Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
National Security and Defence
Issue 3 - Evidence, April 26, 2004
OTTAWA, Monday, April 26, 2004
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met this day at 6:13 p.m. to examine and report on the need for a national security policy for Canada.
Senator Colin Kenny (Chairman) in the Chair.
The Chairman: Honourable senators, it is my pleasure to welcome you to this meeting of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. My name is Colin Kenny. I am a senator from Ontario and I chair the committee. I will introduce the members of the committee.
Senator Norm Atkins is from Ontario. He came to the Senate in 1986 with a strong background in the field of communications. Senator Atkins also served as an adviser to former Premier Davis of Ontario. During his time as a senator, he has concerned himself with a number of education and poverty issues. As well, he has championed the cause of the Canadian Merchant Navy veterans. Over the years, Senator Atkins has been involved in the community with a number of charities, including the Canadian Diabetes Association. Senator Atkins is also a member of the Standing Senate Committee on Internal Economy, Budgets and Administration and of our Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs.
Senator Joseph Day is from New Brunswick. He holds a Bachelor of Electrical Engineering from the Royal Military College in Kingston, an LLB from Queen's University and a Master of Laws from Osgoode Hall. Prior to his appointment to the Senate in 2001, he had a successful career as an attorney. His legal interests include patent and trademark law and intellectual property issues. He also successfully completed the 2004 Boston Marathon last Monday, in a net time of 4 hours, 45 minutes and 16 seconds. He is also Deputy Chair of the Standing Senate Committee on National Finance and our Subcommittee On Veterans Affairs, and an active member of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association.
Senator Tommy Banks is from Alberta. He is well known to Canadians as one of our most accomplished and versatile entertainers and as an international standard-bearer for Canadian culture. A Juno Award-winning musician, Senator Banks has achieved national and international renown as a conductor or music director for many signature events, such as the opening ceremonies for the 1988 Winter Olympic Games. In 2003, he was Co-Chairman of the Prime Minister's Task Force on Urban Issues. In addition to serving on this committee, Senator Banks chairs the Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources, and the Alberta Liberal caucus.
Senator Meighen is from Ontario. He is a successful lawyer and businessman active in a wide range of charitable and educational institutions. He is the Chancellor of the University of King's College in Halifax and was appointed to the Senate in 1990. He has a strong background in defence matters and served on the 1994 Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy. Currently, he is Chair of our Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs. Senator Meighen is also a member of the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce and the Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans.
Ours is the first permanent Senate committee mandated to examine security and defence. Since the committee's inception in mid-2001, we have completed a number of reports, beginning with ``Canadian Security and Military Preparedness.'' This study, which was tabled in February 2002, examined the major defence and security issues facing Canada.
The Senate then asked our committee to examine the need for a national security policy. So far, we have released five reports on various aspects of national security: first, ``The Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility,'' in September of 2002; second, ``An Update on Canada's Military Financial Crisis: A View from the Bottom Up,'' November of 2002; third, ``The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports,'' January of 2003; fourth, ``Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World,'' October 2003; and fifth, ``National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines — An Upgrade Strategy,'' which was published in March of 2004.
The committee is continuing its long-term evaluation of Canadian security and defence policy and is in the process of preparing an assessment of the government's responses to the recommendations to date before proceeding to new phases of our evaluation.
Our witness tonight is Dr. Kenneth Calder, Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy) at the Department of National Defence. A past-member of the Canadian Officers Training Corps, he spent over three decades with the Department of National Defence focusing on strategy, arms control and nuclear issues. He was also the editor of the 1987 defence white paper.
In August 1991, he was appointed assistant deputy minister. He is the principal source of defence policy advice to the Deputy Minister of National Defence and the Chief of Defence Staff.
Welcome to the committee.
Dr. Kenneth J. Calder, Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy), Department of National Defence: Chairman and senators, it is a great pleasure to be back with you. I realized in preparing for this that it has been over two years since I have been here, so this visit is probably long overdue.
Just to set the context of my remarks, there are three policy projects underway currently in the Canadian government dealing with security and defence policy and international policy. I will run through those and, in a sense, ``de-conflict'' them for you. I will speak to them in the order in which I think you will see them when they become public — the national security policy, then the international policy review, and then the defence review.
On December 12 the government announced it would be developing Canada's first national security policy. It would be an integrated effort across government to address the threats to our national security. The Deputy Prime Minister, who is leading the process with the assistance of the new National Security Adviser in the PCO, gave a speech on March 23 outlining some aspects of the national security policy.
In that speech, she said that three elements must be paramount. One is the need to protect the physical safety and security of Canadians at home and abroad. Second is the need to continue ensuring that Canada is not a base for threats to others. Third is the need for the national security policy to contribute to international peace and security.
Particular emphasis in this policy will be placed on intelligence, emergency response and management, and transportation security. Of course, transportation security covers marine security, on which I know this committee has strong views.
The national security policy will also cover international issues, but much of the detailed policy development in the international area will be left to the international policy review. Work on the national security policy has been progressing rapidly. We in National Defence have been involved in the process, along with Foreign Affairs and other government departments.
One of the challenges is to ensure that the national security policy, the international policy framework and the defence policy are in fact consistent with one another and mutually supportive. I think that will happen. I expect we will see a national security policy in the not-too-distant future.
The international policy review began on December 12, when the government announced it would be conducting a comprehensive review of Canada's place in the world. This international policy review is supposed to result in an integrated and coherent international policy framework for defence, diplomacy, development and trade. It is being led by Minister of Foreign Affairs Bill Graham, who is working very closely with the Ministers of National Defence, International Trade and International Co-operation.
I must stress that this is not a foreign policy review. Commentators often talk about a foreign and defence policy review, perhaps harking back to 1994. This is not a foreign policy review. This is a review of all aspects of the government's international policies, with a particular emphasis on diplomacy, development, defence and trade. It is the first time that the government has undertaken a policy review of this nature. The approach is much more integrated than in 1994, when we had the foreign and defence policy review.
There is a series of organisms set up to coordinate this work and to make sure that all the relevant government departments are involved. We have working groups at the working level dealing with those aspects. We have a committee of ADMs, in which I participate on a weekly basis, to manage the process. The DMs meet on a weekly basis, when they are in town, to discuss the international policy review as well as other issues.
Likewise, the relevant ministers also meet once a week when they are in fact available, and these issues of course sometimes come in front of the cabinet committees for global affairs and Canada-U.S. relations, so that all of the mechanisms are in place to ensure that everyone participates and we come up with a policy that can be supported broadly across the government.
The work on this review is progressing steadily. My sense is that there is broad agreement among the departments on the nature of the international context with which we are dealing. There is broad consensus on the challenges out there, and there certainly is an acceptance of the need to have an integrated government approach in a lot of these areas. As mentioned in the Speech from the Throne, the plan as currently articulated is that the international policy framework be submitted to parliamentary committees sometime in the autumn, at which time Canadians will have the opportunity to make their views known.
Of course it is quite early in the process, so to some extent I am perhaps anticipating I would like to see in it, but I expect the international policy framework will reflect a realistic assessment of the international security environment, emphasizing its complexity and unpredictability, and will identify specific threats to Canadian security.
It should outline the broad thrusts, principles and priorities of Canada's international policy and clearly identify the key government instruments, of which National Defence is one, that Canada has at its disposal to play a significant role in the world. I believe it will provide an overarching policy structure that will support the individual departmental efforts, and a lot of the details with respect to policy will then be left to each of the departments covered by that umbrella. That gets us into the third part of this, which is the defence policy review.
While this other work is going on, we in National Defence are conducting our own review. That review, I must stress, is an integral part of and complementary to the international policy framework and will be consistent with the national security policy, which I believe will come out before anything from National Defence. Our aim is to develop a defence policy that identifies key Canadian Forces capabilities to meet future security challenges.
The Prime Minister's speech last week in Gagetown helped chart the course, as did the previous ministerial statements in front of SCONDVA and CDA, so there is some suggestion as to where we are going. Within the department, my policy group is working very closely with the military, primarily the Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, who is responsible for the defence program in the work that we are undertaking.
I believe we already have a lot of the data that we need to conduct a policy review. We produce in National Defence a strategic assessment every year that looks at the nature of the world and the security challenges, so we have a broadly articulated view of what the world is like. We also have 10 to 15 years of military operational experience, operations abroad, which provide a lot of data as to what is useful and less than useful for the Canadian Forces. Therefore we have a lot of information on which to base our policy.
We have identified gaps in our data and we are moving to fill those. The next step, which we have not got to yet, will be for us to formulate the issues and options upon which we need ministerial guidance.
Quite frankly, it is too early to say what will be in that policy in the end, and of course it would be inappropriate for me to say anyway, since that is a role for ministers. However, I do have a few hunches about what one might see that I am happy to share with the committee, with the caveat that ministers may entirely disagree with me and the policy may say something entirely different.
For example, I do not expect to see revolutionary changes in the policy concepts that have traditionally been the underpinning for Canadian defence policy. For example, I would not expect to see the three fundamental roles of the Canadian Forces change. Those are, as you will recall, the defence of Canada, defence of North America, and contributing to international peace and security. I would see that remaining largely intact. If you review the many activities that Canadian Forces undertake, both at home and abroad, you will see that they would also probably continue, although perhaps we may pick up some new ones. For example, in Canada, aid to the civil power, assistance to civil authorities, surveillance and security of Canadian territory, fisheries patrols, humanitarian and disaster assistance will all be reflected in the next policy; and with respect to abroad, peacekeeping, peace enforcement — as we are doing in Kabul — international humanitarian assistance, support of the United Nations, NATO, NORAD and so forth. I would think that would all stay as well.
I would expect the next policy to talk about combat-capable multi-purpose armed forces. I believe we will be looking for flexible and mobile forces capable of rapid response and of participating in a wide range of operations.
All that said, of course, there will be changes. There will inevitably be changes after 10 years without a new policy, and the changes will reflect the events of which we are all sadly aware, September 11 and the new terrorist threat. There will be changes in the policy. There will be corrections and so forth. I would personally anticipate a greater emphasis in the policy on defence of Canada and Canadians, particularly against terrorism and asymmetric threats. I would expect to see more on maritime security in all of the maritime areas under Canadian responsibility. I would expect to see a greater concentration on North American security in cooperation with the United States, obviously underlining the importance of NORAD, but probably going beyond that.
We would probably see more with respect to the Arctic, given that the ice cap is melting and that has certain strategic implications in the North. I would suspect that we would see a great deal more about the reserves, both with respect to the tools that reserves have to do the job but also their roles. In all of those areas you will see those elements in the policy in some form or other. Exactly what is said, what will be proposed, how high the priorities are, remains to be determined.
I believe the real focus of the issue as we go to ministers will be on the program and the capabilities of the Armed Forces. What are the capabilities that the Armed Forces need to address future challenges? There, as I said, we have benefited from all of the operations the Canadian Forces have been on over the last 10 to 15 years. It is a good basis upon which to make realistic decisions.
The other issue, perhaps the most fundamental of all, is the question of how much is enough. This is a question for government. We will be able to go to the government in all of the areas of the Canadian Forces and explain that, with our current assets and the current budget, we can do so much abroad. The army can undertake so many operations abroad or the navy can sail so many ships at the same time; the air force can deploy a certain number of F18s, we can keep them abroad for a certain period of time. We can explain that to government. The issue for government is whether that is enough. Are we actually producing enough? Does that satisfy the government's overall political and foreign policy objectives?
We also have a responsibility to go forward to government with options, saying if you wish to do more in this area, or if you wish to do more in that area, we can do that.
We have to say how we will do it. We have to go forward with realistic proposals. We have to go forward with costs of proposals so the government can look at the menu and say, ``Yes, we think we should have that capability.'' Of course, then one would assume that they would be willing to give us the resources to produce that.
At the end of the day, the real question is: Is the capacity we currently have sufficient, or does the government believe we should have more?
I can say one final word on consultations, which will be an essential aspect of this process. At this point, as I have already mentioned, we have the statement in the Speech from the Throne that the government will come forward to the parliamentary committees in the fall with results, at which time consultations will be possible. I would say that at this point, ministers have not yet made the decisions as to exactly how the public consultations will be developed, but I have every confidence that there will be public consultations, as there have been in the past.
I will stop and respond to your questions.
The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Calder. That was a helpful overview.
Senator Day: Within the last week, the Minister of National Defence has been criticized in the newspapers for sitting on a strategy with respect to equipment replenishment and upgrading. If that is the case, is that because of this ongoing study, and would there be some equipment replenishment and some desire for equipment acquisition in there that might depend on where we are going with respect to policy?
Mr. Calder: I would put a caveat on my answer by saying that precisely why the minister is holding that for the moment would have to be answered by him. I am not in a position to read his mind.
You are talking about what is essentially the capital program of the department. We have always had a capital program. It is a constant feature of our planning, looking ahead 15 years for the defence projects that we want to undertake. There is nothing new in this. What is new is the way it has been put together this time, and it has a new name. That lays out the funding, the projects and the sequencing thereof for a long period.
As I understand from the same reports you saw, that is in the minister's office and he is considering it. It is perfectly natural for a minister looking at billions of dollars of projects over 15 years to think carefully and take his time before he signs off on it. In no way does that stand in the way of anything happening. There is a suggestion that somehow, because that is in his office and he has not signed it, nothing is happening. That is not true. As you know, we have had recent announcements on fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft, on the support ships and on the mobile gun system. In fact, the process of re-equipping the forces continues.
At this point, the minister wants to think fairly carefully before he puts his name to a document.
Senator Day: I should like to talk a little about process. It seems to me that in the last two years, since you were last here, we have seen statements come out of the army, navy, and the air force with respect to the next few years and where they see themselves going as a force within the Armed Forces. I am wondering if that is part of the information base that you say you have and that will help develop the overall plan.
It seemed to me that a number of issues in these various statements were not reflected in the existing 10-year-old 1994 policy. It seemed to be a suggestion as to where the Armed Forces was going, but it was not coming with political input, but rather out of the Armed Forces and driven by the money available.
Mr. Calder: The department and the minister encourage the Armed Forces to think about where they are and where they are going and how they should develop capabilities in the future. When we write a defence policy, we obviously rely to an enormous degree on military advice as to the types of capabilities they think they will need and are appropriate. What you have here is the phenomenon of the armed services thinking about the situation they are in and coming up with suggestions as to how we move forward and what capabilities we need. Inevitably, these will go beyond a white paper written back in 1994 because much has developed in terms of military technology, as well as the types of operations we are in. In each of the services, given the experience they have had recently abroad, given the experience that the air force had in the Kosovo campaign or the experience the army is now having in Kabul or in Kandahar, and given all the naval experience we have had in the Indian Ocean, the forces have learned many lessons. Many capabilities have been identified that might be useful for us to have. The process of the three forces thinking about these things and coming up with coherent plans is, in a sense, an essential part, I would argue, of any sort of policy review. In order for me and my staff to put a policy document on the table, we need military input by real military experts as to those capabilities. It is all part of the process. We do not always agree 100 per cent, but the nature of the policy process is to come up with a consensus as to the direction the government should be going.
Senator Day: What do you anticipate from the military review that is going on? I think you answered, in part, a question as to whether it is being driven by the money available. Do we say this is the ideal for what Canada needs in terms of the Armed Forces, our participation nationally and in North America and our international obligations, and then leave it to the political masters to determine if that can be funded? Or do you say, ``Well, this is what this ideal will cost, and before we come out with a statement on what we will do, we have to know that, and therefore, it is being driven by the money that might be available?''
Mr. Calder: I think it is neither, if I may say so. Certainly it is not a question of doing a review within a fixed budget with no possibility of changing that. That is certainly not my understanding. In fact, I believe that the government is on record as saying, after the last increases, that future increases in defence expenditure would depend upon the results of the review. Obviously we are not tied to a specific budget amount.
On the other hand, we would not go forward and say to the government, ``This is the ideal military structure that we recommend to you, and it will cost you so much,'' because it is obviously not for us to say what is ideal in terms of the basic military arm of the government. It is for the government to decide what it believes to be ideal.
As I say, we are not tied to a particular amount of money. We would go forward and say to the government, ``These are the options available to you. You have certain choices here. You have certain levels of capabilities, in terms of both quantity and quality, and this is what it will cost. You choose.''
There is no single ideal structure. It very much depends on government priorities, government objectives and the role the government wants to play in the world, et cetera. There is no one answer to that question. Unfortunately, it is not empirically driven.
Senator Day: What should we expect as a result of this exercise? Should we expect a blueprint for where we think we would like to go over the next few years, or are we being driven by past neglect? In that regard, for example, it will be tremendously expensive to maintain the CF-18s, our fighter aircraft, and to keep that capability. By default, will the policy say, ``We will get out of tanks and fighter aircraft because we can get along without them and we cannot afford to stay in that game?''
Mr. Calder: I would expect and hope that a policy would come out that would be realistic, that would set, as you say, the direction for the next decade, and that would be fully funded and had broad public support. I think that is the objective.
With respect to particular capabilities, we will have to go through the current holdings of the Canadian Forces and ask ourselves if there are things that we do not need, and by getting rid of those, be able to reallocate those funds elsewhere. This is taking place all across government now. Departments are being asked to look at the question of reallocation because there is a finite amount of money. It is our job to take a look at what we can reallocate. That is very much part of the decision to get rid of the main battle tank and go to the mobile gun system. It is a question of saying, ``We can reallocate that money, and given the missions we have, get a much better capability as a result.''
Senator Day: That is a good example, in my mind, of a policy decision that was made by virtue of money available. Was it not?
Mr. Calder: No, but you have to live within your budget. That decision was made very much on the recommendation of the army, where we were effectively saying, ``We have not used the main battle tank, with one or two small exceptions, since we got out of Europe.'' Fortunately, we did not have to use them there, either. In all the operations we have been on over the last 15 years, we have not deployed those tanks, except in one case of one tank in the Balkans. It is an asset we are not using and we do not anticipate having to use it. We do not see that as an asset that will be terribly usable.
On the other hand, the mobile gun system is smaller, can move faster and has a lot of punch to it. If you ask any of our commanders, for example, our commanders in Bosnia, even more so in Kabul and elsewhere, ``Would you like to have a couple of those things behind you?'' They would say, ``Absolutely.'' That is a resource that can be very useful in the types of situations in which the Canadian Forces are deployed.
That decision was made on the basis of military utility. There is a financial aspect to it. It was a reallocation, but it was not driven by the fact that the mobile gun system would be cheaper than the main battle tank. It was driven by the utility. The important thing is to go through our inventories and ask, ``What will we use in the future and what will we not use?'' The second part is, ``What is missing? What is it that we do not have that we would like to acquire or could use?'' That is where we rely upon the forces, in many cases, to suggest to us things that, on the basis of their firsthand operational experience, they need.
I would assume that the next policy would deal with the issues you raise, for example, the CF-18, et cetera. We have had an update of the F-18. Obviously, they will continue to be useful for some time. There is a question about what will happen eventually. Either this policy review or the next will have to deal with that. You cannot fix everything all at the same time.
The Chairman: On Senator Day's point, Dr. Calder, there is a sense of skepticism in the committee and amongst parliamentarians who are following these issues. The last white paper was a pretty good one, and then you and the department were blind-sided because that white paper was predicated on a certain level of funding. That funding did not go forward and we were left with Canadian Forces that have been in disrepair for a decade because of a lack of stable funding and a planning environment that they could count on.
As we look forward to the next white paper, how do you expect parliamentarians, and by extension, Canadians, to take a planning project or a planning exercise seriously when all of us remember the last one, which proved to be largely a waste of time?
Mr. Calder: Having been responsible for the process that produced that, I would never have said that a white paper that has actually survived for 10 years, and is still in effect until such time as it is replaced the policy of the government, was a waste of time. I thought it was rather successful.
The Chairman: I said precisely that — it was a successful white paper. It just lacked government support after six months.
Mr. Calder: I would say that is an exaggeration. Some of the cuts that happened, even after the white paper came out, were anticipated in the process. For example, the white paper came out in December 1994. There were budget cuts at the beginning of 1995. They were anticipated when we were drafting that white paper. We saw them coming, so we were not surprised.
It is true that after that, we went through fiscally hard times, which inevitably happens from time to time in government. Government funding decisions do not negate the value of the process of laying out what you want to do and then trying to ensure it is funded. This is a constant challenge. It is one that I would suggest exists in any government. It is one we will have to face after the next white paper as well.
The Chairman: Are you attributing it to the time between white papers being too long?
Mr. Calder: No, I am not sure that is a factor. At the end of the day, the amount of money we are given is a reflection of the government's choices and priorities and the money and resources available. For much of the period after the 1994 white paper, the emphasis was on the deficit and on cutting back government expenditures. We went through program review. That was the government's priority. At the end of the day, the money we get is a matter of government choices and priorities. We obviously attempt to implement the policy to the best of our ability with the resources we are given.
The Chairman: I understand. Please do not see my comments as critical of you. They are quite the contrary. They were intended to be complimentary. My point was that most people think it was a terrific white paper. They just think that the government has fallen down badly by not funding it. Had the government chosen to provide the appropriate levels of funding, the white paper would still be a valid document today.
My point was that we have Armed Forces that are in significant disarray. We do not have any one of the arms in a position where they can function. The navy has indicated they cannot sail any more. The air force has huge maintenance problems and aircraft that it cannot get off the tarmac. The army is extended well beyond its capacity. You understand all of these things. You are doing your best to put together a policy to cope with it, but when you come forward with one, you must have the same level of scepticism, in that whatever plan you come up with is only as good as the funding it receives. It does not matter how hard you work or how much effort members of the Armed Forces put into making a plan, if there is not the political will, it does not fly.
Mr. Calder: Mr. Chairman, I do not accept your pessimistic assessment of the current situation. Granted, there are difficulties and challenges. I do not accept that the forces are in the disarray that you characterize them to be. If you take a look at the recent past, service-by-service, in the Kosovo air campaign, we deployed CF-18s. We were one of only four countries in NATO with the capability to drop the precision-guided weapons that were required in that conflict. I repeat: One of four countries in NATO.
That does not sound like an air force in disarray, and we are in fact upgrading the F-18s.
In the same respect, we deployed our forces to Bosnia. When many of our critics were saying that the Canadian army was no longer combat-capable, we deployed to Kandahar, where our forces did as well as anyone else fighting in Afghanistan, and better than some. The Canadian army proved that it was combat-capable in that environment. Today, for example, we are providing the backbone of the forces in ISAF in Kabul. It is the Canadian Forces and commander who are in fact keeping that NATO operation going. That does not sound like an army in disarray. It is under stress, but it is also an army that is superbly competent to do the job it is doing.
With respect to the navy, we deployed more ships in the Indian Ocean in the war on terrorism than we said we would be able to do in the white paper. We overachieved in terms of the 1994 white paper with respect to the navy and we were considered good enough to do that. The Americans also assigned us the task of commanding task forces, as well as having our own ships there, and our people did a superb job of maritime interdiction. I grant you that there are pressures on the forces. There are requirements. There are future funding requirements that I think we are all aware of, but the point is that I do not think that we serve the debate well by exaggerating what you say is the disarray in the forces. The forces are under pressure and we will have to deal with that in the white paper. The point is, at the same time, a lot of things have happened. There has been a lot of re-equipment since 1994, including the submarines, the Coyotes, LAV-3s and so forth. A lot of things have been done in the Canadian Forces that have improved their capabilities.
I do not think any of us would want to be back where we were in 1994.
The Chairman: Can you cite a single independent group that has said that the Canadian Forces are in good shape?
Mr. Calder: I am sure there is one, but I cannot cite one off the top of my head.
Senator Day: On that point, if Dr. Calder does discover one he can let us know at some other time.
Mr. Calder: Aside from groups, I think if you took a look at some of our academics studying military issues, I am not sure they would all disagree with me. Some would.
Senator Meighen: You may have talked about this, Mr. Calder, and I may have missed it, but it I wanted to get clear in my mind the process that is being followed. Do I understand that the basic tenets of the 1994 white paper are being followed and that there are differences of emphasis, which you have mentioned, such as more maritime security, more cooperation with the U.S., more Arctic activity, more reserve roles — and I cannot resist saying no more money, but that is something else. If that is so, I presume you are not moving ahead in a vacuum. There must be some political encouragement for you to put forward these differences of emphasis, or are you operating in a total vacuum? I am worried there has been no meshing of what you are doing and the political will of the government at this point.
Mr. Calder: I would hope not, senator.
What I was suggesting in that portion of my remarks is what I said were my hunches as to what we will see. I may well be wrong, but those hunches are based on, frankly, the kind of general discussion that has gone on, the things that the Prime Minister and the minister have said publicly and the things this committee has said. Some of the things that I suggested would be in the next policy were actually recommended, if I am not mistaken, by this very committee. I was suggesting where I could see it going. Of course, that is subject to ministers, who may say, ``Calder, you have it all wrong and we are going elsewhere.'' That is based —
Senator Meighen: Are you starting with a blank sheet of paper?
Mr. Calder: No.
Senator Meighen: I am not being provocative here, but, for example, what is your authority for saying — if you said this, and I do not want to put words into your mouth — that the basic tenets of the 1994 white paper hold and we will build on that, add to it, change it and do this and that? You may be whistling in the dark.
Mr. Calder: I may be, but that is exactly why I placed the caveat at the beginning that, in fact, my masters may think otherwise.
Senator, one of the basic tenets, the first mission of the Canadian Forces, is the defence of Canada. Does the committee disagree with that?
The second mission of the Canadian Forces is the defence of North America in cooperation with the United States. I have never seen anybody take issue with that in this committee, the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs and SCONDVA, or among our academics and the public commentators out there.
The third role is contributing to international peace and security.
Now, we do not have to contribute. It is not mandatory that the Government of Canada contribute to international peace and security, but everything that I have heard the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of National Defence say suggests to me that it will be a role as well.
I am not operating, I hope, in a vacuum, but on the basis of things that are being said and discussed publicly and commented on. What I gave you is my best guess, which, as I say, could well be wrong.
Senator Meighen: You are part of the team, are you not?
Mr. Calder: Yes.
Senator Meighen: Your guess, I guess, would be pretty good.
I am still concerned that you are working in more of a vacuum than I would like.
Unless there is some guidance from somebody on the political end, we are spinning our wheels. If they were only to say, ``Look, Mr. Calder, draft something up, but no, we cannot substantially increase the funding,'' if that is their position, or, ``Look, draft something up, we understand there will be increases, and they may be too much, but we know we will have to increase the defence envelope.'' From what you have told me, you do not have that sort of guidance.
Mr. Calder: We do have guidance, senator. For example, to go back to the Prime Minister's speech in Gagetown, that was forward leaning with respect to what we should expect in policy. There are areas on which my minister has spoken in front of the CDA and SCONDVA and put certain positions on the record. I pay attention to what these people are saying. Obviously, I take that, among other things, for guidance. We are not operating in a vacuum.
Senator Meighen: Different ministers of defence, and there have been a few, have had different positions, so I suppose you have to take the last position of the last minister?
Mr. Calder: No. I have to take the position of the current Minister of National Defence.
Senator Meighen: That is a better choice of words on your part.
Senator Banks: I will try to move in a slightly different direction because I want to get some advice from you with respect to the policy reviews that are coming up. However, I cannot leave the subject about which my predecessors have all asked you without making clear that in response to your answer to the Chair, about the good things the Canadian Forces have done in the last few years, we have never been critical, we are not critical — and in fact we are admiring very much — of the capability of the people in the forces and the fact that they have performed better than anyone could reasonably expect in the most difficult circumstances.
That is true; we know that the first time we deployed soldiers on the ground in Afghanistan, the American commander who was then in charge said they were the best soldiers he had.
However, we could not replace them. We could not replace 800 soldiers. Canada could not replace 800 soldiers, and that leads to the view that I think most of us have of the white paper.
The 1994 white paper, which was wonderful, but a ``Rube Goldberg machine,'' said that we could not place and maintain a brigade group on foreign shores for a couple of months, if I recall correctly.
Mr. Calder: It said six months.
Senator Banks: We have never been able to do that since 1994. I think that was the point that stuck in all of our craws. It is nice to have a plan of some kind, but for the plan to be effective and to be given effect, there has to be money for it. We think that that needs to be put in place and that Canadians want it to be put in place.
I want to move to the area about which Senator Day had questions. Which situation should we be in? This is how much money we have so this is what we can do; or this is what we should be able to do so this is how much money we need? I know that the truth lies, as you have said, in between those two statements, but would you tell us the difference? We have expressed the opinion before that a defence policy should follow a foreign policy. Once you have established the foreign policy, it explains, or almost determines, the defence policy.
Mr. Calder, you have told us, if I heard you correctly, that there will not be a foreign policy review but there will be a review of our international policy. I know that is different, but could you explain that difference to the committee?
Mr. Calder: First, I agree with the committee that ideally, the defence policy would follow the foreign policy. In this situation, we will achieve that effect through the international policy framework. We will be guided, clearly, in the defence policy by whatever comes out in the national security policy, which will cover a broad range of subjects.
We will also have the international policy framework, which is being prepared by the foreign office, with our cooperation, and which I would hope would set the broad priorities of the Canadian government and the areas where we ought to operate internationally. It will serve, for our purposes, the same function that a foreign policy would. Coming up with a defence policy that is relatively consistent with both of those would put us in a much stronger position.
Your question about the 800 soldiers goes back to the point I made in my remarks: At the end of the day, the real question is, how much? How many missions does the government want to take on? Currently, we have a fairly major mission in Kabul, and we are still in Bosnia and in Haiti. Is that at capacity for the army? Is that sufficient or should we be able to do more? Should we be able to do it for longer? Those choices have to be put to the government and it will fund what it chooses to fund.
Senator Banks: Are those questions not functions of international policy as opposed to defence policy? The question of how much we should do is a foreign policy question, is it not?
Mr. Calder: Yes, it is. It is also a question of what we should do in respect of the United Nations and NATO. Where in the world should we be operating for international peace and security? What kinds of operations should they be? Those issues are of vital concern to my organization, but they are also foreign policy issues. Foreign policy may dictate that Canada does not want to operate in certain parts of the world or to undertake certain kinds of operations. In that case, government would adjust the defence policy accordingly.
I hope that when we reach that point, the international policy framework would provide us with that kind of international guidance.
Senator Banks: I will ask one more question in order to have a little reassurance. Some of our previous reports have made reference to what is not unfairly characterized as a ``spaghetti bowl'' of studies, and offices for this and policies for that; overviews of this and that and the other thing; the fact that it is very confusing and difficult to determine who is actually driving the bus; and whether there is any place one could ask the questions: What is the policy? Who will decide upon A, B and C?
Mr. Calder, you have just described in the last few minutes three different things going on, all of which are supposed to come together somewhere. Are you confident and comfortable that all of this will arrive at some time in the foreseeable future, which we do not think exists now, such that we will be able to find the pointy end of the stick and attribute the handling of it to someone?
Mr. Calder: I would hope that when these three reviews are finished there would be much more clarity in this whole area. It will be fairly obvious as to whom you should ask for the answers in any particular area. Quite clearly, the Deputy Prime Minister and the National Security Adviser are the two people who speak to national security policy. The Minister of National Defence speaks to defence policy, and the other ministers, Mr. Graham and Ms. Carroll, speak to their respective areas. At the end of the day, the person to whom you talk would be the minister responsible and accountable for that portfolio.
Senator Banks: I know that, but to put the question another way, are you comfortable that the bailiwick protection and disconnects between communication and information, which can obtain in other areas, are absent from your sphere of influence, control and interest?
Mr. Calder: I think so, if I understood the question correctly. I have been pleasantly surprised by the degree of consensus that exists, particularly in the international policy framework, between my department, Foreign Affairs and International Trade and CIDA. We meet on a weekly basis and I have been pleasantly surprised by the fact that we share a common view. We will not have disconnects in that area and I hope that this will be reflected at the end of the process, as well as at the beginning.
Senator Banks: The Prime Minister announced the big new ships that we will design and build and that made some of us extremely happy. We have long urged that there be some kind of lift or delivery capability for the Canadian Forces because we were absent that for a long time. I know that you will have heard zillions of proposals from various people about how to better manage the available funds for the Canadian Forces, including doing niche design. Let us concentrate solely on the navy and perhaps a few marines, but never mind the army and forget about the air force — and convolutions of which there are endless numbers.
Is putting a great deal of money into those three big ships with very specific capabilities a soft indication that we are looking seriously at niche roles rather than a large, general, contributing, interoperable role for our Armed Forces?
Mr. Calder: I would not think so. Those ships represent a capability that is necessary for the navy to perform almost all of its various functions. I do not see a connection between that and niche roles for the Canadian Forces. I certainly would not recommend that we strive for niche roles.
Senator Banks: Heavy lift capability is not a role that the Canadian navy has currently, nor has it ever had.
Mr. Calder: That is right.
Senator Banks: They have never had a ship that could move 100 trucks but we are now talking about that kind of role for the Canadian navy; that is new.
Mr. Calder: I think that we are taking advantage of the fact that we have to replace the replenishment vessels and are realizing that there are other things we can do. This is an opportunity not only to replace them, but also to improve the capability. We began discussions on this a number of years ago and determined that if we were to have a new ship, it would be possible to add a number of things that would make it multi-purpose. For example, we used one of the AOR vessels as a headquarters off Somalia during that operation, so we decided that it would be useful to have a headquartering capability in that ship.
Then, of course, there is the potential to use it as a medical facility offshore from an operation. There is also the question of lifts. This is an example of where people have said, let us take this opportunity to improve our lift situation because we do not have that. However, that is actually making us more capable, not pushing us in a niche direction.
Senator Banks: I think all of my colleagues would be very happy about that. Will we build them here?
Mr. Calder: I am sure, senator, you know the policy states that they will be built in Canada if Canadian industries are competitive.
The Chairman: Just on that subject, we have the impression that Admiral Buck has been dreaming about these ships for years, if not decades. Why will it take so long to see a contract let for them? Why does it involve two years of design? The committee tends to discount promises for the future to zero. Why the delay?
Mr. Calder: You are asking me, senator, to step a little out of my area of knowledge, because I have never actually been in the business of procurement.
My understanding is that part of the explanation is that any project this size takes a long time. Part of it is we are talking here about a capability. As I understand it — I am not an expert — there are no designs already available, so a certain amount of work has to go into designing something that is actually new and unique. That will slow down the process somewhat.
I know that there have been suggestions before the committee that we should buy an off-the-shelf design. However, for what the navy is looking at, I am told there are no off-the-shelf designs to buy. I am only repeating what I have been told.
Senator Meighen: Maybe Dr. Calder could help us. I have heard a lot of concern, whether ill-founded and not, that our procurement process seems to take an inordinate length of time. Some suggestions have been weighed — purchase more off the shelf, such as designs — and you have just indicated why, in this instance, the purchase of a ship design may not be feasible. In your experience, who would be the person whom the committee, if it had the time and interest, could ask to come and explain the procurement process and why it appears to take so long?
Mr. Calder: Senator, I have to say that the problem of delay in the procurement process is an issue that has been around at least as long as I have. I certainly remember having studies in the department on this more than 10 years ago. This is a very difficult and complex issue.
The person whom you should call upon is my colleague, Alan Williams, the assistant deputy minister for materiel. He is the person responsible within the department on the whole subject of the procurement process; he is the real expert.
You could also call upon people from Public Works who are involved in the process of procurement and contracting for National Defence, because they also have a piece of the puzzle. As I say, I would recommend Alan Williams, who certainly could speak more knowledgeably on the subject than I.
In this particular case, I am told there is no design. However, we have been certainly saying — and preaching from a policy point of view — for at least 10 years now that, whenever possible, we should be buying proven designs off the shelf. We should be buying things that are being used by other people and which are interoperable, in part because it is a less expensive way of doing business and speeds up the process. However, it is not possible for every piece of equipment.
Senator Atkins: I just want to begin by reinforcing the fact that the committee has been very proud of what the Armed Forces have done. That has been demonstrated in so many different ways.
When you were designing the white paper in 1994, you did not have a crystal ball. You could not have anticipated a lot of the things that have taken place over the last 10 years, and certainly since 2001. I am surprised that you say, within that framework, that you still stand by the white paper, without significant adjustments or changes.
I say that because I think you could not have anticipated the commitments that the government has made on the international scene. There is a perception in this committee that we are spread too thinly and are underfunded. You do not get a sense of urgency in dealing with some of the commitments, for instance, the commitment in Afghanistan, when in fact we were going to pull out in August and now we are there for another year, with 900 troops.
This is what makes it difficult to sell additional funding for National Defence, when it has taken 10 years for the government to decide on replacing the Sea Kings, for instance. How you can expect the public to want to support defence funding when they do not see urgency on the part of the government and National Defence? Can you comment on that?
Mr. Calder: When I said that the principles of the 1994 white paper remain valid, I hope I did not imply that significant changes would not be made.
For example — you are dead on — one of the weaknesses in 1994 was while we anticipated being abroad and various types of exercises, we did not anticipate the demand, especially for multiple operations in different places, which put particular strains on the Canadian Forces. Simply, we did not anticipate the demand for Canadian Forces to be deployed abroad on such a continuous basis.
That is not in the area of principle policy, that is more in terms of looking at the program — how much is enough in the budget and so forth. However, you are absolutely right; we underestimated the demand.
I am in the business of advising government on defence policy. I think that the announcements made by the Prime Minister in Gagetown, for example, and the very fact that these reviews have been undertaken is a signal the government is serious. Also, we got an increase in the budget this year, we had an increase last year, so there are signs that the government is taking these matters seriously and that there is a certain degree of urgency.
You might well argue that more should be done, and of course, that is an entirely appropriate role for a senator to play — SCONDVA has made the same points. The government is in fact addressing these things the way they think they should be addressed.
Senator Atkins: I would argue that leadership is the issue here. If you ask the question — and I know the government conducts polls all the time — what are the most important issues facing Canadians today, defence policy is way down on the scale.
Mr. Calder: I have noticed.
Senator Day: Security is way up on the scale.
Senator Atkins: The fact of the matter is, it will always be down on the scale, because as I cited on another occasion, I did not hear a great hue and cry when they announced the building of the frigates or when they purchased the CF- 18s. We are now faced with a national defence force that is under-financed and spread too thinly.
If you were examining the situation as it is today, how would you recommend that the government reach out to Canadians to convince them that we cannot keep making these commitments unless we can finance them?
Mr. Calder: Senator, you are pushing me beyond the area of my expertise, into the political realm, which I am really not qualified to speak about. It is up to the political leadership to express their priorities and concerns to the Canadian people, not me.
The Chairman: If I could say, you were looking for a political answer and I do not think it is fair to ask that of Dr. Calder.
Senator Atkins: I will not look for a political answer.
The Chairman: The question remains in terms of the planning process. Given the uncertainties about the political will or the willingness to fund, how does one go about planning?
Senator Atkins: That is right, where we realize we are in, if not a critical situation, then a serious situation if we keep going this way.
Mr. Calder: Our responsibility, not only mine, but also my military colleagues, is to bring the facts to our political masters within government and to suggest how these things might be dealt with and the implications and the costs of doing so or not doing so, because it works both ways. We have that obligation inside the government.
Senator Atkins: I will shift to another subject. As you will notice, Senator Wiebe is not here; he is now retired. It is incumbent on us to ask the question: In terms of policy development, have you any suggestions or recommendations with regard to the reserve?
Mr. Calder: As I said in my opening remarks, the reserves will be a major issue in the next policy. We have already seen indications of that in what the Prime Minister said in Gagetown on the subject. It will not be just a question of the size of the reserves, of the tools they have, but also probably a question of the role the reserves play.
I am anticipating that this will be a major feature. It would be premature for me to suggest what the outcome of that might be, but it is certainly an area of great importance.
Senator Atkins: Can you see it playing a bigger role?
Mr. Calder: I would think so.
Senator Atkins: Would it play a bigger role, if not in international security, in national security?
Mr. Calder: I think there is a role in both fields. The reserves are playing a significant role in the forces we deploy abroad. I would think that would continue. There are also the questions of the roles the reserves can play in the defence of Canada, which are quite significant.
Senator Atkins: Our second report recommended an increase in armed forces personnel to 75,000, and a significant increase in financing. If I were to give you $4 billion for policy development tomorrow, could you tell the Department of National Defence how they could spend that amount?
Mr. Calder: You cannot spend that amount quickly. Such an action would have to be done in a responsible fashion and would have to be phased in over a certain period.
Senator Atkins: Are there priorities?
Mr. Calder: There are priorities that have been set out in the capital program. To some extent, ministers must make choices. If one were to have more money, one would then have to present the minister with a menu, saying we could do this, that or something else. One would ask the minister, ``What is your priority, what capability do you want?'' With an infinite amount of money, one could do anything, but that will not happen.
I could not imagine going forward and just saying that we think the forces should be 75,000, or we think the budget should go up by ``X'' amount of money. We would deal more in terms of capabilities. If we want to do this, we will have to increase the forces by a certain amount. We will have to have an increase in the budget.
For example, if we say, which is quite reasonable, that we can conduct a certain number of army operations abroad, as we are doing at the moment in Kabul, it may be desirable for us to have the capability to undertake another of those operations, over and above what we can do now. To do that, you would then have to have ``X'' thousand people, it will cost you ``X'' amount of money, and you put that to the government.
In other words, if we go forward with a large bill and a large increase, it is incumbent upon us to say how it would be used so that the government could see what it is actually getting for its money.
Senator Atkins: I take it from what I am hearing about your input into the policy process that you are committed to a multi-purpose type of military?
Mr. Calder: I would argue that that is a sensible way to go.
Senator Atkins: Can we afford that?
Mr. Calder: We are currently the sixth largest in defence expenditures in NATO, the sixteenth in the world. There are many countries that run multi-purpose combat-capable forces on smaller budgets than we do. It is obviously possible. Can we have everything we want? Can we have everything that our critics want us to have? That is a different matter.
Senator Atkins: Do they have the same obligations and commitments?
Mr. Calder: The NATO allies have all of the same obligations and commitments that we have, except some of them are smaller than us geographically. Our NATO allies have all of the same United Nations and NATO obligations. They may fulfil those obligations differently, but at the end of the day we are still the sixteenth largest in terms of defence expenditures, the last time I looked.
Senator Day: Is that an absolute dollar expenditure, per capita or percentage of GDP?
Mr. Calder: The rating is based on absolute dollars.
Senator Day: We are down a little further on the percentage of GDP; is that correct?
Mr. Calder: That is right.
Senator Meighen: Mr. Calder, you alluded earlier to a SCIP program for new equipment. Press reports indicate that the Minister of Defence is now studying this plan. Do those purchases come out of an existing funding envelope? Would additional monies be required?
Mr. Calder: There is a portion of the defence budget set aside for capital expenditures. I forget exactly what the latest figures are, but certainly it tends to run around 20 per cent. There is a certain amount put aside. The SCIP is based on the existing policy, the existing funding level, and sets out the timetable. It sets out what we think we should be acquiring in terms of capital and a timetable in which it should be carried out.
If the funding level or policy changes, there will be a requirement to go back and redo the SCIP. That may well be one of the reasons why the minister is sitting and contemplating the plan without having decided yet, because it may well change, but I would not anticipate that.
Senator Meighen: That is certainly one of the reasons, perhaps. Thank you very much, Dr. Calder.
The Chairman: Given the government's stated aim to have public input into the white paper, would it be unrealistic for the department to come forward with three scenarios — the $12-billion scenario, the $20-billion scenario and the $30-billion scenario? Here is what you get if you want to keep spending $12 billion a year; here is what you get if you budget $20 billion, and here is what you get if you budget $30 billion.
Has there ever been any consideration of that sort of approach in a white paper?
Mr. Calder: There certainly has not been that approach publicly. Could you repeat the numbers again?
The Chairman: Twelve billion dollars a year, $20 billion a year and $30 billion a year, and saying to the Canadian public that, if we were at that level of spending on an ongoing basis, with inflation, here are the sorts of capabilities over time you could expect the Canadian Forces to provide — and have a debate based on what it would involve.
You could translate it into how much it would cost per capita, if you like. Right now we are spending $430 per capita. The Americans are spending $1,100 per capita. If Canadians wanted to spend $600 per capita, here is the sort of defence force they could anticipate.
Mr. Calder: Mr. Chairman, the difficulty with that approach is that it presupposes that we all agree on what we want the forces to look like. I think that the first debate should be on what you want the forces for and what you want them to do. You then determine what that would cost. Once you have decided on that, there would be a number of different levels at which you could achieve that objective. Theoretically, that probably makes sense.
However, first, I do not think that the government would say that this is framed purely in terms of the amount of money being spent. The question really is what you want the Canadian Forces to do and how much you want them to do, and then the cost is an implication rather that a driver of the options.
The Chairman: I was following your logic. You described your hunches for the committee, and you described the premises that you anticipated the paper would be based upon, and then you said, at the end of your presentation, that you thought the real question was: How much is enough? I am simply following the logic of your ``how much is enough'' question and saying let's give the Canadian people a choice as to how much is enough.
There is no question that you have to answer the first questions first, but once you do, how do you address the ``how much is enough'' if you do not give Canadians the choice and the consequences of what ``how much'' is?
Mr. Calder: I was probably using shorthand when I said ``how much is enough,'' because, of course, the ``how'' much depends on also a pre-consideration of whether you want the capabilities to be, for example, focused on the army and operations, as in Kabul, or in North America and other areas. Before you get to the finances, there are other questions with respect to the roles, and within that you have the question of quantity.
The Chairman: I understand that, but I have never heard a discussion of quantities. When we went through the white paper last time, there were certain assurances. There are members on the committee who recall hearing witnesses from the Department of Finance who gave the committee, as a precursor to the white paper, assurances about what levels of funding one could anticipate in the future.
Had the committee anticipated the levels that eventually materialized, there would have been a different committee report and, I suspect, a different white paper.
Mr. Calder: Yes. I think that when the next white paper comes out people will expect to see exact details on the funding and will seek to be convinced that the funding is sufficient to do what the paper says. That is reasonable.
The Chairman: Do you see any merit, after answering the initial questions, in giving Canadians choices in levels of funding?
Mr. Calder: It is an approach. I suspect that there will be a basis for consultation, which would presumably include both what the Canadian Forces do and how much should be spent on them.
The Chairman: In fairness, I do not think that was part of the debate last time. In fairness, the price tag was not one that Canadians focused on with any great significance, and the suggestion that for half as much or twice as much one would have to contemplate quite different Canadian Forces did not enter into it. It is a dimension that, it seems to me, we should have learned from. I do not get the impression, tonight, at least, that you are rushing forward to embrace the concept. Having said that, it is very hard to have a realistic debate among the population if you do not associate the options with price tags.
Mr. Calder: Yes.
Senator Day: The Reserves 2000 program developed from the Fraser report that look into the reserves and set out a nice program of where the reserves should go. Should I assume that that program will now be just part of the database of knowledge and might no longer be implemented?
Mr. Calder: Obviously, that program and others in the department that are ongoing continue until such time as a new policy comes out. It is very dangerous to stop activities in anticipation of something that the policy may or may not say.
Senator Day: In the same light, nothing is sacrosanct now; everything is under review with respect to military policy leading up to the next policy paper?
Mr. Calder: Yes. In any thorough defence policy review, everything is on the table.
Senator Day: Everything is on the table. That is what I was looking for.
Could you tell me where a decision would be made, in terms of the planning process, if Canada decides to participate in the standing military force in NATO or with the United Nations? That presumably would be a policy decision in the general sense. In terms of what we would contribute to such a standing army, where is that done? Is that done at the international stage or within the Armed Forces? Do we, at a particular time, say what kind of military assistance we can afford to give to this standing army, or do we actually plan this and then start funding it?
Mr. Calder: I am a bit confused about ``standing army.''
Senator Day: Standing armed forces in NATO. It is a plan on the books.
Mr. Calder: That is the NATO response force.
Senator Day: Yes. There have also been discussions with respect to the United Nations, although a decision has not been made.
To what degree do we plan these things, or to what degree do we just react to a general decision to participate?
Mr. Calder: The decision to participate in something like the NATO response force is obviously made very much by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, working with the Minister of National Defence; but the question of whether we should participate is very much a question of foreign policy.
The size and nature of the contribution tends to be determined within National Defence because we are the people with the expertise to say what is possible, et cetera. Who makes the decision depends on the level of the question.
Senator Day: Finally, a number of us were involved at the time of the first deployment to Afghanistan.
The Canadian Armed Forces members were being briefed before they went over there to continue to do what we have a wonderful international reputation for doing. We are known for our efforts in getting to know the community, in helping the community, in developing confidence within the community and for maintaining order in that way.
The forces were even given a bit of a budget. They went into communities and offered to help build schools and with water supplies. Then the Canadian International Development Agency said there was no way they would fund that work after the soldiers had already made commitments. Some of the soldiers collected money on their own to pay for those. A number of people were involved in gathering materials and equipment to send over to help with schools and other projects.
Will that kind of disconnect between an international agency of Canada and the Armed Forces be sorted out in this round, so that that kind of embarrassment does not happen again?
Mr. Calder: There are two points there. I do not remember all aspects of the ``hiccup'' you are describing, but it is my understanding that things are currently working well in Kabul with our forces and ISAF. They are using money provided by CIDA for those purposes. On the ground, I think we have actually sorted that one out.
That type of situation has driven the government toward what we call ``the three Ds and T'' approach. That stands for development, diplomacy and defence, along with trade. It is a concerted, integrated approach. The international policy framework is designed precisely to ensure that, for example, we on the defence side work closely with CIDA when we are both in the same part of the world. We are both in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is now our major military priority abroad and it is either first or second priority for CIDA. We are working closely together. The international policy framework is designed to ensure the cooperation becomes institutionalized.
The Chairman: Dr. Calder, thank you for coming before us. Your responses tonight were helpful. We look forward to having you here again. We will not wait two years to invite you back.
Mr. Calder: It has been my pleasure. I do hope I can come back with the policy in less than two years.
The Chairman: I am sure you will do that. We look forward to discussing it with you.
If anyone has questions or comments, please visit our Web site at www.sen-sec.ca. We post witness testimony and confirmed hearing schedules. Otherwise, you may contact the clerk of the committee by calling 1-800-267-7362 for further information or assistance in contacting members of the committee.
This meeting is now suspended and will continue in camera in the adjacent room.
The committee continued in camera.