



# **Canadian Security and Military Preparedness**

**Report of the Standing Senate  
Committee on National Security and Defence**

**First Session  
Thirty-Seventh Parliament**

**February 2002**

*(Ce rapport est disponible en français)*

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# Canadian Security and Military Preparedness

Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence

*Chair*

The Honourable Colin Kenny

*Deputy Chair*

The Honourable J. Michael Forrestall

February 2002

## MEMBERSHIP

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### 37<sup>th</sup> Parliament - 1<sup>st</sup> Session

#### THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE

The Honourable Colin Kenny, *Chair*

The Honourable J. Michael Forrestall, *Deputy Chair*

And

The Honourable Senators:    Atkins  
   Banks  
   \*Carstairs, P.C. (or Robichaud, P.C.)  
   Cordy  
   Day  
   LaPierre  
   \*Lynch-Staunton (or Kinsella)  
   Meighen  
   Wiebe

The following Senators also served on the Committee during its study: The Honourable  
Senators Jaffer, Hubley, Pépin, Rompkey.

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## ORDER OF REFERENCE

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### 37<sup>th</sup> Parliament – 1st Session

Extract from the *Journals of the Senate* of Thursday, May 31, 2001:

The Honourable Senator Kenny moved, seconded by the Honourable Senator Moore:

That the Standing Senate Committee on Defence and Security be authorized to conduct an introductory survey of the major security and defence issues facing Canada with a view to preparing a detailed work plan for future comprehensive studies;

That the Committee report to the Senate no later than February 28, 2002, and that the Committee retain all powers necessary to publicize the findings of the Committee until March 31, 2002; and

That the Committee be permitted, notwithstanding usual practices, to deposit any report with the Clerk of the Senate, if the Senate is not then sitting, and that the report be deemed to have been tabled in the Chamber.

The question being put on the motion, it was adopted.

Paul C. Bélisle  
Clerk of the Senate

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**Report of the Senate Standing Committee on  
National Security and Defence**

**INTRODUCTION**

The objective of the Committee over the past seven months has been to make its members familiar with the issues and government officials associated with national security and defence, as well as with the opinions of a range of academic and non-governmental experts. We see this as a preliminary step to preparing a work plan for future studies. The list of these issues is included as an appendix and a summary of the testimony received by the Committee is presented in Part 1 of this Report.

The Committee began its study with two days of intensive hearings in Ottawa on July 18-19 2001. On 18 July, officials from the Department of National Defence provided the Committee with an overview of defence policy, planning and operations, while representatives of the Navy, the Army and the Air Force outlined the current capabilities and future challenges faced by the Canadian Forces.

July 19 began with briefings from the Department of the Solicitor General on various aspects of national security including security policy, counter-terrorism, technology and lawful access. This was followed by a discussion of the challenges facing the National Investigation Branch of the R.C.M.P. which investigates potential national security offences.

The Committee then received a briefing from the Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. The day concluded with a presentation on the work of the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness, Department of National Defence.

The September 2001 terrorist assault on the United States took place before the Committee continued its hearings in October. The attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon not only proved the wisdom of establishing the Committee but gave urgency to its work. They also emphasized the fundamental importance of good intelligence for effective counter-terrorism measures and the

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need for even closer international co-operation, particularly between Canada and the United States.

The Senate of Canada established a Special Committee on the Subject Matter of Bill C-36, *An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Official Secrets Act, the Canada Evidence Act, the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act and other Acts, and to enact measures respecting the registration of charities, in order to combat terrorism*. The Bill is an important element of the Government of Canada's response to the attacks. Since much of the testimony before the Special Committee related to the work of the Standing Committee, steps were taken to incorporate extracts into our proceedings so we could refer back to its report. The Standing Committee also carefully reviewed the issues it would study, adjusting its work plan to take into account the new realities created by 11 September.

The October meetings focused on the various aspects of intelligence: the collection of information, its processing into intelligence by analysis, and its dissemination to the relevant decision makers.

The Committee heard from senior officials who, before their retirement, had occupied important positions in the intelligence community whether as Commissioner of the R.C.M.P., as Deputy Director of the Security Intelligence Service, or as Chief of Staff, Joint Operations, in the Canadian Forces. Their testimony was complemented by that of academic specialists, as well as the Assistant Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, the Director General of Military Intelligence, and by the Deputy Commissioner, Operations, of the R.C.M.P. and the R.C.M.P. Assistant Commissioner, Criminal Intelligence Directorate.

The Committee also heard from non-governmental organizations that have a continuing interest in national defence. Their representatives, mainly retired senior officers of the Canadian Forces, could speak more candidly about the current condition and capabilities of the services than could serving officers and departmental officials.

The Committee made two fact-finding trips in November, visiting and being briefed by officials, police and customs officers on security in the ports and airports of Montreal and Vancouver. It also heard from senior officers and NCOs of Regular and Reserve units of the Canadian Forces stationed in Montreal, Esquimalt and Winnipeg, including the Maritime Forces Pacific Headquarters of

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the Navy in Esquimalt and 1 Canadian Air Division/Canadian NORAD Region Headquarters in Winnipeg.

Wherever possible, the Committee made arrangements to meet privately with groups of enlisted personnel and junior officers, as well as with Customs officers and their local union representatives, to discuss “quality of life,” training, and safety issues. These meetings gave the members of the Committee an invaluable insight into the day-to-day concerns of the men and women on the “front lines” of our national security forces.

Committee members would like to thank the officers who organized these meetings and to note its particular appreciation for the clarity and candour of the participants.

In Ottawa, the Committee continued its study of defence issues with a hearing on the present policy of the Department of National Defence, which is still based on the principles set out in the White Paper of 1994. In addition it heard testimony on the program review currently underway, and the potential for a policy review given the 11 September attack on the United States.

The Committee held two meetings in December. On the first of these days the Chiefs of Staff of the three defence environments – maritime, land and air – discussed current operations of their services and the factors that would affect their force capability in the next few years.

They were followed by General Henault, Chief of the Defence Staff, who gave an overview of the participation of Canadian Forces in the campaign against terrorism. This included Operation Apollo and Operation Active Endeavour, the latter of which is NATO’s contribution to the campaign. General Henault also noted the progress that is being made to encourage serving servicemen and women to stay in the forces and to recruit new officers and personnel. He also spoke about upgrading communications and Canadian participation in the multi-national project to develop a new joint strike fighter.

On the concluding day of its December meetings, the Committee was briefed by the Auditor General on two chapters of her December 2001 report. Chapter 8 evaluated the ability of Customs to manage the risk posed by commercial shipments. The Committee paid equal attention to Chapter 10, which painted a bleak picture of the constrained financial resources available to the

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Canadian Forces. It pointed to serious shortcomings in the condition of some Air Force equipment. It also drew attention to shortfalls in the number of technicians available to carry out maintenance and it noted the lack of essential specialized training of some maintenance personnel.

Between January 20-24, the Committee visited units of the Maritime Forces Atlantic and had an opportunity to learn about its work and the challenges its officers and men and women face. The Committee also visited the Port of Halifax and was briefed by Port authorities, customs officials and their union and by the R.C.M.P. and Halifax police who are responsible for controlling organized crime and patrolling the Port.

The tour of the East Coast facilities concluded with a visit to Base Gagetown where the Commander of Land Forces Atlantic Area, briefed the Committee on the organization and mission of his command. This presentation was followed by a candid series of briefings and exchanges with the Commander of 3 Area Support Group, the Commander of the Combat Training Centre, and the commanding officers of the combat schools for artillery, armour and infantry.

These exchanges ranged far beyond the advanced training of officers and men of the Army and included issues such as the health care available to families, quality of life on the base, the impact on operational units of cutbacks in the staff of the schools, etc. The Committee regrets that the discussions were so informative that it was unable to keep its commitment to tour the combat arms schools before it had to leave in order to visit 403 Wolf Squadron, which operates the Griffon helicopter in support of the Army.

The Committee had several objectives for its trip to Washington in early February to discuss Canada's activities since 11 September:

- a. to understand the views of the United States Congress and Administration with regard to current and future military and security issues and how Canada relates to them,
- b. to promote a better understanding of bilateral cooperation for homeland security and future defence arrangements; and
- c. to explore specific issues such as NATO enlargement, NORAD, and emerging joint command questions, the Missile Defence System, border

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issues, and measures to combat terrorism.

The Chair of the Committee and senior staff met with respectively: the Chief of the Defence Staff, the Deputy Minister of National Defence, the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, the Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff and the Director General of International Security Policy on issues relating to CINC<sup>(1)</sup> North and joint Defence.

The Committee prepared for its fact-finding trip to the United States with two days of briefings in Ottawa and one day of briefings in Washington. On Monday 28 January it heard presentations and discussed aspects of Canada-United States relations with three panels.

A panel from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade gave the Committee an overview of the various aspects of the Canadian-United States relationship, covering the Canadian response to the attacks of 11 September, the political dynamic in the United States since then, the challenges facing the relationship, such as balancing border security with the free movement of goods and people, and the respective positions of our governments on the expansion of NATO and the Missile Defence System.

A panel from the Department of National Defence continued the discussion of NATO, NORAD and the National Missile Defence System, as well as the opportunities and risks posed by a likely move by the United States to establish a commander-in-chief for homeland defence.

Because the balance between border security vs. trade is vitally important to both Canada and the United States, a panel including representatives from the R.C.M.P., the Departments of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Transport Canada, the Solicitor General, Canada Citizenship and Immigration and the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency met with the Committee in the evening to review the issue.

On Tuesday, the Committee heard presentations on police cooperation and intelligence sharing with the United States from the perspective of the R.C.M.P. It also was briefed on what the Canadian government has contributed to the

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(1) CINC is Commander in Chief which is a prefix for one of the U.S. regional commands.



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campaign against terrorism and to enhance public security in cooperation with the United States.

In preparation for the trip, the Chair also had separate meetings with the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister to obtain their views on bilateral issues relating to the United States.

The week in Washington began on the morning of Monday, 4 February, when a team from the Canadian embassy briefed the Committee on outstanding issues, and on the committees and personalities the Committee would be meeting.

In the afternoon, the Committee heard presentations from experts on an issue vital to Canadian interests and to North American security – the ideas and technology that can help to separate the vast majority of cross-border container traffic that is low-risk, from the small percentage that must be subjected to closer inspection.

On Tuesday the Committee met with representatives of two Congressional Committees – the House Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services Committee. In between these meetings, the Committee heard presentations and discussed United States foreign and defence policy with experts from the Brookings Institution and the Carnegie Foundation.

Wednesday was a particularly full day. The Committee had an early morning meeting with the House Armed Services Committee at which its Chair requested a continuing committee-to-committee relationship. This was agreed to after the meeting.

The Committee took advantage of an unexpected invitation to meet with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. Then members of the Committee were invited to hear Secretary Rumsfeld testify before the House Armed Services Committee. During the course of the hearing the Chair of the Armed Services Committee and the Secretary complimented and thanked Canada for its contribution to the war against terrorism and for the hospitality shown to the air travellers stranded by the closure of United States air space.

This was followed by meetings in the State Department with officials responsible for the “Canada” file and in the Pentagon for briefings about the plan for a unified northern command, NATO expansion, NORAD, the Missile Defence

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System and border security.

In the evening, the Committee returned to the Capitol for a second meeting with members of the House Select Committee on Intelligence.

On Thursday, the last day of our visit, the Committee had an early morning meeting with the Judiciary Committee of the House before it received a briefing on homeland security at the White House.

The introduction has outlined the Committee's work chronologically. Part 1, which follows, is structured to review the topics the Committee focused upon. Part 2 will set out the Committee's observations and conclusions about defence and security issues; and, Part 3 will outline the mandate that the Committee will seek for more in-depth study in the next fiscal year.



**PART I**

**What We Have Learned**

**Defence Issues**

**1. Developing a Strategic Vision for the 21st Century**

It is conventional wisdom in some circles that budget cutbacks and events have overtaken the White Paper of 1994. The Committee considered the desirability of a review of the White Paper, and defence policy in general, as well as a study of the principles which should guide development of the Canadian Forces in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

The early stages of the Committee hearings witnessed a disagreement among witnesses over whether events had overtaken the White Paper.

Witnesses whose responsibility it is to support government policy, and current funding levels, argued that the Canadian Forces continue to meet or exceed the 1994 White Paper assigned roles and missions.

Academics, defence analysts and representatives of defence non-governmental organizations argued that Canadian Forces' strength, equipment and capabilities fall far short of the tasks set out in the White Paper.

Our first witness, Mr. Daniel Bon, Director General, Policy Planning, Department of National Defence, vigorously defended the departmental opinion that "with some exceptions the Canadian Forces are much more combat-capable than they were as little as 10 years ago."<sup>(2)</sup> Mr Bon later sent the Committee documents supporting his view, as requested.

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(2) Mr. Daniel Bon, Director General, Policy Planning, Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy, Department of National Defence, *Proceedings*, Issue 1, 18 July 2001.

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The departmental view was challenged by, among others, Lieutenant General (Ret) Charles Belzile, Chair of the Conference of Defence Associations. He testified that the Canadian Forces have suffered from under-funding for 30 years, with a critical drop of 30 percent of purchasing power in the mid 1990's. Under funding has led to cutbacks in the strength of the Forces from 85,000 to 57,000 (that is, 53,000 effectives). This, in turn, has placed additional pressures on those remaining, leading to burnout and low rates of retention.

With their capabilities in decline, and new resources unavailable, the Canadian Forces are unable to sustain their commitments beyond a marginal level within the stipulated resource and time limits. General Belizile's conclusion was stark: "We are ready to fight with no capability to sustain." In his opinion, just stabilizing the situation of the Canadian Forces will take a funding increase of \$1 billion/year for five years – that is, an increase from about \$11 to \$16 billion.. In addition, the Canadian Forces should be brought up to their strength of 60,000 effectives, and then increased to at least 75,000.<sup>(3)</sup>

Aside from the disagreement over current capabilities and funding levels, by the end of the hearings there was a growing consensus (including departmental officials and the senior commanders of the Armed Forces) that the 11 September 2001 attack on the United States and the U.S. experience in Afghanistan had challenged the assumptions of the policy set out in the White Paper, and that the Forces faced not only a "funding challenge," but also a "sustainability" problem.

Dr. Kenneth Calder, Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy) DND, acknowledged that a program review launched at the beginning of 2001, "... started with the assumption that the current policy was still valid and that we had the resources to do what was set out in the White Paper. That said, we also recognized that we had a funding challenge." He acknowledged that 11 September had challenged the assumptions about current policy and raised the possibility of a full-blown review of defence policy.<sup>(4)</sup>

The Commanders of the three services were quite candid about the limitations they faced meeting the standards set out in the defence policy. Vice-Admiral Ron Buck, Chief of the Maritime Staff, DND, said that while the Navy

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(3) *Ibid.*, Issue 4, 15 October 2001.

(4) *Ibid.*, Issue 7, 26 November 2001.

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can cover the essential elements of its mandate with its current resources, “we need to resource the military to the correct level to do the things that we are asked to do. As I have said, I am doing the essential. I would like to do that in a manner that would allow me more options in my efforts.”<sup>(5)</sup>

Lieutenant-General M.K. Jeffrey, Chief of the Land Staff, noted that while the Army was in demand, “it faces limited sustainability” and faced an urgent need to improve its capability through modernization. At the end of his opening statement he warned, “No amount of efficiency or new technology can make up for size or depth, and in the end, it is the Government and Canadian society that must determine what they want us to do.”<sup>(6)</sup>

Lieutenant-General Lloyd Campbell, Commander of Air Command and Chief of the Air Staff noted that while “we had managed to preserve, and in fact even enhance, the capability and the quality of many of the forces that we have, we should not confuse that with depth or sustainability, because those are quite different things. You cannot take the kind of resource reductions that we faced in the 1990s and not have something change.”<sup>(7)</sup>

## 2. Canadian Forces Health Services

Even before the attacks on the United States, the Committee was told that there was a need to review the medical care and treatment of personnel returning from UN missions and the services available to their families.<sup>(8)</sup> Almost any level of participation in operations against the foreign bases of terrorists will intensify the pressure on existing medical and dental services and the problem of retaining qualified medical staff.

Early on in the hearings the prevention and treatment of stress-related illnesses and particularly of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder was identified as a

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(5) *Ibid.*, Issue 8, 3 December 2001 AM.

(6) *Ibid.*

(7) *Ibid.*, 3 December 2001 PM.

(8) *Proceedings*, Issue 1, 18 July 2001.

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growing problem.<sup>(9)</sup> More attention is now paid to briefing soldiers about the realities they will face when deployed, and to the follow-up process, both in theatre and on return home. Witnesses reported that some progress has been made in setting up centres to help returning soldiers suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and lesser degrees of stress. More has to be done, particularly for Reservists.<sup>(10)</sup>

Given the nature of the deployments of the Canadian Forces, the risk of stress and stress-related illness is obviously most severe for Army personnel. But the risk also exists for individual members of the Navy and Air Force where the relatively low rate of serious stress-related illnesses can often conceal the existence of the problem.

At 1 Canadian Air Division, for example, the Committee was told that the lack of training time was probably the major cause of stress. The Air Force itself lacks the resources to treat the most serious consequences of stress, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, and has to establish partnerships with non-military clinics. There is still a problem getting airmen to come forward before their stress becomes chronic. Most commonly effected are those airmen and women who have served with the Army; their problem has been made worse by their isolation when they return to their unit.<sup>(11)</sup>

Vice-Admiral Ron Buck, Chief of the Maritime Staff, DND noted that naval personnel are not particularly prone to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder while at sea, but crewmen and divers who participated in the Swissair recovery operation are vulnerable. Clinics have been established in the Halifax and Victoria naval medical facilities.<sup>(12)</sup>

Lieutenant-General Christian Couture, Assistant Deputy Minister (Human Resources) DND outlined for the Committee the initiatives the Forces have taken in recent years to reduce, and treat, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. These include establishment of a network of operational stress clinics across the country; better

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(9) See the brief comments of Colonel William Peters, Director, Land Strategic Planning, Chief of Land Staff and of Commodore Jean-Yves Forcier, Chief of Staff J3, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, *Ibid.*, Issue 1, 18 July 2001

(10) *Ibid.*

(11) Notes from visit in Vancouver, Victoria and Winnipeg, *Proceedings*, Issue 12, 18 February 2002

(12) *Proceedings*, Issue 8, 3 December 2001.

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preparation of personnel for what to expect; better training of leaders to recognize symptoms in-theatre; establishment of a joint centre in Ottawa with Veterans Affairs; and, establishment of the “operational stress injuries support network” to provide non-medical social support to soldiers, and to evaluate and suggest improvements to pre-deployment training and post-deployment de-briefing.

Early access to treatment increases the chances of success in dealing with the disorder. Lt. Gen. Couture said that it is important to convince soldiers to come forward sooner rather than later by ensuring confidentiality of their treatment, and training their immediate supervisors about the nature of the disorder.<sup>(13)</sup>

In informal conversations with rank-and-file members of the Forces and representatives of their families, the members of the Committee heard a number of complaints about the quality of medical care. According to Lt. Gen. Couture, since the Forces eliminated hospitals in the mid-1990s as part of the re-organization of the medical services to focus on support of deployments, the health care system has deteriorated. He acknowledged that it no longer meets the needs of garrisons and operations and told the Committee that the RX2000 program, launched in 2000, will overhaul the system by 2004.<sup>(14)</sup>

### 3. Quality of Life

Implementation of most of the recommendations of the House of Commons report on the quality of life in the Forces was given credit by many witnesses for significant improvements in the pay and allowances and in their living accommodations.

Indeed, the Department of National Defence has established a permanent Directorate of Quality of Life to oversee implementation of the remaining recommendations of the House of Commons Report and to monitor quality of life and other issues.<sup>(15)</sup>

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(13) *Ibid.*, Issue 9, 10 December 2001

(14) *Ibid.*

(15) *Ibid.*



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To-day, the most common source of discontent mentioned in testimony is the tempo of operations and the frequency of foreign deployments. In one of the Committee's earliest briefing sessions Major General (Ret) Clive Addy, National Chair, Federation of Military and United Services Institutes of Canada, argued that the Canadian Forces were being deployed too frequently – six times to the Balkans in the past ten years, for example. In part this is because they have been increasingly understaffed. This became a great hardship for personnel and their families and particularly for the 65 percent who are married.<sup>(16)</sup>

The same point was raised when the Committee visited the West Coast. The tempo of operations had become the major source of complaint, instead of pay and allowances. This was having an impact on morale, individual and family stress, physical health, and group cohesiveness. Whereas most NATO countries maintain a 50 percent time-on-ship to 50 percent time-on-shore ratio, in the Canadian Navy it is a 60-40 percent time-on-ship to time-on-shore shore ratio. In informal conversations with members of the Committee, Navy reservists pointed out that they spend even more time at sea than the 60-40 percent ratio.<sup>(17)</sup>

During the Committee's visit to 1 Canadian Air Division, Chief Warrant Officer Dan Dietrich outlined the "Flight Plan for Life" initiative to enhance the quality of life. The Command Chief Warrant Officer acts as Chair of the Air Command FPfL (Flight Plan for Life) Advisory Committee which has representatives from the various units.

The Advisory Committee solicits and evaluates suggestions on how to improve morale from all ranks, guaranteeing a considered response to each suggestion. The program has proven so successful it has been adopted by other air forces.

Perhaps its greatest success has been to encourage more flexibility in deployments: the 12V concept for deployments to Bosnia-Velika/Kladusa provides for a 12-month Squadron deployment with variable personnel tour lengths – 16 core personnel deploy for 6 months at a time while most remaining personnel serve two 56 day periods and a few serve three periods. This is not only less disruptive of family life, it also makes it easier for reserve personnel to participate in the

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(16) *Ibid.*, Issue 4, 15 October 2001.

(17) Notes from visit in Vancouver, Victoria and Winnipeg, *Proceedings*, Issue 12, 18 February 2002

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rotations. While this new system of rotation had eased the pressures of deployments, the tempo of operations and staff shortages both impeded training, setting up a vicious circle.<sup>(18)</sup>

On its visit to the East Coast the Committee was told about a number of quality of life issues. The federal government housing available in the Halifax area was admittedly sub-standard. In the opinion of many sailors, it was poor value for the rent charged, perhaps one reason why 70 percent of service men and women in the Halifax area have purchased houses. Funding has not been available to modernize the PMQs, or Private Married Quarters, which were built to 1940s-1950s standards. Since the local market had a reasonable supply of 1-2 bedroom accommodations, the plan was to concentrate on updating larger units of 3-4 bedrooms. While the quality of government housing affects only a minority of servicemen and women, the complaints the Committee heard about the thin and unyielding mattresses on Canada's frigates and submarines were shared by all personnel.

Base Gagetown is located outside Fredericton, New Brunswick. One of its major functions is to support the Army training schools. The officers commanding 3 Area Support Group, the Combat Training Centre and the separate schools for advanced artillery, armour and infantry training, brought their senior officers and warrant officers with them to their meeting with the Committee. They raised a number of very important quality-of-life-issues.

The shortage of single-room accommodation at the base is acute due to the increasing demand for training courses and the necessity of bringing in additional instructors from Operational Units. Even during the winter there is a shortage of rooms, and about 200 staff are forced to live two or three to a room. In summer, the Base must provide accommodation for an additional 2,000 students and staff, who must be put under canvas or housed in open barracks.

The lack of services for families is reaching a crisis point. It is prejudicing the willingness of servicemen and women with families to accept postings to Base Gagetown. While there are sufficient medical and dental staff on Base to look after the service personnel, the military does not provide medical services to family members, who are expected to find civilian practitioners. Almost no civilian

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(18) *Ibid.*

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doctors, however, are accepting new patients because the doctor-to-population ratio in the Greater Fredericton area is one-third the national average. It is just as difficult to find a local dentist, and francophones face an even more daunting search for either medical or dental care.

The serviceman or woman suffering from the symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder can cause physical and mental problems among family members. While the military looks after its own, family members must depend on the resources of the province. Increasingly, however, the resources available in the health systems vary from province to province. New Brunswick does not offer the same level of services as British Columbia, Alberta and Ontario. This applies not only to medical care, but also to the availability of special education and social services.

There was a consensus among many military witnesses at Base Gagetown that responsibility for the medical care of families should be the responsibility of the Department of National Defence, and that servicemen and women whose families have special medical, educational or other needs should, without prejudice to their careers, be free to turn down postings located in areas where these needs cannot be met.<sup>(19)</sup>

### **4. Recruiting and Retention**

Recruiting new personnel into all services and trades has become increasingly difficult in recent years, as has the retention of specialists sought after by civilian employers.

The Committee learned that there are 105 military occupations within the Canadian Forces. The status of an occupation is considered Red or “critical” if its “trained effective strength” is 90 percent or less of the “preferred manning level” and there are indications that its strength will not recover within 2 years. It is considered Amber or “caution” if it is 91-95 percent of the “preferred manning level and there are indications that the shortfall will be made up within 1-2 years, if

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(19) Notes from visit in Halifax and Fredericton, *Proceedings*, Issue 12, 18 February 2002.

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there is a rapid change year-to-year in its “trained effective strength,” or if its strength is more than 10 percent above the “preferred manning level.”

On this basis an extraordinary 66 of the 105 occupations are “stressed,” that is 43 are classified as “critical” and 23 as “caution.”

Among the understaffed non-commissioned occupations are highly specialized ones such as fire control and weapons technicians, several kinds of naval electronics technicians, as well as more traditional occupations like vehicle, x-ray, medical lab, and dental technicians. Among officers, all six of the engineer occupations are of concern, as are those of medical and dental officers.<sup>(20)</sup>

According to the naval officers who briefed the Committee, the Regular Force is currently about 400 below strength, mostly in technical trades and at the level of Lieutenant, where there is a shortage of about 80-100 officers. As a result some ships were short-staffed.

A shortage of personnel is one reason why HMCS *Huron* is tied up. However there is no demand for all four Tribal Class Destroyers (DDH-280s), which are not fuel-efficient, to be fully operational.<sup>(21)</sup>

The Air Force, which has a critical shortage of 222 pilots and 40 aerospace engineers, as well as of technicians, hopes that retention bonuses will reduce the loss of its most valuable personnel.

The need to assign some of the most highly-trained personnel to teach recruits places a heavy burden on the units concerned.

The Commander of the Combat Training Centre at Base Gagetown and the Commandants of the individual schools for advanced artillery, armoured and infantry training were particularly candid about the situation they faced. Due to a reduction of roughly 25 percent in their permanent staff, and constant increases in the demand for officer and advanced training, their workload has gone from 1,429 students and 50,000 student days in 1997-1998 to 2,342 students and 106,000

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(20) "Critical Occupations Considered to be at Risk Due to Personnel Shortages". Information provided as a supplement to the testimony of 3 December 2001.

(21) *Proceedings*, Issue 1, 18 July 2001 and Notes from visit in Vancouver, Victoria and Winnipeg, *Proceedings*, Issue 12, 18 February 2002.

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student days in the current financial year. The Army is forced to strip operational units of experienced personnel to serve as instructors.

The demands on the operational units have increased exponentially over the past 5 years, from 233 Reservists and 113 Regulars in 1997-1998 to 734 Reservists and 1,266 Regulars in the current financial year. Given the success of the current recruiting program, the situation will only get worse for the next few years as the new soldiers complete their basic training, carried out elsewhere, and move on to advanced training.

The loss of core personnel to the training schools, particularly during the four summer months, is prejudicial to the ability of operational units to carry out either collective training exercises or the professional training of their officers and personnel. As one of the witnesses bluntly told the Committee, the pace of the increase in workload is not sustainable by the schools or the operational units.<sup>(22)</sup>

According to the witnesses, the current recruiting campaign has generally had a great deal of success. The Forces are offering recruiting allowances for most of the understaffed occupations, offering equivalencies for non-military technical training so that some or all of the military training can be by-passed, introducing a college sponsorship program for some of the technical trades, and encouraging internal transfers.

More is being done to encourage commissioning officers from the ranks. The university studies for more engineers, doctors and dentists are being sponsored. Despite these measures, however, it still takes years of training and experience to produce a qualified technician or officer. An ominous note is that too many trained and qualified personnel leave the Armed Forces rather than re-enlist when their agreed-upon period of service is over.<sup>(23)</sup>

Throughout its hearings and travels the Committee enquired about the success of the Armed Forces in recruiting and retaining francophones, women and visible minorities. The Committee was told that representation of visible minorities in all three services and in all ranks is not what it should be if the Forces are truly to represent the Canadian community. The Committee heard from

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(22) Notes from visit in Halifax and Fredericton, *Proceedings*, Issue 12, 18 February 2002.

(23) *Ibid.*

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departmental witnesses some of the reasons for this were that new recruits are often from smaller towns while the majority of new immigrants live in cities and that many recent immigrants have reason to be suspicious of state authority figures and distrust them.

### 5. Operations Tempo

The tempo of operations refers to the total number of missions undertaken by the Canadian Forces at any one time. These include among others fulfillment of treaty obligations, aid to the civil power, training and training exercises, as well as peacekeeping missions. Already heavily burdened, arguably over-burdened, the Canadian Forces have just been assigned a new mission – to assist the United States “war” against international terrorists. The very high tempo of operations emerged very early on in the Committee’s proceedings and travels as an contributing factor to other problems, whether the latter involve health care, quality of life, the ability to hold large-scale training operations or to ensure the professional development of individual service personnel.

Colonel Peters, in his presentation of July 18, 2001 told the Committee that throughout 1990s the operational tempo was higher for the Army than in any other period since Korea. Not only were there deployments in Eastern Europe, Africa and the Pacific Rim, but major domestic deployments were required to help with floods and ice storms. The Army proved its capability of maintaining two battle-group sized units abroad on demanding peace support operations, but “we managed to accomplish these tasks only at a considerable price. We are very concerned about our ability to sustain this tempo at current resource levels.” Colonel Peters went on to say that the burden is becoming “intolerable” for soldiers, and particularly junior leaders, who have been forced to work the equivalent of 80 days beyond the typical work year. Vital combat skills at higher levels are being eroded at an accelerating rate due to lack of collective training at brigade level.<sup>(24)</sup>

The Committee learned that while the Army has borne the heaviest burden in terms of the tempo of operations, the Navy and Air Force have also been hard

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(24) *Proceedings*, 18 July 2001.

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pressed. Maritime Forces Atlantic, for example, has 5,230 Canadian Forces personnel, of whom about 2,625 serve on surface ships. Well over half of these 2,625 are currently deployed, 1,150 in support of Operation Apollo to combat terrorism, and a further 240 with HMCS Toronto. Since the Navy is short approximately 600 personnel, the workload is that much heavier for the others and personnel are increasingly posted from Operational Unit to Operational Unit. That is, the crew of a ship preparing for deployment can only be brought up to strength by taking personnel from another ship.

While the shortage of junior officers places an addition workload on the others, the success of the current recruiting campaign promises to ease this situation in a few years.<sup>(25)</sup> On the other hand, a serving naval officer described the workload demands placed on middle ranking officers as “having gone beyond abusive.” Since it takes about 20 years to prepare an officer for promotion to Captain in the Navy or the equivalent in the other services, it will be much more difficult to replace them.<sup>(26)</sup>

12 Wing Shearwater provides the helicopter detachments, called “Helairdets,” that serve on the destroyers and frigates of both Maritime Forces Atlantic and Maritime Forces Pacific. Each Helairdet consists of a Sea King helicopter, four pilots and eleven maintenance technicians. Four of these units operate out of 443 Squadron based at Pat Bay, near Victoria, B.C. and five are based at Shearwater, Nova Scotia. Since there continues to be a higher demand from the Navy for Helairdets than are available, operational detachments move from ship to ship, in Air Force vernacular, they “jetty hop.” As a result, Helairdet personnel average more days at sea than most of their naval colleagues and their families must share their shore time with the need for continuous individual and collective training.<sup>(27)</sup>

Not surprisingly, operational tempo was one of the three priority issues identified by Vice-Admiral Ron Buck, Chief of the Maritime Staff, DND.<sup>(28)</sup>

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(25) Maritime Forces Atlantic, “Backgrounder for Senate Committee on Defence and Security: Military Personnel Issues and Quality of Life Issues”

(26) Notes from visit in Vancouver, Victoria and Winnipeg, *Proceedings*, Issue 12, 18 February 2002.

(27) Notes from visit in Halifax and Fredericton, *Proceedings*, Issue 12, 18 February 2002.

(28) *Proceedings*, Issue 8, 3 December 2001.

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## 6. The Canadian Forces Reserves

The Canadian Forces Reserves must provide the mobilization base for war. While the Navy and Air Force have found valid roles for their Reserves, the Army has lagged behind. Although some progress has been made in restructuring the Land Force Reserves (Militia), they still lack a defined role in the Total Force concept.

Briefing the Committee on the role of the reserves, Mr. Bon noted that in the 1994 White Paper, the Reserves were to be reduced in strength to help finance an increase of 3,000 in the field force. When the Committee pressed him about the reduction, he replied that there is “no DND policy with regard to reservists. There is a Government of Canada policy.” Reserves, like Regulars, must reflect the realities of to-day, rather than the reality of yesterday.

Commodore McNeil gave the Committee an overall view of the Naval Reserve, noting that the 4,000 naval reservists are organized into 24 naval divisions with 150-200 reservists each. Like Navy Regulars, the Naval Reserve is currently 400 below establishment. The Navy sets aside specific roles and equipment for its reserves; for example, its coastal defence vessels are basically crewed by reservists.<sup>(29)</sup>

During the visit to the West Coast, Captain (Navy) Pile gave the Committee a more detailed view of the role of the reserves in manning the 6 West Coast and the 6 East Coast Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels. With the exception of two Regular Force technical experts, these vessels are crewed and officered (38 Reservists including the Captain) by reservists from across Canada who are on contracts of between three months and three years. The vessels themselves are very versatile and can be easily given different configurations. They can be equipped with weapons, or to conduct Route Surveys and inspection of objects on the sea floor, or as the Ready Duty Ship for Search and Rescue. The Navy has implemented the Total Force concept, expecting the same standards, expectations, level of leadership and professionalism from Reservists and Regulars alike.

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(29) *Proceedings*, Issue 1, 18 July 2001.



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There are three levels of Reserve pay: Class A for those serving an evening a week and the occasional week-end; Class B, supporting Reserve commitment on fixed length contract; Class C, on full-time call out doing the job of a Regular. In April 2002, deploy ability will distinguish between Classes B and C. Those who are deployable will receive 100 percent of the Regular pay, as opposed to 85 percent.

Captain Pile gave two reasons for delays in taking on recruits as Reservists: if the applicant has a criminal record, or when the applicant has previous service and the records must be searched before an offer is made. Cutbacks have reduced the staff available to search records. Like other officers the Committee spoke to, Captain Pile is opposed to U.S. style legislation governing Reservists: major employers will give time off, even “top up” Naval pay, but smaller employers might be disinclined to hire Reservists if they have to hold the job open. He identified two major problems: shortage of staff (only 5 of the 6 vessels available could be manned) and lack of at sea time for training (most at sea days are allocated to training regular force Naval officers).

Col. Peters briefed the Committee about the Land Force Reserve – the “Militia”. The 15,000 militia reservists are organised into 10 Brigades scattered across Canada. These formations are small and lightly equipped and cannot be deployed or serve in combat. Traditionally, the Militia has been used for force generation and particularly “individual augmentation,” but the intent is to move to company-sized elements (100 soldiers) capable of being deployed with a regular force unit by 2002.<sup>(30)</sup>

In his appearance before the Committee, Lt. Gen. M.K. Jeffrey, Chief of the Land Staff, noted some of the progress that has been made in deploying militia formations as opposed to individual reservists. The unit currently deployed in Bosnia, for example, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Van Doos, includes six full reserve infantry sections. The next rotation, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Van Doos, will include one or two full platoons, and the follow-on rotation will include a full reserve infantry company. He was quite candid about admitting that he was working to end the distrust between the

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(30) *Proceedings*, Issue 1, 18 July 2001.

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Regulars and Reserves: “Frankly, the Reserves did not trust the Regulars, and the same was true the other way round.”<sup>(31)</sup>

During its trip to Montreal, the Committee had the opportunity to meet informally with some officers and non-commissioned officers of the Black Watch Regiment. Some of the points raised were the following:

- a. The Militia is increasingly short of instructors, and consequently cannot quickly increase its numbers;
- b. Sending large numbers of a Militia unit to serve with regulars, whether on deployment or as instructors, compromises its ability to train recruits and others;
- c. Reservists are not guaranteed jobs when they return from serving on missions because employers are not required by law to hold their job open;
- d. It takes longer to hire someone with previous experience in the Militia than a new recruit;
- e. Recruiting of officers and other personnel is impeded by centralization, generally inadequate promotional budgets and material. Very little effort is made to appeal to the idealism of young people or to attract young women to the infantry; it is also very difficult for local units to get permission to recruit on their own at local secondary schools, colleges and universities;
- f. The Militia has been suffering from severe shortages of equipment for several years;
- g. Lieutenant Colonel Bolton, their commanding officer, stressed that the morale of his unit was good despite limited budgets and the increasingly bureaucratic military environment.<sup>(32)</sup>

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(31) *Ibid.*, Issue 8, 3 December 2001.

(32) Notes from visit in Montreal, *Proceedings*, Issue 12, 18 February 2002.

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The establishment of the Regular Air Force is just over 13,000. The Reserves currently number just over 2,100, of whom about 700 are full-time and the remainder part-time. Outside the two Reserve Squadrons which fly the Griffon helicopter, the Air Force Reserves are fully integrated in regular Air Force flights across the country. The Air Force plans to increase the Reserves to 3,000.<sup>(33)</sup>

During the visit to 1 Canadian Air Division in Winnipeg, Lieutenant Colonel Bert Doyle, Commanding Officer, 402 Squadron, spoke to the Committee about the role of the Squadron and the “Total Force” concept which it embodies. Its task is to conduct pilot training on de Havilland Dash 8’s and to provide the aircraft which the Air Navigation School uses for training air crew. Regular and Reserve Force members work side-by-side to fulfill 402’s roles and duties. The only difference is that Regular Force personnel are used wherever they must be used, while Reservists are used wherever they can be used. About 10 percent of the Reservists with 402 Squadron worked full-time with the Squadron. The major concern of the Reservists is their lack of legislated job protection during periods of service on operations or training.<sup>(34)</sup>

Whenever possible members of the Committee questioned officers and other personnel of the Reserves of all three services about the need for legislation forcing employers to give Reservists time off for training and deployment. There was definite reluctance among the officers to support the U.S. model of legislation because small employers in particular might be inclined, all other things being equal, not to hire the Reservist. Some other ranks shared this view, but on balance they favoured legislation to protect their jobs.

The Committee was told that while all provinces except Quebec have legislation allowing public servants to take time off for Reserve duties, the Federal Government had not adopted such legislation. Dr. Kenneth Calder, Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy), DND, noted that legislation before the House of Commons would protect employment of Reservists during emergencies declared by the government – the Ice Storm, the Red River Floods, etc. – but not for peacekeeping operations.<sup>(35)</sup>

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(33) Lieutenant-General Lloyd Campbell, Commander of Air Command and Chief of the Air Staff, *Proceedings*, Issue 8, 3 December 2001.

(34) Notes from visit in Vancouver, Victoria and Winnipeg, *Proceedings*, Issue 12, 18 February 2002.

(35) *Proceedings*, Issue 7, 26 November 2001.

## **7. Equipment and Contracting Out**

Many witnesses noted that the Canadian Forces lack certain equipment; other equipment is at the end of its lifespan, but budget restrictions have delayed its replacement and reduced the quantity that will be replaced. They also referred to the effectiveness of the “Alternate Service Delivery” program, or contracting out of tasks deemed not to be core or essential to the conduct of operations.

Mr. Bon reminded the Committee that by the policy set out in the 1994 White Paper the Forces were to be “appropriately equipped, but no more” to contribute to a wide range of operations at home and abroad. New equipment would only be made available for core capabilities, and it would have to be suited for a wide range of roles. Thus the White Paper identified four priority acquisitions: armoured personnel carriers, search and rescue helicopters, submarines (maybe) and ship-borne helicopters. With the notable exception of the ship-borne helicopters, the equipment on this shopping list has been acquired.

In his presentation, Commodore McNeil showed the Committee a chart illustrating the remaining life of some major equipment, from the Sea King helicopter and ILTIS jeep (none), to the Aurora, Hercules and CF 18 Fighter aircraft, the Leopard Tank, etc. (25-50 percent) and to the new and “nearly new,” such as the Victoria submarines and Halifax Class and Kingston Class vessels, the Griffon helicopter, and the LAV armoured personnel carriers, etc. (75-100 percent). To fund the purchase of new equipment the department’s planning places a heavy emphasis on finding ways to dedicate more of the budget to capital expenditures than the present \$2.1 billion of \$11.4 billion.<sup>(36)</sup>

Witnesses noted that the status of the equipment of the Navy and Army is generally regarded as quite good, largely because these services received a large quantity of new capital equipment in the years prior to the funding cutbacks of the mid 1990s. The naval forces assigned to Operation Apollo, for example, are totally integrated into the United States carrier battle groups. The Navy, however, continues to rely on the Air Force Sea King helicopter squadrons whose replacement has been delayed for more than a decade. 443 Squadron, for example, is supposed to have 6 Sea King helicopters to support Maritime Forces Pacific, but

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(36) *Ibid.*, Issue 1, 18 July 2001.

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none are available. Because of its age and the way its electronics were designed and installed, the Sea King requires 30 hours of maintenance for every hour of flight.<sup>(37)</sup>

According to Vice-Admiral Ron Buck, Chief of the Maritime Staff, DND, the first priority of the Navy is to replace the two 30 year old replenishment ships, HMCS *Protecteur* and HMCS *Preserver*. The Navy hopes to build in some sealift capacity as well as to reduce the crew requirement to roughly half of the 265 crew required to man the existing vessels. The Navy must also plan to replace the command and control and the anti-warfare capability of the 4 Tribal class destroyers, but this will not necessarily entail a hull-for-hull replacement. Although the 1970s era destroyers and 1990s frigates are roughly the same size, the former are crewed by about 330 and the latter by 225, the difference being due to their respective technology.<sup>(38)</sup>

Colonel Peters testified that the Army's most urgent need is to acquire better ISTAR capability – intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance.<sup>(39)</sup> The Air Force supports the Army with one of its most up-to-date platforms, the Griffon helicopter which it intends to modify by installing a system that will provide it with a surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting capability, thus helping to meet the Army priorities. As modified, it will complement the strengths of the Coyote reconnaissance vehicle and contribute much more to land operations.<sup>(40)</sup>

Senior departmental officials noted that most of the Canadian Forces equipment that is in need of outright replacement or major modernization to extend its life belongs to the Air Force. In her recent report and in her appearance before the Committee, the Auditor-General, Ms. Sheila Fraser, was outspoken. The statistics developed for the audit indicate that the equipment owned by the Army is in good shape, and the Navy is holding its own but faces a “bow wave” of deferred work on the frigates that could cause availability, life expectancy and cost problems in the future. The Air Force equipment is deteriorating and in general decline: annual flying hours for the Sea King, Hercules and Aurora have all

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(37) Notes from visit in Vancouver, Victoria and Winnipeg, *Proceedings*, Issue 12, 18 February 2002.

(38) *Proceedings*, Issue 9, 10 December 2001.

(39) *Ibid.*, Issue 1, 18 July 2001.

(40) Lieutenant-General Lloyd Campbell, Commander of Air Command and Chief of the Air Staff, *Proceedings*, Issue 8, 3 December 2001.

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steadily eroded over the past five years. Except for the Griffon helicopter, aircraft availability is low – ranging from 30-60 percent – and falling while the incidence of mission aborts is increasing. The supply system can rarely meet urgent demands, and there is a shortage of maintenance personnel: overall, 13 percent of maintenance positions are vacant, and 15 percent are filled by personnel who are not fully trained for their rank. Almost 40 percent of the training required to do specific jobs in individual units has not been taken.<sup>(41)</sup>

According to Lieutenant-General Lloyd Campbell, Commander of Air Command and Chief of the Air Staff, the delay in deciding on a replacement for the Sea King will virtually ensure that at least some of them will have to remain in service beyond their current life expectancy of 2005. Thus the Air Force is evaluating what would have to be done to extend their airworthiness and safety for a further five years to 2010.<sup>(42)</sup> A \$1 billion modernization project will upgrade 80 of the newest F-18 fighter aircraft and bring them to the same capability as those in service with the United States Navy and Marine Corps. (Initial investments have already been made in a possible replacement for the F-18, an international project to develop an affordable, stealthy, multi-role fighter aircraft, the “joint strike fighter.”) The Aurora maritime surveillance aircraft will also undergo a major upgrade over the next decade to provide them with new avionics and sensor systems.

Lt.Gen. Campbell told the Committee that the fleet of Hercules, the backbone of tactical air mobility and tactical air-to-air re-fuelling capacity is aging, but no decision has been made about replacing them. The fleet of 5 Polaris, a militarized version of the Airbus 310, gives the Air Force a limited strategic airlift capacity, and once two are modified for air-to-air refuelling, a strategic air-to-air refuelling capacity. But the Polaris is not a true strategic airlifter able to move bulky equipment long distances and it is restricted to well prepared and maintained runways. As a result, he argued that the Air Force urgently requires a true strategic airlift capability if it is to deploy military forces and their equipment abroad and to respond to domestic disasters and humanitarian crises.<sup>(43)</sup>

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(41) *Proceedings*, Issue 9, 10 December 2001.

(42) *Proceedings*, Issue 8, 3 December 2001.

(43) *Ibid.*

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A senior officer told the Committee that the Air Force is generally satisfied with how contracting out of pilot training has worked. Bombardier supplies everything, including food and housing, as well as aircraft, simulators and software. The training is considered world class and many NATO pilots come to Canada for training. Contracting out the maintenance of the Radar sites has also seemed to work.

Contracting out the servicing of aircraft is a different matter because the Air Force must be able to service and maintain the aircraft when they are deployed abroad. In general, contracting out reduces flexibility – the contract workers and technicians cannot be assigned other tasks in an emergency or when under-occupied, and cannot be asked to work overtime except at punitive rates.<sup>(44)</sup>

According to the Auditor General, “outsourcing” or the Alternative Service Delivery Program has not provided the savings expected: \$200 million by 2000. That is partially because budget cutbacks reduced expenditures after the mid 1990s, but also because some contracts were ill-advised or poorly drafted. DND now hopes to save \$150 million by 2004.<sup>(45)</sup> Contracting out may relieve some of the burden of training specialists.

Lt. General Christian Couture, Assistant Deputy Minister (Human Resources) DND, told the Committee that long periods of time are required to train military personnel: 18 months to train a recruit; four additional years to train highly skilled personnel like a fire control systems technician; 2-5 years to train a junior officer. The Forces are therefore hoping to make greater use of civilian educational institutions. Civilian universities already provide much of the education required by junior officers through the Regular Officer Training Program, the Reserve Entry Officer Training Program, and the Reserve Entry Scheme Officer Training. Now the forces are turning their attention to the technical training offered by community colleges. Graduates of some courses can earn credit for much of the content of their courses, which make it easier to quickly master military technology and requirements after recruit training. The military is also exploring the possibility of having some colleges design and deliver technical courses to recruits or to supply the instructors for military courses.

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(44) Notes from visit in Vancouver, Victoria and Winnipeg, *Proceedings*, Issue 12, 18 February 2002.

(45) *Proceedings*, Issue 9, 10 December 2001. Testimony of the Auditor General.

## **Security Issues**

### **8. Human Resources and Equipment**

The Committee learned that budget restrictions have compromised the ability of both the RCMP and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service to keep themselves at the forefront of technological change. In addition, many investigations are dropped or not pursued aggressively because of a shortage of trained personnel. Many witnesses, however, were reluctant to give details or to speak for attribution.

Norman Inkster, former Commissioner of the RCMP, told the Committee that over the seven years he was Commissioner, the RCMP budget was cut by \$400-\$500 million and staff was cut from 21,000 to 20,000. Budget cuts and staff have been restored in the years since. In his opinion, however, the Government of Canada must analyse the threat at hand, determine the resources required to meet that threat in a way that Canadians are adequately protected, and then fund and equip the responsible agencies well enough to do the job.<sup>(46)</sup> Serving police officers would only admit to the Committee in general terms that they could always use additional personnel and equipment. But when the government asked what the RCMP needed to combat terrorism following 11 September, the RCMP quickly put together a list of \$50 million of equipment.<sup>(47)</sup> Professor Wesley Wark testified that both the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Communications Security Establishment had to upgrade their technology and that all of Canada's security organizations required additional funding.<sup>(48)</sup>

### **9. Access to Encryption and Cryptography Equipment**

Senior security officials told the Committee that the relatively unrestricted public availability of sophisticated encryption/cryptography equipment and

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(46) *Proceedings*, Issue 3, 1 October 2001

(47) *Proceedings*, Issue 3, 1 October 2001.

(48) *Proceedings*, Issue 3, 1 October 2001



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programs threatens to neuter an essential source of intelligence about the activities of spies, terrorists and criminals. The use of sophisticated devices of this type by non-police users has complicated and frustrated investigations; it has also led to heavy police expenditures on the development of counter-measures.

Mr. D'Avignon, Director General, National Security Directorate, testified that lawful surveillance of suspect communications is an essential tool in combating terrorism and organised crime. Protection of the public from acts of terrorism is balanced on a case-by-case basis with rights of citizens in applying intrusive methods under "lawful access".<sup>(49)</sup> Police methodology, however, is being eroded by illicit use of counter-technology. The rapid increase in the number of telecommunications equipment and service providers has made it more difficult to monitor communications. So has the practice of replacing the use of lined phones with cell phones and then disposing of cell phones quickly.

Superintendent Pilgrim testified that new technologies are harming lawful police surveillance. Local number portability allows customers to keep the same number when they change addresses. Personal communication systems (cell phones, pagers, palm pilots) are digital and more difficult to penetrate. Satellite communications have a global reach. The Internet is increasingly being used by criminals for communication. Criminals have begun using cryptography codes that are almost impossible to decipher. Cyber-terrorism has become a threat to public confidence in computer systems and computerized financial transactions.<sup>(50)</sup>

### **10. Threat of Man-made Environmental Disasters**

There is an increasing threat of national disaster caused by foreign powers or terrorists. The continuing collapse of the industrial infrastructure in countries that once constituted the Soviet Union raises the spectre of nuclear accidents caused by the "rust out" of nuclear facilities, equipment or weapons. Another wave of terrorist attacks in North America could result in the release of toxic bacteriological or chemical agents into the atmosphere.

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(49) *Proceedings*, Issue 2, 19 July 2001

(50) *Ibid.*,

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Superintendent Pilgrim told the Committee that the RCMP has co-operated with the Department of National Defence to form a joint biological and chemical response team located at Base Borden outside Toronto. This team has access to the resources of the Defence Research Establishment at Suffield, Alberta. Wherever possible RCMP bomb disposal experts partner with the hazardous material teams of local fire departments.<sup>(51)</sup>

### **11. Control of Ports and Borders**

Witnesses indicated that tightening control over air and seaports, border crossings and the border itself has become vitally important to campaigns against international terrorism and international crime. The Committee considered the inherent contradiction between the economic need for the free flow of goods and persons across borders, and the need for greater security.

Superintendent Pilgrim did not agree with the perception that Canada has become a safe haven for terrorists and criminals. The RCMP has a very good relationship with its U.S. counterparts, including the FBI and other policing agencies at the federal, state and local levels. It also has good working relationships with the police forces of the United Kingdom and other European Countries. In Canada, the RCMP works hand-in-hand with local policing authorities with jurisdiction over ports. It also conducts independent criminal investigations.

The conundrum over security is that although Canada is less a target for terrorists than the United States, if Canada does not provide an adequate level of security at its borders, the United States is likely to take arbitrary measures to ensure continental security. Sharing information and intelligence and engaging in joint U.S.-Canadian police exercises helps Canada's credibility on this issue. In response to a question about the decision to disband the federal police force that used to patrol Canada's ports and to devolve responsibility to local jurisdictions, Superintendent Pilgrim noted that elimination of port police had been a political

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(51) *Proceedings*, Issue 2, 19 July 2001

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decision, and creation of any new regime will also have to be a political decision.<sup>(52)</sup>

In Vancouver and Halifax, the Committee met with the local officials of the union that represents customs officers. The officers believe that the Customs Agency is understaffed and that during peak periods in the summer it is too dependent on inadequately trained students. Staff shortages have led to a reduction in the number of containers inspected and in the size of “rummaging parties” sent aboard vessels to interview crew and conduct searches. Since a single officer is much more at risk, the union believes no inspection team of fewer than two persons should be sent on board a vessel – even a fishing boat or pleasure craft.

Customs officers told the Committee they could do a better and more efficient job with better equipment. Their computer network is considered inefficient because it does not give them all the information necessary to “target” inspections or passengers. Officers do not have terminals in their vehicles and have to return to their offices to get information and file reports. They see a need for more state-of-the-art technology to allow them to inspect a higher percentage of containers and baggage. Customs facilities are inadequate at some of the locations at which they work, particularly the terminal for cruise ships in Vancouver.

At the Vancouver airport, officers feel they have increasingly been asked to do potentially dangerous work for which they have received little or no training – for example, to interview potentially violent passengers and to search baggage for explosives and chemical or bacteriological agents. They want more training and better personal equipment.<sup>(53)</sup>

In Halifax, union representatives testified that neither summer students nor term employees are adequately trained. As a minimum, full-time officers have to pass a demanding 8-week course with additional 2-4 week modules to learn a speciality involving travellers, mail or commercial goods. After a training period of just two weeks, however, students are allowed to carry out almost a full range of Customs Officer duties. The union said the security of the country is also placed at risk by the lack of adequate immigration training. Customs Officers act as Canada’s front-line immigration officers, either clearing travelers or referring them

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(52) *Ibid.*, Issue 2, 19 July 2001

(53) Notes from visit in Vancouver, Victoria and Winnipeg, *Proceedings*, Issue 12, 18 February 2002.

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to immigration officers. A large number of small and remote posts, however, have no immigration officer on duty, so a customs officer must handle the job. In his April 2000 report, the Auditor General warned that fully 60 percent of customs officers had not received immigration training.

In Halifax, union representatives noted that, beginning in 2000, customs officers increasingly have been mandated to enforce some provisions of the Criminal Code. For instance, they are instructed to detain and arrest drunk drivers, child abductors, and persons driving stolen cars. Many small and remote border posts are staffed by just one customs officer. At the other extreme, the threat of violence is omnipresent at major border crossings and international airports. Police backup is not always immediately available. As a result, the union representatives want at least some customs officers to be given access to firearms.<sup>(54)</sup>

Ms. Sheila Fraser, Auditor General of Canada, told the Committee that the Ambassador Bridge in Windsor, where approximately 6,000-7,000 trucks pass each day, about one-third of the trucks are sent for secondary inspection to a site almost 2 km away. Very few are escorted. In general, customs operations are impeded by a poor exchange of information and a lack of sufficient information to adequately assess the risk posed by a shipment or individual.<sup>(55)</sup>

## 12. Airports

### A) Montreal (Dorval) Airport

Staff Sergeant Charles Castonguay told the Committee that the RCMP mandate at airports focuses on the activities of organized crime and enforcement of the federal laws dealing with contraband, drugs, illegal migrants, Agriculture Canada, the proceeds of crime, copyright and patents, controlled substances, etc. There are RCMP organized crime units at the largest international airports. The

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(54) Notes from visit in Halifax and Fredericton, *Proceedings*, Issue 12, 18 February 2002.

(55) *Proceedings*, Issue 9, 10 December 2001

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biggest units, with staffs of 40 police officers, are based in Toronto and Montreal, with a 20-person unit based in Vancouver. The organized crime units include officials from other federal government departments. The Montreal unit includes: 40 police; one criminal intelligence analyst; one prosecutor; one food inspector; one Customs intelligence officer; and, one immigration officer. Special equipment at the airport includes an X-ray truck and an ion scanner, which allow authorities to search for contraband, explosives and drugs in baggage and parcels without opening them.<sup>(56)</sup>

Mr. Pierre-Paul Pharand, Acting Vice-President of the Airport Authority, testified that, despite tightened security following the 11 September attacks in the United States, two major problems remain: control of restricted area passes (while employees needing a pass are subject to a background check, a pass could be obtained even by those with a criminal record), and screening of passengers and baggage.

Mr. Pharand said that the Airport Authority is responsible for all security except screening passengers and baggage, a task which the airlines contract out to a private security firm. The best and quickest way of improving airport security would be to make Airport Authorities responsible for screening. Under the Airport Authority security officers could do screening one day, traffic control the next, and then other inside work. Rotation would ensure that the staff on screening duty was more alert. In Quebec the pay for security officers is \$11.00/hr, considerably more than the \$7.00 paid in Ontario. More interesting work and better pay would help reduce staff turnover.

Mr. Pharand believed that Transport Canada should not be responsible for both regulating air safety and screening passengers and baggage. An Airport Authority would find it much easier to discipline or fire security officers who fell down on the job. Costs of increased security should be incorporated into the price of airline tickets.

According to Mr. Pharand, security screening of all workers on the airside of the barriers is carried out by the RCMP and the Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) at the request of Transport Canada. The RCMP and CSIS report back to Transport Canada, which then decides whether or not to issue a pass. All told

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(56) Notes from visit in Montreal, *Proceedings*, Issue 12, 18 February 2002.

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about 40-50 people are involved in the control of passes. There are two kinds of passes: blue for access to restricted areas inside, and, red for access to outside security areas. At any one time there are about 15,000 –17,000 passes in circulation, including some that have been lost by employees, or that have not been surrendered by employees upon leaving their jobs.

Mr. Pharand noted, however, that passes now incorporate a security feature. The chip in the pass that allows the holder to proceed through locked doors can be de-activated. Employers with high rates of staff turnover can only obtain short-term passes.

In Pharand's opinion, control of those who work in the vicinity of aircraft is still too weak. Conditions for passes should be made more strict. Passes should only be given to workers if they agree to be subjected to random searches on entering or leaving a restricted area.

The representatives of both the Montreal Urban Police and the Sûreté du Québec praised the level of co-operation and co-ordination which exists among the three police forces. A RCMP Joint Task Force led to improved co-ordination, establishing the responsibility of each of the three forces in the event of different incidents/emergencies.

The local district of the Montreal Urban Police began to assign officers to patrol inside and outside air terminals when the RCMP withdrew from such policing in 1996. They enforce non-federal laws; the most common offences being possession of forbidden items and making threats. The role of the Sûreté du Québec is quite limited. It attaches six officers to the RCMP Organized Crime Task Forces at the Dorval and Mirabel Airports and at the Port of Montreal. It also is responsible for patrolling the local highways leading to the airports and docks.<sup>(57)</sup>

### **B) Vancouver Airport**

Craig Richmond, Vice-President of Airport Operations, Vancouver International Airport, noted that the Airport Authority already is responsible for

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(57) Notes from visit in Montreal, *Proceedings*, Issue 12, 18 February 2002.

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most aspects of airport security. It hires a private security company to control access to restricted areas and to patrol these areas. It also contracts with the Richmond RCMP to respond to security incidents and provide armed response when required at passenger screening points.

It was logical and desirable, according to Mr. Richmond, that the Airport Authority replace the airlines in the area of passenger pre-board screening, acting as the agent of the Government of Canada. The Vancouver Airport Authority wants to see establishment of a national, non-profit government industry organization that will develop and oversee national standards for technology, training and delivery of passenger pre-board screening. It would also oversee the management of pre-board screening at smaller airports. Mr. Richmond said this would provide the following benefits:

- a. unity of command among airport security officials and staff – all would report and be responsible to the Airport Authority;
- b. more varied and interesting work for security staff because they would rotate between pre-board screening, patrolling restricted areas inside and outside the terminal, and monitoring the closed-circuit television system;
- c. better pay, benefits and promotion opportunities for those doing pre-board screening as part of an integrated airport security force, whose higher rate of pay would reduce the very high turnover rate among those doing pre-board screening;
- d. local accountability within the bounds of a national standard.

The RCMP is responsible for enforcing federal law at the Vancouver airport. Their local Richmond detachment, under contract, is responsible for policing the airport.

Inspector Jim Begley outlined the organization and responsibilities of the organized crime unit at the airport. In 1999 it was given 20 new uniformed positions. It now integrates the work previously carried out by a number of sub-units active at the airport. With a combined strength of 47, its mandate is to enforce federal laws and disrupt the activities of organized crime. In its first year of existence, the unit has concentrated on developing intelligence sources and information banks on the activities of organized crime at the airport. It has begun a

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counter-offensive against the smuggling of humans into the country, as well as drug trafficking through the airport. The Vancouver airport is a major transfer point between Asia, the United States and other parts of Canada for both drugs and large amounts of cash being moved without legal explanation.

Inspector Tonia Enger, RCMP Richmond Detachment, briefed the Committee on the responsibilities of her detachment as the police force of jurisdiction. Under contract to the Airport Authority, her detachment provides general duty policing and is expected to respond to a call from a screening point in 5 minutes or less. As the responding police force, her officers co-operate with the RCMP stationed at the airport, but are not responsible to them.<sup>(58)</sup>

### **13. Ports**

#### **A) The Port of Montreal**

A senior officer of the RCMP (with the assistance of criminal intelligence officers from the RCMP, Canadian Customs and the Montreal Urban Community Police) briefed the Committee on the policing of the Port of Montreal. According to the officer, who the Committee agreed not to identify, the most important policing is done by the small Organized Crime Task Force staffed by officers of the RCMP, the Sûreté du Québec and the Montreal Urban Police. Otherwise, very little has been done to control crime since the Port Police unit was disbanded. Only Customs officers are now actively trying to prevent crime. The RCMP officer said that most criminal offences – theft of containers, theft of contents – were not being reported by companies to police. Hence there are no reliable public statistics on the magnitude of these crimes. Security guards, provided by a company hired by the Port Authority, are unarmed. They have no power of arrest nor intelligence capability. In his opinion, these companies are easier for organized crime to penetrate. The previous contracted company had links to the Hell's Angels.

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(58) Notes from visit in Vancouver, Victoria and Winnipeg, *Proceedings*, Issue 12, 18 February 2002.



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The police and other officers suggested several solutions to the problem of organized crime at the Port: (a) develop a better understanding of crime in the Port; (b) develop a better system of exchanging information and intelligence, both nationally and internationally; (c) conduct an in-depth study of crime at the Port; and, (d) investigate and arrest the leaders of criminal operations, many of whom work as checkers, or as inspectors, and even in security at the Port.

The police believe that union control over hiring, firing and assigning dock workers – stevedores and checkers -- must be ended. Checkers should not decide who unloads a particular container. The union which supplies dock workers is “closed” to outsiders; applicants must be sponsored by insiders, who are sometimes members of crime families and their friends. Hence it is very difficult to infiltrate. The police estimated that, at present, about 15 percent of stevedores have criminal records, as do 36.3 percent of checkers and fully 54 percent of the employees of a company with the contract to pick up garbage, do minor repairs and operate the tenders servicing ships moored in open water outside the harbour.

Control at exits from the Port should be strengthened by making the Port Authority re-establish check points to control truckers. The police testified that it is currently too easy for a dominant criminal gang on the docks to crowd a terminal in the early morning as a screen for the pick-up of contraband.<sup>(59)</sup>

### B) The Port of Vancouver

Unlike the Port of Montreal which has a continuous waterfront, the Port of Vancouver has separate locations for terminals handling bulk or loose cargo, cruise lines, container ships, etc. While responsibility for policing the Port of Vancouver is divided between a number of police jurisdictions, the Vancouver City Police is the most important of these. Representatives of the Port Authority told the Committee that they have relatively little responsibility for security at the Port. They said the Port Authority operates a system of closed circuit television cameras which monitor the various parts of the Port 24 hours a day, seven days a week. They testified that they have acquired a mobile scanner that can produce an image of the contents of a 40-foot container in about 40 seconds. Hence it is possible, in

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(59) Notes from visit to Montreal, 5-6 November 2001, *Proceedings*, Issue 12, 18 February 2002.

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theory, to screen 100 percent of the containers moving through the Port. They also noted that the Port Authority is paying \$250,000 a year for increased security patrols around the perimeters of the Port.

The Port Authority has established a small intelligence unit to co-ordinate the work of the eight municipal police forces with jurisdiction over Port territory. There is general satisfaction with the status quo, which is considered an improvement over the Port Police because there are more officers on patrol, and because they have a mandate beyond Port property.

The representatives of the Port Authority said they do not have any knowledge of organized crime activities at the Port. (Customs officials reported to the Committee that they are often subjected to intimidation as they inspect containers, and reported that the Hell's Angels is the dominant criminal influence within the Port.) The Port Authority representatives said that it subjects its own employees to security screening, but that it hires only 121 of the 27,000 persons working on Port property. Companies which lease Port property are free to screen or not screen their employees as they choose. The British Columbia Marine Employers Association hires and trains dock workers, but workers are dispatched to their assignments through a hiring hall. In conjunction with the private companies the Port Authority is, according to its representatives, trying to develop an identification card system common to all port employees.

The representatives told the Committee that the requirement under federal legislation that Port Authorities act on a strictly commercial basis may impede public security since the systematic checking of containers and cargo causes delays and irritates importers and exporters alike, and, since all parties have a financial interest in expediting traffic, security is deemed to be expensive and time-consuming. There was no consensus that making one authority responsible for Port security across Canada would be an improvement.

Policing arrangements at the Port were discussed with Deputy Chief John Unger of the Vancouver City Police and Inspector Doug Kilo, Major Case Manager, E Division Criminal Operations, R.C.M.P.

A large number of municipalities are involved in policing Port property, not to mention separate provincial and federal detachments of the R.C.M.P., departments and agencies, and private security companies. Consequently, there is

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seldom a clear division of responsibility. Nevertheless, the police officers who briefed the Committee were satisfied that policing was co-operative and effective, primarily because of:

- a. the formation of waterfront teams combining the various police forces and agencies, each of which contributes sources of information and intelligence to the combined effort;
- b. the private security company responsible for closed circuit monitoring of Port property functions as the eyes and ears of the teams; and,
- c. modern communications help to unite the various forces and agencies involved in Port security.

An Intelligence Analyst from the British Columbia Organized Crime Unit noted that all the elements of traditional organized crime had infiltrated the Port, as well as more modern threats such as Asian Triads, Russian Gangsters, and Narco-Terrorists. The range of criminal activity is assessed as much the same as at the Port of Montreal. Motorcycle gangs are active and visible, linking criminal activities in the eastern and western ports. The various elements of organized crime tend to have specialities, but they all participate in the import/export of illegal drugs as their most common and lucrative activity. Asian and Russian gangs export stolen luxury cars. Russian gangs are active among chandlers. Mexican and Columbian gangs are involved in narco-terrorism.

The police officers testified that policing crime in the Port is complicated because of the number of stakeholders, but effective co-operation on the ground compensate for the fragmentation. The witnesses opposed formation of a single authority to police all the Ports of Canada believing that it would lack flexibility. About five federal departments have to enforce laws or regulations in the Ports. They said each Port is different and a one-police-force-fits-all model would not be appropriate. The different inputs of the various police forces and agencies are both valuable and valid, and are worth the extra effort necessary to co-ordinate their work. They believed that Ports must have three-level policing to match the interests and responsibilities of the three levels of government at the Port that combines and utilizes the interests and expertise of the various forces. Waterfront teams include representatives from all the police forces.

In conclusion, the police briefers noted that federal and provincial

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expenditures on controlling organized crime were inadequate and completely disproportionate to the proceeds of crime. The \$4 million governments spend represents a minute fraction of one percent of the proceeds of crime. They believed that to ensure national security, governments need to prioritize bringing Canadian Ports up to the level of security that exists at major airports. At a minimum:

- a. employees must be security- screened, and access denied to those with relevant criminal records or known criminal associations;
- b. movement onto and off Port property must be better controlled; and,
- c. reporting of theft of containers and their contents to a central authority, must be made mandatory.

### **C) The Port of Halifax**

Representatives of the Port Authority told the Committee that following disbandment of the national Ports Canada Police, the Halifax Port Authority contracted with the Halifax Regional Police Service for an “enhanced policing service”. The contract calls for full- time patrols on Port property 24 hours a day and seven days a week, for a full-time police supervisor and for a full-time intelligence officer. The enhanced policing service is supplemented with a contract with a private security firm, staffing the Port security desk at all times.

The representatives of the Port Authority said they had implemented specific measures to deny terrorists and other criminal elements “soft” targets. There is a port-wide contingency plan, developed in conjunction with the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Coast Guard, to coordinate the emergency response to various situations, including bomb threats and other acts of terrorism. This plan is regularly reviewed and up-dated. Exercises are held to ensure smooth implementation. Other preventative measures include: surveillance cameras; a cruise vessel facility security plan to restrict unauthorized access; annual cruise vessel security exercises; evening foot patrols of the Cruise Pavilion and adjacent areas; special precautions for the handling of dangerous cargo; perimeter fencing around container terminals.

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The representatives of the Port Authority said they intend to institute a universal system of identity cards and to upgrade both the fencing and camera surveillance of Port property. The proposed identity cards will not be electronic. The Halifax Employers Association has a screening process for hiring new employees and the Halifax police will participate in the security checks of employees, but there will remain the problem of grand fathering existing workers. A New Security Working Committee has been formed. Unions will contribute to its work on an “as needed basis”. Through the Halifax Employers Association, the stevedoring companies hire, train and assign longshoremen and expeditors. Work assignments are made from a list of core workers with needed skills. The union hiring hall only provides additional workers. Like the Port Authorities of the Ports of Montreal and Vancouver, the Port Authority of Halifax denies any knowledge of organized crime activities on its property.

In his briefing to the Committee, Chief Superintendent Ian Atkins of the R.C.M.P. noted that container terminals are the favourite target of organized criminal activity. He said containers are an excellent way of moving contraband, because the vast majority move through the port without being checked by Customs officers. The major areas of criminal activity are the same in the Port of Halifax as in the Port of Montreal and the Port of Vancouver – drugs, stolen cars, tobacco and alcohol, theft of containers and/or their contents, and smuggling of human cargo. A senior police officer said that in Halifax, a sample of 500 longshoremen turned up 187, or 39 percent, with criminal records while in the Port of Charlottetown 28 of 51 (almost 54 percent) had criminal records. Through the biker gangs, organized crime had strong links to the major ports of Quebec, Ontario and British Columbia.

Representatives of the R.C.M.P. indicated that they must also monitor illegal activity in a large number of small ports scattered along the coast of Nova Scotia and the other Atlantic provinces (about 50% of illegal drugs make it to Canada via small boats, which land their contraband on remote beaches). To do this, the RCMP relies on a coastal watch – volunteers who report suspicious movements along the coast. In the future the R.C.M.P. believe they will once again be able to patrol the coast, because a patrol boat for this purpose is being built.

A senior officer of the Halifax Regional Police outlined the contribution of his men to the security of the port. As mentioned above, his force is contracted to provide a detachment of eight police officers, a Staff Sergeant and an intelligence

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officer, to police the Port. To ensure that the 10 officers are always available, regardless of sickness and vacation, 20 have been trained to do the job. Good intelligence is critical to determine which of 250,000 containers to check. In his opinion, the Port needs Customs officers with better equipment to inspect containers. It also needs more police officers.

Jack Fagan, Regional Director of the Intelligence and Contraband-Customs for the Atlantic region, reviewed the mandate and responsibilities of his organization. Given the limited manpower of the Customs and Revenue Agency and the police, he said enforcement had to be intelligence driven, the authorities had to know which containers to inspect. According to his testimony, the Port of Halifax already meets the three percent national inspection standard. It is “de-stuffing”, or unloading, three percent of the containers flowing through the Port, exclusive of those containers subjected to “back-end” inspection.

Those responsible for policing the Port were united in their opinion that the current situation is an improvement over the era of the Port Police. The various policing and enforcement bodies had learned to co-operate and share intelligence. They were de-stuffing a higher percentage of containers than is the practice in either Montreal or Vancouver, or the ports of the eastern United States. Their priorities are to improve the targeting of containers for inspection, to acquire a site for de-stuffing and storing the contents of containers being inspected, and to accelerate the process of inspection.<sup>(60)</sup>

### **Issues Common to Defence and Security**

#### **14. Development of a National Security Policy**

The Committee learned that at present Canada does not have a specific National Security Policy that would place defence policy, foreign policy and internal security in context, and relate them to one another. While the constitutional division of powers represents a challenge, the time may have come

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(60) Notes from visit in Halifax and Fredericton, *Proceedings*, Issue 12, 18 February 2002.

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to develop and promote a national security policy that can be endorsed by all levels of government.

Mr. D'Avignon, Director General of the National Security Directorate, Department of the Solicitor General, testified that the Department of the Solicitor General is the lead ministry for public security, with statutory responsibility for national security (the Canadian Security Intelligence Service), policing (the RCMP) and law enforcement. It is responsible for co-ordinating the response to terrorist incidents. Its minister is the lead government spokesperson during any incident or threat. The National Security Directorate has three divisions: Security Policy; Counter-Terrorism and, Lawful Access.<sup>(61)</sup>

Brig. Gen. (Ret) David Jurkowski, former Chief of Staff for Joint Operations, told the Committee that Canada needs a national, centralized executive intelligence authority that sets priorities for national collection and analysis, has the means and ability to co-ordinate the efforts of all Canadian security organizations, and champions their needs. This body should be in charge of maintaining a centralized repository of national intelligence information that focuses on all aspects of Canadian security.<sup>(62)</sup>

Major Gen (Ret) Clive Addy, National Chair, Federation of Military and United Services Institutes of Canada, supported the conclusions of the Federation Paper, *Canada's Strategic Security 21*, which argues that Canada urgently needs a security strategy that would involve input from Foreign Affairs and International Trade, National Defence, the Solicitor General, Justice, Immigration, Finance, and other relevant departments. The National Security Strategy would be crafted by an independent panel of experts with a mandate to seek the maximum possible degree of "conversion" possible on issues essential to the security of Canada. The panel would report to Parliament. The Strategy would guide future foreign, defence and even financial policies. A national security office would be created to co-ordinate the Strategy at the national level.<sup>(63)</sup>

Douglas Bland, Chair, Defence Management Studies Program, School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, began his presentation by noting that the term

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(61) *Proceedings*, Issue 2, 19 July 2001.

(62) *Proceedings*, Issue 3, 1 October 2001

(63) *Ibid.*, Issue 4, 15 October 2001.

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“national security” could be defined so broadly as to be almost meaningless. In his opinion the definition used by the now closed National Defence College was a good compromise:

“The preservation of a way of life acceptable to Canadian people and compatible with the needs and legitimate aspirations of others. It includes freedom from military attack or coercion, freedom from internal subversion and freedom from the erosion of political, economic and social values that are essential to the quality of life.”

Professor Bland stated that a national security policy should concentrate on the means to mitigate threats and to address vulnerabilities at the same time. It is the nature of most threats to be diffuse and outside national control. They can be mitigated by traditional diplomatic tools such as negotiations, treaties, redress of legitimate grievances, etc. Vulnerabilities are much more concrete and susceptible to national policies.

He outlined the following elements that should be included in a national security policy:

- a. A statement of purpose -- that is, a clear description of what is to be secured, from what, from whom, etc.
- b. A statement of responsibilities including that of individual Canadians as well as various levels of government. This should clearly identify the federal authority accountable to Parliament for the management and direction of national security.
- c. Establishment of an effective national security system to coordinate the many agencies and departments across government and between governments. An important function of this system would be to centralize the collection and processing of information into intelligence. In his words: “You should collect broadly, analyze centrally, and then disseminate quickly from that source.”
- d. A general statement of the resources necessary to produce a national



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- security system.
- e. A statement of the need to coordinate and control national security planning at both the national and international levels. What is needed to combat single-minded, singly-commanded terrorist organizations is “an agile, centrally controlled properly resourced institution....”
  - f. A statement of continental security and perhaps a body something like the Permanent Joint Board on Defence which brings together M.P.'s, Senators and officials, from both the U.S. and Canada, to discuss the needs of defence.

According to Professor Bland, the Canadian Armed Forces' capabilities will continue to decline for the next 45 years, depending on the capacity in question regardless of how much additional funding they get. Military equipment will essentially be worn out in the next 7-10 years. He argued that “...building and maintaining an adequate national defence capability is part of a national security policy to deter, defend against, and defeat terrorists”.

In Canada, the government sets the amount available for defence and then tells the military to do as much as possible within that amount. In Australia, the government and its experts haggle over what is necessary. When consensus is reached, the government funds to that level.

While a Minister should be responsible for national security, Professor Bland did not feel this should be the responsibility of the Prime Minister's Office because the current crisis over terrorism was “not severe enough”. There are other high priority national policies to manage, he said, and it would be difficult to “sustain interest” over the long haul. What is needed is a minister “almost solely dedicated to the question of building a national security system: In my view, we are starting from almost nothing, and we will have to construct the policy, build a structure, bring the agencies together, try it out, run some tests and work for years to try to build this thing. That requires concentration by a Minister.”

In his opinion responsibility for building and managing and being accountable for the national security system ought to fall to the individual who has most of the resources for that already, that is, the Minister of National Defence. It would be appropriate, however, to appoint an Associate Minister of National Defence for operational security and to have then two voices in cabinet talking

about these issues.<sup>(64)</sup>

## **15. Countering National Threats, Terrorism, Asymmetric Threats, and Cyber Threats**

Mr. D'Avignon, Director General of the National Security Directorate, Department of the Solicitor General, is responsible for the national counter-terrorism plan which was approved in 1989. The Plan is subject to ongoing review; a fundamental two year review was completed in May 2000. It now includes, as a response to the Special Senate Committee on Security and Intelligence (1999), reference to nuclear, bacteriological, chemical and radiological threats. The primary threat is that new technology is giving terrorists a new versatility that challenges forces of order "to be constantly vigilant and to be fleet of foot".<sup>(65)</sup> Superintendent Pilgrim, Officer in Charge, National Security Investigations Branch, Criminal Intelligence Directorate, testified that under the National Security Act the RCMP is responsible for criminal investigations of national security offences while the Canadian Security Intelligence Service is responsible for collecting information and advising the government about threats to the security of Canada. Both are responsible for preventing, deterring and investigating potential threats.<sup>(66)</sup>

Professor Wesley Wark told the Committee that Canada faces an intelligence "crisis" because it lacks sufficient information gathering capacity and analytical capacity, combined with a "dysfunctional process for dissemination and usage of intelligence at the highest levels of government". The analytical weakness is particularly dangerous. Canada must seriously consider establishment of a cabinet level ministerial position responsible for intelligence and security. Privy Council Office Co-ordinators of Security and Intelligence normally serve as legal counsel to the cabinet as well, and consequently spend less than half their time on security and intelligence matters.<sup>(67)</sup>

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(64) *Ibid.*, Issue 6, 29 October 2001.

(65) *Proceedings*, Issue 2, 19 July 2001.

(66) *Ibid.*

(67) *Ibid.*, Issue 3, 1 October 2001.

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Mr. Harlick, Assistant Deputy Minister, Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness, DND, testified that this office is a civilian organization with a mandate to provide leadership on critical infrastructure protection and effective emergency management. It reports to the Associate Deputy Minister of Defence, Ms. Purdy. Depending on the funding the Office receives, its staffing will be in the order of 180-200 at full strength – now it is 110-120.<sup>(68)</sup>

Mr. Harlick went on to say that the successful Y2K campaign left the Office with a much better knowledge of critical infrastructures, as well as invaluable contacts with the provinces, foreign countries and private enterprise, particularly the banking, telecommunications and transportation sectors. Six critical sectors have been identified: energy and utilities; transportation; communications; safety (including nuclear and search and rescue); essential services (finance, food, health); and the government sector.

The Office must plan to counter a wide range of threats. These include natural threats (ice storms, floods weather warming, etc.); information technology (the internet is “immature, unsecured, and unstable,” while software is vulnerable to viruses, Trojan back doors, hacking programs, etc.); and traditional threats (i.e., crime, espionage, and terrorism revolutionized by technology). Mr. Harlick offered one illustration of the problem by pointing out that malicious attacks on systems and networks increased by 430 percent from 1999 to 2000, and will probably increase by another 525 percent in 2001. Cyber-warfare has already become part of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and part of political protests.

He noted that in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, the threat to Canadian infrastructure will increase. His reasons: the concentration of the population’s wealth in a small number of vulnerable areas; climate change; infrastructure aging; and more dependency on information technologies.

The current objective of this Office has five elements: to put the federal house in order by completing the inventory of critical infrastructure; to develop a monitoring and co-ordinating capability that is available 24 hours a day, seven days a week; to build creative and sustainable partnerships internationally,

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(68) *Ibid.*

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nationally and locally; to intensify education and awareness, research and development; and to enhance national operational capabilities.

Achievement of the objective will be complicated and time-consuming. In the United States 90 percent of critical infrastructure is not owned by the federal government. Probably roughly the same is true in Canada. Thus there is no magic bullet, the task is ongoing.

### **16. Inter-agency Cooperation and Shared Jurisdictions**

The Committee heard testimony that, in a federal system, the difficulties of international and inter-agency co-operation are often compounded by the requirement of co-operation and co-ordination in shared jurisdictions.

Mr. D'Avignon, referring to the co-operation of the RCMP, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection, told the Committee that he was satisfied that there is, in place, a "seamless organization that can act quickly and coherently anywhere in the country to a terrorist threat." The national counter terrorist plan sets out the "structure and functioning of the government's response to an incident."

The provinces are responsible for first response to every incident, whether it involves terrorists or hazardous materials, or both. Their role was integrated into the national plan after consultations. The Security Offences Act governs RCMP arrangements with local police. Agreements cover all provinces except Quebec, but the arrangements with Ontario and British Columbia are under review. The Act gives the RCMP responsibility for terrorist incidents, although a municipal or provincial force may make the first response.<sup>(69)</sup>

Mike Theilmann, Acting Director of the Counter-Terrorism Division in the Department of the Solicitor General, testified that the operational readiness program to acquaint local forces with plans for their jurisdiction is reinforced with seminars and tabletop exercises across the country. The Department contributes a component to the Incident Commanders Course at the Canadian Police College.

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(69) *Proceedings*, Issue 2, 19 July 2001.

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The Department of National Defence helps define threats/risks, participates in the national counter terrorism plan and sits on the interdepartmental policy advisory group. It also participates in all training and exercises and helps train first responders and police forces.<sup>(70)</sup>

James Corcoran, the former Deputy Director of Operations of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, testified that the Security Intelligence Service is frequently asked to send an officer to a border-crossing point to help Immigration conduct an interview. Most cases arise at major airports, or at the major border crossing points of south-western Ontario. The Security Intelligence Service also develops terrorist profiles for Immigration Officers to use when conducting interviews at its posts around the world. Its foreign-based liaison officers are available to conduct follow-up interviews as necessary.<sup>(71)</sup>

Professor Wark disagreed with the rather sanguine picture some other witnesses painted about the degree of co-ordination and co-operation among the various intelligence agencies. He compared the Canadian intelligence system to a set of separate intelligence silos, co-ordinated largely by the PCO. He argues that Canada needs a new organization to merge the silos into one.<sup>(72)</sup>

Gary Loepky, Deputy Commissioner, Operations, RCMP, told the Committee that following 11 September the government asked what the RCMP needed to respond to this new threat. The RCMP recommended formation of integrated national security enforcement teams, and integrated border enforcement teams. These teams would involve multi-disciplinary federal, provincial and municipal agencies to target individuals identified as posing a security threat who also carry out criminal acts, even if the latter are “low-level” and have no direct national security implications. He said that this would have led at least to the arrest of Ressay and some of the US attackers which would have disrupted their plotting and possibly led to more important information.

According to Deputy Commissioner Loepky, the RCMP also recommended formation of a financial action task force to track the movement of funds to and from terrorist organizations through individuals and charitable groups. This is

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(70) *Ibid.*

(71) *Proceedings*, Issue 3, 1 October 2001

(72) *Ibid.*

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essential to understanding the financing and maintenance of terrorist groups. Criminalization of these activities would encourage prosecutions. It would also promote greater discrimination in the causes supported by fundraisers.

Deputy Commissioner Loeppky said the RCMP sought funding for improved equipment, infrastructure and training from the government. The events of 11 September made “intelligence-driven policing” and national and international partnerships even more important, as much of modern terrorism is driven by events in the terrorists’ homeland, not in their country of adoption. The government gave the RCMP an additional \$59 million (an amount which was raised to \$576 million over six years by the budget). Almost the full \$50 million designated for equipment will be spent and the equipment will be in use by the end of the year. The \$9 million for additional staff has already led to the formation of new teams which became operative well before the end of 2001.

According to Deputy Commissioner Loeppky cooperation and integration is made much more difficult by the lack of standardized technology. Communications systems and computers frequently cannot talk to each other. It is also hampered by the need to trust partners with sensitive information. Much information emanating from foreign sources is only supplied with the agreement that it is not to be shared with third parties.<sup>(73)</sup>

Richard Fadden, Deputy Clerk, Counsel and Security, Intelligence Coordinator, Privy Council Office, outlined the four security/intelligence communities in Canada as follows:

- a. Foreign intelligence is focused on the capabilities, activities and intentions of foreign states, organizations and individuals with an impact on vital Canadian interests. The Communications Security Establishment works exclusively in foreign intelligence, but National Defence, Foreign Affairs, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), and others also contribute.
- b. Security intelligence is focused on activities that might threaten Canadian security – terrorism, espionage, etc. The Solicitor General, through CSIS,

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(73) *Proceedings*, Issue 5, 22 October 2001

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has the greatest responsibility, but National Defence and Foreign Affairs, as well as the RCMP, are also involved.

- c. Military intelligence – the tactical and strategic capabilities and intentions of foreign states and organizations – is basically the preserve of National Defence and the Canadian Forces. But Foreign Affairs, and the Solicitor General can contribute.
- d. Criminal intelligence – information about criminals and criminal organizations, how and why they commit crime – is the basic responsibility of the Solicitor General, through the RCMP and CSIS.

All these intelligence categories are dependent on the international exchange of information, as well as the exchange of information with each other, and with other federal, provincial and municipal authorities.

The Prime Minister has ultimate responsibility for national security; hence the location of the security intelligence co-ordinator in the Privy Council Office.

As Security Intelligence Coordinator, Richard Fadden has four categories of responsibility:

- a. Strategic Trend Analysis – to monitor the separate analyses for emerging or evolving trends that might impact on Canadian security;
- b. Setting National Priorities – to present intelligence priorities to ministers through the annual meeting of Ministers on Security and Intelligence;
- c. Horizontal Issues Management – to bring key players together to share ideas, best practices and problems;
- d. International Relations Management – to preserve and develop the essential relationship with Canada's intelligence partners; the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, and to cultivate other relationships through traditional diplomatic methods, such as exchanges, liaison officers, etc.

As Coordinator he depends on the Security and Intelligence Secretariat, which both provides a forum in which departments can discuss common problems and advises the Prime Minister and Cabinet on security/intelligence issues. His

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staff is actually very small.

On the policy or coordination side of the Security and Intelligence Secretariat, there are 20. Seven work on foreign intelligence issues, seven work on security issues, and six work on physical security issues. On the central assessment side, 29 work for the Intelligence Assessment Secretariat to produce daily assessments for senior decision makers, a weekly assessment for the PCO and regular assessments for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Fadden outlined the Security and Intelligence Committee structure of the Government from the top down:

- The Ministerial Meeting on Security and Intelligence, chaired by Prime Minister, meets once a year to set priorities;
- The Cabinet Committee on Social Union, or an *ad hoc* committee such as the Ad Hoc Committee of Ministers on Public Security and Anti-Terrorism, can make decisions when security and intelligence involves broader social policy issues;
- The Interdepartmental Committee on Security and Intelligence (ICSI), chaired by the Clerk of the Privy Council, includes the Deputy Heads of the sectors, departments and agencies and is the main executive forum that reviews major policy issues before they go to ministers. Its Executive Subcommittee, chaired by the Coordinator, meets more frequently, and consists of the Deputy Ministers of the core intelligence departments, plus the Department of Justice;
- The Intelligence Policy Group, meeting bi-weekly chaired by the head of the Privy Council Office Security and Intelligence Secretariat, and including the Assistant Deputy Ministers of the intelligence community and the Department of Justice, is the principal intelligence policy coordination forum.

In reply to a comment that Canada is regarded as an intelligence “free-loader” by its closest intelligence allies, Mr. Fadden argued that while security/intelligence budgets were cut to provide a peace dividend and to reduce the deficit, since the 2000 budget \$1.5 billion has been re-allocated and much of the \$250 million announced since 11 September also supports security and



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intelligence: “It is not how we respond to this crisis in two or three months, but our actions in the coming three years or six years that is key.” In his opinion security/intelligence budgets should not be given blanket increases, but the object should be to identify specific gaps and problem capacities and fund solutions. 11 September had showed up some problem areas, particularly the need for more standard operating procedures to speed up the flow of information/intelligence in a crisis.

One of the tasks of the Ad Hoc Committee of Ministers on Public Security and Anti-Terrorism, chaired by the Honourable John Manley P.C., is to evaluate the machinery and legislation in the security/intelligence field and advise the Prime Minister on whether more centralization is needed.<sup>(74)</sup>

### 17. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) Mandate

The Committee learned that the operations of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service are basically limited to the collection of intelligence in Canada. Except for the investigation of immigration cases, it lacks the resources to routinely operate in foreign countries.

James Corcoran, the former Deputy Director of Operations of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, testified that under the existing Act the Security Intelligence Service has the power to operate in foreign countries in discharge of its mandate to investigate threats to the security of Canada. Its primary mandate, of course, is domestic. A foreign intelligence service could be established as a separate unit in CSIS through the simple elimination of the words “within Canada” from section 16 of the CSIS Act. A former Commissioner of the RCMP agreed that if it is decided to establish a foreign intelligence capacity, it should be incorporated into CSIS, rather than delegated to a separate agency.

Wesley Wark argued that, notwithstanding the accuracy of Corcoran’s remarks, Canada does not have a true foreign secret service capacity, which it needs if only to maintain an independent role in the global intelligence business and to keep its place at the allied intelligence table. In his opinion, over the past

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(74) *Proceedings*, Issue 6, 29 October 2001

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years Canada has let what foreign information gathering capacity it had deteriorate. In his opinion:

- The communications security establishment needs both the resources to upgrade its technology and more political attention;
- The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade has severely reduced its capacity to report on the politics of foreign countries;
- The Department of National Defence needs more resources for military intelligence, particularly for additional analytical experts.

This testimony came before the announcement of additional resources for security in the recent budget. “The first line of defence against terrorism”, said Dr. Wark, “is intelligence”. In his opinion, improved intelligence can once again be used to help Canada influence the decisions of allies, as was the case during World War II and the Cold War.

In response to the claim that more resources would have to be allocated to military intelligence if Canada is to remain a member in good standing of the allied intelligence community, General Jurkowski, the recently retired Chief of Staff for Joint Operations of the Canadian Armed Forces, acknowledged that, as a member of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (which links Canada and the United States), he often had the feeling that he was considered “the Canadian freeloader.” He did not have intelligence of equal value to offer in exchange for the intelligence he was seeking.

In Professor Wark’s opinion, the budget of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service should be increased. He told the Committee that a decision to develop an overseas intelligence capability would add an additional and large expense to the budget of CSIS and would take a decade to produce results. He believes that reform of the security and intelligence agencies should be both internal to the agencies and external. It could be carried out by a Parliamentary committee, issuance of a White Paper, or creation of a Royal Commission. The

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process, in his opinion, has to be open to debate and understanding and led by a supportive Prime Minister to ensure that there is change.<sup>(75)</sup>

Major General Maisonneuve, Assistant Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff outlined three priorities in strengthening military intelligence:

- a. Enhance the human, as opposed to the technological, collection of intelligence, by training more personnel in the collection of intelligence from human sources;
- b. Enhance the analytical capability of the Forces to deal with the ever increasing volume of information, by hiring more analysts and by forming partnerships with outside cultural, academic, etc. experts; and,
- c. Establish an “information fusion centre” that will receive feeds from all collection assets and analyse the information.<sup>(76)</sup>

Gary Loeppky, Deputy Commissioner of Operations of the RCMP, agreed that sometimes it would be useful to have an off-shore intelligence capability, since much of terrorism is driven by homeland politics. In most cases, however, Canada can already get the information necessary from partnerships with foreign agencies. Canadian analysis of information collected abroad, however, might be valuable.<sup>(77)</sup>

### 18. The Washington Fact-Finding Trip

The fact-finding trip of the Committee to Washington D.C., during the first week of February, gave the Committee unprecedented access to the Congressional committees and Administration officials responsible for defence and security. Unquestionably, part of the reason for this degree of access was Canada’s supportive response to the attacks of 11 September<sup>(78)</sup>. The members of the Committee took a strong message to their American hosts:

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(75) *Proceedings*, Issue 3, 1 October 2001.

(76) *Proceedings*, Issue 5, 22 October 2001.

(77) *Proceedings*, 22 October 2001.

(78) Notes from visit to Washington D.C., *Proceedings*, Issue 12, 18 February 2002.

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- First, the government and people of Canada consider the attacks on New York and Washington to have been an attack on North America.
- Second, contrary to some media reports and the opinions expressed by a few members of Congress, Canada and the Canadian border are not part of the security problems of the United States, but part of the solution. Even before 11 September, the security of the Canadian side of the border compared favourably with the security of the United States side. Since then, the Canadian Government has poured additional resources into at least the non-military elements of security, and has proven its determination to intensify cross-border co-operation as symbolized by the 30 point action plan to create a “smart” border.
- Third, the Committee strongly promoted Canadian energy resources, gas, oil and hydro, as an important element of U.S. and North American security.

Not surprisingly, the issues of U.S. and North American security dominated the Committee’s discussions in Washington. While the Committee received many expressions of thanks for Canadian friendship and support, it also received many expressions of concern about the failure of the NATO allies of the United States in general, and Canada in particular, to devote enough of their resources to the modernization of their armed forces.

Members of the United States Senate and House Committees on both Intelligence and the Armed Forces expressed a strong interest in developing a permanent, binational, committee-to-committee relationship that would help sensitize the committees of each country to the political realities faced by the other.

During these discussions the Committee also found it necessary to deliver two rather pointed messages about the common campaign against terrorism.

- In the Committee’s view, Canadian public opinion was not reacting favourably to the perceived United States treatment of Taliban and Al Qaeda prisoners.
- Secondly, Canadians had received no information that would favour expansion of the war to any of the countries of the so-called “Axis of Evil”.

When the point was made that these issues were of political concern in

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Canada, several members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives immediately indicated that they understood that our statements were a reflection of the Canadian political reality.

### **19. NORAD and the Proposed Homeland Defence Command**

The North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) continues to be essential to North American air defence and to the security of Canadian and United States air space. According to a briefing before the visit to Washington from Lieutenant General George Macdonald, Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, DND, since 11 September NORAD has flown over 10,000 sorties. It has expanded its focus to include suspicious activities in the air space, both within Canada and the United States, rather than focus almost exclusively on aircraft approaching the North American air space. It is working more closely with civilian air traffic control organizations in both countries to secure their respective air space.<sup>(79)</sup>

Canada renewed the NORAD agreement as recently as May 2001 because it continues to be one of the key aspects of the Canada-United States defence structure. It incorporates a command- and- control framework, a pattern for coordinated action and an integrated military headquarters. Most important, it has a bi-national command structure that respects the sovereignty of both countries; it thus provides a successful and proven pattern for coordinated action, including military plans and rules of engagement.

The United States Department of Defence is now in the final stages of developing a plan for Presidential and Congressional approval that would establish a commander-in-chief for homeland defence and complement the civilian homeland defence structure responsible to Governor Ridge. This raises the critical issue of the relationship of NORAD to the proposed homeland defence command. In the view of General Macdonald, it is essential that NORAD not become a subordinate command in such a way as to weaken the command and control of the

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(79) *Proceedings*, Issue 10, 28 January 2002.

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Canadian Chief of Defence Staff over the Canadians and Canadian Air Force units integrated into NORAD's structure.<sup>(80)</sup>

During its trip to Washington at the beginning of February, the Committee had an opportunity to discuss the future of NORAD and a possible Canadian role in the homeland defence command with officials of the United States Administration and members of both the Senate and House Armed Forces Committees.

The Canadian Senate Committee opened these discussions by asking for a clear description of the proposed new homeland defence command. It then asked how Canada might fit in. The members of the Senate and House Committees did not have the details of northern command and could not comment on Canada's role. The discussions with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and officials of the Department of State, the Department of Defence and the National Security Council filled in some of the details about the architecture of the plan.

At each of these meetings, members of the Canadian Senate posed two questions.

- a. How will the CINC North function?
- b. How did they view Canada's participation?

Secretary Rumsfeld told the Committee that he planned to proceed and establish the new command by 1 October 2002, but that he had not taken the plan for the new command to the President. After obtaining the approval of the President, he had to consult Congress. Then he hoped to begin consultations with Canada and Mexico.

In describing the new command, which he referred to as "CINC NORTH", Secretary Rumsfeld said it would include a geographical area from the North Pole to Panama and about 200 miles off each coast.

He told the Committee that no decision had been made about the location of the new command, but it was clear the officer in command (a four star General) would have to work closely with Governor Ridge. Secretary Rumsfeld commented

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(80) *Ibid.*

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that the new command would have a relatively small staff and few permanent assets – other commands would serve as “force generators” as required.

When asked about Canada’s involvement, Secretary Rumsfeld commented that NORAD was already in place. The Treaty had just been renewed. He said he was very aware of the importance of maintaining the direct links from the Commander of NORAD to the Canadian command structure as well as the American command structure.

He said that Americans were pleased with the way NORAD functioned and assumed that Canadians were as well. He then said he would welcome similar Canadian participation with both the sea and the land elements, but that it would be up to Canadians to determine whether it was in their national interest to participate in either or both. He indicated that Canada and the United States had a long history of cooperation, and that he would be happy with whatever decision Canada made.

Essentially the same position was put forward by the officials of the Department of State, the Department of Defense and the National Security Council.

Since no concrete proposal had yet been laid before the President the members of the Canadian Senate Committee did not comment, other than to note that the Canadian government would receive the proposals with interest.

### **20. NATO Enlargement**

NATO enlargement will alter the nature of the alliance and have an as yet undetermined impact on Canadian defence and security policy. According to Dr. Kenneth Calder, Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy), DND, the enlargement of NATO, like its growing emphasis on peacekeeping, proves its ability to evolve in tune with the international situation and continues to make the alliance relevant. The invocation of Article 5 of the Treaty following 11 September proved its ability

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to respond quickly to an attack on North America, thus emphasising that it exists to defend North America as well as Europe.<sup>(81)</sup>

Jill Sinclair, Director General of the International Security Bureau of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, noted that Canada has always been one of the strongest supporters of enlargement, believing that this is the best way to extend the zone of stability and security in Europe. She then reviewed the countries seeking admission: the three Baltic countries (Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania), two parts of the former Yugoslavia (Macedonia and Slovenia) and the countries of Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia.

She commented upon NATO's Membership Action Plan, which sets out guidelines for the admission of new members, addresses not only issues of military capability, but also human rights standards, and political, economic and social issues. This May, the NATO foreign ministers will receive progress reports on each of the nations seeking membership.

According to the U.S. Department of State officials who briefed the Committee, President Bush is committed to a "robust" expansion at the Prague summit in November 2002 as part of a wider reform of the alliance. The United States Administration would like to see NATO take a strong position against terrorism and notes that the Missile Defence System is intended to protect European members of the alliance as well as North America. President Putin of Russia and his senior advisers have dropped their objections to NATO enlargement. They recognize the inevitability of expansion and that it does not pose a threat to Russian security. Indeed, Russian relations with the first three new members, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, have improved since the latter were admitted.

On the other hand, officials from the Brookings Institution and Carnegie Foundation told the Committee that important elements of the Russian General Staff and senior officials are still very suspicious of western motives.

Dr. Crouch of the U S Office of the Secretary of Defense told the Committee that the earlier expansion had been a success in helping to build security in central Europe. In his view, expansion could be expected to make it more difficult to

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(81) *Proceedings*, Issue 7, 26 November 2001.



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develop consensus among NATO members. There are already different levels of interoperability among NATO forces which expansion could be expected to exacerbate. The challenge over time would be to move the alliance toward greater interoperability and burden sharing.

### **21. NATO Interoperability**

NATO Interoperability, or the need to ensure that the training and equipment of Canadian Forces personnel allows their full participation in NATO operations, is an ongoing concern. Because of NORAD, the Canadian Air Force is almost fully capable of operating with the United States. According to testimony before the Committee, Canadian ships can be integrated into a U.S. Carrier Battle Group and frequently participate in joint exercises and missions. They are controlled by the Commander of the Carrier Battle Group within the rules of engagement established by the Canadian Government. The Commander of the Carrier Battle Group assigns missions based on the capabilities of Canadian ships and the parameters set by the government. Only the Government of Canada can amend missions and the rules of engagement. While both the Canadian Navy and Air Force have a reasonably high degree of interoperability with their United States counterparts, the Canadian army has lacked opportunities to exercise with United States forces since Canada left Europe.

American expenditure on defence was increasing rapidly even before the attacks of 11 September and the current intention is to increase spending from about U.S. \$350 billion this year to about U.S. \$450 billion by 2007. A growing percentage of this expenditure will be spent on technology as the United States re-equips its conventional forces. Inevitably, this will increase the interoperability gap between the United States and its allies.

The Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is a good example of the innovative way the United States exploits technology for military purposes. According to its Deputy Director, Dr. Jane Alexander, it exists, not to solve the technological problems of to-day, but to identify problems that might arise a decade or fifteen years in the future. To solve the latter, it has an annual budget of more than U.S. \$2 billion to fund radical solutions.

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The Committee was told that Canada and the other members of NATO face the prospect that United States forces will become so technologically advanced that interoperability becomes a thing of the past and the United States will operate alone. Major General Dunn of the Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, emphasised the importance of common standards of communication and training as well as of joint exercises in achieving interoperability. Nevertheless, there was a strong message that a number of steps will have to be considered.

The Committee heard politely expressed, but clear, suggestions that Canada and the other NATO allies will have to increase the level of their military expenditures. For its part, the United States will have to transfer technology by offering more opportunities for its allies to participate in the development of new weapons systems, such as the joint strike fighter or missile defence. Finally, every country (including the United States, which prepares for combat, not peacekeeping) will have to consider more specialization, to decide what things it will do exceptionally well whether this be providing strategic air lift capacity, combat forces, special forces, etc.

### **22. National Missile Defence**

National Missile Defence, the United States' plan to develop and deploy what U.S. authorities described as a limited missile system to intercept and destroy incoming ballistic missiles, will have a profound effect on the future of Canadian-US military co-operation, particularly in NORAD, and on Canadian defence and foreign policy in general.

Early in the hearings Canadian Department of National Defence officials told the Committee that, in the opinion of the department, the U.S. does not really need Canadian participation. Canada, however, did not have enough information to adopt a position.<sup>(82)</sup>

Prior to the departure of the Committee for Washington, Jill Sinclair, Director General of the International Security Bureau of Foreign Affairs, provided a briefing on the issue which she characterized as "cutting to the heart of a broad

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(82) *Proceedings*, Issue 1, 18 July 2001.

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range of foreign policy and defence issues” and as “one of the more provocative issues on the security agenda.”

She outlined a number of Canadian concerns, including: how missile defence will fit into the broader framework of United States-Canada relations; how it will affect strategic stability and particularly relations with Russia and China; and, how it will affect global non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament.

In Washington, presentations by Professor O’Hanlon, of the Brookings Institution, and Joseph Cirincione, of the Carnegie Foundation, explained to the Committee why the Missile Defence System had become such a high priority to the United States and why, in their opinion, the Administration had scant faith in the value of arms control treaties.

In dealing with the near-nuclear powers, North Korea, Iraq and Iran (the so-called “Axis of Evil”) the United States wants a third option between nuclear retaliation and acquiescence, should one of these countries attempt nuclear blackmail some time in the future. In the U.S. government’s opinion, there is also the realization that the coercive impact of attack by a nuclear ballistic missile is much more potent than the threat of a suitcase bomb. In Congress, support for missile defence has been strong enough to give the program a large increase in funding for this financial year.

In discussions with members of the United States Congress and Administration officials, the Committee could not offer an opinion about the merits of the Missile Defence System other than to note that Canada was waiting for more specific information about the architecture of the proposal before adopting a position.

### **23. The Axis of Evil**

Members of the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence were asked on three separate occasions about the “Axis of Evil” countries – Iran, Iraq and North Korea.

The Senate Armed Services Committee, the House Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Armed Services Committee all asked whether Canada

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would be prepared to support the United States in an armed conflict with these countries.

Each time the issue was raised, the Canadian Committee replied that the burden was on the U.S. to show that Canada should join America in such an endeavour. The Committee pointed out that the Americans would have to make the case in public in such a manner that the Canadian electorate and government would perceive the campaign to be in Canada's national interest.

The Committee pointed out that, as always, Canadians would listen attentively to American concerns before making a decision. It also noted that a United Nations resolution supporting the American objectives would be of great assistance in helping the Canadian Government arrive at a decision.

The Committee came away from the meetings with the sense that the American legislators were satisfied with its response.

### **24. Al Queda and Taliban Prisoners at Guantanamo**

The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence raised the question of Canadian concern regarding the perceived treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo military base with several organizations it met in Washington, including the three committees mentioned above.

While the Committee's concerns were not shared, they were noted. Some groups went on to say they had received similar expressions of concern from other allies.

### **25. Border Issues**

The briefings the Committee received and its trip to Washington made it clear that both Canada and the United States need to do more to secure their borders and to prevent the movement of contraband, illegal aliens and terrorists. While Canada's ability to prevent its territory from becoming a haven for those wishing to enter the United States illegally, or to smuggle contraband into the

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United States, has been called into question, the United States faces problems that are just as serious.

Some of the United States politicians the Committee spoke to expressed strong dissatisfaction with the under funding of both the U.S. immigration service and the coast guard as well as with the general lack of United States resources assigned to the border with Canada. The work of the Committee and its trip to Washington made it clear that Canada and the United States will have to intensify their cooperation to make the border more secure by adopting common measures to identify the high level of cross-border traffic that is low risk, from the remainder that is suspect and should be subjected to more thorough inspection.

At the beginning of the Committee's hearings, Mr. D'Avignon, an official from the Department of the Solicitor General, (responsible for CSIS and the RCMP), told the Committee that his department co-operates closely with Citizenship and Immigration to control borders. Procedures were tightened in the aftermath of the Ressayre incident. The Passport Office now has an automated system that verifies information with other departments and can determine whether there is a security concern. A cross-border crime forum seeks practical solutions for drug smuggling and other issues. There is well-established Canada-United States information exchange and operational co-operation at the working level across Canada.<sup>(83)</sup>

Superintendent Pilgrim, the Officer in Charge of the RCMP's National Security Investigations Branch, Criminal Intelligence Directorate, told the Committee that since 1996 the national security investigation capability at major international airports has been enhanced. Units are now located at Vancouver, Edmonton, Calgary Winnipeg, Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal (Dorval) and Halifax. Sixty-five agreements cover relations between the RCMP and police with local jurisdiction. In the event of a national security incident, as defined by the Security Offences Act, the RCMP has jurisdiction, but not exclusive jurisdiction. Internationally, the RCMP works through international forums and working groups to combat terrorism. It has several bilateral arrangements, especially with the United States and the United Kingdom. Twenty-nine liaison officers are currently

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(83) *Proceedings*, Issue 2, 19 July 2001

## CANADIAN SECURITY AND MILITARY PREPAREDNESS

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posted in 20 foreign countries to assist criminal investigations and exchange of information.<sup>(84)</sup>

Norman Inkster former Commissioner of the RCMP, noted some of the problems at the border. Canada has 9,000 km of shared border with the United States. A large percentage of customs agents are university students – about 2,200, for example, were hired to work during the summer of 2001. This raised the question, in his mind, as to whether students should be used so extensively, and if so, whether their training could be improved.

According to the testimony of the Canadian Customs and Revenue Agency, the ratio of student and term customs officers to permanent customs officers probably varies between 40-50 percent term to 60-50 percent permanent across the country, depending on the time of year. The students receive just two weeks of training. They are then are paired with a senior customs officer for a month before working on their own, sometimes on the primary inspection line.<sup>(85)</sup>

While new computers are being installed at border posts to assist customs agents screen people, these data banks are not connected to the RCMP data bank on criminals, or to data banks on suspected terrorists. At present there is no link to U.S. border computers.<sup>(86)</sup>

The visit of the Committee to Washington confirmed that in the aftermath of 11 September, the United States has been united in its determination to find and punish the attackers and to dramatically strengthen its defences, and particularly its borders, against further terrorist attack. Prior to leaving for the United States the Committee sought and received thorough briefings about all aspects of the security of the Canadian-United States border, about likely criticisms of security on the Canadian side of the border, and about problems on the American side of the border.

Free and unrestricted movement of goods and persons across the Canadian borders with the United States is essential to the economic well being of both countries, but Canada is undeniably even more dependent on bilateral trade than is the United States. Over \$1.9 billion (Cdn) in goods and services flows across the

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(84) *Proceedings*, Issue 2, 19 July 2001.

(85) Notes of visit in Halifax and Fredericton, *Proceedings*, Issue 12, 18 February 2002.

(86) *Proceedings*, Issue 3, 1 October 2001.

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border every day. Canada's exports to the United States represent about 87 percent of its merchandise exports and 43 percent of its Gross Domestic Product. Exports to Canada account for 25 percent of all United States exports, but just 25 percent of its Gross Domestic Product. Nevertheless, 38 states have Canada as their largest trading partner.<sup>(87)</sup> Seventy percent of the cross-border trade is carried by truck, about 45,000 of which cross the border each day at the same four or five border points in south-western Ontario. Two-way trade has doubled since 1993, and traffic volumes are projected to grow by 10 percent annually over the next decade. Clearly the stakes involved for Canada and the United States in ensuring the free flow of this trade are as huge as the volume of trade itself.

Over the past decade the perception has grown in the media of both the United States and Canada that the Canada-U.S. Border is porous. Prior to 11 September, many in the United States had come to the conclusion that contraband, illegal immigrants, criminals and terrorists pour across the border from Canada into the United States. Unfortunately, this belief was given dramatic currency by the Ressam incident. It was not surprising after that, that it was initially reported that many of the terrorists responsible for the attacks had a Canadian connection.

In fact terrorists who carried out the attacks did not come through Canada. All had legally entered the United States. Members of the Canadian Senate Committee pressed home these facts with those U.S. politicians and officials who suggested a significant "Canadian connection" to the attacks.

When members of Congress raised the issue, members of the Canadian Committee asked the Americans if they could provide the names of any individuals with terrorist connections who had crossed the border from North to South, other than Mr. Ressam. Inasmuch as no member of Congress could name an individual, this issue was not pursued further.

On 12 December 2001, Canada and the United States signed a declaration for the mutual development of a "Smart Border" between the two countries. The Declaration embodies a 30- Point Action Plan calling on the two countries to collaborate in identifying and removing security risks, and in expediting the legitimate flow of people and goods across the border. Other elements of the Plan will strengthen co-ordination between the enforcement agencies of the two

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(87) *Proceedings*, Issue 10, 28 January 2002

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countries in addressing common security threats. Canadian and United States officials will meet in early 2002 to review the progress made in implementation of each of the objectives set out in the Action Plan.

Shortly after its arrival in Washington, the Committee heard a presentation by Stephen Flynn, a Commander in the United States Coast Guard and a Senior Fellow in the National Security Studies Program at the Council on Foreign Relations. For some years he has been very concerned about the potential use of a maritime cargo container in a terrorist attack. If the movement of containers should ever be halted so that all can be inspected, instead of the two percent that at present are subjected to at least a cursory check in the United States, the North American transportation system will be tied up for months.

More than 12 million maritime containers pass through the United States border inspection system annually. He proposes a reform of the international transportation system, beginning with the seven greatest ports of the world through which most of the world's sea traffic moves. If these ports agreed on common standards for security, reporting, and information-sharing for operators, conveyances and cargo, these standards would quickly become universal. Containers would be loaded at security-sanitized facilities, and after loading the containers would be equipped with monitors that would record any attempt to tamper with their seals. Movement of the containers would be monitored by a global positioning system. The secure movement of the containers would be complemented by advance notice of their contents, shippers, etc. to allow authorities time to assess the level of risk they presented.

Challenging the myth of the porous Canadian border, and promoting the measures that have already been implemented or are contemplated to improve security at border points, were important objectives of the Committee's visit to Washington.

The argument was presented forcefully that the vast majority of the container traffic is low risk. Greater use of technology and biometrics, security screening of shippers, truckers and individuals who frequently cross the border, and advance information about containers will go a long way to increasing the security of trans border shipments, as will intensified Canadian-United States cooperation in the form of a single inspection system and joint border patrols. These are just some of the ideas that the Committee raised in discussions about border



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security with the members of United States committees. For the most part the principle of taking steps to identify “low risk” shipments was well received, as was the concept of cooperation and sharing of limited resources.

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## PART II

### What We Think

In Part 2 of the Report the Committee presents its observations and conclusions based on the testimony it has heard over the past eight months, and about its fact-finding trips to eastern and western Canada and to Washington, D.C. Part 2 is not an exhaustive catalogue of the issues of national security and defence. Rather it is a discussion of some issues that the Committee noted with concern during the discharge of its mandate. Some of the observations and conclusions which follow are expressed in the form of recommendations, while others are flagged for further study by this Committee or by some other body. The first section of Part 2 will cover Defence issues, the second will deal with National Security issues.



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## PART II (A)

### Defence: What We Think

#### *The Committee's Premises*

- **The first obligation of the state is to guarantee the safety of its citizens.**
- **To ensure our sovereignty and values as a nation, Canada needs to maintain an independent combat capable military force capable of working with our allies to defend our borders and national interests against any and all threats through operations in Canada and abroad.**
- **Parliament has the obligation to provide the Canadian Forces with sufficient equipment, personnel levels and training to meet the demands it places on them.**
- **The Canadian Forces demand of its personnel, as a condition of employment, 24 hours per day 7 days a week availability and the potential for deployment to life-threatening operations.**
- **To maintain an effective military force, military personnel must be accorded a basic quality of life similar to all Canadians, and receive a reasonable pay reflecting the demands placed upon them.**
- **Canadians are proud of the job the men and women of the Canadian Forces have performed over the years in defending Canada and in upholding our values including during the current hostilities in Afghanistan. They and their family members deserve our respect and full support.**

The Committee's deliberations and findings are based upon these premises.

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## 1. Context

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 signaled the end of the 45-year bipolar Cold War. The result was a changed world, but hardly a peaceful world. Hostilities in Kuwait, Rwanda, Bosnia and the Balkans during the ensuing decade offer but a few examples of global military conflict. Canada's national interests were involved in all of these conflagrations, since there can be no security and prosperity for Canadians in an unstable world. In each of these cases, Canada took military action both to improve the lot of other peoples and to defend its own national interests.

Disputes over borders and many other issues are prevalent in many parts of the world, including the Middle East, South Asia, Africa, Europe and the Korean Peninsula. This high level of instability has serious implications both for international peace and security and the healthy growth of global commerce. Both these matters are of huge concern to Canada, a peaceful nation and a nation that depends on exports for its economic well-being. Canada is also a country largely built on immigration. Many Canadians have personal interests in those areas of the world in which conflict persists.

The global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly in undemocratic states, remains a matter of ominous concern to all civilized peoples, including Canadians. This threat has been compounded in recent times by the hostile activities of non-state actors, particularly well-organized and well-funded terrorist groups. September 11, 2001 demonstrated clearly that threats to Canada's national interests and national security are not as remote as many Canadians had believed them to be.

The threat is now on our own continent, potentially in our own skies, potentially on our own streets. The willful destruction of the lives of so many Canadians aboard the Air India flight from Toronto to London in 1985 should have served as an early warning, but the fall of the Berlin Wall lulled many Canadians back to sleep. Our Committee has attempted to assist in a reawakening. Canadians need to be aware of the state of their military and what role it might be called upon to play, in their interests, in the coming years.

## **2. Defence Funding**

The Committee heard expert testimony from senior Department of National Defence personnel and from a number of defence-interest organizations. It also toured several Canadian Forces bases. The Committee recognizes that government witnesses are bound by Government policy. As a consequence, the Committee was sometimes frustrated in its attempt to get a feel for debate going on within the Department of National Defence over the condition of Canada's Armed Forces. On the other hand, the Committee found that witnesses from the various non-official defence-interest groups, former officials and officers and from academia were less constrained, and were often able to provide a more candid perspective on the operational limitations placed on the Canadian Forces as a result of budget reductions. Some of these people have been characterized as "armchair generals" out of touch with reality. Quite to the contrary, the Committee found these witnesses to be:


- knowledgeable;
- genuinely interested in describing the effects of the significant under funding and over-tasking of the Canadian Forces;
- concerned about improving conditions of service and the quality of life of the soldiers;
- desiring an improvement in the capabilities of the Canadian Forces.

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## 3. Defence Expenditures Historical Trend – Constant 2000 \$

The following graph indicates that the Canadian Forces budget has been reduced by **approximately 30 percent** over the period 1988 to 2000.



Source: Public Accounts Estimates (Part III) and DND Economic Model

## 4. Committee Assessment

Based on witness testimony, as well as first-hand observation at a number of military units, the Committee concluded that the level of funding for the Department of National Defence is insufficient to meet the many tasks assigned to our military. This limited funding has forced the Department of National Defence to focus on a cost-driven, resource-limiting approach to operations, capital acquisition and training in order to live within tight budgets. The military has coped admirably with its financial limitations, but there have been severe and unavoidable consequences. The bottom line is a significant deterioration of Canadian Forces equipment. Maintenance is becoming extremely manpower-

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intensive and expensive. Training has been curtailed, and personnel are being asked to perform at an unacceptably high level of operations tempo.

The Auditor General of Canada, the Conference of Defence Associations, the Federation of Military and United Services Institutes of Canada, and the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century have all stressed the need for additional funding for the Department of National Defence. Their generally accepted minimal figure is a \$1Billion increase per year, for five years.

How would this money be used? After analyzing our military's capacities and the many demands on those capacities, and after witnessing the problems associated with the recent deployment to Afghanistan, the Committee found that additional monies are required to:

- sustain current operations;
- address the continuing "rust-out" of equipment;
- increase the number of personnel in the Canadian Forces;
- increase training and capacity for new types of operations.

### **5. Defence Capability Underpins Foreign Policy**

The Committee agrees with Deputy Prime Minister Manley that a credible foreign policy is dependent upon a robust defence capability. Canada's capacity is far from robust. Canada continues to over task and under fund the Department of National Defence. In 2000, Canada ranked 17<sup>th</sup> of 19 NATO countries in Defence expenditures as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product. At 1.2%, it ranked ahead of only Luxembourg within NATO as well as Iceland which has no military forces. As Mr. Manley so astutely stated in November 2001: "You can't just sit at the G-8 table and then, when the bill comes, go to the washroom. If you want to play a role in the world, even as a small member of the G-8, there is a cost to doing that".


It is noted in this context, that in order to address the new security environment, President Bush recently announced that the United States defence budget would be increased by U.S. \$100 billion from U.S. \$350 Billion to U.S.



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\$450 Billion by 2007.

## NATO DEFENCE EXPENDITURES AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT / DÉPENSES DE DÉFENSE DE L'OTAN EN POURCENTAGE DU PRODUIT INTÉRIEUR BRUT



## 6. Budget 2001

The Committee was disappointed at the level of funding allotted to the Department of National Defence in the Budget of December 2001 that was designated to counteract terrorism.

The amount may or may not have been what departmental officials specifically asked for to counteract terrorism. But it certainly falls far short of what should have been asked for to address huge shortfalls in other areas of need, *as well* as addressing the new terrorist threat.

The Committee's analysis shows that funds provided to the Department in Budget 2001 did not address the overall under funding of the Canadian Forces. There was an increase in the base budget of \$119 million, over five years, to

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expand Joint Task Force 2 (JTF). An additional \$210 million was provided to pay for the incremental costs of Operation Apollo (not anticipated when the annual budget was approved by the Government). There was \$513 million for Research and Development into Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Defence. That money is spread over five years and is to be shared with a number of other Government Departments. As well there was a **one time** infusion for capital equipment. Let us be blunt. These increases, while helpful, do not address the chronic, critical under funding of the Department of National Defence.

### 7. Results of Testimony and Visits

In particular, the committee noted that:

- a. The trained effective strength of the Canadian Forces is well below the currently-mandated 60,000 members required to execute the present government-tasked missions (by official departmental estimates, the trained effective strength of the Canadian Forces is now somewhere between 50,000 and 55,000).
- b. The Canadian Forces are over-committed in operations and have insufficient trained personnel to sustain the present level of operational tempo. For instance:
  - I. the Navy is unable to sustain the present commitment of five ships in the Arabian Gulf. It will soon be reducing that commitment to three ships, a most modest naval contribution to the War on Terrorism;
  - II. the Sea King operations are clearly over-extended; 24 of Canada's overall total of 37 Sea King operational pilots are on deployment in the Arabian Gulf. Their activities cannot be sustained beyond six months.
- c. The Navy has a number of ships "tied up." It has been required to introduce a "tier readiness" program, as it does not possess sufficient personnel, nor operational funding, to maintain its inventory of ships

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- “ready for operations.”
- d. Many Canadian Forces personnel are not being provided with minimal training required for their operational assignments, reducing their effectiveness and risking lives. This observation was repeatedly made to the Committee during its visits, and was reinforced in the December 2001 report of the Auditor General of Canada, who commented in particular that many maintenance personnel are not being trained to meet the critical demands of their jobs.
  - e. Operational training (including training at the brigade level) has been curtailed in order to ensure that vital equipment and personnel are on hand for overseas deployments. Lack of training will obviously have a long-term detrimental effect on the capacity of the forces to do their job effectively and as safely as possible.
  - f. Flying hours of all air force fleets have been reduced:
    - The Aurora sovereignty flights in the Arctic have been reduced to two per year;
    - Prior to September 11<sup>th</sup>, there were only four CF 18s on air defence alert in all of Canada (two in the east and two in the west).
  - g. Canada’s aging C130 Hercules require an inordinate amount of maintenance to ensure availability of flight. Rarely are more than half of these aircraft serviceable on any given day.
  - h. To meet continuing government tasking for NATO, UN and coalition operations, the Canadian Army is short 7,500 personnel.
  - i. The military has a shortage of field engineers and communications groups to provide deployment sustainability.
  - j. The military is short approximately 200 project managers necessary for large DND capital projects.
  - k. Training budgets have been reduced to divert funding into operations and capital acquisition. This has resulted in extra work loads for qualified

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- technicians and their supervisors, causing dangerous fatigue levels and also forcing a number of experienced senior technical personnel to leave the military.
- l. The Canadian Forces, particularly the Navy, has not conducted required maintenance on their major equipment. This was confirmed all by the Auditor General in her report of December, 2001. She said there is a huge backlog of work downstream, with attendant increased maintenance costs in the short-term.
  - m. The Canadian Forces Reduction Program in the early 1990s was all too successful. There is now a critical shortage of experienced senior personnel, placing an increased strain on remaining members of the military.
  - n. The Canadian Army Reserve lacks sufficient equipment to conduct company level training.
  - o. The Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness has insufficient resources to take a lead role in development of national procedures to deal with attacks on critical infrastructure.
  - p. Notwithstanding the budget allocations of 2001, the Canadian Forces capability in the area of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) response is feeble. CBRN is unequipped to deal with a crisis of any magnitude.
  - q. Female members believe that their uniforms are not functional because they are not designed for their bodies.
  - r. Members of the Canadian Forces appreciate recent pay increases, but they are still behind their civilian counterparts.
  - s. The increasing number of days spent away from home, either during operations overseas or during training (operations tempo), appears to be the biggest single quality-of-life issue with the members of both the Regular and Reserve forces.

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## 8. Canadian Forces Operations - Doing More with Less

The Committee believes that Canadians are greatly appreciative of the pride and determination that the Canadian Forces continue to demonstrate in all their operations, both domestic and overseas. Wherever the Canadian Forces are sent, they do everything in their power to provide outstanding service to the mission and are clearly determined to “fight along side the best, against the best”. However, the Canadian Forces are stretched to the breaking point. Decisions to deploy up to 4,000 personnel and to sustain them on a continuing basis are having detrimental effects on both equipment and personnel. This has caused a deterioration in equipment, a high turnover rate of personnel, increased instances of post-traumatic stress disorder and other health problems which have significantly reduced effectiveness.

## 9. Where did all the Troops Go?

The Committee notes that the Canadian Forces is unequivocally short of personnel. **The Committee recommends that to sustain the level of tasking required of them over the last eight years, the Canadian Forces need at least 75,000 trained effective personnel.** A workable breakdown of the Canadian Forces by element shows a need for: 14,000 in the Navy to provide it with personnel to fully crew all its war ships; 43,500 in the Army to increase by one brigade and fully man the existing three Army brigades and provide troops to accommodate the Army modernization program; 17,500 in the Air Force to permit it to expand its flying operations to meet national tasking and allow for project management personnel.

The estimate of the present shortfall, including necessary personnel, maintenance, additional training, spare parts and accommodation, is estimated to be approximately \$1 billion per fiscal year.

## 10. Tunnel Vision on Terrorism

Canada requires conventional war fighting capabilities to respond to all

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types of threats and to participate in treaty and coalition operations. This is not about “fighting the last war”; it is about fighting the war we’re in today. It is important that the Canadian military maintains combat capable forces ready to join coalitions and make a meaningful contribution.

Since the horrific attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001, Canada and her allies have focused on the War on Terrorism. In response to this attack, Canada has contributed 3,700 military personnel. The Canadian Forces are unable to sustain this commitment of operational troops to this mission indefinitely. It is important to ensure that Canadians do not get “tunnel vision” on this one threat. There is too much instability on other fronts. We must ensure that the Canadian Forces are capable of meeting our defence commitments under Canada’s “collective security” policy. Other missions undertaken by the Canadian Forces include peacekeeping, other coalition operations and assistance in dealing with natural disasters. To maintain world stability, we must maintain our ability to project “conventional” but modernized military force beyond our borders.

### **11. The Impact of Winning the Cold War/An Ounce of Prevention**

To avoid the massive cost of wars, Canadian policy has traditionally been to maintain membership in alliances and coalitions. These act as a strong deterrent to aggressive international behaviour. They also have the benefit of containing conflict as far away from Canadian territory as possible. Canada’s membership in NATO, NORAD and the United Nations are examples of our approach to collective defence. The 1994 White Paper on Defence policy committed the Government of Canada to the maintenance of a military that is multi-purpose, globally deployable, and combat-capable, with the ability to “conduct operations alongside the best, while fighting the best”. But the Cold War ended and the romantic notion of a peace dividend gained currency. In the real world, an ongoing military premium must be paid, not for bellicose reasons, but to maintain the peace.

The cost of armed conflict is immense in human and economic terms. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Canada was called upon to participate in two World Wars and the Korean War, at a tremendous cost in lives and hardship. We do not want another war of these dimensions. The human and financial costs of war far exceed the costs

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of doing everything in our power to deter war.

Over the past eight years, the Department of National Defence budget has been reduced by approximately 30 percent in real terms. Unfortunately, the legitimate demand for domestic and overseas operations has not been reduced.

Ironically, peace has placed greater demands on the Canadian Forces. The bipolar standoff between the United States and Soviet Union was terrifying, but relatively stable. The post-Cold War world has become more regionally unstable.

Since the mid 1990s, the pace of Canadian Forces operational deployments has increased to a level not witnessed since the Korean War.

Increased operations on a smaller budget have resulted in insufficient funds for capital acquisition and maintenance in a world in which the technical sophistication of war has been increasing at an exponential rate. Both in terms of equipment and intelligence, we are falling behind both our enemies and our friends.

### **12. Coping with a 30% Reduction of Budget**

Delays in replacing fatigued, outdated equipment have reduced operational capabilities, and saddled the military with a huge increase in the costs of maintaining older equipment. For example, delays in the Maritime Helicopter Project have forced DND to make plans for operating the 40+-year-old Sea King helicopter until at least 2010. This drains time and funds to ensure safe flight operations of the helicopter, as well as to improve operational capability. Upgraded radios and electronic warfare equipment are needed to ensure that these aircraft meet operational tasking and can operate effectively when on UN and other coalition operations.

The Committee does applaud the Department's acquisition of equipment such as the Army's Light Armoured Vehicle (LAV), the Canadian Patrol Frigates for the Navy, and the upcoming strategic air-to-air-refueling capability. However, as the Auditor General observes funding allocated to capital equipment is dwindling at an alarming rate.

### **13. Quality of Life**

The committee was pleased to note that DND continues to address the issues raised in the Commons Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs report of 1999, and that action had been initiated to address its recommendations.

However, during visits to military units in the field, Canadian Forces personnel continued to document irritants that undermine what should be a decent standard of living with conditions likely to sustain family life.

Issues raised at every military unit were the extreme operations tempo demanded of Canadian Forces personnel, and inadequate financial compensation, particularly at the senior non-commissioned level. A list of other frequent concerns follows.

### **14. Health Service**

Health Services remain an issue of concern for a large number of personnel, mainly in the following areas:

- a. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder treatment, as noted in the Canadian Forces Ombudsman's report of February 05, 2002;
- b. Treatment for personnel who encounter operational injuries;
- c. Treatment for personnel suffering from depression, and extreme fatigue;
- d. A more effective system to deal with family violence;
- e. Staff shortages in the Operational Trauma Service Support Centre (OTSSC);
- f. Lack of social support programs for families of personnel suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, depression, fatigue and family violence.

The Committee noted that in many parts of Canada there is a shortage of doctors. This situation is particularly severe in smaller, isolated locations. As a



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consequence, while the Canadian Forces provide medical care for the military personnel themselves, family members often encounter significant problems in securing a family doctor in local communities.

The Committee also was advised that the availability of French-speaking doctors is extremely limited in the Camp Gagetown area. There is a similar shortage of specialists to deal with the special medical needs of some families.

### 15. Pay and Benefits

Despite the recent pay boosts, members of both the Regular and Reserve forces continue to believe that military pay is not sufficient to attract and keep good personnel, and does not match rates for similar employment paid to their civilian counterparts.

This is particularly the case for enlisted troops and junior officers. In recent months there has been much verbal support for the military in Parliament, this has not translated into improved compensation where it is needed. These are still relatively poorly-paid people doing high-pressure, high-risk jobs.

Some of the major concerns the Committee heard regarding compensation while visiting Canadian Forces military bases were:

- a. The need to increase the pay of senior enlisted personnel;
- b. The need to remove the “compression effect”<sup>(88)</sup> of senior non-commissioned officers;
- c. The need to ensure comparable pay with civilian or police counterparts for equivalent jobs;
- d. The need for some form of benefit, bonus or additional pay to cover appointments of responsibility (both for non-commissioned and commissioned officers);

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(88) Definition of “compression effect”: The compression effect is that the difference in pay between successive ranks becomes smaller and smaller.

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- e. That “on duty requirement for 24 hours per day, 7 days a week” without standby pay or overtime should be reflected in the basic pay of Canadian Forces personnel;
- f. That an effective bonus program to attract and retain good personnel taking into consideration income tax considerations should be introduced;
- g. That the categories of specialists qualifying for skills pay should be expanded;
- h. The need for a pension plan for members of the reserve.

### **16. Clothing and Personal Equipment**

The Committee found that Canadian Forces personnel, particularly females, are unhappy with the design and tailoring of their uniforms. The following concerns were registered with the Committee:

- a. There is an inadequate supply of clothing designed and/or sized for women (i.e., well-fitting shoes and pants). The “supply system” attitude appears to be one of using up all the old ill-fitting and poorly-designed clothing prior to ordering any of the newly designed female clothing;
- b. Protection vests supplied to women are poorly-designed, uncomfortable, and cumbersome.

Canadian forces personnel, as appropriate, also should be provided with operationally effective and comfortable clothing suitable for all potential geographic areas of operation.

### **17. Other Morale Issues**

There is clearly a high level of frustration among the maintenance personnel who work on the Sea King aircraft, due to the repeated postponement of the Maritime Helicopter Program, as well as alarmist media reports concerning the

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safety of the aircraft.

Shortage of personnel in critical trades like this one has been detrimental to both operations and morale.

## 18. Recruiting and Retention

While the recent and aggressive Canadian Forces recruiting program appears to be paying off, the Committee noted a number of issues that are counter-productive to a healthy level of recruitment and retention. These issues include:

- a. Unacceptable bureaucratic delays in processing potential recruits. The Committee heard several sad stories of prospective recruits being told to return in six months for further processing.
- b. Reservists are being told that retrieval of their records and “accreditation” of their qualifications requires review by central agencies, resulting in extraordinary delay.
- c. The recruiting process is unacceptable when dealing with individuals who possess previous military experience. Just one example: former Canadian Forces pilots who were laid off when Canada 3000 ceased operations, were told that the re-entry process would be as long or longer than that of an initial recruit due to the need to obtain their “former Canadian Forces records” from an understaffed central agency which does not have automated records management systems.
- d. Canadian Forces advertising literature and recruiting campaigns should be more widely oriented towards all Canadians, and must be appealing to minorities.
- e. The extremely pressurized tempo of operations is an overriding source of discontent that no pay increase will solve;
- f. Greater effort is required to keep existing skilled personnel. Shortage of Navy officers in both operations and engineering trades has caused an unacceptable workload for middle ranking officers.

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- g. Coastal defence vessels operated by naval reserve are short-staffed, with the consequence that transfers from naval reserve to the regular forces are discouraged.
- h. Many Non-Commissioned Members in the reserve would like to see some form of job protection legislation to protect civilian employment while serving with the Canadian Forces. (The Committee heard conflicting views on this issue and is of the opinion it requires further consideration.)

### **19. The Submarine Project**

The Committee had the opportunity to tour the Canadian Forces newest submarines while visiting Halifax and learned of significant delay in this project. Further maintenance has been required to bring the boats up to “contract delivery standards”. Training has taken twice as long as anticipated. Adapting to Canadian communications and weapons systems of the first boat has taken almost three times as long as planned.

In addition, personnel selected for the initial training were taken from lists of Canadian Forces personnel who had previous experience in submarines. Consequently, the majority of this initial cadre is older than the average naval personnel, and will be retiring prior to the boats becoming operational. The effect of this situation is that the boats will be short of trained personnel once they are declared fully operational.

### **20. Qualification/Specialist Pay**

The Committee learned that shortages in skilled technicians are largely caused by outside employers offering better salaries and quality of life. The Committee believes that the Canadian Forces should consider the introduction of a more widespread “qualification pay” program.

In addition, the Canadian Forces should consider applying obligatory service to more “specialist” training. It is the Committees view that some form of

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increased specialist pay is less expensive than training new personnel.

While the Department of National Defence has recently introduced a limited number of specialists bonuses, the current policy is extremely slow to start but very quick to end when the situations return to normal. The Committee recommends that this practice be reversed, or at least made more fair.

### **21. The Reserves**

The Committee was able to visit a number of reserve units and found that morale was generally good among these dedicated Canadian men and women. The Air Force Total Force Squadron in Winnipeg (i.e., comprised of both members of the regular and reserve force) appeared to be working well, with a reserve mission providing support to the training of air navigators. Equally effective was the employment of reserves in the tactical aviation community. Personnel were enthusiastic about their role in supporting Canada's Griffon helicopters.

The members of the Naval Reserve employed on Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels believe that they make a strong contribution to the naval mission. While the Committee was unable to study the issue in depth, it did question whether the Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels could be employed more frequently to interdict ocean-going vessels as far out as the Canadian territorial limits.

The Canadian Militia, while providing excellent support to army overseas deployments still appeared to be concerned about a "national" mission. As noted earlier in this report, the Committee is of the view that some Army Reserve should be employed across the country as Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) specialists assisting local first responders in dealing with these types of emergency situations. This mission would strengthen the already-close ties the Militia has with local communities.

The Committee is pleased to note that the Canadian Forces have recently announced an enhanced capability to deal with CBRN situations, but believes that the regular force will be unable to provide regional teams to address the problem. It should consider employment of Reservists in this role, as well as the regional stockpiling of CBRN resources.

## **22. Requirement for \$4 Billion Increase in Baseline Budget**

The many shortfalls and deficiencies in Capital Equipment, Personnel and Operations and Maintenance have been outlined in this report. **The Committee accordingly recommends an immediate increase to the Department of National Defence baseline budget of \$4 billion.**

This amount is in keeping with the total increase recommended by other Canadian organizations, which have studied this issue in depth. While they have proposed that the increase be phased in over several years, experience has shown that a variety of government exigencies can intervene to constrain or reverse multi-year commitments. The committee believes the case of the Canadian Forces is stark enough to argue that the total increase should be allocated **immediately**.

The Committee notes that such an increase in budget would be approximately 1.69 percent of Canadian GDP, up from the current level of 1.2 percent. It would move Canada to 12<sup>th</sup> place among 19 NATO countries, up from the current position of 17th, and at least put us in the company of the Netherlands and Hungary but still below countries like Portugal, Poland, Norway and the Czech Republic.

For those who might argue that such a sharp increase in funding cannot be readily or efficiently absorbed in one stroke, we would note that the Department of National Defence in the past has been able to deal with significant increases in time of need.

While it is not the intent of the Committee to instruct the Government or the Department on how to allocate the initial \$4 billion, the following examples are offered as to how such funds might justifiably be dispersed. Other worthy approaches could be cited.

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## An Example of Possible Expenditure Allocations

		<b>In millions</b>	<b>In billions</b>
<b>Operations</b>	Collective Training	\$700	
	Increasing Manning levels		
	Increased flying hours		
	Increased steaming days		
<b>Maintenance to support operations</b>	Routine Maintenance	\$300	
	Additional 2nd and third line maintenance		
	Additional spare parts		
<b>Total Operations and Maintenance</b>			<b>\$1.0 (25%)</b>
<b>Personnel</b>	Selective pay raise for military (weighted to the lower ranks level); retention and expanded specialist bonuses	\$150	
	Quality of Life program (personnel, training, post traumatic stress disorder treatments, housing and other infrastructure)	\$150	
	Increase the military to 75,000 personnel	\$375	
<b>Total Personnel</b>			<b>\$0.675 (16.9%)</b>

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<b>Capital Equipment</b>	Maritime Helicopter Project	\$200	
	Departmental Information Technology	\$300	
	Strategic Airlift	\$700	
	Aurora Weapons	\$75	
	CF 18 Smart Weapons	\$200	
	Satellite Communications	\$40	
	CF Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance	\$150	
	Upgrade M109 Artillery	\$35	
	Afloat Logistics Sealift	\$150	
	Joint Space Project (Surveillance of and from space)	\$100	
	CBRN Training & Equipment	\$100	
	Army Vehicle Update	\$100	
	Research & Development	\$125	
	Miscellaneous Expenditures	\$50	
<b>Total Capital</b>			<b>\$2.325 (58.1%)</b>
<b>Overall Total</b>		- Operations & Maintenance - Personnel - Capital	<b>\$1</b> <b>\$0.675</b> <b><u>\$2.325</u></b> <b>\$4 billion (100%)</b>



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This significant increase (just over 30 percent) in the base budget for National Defence is necessary to maintain an effective Canadian Forces. Canada needs to play catch-up, and quickly. Canada must not be allowed to fall behind in our commitment to the security of the nation. **The Committee therefore recommends future annual budget increases, which are realistic, purpose-driven and adjusted for inflation.**

### 23. Near Term Requirements

This increase in funding could permit the Department of National Defence to begin funding the following Canadian Forces activities that would fulfill current government tasking. It is understood that most of these projects are already included in the defence acquisition plan, but have been delayed due to financial limitations within the current budget:

- a. Proceed expeditiously with the purchase of 28 modern helicopters under the Maritime Helicopter Project;
- b. Purchase a national strategic lift capability to permit the timely deployment of Canadian Forces by:
  - I. purchasing eight strategic heavy lift aircraft to permit deployment of “outsize cargo” and
  - II. purchasing four afloat logistics and sea lift “roll on/roll off” ships.
- c. One more mechanized brigade group (equivalent to the first brigade based in Edmonton) and full manning of the current three brigades to provide a total of four fully manned brigades.
- d. Improve military information technology required to connect with other security and defence agencies and coalition partners by funding the Canadian Military Satellite Communications project;
- e. Replace the army’s medium logistics wheeled vehicles;
- f. Conduct a comprehensive Frigate mid-life update to extend the ships’

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- operational life;
- g. Purchase smart weapons for the CF18 and Aurora aircraft;
  - h. Enhance Canadian Forces intelligence, surveillance target acquisition and reconnaissance capabilities through execution of a number of projects;
  - i. Improve the Canadian Forces capability to react to Chemical, Radiological, Biological and/or Nuclear (CRBN) incidents.
  - j. Provide the army with indirect fire support by upgrading the current M109 system with a 52 caliber 155 mm cannon upgrade with an integrated and automated fire-control system;
  - k. Provide funding for the Canadian Forces joint space project to ensure ongoing civilian and military communications and surveillance capabilities of and from space, such as the RADARSAT II satellite which assisted authorities in responding to the Manitoba floods of 1997;
  - l. Provide, as appropriate, all Canadian Forces members with operationally effective and comfortable clothing suitable for all potential geographic sites of Canadian Forces operations; and
  - m. Set up a “strategic analysis team” comprised of representatives from academic institutions, strategic planners and experts from the research and development community to think “outside the box” in looking forward to future technologies and how equipment, tactics and strategies are likely to change.

### **24. Interoperability**

The committee discussed “interoperability” with its counter parts in Washington. While Canada, the United States and our NATO allies continue to operate under the same command and control procedures, concern was expressed at the rate of technological advancement within the United States forces. It is evident that in the near future, the United States will employ technologically superior communications, weapons systems and doctrine that will far outstrip the

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capability of her allies.

The Committee is of the view that while challenging, interoperability with its allies should be pursued to the greatest extent possible.

Given the ever increasing cost of high tech military capability, it was brought to the Committee's attention that the Canadian Forces should investigate specializing in certain military capabilities, mutually complementary with its allies.

### **25. NATO Enlargement**

The committee received testimony from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade prior to discussing this issue with its counterparts in Washington during the fact-finding visit. The Committee endorses the Canadian view that NATO enlargement is a good thing and should contribute to the maintenance of stability and security in the world.

Given the large number of candidate countries under consideration for the second round of NATO enlargement however, as part of the Membership Action Plan (Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Slovenia, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia), the Committee is concerned about the impact such a large expansion will have on funding requirements and the governance of NATO.

In particular, the Committee noted consensus (unanimity) is required for NATO decisions and a significant increase from 19 members will inevitably lead to slower decision making.

### **26. Northern Command**

Canada is fortunate that we have a long tradition of working with the U.S. military. We have been members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and more importantly, have shared the air defence of the North American continent with the United States under the North American Aerospace Defence Agreement (NORAD) since 1958. Under the NORAD agreement, the Commander in Chief of NORAD is appointed by, and reports directly to, both the President of the United

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States and the Prime Minister of Canada.

The United States moved to create a civilian Homeland Defence Organization after September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001 under the direction of Governor Ridge. The U.S. military is in the process of developing a Homeland Defence organization that would encompass air, sea and land capabilities.

While the final structure of this new military organization has yet to be determined, the Committee received briefings on a number of potential options during a fact-finding visit to Washington in early February 2002.

The Committee met with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Dr. Mason of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, U.S. military planners and Dr. Miller of the National Security Council. All of them indicated that the United States plans to introduce this command by October 2002.

The concept is based upon the present United States Commander-in-Chiefs Unified Command Plan. It is intended that the command would be quite small, with a headquarters and support personnel. Military forces would be assigned to the command by other agencies on an “as required” basis. A number of US officials advised the Committee that Canada will be invited to participate in the new structure.

All U.S. officials who spoke to the Committee on the proposed new Northern Command indicated that one of the options under strong consideration was the NORAD model. Use of the NORAD model would mean that Canadian sovereignty and national security would be maintained, and that Canadian Forces would not be employed without the express authorization of the Prime Minister.

## **27. Defence Policy**

During the testimony to the Committee, and in discussions with military personnel on visits to operational units, common complaints about insufficient resources, old equipment and the relevancy of the current defence policy persisted.

The Committee notes that all of Canada’s principal allies have conducted some form of defence review recently. Examples provided to the Committee of

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reviews conducted prior to September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 included: the Quadrennial Defence Review in the United States as well as similar reviews in the United Kingdom and Australia.

Individuals and organizations from outside the Department of National Defence were unanimous in their opinion that the Defence White Paper of 1994 is outdated and not relevant to the 21st century.

In particular, the Conference of Defence Associations, in their publication “Caught in the Middle,” the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century in their publication “To Secure a Nation,” and the Federation of Military and United Services Institutes of Canada in their February 2001 publication on “Security Strategy for Canada” all state emphatically that a policy review is overdue.

As a result of these and other testimonials, coupled with experience gained through fact-finding trips, the Committee is of the opinion that:

- a. the present roles and missions assigned to the Canadian Forces cannot be fully executed given the current levels of funding and personnel;
- b. the 1994 Defence White Paper has outlived its usefulness. In particular, the current defence policy is not relevant in the new age of terrorism and asymmetric threats; and
- c. a Defence policy review is required in the near future to provide Canada and the Canadian Forces with a relevant defence policy for the first part of the 21st century.

**“Committee believes that Defense Policy should flow from Foreign Policy and that a Foreign Policy review should precede a Defence review.”**

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### **Foot Notes:**

The Committee believes it would facilitate its work and relationship with the Department of National Defence if:

- a. The Committee could be notified by the Department of major policy announcements and troop deployments at the same time as the media.
- b. The Department could assign to the Committee on a part time basis an experienced military officer similar to the officer provided to the Committee during its travel associated with this report.



**PART II (B)**

**National Security: What We Think**

***The Committee's Premises***

- **Ensuring the security of its people is one of the fundamental obligations of any federal government.**
- **Terrorism has assumed a vastly enhanced global dimension. It no longer is limited to activities of individuals or small groups.**
- **The threat of well -organized and well-funded terrorist networks will require new Canadian responses, which will require new resources.**
- **Everything cannot be protected all the time.**
- **Effective use of intelligence can minimize society's risks.**
- **The sooner and farther away threats can be identified, the better they can be addressed.**
- **Limited resources place a premium on cooperation, internally and externally.**
- **Exploiting technology can exponentially increase the effectiveness of security.**
- **Insuring the security of Canadian ports has become a prerequisite for their economic viability.**
- **Organized crime provides fertile ground for terrorist activity.**

The Committee's deliberations and findings are based upon the Committee's premises.



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## Introduction

The Committee focused on potential terrorist activity, examining areas where asymmetric<sup>(89)</sup> threats are most likely.

The Committee heard testimony from a variety of witnesses in Ottawa and elsewhere. It visited major international airports at Montreal (Dorval) and Vancouver, as well as the seaports of Halifax and Vancouver and the inland port of Montreal. The Committee questioned a variety of organizations with responsibility for various aspects of security at these locations.

The Committee examined the capacities and security plans of the organizations, exploring for vulnerabilities that might permit circumvention by terrorists.

This report addresses:

- a. Security at Sea Ports and Airports;
- b. Border Issues;
- c. Emergency Response and Intelligence Coordination in Canada;
- d. The Need for a National Security Policy.

While more work clearly needs to be done, the Committee's activities produced sufficient detail to raise concerns and to draw some conclusions on the state of Canadian security in the wake of Sept. 11, 2001.

## 1. Security at Sea Ports

The Committee emerged from its hearings concerned about a broad range of security issues related to organized crime activities at Canadian ports that increase Canada's vulnerability to terrorist activities.

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(89) Threats from non-state actors, like terrorists, using a variety of means possibly including chemical and biological weapons.

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### **A) Port Authority Focus**

Port Authorities, appropriately, are primarily concerned with the economic viability of the Ports that they administer. Port Authority officials in Montreal, Halifax and Vancouver testified as to the economic importance of their ports to local, regional and the national economies. All told us that a significant portion of containers they handle are in transit to U.S. destinations. For example, more than 60 per cent of the containers handled at the Port of Halifax is destined for the New England States and the Mid-West.

Port Authority officials indicated that they had relatively little responsibility for security. Security issues are dealt with primarily by companies renting space at ports, often using private security guards backed up by municipal police forces. In some ports there are joint task forces on crime, with representatives from Customs and Revenue, Immigration, municipal and provincial police forces (in Quebec), as well as the RCMP. The Committee found that these task forces were a helpful source of information on the infiltration of organized crime at the ports.

The Committee heard testimony that organized crime organizations are generally active within the ports. Law enforcement officials related their concerns about the degree of infiltration of these organizations. Neither the police nor the Port Authorities could give the Committee statistics outlining the value of containers and merchandise stolen at any of the ports. Claims are made to hundreds of insurance companies, but these thefts are often not reported to any centralized policing agency that could put together an accurate statistical picture of the scope of the problem. Police at the Port of Vancouver estimated that the \$4 million a year spent on policing and security at the Port represents a fraction of one percent of the proceeds of crime. They noted the enormous loss of tax revenue in this regard.

Customs officers told the Committee that criminals can make whole containers disappear as they are being unloaded from the ships, either arranging to have them smuggled directly out of the port or hiding them on port property for later looting. We heard testimony that inspectors rarely work alone because of the danger that something will happen to them. Containers had been known to be suspended over their vehicles during an inspection, to be “accidentally” dropped close to inspectors – a brutal warning that their lives are at risk.

Statistics presented to the Committee showed that an extraordinarily large

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percentage of port employees have criminal records. Police and other officials expressed concern that these people had chosen to work at ports because such employment presents opportunities for further criminal activity.

The implications of this lack of control of criminal activity at Canadian ports are clear. The Committee concluded that where organized crime flourishes, it does so because activities at any given port are beyond the control of the authorities in charge of the port.

Clearly, this lack of control creates fertile ground for terrorist activity, including covert immigration, and potentially the covert importation and shipment of weapons and other agents of mass destruction.

The Committee was presented evidence of clear-cut security lapses, such as the lack of adequate fencing and the absence of either effective pass systems or comprehensive background checks on people who work at Canadian ports or have access to them.

The Committee concluded that these lapses create national security problems, and must be addressed both in the interests of the economic viability of the ports themselves, and the security of Canadians and their North American neighbours.

The paramount concern of the Committee is the safety of Canadians. It is also concerned that there will be an inevitable and potentially debilitating economic impact on Canadian ports if U.S. border officials conclude that they are not secure. The U.S. government is likely to restrict container traffic from ports with reputations for criminal activity and the consequent potential for serious security breaches. When we raised this issue with members of the U.S. Congress, they admitted that many of their ports also had a major problem with organized crime, which they must address.

It is clear to the Committee that the attacks of September 11 on the United States have launched a major re-evaluation of the vulnerability of ports of entry into the United States and throughout the world. The Committee believes that significant enhancement of Canada's ports security is not only necessary, but inevitable, and the sooner the process begins, the better for Canada's economy and Canada's security.

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Those ports that improve security first will gain a comparative advantage.

**“The Committee is of the view that Canadian ports could improve their competitive position in North America by moving immediately to significantly enhance security.”**

### **B) Fences and Passes**

The Committee is not at all satisfied that a proper system of entry/exit control has been set in place at the marine ports visited. The Committee believes that the perimeter of the ports must be securely fenced, that entrances and exits must be closely controlled at all times of the day and night, 365 days of the year. Within the ports, highly sensitive areas should be closed off so they can be accessed only by those with proper security clearance.

Access to the restricted areas of the ports, and movement within the port generally, should be controlled by a system of electronic passes which would identify the card bearer and restrict that person's access to appropriate areas. These electronic passes are a perfect example of how exploiting technology can increase the effectiveness of security.

An electronic system, as opposed to a simple photo identity card, would permit varying levels of security, depending on the duties and security clearance of the pass holder. While electronic passes are not foolproof, they can be automatically deactivated when the holder leaves his or her employment. The success of any system, of course, depends on prompt reporting of the loss or misplacement of all passes.

**“The Committee recommends a full review of the fencing and entry/exit security systems currently in place at Canada's significant ports to determine their adequacy. This review should also consider the introduction of national standards for port security systems.”**

### **C) National Screening System**

The system of electronic passes must be reinforced by the introduction of a proper screening system for port employees that will include police and security

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background checks. Canada Customs officers testified that they were occasionally subjected to acts of intimidation by dockworkers during patrols, or while engaged in searches.

The widespread theft of containers and the number of break-ins at ports are disturbing indicators of a high level of criminal activity. The Committee was struck by police comments concerning the sizable percentage of dockworkers with criminal records and the seeming lack of concern about this on the part of most Port employers and Port Authorities.

At the Port of Montreal, the Committee was told that roughly 15 per cent of longshoremen and 36 per cent of checkers have serious criminal records. At the Port of Halifax, police told the Committee that 187 of 500 employees (39 per cent) whose records the police checked had serious criminal records. At the Port of Charlottetown, it was 28 of 51 (54 per cent).

The Committee is certainly concerned with the sizable percentage of employees with criminal records. But it also believes that criminal elements are unlikely to have a zealous interest in countering terrorist activities, and may knowingly or unknowingly engage in acts that assist terrorists. Even their relentless efforts to prevent Port Authorities from exercising control over activities at a port, so that they can go about their illegal activities, plays into the hands of any would-be terrorists who might be deterred by a more effective level of supervision.

The Committee is unanimous in its belief that an enhanced capacity to screen port employees for criminal activity, as well as for security reasons, is essential to reassure Canadians and Canada's trading partners that our ports do not constitute a danger to their well-being.

Police expressed concern that unions continue to exercise excessive control over the functioning of ports.

This is exemplified by the traditional hiring hall model, whereby employers request the number of employees they need and the union determines who gets selected and where they will work.

**“The Committee recommends the introduction of a compulsory background screening system at significant ports to identify from among**

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**those employees or candidates for employment those persons who are identified by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service as posing a security risk.”**

### **D) Issues Relating to Maritime Commerce**

The Committee is of the view that the complexity and costs of providing adequate security at Canada’s sea and inland ports is not widely understood. The resource needs of the agencies responsible for security at Canadian ports (Canada Customs, Immigration and the RCMP, as well as municipal police), are not adequately funded to deal effectively with either criminal activity or the potential for terrorist acts.

Canada Customs and the RCMP rely heavily on information from informants and officials in foreign countries, together with statistical analysis of previous problems, to target their work. They explained to the Committee that, absent the resources to examine every container – and hundreds of thousands move through Canadian ports and border crossings each year – intelligence is essential.

Canada Customs and Revenue Agency officials testified that three per cent of cargo containers are routinely searched. The Committee learned that this degree of vigilance is not based on any study, or any sophisticated knowledge as to the optimal level of inspection that might produce an acceptable level of compliance and security. Rather it is based on the financial resources made available to hire and equip inspectors. While it should be noted that Canada’s inspection rate is more than double the average at ports in the United States, that in no way demonstrates that it is sufficient to deter widespread circumvention.

Technology offers a new way of inspecting the contents of a container that is more thorough than just opening the back and looking inside, and much less labour intensive than completely unloading and inspecting the contents.

Customs officials at the port of Vancouver demonstrated a mobile machine capable of X-raying a container at the rate of one foot per second. Within a minute, it allows Customs officials to “see” into a container and, on this basis, decide whether it should be “targeted” for a full inspection. This is another

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example of how technology can increase the effectiveness of security measures. The U.S. is moving forward quickly with technology.

**“The Committee recommends that in Canada’s ports the Customs and Revenue Agency:**

- a. conduct a sensitivity analysis to determine what level of examination of containers will provide effective security; and**
- b. receive the funding necessary to equip significant ports and major border crossings with X-ray machines and other appropriate technology to inspect high risk containers.”**

### **E) National Enforcement Strategy for Security in Ports.**

The Committee has doubts about the capacity of individual enforcement agencies to deal with the overall security and organized crime risks at the seaports. The inability to ensure effective security control of commerce at the ports could have a devastating impact on their economic viability.

**“The committee recommends that a public inquiry, under the *Inquiries Act* into significant ports be established, with a mandate that would include:**

- a. a major review of security at the ports and the development of a national approach to recruiting, training, and the retention of security personnel;**
- b. examination of the degree of control that organized crime has over Canadian sea port operations, as well as the relationship between such control and threats to national security;**
- c. an assessment of the potential for use of Canadian ports to further terrorism;**
- d. a comprehensive review of the customs, policing and security resources, including the role of private security agencies, which are required at ports;**

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- e. a review of the effectiveness of customs inspections of vessels and cargo arriving at Canadian ports; and
- f. a review of hiring practices at Canadian ports.”

### **F) Universal Set of Security Standards**

The sooner security threats can be identified, and the farther away from Canadian shores they are identified, the greater is the likelihood that they can be countered.

In Washington, the Committee was briefed by Commander Stephen Flynn, a representative of the U.S. Coast Guard and Senior Fellow in the National Security Studies Program at the Council on Foreign Relations about his proposed reforms to the international transportation system that would enhance this objective. The reforms would begin at the world’s seven greatest ports, through which most of the world’s sea traffic moves. The thought being if the seven ports agree, others would quickly follow to remain competitive.

These ports would be persuaded to agree to a universal set of effective security standards. In return for adopting these standards they would receive preferential access to the United States.

Containers would be loaded at inspected, well-supervised facilities that qualify as secure under this universal set of standards. The loaded containers would be equipped with monitors that would record any attempt to tamper with their seals. Movement of the containers would then be monitored through the use of a global positioning system.

Members of Congress and other administration officials who met with the Committee supported the thrust of this proposal.

**“The Committee recommends the Flynn model of enhanced port security with preferential access should be monitored closely and examined further.”**



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## G) Small Ports and Harbours

Of course, heavier security at major ports is not enough. Canada has thousands of kilometres of coastline, and hundreds of harbours and small ports with little or no security. On the East Coast there is a volunteer watch in some harbours and small ports. The RCMP employs a limited number of small boats which can be used for patrol purposes. On the East Coast there is one RCMP vessel which has open sea capability and a second on order.

There are occasional Aurora over flights, and the Navy has set aside a limited number of days to assist Fisheries and Oceans and the RCMP. Notwithstanding this, the Committee heard testimony from police and customs that Canada has no effective system to scrutinize foreign vessels landing outside major ports.

**“The Committee recommends that the issue of the security of Canada’s coastline be examined, and a plan developed to broaden and tighten its security.”**

## 2. Airport Security

### A) Pass System

The Committee visited Vancouver International and Montreal’s Dorval Airport. In the course of these visits the committee heard evidence concerning different types of security passes and systems. None of the people briefing the committee were able to indicate how many passes are in circulation across the nation, but all estimates were in the tens of thousands.

As already noted in the discussion of security in seaports, the Committee believes that use of electronic passes will allow the airport authorities to greatly enhance the effectiveness of airport security at a very low relative cost.

The passes varied in character from photo-ID, with different colours for different areas, to electronic passes encoded with information about the bearer. The

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latter can be programmed so that the bearer can only enter certain areas. They can also be deactivated if the need arises.

Controlling passes is complicated by the fact that pass holders work for scores of different companies. While a background check of new employees is carried out by the RCMP and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Committee did not hear of any follow-up investigation of unsuitable candidates, nor receive any information about the number of employees denied a pass. Nor is it clear under what circumstances an employee might be asked to agree to additional security screening.

Of the tens of thousands of passes that are currently in circulation, the committee was advised that thousands cannot be accounted for, including those issued to employees of the defunct Canada 3000 airline, and others that have been lost, stolen or kept by employees who had quit their jobs without notice.

The Committee was struck by the freedom of access of employees who have airside passes, and appear to move relatively freely through restricted areas at airports.

**“The Committee recommends for airports:**

- a. that a nation-wide system of electronic identification (smart passes) be introduced to control movement through high risk security areas;**
- b. that a review be conducted of the entry and exit control systems that monitor the movement within secure areas of terminals and airport perimeters; and**
- c. that more rigorous security and police checks be undertaken on all prospective pass recipients.”**

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## B) Passenger and Baggage Screening

The Committee was told that while passengers are screened for metal objects that could be used as weapons, there has been no comprehensive screening for explosives.

Baggage checked receives significantly less screening than baggage carried, although an effort has been made to ensure that all baggage on a flight is matched to a passenger on board.

Given that many terrorists are prepared to commit suicide to achieve their ends, more rigorous inspection of both passengers and baggage is clearly in order.

The technology and equipment is available that will substantially increase the effectiveness of security measures and the safety of Canadians. All that remains is to acquire it and train staff how to use it.

**“The Committee recommends that equipment be installed at all airports designated by Transport Canada to ensure that all baggage and passengers are screened for weapons and explosives and that, as reliable equipment capable of detecting the presence of chemical or biological or bacteriological agents becomes available, it also be installed.”<sup>(90)</sup>”**

## C) Private Security Companies

The Committee was also briefed on the low pay and high turnover of employees of security companies currently screening passengers at airports. Airport authorities stressed the importance of this work, the problems associated with boredom on the job, the paucity of training provided to those doing the screening, and the difficulty private security companies have retaining experienced personnel. The Committee also noted that inspection standards vary from airport to airport.

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(90) The recent federal budget included funding to implement this recommendation.

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The Committee noted widespread dissatisfaction with the fact that this work is routinely sub-contracted to the lowest bidder, with little to indicate that this practice will change.

**“The Committee recommends that a federal agency be created that will be responsible for selection, training, and supervision of persons and systems responsible for passenger and baggage screening at airports, and that this agency report to the RCMP.<sup>(91)</sup>”**

## **D) Mail and Cargo Delivery**

The Committee did not have the opportunity to assess the security measures in place to deal with the millions of pieces of mail and packages that are processed daily at airports. The guaranteed time-line for delivery of courier packages and mail presents challenges to security. Tight delivery schedules mitigate against adequate time allotments for security inspection. This of particular concern given the massive volume of packages processed by courier companies and Canada Post flowing through Canada’s airports.

The Committee notes that this probably represents another opportunity to use technology to increase the effectiveness of security.

**“The Committee recommends that the movement of mail and parcels at airports be reviewed to ensure adequate security inspection.”**

## **3. Border Issues**

### **A) Trade issues**

The Committee heard evidence from both Canadian and American witnesses that the rapid and assured transit of cross -border goods is a major economic

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(91) The recent federal budget included funding to implement this recommendation. The Committee is recommending a different approach to security in seaports and airports because seaports are oriented toward cargo and airports toward passengers.

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priority. The enormous volume of border trade – approximately \$1.9 billion (CDN) in goods and services each day – is vital to Canada’s economic well being. Pre-clearance procedures must be developed to ensure the rapid flow of *low-risk* shipments across the border.

It is essential that a system be developed that creates a “smart border” through the use of technology and integrated enforcement agencies. Smart, sophisticated border systems have proven that they can reliably ensure the rapid transit of cargo and individuals clearly identified as being of low risk to security.

The decision immediately following the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks to tighten security and impose more rigorous across-the-board inspections at Canada-U.S. borders created huge delays for routine shipments at border crossings. Travelers and shippers accustomed to crossing borders in minutes were often forced to wait hours, with trucks lined up for miles, engines running, and drivers unable to sleep because of the need to keep creeping forward in line. The impact on the economic movement of perishable goods, as well as on-time delivery merchandise, was significant.

The Committee supports the 30 Point Action Plan embodied in the “smart border” declaration signed by Canada and the United States on 12 December 2001. The Plan has not yet been ratified, but officials from both countries hope to implement it by June. The plan would utilize existing, tested technology that has shown that it can combine speed-of-movement for identifiable low-risk crossings with effective border security. The plan also recognizes that both countries have finite resources, and that close cooperation is essential.

Delays at Canadian-U.S. borders are currently not substantially longer than they were before 11 September, but part of this improvement results from a significantly reduced volume of traffic. Reduced traffic means less tourism and reduced economic activity dependant on imports and exports. Each country recognizes the importance of maximizing border volume while minimizing security risks, and pilot projects with smart border systems have proven that this is attainable.

**B) Canada Customs and Revenue Agency Staffing and Working Conditions**

During the fact-finding trips of the Committee to the west and east coasts of Canada, the Committee learned from both union representatives and management that the Canadian Customs service is under-staffed. From the unions' viewpoint this means that, during the day, too many border posts are staffed by a lone customs officer, without the possibility of immediate support from either immigration officers or police.

The Committee heard from customs inspectors that while three out of the four agencies on Canada-U.S. borders are allowed to carry arms, they are not. The inspectors believed that they need weapons to back up their designated authority to prevent illegal crossings at border points, and provided the Committee with a number of examples where they were unable to do so.

The Union representing Customs Inspectors noted that part-time students carry out almost the same duties as permanent Customs officers, but the students receive only two to three weeks of training, rather than the eight to ten required of permanent officers.

**“The Committee recommends that:**

- a. the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency insures that all personnel on the primary inspection line are trained to the highest standard;**
- b. the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency insure that no Customs Officers work alone at posts.”**

**“The Committee has not been persuaded that Customs officers should be armed.”**

In Washington, the Committee listened to Members of Congress complain about the inadequate resources the U.S. government allocates on their side of the border, including under-staffed border crossings. Since the Committee does not believe Canadian posts should be staffed by a single Customs officer, a combined Canada-United States post may turn out to be the optimal solution at many locations.

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The Canada-U.S. border is already considered to be the world's best example of how two countries can avoid the two extremes of a traditional, restricted border with its paralyzing red tape, and a full customs union, with the lessening of each member's political autonomy such a union implies. The Canada-United States agreement to work toward a "smart border" should meet the economic and political needs of a border that is secure, yet encourages the free flow of people and goods.

### **4. A Fundamental Challenge Facing the RCMP and CSIS**

The Committee heard evidence that both the RCMP and CSIS have experienced difficulty recruiting analysts and officers with the linguistic, religious and cultural backgrounds necessary to help them carry out sophisticated missions. The gathering of intelligence is a time-consuming and complex task, but it is perhaps the key ingredient to dealing effectively with the covert activities of terrorists.

**"In the view of the Committee, solving this problem will be considered a test of the leadership of the Commissioner of the RCMP and of the Director of CSIS."**

### **5. Canadian Security and Intelligence Service**

Based on testimony from several witnesses, the Committee concluded that the current government funding that CSIS receives does not permit it to gather significant amounts of foreign intelligence outside Canada, even though it has the legal and parliamentary authority to operate beyond Canadian borders. The Committee believes that CSIS must be mandated to expand its capacity to gather foreign intelligence.

Again, the sooner and farther from Canada's borders threats can be identified, the better they can be addressed. Effective foreign intelligence can minimize the risk of terrorism, both to Canadians, and its neighbours. Canada is not a large enough country to develop military might on the scale of the United

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States or some European countries. Canada's forte in the fight against terrorism should be intelligence, but at the moment Canada's intelligence capacity is inadequately funded.

A former Deputy Director of CSIS and a former Commissioner of the RCMP agreed that developing an off-shore intelligence capability within CSIS should be a priority. The Committee fully agrees with one expert witness's testimony: "The first line of defence against terrorism is intelligence."

The Committee learned that CSIS liaison agents are overburdened with the number of refugee and immigration claimant verifications they must process at overseas posts. The budget reductions at CSIS have resulted in fewer CSIS resources trying to cover a larger volume of work.

The Security and Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), in its 2000-2001 Report, stated that CSIS conducted 125,928 background checks on potential immigrants and refugees to Canada, and reviewed 161,895 citizenship applications.

CSIS staff have been overwhelmed by the backlog. Delays in processing applications keep lengthening. The SIRC Report states that CSIS took an average of two years to report to Citizenship and Immigration Canada on cases that raised security concerns.

### **"The Committee recommends**

- a. that the lengthy delay in processing of Citizenship and Immigration Canada applications by the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service is unacceptable and that sufficient resources should be allocated to deal with delays; and**
- b. that CSIS should be instructed to upgrade its intelligence operations overseas."**



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## 6. Oversight Requirements

Only the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service and the Communications Security Establishment have formal oversight review agencies. The Committee notes that the following departments and agencies are involved in intelligence gathering:

- Department of the Solicitor General, (National Counter-Terrorism Plan);
- the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, (Criminal Intelligence Directorate);
- the Department of National Defence (Director General Intelligence Division);
- the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness (Information sharing with the security and intelligence community);
- the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Security and Intelligence Bureau);
- Citizenship and Immigration Canada;
- The Canada Customs and Revenue Agency; and
- the Privy Council Office (Security and Intelligence and Intelligence Assessment Secretariat).

The Committee notes that only two of these ten organizations engaged in this very serious and critical activity are subject to any external review process.

**“The Committee recommends that there be an examination to determine which, if any, additional government departments or agencies beside the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service and the Communications Security Establishment require oversight bodies.”**

## 7. The Need for a National Security Policy

As the Committee proceeded, hearing more witnesses and visiting more locations in the field, it became increasingly evident that executive direction and coordination of activities is required when dealing with national incidents, whether natural (eg. ice storm, floods, earth quakes), accidental (eg. toxic derailments, major oil spills), or premeditated acts of terror (eg. Air India, Sept 11/01).

There is no national security policy that agencies at all levels of government can use as standard operating procedures or “concepts of operations.” Organizational charts reveal that the responsibility for major incidents is fragmented and relegated to different Ministries.

For instance, the Solicitor General is responsible for national security issues; the Minister of National Defence for military involvement and natural disasters. A host of other departments play a part in the management of catastrophic incidents. Each situation is pretty well treated on an ad hoc basis, requiring individuals at all levels of response (often different on each occasion) to relearn lessons of the past.

There are questions as to the level of coordination between the numerous departments and agencies involved in intelligence gathering and analysis. Each of several organizations collects, coordinates, analyzes and disseminates intelligence information in a different manner. Some do so strictly for their own internal audiences, while others forward some of their intelligence to an under-staffed section of the Privy Council Office for assimilation into a package to guide senior government officials.

The Committee received a written submission from The Medical Officer of Health of the City of Toronto, a “first responder” to disasters, who was clearly distressed at the lack of coordination and planning as it affected her office: “There is a clear need for better coordination among local first responders, health service providers at all levels and various provincial and federal departments in the areas of:

- a. Sharing plans, resources, and intelligence;
- b. Scenario – based contingency planning;

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- c. Tabletop exercises, training and drills;
- d. Inventory management, distribution and deployment; and
- e. Criteria and procedures for threat/risk assessment and associated protective measures for workers and the general public”(92).

The Committee was uneasy with testimony from representatives of D.N.D.’s Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP). While OCIPEP is admittedly in the early stages of developing its mandate, its representatives did not appear to have a good grasp of how their mandate should develop to address the protection of essential Canadian infrastructure. Since September 11, the agency’s role has become more critical, and the organization has been allocated additional resources.

OCIPEP should emerge as a key “facilitator” for municipal, provincial and federal agencies. It is essential for it to provide national leadership, and that it develop clear command procedures to deal with all kinds of emergency situations.

**“Given the importance of National Security issues, and the need to have procedures and policies in place before incidents happen, the Committee recommends that a study be undertaken to develop a National Security Policy, which will examine the roles of all levels of government.”**

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(92) See appendix for Dr. Basrur’s letter

# CANADIAN SECURITY AND MILITARY PREPAREDNESS

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## The Committee Makes the Following Recommendations

### DEFENCE

1. **The Committee recommends that to sustain the level of tasking required of them over the last eight years, the Canadian Forces need at least 75,000 trained effective personnel.**  
  
(p. 88, Part II A)
  
2. **The Committee accordingly recommends an immediate increase to the Department of National Defence baseline budget of \$4 billion.**  
  
(p. 97, Part II A)
  
3. **The Committee therefore recommends future annual budget increases, which are realistic, purpose-driven and adjusted for inflation.**  
  
(p.100, Part II A)
  
4. **The Committee believes that Defence Policy should flow from Foreign Policy and that a Foreign Policy review should precede a Defence review.**  
  
(p.104, Part II A)

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## **NATIONAL SECURITY**

- 5. The Committee recommends a full review of the fencing and entry/exit security systems currently in place at Canada's significant ports to determine their adequacy. This review should also consider the introduction of national standards for port security systems.**

(p. 111, Part II B)

- 6. The Committee recommends the introduction of a compulsory background screening system at significant ports to identify from among those employees or candidates for employment, those persons who are identified by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service as posing a security risk.**

(p. 112, Part II B)

- 7. The Committee recommends that in Canada's ports the Customs and Revenue Agency:**
- a. conduct sensitivity analysis to determine what level of examination of containers will provide effective security; and**
  - b. receive the funding necessary to equip significant ports and major border crossings with X Ray machines and other appropriate technology to inspect high risk containers.**

(p. 114, Part II B)

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8. **The committee recommends that a public inquiry, under the *Inquiries Act* into significant ports be established as soon as possible, with a mandate that would include:**
- a. **a major review of overall security at the ports and the development of a national approach to recruiting, training, and the retention of security personnel;**
  - b. **examination of the degree of control that organized crime has over Canadian sea port operations, as well as the relationship between such control and threats to national security;**
  - c. **an assessment of the potential for the use of Canadian ports to further terrorism;**
  - d. **a comprehensive review of the customs, policing and security resources, including the role of private security agencies, which are required at ports;**
  - e. **a review of the effectiveness of customs inspections of vessels and cargo arriving at Canadian ports; and**
  - f. **a review of hiring practices at Canadian ports.**

(p. 114, Part II B)

9. **The Committee recommends the Flynn model of enhanced Port security with preferential access should be monitored closely and examined further.**

(p. 115, Part II B)

10. **The Committee recommends that the issue of the security of Canada's coastline be examined, and a plan developed to broaden and tighten its security.**

(p. 116, Part II B)

## **CANADIAN SECURITY AND MILITARY PREPAREDNESS**

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**11. The Committee recommends for airports:**

- a. that a nation-wide system of electronic identification (smart passes) be introduced to control the movement through high risk security areas;**
- b. that a review be conducted of the entry and exit control systems that monitor the movement within secure areas of terminals and airport perimeters; and**
- c. that more rigorous security and police checks be undertaken on all prospective pass recipients.**

(p. 117, Part II B)

**12. The Committee recommends that equipment be installed at all airports designated by Transport Canada to ensure that all baggage and passengers are screened for weapons and explosives and that, as reliable equipment capable of detecting the presence of chemical or biological or bacteriological agents becomes available, it also be installed.**

(p. 118, Part II B)

**13. The Committee recommends that a federal agency be created that will be responsible for selection, training, and supervision of persons and systems responsible for passenger and baggage screening at airports, and that this agency report to the RCMP.**

(p. 119, Part II B)

**14. The Committee recommends that the movement of mail and parcels at airports be reviewed to ensure adequate security inspection.**

(p.119, Part II B)

## **CANADIAN SECURITY AND MILITARY PREPAREDNESS**

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**15. The Committee recommends that:**

- a. the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency ensure that all personnel on the primary inspection line are trained to the highest standard;**
- b. the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency ensure that no customs officers work alone at posts.**

(p.121, Part II B)

**16. The Committee has not been persuaded that Customs Officers should be armed.**

(p.121, Part II B)

**17. The Committee recommends:**

- a. that the lengthy delay in processing of Citizenship and Immigration Canada applications by the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service is unacceptable and that sufficient resources should be allocated to deal with delays; and**
- b. that CSIS should be instructed to upgrade its intelligence operations overseas.**

(p. 123, Part II B)

**18. The Committee recommends that there be an examination to determine which, if any, additional government departments or agencies beside the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Communications Security Establishment require oversight bodies.**

(p. 124, Part II B)



## **CANADIAN SECURITY AND MILITARY PREPAREDNESS**

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**19. Given the importance of National Security issues, and the need to have procedures and policies in place before incidents happen, the Committee recommends that a study be undertaken to develop a National Security Policy, which will examine the roles of all levels of government.**

(p. 126, Part II B)

**PART III**

**Proposed Order of Reference**

That the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence be authorized to examine and report on the need for a national security policy for Canada. In particular, the Committee shall be authorized to examine:

- a. the capability of the Department of National Defence to defend and protect the interests, people and territory of Canada and its ability to respond to or prevent a national emergency or attack;
- b. the working relationships between the various agencies involved in intelligence gathering, and how they collect, coordinate, analyze and disseminate information and how these functions might be enhanced;
- c. the mechanisms to review the performance and activities of the various agencies involved in intelligence gathering; and
- d. the security of our borders;

That the Committee report to the Senate no later than June 30, 2003, and that the Committee retain all powers necessary to publicize the findings of the Committee until July 30, 2003; and

That the Committee be permitted, notwithstanding usual practices, to deposit any report with the Clerk of the Senate, if the Senate is not then sitting, and that the report be deemed to have been tabled in the Chamber.



**APPENDIX I**

**MAJOR ISSUES IDENTIFIED BY THE COMMITTEE**

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**MAJOR SECURITY AND DEFENCE ISSUES IDENTIFIED BY THE COMMITTEE**

During its initial planning, the Committee identified a series of issues it wanted to address consistent with its order of reference from the Senate. This list of issues guided the subsequent work of the Committee as it developed its program of activities including inviting witnesses to hearings in Ottawa, arranging meetings with individuals and groups in various parts of Canada and organizing fact-finding visits. A record was kept of the issues discussed at each event as shown by the following matrix:

**Defence**

<b>Issue</b>	<b>Date of Fact-finding Visit or Committee Hearing in Ottawa</b> <i>(No. of Printed Proceedings is indicated)</i>
<p><b>Developing a strategic vision for the 21<sup>st</sup> century</b> Many have argued that budget cutbacks and events have overtaken the White Paper of 1994. A review of the White Paper could be turned into a study of the principles which should guide development of the Canadian Forces in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. What role will counter-terrorist operations play in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, and how well are the Canadian Forces organised, equipped and trained to undertake such operations?</p>	<p>July 18, 2001 (No. 1) October 15, 2001 (No.4) December 3, 2001 (No. 8)</p>

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<p><b>Review of Canada’s influence in the global arena.</b> What foreign and defence policies will best ensure and develop Canada’s future influence in the global arena and protect her vital interests?</p>	<p>July 18, 2001 (No. 1)  October 15, 2001 (No. 4)  December 3, 2001 (No. 8)  January 28, 2002 (No. 10)</p>
<p><b>Review of Canadian Forces Health Services.</b> Even before the attacks on the United States there was a need to review the medical care and treatment of personnel returning from UN missions and the services available to their families. Almost any level of participation in operations against the foreign bases of terrorists will intensify the pressure on medical and dental services and the problem of retaining qualified medical staff.</p>	<p>Western trip (Nov 2001)  Eastern trip (Jan 2002)  July 18, 2001 (No. 1)  December 10, 2001 (No. 9)</p>
<p><b>Quality of life.</b> To examine the current living standards of the junior ranks of the Canadian Forces and an evaluation of the effectiveness of the program to improve the quality of life for servicemen and women and their families. The issue of violence in military families would be a critical component of the study</p>	<p>Western trip (Nov 2001)  Eastern trip (Jan 2002)  July 18, 2001 (No.1)  December 3, 2001 (No. 8)  December 10, 2001 (No. 9)</p>
<p><b>Recruiting and retention.</b> Recruiting new personnel into all services and trades has become increasingly difficult in recent years as has the retention of specialists sought after by civilian employers. What are the present and future personnel requirements of the Canadian Forces and what trades will have to be developed to support the Revolution in Military Affairs in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century? What trades would participation in counter-terrorist operations require? To what degree do the</p>	<p>Montreal trip (Nov 2001)  Western trip (Nov 2001)  Eastern trip (Jan 2002)  July 18, 2001 (No. 1)  October 15, 2001 (No. 4)  December 3, 2001 (No. 8)  December 10, 2001 (No. 9)</p>

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<p>Canadian Forces intend to make the most of the present economic downturn to aggressively recruit new and highly skilled personnel? What pay and benefit packages will help to encourage present skilled personnel to stay in the Canadian Forces?</p>	
<p><b>Operations tempo-</b> The tempo of operations refers to the total number of missions undertaken by the Canadian Forces at any one time. These include fulfillment of treaty obligations, aid to the civil power, training and training exercises etc. as well as peacekeeping missions. Already heavily burdened, perhaps over-burdened, the Canadian Forces have just been assigned a new mission – to assist the United States “war” against international terrorists.</p>	<p>Montreal trip (Nov 2001)          Western trip (Nov 2001)          Eastern trip (Jan 2002)          July 18, 2001 (No. 1)          July 19, 2001 (No. 2)          October 1, 2001 (No. 3)          November 36, 2001 (No. 7)          December 3, 2001 (No. 8)</p>
<p><b>The Reserves</b> must provide the mobilization base for war. They include: the Supplementary Reserve, composed of retired (but not over aged) regular and reserve force members; the Canadian Rangers (who operate in the near and far North); the Cadet Instructor Cadre; the Naval Reserve; the Communications Reserve; the Air Reserve; and, the Militia, or Land Force Reserve. Although some progress has been made in restructuring the Land Force Reserves (Militia), they still lack a defined role in the Total Force concept, unlike the Naval Reserve, the Communications Reserve, etc.</p>	<p>Montreal trip (Nov 2001)          Western trip (Nov 2001)          Eastern trip (Jan 2002)          July 18, 2001 (No. 1)          July 19, 2001 (No. 2)          October 15, 2001 (No. 4)          November 26, 2001 (No. 7)          December 3, 2001 (No. 8)          December 10, 2001 (No. 9)</p>

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<p><b>Equipment, procurement and contracting out.</b> Some Canadian Forces equipment is at the end of its lifespan, but budget restrictions have delayed its replacement and reduced the quantity that will be replaced. There have been accusations from within and without the Forces that the procurement process has become unduly distorted by political considerations.</p>	<p>Montreal trip (Nov 2001)          Western trip (Nov 2001)          Eastern trip (Jan 2002)          Washington trip (Feb 2002)          July 18, 2001 (No. 1)          October 15, 2001 (No. 4)          October 22, 2001 (No. 5)          December 3, 2001 (No. 8)          December 10, 2001 (No. 9)</p>
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**Security**

<p><b>Issue</b></p>	<p><b>Date of Fact-finding Visit or Committee Hearing in Ottawa</b>  <i>(No. of Printed Proceedings is indicated)</i></p>
<p><b>Human resources and equipment: maintaining state of the art capacity.</b> Budget restrictions have compromised the ability of both the RCMP and the Security Intelligence Service to keep themselves at the forefront of technological change. Many investigations are dropped or not pursued aggressively because there is a shortage of trained personnel.</p>	<p>October 1, 2001 (No. 3)          October 15, 2001 (No. 4)          October 22, 2001 (no. 5)          October 29, 2001 (No. 6)          January 29, 2002 (No. 11)</p>

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<p><b>Access to encryption and cryptography equipment.</b> The relatively unrestricted sale of sophisticated encryption and cryptography equipment and programs threatens to eliminate an essential source of intelligence about the activities of spies, terrorists and criminals. This has complicated and sometimes frustrated investigations and has led to heavy expenditures on the development of counter-measures.</p>	<p>July 18, 2001 (No. 1)            July 19, 2001 (No. 2)            October 1, 2001 (No. 3)            October 15, 2001 (No. 4)</p>
<p><b>Threat of man-made environmental disasters.</b> A national catastrophe might be caused, whether accidentally or deliberately, by a foreign power or by terrorists. The continuing collapse of the industrial infrastructure in the countries once part of the Soviet Union raises the spectre of another nuclear “accident” caused by the “rust out” of nuclear facilities, equipment and weapons. Another wave of terror attacks in North America might involve the release of toxic bacteriological or chemical agents into the atmosphere.</p>	<p>July 19, 2001 (No. 2)            October 1, 2001 (No. 3)            October 29, 2001 (No. 6)</p>
<p><b>Transnational and cyber crime.</b> Like legitimate enterprises, crime has become international and global in its scope and can make use of the most advanced technology. This has profound implications for law enforcement and co-operation among police forces at the international level, and even for local policing.</p>	<p>July 18, 2001 (No. 1)            July 19, 2001 (No. 2)            October 1, 2001 (No. 3)            October 15, 2001 (No. 4)</p>



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**Joint Issues**

<b>Issue</b>	<b>Date of Fact-finding Visit or Committee Hearing in Ottawa</b> <i>(No. of Printed Proceedings is indicated)</i>
<p><b>Development of a National Security Policy.</b>            At present Canada does not have a specific National Security Policy that would place defence policy, foreign policy and internal security in context and relate them to each other. While the constitutional division of powers represents a challenge, the time may have come to develop and promote a national security policy that could be endorsed by all levels of government.</p>	<p>October 1, 2001 (No. 3)            October 15, 2001 (No. 4)            October 29, 2001 (No. 6)            November 26, 2001 (No. 7)            December 3, 2001 (No. 8)            January 29, 2002 (No. 11)</p>

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<p><b>Countering national threats, terrorism, asymmetric threats and cyber threats</b> The Committee could investigate and evaluate the relative importance of the threats posed to Canada and its allies by: hostile foreign governments; asymmetric threats of governments and terrorist groups; and cyber terrorism – the attempt to compromise or bring down the information systems which are the foundation of modern economies.</p>	<p>Montreal trip (Nov 2001)          Western trip (Nov 2001)          Eastern trip (Jan 2002)          Washington trip (Feb 2002)          July 18, 2001 (No. 1)          July 19, 2001 (No. 2)          October 1, 2001 (No. 3)          October 22, 2001 (No. 5)          October 29, 2001 (No. 6)          November 26, 2001 (No. 7)          December 10, 2001 (No. 9)          January 28, 2002 (No. 10)          January 29, 2002 (No.11)</p>
<p><b>Inter-agency cooperation / shared jurisdictions</b> In a federal system the difficulties of international and inter-agency co-operation can be compounded by the requirement of co-operation and co-ordination in shared jurisdictions. The Committee could investigate how well the various federal security organizations co-operate with each other and co-ordinate their activities, and how well they co-operate on both the international level and the provincial/territorial level with similar agencies.</p>	<p>Montreal trip (Nov 2001)          Western trip (Nov 2001)          Eastern trip (Jan 2002)          Washington trip (Feb 2002)          July 18, 2001 (No. 1)          July 19, 2001 (No. 2)          October 1, 2001 (No. 3)          October 15, 2001 (No. 4)          October 22, 2001 (No. 5)          October 29, 2001 (No. 6)          November 26, 2001 (No. 7)          December 3, 2001 (No. 8)          December 10, 2001 (No. 9)          January 28, 2002 (No. 10)          January 29, 2002 (No. 11)</p>

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**International Issues**

<b>Issue</b>	<b>Date of Fact-finding Visit or Committee Hearing in Ottawa</b> <i>(No. of Printed Proceedings is indicated)</i>
<p><b>NORAD</b>, the continuing importance of NORAD to North American air defence and to the security of Canadian and US air space;</p> <p><b>NATO enlargement</b> to the east and the development of a distinct European Security and Defence Identity, in addition to the traditional North Atlantic focus, will alter the nature of the alliance and have an as yet undetermined impact on Canadian defence and security policy;</p> <p><b>NATO Interoperability</b> or the need to ensure that the training and equipment of Canadian Forces personnel allows their full participation in NATO operations, is an ongoing concern that must be addressed;</p> <p><b>National Missile Defence</b>, the United States' plan to deploy a limited missile system to intercept and destroy incoming ballistic missiles, will have a profound effect on the future of Canadian-US military co-operation, particularly in NORAD, and on Canadian defence and foreign policy in general;</p>	<p>Washington trip (Feb 2002)</p> <p>July 18, 2001 (No. 1)</p> <p>October 15, 2001 (No. 4)</p> <p>December 3, 2001 (No. 8)</p> <p>January 28, 2002 (No. 10)</p>

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<p><b>Defence of North America</b> Homeland defence is an important issue for both the United States and Canada; it is time to discuss potential expansion of the Basic Defence Plan between Canada and the US to include a Joint North American Defence Command based on the NORAD model</p>	
<p><b>Border issues</b> - Canada's ability to prevent the its territory from becoming a free haven for those wishing to enter the United States illegally or to smuggle contraband into the United States has been called into question as has its ability to control its air space and offshore waters.</p>	<p>Montreal trip (Nov 2001)          Western trip (Nov 2001)          Eastern trip (Jan 2002)          Washington trip (Feb 2002)          July 18, 2001 (No. 1)          July 19, 2001 (No. 2)          October 1, 2001 (No. 3)          October 29, 2001 (No. 6)          January 28, 2002 (No. 10)          January 29, 2002 (No. 11)</p>
<p><b>The mandate of CSIS</b> is basically limited to the collection of intelligence in Canada and it has a limited role and capacity to operate in foreign countries. How has CSIS compensated for this restriction and has the restriction limited the ability of CSIS to give the government accurate and timely information about security threats? If it is decided that Canadian vital interests could be promoted by collecting intelligence abroad, should this responsibility be given to CSIS or to a separate body?</p>	<p>October 1, 2001 (No. 3)          October 22, 2001 (No. 5)          October 29, 2001 (No. 6)          January 28, 2002 (No. 10)          January 29, 2002 (No. 11)</p>



**APPENDIX II**

**LETTER FROM MEDICAL OFFICER OF HEALTH, Toronto**

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**Community & Neighbourhood Services**  
**Eric Gam**, Acting Commissioner

**Public Health**  
277 Victoria Street  
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Toronto, Ontario M5B 1W2

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Medical Officer of Health

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**Reply:**

January 29, 2002

Barbara Reynolds  
Senate Clerk  
Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence  
Senate of Canada  
Parliament Buildings  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0A4

Dear Ms. Reynolds:

**Re: Public Health Emergency Preparedness**

As Medical Officer of Health for the City of Toronto, I wish to bring to the attention of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence some of the issues faced by local public health officials in Canada's largest city.

As you are aware, the response to an emergency of any magnitude begins locally. Local first responders bear heavy responsibilities as a result of being first on the scene, serving as incident commanders, and being public spokespersons while under intense media scrutiny from the earliest moments onward. Yet local first responders tend to be on the margins of federal emergency planning, which only takes place in concert with provinces and territories. Similarly, local emergency plans are developed and tested without the regular inclusion of federal officials, resources or expertise. As a consequence, our collective ability to prepare for a major emergency in Canada is significantly diminished.

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### **LETTER FROM MEDICAL OFFICER OF HEALTH, Toronto**

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Lack of integration between federal, provincial and local emergency preparedness is a crucial gap that must be addressed, especially in a large urban centre such as Toronto.

Emergency planning has been a provincially mandated responsibility of public health units in Ontario for many years under the Health Protection and Promotion Act and the Emergency Plans Act. In general, we focus on the prevention and control of situations that could present a health hazard to the general public. This is accomplished through an extensive network of relationships with other first responders, hospitals, long term care institutions, physicians, laboratories, and community-based health and social service organizations.

In environmental emergencies (including chemical, radiological and nuclear threats), our role is to protect food and water supplies, to assess health risks, and to provide advice to the public to prevent or reduce adverse health impacts. Operationally, Public Health plays a supporting role to Police, Fire and Ambulance services as well as to the provincial Ministry of the Environment.

By contrast, Public Health is the lead agency for emergencies involving biological agents, as in the investigation and control of outbreaks and epidemics. In these situations, we conduct disease surveillance among hospitals and laboratories, investigate and counsel cases and contacts, and implement disease control measures such as immunization. Other first responders usually do not have direct operational responsibilities in these situations.

However, in emergencies involving biological terrorism – whether a series of defined threats or a potentially massive outbreak of unknown origin – Public Health’s lead role to investigate and control the spread of infectious disease can conflict with the operational responsibilities of other first responders. Recent anthrax-related events have demonstrated a clear need for better co-ordination among local first responders, health service providers at all levels, and various provincial and federal departments in the following areas:

- sharing plans, resources and intelligence;
- scenario-based contingency planning;
- tabletop exercises, training and drills;
- inventory management, distribution and deployment;
- criteria and procedures for threat / risk assessment and associated protective measures for workers and the general public.

Generic and scenario-specific protocols are needed that emphasize communication and response coordination across related services. For example, on-scene investigation and collection of evidence by police services must occur in a manner that enables relevant information to be shared with public health authorities, and vice versa. This would enable both services to benefit where appropriate from the information and intelligence

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that has been collected during their respective investigations. The use of a common planning framework (such as the Incident Command System) would also greatly increase our collective efficiency during the preparation, response and recovery phases of an emergency.

The January 1999 Report of the Special Senate Committee on Security and Intelligence provides an interesting perspective on some of these gaps. The section on Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons Attacks (p. 47) lacks any reference to public health needs or organizations, and its use of the term “first responders” refers largely to police, fire and ambulance services (p. 48). The Report’s recommendations pertaining to first responders do also apply to some public health needs, such as those which recommend that the federal government:

- support the training of first responders across Canada to identify and respond appropriately to a nuclear, biological or chemical attack;
- ensure that first responders receive the protective and diagnostic equipment they require to respond appropriately to such an attack;
- establish a national inventory of equipment and other assets available throughout the country to respond to a nuclear, biological or chemical attack;
- conduct regular joint training exercises among staff from the Department of National Defense, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and first responders throughout the country; and
- encourage the proliferation of training and equipping of first responders on the National Capital model or some enhanced version.

Unfortunately, from a local perspective it appears that these recommendations have only been partially implemented. The National Capital First Responders Committee’s plans and policies have not been documented or disseminated in a manner that would enable other municipalities to learn from their experiences. Despite recent federal and provincial budget announcements for enhanced emergency preparedness, first responders at the local municipal level do not yet have access to sufficient resources, training or in-kind support from any level of government to “ensure” they can respond appropriately to a nuclear, biological or chemical attack. As well, information sharing across government levels and departments remains very limited.

Greater public health capacity from a national perspective also appears to be needed in areas that include:

- real-time medical and hospital-based surveillance systems for the early detection of unusual disease patterns;
- rapid epidemiologic investigation of biological or other incidents in order to assess the human impacts arising from a recognized health hazard and to identify and evaluate the effectiveness of risk reduction measures;
- laboratory facilities (including containment procedures, reagents and training) for



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- rapid analysis of suspicious packages and samples where high level biohazards are suspected;
- stockpiles of vaccines, antimicrobials, personal protective equipment and related supplies;
- regional deployment of the federal inventory of emergency supplies and equipment to support the implementation of contingency plans arising from foreseeable scenarios, e.g. through the development and testing of “push packs”, a concept already used successfully in the U.S.;
- information and expertise on decontamination procedures, health risk assessments arising from chronic environmental exposures, and other aspects of consequence management;
- critical incident stress management, risk communication and mental health support for first responders, other exposed individuals and the general public; and
- review of current federal and provincial legislation to ensure that disease control measures requiring quarantine, the restricted movement of exposed individuals, and/or the designation of public or private buildings for isolation purposes can be undertaken quickly, effectively and with clear legal authority.

While the National Counter Terrorism Plan addresses lead agency roles at the national level as well as federal-provincial relationships, the plan fails to address adequately the role of first responders to terrorist incidents. National security and emergency preparedness discussions in Canada appear to be dealt with largely through federal/provincial/territorial processes that have no local representatives. A case in point is a recent national consultation by the federal Solicitor-General to identify needs and gaps in emergency preparedness. The choice of representatives at these consultations was at the exclusive discretion of each province; Toronto Public Health was informed of this process only by chance and after the final report had been written.

In Canada, a municipal government may request additional assistance to respond in an emergency from their province and then, if needed, from the federal government. During and between emergencies, the federal government plays a supporting role to provinces and has no direct access to a local municipality except through the respective province. Reliance on standard federal-provincial arrangements to plan and prepare for emergencies has precluded the development of a national approach that is inclusive of local first responders, including Public Health. The Canadian system of “bottom-up” response under provincial control stands in contrast to the United States, where emergency response is clearly a top down approach. The U.S. government provides on site response in the aftermath of an incident as well as training and resources for local emergency preparedness in accordance with national standards. Clearly a stronger federal role and local presence is required in Canada as well.

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**LETTER FROM MEDICAL OFFICER OF HEALTH, Toronto**

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Cities hold strategic importance for the country as sites of critical infrastructure, as potential terrorist targets, and as major population centres. Conversely, cities have the potential to be an invaluable resource to other levels of government and to smaller municipalities. Strong local capacity to prevent, contain and reduce the impact of an emergency has a direct bearing on the responsibilities and resource implications that would otherwise accrue to the provincial and federal governments. Major Canadian cities should be included as direct participants in federal emergency planning as a matter of national importance, as our inclusion can no longer be left solely to the discretion of provinces.

In summary, stronger federal support for local first responders, including Public Health, will assist governments at all levels to discharge their responsibilities more effectively and to reduce future costs to Canadians. Promising efforts are being made by Health Canada and the federal Solicitor General in this regard and should be recognized and supported. Nonetheless, jurisdictional sensitivities are a heavy obstacle to the proactive sharing of information and resources, even in the current environment of heightened political will among the major players to work co-operatively. The needs of local first responders, as well as the knowledge and expertise that is resident among them, must receive stronger recognition, and measures to ensure their direct participation in future federal planning activities must be developed.

I hope that this information has been useful and will inform the Committee's deliberations in a manner that helps to address our needs. I look forward to your final report.

Yours truly,

*Original signed by Dr. Basrur*

Dr. Sheela V. Basrur  
Medical Officer of Health

cc: Scott Dudgeon, Executive Director, Toronto District Health Council



**APPENDIX III**

**PEOPLE APPEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE**

---

**Addy**, Major General  
(ret'd) Clive  
National Past Chairman  
Federation of Military and  
United Services Institutes  
of Canada  
Oct. 15/01

**Allard**, The Honorable  
Wayne  
Ranking Member  
(Republican – Virginia)  
U.S. Senate Armed  
Services Committee  
Feb. 05/02

**Amos**, Chief Warrant  
Officer Bruce  
423 Maritime Helicopter  
Squadron  
12 Wing Shearwater  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Atkins**, Chief  
Superintendent Ian  
Criminal Operations  
Officer, H Division  
Royal Canadian Mounted  
Police  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Alexander**, Dr. Jane  
Deputy Director  
U.S. Defence Advanced Research  
Projects Agency (DARPA)  
Feb. 04/02

**Allen**, Mr. Jon  
Director General, North America  
Bureau  
Department of Foreign Affairs  
and International Trade  
Jan. 28/02

**Andrash**, Mr. P. (Duke)  
Sergeant 481  
Vancouver Police Department  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Atkinson**, Ms. Joan  
Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy  
and Program Development  
Department of Citizenship and  
Immigration  
Jan. 28/02

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### **PEOPLE APPEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE**

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**Badger**, Captain Chris J.  
Vice President, Operations  
Vancouver Port Authority  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Bartley**, Mr. Alan  
Director General, Policy  
Planning and Readiness,  
Office of Critical  
Infrastructure Protection  
and Emergency  
Preparedness  
Department of National  
Defence  
July 19/01

**Bastien**, Commander Yves  
Formation Administration  
Officer  
Maritime Forces Atlantic  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Barrett**, Major Roger R.  
Operational Officer, 2 RCR  
CFB Gaagetown  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Bastien**, Major-General Richard  
Deputy Commander of Air  
Assistant Chief of the Air Staff  
Department of National Defence  
Dec. 03/01

**Begley**, Inspector J.J. (Jim)  
Federal Policing Service  
Royal Canadian Mounted Police  
Nov. 18-22/01

**APPENDIX III**

**PEOPLE APPEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE**

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**Bell, Mr. Peter**  
Intelligence Analyst  
Organized Crime Agency  
of British Columbia  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Belzile, Lieutenant-General**  
(ret'd) Charles  
Chairman  
Conference of Defence  
Associations  
Oct. 15/01

**Bishop Jr., The Honorable**  
Sanford D.  
(Democrat – Georgia)  
U.S. House Select  
Committee on Intelligence  
Feb. 05/02

**Black, Lieutenant Colonel Dean**  
C.  
Commanding Officer, 403  
Squadron  
CFB Gagetown  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Bland, Professor Douglas**  
Chair of Defence  
Management Program  
School of Policy Studies  
Queen's University  
Oct. 29/01

**Boisjoli, Lieutenant-**  
Commmander André  
Commanding Officer, HMCS  
Glace Bay  
Maritime Forces Atlantic  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Bolton, Lieutenant Colonel**  
Bruce D.  
Commanding Officer  
The Black Watch, Royal  
Highland Regiment of  
Canada  
Nov. 5-6/01

**Bon, Mr. Daniel**  
Director General, Policy Planning,  
Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy  
Department of National Defence  
July 18/01

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**Bradley**, Corporal John  
Imagery Technician  
17 Wing Imaging and  
Associate Air Force  
Historian  
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Nov. 18-22/01

**Buck**, Vice-Admiral Ron  
Chief of the Maritime Staff  
Department of National  
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Dec. 03/01

**Burke**, Mr. Sean  
Research Associate,  
National Security Studies,  
Council on Foreign  
Relations  
Feb. 04/02

**Calder**, Mr. Kenneth  
Assistant Deputy Minister,  
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Nov. 26/01

**Bramah**, Mr. Brian  
Regional Director,  
Transport Canada  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Bullock**, Ms. Margaret  
Manager, Security Awareness,  
Policy and Regulatory Corporate  
Security  
Air Canada  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Burke**, Captain (N) Greg  
Chief of Staff, Maritime Forces  
Atlantic  
Department of National Defence  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Cameron**, Colonel Scott  
Director of Medical Policy on the  
staff of the Director General  
Health Services (DGHS)  
Department of National Defence  
Dec. 10/01

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**Campbell**, Lieutenant-General Lloyd  
Commander of Air Command and Chief of the Air Staff  
Department of National Defence  
Dec. 03/01

**Charette**, Mr. Serge  
National President  
Customs Excise Union  
Douanes Accise (CEUDA)  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Cirincione**, Mr. Joseph  
Senior Director, Non Proliferation Project  
The Carnegie Foundation  
Feb. 05/02

**Coble**, The Honorable Howard  
Ranking Member  
(Republican, North Carolina)  
U.S. House Judiciary Committee  
Feb. 07/02

**Castonguay**, Staff Sergeant Charles  
Unit Commander  
Royal Canadian Mounted Police  
Nov. 5-6/01

**Chartrand**, Lieutenant-Commander Yves  
Acting Commanding Officer,  
HMCS Huron  
Maritime Forces Pacific  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Clapham**, Superintendent Ward D.  
Officer in Charge  
Royal Canadian Mounted Police  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Conyers, Jr.**, The Honorable John  
Ranking Member (Democrat – Michigan)  
U.S. House Judiciary Committee  
Feb. 07/02



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**Corcoran**, Mr. James  
Former Deputy Director,  
Operations  
Canadian Security and  
Intelligence Service  
Oct. 01/01

**Côté**, Mr. Bertin  
Deputy Head of Mission  
Canadian Embassy  
(Washington)  
Feb. 04-07/02

**Couture**, Lieutenant-  
General Christian  
Assistant Deputy Minister  
(Human Resources –  
Military)  
Department of National  
Defence  
Dec. 10/01

**Crouch**, Dr. Jack Dyer  
Assistant Secretary of  
Defence, International  
Security Policy  
Office of the U.S.  
Secretary of Defence  
Feb. 06/02

**Cormier**, Captain Michael P.  
Deputy Harbour Master  
Vancouver Port Authority  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Côté**, Mr. Yvan  
Investigator, Organized Crime  
Task Force  
Montreal Urban Community  
Police Department  
Nov. 05-06/01

**Creamer**, Mr. Dennis  
Vice-President, Finance and  
Administration  
Halifax Port Authority  
Jan. 22-24/020

**D'Avignon**, Mr. Michel  
Director General, National  
Security, Policing and Security  
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Solicitor General Canada  
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**PEOPLE APPEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE**

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**Davies, Ms. Krysta M.**  
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Specialist  
KPMG Investigation and  
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Oct. 01/01

**Davis, Chief Petty Officer First  
Class Kim**  
Formation Chief Petty Officer  
Maritime Forces Pacific  
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**Dawe, Mr. Dick**  
Manager, Personnel  
Support Programmes  
Maritime Forces Pacific  
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**De Riggi, Mr. Angelo**  
Intelligence Officer  
Organized Crime Task Force -  
Royal Canadian Mounted Police  
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**DeCuir, Brigadier-General  
Mike**  
Deputy Regional  
Commander  
Canadian NORAD Region  
Headquarters  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Devlin, Mr. W.A. (Bill)**  
Manager, Hub Development  
Vancouver International Airport  
Air Canada  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Dickenson, Mr. Lawrence  
T.**  
Assistant Secretary to the  
Cabinet  
Security and Intelligence  
Privy Council Office  
Oct. 29/01

**Dietrich, Chief Warrant Officer  
Dan**  
Chief Warrant Officer  
One Canadian Air Division  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Ditchfield, Mr. Peter**  
Deputy Chief Officer  
Organized Crime Agency  
of British Columbia  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Dowler, Chief Petty Officer First  
Class George**  
Maritime Forces Atlantic  
Jan. 22-24/02

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### **PEOPLE APPEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE**

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**Doyle**, Lieutenant Colonel  
Bert  
Commanding Officer, 402  
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17 Wing Winnipeg  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Duguay**, Mr. Yves  
Senior Director  
Corporate Security Risk  
Management  
Air Canada  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Enger**, Inspector T.G.  
(Tonia)  
Operations Officer  
Royal Canadian Mounted  
Police  
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**Fadden**, Mr. Richard  
Deputy Clerk, Counsel and  
Security Intelligence  
Coordinator  
Privy Council Office  
Jan. 29/02

**Falconer**, Captain Vic  
Formation Drug Education  
Coordinator, Formation  
Health Services (Pacific)  
Maritime Forces Pacific  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Droz**, Superintendent Pierre  
Criminal Operations  
Royal Canadian Mounted Police  
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**Dunn**, Major General Michael  
Vice Director, Strategic Plans and  
Policy  
The Pentagon  
Feb. 06/02

**Evans**, Ms. Daniela  
Chief, Customs Border Services  
Canada Customs and Revenue  
Agency  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Fagan**, Mr. John  
Director of Intelligence and  
Contraband, Atlantic Region  
Canada Customs and Revenue  
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Jan. 22-24/02

**Falkenrath**, Mr. Richard  
Senior Director  
U.S. Office of Homeland Security  
Feb. 07/02

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**Ferguson, Mr. Brian**  
Assistant Deputy Minister,  
Veterans Services  
Veterans Affairs Canada  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Flagel, Mr. Brian**  
Director, Airport Operations  
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**Flynn, Commander Steven**  
U.S. Coast Guard and  
Senior Fellow  
National Security Studies,  
Council on Foreign  
Relations  
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**Forcier, Commodore Jean-Yves**  
Chief of Staff J3, Deputy Chief of  
the Defence Staff  
Department of National Defence  
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**Forgie, Mr. John**  
Enforcement Supervisor,  
Vancouver  
Citizenship and  
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**Fraser, Rear-Admiral Jamie D.**  
Commander  
Maritime Forces Pacific  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Fraser, Ms. Sheila**  
Auditor General of Canada  
Office of the Auditor  
General of Canada  
Dec. 10/01

**Gauvin, Commodore Jacques J.**  
Acting Assistant Chief of the  
Maritime Staff  
Department of National Defence  
Dec. 03/01

**Giasson, Mr. Daniel**  
Director of Operations,  
Security and Intelligence  
Privy Council Office  
Jan. 29/02

**Gibbons, The Honorable Jim**  
Member (Republican – Nevada)  
U.S. House Select Committee on  
Intelligence  
Feb. 06/02

## **APPENDIX III PEOPLE APPEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE**

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**Gilbert**, Chief Warrant  
Officer Daniel  
Department of National  
Defence  
Dec. 03/01

**Goatbe**, Mr. Greg  
Director General, Program  
Strategy Directorate  
Canada Customs and Revenue  
Agency  
Jan. 28/02

**Goss**, The Honorable  
Porter  
Chair (Republican - Florida)  
U.S. House Select  
Committee on Intelligence  
Feb. 06/02

**Gotell**, Chief Warrant Officer  
Peter  
Operations  
12 Wing Shearwater  
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**Goupil**, Inspecteur Pierre  
Commandant  
Direction de la protection  
du territoire  
Unité d'urgence, région  
ouest  
Sûreté du Québec  
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**Grandy**, Mr. Brian  
Acting Regional Director, Atlantic  
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Jan. 22-24/02

**Guindon**, Captain (N) Paul  
Submarine Division  
Maritime Forces Atlantic  
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**Haeck**, Lieutenant Colonel Ken  
F.  
Commandant of Artillery School  
IFT  
CFB Gagetown  
Jan. 22-24/02

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**Harlick**, Mr. James  
Assistant Deputy Minister,  
Office of Critical  
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Defence  
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**Hatton**, Commander Gary  
Commanding Officer,  
HMCS Montreal  
Maritime Forces Atlantic  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Hearn**, Brigadier-General  
T.M.  
Director General  
Military Human Resources  
Policy and Planning  
Department of National  
Defence  
Dec. 10/01

**Henneberry**, Lieutenant-  
Commander, HMCS  
Nanaimo  
Maritime Air Force  
Command Pacific  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Harrison**, Captain (N) R.P.  
(Richard)  
Assistant Chief of Staff,  
Operations  
Maritime Forces Pacific  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Hazelton**, Lieutenant Colonel  
Spike C.M.  
Commandant of Armour School  
C2 SIM  
CFB Gagetown  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Henault**, General Raymond R.  
Chief of the Defence Staff  
Department of National Defence  
Dec. 03/01

**Herbert**, Mr. Ron  
Director General, National  
Operations Division  
Veterans Affairs Canada  
Jan. 22-24/02

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**Hincke**, Colonel Joe  
Commanding Officer  
12 Wing Shearwater  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Hines**, Colonel Glynne  
Director, Air Information  
Management, Chief of the Air  
Staff  
Department of National Defence  
July 18/01

**Hornbarger**, Mr. Chris  
Director  
U.S. Office of Homeland  
Security  
Feb. 07/02

**Hunter**, The Honorable Duncan  
Ranking Member, Subcommittee  
on Military Procurement  
(Republican – California)  
U.S. House Armed Services  
Committee  
Feb. 06/02

**Inkster**, Mr. Norman  
President, KPMG  
Investigation and Security  
Inc.  
Former Commissioner,  
Royal Canadian Mounted  
Police  
Oct. 01/01

**Issacs**, Sergeant Tony  
Search and Rescue Technician  
Maritime Forces Atlantic  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Jackson**, Ms. Gaynor  
Manager, Military Family  
Support Centre  
Maritime Forces Pacific  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Jeffery**, Lieutenant General M.K.  
Chief of the Land Staff  
Department of National Defence  
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**Joncas**, Chief Petty Officer  
First Class Serge  
Maritime Command Chief  
Petty Officer  
Department of National  
Defence  
Dec. 03/01

**Jurkowski**, Brigadier General  
(ret'd) David  
Former Chief of Staff, Joint  
Operations  
Department of National Defence  
Oct. 01/01

**Kasurak**, Mr. Peter  
Principal  
Office of the Auditor  
General of Canada  
Dec. 10/01

**Keane**, Mr. John  
Deputy Assistant Secretary,  
Bureau of Western Hemisphere  
Affairs  
U.S. Department of State  
Feb. 06/02

**Kee**, Mr. Graham  
Chief Security Officer  
Vancouver Port Authority  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Kelly**, Lieutenant Colonel W.J.  
Force Planning and Program  
Coordination,  
Vice Chief of the Defence Staff  
Department of National Defence  
July 18/01

**Kennedy**, Mr. Paul  
Senior Assistant Deputy  
Solicitor General  
Solicitor General Canada  
Jan. 28/02

**Khokhar**, Mr. Jamal  
Minister-Counsellor  
(Congressional Affairs)  
Canadian Embassy (Washington)  
Feb. 04/02

**Kiloh**, Insp. D.W. (Doug)  
Major Case Manager  
Royal Canadian Mounted  
Police  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Krause**, Lieutenant Colonel  
Wayne  
Commanding Officer, 423  
Maritime Helicopter Squadron  
12 Wing Shearwater  
Jan. 22-24/02



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**Kurzynski**, Major Perry  
Officer-in-charge, Search  
and Rescue Operations  
Centre  
Maritime Forces Atlantic  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Laing**, Captain (Navy) Kevin  
Director, Maritime Strategy,  
Chief of Maritime Staff  
Department of National  
Defence  
July 18/01

**Lenton**, Assistant  
Commissioner William  
Royal Canadian Mounted  
Police  
Jan. 28/02

**Levy**, Mr. Bruce  
Director, U.S. Transboundary  
Division  
Department of Foreign Affairs  
and International Trade  
Jan. 28/02

**Lucas**, Major General  
Steve  
Commander One Canadian  
Air Division /  
Canadian NORAD Region  
Headquarters  
Nov. 18-22/01

**LaFrance**, Mr. Albert  
Director, Northern New  
Brunswick District  
Canada Customs and Revenue  
Agency  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Leblanc**, Ms. Annie  
Acting Director,  
Technology and Lawful Access  
Division  
Solicitor General Canada  
July 19/01

**Lerhe**, Commodore E.J. (Eric)  
Commander, Canadian Fleet  
Pacific  
Maritime Forces Pacific  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Loeppky**, Deputy Commissioner  
Garry  
Operations  
Royal Canadian Mounted Police  
Oct. 22/01

**Lupien**, Chief Petty Officer First  
Class R.M.  
Canadian Forces Chief Warrant  
Officer  
Department of National Defence  
Dec. 03/01

**APPENDIX III**

**PEOPLE APPEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE**

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**Macdonald**, Lieutenant-  
General George  
Vice Chief of the Defence  
Staff  
Department of National  
Defence  
Jan. 28/02

**MacLeod**, Colonel Barry  
W.  
Commander 3 Area  
Support Group  
CFB Gagetown  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Maisonneuve**, Major-  
General J.O. Michel  
Assistant Deputy Chief of  
Defence Staff  
Department of National  
Defence  
Oct. 22/01

**Mason**, Mr. Dwight  
Joint Chief of Staff, U.S.  
Chair, Permanent Joint  
Board on Defence  
The Pentagon  
Feb. 06/02

**Mack**, Rear Admiral Ian  
Defence Attaché  
Canadian Embassy (Washington)  
Feb. 04/02

**Maher**, Lieutenant Earl  
4 ESR  
CFB Gagetown  
Jan. 21-24/02

**Malec**, Mr. George  
Assistant Harbour master  
Halifax Port Authority  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Mason**, Ms. Nancy  
Director, Office of Canadian  
Affairs, Bureau of Western  
Hemisphere Affairs  
U.S. Department of State  
Feb. 06/02

## **APPENDIX III PEOPLE APPEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE**

---

**Mason**, Lieutenant  
Colonel Dave  
Commanding Officer, 12  
Air Maintenance Squadron  
12 Wing Shearwater  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Massicotte**, Ms Olga  
Regional Director  
General/Atlantic  
Veterans Affairs Canada  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Mattie**, Chief Warrant  
Officer Fred  
12 Air Maintenance  
Squadron  
12 Wing Shearwater  
Jan. 22-24/02

**McIlhenny**, Mr. Bill  
Director for Canada and Mexico  
U.S. National Security Council  
Feb. 07/02

**McKinnon**, Chief David  
P.  
Chief of Police  
Halifax Regional Police  
Force  
Jan. 22-24/02

**McManus**, Lieutenant-Colonel  
J.J. (John)  
Commanding Officer, 443 (MH)  
Squadron  
Maritime Air Force Command  
Pacific  
Nov. 18-22/01

**McNeil**, Commodore  
Daniel  
Director, Force Planning  
and Program Coordination,  
Vice Chief of the Defence  
Staff  
Department of National  
Defence  
July 18/01

**Mercer**, Mr. Wayne  
Acting First Vice-President, Nova  
Scotia District Branch  
Customs Excise Union  
Douanes Accise (CEUDA)  
de la Nouvelle-Écosse  
Customs Excise Union  
Douanes Accise (CEUDA)  
Jan. 22-24/02

**APPENDIX III**

**PEOPLE APPEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE**

---

**Miller, Mr. Frank**  
Senior Director,  
President's Adviser on  
Military Matters  
U.S. National Security  
Council  
Feb. 07/02

**Mitchell, Mr. Barry**  
Director, Nova Scotia  
District  
Canada Customs and  
Revenue Agency  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Mogan, Mr. Darragh**  
Director General, Program  
and Service Policy  
Division, Veterans  
Services  
Veterans Affairs Canada  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Munger, Chief Warrant  
Officer JER**  
Office of Land Force  
Command  
Department of National  
Defence  
Dec. 03/01

**Minto, Mr. Shahid**  
Assistant Auditor General  
Office of the Auditor General of  
Canada  
Dec. 10/01

**Mitchell, Brigadier General Greg**  
Commander  
Land Forces Atlantic Area  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Morris, Ms. Linda**  
Director, Public Affairs  
Vancouver Port Authority  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Murphy, Captain (N) R.D. (Dan)**  
Deputy Commander, Canadian  
Fleet Pacific  
Maritime Forces Pacific  
Nov. 18-22/01

## **APPENDIX III**

### **PEOPLE APPEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE**

---

**Murray**, Ms. Anne C.  
Vice President  
Community and  
Environmental Affairs  
Vancouver International  
Airport Authority  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Narayan**, Mr. Francis  
Detector Dog Service  
Canada Customs and  
Revenue Agency  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Neville**, Lieutenant-  
Colonel Shirley  
Wing Administration  
Officer, Acting Wing  
Commander, 17 Wing  
17 Wing Winnipeg  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Newton**, Captain John F.  
Senior Staff Officer,  
Operations  
Maritime Forces Atlantic  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Murray**, Admiral (ret'd). Larry  
Deputy Minister  
Veterans Affairs Canada  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Neumann**, Ms. Susanne M.  
Compliance Verification Officer  
Customs – Compliance Mgt.  
Division  
Canada Customs and Revenue  
Agency  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Newberry**, Mr. Robert J.  
Principal Director, Territorial  
Security  
The Pentagon  
Feb. 06/02

**Nymark**, Ms. Christine  
Associate Assistant Deputy  
Minister  
Transport Canada  
Jan. 28/02

**APPENDIX III**

**PEOPLE APPEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE**

---

**O'Bright, Mr. Gary**  
Director General,  
Operations,  
Office of Critical  
Infrastructure Protection  
and Emergency  
Preparedness  
Department of National  
Defence  
July 19/01

**O'Hanlon, Mr. Michael**  
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy  
Studies  
The Brookings Institution  
Feb. 05/02

**O'Shea, Mr. Kevin**  
Director, U.S. General  
Relations Division  
Department of Foreign Affairs  
and International Trade  
Jan. 28/02

**Ortiz, The Honorable Solomon P.**  
Ranking Member, Subcommittee  
on Military Readiness (Democrat  
– Texas)  
U.S. House Armed Services  
Committee  
Feb. 06/02

**Paulson, Captain (N) Gary**  
Commanding Officer,  
HMCS Algonquin  
Maritime Forces Pacific  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Payne, Captain (N) Richard**  
Commanding Officer, Fleet  
Maintenance Facility Cape Scott  
Maritime Forces Atlantic  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Pearson, Lieutenant**  
Colonel Michael J.  
Commandant of Infantry  
School SAT  
CFB Gagetown  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Pellerin, Colonel (ret'd) Alain**  
Executive Director  
Conference of Defence  
Associations  
Oct. 15/01

## **APPENDIX III PEOPLE APPEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE**

---

**Peters**, Colonel William  
Director, Land Strategic  
Planning, Chief of the  
Land Staff  
Department of National  
Defence  
July 18/01

**Pichette**, Mr. Pierre-Paul  
Assistant Director,  
Montreal Urban  
Community Police  
Department  
Nov. 5-6/01

**Pile**, Captain (N) T.H.W.  
(Tyron)  
Commander, Maritime  
Operations Group Four  
Maritime Forces Pacific  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Pitman**, Mr. B.R. (Brian)  
Sergeant, Waterfront Joint  
Forces Operation,  
Vancouver  
Royal Canadian. Mounted  
Police  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Pharand**, M. Pierre  
Director, Airport Security  
Montréal Airports  
Nov. 5-6/01

**Pigeon**, Mr. Jean François  
Acting Director, Security  
Montreal Airports  
Nov. 5-6/01

**Pilgrim**, Superintendent J. Wayne  
Officer in Charge,  
National Security Investigations  
Branch,  
Criminal Intelligence Directorate  
Royal Canadian Mounted Police  
July 19/01

**Preece**, Captain (N) Christian  
Maritime Forces Atlantic  
Jan. 22-24/02

**APPENDIX III**

**PEOPLE APPEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE**

---

**Primeau, M. Pierre**  
Investigator  
Organized Crime Task  
Force – Royal Canadian  
Mounted Police  
Nov. 5-6/01

**Proulx, Assistant Commissioner**  
Richard  
Criminal Intelligence Directorate  
Royal Canadian Mounted Police  
Oct. 22/01

**Reed, The Honorable Jack**  
Chair (Democrat – Rhode  
Island)  
U.S. Senate Armed  
Services Committee  
Feb. 05/02

**Reid, Lieutenant Colonel Gord**  
Commandant, Canadian Forces  
Air Navigation School (CFANS)  
17 Wing Winnipeg  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Richmond, Mr. Craig**  
Vice President, Airport  
Operations  
Vancouver International  
Airport  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Rose, Mr. Frank**  
International Security Policy  
The Pentagon  
Feb. 06/02

**Ross, Major-General H.**  
Cameron  
Director General,  
International Security  
Policy  
Department of National  
Defence  
Jan. 28/02

**Rumsfeld, The Honorable**  
Donald  
U.S. Secretary of Defense  
Feb. 06/02



## **APPENDIX III**

### **PEOPLE APPEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE**

---

**Salesses**, Lieutenant  
Colonel Bob  
Logistics Directorate for  
Homeland Security  
The Pentagon  
Feb. 06/02

**Sensenbrenner, Jr.**, The  
Honorable F. James  
Chair (Republican –  
Wisconsin  
U.S. House Judiciary  
Committee  
Feb. 07/02

**Simmons**, Mr. Robert  
Deputy Director, Office of  
European Security and  
Political Affairs, Bureau of  
European and Eurasian  
Affairs  
U.S. Department of State  
Feb. 06/02

**Skelton**, The Honorable  
Ike  
Ranking Member  
(Democrat – Missouri)  
U.S. House Armed  
Services Committee  
Feb. 06/02

**Samson**, Brigadier-General  
Director General -  
Intelligence  
Department of National Defence  
Oct. 22/01

**Shapardanov**, Mr. Chris  
Counsellor, Political  
Canadian Embassy (Washington)  
Feb. 04/02

**Sinclair**, Ms. Jill  
Director General, International  
Security Bureau  
Department of Foreign Affairs  
and International Trade  
Jan. 28/02

**Slater**, Ms. Scenery C.  
District Program Officer  
Metro Vancouver District  
Canada Customs and Revenue  
Agency  
Nov. 18-22/01

**APPENDIX III**

**PEOPLE APPEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE**

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**Starck, Mr. Richard**  
Senior Counsel  
Federal Prosecution  
Service, Quebec Regional  
Office  
Department of Justice  
Nov. 5-6/01

**Stark, Lieutenant-Commander**  
Gary  
Commanding Officer, HMCS  
Whitehorse  
Maritime Forces Pacific  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Stewart, Mr. James**  
Civilian Human Resources  
Maritime Forces Atlantic  
Jan. 22-24/02

**St-Pierre, M. Jacquelin**  
Commanding Officer, Post 5  
Montreal Urban Community  
Police Department  
Nov. 5-6/01

**Stump, The Honorable**  
Bob  
Chair (Republican –  
Arizona)  
U.S. House Armed  
Services Committee  
Feb. 06/02

**Szczerbaniwicz, Lieutenant-**  
Colonel Gary  
Commanding Officer, 407  
Squadron  
Maritime Air Force Command  
Pacific  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Taylor, The Honorable**  
Gene  
Ranking Member,  
Subcommittee on Military  
Procurement (Democrat –  
Mississippi)  
U.S. House Armed  
Services Committee  
Feb. 06/02

**Taylor, Mr. Robert**  
Inspector,  
Vancouver Police Department  
Nov. 18-22/01

## **APPENDIX III**

### **PEOPLE APPEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE**

---

**Theilmann**, Mr. Mike  
Acting Director,  
Counter-Terrorism  
Division  
Solicitor General Canada  
July 19/01

**Verga**, Mr. Peter F.  
Special Assistant for  
Homeland Security  
The Pentagon  
Feb. 06/02

**Ward**, Colonel Mike J.  
Commander Combat  
Training Centre  
CFB Gagetown  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Warner**, The Honorable  
John  
Ranking Member  
(Republican – Virginia)  
U.S. Senate Armed  
Services Committee  
Feb. 05/02

**Tulenko**, Mr. Timothy  
Political-Military officer, Office  
of Canadian Affairs, Bureau of  
Western Hemisphere Affairs  
U.S. Department of State  
Feb. 06/02

**Wamback**, Lieutenant-  
Commander Arthur  
Commanding Officer, HMCS  
Windsor  
Maritime Forces Atlantic  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Wark**, Professor Wesley K.  
Associate Professor in the Dept.  
of History  
Munk Centre for International  
Studies  
Trinity College  
University of Toronto  
Oct. 01/01

**Watts**, Chief Warrant Officer  
Ernest  
3 Area Support Group  
CFB Gagetown  
Jan. 22-24/02

**APPENDIX III**

**PEOPLE APPEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE**

---

**Weldon**, The Honorable  
Curt  
Chair, Subcommittee on  
Military Procurement  
(Republican –  
Pennsylvania)  
U.S. House Armed  
Services Committee  
Feb. 06/02

**Whitburn**, Lieutenant Colonel  
Tom  
Squadron 435  
17 Wing Winnipeg  
Nov. 18-22/01

**Woodburn**, Commander  
William  
Commander, Submarine  
Division  
Maritime Forces Atlantic  
Jan. 22-24/02

**Zoom**,  
Detector dog  
Canada Customs and Revenue  
Agency  
Nov. 18-22/01

## **APPENDIX IV**

### **ORGANIZATIONS APPEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE**

---

12 Wing Shearwater  
17 Wing Winnipeg  
Air Canada  
Canada Customs & Revenue Agency  
Canadian Embassy (Washington)  
Canadian NORAD Region Headquarters  
Canadian Security & Intelligence Service  
CFB Gagetown  
Citizenship & Immigration Canada  
Conference of Defence Associations  
Customs Excise Union Douanes Accise (CEUDA)  
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade  
Department of Justice  
Department of National Defence  
Federation of Military & United Services Institutes of Canada  
Halifax Port Authority  
Halifax Regional Police Force  
KPMG Investigation & Security Inc.  
Land Forces Atlantic Area  
Maritime Air Force Command Pacific  
Maritime Forces Atlantic  
Maritime Forces Pacific  
Montreal Airports  
Montreal Urban Community Police Department  
National Security Studies, Council on Foreign Relations  
Office of the Auditor General of Canada  
Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defence  
One Canadian Air Division  
Organized Crime Agency of British Columbia  
Organized Crime Task Force – Royal Canadian Mounted Police  
Privy Council Office  
Royal Canadian Mounted Police  
Richmond City Detachment  
School of Policy Studies, Queen's University  
Solicitor General Canada

**APPENDIX IV**

**ORGANIZATIONS APPEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE**

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Sûreté du Québec  
 The Black Watch, Royal Highland Regiment of Canada  
 The Brookings Institution  
 The Carnegie Foundation  
 The Pentagon  
 Transport Canada  
 Trinity College  
 University of Toronto  
 U.S. Department of State  
 U.S. House Armed Services Committee  
 U.S. House Judiciary Committee  
 U.S. House Select Committee on Intelligence  
 U.S. National Security Council  
 U.S. Office of Homeland Security  
 U.S. Secretary of Defense  
 U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee  
 U.S. Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)  
 Vancouver International Airport  
 Vancouver International Airport Authority  
 Vancouver Police Department  
 Vancouver Port Authority  
 Veterans Affairs Canada

**APPENDIX V**

**STATISTICS ON COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES**

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# of Persons Whom The Committee Met	# of Organizations Appearing Before Committee	# of Hours
204	57	173.5



## APPENDIX VI LIST OF EXHIBITS

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- Exhibit #1: Conference of Defence Associations  
*(November 26, 2001, Issue no. 7)*
- Exhibit #2: Royal Canadian Military Institute  
*(November 26, 2001, Issue no. 7)*
- Exhibit #3: Council for Canadian Defence & Security in the 21st Century at the Centre for Military & Strategic Studies  
*(November 26, 2001, Issue no. 7)*
- Exhibit #4: Library of Parliament – Subject matter of Bill C-36  
*(November 26, 2001, Issue no. 7)*
- Exhibit #5: Department of National Defence – Maritime Forces Pacific  
*(December 10, 2001, Issue no. 9)*
- Exhibit #6: Port of Vancouver  
*(December 10, 2001, Issue no. 9)*
- Exhibit #7: City of Vancouver Police Department  
*(December 10, 2001, Issue no. 9)*
- Exhibit #8: Transport Canada  
*(December 10, 2001, Issue no. 9)*
- Exhibit #9: Vancouver International Airport  
*(December 10, 2001, Issue no. 9)*
- Exhibit #10: Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)  
*(December 10, 2001, Issue no. 9)*
- Exhibit #11: Canada Immigration  
*(December 10, 2001, Issue no. 9)*
- Exhibit #12: Canada Customs  
*(December 10, 2001, Issue no. 9)*



## **APPENDIX IV**

### **ORGANIZATIONS APPEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE**

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- Exhibit #13: Department of National Defence – One Canadian Air Division  
*(December 10, 2001, Issue no. 9)*
- Exhibit #14: Department of National Defence – 17 Wing Winnipeg  
*(December 10, 2001, Issue no. 9)*
- Exhibit #15: Air Canada  
*(December 10, 2001, Issue no. 9)*
- Exhibit #16: Department of National Defence – CFB Gagetown *(February 11, 2002, Issue No. 12)*
- Exhibit #17: Halifax Port Authority  
*(February 11, 2002, Issue No. 12)*
- Exhibit #18: Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)  
*(February 11, 2002, Issue No. 12)*
- Exhibit #19: Veterans Affairs Canada  
*(February 11, 2002, Issue No. 12)*
- Exhibit #20: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade  
*(February 11, 2002, Issue No. 12)*

**APPENDIX VII**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE**  
(Senator Atkins)

---

**SENATOR NORMAN K. ATKINS, D.C.L.**

Appointed to the Senate of Canada on July 2, 1986, Norman Atkins acquired more than 27 years of experience in the field of communications before assuming his responsibilities as a member of the upper chamber of Parliament.

Senator Atkins is a former President of Camp Associates Advertising Limited, a wholly Canadian-owned, full-service advertising agency, serving clients in the private and public sectors at home and abroad. He joined the agency in 1959 and served in a number of capacities prior to becoming President in 1968. Senator Atkins also played an active role within the advertising industry and was a Director of the Institute of Canadian Advertising between 1982 and 1985.

Senator Atkins is a Past President and Honourary Director of the Albany Club of Toronto and was the coordinating Chair of Diabetes Canada from 1982 to 1987. He has also served as a Director of the Juvenile Diabetes Foundation, the Dellcrest Children's Centre and the Institute for Political Involvement, as well as being Chair for the Camp Trillium-Rainbow Lake Fundraising Campaign.

Senator Atkins has a long personal history of political involvement, having contributed his time and energies to the service of the Progressive Conservative Party at both the national and provincial levels for more than three decades. He has held senior organizational responsibility in a number of election campaigns and has served as an advisor to the Prime Minister, Rt. Hon. Brian Mulroney; The Rt. Hon. Robert L. Stanfield, former Leader of the PC Party of Canada and to the Hon. William G. Davis, former Premier of Ontario.

Senator Atkins served as National Campaign Chair during the 1984 federal election when a Progressive Conservative government was elected, and on August 1, 1986, he was named National Chair of Organization for the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada by the Rt. Hon. Brian Mulroney.

Most recently, Senator Atkins served as National Campaign Chair for the 1988 federal campaign, which concluded with the election of a historic second Progressive Conservative majority government.

Senator Atkins is presently the Chair of the Progressive Conservative Senate Caucus. He previously served as Chair of the National Caucus from 1993-97. He is currently Deputy Chair of Internal, Economy, Budgets and Administration, a member of the Defence and Security Committee and the Veterans Affairs

## **APPENDIX VII**

### **BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE**

(Senator Atkins)

---

Committee.

Since 1988, Senator Atkins has been involved in a number of special projects and community activities including working closely in the development and implementation of the Federated Health Campaign in Ontario and the Healthpartners campaign in the Federal Public Service.

Senator Atkins was born in Glen Ridge, New Jersey. His family is from Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, where he has spent a great deal of time over the years. He is a graduate of Appleby College in Oakville, Ontario and of Acadia University in Wolfville, Nova Scotia, where he completed the Bachelor of Arts program in 1957. Senator Atkins subsequently received an Honourary Doctorate in Civil Law in 2000, from Acadia University.

Over the years, Senator Atkins has been involved both politically, in the community and with charities, as an organizer and a participant in a number of important causes and events.

- 1997-1999 Chair Camp Trillium-Rainbow Lake Fundraising Campaign
- 1997\* Chair of the PC Senate Caucus
- 1993-97 Chair of the PC National Caucus
- 1992 Director and member of Bid Steering Committee Expo 98 Corporation for the City of Toronto
- 1990 Member of Bid Steering Committee, Expo 2000 for the City of Toronto
- 1988 Federal election campaign (National Campaign Chair)
- 1986 Appointed National Chair of Organization, P.C. Party of Canada
- 1985 Ontario leadership campaign (Campaign Chair for Larry Grossman)
- 1985 Ontario leadership campaign (Campaign Chair for Roy McMurtry)
- 1984 Federal election campaign (National Campaign Chair)

**APPENDIX VII**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE**  
(Senator Atkins)

---

- 1983 Bermuda general election (Senior Consultant to the United Bermuda Party)
- 1982 New Brunswick provincial election campaign (Communications Coordinator and Organization Advisory)
- 1982 Newfoundland provincial election campaign (Campaign Communications Advisor)
- 1981 Ontario provincial election campaign (Campaign Chair)
- 1979 Newfoundland provincial election campaign (Communications Coordinator and Organization Advisory)
- 1978 New Brunswick provincial election campaign (Communications and Organization Advisor)
- 1977 Ontario provincial election campaign (Campaign Co-Chair)
- 1975 Ontario provincial election campaign (Campaign Manager)
- 1974 Federal election campaign (Director of Operations)
- 1974 New Brunswick provincial election campaign (Communications and Organization Advisor)
- 1972 Federal election campaign (Communications Co-ordinator)
- 1971 Ontario provincial election campaign (Campaign Manager)
- 1971 Ontario leadership campaign (Campaign Chair for Allan Lawrence)
- 1970 Prince Edward Island provincial campaign (Communications and Organization Advisor)
- 1970 Nova Scotia provincial election campaign (Communications Co-ordinator)
- 1970 New Brunswick provincial election campaign (Organization Advisory)

**APPENDIX VII**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE**  
**(Senator Atkins)**

---

- 1968 Federal election campaign (Campaign Manager in Don Valley riding for D.K.Camp)
- 1967 Nova Scotia provincial election campaign (Communications Co-ordinator/Organizational Advisor)
- 1967 Federal leadership campaign (Convention Co-Chair for R. L. Stanfield)
- 1966 Campaign for National President (Campaign Manager for D.K. Camp)
- 1965 Federal election (Campaign Manager in Eglinton riding for D.K.Camp)
- 1964 Federal policy conference - "National Conference on Canadian Goals" (Member of Planning Committee and On-Site Organizer)
- Campaign for National President (Campaign Manager for D.K. Camp)
- 1963 Nova Scotia provincial election campaign (Communications and Production Co-ordinator)
- 1963 Federal election campaign (Production Co-ordinator)
- 1962 Manitoba provincial election campaign (Communications and Production Co-ordinator)
- 1962 Federal election campaign (Production Co-ordinator)
- 1960 New Brunswick provincial election campaign (Communications and Production Co-ordinator)
- 1960 Nova Scotia provincial election campaign (Communications and Production Co-ordinator)
- 1957 Federal election campaign (Assistant to Campaign Co-ordinator for Atlantic Canada)
- 1956 Nova Scotia provincial campaign (student organizer)

**APPENDIX VII**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE**  
**(Senator Atkins)**

---

- 1956      New Brunswick provincial campaign (Assistant to Campaign Co-ordinator and Gofer)
- 1952      New Brunswick provincial campaign (Assistant to Campaign Co-ordinator and Gofer)

\*Currently serving as Chairman

## APPENDIX VII

### BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE

(Senator Banks)

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Tommy Banks - Liberal Party of Canada

**Province:** Alberta

**Senatorial Division:** Edmonton

**Appointed by:** Chrétien (L)

**Office:** 408, Victoria Building

**Telephone:** (613) 995-1889

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### Biography

**Date of Birth:** December 17, 1936

Tommy Banks is well-known to Canadians as one of our most accomplished and versatile entertainers, and an international standard-bearer for Canadian culture.

From 1968-83, he was the host of The Tommy Banks Show. A Gemini Award-winning variety television performer, he is today the owner of Tommy Banks Music Ltd.

A Juno Award-winning musician, Mr. Banks has achieved national and international renown as Conductor or Music Director for such signature events as: The Royal Command Performance (1978); The Commonwealth Games (1978); the World University Games (1983); and the Opening Ceremonies for EXPO '86 and the XVth Olympic Winter Games (1988). He has also served as a guest conductor with symphony orchestras throughout Canada and in the United States.

As founding Chairman of the Alberta Foundation for the Performing Arts, Mr. Banks has worked tirelessly to ensure that other promising musicians and performers receive the exposure they deserve right across the country.

In 1979, Mr. Banks received an Honourary Diploma of Music from Grant MacEwan College. That same year, he received the Juno Award and the Grand Prix du Disque-Canada. In 1987, he received an Honourary Doctor of Laws from the University of Alberta. In 1990, he received the Sir Frederick Haultain Prize.

**APPENDIX VII**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE**  
**(Senator Banks)**

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In 1991, Mr. Banks was made an Officer of the Order of Canada. And in 1993, he was awarded the Alberta Order of Excellence.

On 9 May 2001, Senator Tommy Banks was appointed Vice-Chair of the **Prime Minister's Caucus Task Force on Urban issues**. The Task Force will consult with citizens, experts and other orders of government to explore how these groups and individuals can work more collaboratively, within the federal jurisdiction, to strengthen quality of life in our large urban centres.

Mr. Banks lives in Edmonton.

**Current Member of the following Senate committee(s):**

Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources

National Finance

National Security and Defence

The Special Committee on Illegal Drugs.



**APPENDIX VII**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE**  
(Senator Cordy)

---

**CORDY, Hon. Jane M.**

Designation: Nova Scotia

Senate address: 314 Victoria Building

Ph: (613) 995-8409; Fax: (613) 995-8432

Internet: [cordyj@sen.parl.gc.ca](mailto:cordyj@sen.parl.gc.ca)

Appointment: June 09, 2000 Retirement July 2, 2025

Birth: 02 July 1950

**Education:** N.S. Teachers College  
Mount Saint Vincent University

**Public Career:**

Vice-Chair, Halifax-Dartmouth Port Development Commission

Chair, Board of Referees, Halifax Region of Human Resources Development  
Canada

Member of the Board, Phoenix House

Member, Judging Committee, Dartmouth Book Awards 1993-1995, 1999,2000

Member, Strategic Planning Committee, Colby Village Elementary School

Religious Education Program Volunteer and Lector, St. Clement's Church,  
Dartmouth, N.S.

**Private Career:**

Teacher:

Sydney School Board

Halifax County School Board

New Glasgow School Board

Halifax Regional School Board

**Areas of interest and specialization:**

**APPENDIX VII**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE**  
**(Senator Cordy)**

---

Education; children; social affairs; health care

**Member of Senate Committees:**

Special Senate Committee on Bill C-20 (2000)  
Senate Committee on Transport and Communications (2000)  
The Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples  
The Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology  
The Joint Committee on the Library of Parliament  
The Senate Committee on Defence and Security

**Parliamentary Associations and Friendship Groups**

Canada-Europe Parliamentary Association  
Canada-United States Inter-Parliamentary Group  
Canadian Branch, Commonwealth Parliamentary Association  
Canadian Group, Inter-Parliamentary Union  
Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association  
Canadian Parliamentarians for Global Action (2000)  
Canada-Germany Friendship Group  
Canada-Israel Friendship Group  
Canada-Italy Friendship Group

**Marital Status:**

Married to Bob Cordy, with two daughters Alison and Michelle

**Parliamentary Address:**

The Senate of Canada, Ottawa, Ontario Canada K1A 0A4

**APPENDIX VII**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE**  
(Senator Day)

---



Joseph A. Day - Liberal Party of Canada  
**Province:** N.B. /N.-B.  
**Senatorial Division:** Saint John-Kennebecasis, New Brunswick  
**Appointed by:** Chrétien (L)  
**Office:** 620, Victoria Building  
**Telephone:** (613) 992-0833

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**Biography**

**Date of Birth:** January 24, 1945

**Place of Birth:** Saint John, N.B.

**Appointment:** October 04, 2001 **Retirement:** 2020

**Education:**

B. Eng. The Royal Military College of Canada

LL.B. Queen's University

LL.M Business Law (Osgoode Hall Law School)

**Public career:**

Candidate for the Liberal Party of Canada, 1978, 1979, 1980 and defeated

Candidate for the Leadership of the Liberal Party of N.B., 1982 and defeated

Candidate for the Liberal Party of N.B. in Saint John North, 1982 and defeated

**Private career:**

Private practice of law, Toronto, Saint John, Ottawa, Kitchener-Waterloo

Business Law - Patent and Trademark Agent

International Commercial Arbitration and Technology and the law matters

Legal Council with a private diversified corporation

President and CEO of the N.B. Forest Product Association

**APPENDIX VII**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE**  
**(Senator Day)**

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**Areas of interest and specialization:**

Science and Technology  
Defence  
International Trade Issues  
International Human Rights Issues  
Heritage and Literacy

**Parliamentary Groups:**

Canada-China Legislative Association  
Canada-Europe Parliamentary Association  
Canada-France Inter-Parliamentary Association  
Canada-Japan Inter-Parliamentary Group  
Canada-UK Inter-Parliamentary Association  
Canada-United States Inter-Parliamentary Group  
Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association  
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association  
Inter-Parliamentary Union  
Assemblée parlementaire de la francophonie  
Canada-Germany Friendship Group  
Canada-Ireland Friendship Group  
Canada-Israel Friendship Group  
Canada-Italy Friendship Group

**Honours:**

Honorary life member of the Royal Military Colleges Club of Canada Foundation Inc.  
Board of Directors of the Corps of Commissioners of Canada  
Fellow of the Canadian Intellectual Property Office

**Family:**

Spouse: Georgie Fraser Day  
Children: Emilie, Mount Allison University and Fraser Day, Hampton High School

**Religion:** United Church of Canada

**Languages spoken:** English and French

**Internet address:** dayja@sen.parl.gc.ca

**APPENDIX VII**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE**  
**(Senator Day)**

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**Current Member of the following Senate committee(s):**

Agriculture and Forestry

National Security and Defence

Subcommittee Veterans Affairs

**APPENDIX VII**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE**  
(Senator Forrestall)

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**HONOURABLE J. MICHAEL FORRESTALL**

The Honourable J. Michael Forrestall was born at Deep Brook, Nova Scotia on September 23, 1932. After an early career as a journalist with the *Chronicle Herald* and airline executive, he entered politics and was first elected to the House of Commons in the General Election of 1965.

The Honourable J. Michael Forrestall was subsequently re-elected to the House of Commons in 1968, 1972, 1974, 1979, 1980, and 1984. He first became Official Opposition Defence Critic in 1966, and challenged the government of Prime Minister Pearson on the Unification of the Canadian Forces. Senator Forrestall subsequently served as Defence Critic from 1966-1979 and served over that period of time as a member of the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs.

From 1979-1984, the Honourable J. Michael Forrestall served as a member or alternate to the North Atlantic Assembly. During that period of time he also served as General Rapporteur of the North Atlantic Assembly's Military Committee and presented the committee report entitled *Alliance Security in the 1980's*. In November of 1984, Senator Forrestall led the Canadian delegation to the 30<sup>th</sup> Annual Session of the North Atlantic Assembly.

In 1984, the Honourable J. Michael Forrestall was appointed Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Transport, and in 1986, the Minister of Regional Industrial Expansion and the Minister of State for Science and Technology. He was a candidate in the 1988 General Election and defeated. In 1989, Senator Forrestall was appointed to the Board of Directors of Marine Atlantic, and then in 1990, appointed to the Veterans Appeal Board.

On September 27, 1990, the Honourable J. Michael Forrestall was appointed to the Senate of Canada. From 1993-1994 he was a member of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Canada's Defence Policy, and serves to this day as Defence and Transport critic in the Senate. Senator Forrestall is currently Deputy Chair of the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence, Deputy Chair of the Senate Standing Committee on Transport and Communications, a member of the Standing Committee on Internal Economy. The Honourable J. Michael Forrestall has served as a member of the Senate Special Committee on the Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia, Senate Standing Committee on Foreign

**APPENDIX VII**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE**  
**(Senator Forrestall)**

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Affairs, Senate Sub-Committee on Veterans Affairs. In the last session of Parliament he asked over 180 questions on defence and foreign policy issues.

The Honourable J. Michael Forrestall is currently a member of the NATO Parliamentary Association, Inter-Parliamentary Union, Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, Canada-U.S. Inter-Parliamentary Group and the Royal Canadian Legion.

His legislative office is Room 363-S, Centre Block, The Senate, Ottawa, Ont. K1A 0A4, (613) 943-1442, Fax (613) 943-1795.

## **The Honourable Colin Kenny, Senator**

### ***Career History***

Sworn in on June 29th, 1984 representing the Province of Ontario. His early political career began in 1968 as the Executive Director of the Liberal Party in Ontario. From 1970 until 1979 he worked in the Prime Minister's Office as Special Assistant, Director of Operations, Policy Advisor and Assistant Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Pierre Trudeau.

### ***Committee Involvement***

During his parliamentary career, Senator Kenny has served on numerous committees. They include the Special Committee on Terrorism and Security (1986-88) and (1989-91), the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy (1994), the Standing Committee on Banking Trade and Commerce, the Standing Committee on National Finance, and the Standing Committee on Internal Economy, Budgets and Administration.

He is currently Chair of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, and is Deputy-Chair of the Special Committee on Illegal Drugs. The Senator is also currently a member of the Steering Committee of the Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources.

### ***Defence Matters***

Senator Kenny has been elected as Rapporteur for the Defence and Security Committee of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Prior to that he was Chair of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Subcommittee on the Future Security and Defence Capabilities and Vice-Chair of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Subcommittee on the Future of the Armed Forces.

EMAIL: [kennyco@sen.parl.gc.ca](mailto:kennyco@sen.parl.gc.ca)

Website: <http://sen.parl.gc.ca/ckenny>



**APPENDIX VII**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE**  
(Senator LaPierre)

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Laurier L. LaPierre - Liberal Party of Canada

**Province:** Ontario

**Senatorial Division:** Ontario

**Appointed by:** Chrétien (L)

**Office:** 343, East Block.

**Telephone:** (613) 992-0081

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**Biography**

**Date of Birth:** November 21, 1929

**Appointed:** June 2001

Laurier LaPierre is widely-known and respected across Canada for his extraordinary achievements as an author, journalist, commentator and educator.

Mr. LaPierre holds a B.A., M.A., and a Ph.D. in History from the University of Toronto, an Honorary Doctor of Laws from the University of Prince Edward Island and a Doctor of Letters (Honoris Causa) from Brock University. From 1959-78, he served on the faculties of the University of Western Ontario, Loyola College and McGill University. In 1993-94, he was the Max Bell Visiting Professor of Journalism at the University of Regina.

He earned national acclaim for his work with the CBC between 1962 and 1978 as host and writer for such programs as *This Hour Has Seven Days*, *Inquiry* and *Midnight*. Over the years, he has also been a much sought-after host and commentator on television and radio. Up to the time of this appointment he was Chair of Telefilm Canada. He is currently the honorary Chair for the Historical Foundation's Heritage Fairs Programme.

**APPENDIX VII**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE**  
**(Senator LaPierre)**

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A foremost authority on Canadian history and public affairs, Mr. LaPierre has authored or edited numerous books and publications, including: *Quebec: A Tale of Love; Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Romance of Canada; 1759: The Battle for Canada; Québec Hier et Aujourd'hui*; and, *The Apprenticeship of Canada, 1876-1914*. He has written articles for, among others, *The Financial Post, International Review, Canadian Forum and Encyclopaedia Britannica*. In the late 1970s he was on the Commission of Inquiry into the Education of the Young Child and from 1990-91, he was Host of the Electronic Town Hall Meetings held in connection with The Citizens Forum on Canada's Future. From 1997 to 2000 he was a member of the Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces.

Mr. LaPierre was made an Officer of the Order of Canada in 1994.

**Senate Responsibilities:**

Member of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence  
(2001- )

Member of the Standing Senate Committee on Transport and Communications  
(2001- )

Member of the Standing Joint Committee on Official Languages (2001-)

**Current Member of the following Senate committee(s):**

National Security and Defence

Transport and Communications

**APPENDIX VII**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE**  
(Senator Meighen)

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**THE HONOURABLE MICHAEL ARTHUR MEIGHEN, QC, BA, LL.L., LL.D.**

- PERSONAL** Born March 25, 1939, Montréal, Québec  
Married: Kelly Elizabeth Meighen (Dillon)  
3 Sons: Theodore Richard (Ted), Hugh Arthur Kennedy, Max Talbot de Lancey
- EDUCATION** Primary & Secondary: Nova Scotia, Québec and Ontario  
University of Geneva, Certificat d'études françaises, 1957  
McGill University, Bachelor of Arts, 1960  
Université Laval, LL.L. (cum laude), 1963
- HONORARY** Mount Allison University, Sackville, NB, LL.D. (honoris causa)
- LANGUAGES** Fluent in English and French
- CAREER**
- 1990-present Counsel, Meighen Demers, Toronto, Ontario
- 1990 Appointed to the Senate of Canada
- Committee Membership: Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce; Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries ; Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs (Chairman); Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy (1994); Special Joint Committee on a Renewed Canada (1991-92)
- 1985-87 Legal Counsel, Deschênes Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals
- 1981-90 Partner, practising administrative and commercial law, McMaster Meighen (later Meighen Demers), Toronto, Ontario
- 1983 Appointed Queen's Counsel
- 1981 Admitted to the Law Society of Upper Canada

**APPENDIX VII**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE**  
(Senator Meighen)

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- 1978-80 Vice-President, Director of Marketing, TV Guide Inc., Toronto, Ontario
- 1974-77 Elected National President, Progressive Conservative Association of Canada
- 1972, 1974 Federal elections, official candidate, PC Party, riding of St-Henri-Westmount
- 1971 Chairman, Annual General Meeting, Progressive Conservative Association of Canada
- 1968-71 Elected National Secretary, Progressive Conservative Association of Canada
- 1964-78 Associate and subsequently partner, practising litigation and commercial law with McMaster Meighen, Montréal, Québec
- 1964 Admitted to the Bar of the Province of Québec

**MEMBER** Senate of Canada  
Barreau du Québec  
Canadian Bar Association  
Law Society of Upper Canada

**DIRECTORSHIPS**

Cundill Funds, Vancouver, British Columbia (Chairman of the Board of Governors)

Deutsche Bank Canada, Toronto, Ontario (Chairman, Conduct Review Committee and member, Audit Committee)

Paribas Participations Limited, Toronto, Ontario

CanVec Corporation, Toronto, Ontario (Chairman, Corporate Governance and Human Resources Committee)

Cisco Systems Inc., Toronto, Ontario (Member, Advisory Board)

J.C. Clark Ltd., Toronto, Ontario (non-industry Director)

**PAST DIRECTORSHIPS**

## **APPENDIX VII**

### **BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE**

(Senator Meighen)

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Donahue Inc., Montreal, Quebec  
Canadian General Investments Ltd., Toronto, Ontario (Chairman)  
Third Canadian General Investment Trust, Toronto, Ontario  
Conwest Exploration Co. Ltd., Toronto, Ontario  
Laurentian Group Inc., Montreal, Quebec  
Merchant Private Ltd., Toronto, Ontario  
Sodarcac Inc., Montreal, Quebec  
BEP International Corp., Montreal, Quebec  
UAP Inc., Montreal, Quebec  
Connor Clark & Company Ltd., Toronto, Ontario  
Albany Club of Toronto  
Connor Clark Private Trust, Toronto, Ontario

#### **COMMUNITY INTERESTS**

Stratford Festival of Canada (Chairman, Endowment Committee)  
Toronto & Western Hospital Foundation (Director)  
Loeb Health Research Institute (Director)  
Centre for Cultural Management, University of Waterloo (Chairman)  
La Fondation de l'Université Laval (Director and member of Executive Committee)  
Trinity College School, Port Hope, Ontario (Life Governor)  
P.C. Canada Fund (Director and former Chairman 1995-96)  
Frontier College Learning Foundation (Honourary Director)  
Atlantic Salmon Federation - Canada (Vice-President)  
Salvation Army Metro-Toronto Advisory Council (Chairman)  
T.R. Meighen Foundation, a registered charitable foundation, St. Andrews, N.B. (Chairman and Director)  
University of King's College, Halifax, N.S. (Chancellor)  
Prostate Cancer Research Foundation of Canada (Director)  
University McGill (Board of Governors)

#### **PAST COMMUNITY INTERESTS**

Stratford Festival of Canada, 1995-97 (President) 1986-98 (Director)  
Stratford Festival Theatre Renewal Campaign, 1995-97 (Chairman)  
Ontario Fundraising Chairman, Jean Charest Leadership Campaign, 1993  
Laval University Fundraising Campaign, 1985-87 (Co-Chairman, Special Names Committee)

**APPENDIX VII**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE**  
**(Senator Meighen)**

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"Campagne Défi", Laval University, 1996-98 (Member, Campaign Cabinet)  
Cancer Care International, 1995-98 (Director)  
Ontario Cancer Treatment and Research Foundation, 1982-93 (Chairman)  
Ontario Cancer Institute / Princess Margaret Hospital, 1982-93 (Director)  
National Ballet of Canada, 1986-92 (Director) 1990-91 (Chairman, Corporate  
Canvass Campaign)  
Montreal Museum of Fine Arts, Capital Campaign 1988-1993 (National Co-  
President)  
McGill Twenty-First Century Fund, Major Division Committee, Canvass  
Volunteer  
Council for Canadian Unity (Past Chairman and Life Member)

RECREATION    Fishing, Golf, Skiing

OFFICE        Meighen Demers LLP  
                 200 King St.W., 11th floor  
                 Toronto, Ontario M5H 3T4  
                 Tel (416) 340-6016  
                 Fax (416) 977-5239  
                 E-mail: [mmeighen@meighen.com](mailto:mmeighen@meighen.com)

RESIDENCES    4, Lamport Avenue  
                 Toronto, ON M4W 1S6  
  
                 201 Joe' s Point Road  
                 St. Andrews, NB E5B 2J7

## **APPENDIX VII**

### **BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE**

(Senator Pépin)

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#### **The Honourable Senator Lucie Pépin**

##### **Biographical Overview**

Born in Saint-Jean d'Iberville, Senator Pépin studied nursing with a specialization in obstetrics and gynecology. Her early career focused on women's health, leading to a lifelong dedication to social justice and human rights advocacy, with a special emphasis on women and children.

##### **Fertility, Contraception and Reproduction**

A pioneer in birth planning, Senator Pépin helped establish Québec's first out-patient birth planning clinic in 1966, as well as assisting shortly thereafter in the creation of a Canada-wide network of hospital-based clinics.

From 1971-79, she was National Coordinator of the Canadian Committee for Fertility Research, a clinical research centre specializing in human reproduction. Lucie Pépin also acted as a coordinator for several international organizations including the World Health Organization (WHO), the Population Council and the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations.

Throughout the 1970s, Senator Pépin taught courses on birth planning and sexuality at the University of Montréal's Faculty of Medicine, in its Departments of Nursing and Sociology. In 1975, Senator Pépin was appointed National Coordinator of the Badgley Commission on Justice and Health, studying the application of the abortion law in Canada.

##### **Women's Health and Equality**

Senator Pépin's early interest in women's health quickly led to public activism on the broader issues of women's equality. Senator Pépin was instrumental in the coordination of advocacy efforts at the national level, securing legislation which guaranteed women's right to contraception and abortion, as well as at the provincial level, securing their right to sign medical authorizations and the legalization of birth planning clinics. Senator Pépin was also deeply involved in advocacy efforts to ensure the entrenchment of women's rights in the Canadian Constitution.

**APPENDIX VII**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE**  
**(Senator Pépin)**

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Senator Pépin's enthusiastic involvement in improving the status of women was recognized by the Government of Canada, which, in 1979, appointed her Vice-President of the Advisory Council on the Status of Women and, the following year, to its presidency. Under her direction, the Advisory Council undertook research and advised the federal government on a wide variety of subjects, most notably employment equity, child care, violence against women, pension reform, women's rights and the Constitution, as well as reforms to the Divorce Act.

In 1984, Senator Pépin was elected the Liberal member of Parliament for Outremont. From 1985 to 1988, she was Official Opposition critic for the Status of Women, sitting on parliamentary committees considering bills on child care, divorce, pornography, immigration, prostitution, family allowances and employment equity. She served as President of the Québec Federal Liberal Party caucus as well as Vice-President of her party's policy committee.

In 1989, Senator Pépin was appointed a member of the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing. As the only female commissioner, Senator Pépin's goal was to see amendments brought to the Canada Elections Act facilitating the entrance of women and other underrepresented groups in federal politics.

In 2000, she becomes a member of the honorary committee for the 125<sup>th</sup> anniversary celebrations of the YMCA; 125 years of helping women gain economic independence.

### **Children and Youth**

From the start of her career, Senator Pépin placed great importance on informing young people about issues of sexuality, maternity, contraception and abortion. This focus on youth led her to provide expertise in various public forums. In 1971, Senator Pépin was a member of the Executive Committee of the Québec Government's Committee for Handicapped Children. In 1979, Senator Pépin was responsible for organizing a National Symposium on Adolescent Contraception and Sexuality. In 1981, she was appointed a member of the Badgley Committee on Sexual Offences Against Children.

Senator Pépin is a founding member of Passage, a shelter for young women prostitutes in Montréal. She was instrumental in founding the Maison des Jeunes d'



## **APPENDIX VII**

### **BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE**

**(Senator Pépin)**

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Outremont, a drop-in centre for youth. She also initiated and worked closely with a volunteer group, Promotion of the Social Integration of Ethnic and Cultural Communities (PROMI), in setting up a pilot project in the Côte-des-Neiges area of Montréal to provide child care services and language training for immigrant and refugee women and children.

#### **Social Justice**

Senator Pépin's professional life has been devoted to improving the lives of Canadians. Her concern over social conditions led her, in 1990-91, to sit on a committee mandated by the Solicitor General of Canada to examine the temporary absences permitted to penitentiary inmates. From 1993 to 1997, Senator Pépin served as a member of the Appeal Division of the National Parole Board.

Senator Pépin has always maintained an international focus in her work. Her early association with the World Health Organization (WHO) and other international bodies provided an international perspective and ongoing concern for the people in developing countries. In the 1990s, she acted as a consultant to Path International in Seattle, Washington, a non-governmental organization developing health technology for the developing world. In 1996, Senator Pépin traveled to Vietnam in order to help prepare women running for political office in their first general election; twenty-six per cent of female candidates were subsequently elected.

#### **At the Senate**

Since Senator Pépin's appointment to the Senate in 1997, she has pursued her work on human rights and social justice. She acted as a member of the Special Joint Committee on Child Custody and Access and as Co-Chair of the Special Joint Committee studying Article 93 of the 1867 Constitutional Law concerning the education system in Québec. She was a member of the Special Senate Committee on Security and Intelligence as well as acting as Deputy Whip in 1998, 1999 and 2000. Senator Pépin was a member of the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs where, in 1998, she sponsored Bill C-57 amending the Nunavut Act relative to the Nunavut Court of Justice. She has been a member of the Senate Standing Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology as well as a member of the Sub-Committee to update the Senate report "Of Life and Death". She has also joined the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs where she sponsored Bill C-23, an Act to modernize the

**APPENDIX VII**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE**  
**(Senator Pépin)**

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Statutes of Canada in relation to benefits and obligations. In the year 2000, she joined the Special Committee on illegal drugs and the Sub-committee on Veterans Affairs. In 2001, she became member of the Senate Standing Committee on Defence and Security. She has been delegated by the Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Art Eggleton, to work on an action plan prepared by the militaries to address the problem of family violence in the Canadian Armed Forces. Also, in June 2001, she joined, as Senate and Parliamentarians representative, the newly-created Canadian Armed Forces Artists Selection Committee sponsored by the Department of National Defence.

She is currently serving on the Senate Standing Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology as well as the Sub-committee on Veterans Affairs.

**APPENDIX VII**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE**  
(Senator Wiebe)

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**WIEBE, Hon John E.N.**

Designation: Saskatchewan

Senate address: 414 Victoria Building

Ph: (613) 995-1800 Fax: (613) 995-1861

Internet: [jwiebe@sen.parl.gc.ca](mailto:jwiebe@sen.parl.gc.ca)

Appointment: April 7, 2000 Retirement May 31, 2011

Birth: 31 May 1936

**Education:** Luther College, Regina  
University of Saskatchewan

**Public Career:**

**Lieutenant Governor, Province of Saskatchewan, May, 1994 – February, 2000**

Saskatchewan Chair, Canadian Forces Liaison Council 1998-2000

Director, VIA Rail Canada Incorporated, 1979-83

Member Saskatchewan Legislature, 1971-79

**Director, Saskatchewan Power Corporation 1967-71**

Member, Federal Department of Agriculture Trade Commission to China

Member, Canadian Wheat Board Trade Commission to Brazil

Member, Saskatchewan Co-operative Advisory Board

**Private Career:**

President and owner of L & W Feeders Limited, 1970-85

Chairman, Main Centre Wheat Pool Committee, Herbert Co-op

Member, Board of Directors, Herbert Credit Union

Founding member and sec.-treasurer of the Herbert Ferry Regional Park

**Honours:**

Knight, Order of St. John of Jerusalem, October 21, 1994

Honourary Member, Royal Regina Golf Club

Honourary Member, Saskatchewan Curling Association Honourary Member,

Saskatchewan Commissionaires

Master Farm Family Award

**APPENDIX VII**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE**  
(Senator Wiebe)

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**Association Activities:**

Past president, Herbert's Lion Club  
Member, Northwest Mounted Police Masonic Lodge  
Member, Swift Current Shrine  
Saskatchewan Stock Growers Association (LIFE)  
Saskatchewan Wheat Pool  
Senior Hockey Coach and Referee  
Leader, Rush Lake Multiple 4-H Club  
Officer Cadet, Royal Regina Rifles 1957-59

**Areas of interest and specialization:**

Agriculture; international trade; Canadian Forces; environment; regional economic development; energy; education; youth; culture

**Current Member of the following Senate committees:**

Deputy Chair, Standing Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry (37<sup>th</sup> Parliament)  
Senate Banking, Trade and Commerce (37<sup>th</sup> Parliament)  
National Security and Defence Committee (37<sup>th</sup> Parliament)

**Parliamentary groups:**

Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association  
Commonwealth Parliamentary Union  
UNESCO

**Friendship groups:**

Canada-Germany

**Marital Status**

Married to Ann Lewis, with three children, 4 grandchildren

**Parliamentary Address:** The Senate of Canada, Ottawa, ON K1A 0A4



**APPENDIX VIII**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT**  
**(Deputy Commissioner (ret'd) Roy Berlinquette)**

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**ROY V. BERLINQUETTE**  
**CONSULTANT**

**EMPLOYMENT HISTORY**

Roy Berlinquette is a consultant on police and public safety with BMCI Consulting Inc. Ottawa. He retired in 2000 as Deputy Commissioner, North West Region of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The North West Region is comprised of the provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, the Northwest Territories and the Territory of Nunavut. He retired after a successful 36-year career with the RCMP having held several senior posts.

Prior to his promotion to Deputy Commissioner he was the Commanding Officer of “J” Division, which is the RCMP federal, provincial and municipal policing contract for the province of New Brunswick.

He also served for 12 years with the RCMP Security Service in Montreal Quebec and was directly involved in the investigation of some of the high profile terrorist cases of the early 70’s. He held several positions in the security and intelligence field and has an in-depth understanding of the intricacies of intelligence operations.

As Deputy Commissioner of the North West Region, he was directly accountable and responsible for an expenditure budget of over 500 million and revenues of 340 million. The total compliment of the North West Region is over 5500 police and public service employees.

**EXPERIENCE AND CAPABILITIES**

Roy Berlinquette is a member of the Office of the Oversight Commission on Police Reform for Northern Ireland. He has completed consulting projects dealing with modern comptrollership specializing in accrual accounting.

He has extensive experience as an innovator and practitioner of Community Based policing systems. He was instrumental in introducing the new District Policing model to the RCMP when he spearheaded its introduction to the RCMP’s “J” Division in New Brunswick. Speaking and teaching the principles and practices of community policing philosophy is a strong capability, with special focus on innovation and risk management. He was instrumental in leading the negotiations

**APPENDIX VIII**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT**  
**(Deputy Commissioner (ret'd) Roy Berlinquette)**

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for the birth of RCMP “V” Division in Canada’s newest territory of Nunavut.

Roy Berlinquette has made numerous speaking engagements on police Leadership, Vision, Mission and Values for police management, on Aboriginal and First Nations policing issues, as well as Traffic Safety for Canadians.

He is Past Canadian Director to the International Association of Chiefs of Police, (IACP), State and Provincial Division. He was the vice-chair to the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police Traffic Safety Committee from 1997 to 2000. He has held positions on notable charity organizations and was most recently a founding member and Director for the Saskatchewan Prairie Action Foundation. He is presently an executive member of the RCMP National Heritage Center Building Committee.

He is also a member of the Northern Ireland Oversight Committee on Police Services in Northern Ireland.

**PERSONAL HISTORY**

Roy Berlinquette is a graduate of the University of Montreal, Loyola campus with a Bachelor of Arts, majoring in Political Science and Sociology. He attended numerous specialized and diversified learning and development courses throughout his career and is a graduate of the Canadian Police College Executive Development course as well as the Federal Government Canadian Centre for Management Development. He is a life member of the International Association of Chief’s of Police and the Canadian Association of Chief’s of Police.

He has been the recipient of several awards and recognitions throughout his career, including the National Award for Traffic Safety, the Canadian 125<sup>th</sup> Anniversary Medal and the RCMP Long Service Medal with Gold Clasp.

He is bilingual and holds exemptions in writing and speaking in both languages.

**APPENDIX VIII**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT**  
(Chief Warrant Officer Dessureault)

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**Chief Warrant Officer  
J.J.L.M. Dessureault,  
OMM, CD**

**Canadian Forces  
Chief Warrant Officer**



Chief Warrant Officer Dessureault was born on 2 November 1945 in Shawinigan, Quebec. He enrolled in the Canadian Army on 26 March 1964 and completed his training at the Royal 22<sup>e</sup> Regiment depot at Valcartier, Quebec. In September of that year, he was posted to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion Royal 22<sup>e</sup> Régiment, then stationed at Valcartier.

In July 1965, he accompanied the unit to Werl in Northern Germany for a period of four years. Upon his return to Canada in November 1969, he held a variety of positions within the 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion until June 1971, date where he rejoined the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, which had been transferred to Lahr in Southern Germany. In April 1972 he was promoted to Master-Corporal.

In August 1974, following his return to Canada, he was promoted to the rank of Sergeant, initially acting as section commander and then as platoon Second in Command for the 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion at Valcartier. In August 1976 he is affected to the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion for a duration of five years. He was promoted twice during that posting.

In June 1983, he returned to Canada to assume the duties of Master Warrant Officer of the military drill training section at the Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean, Quebec. In June 1986, he was appointed to a position of company Sergeant-Major at the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion. He accompanied the unit to Cyprus in February 1987. During this tour of duty, he was promoted to the rank of Chief Warrant Officer and, in June 1987, was posted to Headquarters "Secteur de l'Est" in Montreal.



**APPENDIX VIII**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT**  
**(Chief Warrant Officer Dessureault)**

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In June 1990, following his three-year posting, he was assigned the position of Regimental Sergeant-Major of the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion Royal 22<sup>e</sup> Régiment. On 8 April 1992, he accompanied this unit to the former Yugoslavia as part of a United Nations peacekeeping mission. He was therefore the first Regimental Sergeant-Major to be deployed with a battle group since Korea. When he returned to Canada in June 1993, he was assigned the duties of Chief Warrant Officer Land Force Quebec Area. On 20 June 1996, he is nominated Chief Warrant Officer of the Land Force Command. He is the Canadian Forces Chief Warrant Officer since 15 June 1999 until retirement the 31 July 2001.

November 1994, he was decorated Member of the Order of Military Merit and promoted to the rank of Officer of Military Merit in January 2000

Chief Warrant Officer Dessureault is married to Marianne Claassen, who is originally from the Netherlands; they have one daughter, Désirée.

**APPENDIX VIII**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT**  
**(Major-General (Ret'd) Keith McDonald)**

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**MAJOR-GENERAL(Ret) G. Keith  
MCDONALD**

MGen McDonald grew up in Edmonton, attended College Militaire Royal in St. Jean and Royal Military College in Kingston (RMC), graduating in 1966 and being awarded his pilot wings in 1967.

He instructed on T-33 aircraft at Canadian Forces Base, Moose Jaw Saskatchewan. In 1970, he was posted to RMC as a Squadron Commander and later the Assistant Director of Cadets.

1973 saw MGen McDonald return to the cockpit training on the CF-5 and CF104 aircraft. He was posted to 439 Squadron at CFB Baden-Soellingen in 1974 flying the CF104 in the ground attack role. Promoted to Major in 1977, MGen McDonald became the Group Tactical Evaluation Officer in 1978.

In 1980, MGen McDonald attended the Royal Air Force Staff College at Bracknell in England. Promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel in January 1981, he returned to National Defence Headquarters responsible for CF-18 operational planning and CF-18 equipment purchases. In 1982, he moved to the CF-18 Project Management Office as the Operational Requirements Manager.

MGen McDonald completed CF-18 Training at CFB Cold Lake, prior to returning to CFB Baden-Soellingen in 1985 as the first CF-18 Squadron Commander of 439(Tiger) Squadron. In July 1987, he was promoted to Colonel and posted to NDHQ as Director Professional Education and Development. In July 1989, MGen McDonald assumed command of CFB and #4 Wing Baden-Soellingen. During his tenure as Base/Wing Commander he oversaw the mounting of the CF18 air task group to the Persian Gulf War and set in motion the closure of Baden. In 1992, he

**APPENDIX VIII**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT**  
**(Major-General (Ret'd) Keith McDonald)**

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returned to NDHQ as Special Assistant to the ADM(Per) and in July 1993 assumed the newly created position which combined the SA/VCDS and the Director of the NDHQ Secretariat.

In Jun 94, General McDonald was promoted to Brigadier General and assumed the duties of Director General Aerospace Development at NDHQ. He was promoted to Major General in 1996, assuming the position of director of combat operations, Headquarters North American Aerospace Defense Command at Colorado Springs, USA. He held that position until his retirement from the Canadian Forces in 1998 after 37 years in the Canadian Forces.

Gen McDonald has accumulated over 4000 hours of pilot in command flying time, primarily in the CF18, CF104, CF5 and T-33. Professional education includes a Bachelors degree in Politics and Economics, staff school, the RAF Staff College, Post Graduate Courses in Business at Queens University, the National Security studies course, and numerous project management courses.

After leaving the military in 1998, Gen McDonald served a period of “conflict of interest” prior to joining BMCI Consulting as a Principal Consultant in the Aerospace and Defence Division.

Gen McDonald is married to the former Catherine Grunder of Kincardine, Ontario, and they have two grown daughters, Jocelyn and Amy.

**APPENDIX VIII**  
**BIOGRAPHIES OF COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT**  
(Grant Purves – Barbara Reynolds)

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**Grant Purves**

A senior research officer, Mr. Purves joined the Parliamentary Research Branch of the Library of Parliament in 1974. Since then he has helped a number of Parliamentary committees prepare major studies. He was assigned to the Senate Committee on National Security and Defence in 2001.

Mr. Purves has a strong academic background in military and East European history.

**Barbara Reynolds**

Barbara Reynolds has worked with Canadian parliamentarians for 28 years in various capacities. Trained as a sociologist, she worked for 10 years as a research officer for the Library of Parliament, assisting committees involved in the area of social affairs. During this time she served for three years as Director of Research for the House of Commons Committee on Disabled Persons that produced the landmark report entitled *Obstacles*.

An associate of the Parliamentary Centre for 15 years, she organized fact-finding visits for legislators to and from the United States as well as study tours to Canada for legislators from African and Southeast Asian countries. She coordinated professional development programs for legislators and their staff, and wrote guidebooks on the operation of parliamentarians' offices in Ottawa and in their constituencies. In addition, she served as the director of the *Parliament, Business and Labour Trust*, a program under which legislators spend up to a week with major corporations and trade unions.

From 1985 to 2000 she also served as adviser to the Canadian Group of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the worldwide organization of legislators that serves as the parliamentary wing of the United Nations.

In April 1998, she joined the Senate Committees Directorate as a Committee Clerk. Her committee assignments have included: Security and Intelligence; Boreal Forest, Fisheries; Transportation Safety; Veterans Affairs; and National Security and Defence.



**Veronica Morris**

Veronica Morris joined the office of the Honourable Colin Kenny in November 1999, as a Special Assistant working on tobacco legislation sponsored by the Senator. In June of 2001 Ms. Morris assumed responsibility for media relations with the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence as it conducted an introductory survey on Canadian Security issues.

Meetings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence are open to members of the media. Exceptions include when the Committee is drafting reports, dealing with personnel matters, or when a host specifically requests proceedings be held in camera.

When in Ottawa, Committee hearings are televised on the Cable Public Affairs Channel (CPAC); on the Senate internet site (audio and video); the Parliamentary TV Network; and the Senate audio network, frequencies

(MHz): Floor: 94.7, English: 95.5, French: 95.1.

Those interested in the Committee's activities can subscribe to a mailing list that provides advance notice of meeting times, locations, and witnesses.

Information regarding the Committee can be obtained through its web site:  
[www.parl.gc.ca/defence.asp](http://www.parl.gc.ca/defence.asp)

Questions can be directed to:  
Toll free: 1-800-267-7362

Or via email:  
The Committee Clerk: [defence@sen.parl.gc.ca](mailto:defence@sen.parl.gc.ca)  
The Committee Chair: [kennyco@sen.parl.gc.ca](mailto:kennyco@sen.parl.gc.ca)

Media inquiries should be sent to: [ckres2@sen.parl.gc.ca](mailto:ckres2@sen.parl.gc.ca)

Since its formation there have been over 160 media stories (print and electronic) pertaining to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence and its activities.



**SENATE OF CANADA**

**National Security and Defence,**

**Standing Senate Committee**

**1st Session, 37th Parliament, 2001-02**

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