledged an additional $137 million to support the enhancement of intelligence capabilities and up to $30 million over five years to establish the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre.[46]

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Communications Security Establishment and the Intelligence Assessement Staff at the Privy Council Office have increased recruitment efforts since receiving funding after September 11, 2001.

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service

The Service reported to the Committee in April 2004 that it planned to use part of the budget increase it received in December 2001 to expand its personnel level by roughly 10% between 2002 and 2007.[47] The Service has largely completed its expansion.[48] 

The Communications Security Establishment

The Communications Security Establishment has approximately added 250 employees since September 11th, 2001.[49] The Communications Security Establishment had about 1,000 personnel in 2002.[50]


The International Assessment Staff

The Privy Council Office’s International Assessment Staff (formerly the Intelligence Assessment Secretariat) has doubled in size to over 40 people.[51]

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

  • The intelligence community must grow to meet Canada’s security threats

Growth in the intelligence community must not stop. In fact it must continue on a far larger scale than it has to date given that:

  1. virtually all of Canada’s national security programs are intelligence-driven;

  2. it takes a long time to train intelligence officers; and,

  3. the security environment is not likely to become more stable at any time soon.

  • Stop cutting corners on intelligence

Even with marginal expansion recently, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service is not back to the staffing levels it was at pre-1993.  The International Assessment Staff (formerly the Intelligence Assessment Secretariat) currently has 40-50 analysts.

Intelligence is key to Canada’s national security.  The Committee will continue to monitor whether the Canadian government is putting sufficient resources into this vital area.


Problem 10:   Weak Overseas Intelligence

Canada has limited resources for national security.  The best way to apportion them is through some system of risk management. The most important step in determining risks is intelligence. The sooner we can a identify a threat, and the further away from Canada we can deal with it, the safer Canadians will be. Increasing Canada’s overseas intelligence gathering capacity is the best way of using limited resources to discern threats as early and as far away from Canada as possible.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service should be instructed to upgrade its intelligence operations overseas.  (Report: Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #17.B)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service has noted that “as expertise has grown, CSIS’ foreign operations have expanded to include, amongst others, such techniques as: tasking human sources to travel abroad, recruiting foreign sources, meeting those sources in third countries.”[52]

However, the Prime Minister has indicated that he is open to reconsidering the amount of overseas intelligence Canada deploys. As he said at a town hall meeting in February, “I’m not sure that outside of our country that we do as much as we should.”[53]

The Prime Minister’s National Security Advisor Robert Wright took the Prime Minister’s comments one step further and said that “Over the coming years, I wanted to increase the proportion of existing effort that is focused on security needs…That would argue for a capacity for CSIS to continue to adapt its role overseas.”[54]

 CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

  • Expand foreign intelligence operations further

The Service has become considerably more active outside Canada in recent years, however, increased asymmetric risk at home and abroad continues to require an expansion of the Service’s foreign operations. That expansion should come both through increased cooperation with allied foreign governments, and also through the increased deployment of clandestine Canadian intelligence officers.

The government needs to provide the direction, resources and the personnel to assure that this activity increases substantially.


Problem 11:  Information Fusion Failures

Many witnesses have told the Committee that the government fails to bring together and share intelligence adequately. 

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the government expand information-sharing among departments, agencies, police forces and the military, recognizing some potential limitations required by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms as well as confidentiality guarantees sometimes required by foreign intelligence sources.

 (Report: Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, October 2003, #3.5)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government’s April 2004 National Security Policy recognizes the lack of information fusion and pledges to create a “new” Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC) to put together a comprehensive threat picture for Canada.[55] The Integrated Threat Assessmant Centre represents the next generation of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s Integrated National Security Assessment Centre (INSAC).

The government has created a Government Operations Centre to communicate and coordinate with federal departments, provincial and municipal authorities, and allies like the U.S.[56]

The government will create two Marine Security Operations Centres by transforming existing Canadian Forces facilities on the east and west coasts and linking those in with the Government Operations Centre.[57]


CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

While some steps have been taken, all of the government’s initiatives seem to be at least a year away from completion. Meanwhile, the Committee continues to hear complaints about the adequate sharing of intelligence.


Problem 12:  Lack of Oversight

At least eight departments and agencies are involved in intelligence collection.  They require independent oversight to ensure they are doing an adequate job of protecting Canadians while at the same time respecting their civil liberties. Only the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Communications Security Establishment are currently subject to review.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommends that there be an investigation to determine which, if any, additional government departments or agencies besides the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Communications Security Establishment require oversight bodies. (Report: Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #18)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

In its October 2002 response to this Committee’s first report, the government stated that it “is confident that the review and accountability requirements of the security and intelligence community are being met and the interests of the Canadian public continue to be well-served in this regard.”[58]

The government’s April 2004 National Security Policy outlined four bodies it claimed were necessary to improve review mechanisms in the security and intelligence community.[59] All are still in the planning stages, including:

  • An independent arm’s length review mechanism for the RCMP’s national security-related activities.[60] The review body will be based in part on recommendations from Mr. Justice Dennis R. O’Connor’s examination of the Maher Arar affair.[61]

  • A National Security Committee made up of Parliamentarians, the structure, role, and responsibilities, powers, and independence of which are still to be determined.

Over the summer of 2004, the Government sought advice from an ad hoc working group of Parliamentarians on how to create the National Security Committee of Parliamentarians, based on a discussion paper it prepared. The working group was made up of members from both chambers of Parliament and from all parties. The group’s work has yet to be made public and legislation creating the Parliamentary Intelligence Committee has yet to be tabled. Three members of our Committee were on the working group.

  • A cross-cultural roundtable that will give groups the opportunity to dialogue with the government on national security and how it affects diverse populations. It has yet to be established.

  • A National Security Advisory Council made up of security experts external to the government.  It too is still in the consultation stage.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

The change in the government’s position between being satisfied with existing review mechanisms in October 2002 and proposing four new additional bodies just over a year later suggests that the government’s initial response was over-optimistic at the very least.

  • Ensure adequate oversight of the RCMP

The government’s commitment to create a mechanism to review the national security functions of the RCMP is a step forward. The Committee will assess the review body when it is proposed, as well as any measures needed to bolster RCMP security capacity, in future reports.

  • Table the Report of the Interim Committee of Parliamentarians on National Security

The government should release the October 2004 of the Interim Committee of Parliamentarians on National Security.  This Committee made detailed recommendations toward establishing a Parliamentary Intelligence Committee. Releasing the report would increase public debate as to how best to get Parliament involved in enhancing national security.

  • Establish the Parliamentary Intelligence Committee

The government should follow through on its promise and introduce legislation in Parliament to create a Parliamentary Intelligence Committee.

  • Create the Cross-Cultural Roundtable and the National Security Advisory Council

Neither a cross-cultural roundtable nor an expert advisory council on national security had been established when this was written, although the government was accepting applications for membership on both before October 2004.[62] These important advisory bodies should be created without further delay.

 

Problem 13: Coordination Lacking In Coastal Defence

Canada and the United States have long coast lines that abut in the Atlantic, the North Pacific and the Beaufor Sea. Close cooperation between the two countries is needed at each of these junctures.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

In order to improve defence of Canada’s territorial waters, the Committee recommended greater cooperation and coordination with U.S. counterparts.

(Report: Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility, September 2002, #3)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government has reached numerous cooperation agreements with the U.S. government since the Committee’s recommendation, on:

  • The creation of the military-to-military Bi-national Planning Group to address issues of maritime, land and civil defence coordination and contingency planning;

  • The screening of shipping containers by operating joint customs teams at major ports;

  • The pre-screening of ships at the port of Montreal before they arrive in the Great Lakes/St. Lawrence Seaway system; and

  • Transport Canada and the U.S. Coast Guard have been working closely to coordinate and harmonize the marine security regimes so that Canadian-flagged ships that meet Canadian security requirements can enter U.S. harbours and U.S.-flagged vessels that comply with American requirements can enter Canadian ports.

The government stated in the April 2004 National Security Policy that it is pursuing negotiations on the next phase of the Smart Borders Action Plan with the governments of the U.S. and Mexico;[63]

Canada and the U.S. have established Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETS) at 15 geographic regions across the border to jointly investigate cross-border criminal and terrorist activity.[64]

Canada and U.S. law enforcement intelligence officers from Integrated Border Enforcement Teams will be co-located at two locations in Canada and two locations in the U.S. to share intelligence on a daily basis. The co-located intelligence centres at the Pacific Corridor and Red River IBETs are operational; those at the Central St. Lawrence Valley and Windsor-Detroit IBETs are expected to be up and running by March 2005.[65]

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

  • Keep up momentum of Canada-U.S. cooperation

The government has done well to date but this challenge will be ongoing. There there are a number of projects in this file that require attention. The principle one of which is the renewal of the NORAD Agreement in 2006. The renewed agreement should include a maritime component.


Problem 14:  Allocations of Proceeds of Crime

The government departments and agencies involved in policing and border security cannot sell confiscated items to pay for service upgrades. The funds revert to the Consolidated Revenue Fund.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that goods confiscated by the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in conducting their normal duties be auctioned off and the funds raised be reinvested in the upgrading of policing capabilities. (Report: Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, October 2003, #2.10)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government has not announced any plans to allow CBSA or RCMP the right to auction off the goods they confiscate to raise capital.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

The Committee is cognizant that many of its recommendations carry price tags. The Members believe this recommendation might aid the other side of the ledger.



Problem 15:  Canada Too Inward Looking

Canada does not have to reinvent the wheel on every issue. It can learn valuable lessons about maritime and port security by studying the approaches of other countries, such as the U.S. and The Netherlands.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the Government of Canada commission a report on how other countries are upgrading their maritime security, with particular reference to the use of coast guards and anti-crime and anti-terrorism methodology at sea ports and airports. (Report: Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Border in the World, October 2003, #6.4)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government has not commissioned a study of how other countries are upgrading their maritime security.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

  • Identify best practices abroad and apply them in Canada

It would cost very little to study the best security ideas being implemented around the world.  And the payoff could be huge.  Do the study.


 

CHAPTER 6

Ports

Problem 1:   Vulnerable Ports

HIGH PRIORITY  

Canada’s ports are insecure and the extent of their vulnerability to crime makes them a target for terrorists.   The Organized Crime Agency of British Columbia has found that there are 48 members or associates of the Hells Angels working on Vancouver’s docks.  The Agency’s report, quoted in the Globe and Mail, “identifies members of East European, Indo-Canadian, Columbian, Mexican [and] triad organized-crime syndicates working on the port.”  An even greater concern is the so-called ‘unholy alliance’ between organized crime and terrorist networks.[66]

 COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommends that a public inquiry, under the Inquiries Act into significant ports be established as soon as possible, with a mandate that would include:

a) a major review of overall security at the ports and the development of a national approach to recruiting, training, and the retention of security personnel;

b) examination of the degree of control that organized crime has over Canadian sea port operations, as well as the relationship between such control and threats to national security;

c) an assessment of the potential for the use of Canadian ports to further terrorism;

d) a comprehensive review of the customs, policing and security resources, including the role of private security agencies, which are required at ports;

e) a review of the effectiveness of customs inspections of vessels and cargo arriving at Canadian ports; and

f) a review of hiring practices at Canadian ports.

(Report: Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #8, The Committee reiterated the need for an inquiry in Canada’s Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, October 2003, recommendations #4.2)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government has not created a public inquiry as recommended.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

  • The public needs to know

Ports are central to Canadians’ economic lives.  Reform comes slowly at ports – there are so many vested interests resisting change that change becomes difficult.  It would be less difficult if the public were given insights into the problems at Canada’s ports, which would surely elicit pressure for the necessary reforms to assure appropriate national security.


Problem 2:  Organized Crime in Ports

HIGH PRIORITY  

The presence of organized crime in Canada’s ports and airports leaves Canada’s security perimeter vulnerable to both smuggling and terrorist infiltration. The Committee heard in 2002 that an estimated 15% of longshoremen and 36% of checkers at the Port of Montreal have criminal records, that out of a sample of 500 longshoremen at the Port of Halifax, 39% had criminal records, and that 28 out of a sample of 51 workers at the Port of Charlottetown (almost 54%) had criminal records.[67]

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended the introduction of a compulsory background screening system at all major ports to assess whether employees or candidates for employment pose a security risk. (Report: Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #6)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

On 22 January 2003, Transport Canada announced a $15.4 million program to tighten access to ports, which was to include RCMP and CSIS background checks on employees working within secure areas.[68] This program affected only a small percentage of workers in ports.

In May 2004, the government announced the $115 million Marine Security Contribution Program to help marine facility owners and operators to enhance port security to a level comparable to airports and border crossings. The contribution program will come into force of Section 11.1 of the Marine Transportation Security Act, which is expected on December 1, 2004.[69]

In a 15 September 2004 speech, Transport Canada Minister Lapierre said that his department was working with labour and industry on a system of mandatory background security checks of marine facility workers who have access to certain restricted areas or who are in designated positions.[70] Consultations began in September and Transport Canada hopes to have the new regulations in place by early 2005.[71]

Transport Canada said in September 2004 that it could security clear about 10,000 marine workers annually. These security clearances are called for under the proposed Marine Facilities Restricted Area Access Clearance Program and would include background checks. Since about 30,000 employees are expected to require Transportation Security Clearances, the Department is planning to phase-in the Clearance Program by security clearing some workers in later years.[72]

Transport Canada Minister Jean Lapierre has said that port security in Canada needs to be tightened. “It’s clear that Canadian ports cannot remain sieves,” he said.  “We have to tighten the screw.”  When asked for clarification, the Minister said he was quoting from the Committee’s 2002 report that discussed port security as well as other areas of national security.[73]

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

The Committee supports this program. Although Transport Canada’s program has not been implemented, the Committee is prepared to give the Department the benefit of the doubt. The Department appears to be doing something similar to the Committee’s recommendation.


  • Security clearances welcome

The Minister of Transport Canada has made positive steps toward requiring that background checks be conducted on marine facility workers in our ports. The proposal to security clear 10,000 workers annually until the process is complete is welcome. The government appears to be approaching this issue in a responsible manner.


Problem 3:  Port Perimeters

The perimeters of Canadian ports are badly protected and this provides opportunities for smuggling and the infiltration of terrorists.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommends a full review of the fencing and entry/exit security systems currently in place at Canada’s significant ports to determine their adequacy. This review should consider the introduction of national standards for port security systems. (Report: Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #5)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Transport Canada and local ports conducted fencing reviews as part of a mandatory two-stage International Ship and Port Facility Security Code certification process. Stage Two involved onsite reviews of port facility security plans. Canada began enforcing the ISPS Code on July 1, 2004. About 98% of affected marine facilities in Canada have complied with the ISPS Code.[74]

Transport Canada released information on a $115 million Marine Security Contribution Program in May 2004 to help marine facility owners and operators enhance port security. The contribution program is conditional upon the coming into force of Section 11.1 of the Marine Transportation Security Act, which is expected on December 1, 2004.[75]

Projects eligible for funding under the Marine Facility Security Contribution Program include:

  • surveillance equipment, including cameras and closed-circuit TV systems

  • improvements to dockside and perimeter security and access control, such as fencing, gates, signage and lighting

  • command, control and communications equipment, such as portable and vessel-to-shore radios

  • infrastructure security protective measures, such as security guards and arrangements with local police departments[76]

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

  • Fund these improvements quickly

Implementing the International Ship and Port Security Code is a real start. The Marine Security Contribution Program is promising. The government is addressing this recommendation. The challenge to the government is to ensure that port facility owners and operators receive the funding they need expeditiously.

Funding available under the Marine Facility Security Contribution Program makes no specific mention of water-borne threats – the emphasis seems to be on protecting the ports from the land sides.  All sides are vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

Once the Committee’s current work is complete, it may chose to examine whether the International Ship and Port Security Code provides Canadian ports with the security they need.


Problem 4: Insufficient Police at Ports

From the point of view of security, the devolution of ports and airports to local communities has failed. Security forces at ports and airports are under-manned and ill-prepared to deal with organized crime and terrorism. There is a need for specialized police in unique environments, and ports and airports clearly qualify as unique environments. For example, The Netherlands has about 350 police permanently stationed just in the Port of Rotterdam.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) be designated as the lead police force at all Canadian air and sea ports with adequate funding to combat security breaches caused by the presence of organized crime at those ports.  (Report: Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, October 2003, #2.5)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

RCMP National Port Enforcement Teams have been established at Halifax, Montreal, and Vancouver to investigate federal statute offences, such as those involving national security. There are only these three National Port Enforcement Teams and the officers involved are not specialized in port security. At most ports basic security functions, such as access control, are the responsibility of the Port Authorities and police forces of jurisdiction, which provide standard police services / law enforcement at the ports. [77]

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

  • Port policing is a national responsibility

If the federal government recognizes that it needs to supervise security screening at ports, it should also recognize the responsibility to take charge of port policing. This is a national responsibility. From a security point of view, these two processes are joined at the hip.

  • RCMP should be in charge

The RCMP is Canada’s national policing organization. Mandating it take charge of policing related to security at ports would bring consistency to purpose, strategy and application across the country.

Currently the RCMP has not been adequately funded to assign a sufficient number of officers to the ports of Halifax, Montreal, and Vancouver. This needs to be rectified and National Port Enforcement Teams should be created and deployed to other Canadian ports.


Problem 5: Inadequate Container Screening

HIGH PRIORITY  

Border officials can only inspect a very small percentage of shipping containers. They have not done satisfactory sensitivity testing to ensure optimal inspection levels. Ports have lacked sufficient intelligence and technology to improve the odds that the containers chosen for inspection are the ones most likely to pose a threat.

Of course container inspection is only a small part of a layered approach to marine security – far better to detect problems off Canada’s shores than in ports.  Still, dealing with threats once they have landed is better than not dealing with them at all.  And not dealing with them in port will not earn us the cooperation of countries to which these containers may be trans-shipped, notably the United States.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that in Canada’s ports, the Canada Border Services Agency:

A. conduct sensitivity analysis to determine what level of examination of containers will provide effective security; and

B. receive the funding necessary to equip significant ports and major border crossings with X-Ray machines and other appropriate technology to inspect high-risk containers.

(Report: Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #7)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The government has increased the use of inspection equipment including Vehicle and Cargo Inspection Systems (VACIS). [78]

In its 2004-05 Report on Plans and Priorities, the Canada Border Services Agency said it had purchased 11 mobile Vehicle and Cargo Inspection Systems to search for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive threats in cargo.[79] It has also installed 3 Pallet Vehicle and Cargo Inspection Systems – which are self-contained scanning systems that capture images of large pieces of freight – at marine container examination facilities in Burnaby, British Columbia, Montreal, Quebec and Dartmouth, Nova Scotia.[80] These systems were fully operational by September 2004.

The Canada Border Services Agency uses a risk management-based approach to determine which containers to call “high risk.”[81] Canada Border Services Agency claims it has the resources to scan and / or inspect all containers it deems “high risk.”[82] But they do not say how many containers that equates to. Officials in Halifax told the Committee in September 2003 that new technologies, like Vehicle and Cargo Inspection Systems, had allowed them to triple the overall inspection rate in their port. According to the officials, between January and June 2003, 8% of the containers that came through the port (around 9000 containers) were inspected.[83] They also reported that there were “some challenges” with the crane-mounted radiation detection systems then being tested.[84]  But in February 2004, Canada Border Services Agency officials reported much lower national inspection numbers. They said national inspection rates were closer to 4%.[85] Canada Border Services Agency President Alain Jolicoeur told the Committee in February 2004 that Canada Border Services Agency was not limited in searching containers by the number of machines it has.[86]

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

  • Be straightforward

The Canadian Border Services Agency needs to give a straightforward accounting of how many containers it searches, by which methods, and at which ports. The Committee believes, and will continue to believe until it is shown otherwise, that the agency’s reluctance to provide specifics is less about operational necessity and more about protecting a sub-par system.

  • Expand scanning capacity

The Committee does not have confidence that the Canadian Border Services Agency has the capacity to search all the containers it should. Installing just 14 Vehicle and Cargo Inspection Systems to deal with approximately 2.5 million containers shipped to Canadian ports every year falls short of reasonable coverage. Most of these containers will have had moments of vulnerability in the international logistics chain. The Canadian Border Services Agency relies heavily on its container-targeting regime to recognize suspicious containers because it does not have the capacity to scan, or open and inspect, anything more than a token percentage of containers.

  • Give Canadians reason to be confident

The government has not yet demonstrated to the Committee that Canadians should have confidence because it appears that it:

  1. Relies heavily on past shipping behaviour and has little margin for identifying unexpected threat characteristics;

  2. Allows inspection capacity, not risk analysis, to determine risk tolerance.

Canadian Border Services Agency has not provided any acceptable set of criteria, stated in quantifiable terms, for evaluating the adequacy of its container-screening program. 


Problem 6:   Inadequate Container Supervision

The loading of maritime shipping containers is under-supervised. Canada’s economy cannot function properly if people do not have confidence in its container security regime.

A system is needed to monitor the integrity of the contents of containers. Containers are shipped many hundreds of kilometers before reaching port, and the ports are useful chokepoints to check containers entering and leaving the country.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended examination of the Flynn model – in which containers are loaded under secure conditions and provided with monitors to record attempts to tamper with their seals – for improving container security at Canadian ports. (Report: Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, February 2002, #9)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

There is no indication that Canadian officials or the Canadian government have considered the Flynn model for enhancing container security.

However, the government has taken some encouraging steps toward practices suggested by the Flynn Model.

The government has implemented the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, a different port and ship security model.[87] The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code came into effect on 1 July 2004.

The government stated in the April 2004 National Security Policy that it will work with its G8 partners and the World Customs Organization to establish “an integrated container security regime that enhances the level of security of intermodal containers globally.”[88]

The Canadian Border Services Agency’s 2004-05 Report on Plans and Priorities said that Canada “will work with our international partners to identify and implement new technologies, such as electronic seals, global positioning system tracking, and embedded computer chip technology, to signal breaches of the physical integrity of shipping containers whether at a port, or on a truck, ship, or train.”[89]

In October 2004, the government agreed to Canada’s participation in the U.S. Container Security Initiative, where Canada Border Services Agency agents would be deployed to a foreign marine port by April 2005 to search shipping containers bound for North America.[90]

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

The Committee believes the government needs to undertake a further examination and evaluation of the Flynn model and release its findings publicly.


Problem 7:  Fragile Ferries

The vulnerability of cruise ships and ferries to acts of terrorism necessitates vigilance by the government in a fashion similar to what is in place for aircraft.

COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATION

The Committee recommended that all cruise ships, ferries and other vessels approaching Canadian ports be required to provide information on passengers and crew comparable to that provided to immigration officials at Canadian airports under the Advance Passenger Information/Personal Name Record Program. (Report: Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, October 2003, #2.8)

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Government witnesses referred to a “ferry security benchmarking exercise” in 2002. The Committee believes that this refers to Canadian cooperation with U.S. authorities on the tracking of suspicious persons, but it does not appear that the exercise approached anything as comprehensive as airline tracking.[91]

To the Committee’s knowledge, the government has not launched a program to collect detailed information from ferry and cruise ship passengers / crew comparable to its identification program for air passengers.

CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT

  • Recognize that ferries are soft targets

Canadians expect that security is in place for all modes of transportation, including the screening of cruise ship passengers and crew.  There is no reason to restrict passenger scrutiny to aircraft. At the heart of asymmetrical warfare is the concept of attacking where attacks are least expected. Terrorists move from hardened targets to softer targets. Passenger ferries should receive the same attention as passenger aircraft.

The February 2004 Abu Sayyaf attack on a large ferry in the Southern Philippines which killed at least 100 people highlights this threat.

The Committee intends to revisit this issue.


[1] International Institute for Strategic Studies, “International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower in 2001, 2002 and 2003,” The Military Balance 2004, Vol. 104, No. 1 (Oxford University Press, 2004), 353. Available from: Ingenta Select (date accessed: 5 November 2004). Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has grown from 16 to 26 member countries, adding 3 in 1999 (Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic) and 7 earlier this year (Lithuania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia). Canada’s military spending, as a percentage of its GDP, has consistently ranked it third from the bottom of NATO countries since before the 199 expansion.

[2] According to the Government’s Main Estimates of 2002-2003 and 2004-2005.

[3] Office of the Prime Minister, “Address by Prime Minister Paul Martin at CFB Gagetown, New Brunswick” (April 14, 2004), http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news.asp?id=172 (accessed: November 16, 2004).

[4] Department of National Defence, Making Sense Out Of Dollars 2003-4 (August 2004), 46.

[5] Honourable William Graham, “Letter to Senator Colin Kenny” (November 3, 2004): 4.

[6] The Committee made an exception in its recommendation for recurring commitments such as military attaches, military staff at NATO and SACLANT Headquarters, NORAD-assigned Military Staff (which would now also include members of the bi-national planning group) and the NATO AWACS units at Geilenkirchen, Germany.

[7] Government of Canada, Canadian Security and Emergency Preparedness - The Government's Response to the Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence (2002) (October 2002), 11.

[8] General Ray Henault, Speech to the Conference of Defence Associations Institute (February 26, 2004), url: http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/pubs/speeches/26-Feb-04_e.asp (accessed November 1, 2004).

[9] Department of National Defence, E-mail to researcher, November 19, 2004.

[10] Honourable William Graham, “Letter to Senator Colin Kenny” (November 3, 2004): 5.

[11] There were still 1,633 Canadian Forces personnel overseas as of October 15, 2004.

[12] 1994-1995 figures: Department of National Defence, 1994-95 Estimates: Part III, Expenditure Plan, (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1994) 22, 212. 2004 figure: Department of National Defence, “Current Operations,” http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/operations/current_ops_e.asp (accessed: March 11, 2004).

[13]  Department of National Defence, email to researcher, November 4, 2004.

[14] Honourable William Graham, “Letter to Senator Colin Kenny” (November 3, 2004): 5.

[15] Honourable William Graham, “Letter to Senator Colin Kenny” (November 3, 2004): 5.

[16] Colonel Jocelyn P.P.J. Lacroix, “Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Hearing Transcript, September 24, 2003, Issue 1, 37th Parl., 2nd Sess., Issue 23, http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/372/defe/23eva-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses=2&comm_id=76 (accessed May 8, 2004).

[17] Honourable William Graham, “Letter to Senator Colin Kenny” (November 3, 2004): 5.

[18] National Defence, Brigade Training Event Backgrounder (April 6, 2003), url:  http://www.army.dnd.ca/LFCA_HQ/LFCA/BTE/english/newsroom/BTE_Backgrounder.doc (Accessed November 1, 2004).

[19] Honourable William Graham, “Letter to Senator Colin Kenny” (November 3, 2004): 6.

[20] Office of the Prime Minister, “Cabinet Committees Mandates and Membership” (25 October 2004), http://www.pm.gc.ca/grfx/docs/Cab_committee-comite.pdf (accessed 10 November 2004).

[21] Currently, Marlene Jennings is Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister with special emphasis on Canada–U.S. relations. See Prime Minister’s Office, “Parliamentary Secretaries” (July 23, 2004), http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/new_team_1.asp (accessed October 20, 2004).

[22] Privy Council Office, Securing an Open Society, 38.

[23] Privy Council Office, Securing an Open Society, 38.

[24] In the first session of the 38th Parliament that legislation is Bill C-6 – An Act to establish the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and to amend or repeal certain Acts.

[25] Robert Wright was appointed to the new position of National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister in December 2003. In addition to that role, Wright is the Associate Secretary to the Cabinet Committee on Security, Public Health & Emergencies, Privy Council Office Security and Intelligence Coordinator and Deputy Minister to the Deputy Prime Minister.

[26] Transport Canada, “Frequently Asked Questions: Roles and Responsibilities – Vessel and Port Facility Security,” (September 10, 2004), http://www.tc.gc.ca/vigilance/sep/marine_security/faq.htm (accessed October 20, 2004).

[27] See Privy Council Office, “Information Resources – Cabinet Committee Membership,” (September 2004), http://www.pm.gc.ca/grfx/docs/Cab_committee-comite.pdf (accessed October 20, 2004).

[28] Robert Wright, Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Hearing Transcript, February 23, 2004, Issue 1, 37th Parl., 3rd Sess., http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/373/defe/01evb-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses=3&comm_id=76 (accessed October 20, 2004).

[29] Privy Council Office, Securing an Open Society, iii-iv.

[30] Rob Wright, “The New Security Environment in Canada: Are we getting it right?” (Speech presented at the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies Annual Conference, October 14, 2004).

[31] Privy Council Office, Securing an Open Society, 24.

[32] Public Security and Emergency Preparedness, E-mail to researcher (November 25, 2004).

[33] Honourable William Graham, “Letter to Senator Colin Kenny” (November 3, 2004): 7.

[34] Lieutenant General George MacDonald, Questions Taken on Notice from the Appearance of LGen Macdonald from the Department of National Defence, February 23, 2004 (Exhibit 5900-3.37/N2-SS-1, 2, “6”).

[35] Department of National Defence, Email to researcher, April 30, 2004.

[36] Department of National Defence, “News Release – Canada and United States Commit to Renewed Defence Cooperation” NR – 04.093 (November 29, 2004), http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1529 (Accessed: November 30, 2004).

[37] MIMDEX will account for $7.4 million of the $16.2 million Marine Security Coordination Fund between now and 2007. Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group, Enhancing the Security of Canada’s Marine Transportation System, and Department of National Defence, Email to researcher, April 8, 2004.

[38] Department of National Defence, Email to researcher, April 8, 2004.

[39] Privy Council Office, Securing an Open Society, 38, and Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group, Enhancing the Security of Canada’s Marine Transportation System (Ottawa: January 2004), 11,  http://www.tc.gc.ca/vigilance/sep/marine_security/enhancing/menu.htm (accessed October 24, 2004).

[40] Department of National Defence, E-mail to researcher, (October 28, 2004).

[41] Honourable William Graham, “Letter to Senator Colin Kenny” (November 3, 2004): 1.

[42] Honourable William Graham, “Letter to Senator Colin Kenny” (November 3, 2004): 1.

[43] Department of National Defence, E-mail to researcher, (October 28, 2004).

[44] Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2003 Public Report (28 October 2004), http:// www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/publicrp/pub2003_e.html (accessed: 15 November 2004).

[45] Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2002 Public Report (5 June 2003), http:// www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/publicrp/pub2002_e.html (accessed: 15 November 2004).

[46] Privy Council Office, Securing an Open Society, 17.

[47] Ward Elcock, “Letter to Senator Colin Kenny,” (April 13, 2004).

[48] Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2003 Public Report (October 28, 2004), http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/publicrp/pub2003_e.html (accessed November 8, 2004). According to its 2003 annual report, the Service grew by over two hundred personel between 2001 and 2003 (the latest date for which public figures are available), and it will add less than a hundred more between 2004 and 2007.

[49] Communications Security Establishment, Email to researcher, (April 30, 2004).

[50] Communications Security Establishment, “Corporate Information - Administration and Resources,” (September 10, 2004), http://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/en/about_cse/resources.html, (accessed November 2, 2004). The Communications Security Establishment receives considerable operational assistance from the Department of National Defence.

[51] Privy Council Office, Securing an Open Society, 16.

[52] Canadian Security Intelligence Service, “Operations Abroad,” (May 2004), http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/backgrnd/back16_e.html, (accessed October 29, 2004).

[53] Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, “Your Turn with the Prime Minister,” The National, Transcript (4 February 2004).

[54] Robert Wright, Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Hearing Transcript, February 23, 2004, Issue 1, 37th Parl., 3rd Sess., http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/373/defe/01evb-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses=3&comm_id=76 (accessed October 20, 2004).

[55] Privy Council Office, Securing an Open Society, 11.

[56] Public Security and Emergency Preparedness E-mail message to researcher, (October 25, 2004).

[57] Privy Council Office, Securing an Open Society, 38-39.

[58] Government of Canada, “Canadian Security and Emergency Preparedness - The Government's Response to the Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence (2002),” (Ottawa: October 2002) 11.

[59] Privy Council Office, Securing an Open Society, 18.

[60] Prime Minister’s Office, “Changes to Government” (December 12, 2003), http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/chgs_to_gov.asp (accessed October 24, 2004).

[61] Privy Council Office, Securing an Open Society, 19.

[62] Privy Council Office, “Government of Canada Invites Applications for Advisory Council on National Security,”

(September 29, 2004), http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/default.asp?Language=E&Page=PCOsSecretariats&sub=si&doc=20040929_pr_e.htm, (accessed November 2, 2004); Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, “Government of Canada Extends Deadline for Nominations to Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security,” (September 20, 2004), http://www.psepc-sppcc.gc.ca/publications/news/20040920_e.asp, (accessed October 20, 2004).

[63] Privy Council Office, Securing an Open Society,  46.

[64] Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, “Backgrounder: Canada - United States Smart Border Declaration And Action Plan,” attachment to “McLellan and Ridge Highlight Progress on the Smart Border Action Plan,” (October 14, 2004), http://www.psepc-sppcc.gc.ca/publications/news/20041014_e.asp, (November 2, 2004).

[65] Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, “Canada and the United States Strengthen Partnerships to Tackle Cross-Border Crime,” (October 22, 2004), http://www.news.gc.ca/cfmx/CCP/view/en/index.cfm?articleid=104279, (accessed October 28, 2004).

[66] Victor Malarek, “Port Security: Organized Crime Feared Colluding with Terrorists on Waterfront Despite the Lessons of Sept. 11, Canada’s Ports Still Wide Open,” The Globe and Mail (August 31, 2002): A4.

[67] Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, (Ottawa: February 2002): 44, 48, 112.

[68] Transport Canada, “News Release No. GC001/03: Government of Canada announces up to $172.5 million in new marine security projects” (22 January 2003), http://www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/releases/nat/2003/03-gc001.htm (accessed October 30, 2004).

[69] Transport Canada, “Marine Security Contribution Program,” (October 19, 2004), http://www.tc.gc.ca/vigilance/sep/marine_security/contribution/menu.htm, (November 1, 2004).

[70] Honourable Jean-C. Lapierre, “Speech at the 3RD Annual U.S. Maritime Security Expo & Conference

New York, New York,” (September 14, 2004), http://www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/speeches/2004/2004-09-14.htm, (accessed October 26, 2004).

[71] Julia Kuzeljevich, “Transport Canada begins consultations on marine transport security,” Canadian Transportation and Logistics, (September 17, 2004), http://www.ctl.ca/article.asp?catID=561&id=34844&story_id=&issue=&btac=no, (accessed October 30, 2004).

[72] Transport Canada, “Restricted Areas and Marine Facilities Restricted Area Access Clearance Program (MFRAACP) Implementation at Canadian Ports and Marine Facilities,” (September 24, 2004), http://www.tc.gc.ca/vigilance/sep/marine_security/regulatory/mfraacp.htm#MFRAACP%20Implementation%20Strategy, (accessed 10 November 2004).

[73] Sylvain Larocque, “Canadian ports are ‘sieves’ says Transport Minister Jean Lapierre’”Canadian Press NewsWire (October 8, 2004), http://proquest.umi,com/pqdlink?RQT=309&VInst+PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD&sid=1&index=17&SrchMode=3&Fmt=3&did=000000714534281&clientId=3485 (accessed November 15, 2004).

[74] Honourable Jean-C. Lapierre, “Speech at the 3RD Annual U.S. Maritime Security Expo & Conference

New York, New York,” (September 14, 2004), http://www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/speeches/2004/2004-09-14.htm, (accessed October 26, 2004).

[75] Transport Canada, “Marine Security Contribution Program,” (October 19, 2004), http://www.tc.gc.ca/vigilance/sep/marine_security/contribution/menu.htm, (November 1, 2004).

[76] Transport Canada, “Backgrounder - Marine Security Transport Canada,” (May 2004), http://www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/releases/nat/2004/04-gc005ae1.htm, (accessed November 3, 2004).

[77] Royal Canadian Mounted Police, “RCMP Fact Sheets - RCMP National Ports Strategy,” (September 7, 2004), http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/factsheets/fact_national_ports_e.htm, (accessed October 29, 2004).

[78] Other technology investments have included gamma-ray systems, ion mobility spectrometers, and trace detection systems.

[79] Canada Border Services Agency, 2004-05 Report on Plans and Priorities, (September 27, 2004), http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/est-pre/20042005/BSA-FEA/BSA-FEAr4501_e.asp, (accessed October 30, 2004).

[80] Canada Border Services Agency, “Fact Sheet – Pallet Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System,” (July 2004), http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/newsroom/factsheets/2004/0727vacis-e.html, (accessed October 30, 2004).

[81] Graham Flack, Proceedings of Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Hearing Transcript, February 23, 2004, Issue 1, 37th Parl., 3rd Sess., http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/373/defe/01evb-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses=3&comm_id=76 (accessed October 30, 2004).

[82] Canada Border Services Agency, Email to researcher, (March 2, 2004).

[83] Robert Russell, Proceedings of Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Hearing Transcript, September 22, 2003, Issue 22, 37th Parl., 2nd, Sess.. http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/372/defe/22evb-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses=2&comm_id=76 (accessed October 25, 2004).

[84] Mark Connolly, Proceedings of Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Hearing Transcript, September 22, 2003, Issue 22, 37th Parl., 2nd, Sess.. http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/372/defe/22evb-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses=2&comm_id=76 (accessed November 10, 2004).  

[85] Canada Border Services Agency, Email to researcher, March 5, 2004. According to CBSA officials, the 4% inspection rate breaks down like this: 1% tailgate, 2% full de-stuff and 1% VACIS screening.

[86] Alain Jolicoeur, Proceedings of Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Hearing Transcript, February 23, 2004, Issue 1, 37th Parl., 3rd Sess., http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/373/defe/01evb-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses=3&comm_id=76 (accessed October 25, 2004).

[87] Developed by the International Maritime Organization, the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code is a new internationally recognized standard for maritime security. Many countries, including the U.S. have signed on to the ISPS Code.

[88] Privy Council Office, Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy, (Ottawa: April 2004) 40.

[89] Canada Border Services Agency, 2004-05 Report on Plans and Priorities, (September 27, 2004), http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/est-pre/20042005/BSA-FEA/BSA-FEAr4501_e.asp, (accessed October 31, 2004).

[90] Government of Canada, “Mclellan And Ridge Highlight Progress on the Smart Border Action Plan,” Ottawa, (October 14, 2004), http://www.news.gc.ca/cfmx/CCP/view/en/index.cfm?articleid=102759&categoryid=1, (accessed October 29, 2004).

[91] Robert Wright, Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Hearing Transcript, February 23, 2004, Issue 1, 37th Parl., 3rd Sess., http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/373/defe/01evb-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses=3&comm_id=76, (accessed October 30, 2004).


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