Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
National Finance
Issue 12 - Evidence
OTTAWA, Tuesday, May 16, 2000
The Standing Senate Committee on National Finance met this day at 9:35 a.m. to examine the Main Estimates laid before Parliament for the fiscal year ending March 31, 2001 (Emergency and Disaster Preparedness).
Senator Lowell Murray (Chairman) in the Chair.
[English]
The Chairman: Honourable senators, we will resume our consideration of Canada's emergency and disaster preparedness. Our first witnesses this morning, from the Treasury Board Secretariat, are Mr. Andrew M. Lieff and Mr. Gérald Cossette.
Please proceed, Mr. Lieff.
Mr. Andrew M. Lieff, Senior Director, Expenditure Operations and Estimates Division Planning, Performance and Reporting Sector, Treasury Board Secretariat: Mr. Chairman and honourable senators, I am pleased to appear here today with my colleague, Mr. Gérald Cossette, Director of Foreign Affairs and Defence Division of Treasury Board Secretariat. We are here to respond to a request from Senator Stratton for further details on federal disaster spending in the Estimates. Senator Stratton made his request at the committee hearing of Wednesday, March 22, on the tabling of the Main Estimates 2000-01.
[Translation]
You have received copies of a document from the President of the Treasury Board, in response to a request from Senator Stratton, which gives you an overview of federal spending and activities related to natural disasters.
[English]
The majority of federal spending is in the form of compensation for the consequences of national disasters. Overall, federal disaster management programs are delivered using four categories of instruments. First is the Joint Emergency Preparedness Program or JEPP. Main Estimates forecast expenditures for 2000-01 are approximately $4.7 million for emergency planning and preparedness activities. DFAA, Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements, is the second category. Main Estimates forecast expenditures for 2000-01 in relation to past disasters under the DFAA are approximately $441 million. The third category is special ad hoc programs in response to specific disasters. Main Estimates forecast expenditures for 2000-01 are approximately $16.3 million, related primarily to activities in the Red River basin associated with the 1998 flood. Fourth, there are a variety of other departmental activities that contribute to the government's disaster planning and assistance efforts. Main Estimates forecast expenditures for 2000-01 for those other activities are approximately $129.3 million. The total Main Estimates forecast spending for 2000-01 for those four program components is $591.3 million.
More specifically, in relation to those four types of program instruments, the Joint Emergency Preparedness Program provides assistance for two main types of projects, which, as I mentioned, account for approximately $4.7 million in spending annually. Planning projects assist provinces and territories in developing policies, procedures, plans, training programs and exercises to ensure that they have emergency response capabilities. They also assist in developing the human resource capacity of emergency preparedness organizations, both provincial and municipal, and capital projects, which assist provinces and territories by supporting capital investments that increase or support community response capacity. Examples of these projects include building response centres and the acquisition of specialized emergency response equipment.
The Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements component is intended to assist provincial and territorial governments in dealing with disasters where the costs exceed what they might reasonably be expected to bear on their own. The objective of these contributions is to assist provinces and territories in restoring public works to their predisaster condition and to assist in the restoration of basic essential property of individuals, farmsteads and small businesses. Forecast expenditures for 2000-01 are approximately $441 million. These expenditures are related to past disasters, such as the effects of the 1998 ice storm and the Saguenay and Red River floods.
[Translation]
Emergency Preparedness Canada, an agency reporting to Minister Eggleton, who is responsible for emergency planning in Canada, oversees the Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements as well as the Joint Emergency Preparedness Program.
[English]
The federal government has also developed special ad hoc programs on three occasions over the past five years. These have been delivered by federal economic development agencies in conjunction with the provinces, in response to provincial requests for more funding than was eligible under the Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements. In these instances, the initiatives were funded on a 50-50 federal-provincial cost-sharing basis and were aimed at restoring economic activity in affected areas. The three instances of special programming were the 1996 Saguenay flood, the 1997 Red River flood, and the 1998 ice storm of Western Quebec and Eastern Ontario.
Forecast expenditures in 2000-01 of $16.3 million for these ad hoc programs relate to the recommendations of the International Red River Basin Task Force, which was set up by the International Joint Commission to address issues of prevention and risk reduction due to the high flood risk of the Red River in Manitoba. Canada and Manitoba have agreed to spend $100 million over four years on a 50-50 cost-shared basis to address these issues.
Finally, a number of federal departments are engaged in other mandated activities that, by their nature, can help prepare for or mitigate the effects of natural disasters. These activities, which total $129.3 million in the 2000-01 Main Estimates, range from ice-breaking programs, which contribute to flood control, to fire control and avalanche management activities in Canada's national parks.
[Translation]
Information concerning these activities can be found in the document circulated to you.
Mr. Chairman, I will take a few moments to review how this document is structured.
[English]
If you have the document in front of you, senators, I should like to run through its structure and point out a number of things. The first six pages summarize the four program components that I just mentioned. There is a description and some examples of each of the elements.
I should like to draw your attention to page 4 under "Natural Resources" in the English version. I believe it is on the same page in the French version. There are four paragraphs. Due to the magic of technology, one of the paragraphs is out of order. I point this out to you so that it will not be confusing when you read through it. The third paragraph, which commences, "As input to the development of risk reduction strategies," should be the second paragraph since it relates to the Geological Survey of Canada and flows a little better when it is in that order.
On page five, there is mention at the third bullet of the Fraser River Flood Control Program, and it just shows a dollar amount with no narrative. I should like to give you a bit more background information on that item. That was a 50-50 cost-shared program with the Province of British Columbia, from 1968 to 1995, to reconstruct and maintain dikes in the Lower Fraser Valley. They were originally built following the 1948 Fraser River flood.
I also want to draw your attention to the category on that page entitled "Other Federal Departments and Programs." Here we have attempted to list other types of programs related to disaster programming for which solid financial estimates are not available because the program components are part of larger programs. We have attempted to list them in the document to give you as full a sense as possible of the range and scope of various federal disaster-related activities. Therefore, the expenditures for those components, the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program, the Dam Safety and Building and Fire Codes are not built into the tables. They are included for your reference.
Six appendices contain the expenditure information. Spending by organization is found in Appendix A. Appendix B contains the spending at the program level, based on the four categories that I introduced. Appendix C contains two different charts. The first one, entitled "Departmental Programs," is an attempt to display spending by province on planning preparedness and risk reduction type of expenditures. That is found at pages 9 and 10. The second chart starts on page 11 and is entitled "Assistance." It is the assistance component to programs, mainly in responding to disasters by province. There are those two components -- the preparing and risk reduction component and the assistance component. Those could have been better titled.
Senator Bolduc: For the province of Quebec I understand you have both the ice storm and the Saguenay flood in the same heading?
Mr. Lieff: That is right.
Appendix D is a list of the functions and planned expenditures for 2000-01 related to the Meteorological Service of Canada, which has significant expenditures of $100 million annually. Appendix E is a list of disasters since 1994. Appendix F is a brief overview of the Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements.
Senators, I am sure that because of your past deliberations none of this material will be new to you, but it was our attempt to give you a flavour of the overview of federal programming and spending at a fairly high level. There are some areas where the amounts are a bit imprecise but, basically, they are the best we could do under the circumstances. That concludes my preliminary remarks and we would be happy to respond to your questions.
The Chairman: Thank you Mr. Lieff. That was very helpful.
Senator Stratton: First, Mr. Lieff, I wish to thank you and Mr. Cossette for all your help. It was the day after budget day back in February that I asked for some information. I did not realize at that time just how much work would be put into this until I went over your document briefly. I wish to congratulate you for it. Although it takes a little study to comprehend just what takes place, it is a very comprehensive report. I wish to thank you for it.
When we are looking at these summaries, and when you are looking to the future, as we must do, are you aware of or are you being made aware of plans for the future to further mitigate problems across the country? That is a difficult question and perhaps you will not be able to answer it. The International Joint Commission on boundaries has just reported on the Red River flood and the potential for flooding. It is recommending either an enlargement of the floodway that goes around the city of Winnipeg, or the construction of a large dike south of the town of Ste. Agathe. One would cost in the neighbourhood of $500 million, while the other would cost something in the range of $800 million, the higher number being the cost for enlarging the existing floodway.
Are you aware, or have you been made aware, of any other plans of significance either in the Saguenay or in British Columbia along the Fraser River, which came close to having a significant flood last spring, to consider mitigating problems? It was simply that it was a cool spring and there was a slow melt that forestalled the problem. As well, are you aware of any information concerning earthquakes in British Columbia?
This is a comprehensive question, but it outlines areas across the country that may or may not have significant dollar sums attached to mitigation or future mitigation in their regions. Have you been made aware of any of those as of today's date?
Mr. Lieff: Let me try to answer that question on several levels. First, with the exception of the Red River, I am not aware of any specific initiatives or challenges that are under discussion by the government in terms of mitigation.
With respect to the Red River, there was the report of the International Joint Commission. In this year's Estimates there is about $16.2 million related to following up on the recommendations of that study. As to the specifics, I believe that is more for planning than for constructing. Recommendations will arise from those plans.
At a broader level, a number of planning initiatives are underway, led by Emergency Preparedness Canada, to address the issue of a mitigation strategy. They are looking at that with the provinces. They are thinking about what a mitigation strategy might involve and the dollars involved in its early stages. Clearly, with the Y2K emphasis behind us now, emergency planning organizations, NGOs and other organizations like this committee are turning their attention to better addressing the risk from natural disasters. That work is under way.
Mr. Gérald Cossette, Program Director, Foreign and Defence Programs, Treasury Board Secretariat: At this stage, the work that is being done does not necessarily focus exclusively or specifically on mitigation. The federal government is trying to come up with an integrated approach that will take into account different components of our disaster management strategy, and mitigation is only one aspect.
Most of the money spent is on preparedness and response through the DFAA and the JEPP program. The issue now is to see how all the components fit together, including the DFAA, mitigation and special programs. Although they are not part of any official strategy, all the components have been used in the past. We need to determine where mitigation fits in. The issue is much more than mitigation per se.
The second component of the work being done now is about the role of the federal government. Nothing that we do with regard to disasters is exclusively done by federal authorities. Everything is done in cooperation and collaboration with the provinces and the municipal and local governments. It is a whole package that the government must consider, not exclusively one aspect.
Senator Stratton: Which minister and department are responsible for this study?
Mr. Cossette: Minister Eggleton is responsible Emergency Preparedness Canada, and EPC is located in DND.
Senator Stratton: Are you aware of the report by the Insurance Bureau of Canada on catastrophic loss reduction? Have you reviewed that report? I am sure that Emergency Preparedness Canada has. The report recommends joint federal-provincial funding of about $150 million a year just to be spent on mitigation so that, over time, we will lessen by far the chances or the opportunities for disaster to strike and succeed. Are you aware of that study?
Mr. Cossette: We are aware of the study. We are not involved directly in the response to that study, but we are part of the process with several other departments.
Senator Stratton: You are part of the process. Are you aware of the dollar values?
Mr. Cossette: Yes.
Senator Bolduc: In the last appendix to the document you just gave us, Appendix F on Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements, you gave us the basis of the arrangements. I see that when the cost is higher per capita, the federal government intervenes and gives a larger share -- for example, up to 90 per cent, with 10 per cent for the province. In another bracket it is 75 per cent, and for the provinces, 25 per cent.
On that basis of the arrangements, is there any incentive on the part of the federal government in terms of guidelines or conditions that would persuade the provinces to be more prepared for emergencies? Instead of just paying, since it is costly, is there any incentive to try to do a bit of planning so that things will not get out of hand like they did in Saguenay, for example, or with the ice storm?
Senator Stratton: Mr. Lieff, perhaps I can help with that, just because of my experience in the Red River Valley. After the flood of 1997, the criteria became that people living in the valley threatened by flood had to rebuild two feet above the 1997 flood level, if they were allowed to rebuild. In areas where the residences and buildings could not be protected to those levels, people are simply being bought out and are leaving. Their houses are either torn down or removed. That is taking place and has become the standard.
Senator Bolduc: I say that because I am from the county of Bellechasse, outside of Quebec City. We have the Chaudière River in La Beauce county. Every spring, it is almost like a sport to be flooded. Culturally speaking, people expect that to occur at Easter. They were ready for maple syrup, and they use a bit of gin. It is a great time of the year. It occurs throughout the region, and it is party time.
It was difficult at the local level. When I was deputy minister of municipal affairs, the provincial government said, "Come on. You cannot come back every year with a bill like that." We tried to impose on them a zoning ordnance so that, for example, in the area where there was flooding for the past two years, that would not occur any more. However, people said, "We will not retreat to the hills, because it is a way of life."
The Chairman: Their grandfathers were there.
Senator Bolduc: Yes. However, the municipalities did not agree. They said, "No, we do not want that." People have their property there. Their fathers and grandfathers were there, and so on.
Are there things such as zoning incentives in the formula? I see here that when it is very costly it is the federal government, when it is less costly it is the provincial government.
The Chairman: Do they allow new building on both sides?
Senator Bolduc: Now it is improving. The culture has changed, but cultural change is a slow process.
The Chairman: Do they allow new buildings?
Senator Bolduc: No, not now. After 25 years they were finally convinced that it is time to move to higher ground. It is also part of the new fashion to build on high ground now. That is silly, but that is the way things are.
Mr. Cossette: The DFAA criteria are not designed in a way to provide an incentive, but, since it is based on a per capita formula, the provinces, for instance Quebec, would need to assume the first $7.5 million. Unless it is a major flood, the municipal or the provincial levels would be stuck with the bill. Therefore, up to that $1 per capita they must foot the whole bill. That is the incentive for a local circumstance. The program itself does not have an incentive built in, per se.
Senator Bolduc: I make that statement because in the past, 25 years ago, a $7-million or $10-million expenditure was a big one. Now with the provincial budget set at $30 billion or $35 billion, $7 million is not as big a deal. Perhaps you should raise it from $1 to $3, or it could be from $2 to $7, or something that is sufficiently high that they must give it some consideration.
The Chairman: I have had this discussion before; there is a similar problem every year along the Saint John River Valley in New Brunswick.
Senator Bolduc: The document that the witnesses have prepared is very good. We should include it in our report as a first document on the facts. Perhaps we could include something like the costs of the major disasters and the participation of the federal government.
Senator Moore: In every national disaster situation, the maintenance of law and order is critical. Our society is based on the rule of law. I was looking at Appendix A, and I do not see anything there for Solicitor General or Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Is it somewhere else in there? I thought that would be one of the main components of response and reaction in dealing with a national disaster. Could you comment on that?
Mr. Lieff: You raise an interesting point. Indeed, there are a number of other types of government expenditures that contribute either to maintaining law and order or to responding to disasters. In fact, when putting this paper together we were faced with a dilemma as to what to include and what not to include.
With respect to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and, for that matter, municipal and provincial police forces, their objective is to maintain order. That would be seen as a regular part of their mandate. The federal RCMP, like the military when it gets involved in responding over and above what they are financed and equipped to do, could always make application to the government for supplementary funds through the budget process and we would come to you with a Supplementary Estimate. This would be in response to particular disasters and for particular efforts, such as in the case of the ice storm when the Department of Defence got involved. I believe they spent some $44 million over and above the salaries for the soldiers and the equipment involved that they had on hand.
In the case of DND, it is mentioned in the document that they get involved in disaster response when requested to do so, but there are no explicit expenditures earmarked for that, although I am sure that in their own organizations they have a planning and response capacity built in. However, it is very hard to identify that amount of expenditure.
Senator Moore: In the ongoing work of Emergency Preparedness Canada, is the force represented at the table? Are they part of that ongoing preparedness planning?
Mr. Cossette: I do not wish to mislead you. Emergency Preparedness Canada lists a whole group of departments as capabilities and how they would act in any given circumstances. They include, of course, RCMP and local police forces and so on. In terms of resource allocations, as Mr. Lieff was saying, they do not necessarily identify that the RCMP would need to spend this or that amount of money. They look at them as a capability. In a certain circumstance they would do this, they would deploy this way, and provide services A, B, and C.
Senator Moore: I have been sitting here thinking about these different disasters that occur. The Canadian public is a very giving group of people. People want to give money to help provide relief and to help other people who are suffering as a result of disasters. I thought it might be useful if we had a thing called the "Canada Fund," P.O. Box 1867, Ottawa, where you could send donations and get a tax credit. That would happen in the event of national disasters as determined by the Governor in Council. We could cap it at, say, $1,000, so that it would not be abused or taken advantage of by people or corporations with wealth. Would something like that be useful? There is a tremendous drain on the budget when one of these disasters happens. The various department officials must run around trying to allocate and reallocate funds. Would that make sense?
Mr. Lieff: That is an interesting concept. I am not sure, honestly, how to respond. I do know that in the case of past disasters Canadians have responded very generously and the funds were not government administered. The funds were administered through the NGOs, such as the Red Cross and other organizations. Therefore, a network exists.
Senator Bolduc: Since your reasoning is in terms of fiscal expenditure, that answer could probably come from the Department of Finance instead of from the Treasury Board.
Senator Moore: Perhaps the place to direct the question is the Department of Finance, but it would be money that these people would not need to look for to cover the expenses. I throw that suggestion on the table.
The Chairman: Thank you, senator. I do not think it would be capable of much abuse given the present tax treatment of charitable donations in this country.
Senator Moore: This would be a tax credit.
The Chairman: Like the political party?
Senator Moore:Yes.
The Chairman: We all know how that works.
Senator Stratton: In regard to Emergency Preparedness Canada, through the minister, do you know when this study that they are conducting will be complete? Do you have any idea, or is that a question more appropriately addressed to Emergency Preparedness Canada?
Mr. Cossette: That question should be for EPC. I can tell you at this stage that we are just out of the Y2K exercise; therefore, EPC is in the process of mapping out how the consultation with stakeholders would take place, which departments would need to be involved, the different components that should be looked at, and so on. We are not talking about something that will happen over the next couple of months. The process may be launched over the next couple of months, but my sense is that this is a study or survey that will take months to complete. Also, it will lead to discussions with the provinces since everything we do in terms of disasters is done in a 50-50 relationship with the provincial authorities.
The Chairman: Mr. Lieff, I have always been mildly scandalized -- and this goes back to my days when we were in government -- that the fisc simply raids various departments and agencies for money when they need it for a particular purpose, even though the relationship between the program they are raiding and the particular need is barely plausible. I am not saying that this is happening in emergency preparedness, but I am particularly sensitive to the use of so-called regional development funds for purposes that are barely related to regional development.
The amounts here are not great. However, I see that Western Diversification had to pony up for $17.3 million for the fiscal year just ended, and Economic Development Quebec, for $1.9 million. You have an explanation in the brief. You state that:
The federal government has developed special ad-hoc programs...
-- and "ad-hoc" is the operative word here --
...on three occasions over the past five years. These have been delivered by the federal economic development agencies in conjunction with provinces, as a result of the provinces requesting more funding than what was eligible under the Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements.
Honourable senators, you see what happens there -- "We need more money." The regional development agencies are always a convenient pool of funds for everyone else to raid. You go on to state:
In the three instances the initiatives were funded on 50/50 (federal-provincial) basis and were aimed at restoring economic activity in affected areas.
That is the fig leaf.
The three instances of special programming were the 1997 Red River flood (Manitoba), the 1996 Saguenay flood (Quebec) and the 1998 ice storm of Western Quebec and Eastern Ontario.
A summary of these expenditures can be found in Appendix C. I notice that most of the money is not really under "assistance" but under "planning, preparedness and risk reduction." That is the category, although you say here that the funds were aimed at restoring economic activity in affected areas. Convince me, please, that this is not just a raid on the regional development purse for purposes that are barely related to regional development.
Mr. Lieff: Senator Murray, there are a number of components to your question. Perhaps I will tackle the last one first. In terms of the amount of money in 2000-01 for planning and preparedness, which looks high for Western Economic Diversification, for example, $16.3 million --
The Chairman: Yes, and $17.3 million in the previous year.
Mr. Lieff: Those amounts were, essentially, to fund follow-up to the International Joint Commission recommendations related to the Red River flood. They are things like diking, mapping and planning, whereas a high percentage of the total spending in relation to those three disasters was in years prior to 1999-2000 and was for assistance. Current spending is really an anomaly from that trend and is, in fact, to deal with mitigation effects in the case of the Red River. Other amounts have been used to fund better planning and preparedness as well, but they have been relatively small for the regional agencies.
With respect to the more general question, though, in terms of the regional agencies being a convenient source of funds, the reason the federal government has used those agencies is that those disasters have been regional in nature. Regional agencies have planning and programming instruments on the ground in those regions. The need for ad hoc supplementary support of the type offered by the regional agencies is because the provinces felt there was a need to provide assistance to certain types of activity to sustain economic activity not covered under the DFAA, such as support to small business and to farmsteads. The DFAA covers support to individuals and to owner-operated businesses. There was a gap in terms of being able to respond when provinces wanted to support small business and farmsteads that were adversely impacted. Since this is the same general type of programming that regional agencies normally would do, that is why they were chosen as a delivery instrument.
In terms of the idea that these funds came from within existing funds that were allocated to the regional agencies for regional planning, I do not have the exact data in front of me. However, I do know that in a number of cases the funds were topped up from funds in the fiscal framework to support the response to those emergencies. That is a bit imprecise, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman: It is helpful. I appreciate the detail and your candour on the matter.
Frankly, sometimes I think it is a bit of a stretch in view of the stated purposes of those agencies. I remember when the legislation went through creating WED. I was involved quite directly in the ACOA legislation. The purpose was to try to stimulate entrepreneurship and economic activity, particularly for small business. In the case of the western provinces, it was to stimulate diversification away from the traditional natural resources sector.
The provincial governments have more interest in having their favourite projects, or necessary projects, subsidized or cost shared than they have in maintaining any particular discipline. To a man, I found that provincial premiers do look upon the regional agencies as a pool of money to be tapped for their purposes whenever necessary.
I appreciate what you said. In particular, I appreciate the point that you made about the presence on the ground of certain talent and programs and, in particular, certain human resources and the planning capacity, as well as the fact that in most cases it appears that it was not so much a raid on existing funds as an assignment that was given to the agencies in respect of which their budgets were topped up. That satisfies me and alleviates some of my concerns.
Is there anything further? If not, I wish to thank you, Mr. Lieff and Mr. Cossette, for appearing here this morning. You have both been very helpful and have made a comprehensive and thorough presentation.
Our next witness, unfortunately, could not be here. He is ill and he apologizes for his absence. He has asked our third witness, Ms Kathryn White, to represent his organization. She is also a member of the board of Dr. Davenport's organization, so she will be able to represent both her organization and the Canadian National Committee for the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction.
Ms White, welcome. Please proceed.
Ms Kathryn White, President, Black & White Communications Inc.: While I am very happy to be here today, I am also very unhappy that my esteemed colleague, Dr. Alan Davenport, is not able to join us.
At the suggestion of your clerk, I should like to give you some background information on the Canadian National Committee for the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction, which refers to the decade that has just ended. I will then proceed with the next presentation.
The CNC-IDNDR was initiated through the hard work, as committees often are, of a single individual. In this case it was Dr. Alan Davenport, a Canadian who is esteemed internationally as one of the leading engineers in surface layer wind functions. He is the chair of the Boundary Layer Wind Tunnel Laboratory at The University of Western Ontario.
One of his colleagues, Dr. Frank Press, an American, advocated, starting about 1986, that we take the broadest possible perspective into the long-term risks and investments as a result of the increasing effects of natural disasters. My own opinion is that the decade has been an overwhelming failure if we attribute success to the number of disasters, because around this table you know that they have increased exponentially and continue to do so. The successes, on the other hand, both in Canada and internationally, raised the awareness of these important issues and the effects that they have on communities around the world and in Canada.
As part of the agreement with the Geneva-based body, it is a UN-declared decade. There was an emphasis on risk assessments and undertaking national risk assessments to promote warnings -- that is, the technology around warnings and monitoring of natural disasters -- and also increasing public education and awareness. I will speak about that further later this morning.
The committee itself had representations from many of the departments that you heard about from the preceding speaker as well as representations from NGOs, industry and the wider civil society as well. At the last meeting that was held in the decade, we agreed to strike a working group that would focus on the outcome -- that is, how we maintain this momentum and how we ensure that the knowledge, skills and awareness level that have been raised will be sustainable into the future. I think your deliberations around this table are one of the ways that that will happen.
I am sure Dr. Davenport would want me to thank the participants in the national committee in Canada, but I should also like to recognize for him Canadian fora like this that continue to move the importance of this issue. That has had profound effects on our economies, on our environment, and, most importantly, on the lives of the communities you come and represent.
Would you like me to answer any general questions about the CNC-IDNDR, or would you like me to continue with my presentation at this time?
The Chairman: Just continue, and then we will open the floor for discussion.
Ms White: I will now do my best not to digress too much from my prepared presentation.
You do not need to hear one more time about the increasing risks and costs we face as a result of increased extreme events. This threat is real and imminent. Canadians have felt and know the consequences of natural disaster.
It is time for imagination and determination. Building resilient communities, ensuring a culture of prevention, developing citizens who are better risk decision makers, and modelling socially responsible sustainable development are the issues we confront. The development of a national disaster reduction policy is essential for Canada. At the conclusion of the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction, Canadians are well aware that we are not immune to the effects of disaster. We have many diverse groups in our communities that, together, are calling for some leadership, and we have an opportunity to highlight some Canadian good practices, technologies and community-based approaches to reducing the impacts of the disasters.
The research and development work of Black & White, particularly through its RISK & Society initiative, which was developed as a response to a needs assessment of the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction, focuses particularly on the social aspects of disasters. Through its national and international research and consultations, including strategic citizen engagement activities, especially around disasters that you have spoken about around this table, the RISK & Society initiative has identified some keys to a national disaster reduction policy. They are described on the Canon on Disaster Reduction, which I will leave with the Chair.
I will talk for a moment now about these three essential points. I would also be happy to talk about some of the social research on who has authoritative voices in the community when it comes to natural disaster, how young Canadians understand their roles and responsibilities around disaster, and how we can make projections. This is a new kind of social science or research about how they will respond in the future. We had a lively engagement here about understanding human desire to be in beautiful places in spite of the fact that, as we heard from one of your colleagues, the decision to do so carries with it the certainty that one will be faced with recurrent flooding, particularly if one lives in the Red River Valley, which is where the most damage occurred during the last flood.
There are three essential aspects to a national policy. First, it must be truly broad in scope and more than putatively multidisciplinary. True partnership is essential. We have seen that the monolithic structural approach of the so-called old World Bank to pour concrete or reroute rivers in an attempt to reduce disasters in the Third World has failed miserably by their own acknowledgement.
This diverse group before you attests to the wider engagement of the existing community of interest with the community at large. This engagement of Canadians at all different levels of government, the private sector and civil society, including the most vulnerable Canadians, offers opportunities to devise local solutions and bring good practices to share.
Second, leadership from the federal government should echo this multidisciplinary, multi-partner approach, with a designated leader, I suggest, in a central agency. All disaster recovery funds can include a budget element -- the World Bank has chosen 15 per cent-- set aside to be allocated to disaster reduction efforts. We know that the terrible and devastating moment of a disaster and the painful period immediately after are the times when citizens -- that is, when humans -- are most willing to invest in disaster reduction. Through the mechanism of a secretariat investing 15 per cent of all recovery dollars into disaster reduction, there is an opportunity to realize a significant return on investment. I would hope that we could even undertake to show more vision and set aside the same 15 per cent of all new infrastructure projects supported in any way by the Government of Canada towards reducing the impacts and the causes of increased disasters. Again, I use the confusing language of "mitigation," which means something specific when we talk about climate change, which is having a more profound effect, and our notion of mitigation refers to reduction of the effects.
In this way, we have an opportunity to assert true leadership of disaster reduction and adaptation to a changing environment. Part of this commitment, if focused through a secretariat, would build on the existing government expertise, particularly through incorporating the existing network of Emergency Preparedness Canada in facilitating disaster prevention into the response, recovery and preparedness function of its mandate. The secretariat would also draw upon the experience of the former disaster reduction programs, like the successful National Flood Plan of Environment Canada, and their expertise in the reduction or mitigation of and adaptation to climate change, which has already brought increasing extreme weather events to Canada. You will note that there is now good science linking, for example, the ice storm to a modest rise in the winter temperature. Likewise, Natural Resources Canada has developed some world-class innovations in monitoring and predictive technologies and techniques, with a wide breadth of expertise, particularly in earthquakes and wildfires.
Additionally, with this enlightened approach, Canada would have something to share with the world: vision in the reduction of disasters and models for integrated recovery from disasters that build on our collective knowledge of adaptation. This highlights another opportunity. Through the involvement of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and CIDA as well, Canada could share and advocate for disaster reduction worldwide and promote the support of the technologies and skills developed here in Canada. I have highlighted some departments and agencies, but there are others too who must be at the secretariat table: Health Canada, HRDC and Public Words are certainly the next three on the list, and there are others.
In advising the secretariat, an established council could draw from the input of the task force struck by the Canadian National Committee for IDNDR, and could emphasize private and non-governmental participation, creating a legacy of knowledge from this decade and a reach into civil society for the secretariat. This committee would provide a focal point outside of government for building and maintaining partnerships and for advocacy at the community, regional, provincial, national and international level. It would provide -- important today in everything that confronts us -- an evolving model of governance, and it would provide a nexus and advice on research and development opportunities.
Finally, a national policy must address public education and awareness to reinforce and mobilize a "culture of prevention." Our own research, supported broadly by many of the organizations with representation before you, indicates a real willingness by young Canadians to have a role and to take responsibility for the risks they pursue and avoid as part of citizenship. We have also learned that there are different voices that speak with authority to Canadians on disaster reduction. We need to explore how we engage Canadians in accepting responsibilities associated with risks, and we need to engage in a continuing public dialogue on these issues. Opportunities abound for us when we awaken to the impacts of climate change. RISK & Society has highlighted, through research, the development of a common language of risk to engage citizens, especially those at first risk to disaster.
In conclusion, I am truly excited by the potential of this forum and the momentum created by those of us engaged in this important global issue. I thank not only the Senate committee, but the men and women who have worked diligently, both through groups like the CNC and behind the scenes undertaking research, and those Canadians who have suffered the devastating effects of disasters on their communities, their homes and their lives. We cannot diminish the real pain that has been felt, but today we can agree to learn through those experiences and develop a forward-looking policy.
Senator Stratton: That was a most interesting presentation. Part of the problem that this study has had is that we have been focused primarily in Ottawa due to the cost of travel. We were not able to hear appropriate evidence from the various regions, such as the Saguenay, or areas in Quebec and Ontario that suffered the effects of the ice storm, or Manitoba, along the Red River Valley. We were unable to hear from community groups as to the social impacts on their lives.
You stated in the beginning of your presentation that you could talk more about that. Would you care to elaborate? I believe this committee needs to hear that because it is the one area in which I feel we are weak: namely, what has been the social impact on the lives of those Canadians?
Ms White: That is a good question, and it is a subject that is very dear to my heart. As you have dealt often, I am sure, with the structural aspects of response to disaster and preventing further disasters, you will recognize that the integrated approach I am advocating means recognizing the human role in disaster as we undertake to understand not only climate change and human activity in increasing our own risks but, more important, what happens in the community and how that is important to the Canadian government.
I have felt extremely privileged to be able to undertake the research that I have, because I have dealt with people in very vulnerable and exposed situations after they have been affected by natural disasters. The consequences that are felt are not always measured in budget accountings, such as the very thorough one that you heard about earlier.
I wish to add a proviso: There is much research that needs to be done. I will refer to some of the work that I have done, but it seems to me that merely the act of researching reduces the risk in some ways.
We understand at the most profound level that the risk here is to social cohesion. Typically, following a disaster there is a wonderful feeling and a moment of reaching out by all Canadians. We have all been touched by that. Again, Senator Moore, even by this notion of setting up a fund, you have indicated a wonderful call that people who are vulnerable make to us, and how we are willing to respond.
However, that first response wears off. In fact, you will know that many of those in the NGO community who do first response try to work hard to say what we should not send. I am thinking back to the Barrie tornado and a famous incident, at least among an exclusive group of disaster response NGOs, where a young radio journalist said on air that we need all sorts of clothing for the affected families. By and large, that is the last thing any community needs. In fact, in many natural disasters we spend a lot of resources looking after inappropriate donations. That has been a focus of its own study and decision taking.
The notion of social cohesion is a major issue here. I am reluctant to say that we ought not to donate when the feeling moves us, because in a way it affirms this process of collective citizenship. On the other hand, often a community later on feels neglected by the same people who poured attention on them. You will know, for example, that there are still people in the Red River Valley who have not moved into permanent homes. By and large, they are not the people who have Mastercards and who can go to a hotel at the first sign of flooding. We all know that there is no insurance in Canada for flood protection; however, there certainly is for other losses.
There are issues like employment. I was interested when the chairman brought up the issue of regional economic development. With respect to donations, some of the international aid agencies have said, "Just send cash." I do not think they have always explained that well enough. The reason cash donations are particularly helpful, as opposed to goods, is that then we can give funds to local residents affected by disasters so that they can go to local merchants, who have also been affected by disasters, and thereby re-establish their own business base. There is powerful local fallout to small business as well as to citizens.
We see rates of domestic abuse increase following natural disasters. I will tell you of one such experience. The International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction has marked the second Wednesday in October every year. In 1997, together with the committee, Black & White Communications held an event in St. Adolphe, which is one of the communities south of Winnipeg most affected. Part of the work was to focus on young people and the next generation and the impact of disaster on them and long-term recovery, as well as long-term inculcation of a culture of prevention.
First I will tell you, because it is important to know, that we had a moving rendition of a song about being wrenched away from your home. The song was delivered to us by a group of 3-year-olds. We also had with us a group of Grade 7 students who had been evacuated. Partly to involve them in this process, we listened to the stories of their families, which talked about family breakdown and evacuations that sometimes left dads at home to fight with the local community to do sandbagging. The stories were about people suffering economically as families were broken up and tried to make sense of it. We did another piece called "The Meaning of Home," which illustrated what happens to a community.
This communitarian approach is an integral part of what being Canadian means. What does it mean when the value of returning with dignity to a home is somehow not allowed? Again, for those of you who have been involved in politics, the perception is profoundly important. That is to say, "Do Canadians care about me?" To understand what happens in the microcosm of a family, as well as in a community, after a disaster, we need to start measuring those costs as well. The kind of feeling that one area of the country was responded to with more enthusiasm and in a more robust way than another area becomes profoundly important. In a way, through looking at reduction and mitigation, we also have an opportunity to involve whole communities, especially communities at risk, so that they can understand. It is no surprise that the poor are at most risk.
We know that is true internationally as well. We need only look at the hard work that CIDA, the World Bank and others did in communities that were affected by Hurricane Mitch, for example. We lost 20 years of development partly because we did not build in the notion of reduction. That is to say, where should we be building? Where should community centres be? What are the other considerations?
We also know that, even within this vulnerable group, the poor suffer more than the middle class or the wealthy.
Our research also found that, in different situations such as climate change or what have you, new immigrants might not respond to the same kind of warning advice that we give out.
In our work with the International Joint Commission we went to Montreal, Kingston, Ste Agathe and Grand Forks. We were looking at who has the authoritative voice in the community and what they would need to get someone to evacuate from a place they love. It varied greatly across the country. When we talk about preparedness and reduction, we need to know about these things. They make a great deal of difference in terms of safety for the people in the community who are affected by disasters.
Senator Stratton: With respect to item 2 on the second page of your presentation, you talk about investing 15 per cent of all recovery dollars in disaster reduction. Is that based on the U.S. model? How did you arrive at that 15 per cent?
Ms White: This is a model used by the Federal Emergency Management Agency in the United States. It was also adopted at a meeting in February at which the president of the World Bank made that commitment. The first question he took after making that announcement was this: "When will that apply to development in general?"
It seems to me that 15 per cent is a reasonable amount. In many ways, I would be naive if I did not acknowledge that some aspects of rebuilding are almost automatic. We are able to engage lessons learned and say, "Let us not build in the same place." However, the desire of most people -- and we heard it here in a presentation this morning -- is to go right back where we were that put us at risk in the first place. It seems to me that we must ask questions: Is this good land use policy? Should we build here or somewhere else? Should we build on unstable ground? Should we have community centres that act as evacuation centres, et cetera? That 15 per cent is quite reasonable. It resonates with other national programs.
Senator Moore: You state that your research indicates "a real willingness by young Canadians to have a role and to take responsibility for the risks they pursue and avoid as part of citizenship." Could you tell us a bit about what your research involved, what that real willingness is and what the young people have told you?
Ms White: We have done a number of research programs. Our focus has been on 12-year-olds, who across the country are usually in about grade 7. We chose 12 years old because, first, that is the level at which most daily papers are written. I am sure we can all read footnotes if we are forced to, but we would prefer not to. If I can talk to 12-year-olds, then I can talk comfortably to people about these issues anywhere. Second, 12-year-olds are on the cusp of moving into a social dimension in society where they are making their own decisions out of the protective, we hope, influence of their parents. That is the cusp of change where we can have the most influence. Those were two important considerations.
We did a number of studies, both qualitative and quantitative -- qualitative being dialogues not unlike this and quantitative being where we had robust numbers upon which we could base meaningful conclusions. Our RISK & Society youth survey went to over 1,000 young Canadians. We went back into Montreal after the ice storm and back into Winnipeg schools right after the flooding. In fact, when we delivered the first survey, we heard that there was way too much snow around. We went back into the communities to find out what difference having lived through a natural disaster would make in the young people's perceptions of risk and their responsibility for it.
We learned that young people at that age are still greatly influenced by their family. The lesson for us is that it behooves us to ensure that their families are well educated on what appropriate responses are and actions on reduction. We also asked questions, as social scientists are wont to do, such as "Can you understand loving a river?" We were looking for environmental aspects. Is there a culture we could quantify of understanding your place in the environment in some way? Does that reduce your risk taking?
Indeed, we found that it was true that young people who saw that what they did had an effect, even if it was just an effect on a brother or sister or their parents, also understood the wonderful effect of a pebble in a pond and that it would affect the world. It affirmed what we need to do here, which is reach to young Canadians as well. I have some of this research here and I would be happy to leave it with you.
We also talked to young Canadians about the language of risk. Again, around this table, we use fancy words. "Mitigation" means something completely different to climate change specialists than it does to emergency responders. We found that was important.
We also asked them whom they trusted, as we did with other Canadians. In other words, was it environmentalists and such, or government scientists? What did the government mean? By and large, I am happy to tell you that at least by Grade 12 the notion of science adding credibility was very important to them. Eighty-seven per cent of young Canadians said that they should have ultimate responsibility for their actions and should bear the consequences. They understood, for example, that this would extend to decisions about taking precautions and about the community endorsing. We gave them nice graspable examples such as land use management. Should we build on a flood plain, or should Canadians say something about that?
There was also a great willingness on the part of these young people to be engaged in this subject. There was much enthusiasm for it in general. Overall, the most important finding was this willingness to engage with their community at large in reducing the risk and understanding that that was part of citizenship, that citizenship is not merely rights but involves a series of responsibilities as well.
The Chairman: The questions have been few, but the answers have been quite comprehensive. We thank you for that. Thank you for your presentation, Ms White.
Senators, with regard to the subject matter that is now before us, Canada's emergency and disaster preparedness, this meeting today was the final meeting at which we will be hearing witnesses. The next step will be to consider our report. I suggest that we ask Mr. Beaumier from the parliamentary library to complete his summary of the main points in the testimony that we have heard over the past number of weeks and, by way of an outline, to identify areas that we may wish to address in our final report. As soon as that document is in my hands in both languages <#0107> and I assume that will happen over the next couple of weeks -- I will circulate it to members of the committee so that you can mull it over. At the first opportunity, we will then have an in camera meeting, perhaps on the margins of one of our regular meetings or perhaps a special meeting. We will then thrash it out and give final drafting guidance to our advisor from the parliamentary library.
I take it, Senator Stratton, that you would like to present a final report on this matter before we go home at the end of June?
Senator Stratton: I would hope so.
Senator Moore: Yes. That sounds reasonable.
The Chairman: Thank you.
Senator Stratton: Could the clerk circulate to us the report that Ms White left with us? Also, could you circulate to us the updated schedule regarding our meetings so that we can properly organize our calendars for that?
The Chairman: Yes.
The committee adjourned.