Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
National Security and Defence
Issue 3 - Evidence, April 28, 2004
OTTAWA, Wednesday, April 28, 2004
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met this day at 12:07 p.m. to examine and report on the need for a national security policy for Canada.
Senator Colin Kenny (Chairman) in the Chair.
The Chairman: Honourable senators, it is my pleasure to welcome you to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. Today we will be hearing testimony on the upcoming foreign policy and defence review.
My name is Colin Kenny. I am a senator from Ontario, and I chair the committee.
On my immediate right is the distinguished deputy chair of the committee, Senator Michael Forrestall. Senator Forestall started early in his professional career as a journalist with the Halifax Chronicle-Herald, and then subsequently as an airline executive. He entered politics and was first elected to the House of Commons in 1965. He has served the constituents of Dartmouth for more than 39 years. He has followed defence matters throughout his parliamentary career and has served on various parliamentary committees, including the 1994 special joint committee on Canada's defence policy. He has chaired the Special Senate Committee on Transportation Safety and Security, and the subcommittee on transportation safety. He is currently a member of the joint committee on the Library of Parliament.
On his right is Senator Norman Atkins from Ontario. He came to the Senate in 1986 with a strong background in the field of telecommunications. Senator Atkins also served as an adviser to former Premier Davis of Ontario. During his time as senator, he has concerned himself with a number of education and poverty issues. As well, he has championed the cause of the Canadian Merchant Navy veterans. Over the years, Senator Atkins has been involved in the community with a number of charities, including the Canadian Diabetes Association. Senator Atkins is also a member of the Standing Committee on Internal Economy, Budgets and Administration, and on our Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs.
On my far left is Senator Michael Meighen from Ontario, a successful lawyer and businessman who is active in a wide range of charitable and educational institutions. He is the chancellor of the University of King's College in Halifax and was appointed to the Senate in 1990. He has a strong background in defence matters and served on the 1994 special joint committee on Canada's defence policy. Currently, he is chair of our Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs. Senator Meighen is also a member of the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce and the Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans.
The delay in the arrival of some of the senators is a result of conflicting meetings with caucus. As the various caucuses end, the senators will be joining us.
Senator Tommy Banks has just joined us. Senator Banks is well known to Canadians as one of our most accomplished and versatile entertainers, who is an international standard-bearer for Canadian culture. A Juno award- winning musician, Senator Banks has achieved national and international renown as a conductor or music director for many signature events such as the opening ceremonies of the 1988 winter Olympic Games. In 2003, he was co-chairman of the Prime Minister's task force on urban issues. In addition to serving on this committee, Senator Banks chairs the Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources and the Alberta Liberal caucus.
Our committee is the first permanent Senate committee mandated to examine security. Since the committee's inception, in mid-2001, we have completed a number of reports, beginning with ``Canadian Security and Military Preparedness.'' This study, which was tabled in February 2002, examined the major defence and security issues facing Canada.
The Senate then asked our committee to examine the need for a national security policy. We have released five reports on various aspects of national security. First, ``Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility,'' in September 2002; second, ``...Update on Canada's Military Crisis: A View from the Bottom Up,'' tabled in November 2002; third, ``The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports,'' tabled in January 2003; fourth, ``Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World,'' tabled in October 2003; and fifth, ``National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines —- An Upgrade Strategy,'' tabled in March 2004.
The committee is continuing its long-term evaluation of Canadian security and defence policy and is in the process of preparing an assessment of the government's responses to our recommendations to date before we proceed with new phases of our evaluation.
Today we are fortunate enough to have as our witness Dr. Jack Granatstein, OC, FRSC, who is here today as the chair of the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century. A distinguished author and historian, Dr. Granatstein is a graduate of the Royal Military College and served in the Canadian Army for a decade before joining the history department of York University.
A fellow of the Royal Society of Canada and an Officer of the Order of Canada, he has won numerous awards. In 1997, he advised the Minister of National Defence on the future of the Canadian Forces.
Dr. Granatstein, welcome to the committee. I understand you have an opening statement and we look forward to hearing from you.
Dr. J. L. Granatstein, Chair, Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century: Honourable senators, I would like to make a few points about the upcoming foreign policy and defence reviews.
First, from what we know at present — and frankly we do not know very much — there is an international security policy review underway. We have the results of what looks like an interim national security policy review announced yesterday by the Deputy Prime Minister. Still, no one expects much serious activity until after a general election. There will also likely be a Defence white paper in 2005 once the reviews are completed.
It is heartening that both national and international security will be considered at the same time, if not together, in Canada. The Department of National Defence is the only major department with responsibilities in both spheres, though its role in national security is sometimes forgotten or downplayed — as it appeared to be in yesterday's paper from the Deputy Prime Minister. It is important that we remember the defence role this time, especially as Canada is under serious threat of terrorism, possibly with weapons of mass destruction. The military role in such an event would certainly be substantial.
It is also most important that the national and international security reviews be thoroughly coordinated. Your committee might play a most useful role by noting this and pressing for the Canadian Forces' roles in both spheres to be recognized, planned for and properly financed.
Most particularly, it is critical that the role of the Canadian Forces reserves in national security be recognized, their strength enhanced and properly funded. If there were a terrorist attack on Toronto, for example, the availability of 2,000 trained reservists to work with police and fire departments would be invaluable.
No one wants to interfere with reservists' training or their role in mobilization — if only we could get a mobilization plan from National Defence Headquarters — but homeland security is a critical need today and one the reserves simply must be tasked for and trained to fill. This will require additional funding and personnel. The militia seems ready to accept this role, but so far the naval and air reserves are not. They simply must be.
I noticed that there was not a word in the Deputy Prime Minister's paper yesterday on the reserves. The government simply must recognize the role of the reserves in national security. In his address at Canadian Forces Base Gagetown, on April 14, Prime Minister Martin laid down some principles for the government's military policy. These are the right ones, and Mr. Martin deserves congratulations. His announcements of government spending on equipment — if ultimately carried out — are also most welcome, so too was his speaking of the 3Ds and T — the combination of defence, diplomacy, development and trade — as the preferred way for Canada to operate overseas.
This is as much praise as I can offer. The Martin government has a long way to go to make up the deficiencies of 40 years and most particularly the budget slashing of the last decade. Personnel numbers are down to 53,000 effectives in the regular force, and some 20,000 in the reserves. This is far too low. We need at least 80,000 regulars and 40,000 reservists. There are retirements and resignations coming in the next few years that will cripple the Canadian Forces even further by draining away skilled technicians and junior leaders. The review process must tell us how the government will deal with this problem and expand the Canadian Forces to a reasonable strength.
As members of this committee know, equipment is in a state of ruination, with 40-year-old aircraft and ships and 20- year-old vehicles being the most noticeable problems. The new equipment the Martin government has committed to acquiring will take five to ten years to get to units and we will need much more. Will the reviews and the white paper offer a coherent plan and hard fiscal promises for such acquisitions? They must.
The Canadian Forces budget, at just 1 per cent of GDP, is under half the NATO average, and half what Canada needs to be spending. The reviews must detail a plan to increase Canadian defence spending toward the NATO average as quickly as possible.
If the tea leaves are read properly, the reviews and the Defence white paper are likely to try to deal with the military personnel, equipment and budgetary shortfalls by opting for niche roles. This will be sufficient if, and only if, the government is lucky in the niches it chooses. We know that infantry are certain to be required for almost all foreseeable roles; we know that naval vessels and air transport are similarly certain to be needed. However, we seem to have decided to scrap tanks, and there are many who wish to eliminate submarines and not to replace the navy's destroyers.
Defence Minister McCallum and Prime Minister Chrétien not long ago indicated that they preferred renting or borrowing heavy air transport to the Canadian Air Force having its own. The previous chief of land staff foresaw a light-to-medium-weight role for the army, and the acquisition of the mobile gun system, already announced, is aimed at this role.
These decisions, which anticipated the review process, have already foreclosed options. Let us be clear: no Canadian force will be able to operate alone against even a small enemy force without heavy lift aircraft and main battle tanks. No Canadian-commanded naval task force would be able to operate without destroyers unless some frigates are expensively fitted with command and control facilities. Some coalition forces we may want to join may not want or need what niche forces we can offer.
These limitations may not matter if we are lucky. They might matter greatly if we are not, and the cost in lives and prestige could be extensive if, as I fear, a future government commits the Canadian Forces to operations for which it is not suited. Our history suggests that our governments will at some point declare the mobile gun system to be the equivalent of a tank. It is not and never will be. In other words, the choices we make in the reviews today will matter for a generation to come. We need to think in the long term in defence.
Let me give a couple of small examples. The war on terrorism is likely to be long-lasting. Should we not think of recreating the Canadian Officers Training Corps and the air and naval equivalents to supply university graduates to the reserve forces, especially graduates with the technical skills we know the military will need? Could this not bring the country's educated elite back in touch with the Canadian Forces, healing a breach that was widened with the cancellation of the COTC program in 1968? A wise government might think beyond the present to the future's needs. That a recreated COTC could help fund increasingly expensive higher education for students should be an incentive for government to act.
Another long-term perspective might focus on industrial requirements. We created a shipbuilding industry to build the patrol frigates, but we have since shut it down — a huge waste of public monies and of hard-learned skills. We are now to acquire replacements for the Preserver class of supply ships, and the navy also needs new destroyers. The patrol frigate soon must have mid-life refits, and we ought to be thinking of replacements for them a decade hence. Could these needs be met in Canada now? Would it not have been sensible to recognize that Canada and its navy would always require ships and to plan for the long term by building, say, even one ship a year to keep a needed capability in operation and to keep skilled jobs in Saint John and Levis? Would it not be sensible to ensure that we get it right this time?
There is no doubt we paid more for the frigates in the 1980s and 1990s by building them in Canada rather than purchasing them abroad. I do not object to this at all. It was also right to pay $85,000 for Iltis jeeps built by Bombardier, which we could have bought for $25,000 each off German production lines. However, this was right only if the capacity was sustained and if the skilled jobs were created and maintained. In both cases, unfortunately, the capacity withered and the employment gains and skills learned were squandered. This makes absolutely no sense. Neither does it make sense to charge the Department of National Defence budget the extra costs of made-in-Canada purchases. The Department of Industry, not DND, should pick those up.
To move the country in the right directions will require more than money. We need political leadership to persuade Canadians in all parts of the nation that defence is important. First and foremost, it is clearly in our national interest to keep our enemies away from North America and, if we must fight, to battle them overseas. Second, it is in our national interest to be able to work with our friends in coalitions and alliances abroad to encourage and sustain the spread of democracy and freedom. Third, it is a Canadian vital interest to cooperate with our great neighbour in the defence of the continent. Finally, it is in the Canadian national interest for us to be able to defend our territory, airspace and sea approaches.
Moreover, we need to be able to persuade the United States that we can do this effectively, for, if we cannot, the Americans will defend us whether we like it or not. In their own interests, they must. The Americans cannot allow a defence vacuum to exist to their north. In other words, to protect our own sovereignty and independence, we simply must have a credible military.
Leadership has been in short supply in Ottawa in recent years. I hark back to Louis St. Laurent, who took Canada into NATO and into the Korean War and directed the great Cold War rearmament that saw Canada spend up to 7.5 per cent of GDP on defence in the 1950s. St. Laurent was a francophone who campaigned in all parts of the nation, speaking the hard truths that explained the military build-up. He won two huge majorities in 1949 and 1953, including sweeping victories in Quebec, because he led. We need leadership like this now.
We need a government that will focus on our national interests and on the tools we need to advance and protect them. To me, Canada is about more than medicare and more than transient values. Canadians have national interests, and these national interests require elaboration and protection. After all, our values will count for nothing if the nation does not survive. If we fail to protect our national interests, we might not.
The Chairman: Thank you very much, Dr. Granatstein. It is always refreshing to have you appear before this committee. Perhaps it is because we agree with much of what you say that we think you are so smart. Thank you for your presentation.
Senator Forrestall: I want to take you down the same road with a couple of little paths that you glanced at and skittered on by. One is the reserves. We have seen them as our footprint in communities from one end of the country to the other. We view them as a principal augmentation source. I will ask you to cast your mind a little broader and give me the benefit of your views on a broader role. I will tell you what I have in the back of my mind.
I have been reminding this committee on a very regular basis that we have units in Canada like the Halifax rifles. I would like to take you generally down the path that the Halifax rifles have gone. We have thousands of kilometres of coastline. The navy cannot patrol them; they cannot get into shallow water. The Coast Guard does not have that kind of a capacity or that type of vessel. Nobody else seems capable of looking at all the bays around the points of our territory.
Is there something that we could do? Sooner or later, Minister McLellan or someone will have to face up to this enormous gap in maritime security. We do a great job with the coastal ports of Halifax and the principal ports of Canada and the principal single commodity ports. We look after that, but we cannot look after the far reaches of our coastlines.
I have in the back of my mind a role for the reserves that could be a permanent role, one that they would undertake not in augmentation but in responsibility totally and completely. This may be wishful thinking. Is there any possibility of that ever occurring? I do not know how else we will provide coastal security.
Mr. Granatstein: I do not know what could be done to provide that. Before the Second World War we had a fishermen's reserve that did play kind of the role that you are suggesting, but we do not seem to have many fishermen left any more. It is hard to create fishing fleets when there are not fish. I am not sure how such a thing could be recreated. I wonder, frankly, how much of it you need if we have sufficient satellite coverage, for example. Perhaps the new technology can fill in to make up for that shortfall.
Senator Forrestall: The satellite coverage is as close to real-time as it might come. Still, we have to find the resources to respond to the message. We do not have them in our permanent forces. We do not have them in the RCMP. We do not have them in any other land security group.
Mr. Granatstein: It might be easier to create that capacity than to try to invent a reserve force to provide the kind of coverage that you want. It might even be cheaper.
Senator Forrestall: That is interesting.
I tend to agree with something you mentioned not only in your remarks today but also on other occasions. A large part of the fault for what has happened to the Canadian Armed Forces, in my sojourn here, has been the difficulty in finding Canadian interest. For example, we have been told that the defence policy has already been written. How do we get Canadians interested enough to sort out their thoughts and pass them along, if that is a fact? How do we do it?
Mr. Granatstein: Over the last five to ten years, we have had almost unprecedented Canadian public interest in our defence. Particularly after 9/11, there has been a succession of think tanks that have produced papers. There has been a succession of organizations and associations that have undertaken studies of defence and foreign policy. The House of Commons has done a series of important reports. Even more important, the former chair of the committee is now the Defence minister. Your committee has done a series of important and influential reports.
I cannot think of any time in nominal peace time in Canada, when there have been more such studies. The impressive thing is that they all say the same thing. They all point to the same flaws and shortfalls. I believe that we have made some progress in persuading government that it must do something.
In my opening remarks, I mentioned that Mr. Martin spoke Gagetown two weeks ago. It has been a long time since a Prime Minister has gone to a Canadian Forces base to make a speech. It has been a long time since a Prime Minister made a speech that hit on precisely the right points about what the Canadian Forces must be able to do.
That would not have happened 10 years ago or 20 years ago. We have made some progress. Part of this is 9/11; part is the simple fact that the Americans are very unhappy with the way we have conducted ourselves militarily and politically. That pressure is having an effect. However, many Canadians were saying these things before 9/11. There is interest out there. The opinion polls also show this. It is tough to ask a Canadian to choose between medicare or more money for the Canadian Forces. However, if you ask people to rank areas where they have concerns, the military, for once in a very long time, is starting to climb up near the top of those polls. The situation is not as bleak as you suggest.
Senator Forrestall: You are suggesting that the body of research and study that we need is already there. Are you suggesting that that body is coherent and in agreement?
Mr. Granatstein: Yes, there is extraordinary an agreement in the studies that have been done outside government and in the studies that have been done in parliamentary committees. It will be very interesting to see if Mr. Calder's existing draft reflects the body of opinion outside.
Senator Forrestall: I hope so because I tend to share your view. It is too late in any event to start to seek out in-depth studies on work that has to be done. Thank you.
Senator Atkins: Do you get a sense that there is a disconnect between Canada's commitments internationally and its military?
Mr. Granatstein: Yes. I mentioned that I feared that in the future we would have a government that would not pay attention to the kinds of equipment and personnel decisions made today. I said that because we have not paid attention to it in the past.
We had, at National Defence Headquarters, a senior army planner working for the chief of the defence staff who resigned when the decision was made to send 2,000 troops to Afghanistan a year or so ago. In his view, as much as I understand it, we simply were over-tasking our military. We had stretched the rubber band as far as it could be stretched. The government did not pay any attention to that. It paid not attention to the military advice it had been getting. It decided for political reasons — which will always take precedence — to send people to Afghanistan.
The Chairman: For the record, it was also our view that they should not send troops anywhere.
Mr. Granatstein: I remember your suggestion that we should have a two-year moratorium. I thought it should be longer.
The point is that the government did not pay attention to the advice it was receiving. A government in the future possibly will not because there will always be pressures. I worry that if you go for niches, someone will come along five years down the road and decide that it does not matter that we do not have tanks because the MGS system is an armoured vehicle.
I remember when I was an officer cadet training at Camp Borden during the Diefenbaker period. We were in serious trouble in the military then in terms of equipment. We went on exercises where we would literally yell, ``bang-bang'' because we did not have any ammunition for training. We would say, ``clank-clank, I am a tank.'' I do not want to see us go back to that situation.
If we are to be a serious player in the world — and Canadians want us to be — and we are to be respected by our allies — and Canadians think we are, and they are wrong — we need to make the investments to rebuild our forces so they can do what we want them to do abroad. Canadians believe in peacekeeping. They think that peacekeeping is all we do. They do not realize that peacekeeping is not what it used to be.
Peacekeeping is now what we used to call war-making. It is a dangerous business. It is not enough to slap a blue beret on an 18-year-old kid's head send him out to keep the peace somewhere. He now needs to have the full military kit and the best training we can provide.
We do not seem to have grasped that in this country. It is a crime for which governments should suffer when we send people into situations for which they are neither trained nor equipped.
Senator Atkins: You say Canadians are in support of all this. Would not you say such support comes even more from the friendly nations with which we work? They want to see Canada take a larger role.
Mr. Granatstein: Absolutely. The extraordinary thing is that our friends still have the sense that we produce good soldiers, sailors, airmen and airwomen.
Senator Atkins: We do.
Mr. Granatstein: We do. We produce well-trained people who generally perform above their equipment level — if I may put it that way. The government always says that we are ``punching above our weight.'' Frankly, that is nonsense; it is only true if we are flyweights.
The soldiers and sailors we send abroad do terrific work with what they have. They get the maximum out of the lousy equipment provided them. They could do much better with the right stuff and more credit would be earned for the country with our allies, if they had what they needed.
Senator Atkins: I want to get to the question of urgency. You have been an observer of the military for almost 50 years, if not more. You speak with a bit of optimism. Do your not feel a tremendous frustration that the government does not seem to respond to its commitments by backing the military in the way that it should?
Mr. Granatstein: Yes. I feel terrific frustration. It seems to me incredibly short-sighted. I am a historian. I have studied the wars of the 20th century and Canada's role in them. It is clear to me that there are large heaps of dead Canadians who did not have to die had we been prepared in 1914 or 1939 or 1950, when we sent Canadians to war with the wrong equipment, with their training lacking, sometimes with parsimonious financial support behind them.
I do not like that. Every Canadian has a fire insurance policy on his or her house because we all assume that there are risks against which we must protect ourselves. I do not understand why we have never accepted the idea that a national form of insurance is to have a well-equipped, well-trained military. If you do not use it — and most of us do not ever cash in our fire insurance — you say we are lucky, but if you do have that fire, if you do have that international conflagration, then you need those people. I have never understood the short-sighted approach that our governments and the Canadian people seem to follow.
The Chairman: I am in the business of keeping the record here, Senator Atkins. I assume you are referring to our report, which was the ``Update on Canada's Military Crisis: A View From the Bottom Up,'' where we said that the premium should be increased from $440 to $580.
Mr. Granatstein: I was, of course, referring to your report, sir. I was hoping you would acknowledge that you probably stole the insurance idea from me, but that is an aside.
The Chairman: We did. You testified first and we paid attention.
Mr. Granatstein: Good.
Senator Atkins: I assume that you are in favour of an all-purpose military.
Mr. Granatstein: As much as I can be. We are a small country and we cannot do everything, but I do not want to see us opt for niches that are so narrow that they can never be used and that they can never meet the real requirements that we might face. People are talking of civil military specialists, military police, mountain-climbing troops, et cetera.
We may need some of those. However, the point is that we do know that we will need, for sure, infantry, we will need frigates or equivalent ships, we will need supply ships, and we will need air transport. Those are things that we know we will need. They happen to be expensive pieces of kit and that is why governments will desperately look for military police instead of heavy air transport, because it is cheaper to produce military police. However, are military police useful? Will they serve our needs? Will they protect our national interests? Well, not really. That is the point.
I want us to be as all-purpose and as combat-capable as possible within the limits of budget and within the limits of sound forward thinking. The niche supporters seem to be looking at the world through a very narrow perspective most of the time.
Senator Atkins: Listening to you I had the feeling that you are in favour of buy Canadian where possible. However, what is your view about buying off the shelf?
Mr. Granatstein: It is obviously cheaper. It makes eminent sense that if we can go to Europe or the U.S. and buy an aircraft when we need it, we will certainly save money.
However, I am a realist. I understand that in this country employment is important and governments have used military contracting time after time to serve political purposes and employment purposes. Realistically, that will not change.
There is an article on defence in the current issue of Policy Options that says we must do away with this idea of using government contracting to create employment. Well, I wish we could, but realistically we cannot and we will not.
The question is how do we maximize the benefits of that? It serves no one's interest to create a short-term — 10 years say — employment in Saint John, New Brunswick building ships if you throw it away. You know you will need ships. Why not keep that shipyard going? There is enough work to keep it going.
Senator Atkins: It is too late for that.
Mr. Granatstein: Too late now, but we are going do it again.
Senator Forrestall: It is not too late yet.
Senator Atkins: For Saint John.
The Chairman: On the shipbuilding, the frigate program turned out to be a fraud on the taxpayer. We probably paid four times the amount that we could have got the frigates for elsewhere. It turned out to be a fraud on the workers at Levis, who got laid off. It turned out to be a fraud on the workers in New Brunswick, who were laid off.
What sense do you have that we are going to have a sufficient demand for ships in the future that we could sustain a number of yards? If we have only one we will not have competitive prices. What sense do you have that this is a rational way to go? Why would it not make more simply to send a cheque to the folks on the south shore and take the subsidy out of the defence envelope, and if the government wants to do regional development send them a cheque? It is perfectly transparent. Everyone can see what is happening.
Right now we have a hidden subsidy in the defence department budget and we end up putting these people out of work after taxpayer pays for their training, their equipment and four times what they should have for the frigate.
Everything else you say is so rational and sensible. Why are you pursuing this policy that seems to be not quite so?
Mr. Granatstein: The government will pursue this policy, whether it is rational or not. My point is that we must find some way of getting some longer term benefits out of it by spacing out ship construction so that we can keep these yards that we create and subsidize going.
The Chairman: Right now there are no workers to lay off, they have already been laid off. The yards have dry docks but they do not have the modern equipment, so is this not the time, if there ever was, to break the cycle? More to the point, the new ships they are looking at are too big to fit at Levis.
Mr. Granatstein: I notice that in today's Globe and Mail there was an article saying that unions fear government may send contracts abroad. In other words, there will be, inevitably, political pressure to build the ships here. We will build them here. You know that as well as I do. We will pay four times what we could pay to buy them off the shelf somewhere else, and you know that too.
The question is: How can we handle this so we at least get some benefits out of doing this, so that it is not a one-off throw away where we create something, train the people, build the ships — at least we got good frigates out of this program — and then shut them down? We know we are going to need to replace the frigates 10, 15 years hence. We know we will need new coast guard ships, we know we will need something to replace the MCDVs for coastal patrols.
Rational planning suggests that we build in a process that keeps our shipyards busy producing the ships we know we will need. Why would any nation with coastlines such as ours pretend that it will not need ships at some point in the future?
Senator Atkins: There is one point you made in your statement that I think is a wonderful idea, and that is the COTC. I hope that you pursue that one. I also hope that, as a committee, we do. It makes a lot of sense. It also deals with other issues relating to the university or post-secondary level.
Mr. Granatstein: I was a member of the special commission on the restructuring of the reserves with former chief justice Brian Dickson. We talked about the need for recreating COTC and UNTD and the air reserve training program. I put the question to the then Chief of the Defence Staff, General de Chastelain. He said, ``Nice idea but we do not have any use for the people.'' I thought that was remarkably short-sighted. First, the reserves are tiny and they need to be strengthened. Second, and almost as important as that, I am convinced — and I cannot demonstrate this but I believe this to be true — that the ending of the university reserve training programs has had a substantial amount to do with the gulf that exists between the population of Canada and the elites and the military.
If you have people who have had some kind of military training at some point in their career and, ideally, if they go into the reserves and carry that training forward, then you create a body of opinion that thinks the military is not a terrible thing and that there is some use that can come out of it. The kinds of skills that reservists and university-trained reservists can bring are always in short supply. There is a whole series of new disciplines that the military needs now — geomatics, for example. I do not even know what that is but I know the military says it needs it. Doctors are another example. The Canadian Forces are paying more than a quarter of a million dollars to try to entice doctors into joining. It might be simpler to have university training programs that subsidize people's education. We have some of those to some extent. Moving people into the reserves makes eminent sense. I think it is an idea whose time has come again.
Senator Atkins: I could not agree more. You see it as tying in with the reserves?
Mr. Granatstein: Absolutely. It always did. The COTC was to train reserve officers. You were not obliged to go and serve, but I have always been in favour of a little compulsion. It seems to me that if the state pays Joe Doakes to go to university and do a little military training in the summer, the state might well be able to say, ``You owe the militia three years at the end of that,'' and hope that the person will stay in longer.
Senator Meighen: Welcome, Dr. Granatstein. I have a number of questions and I am glad that Senator Atkins brought us to the question of reserves. A former member of our committee, Jack Wiebe, held this whole matter close to his heart. I share your view, but I wonder if we could talk a little about the role of the reserves.
Yes, they can bring some skills, such as geomatics — again, whatever that is. However, in the minds of some full- time, permanent-force people, I have had the impression — and maybe this is vanishing now — that reservists are the grunts. They are not really skilled enough; they do not practice enough; they are not trained enough to take command of a ship with its highly sophisticated electronic equipment. They are fine for peacekeeping in the traditional sense of the word. They are fine for sort of filling in the ranks but that is about it.
Consequently, there is an undeniable gulf — a tension — that was created at one point between the permanent force and reservists. Can you bring any information to bear on this? If that gulf did exist, has it narrowed? Is the role of the reserves the same as that of the permanent force or as grunts?
Mr. Granatstein: When I was appointed to the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves nine years ago, it was because of the gulf that existed. There was concern that relations between reservists and regulars — particularly the militia and army — had reached a poisonous level. The commission's set out a series of recommendations, almost all of which have been adopted.
The gulf still exists. However, in my view, it is less now than it has ever been, in substantial part because of the project manager on restructuring of the reserves, General Ed Fitch. He was a regular but has now retired. He is still at NDHQ as a reservist major-general. He has been remarkably skilful at getting cooperation and getting the regulars and the reserves to talk together, to recognize their shared tasks and their many things in common.
The sniping has largely disappeared. All that is needed is the money to carry out the plan for building up the militia, which is still well under the strength at which it should be. There is a series of phased steps and the money has been trickling in very slowly. Until that money — peanuts, in National Defence terms — is there, there will still be a good deal of tension.
It seems to me that the emphasis on national security and the current requirement to have homeland defence in a real way in this country is the opportunity for the reserves to move in and to get the extra money, the extra equipment, the extra people they need. It is absolutely critical that we are able to put on the streets of Montreal a couple of thousand reservists in the event of a terrorist attack. There is no other source of people instantly available. They need specialized training. We need our reservists working with the police and the fire departments now, training and getting an understanding of how they function and getting the kinds of specialized NBCW training that they need to play the roles that we hope they will never have to play but might.
It is quite important that this take place. This emphasis on national security —homeland defence — is the opportunity for the reserves to move in to take this role, while keeping their other roles in augmentation, in mobilization and in training for war. This is something that must be done.
Senator Meighen: Do you attach any importance to the question that has been debated for a long time and which, it is argued, might impact on recruitment of reserves: Should we have a law, as there is in some countries, obliging employers to protect the positions of reservists?
Mr. Granatstein: Yes. The special commission in 1995 called for that. That is one of the very few recommendations that the government did not accept. I think they should. It is absolutely critical.
The government position is that there is an advisory body that works with industry and has had some success. It does good work, but students form the bulk of the reserves now. If we want to get bank managers and lawyers and shop-floor workers — a cross-section of Canadians — into the reserves and keep them there, we simply must have this kind of legislation.
Senator Meighen: This committee heard ample testimony that there are, among other problems, bureaucratic administrative problems within the Armed Forces in transferring from reserves to permanent force and vice versa. Do you know of any progress or lack thereof in that area?
Mr. Granatstein: I hate to keep going back to 1995, but we talked about that at the commission as well. We wanted a more permeable membrane between the regulars and the reserves so that people could cross over at different times in their careers and go from the reserves to the regular and vice versa, without complications. I do not know that there has been much in the way of progress in fixing that, but it is something we simply must tackle. It is important.
Furthermore, it is important that when a regular leaves the forces, that person should be given incentives to join the reserves because his skills are enormously valuable. We the taxpayers paid for them and we do not even keep serious lists of where people retire. It is nonsense that we treat this so casually. We operate on the assumption that we will never need these people again, but we will. We need to keep track of them. We need to keep them up-to-date in their skills. Think of what they can bring the reserves when they join them. It is very important to do this.
Senator Meighen: On another topic, perhaps you can bring some non-partisan, non-political light on the issue of procurement. I do not understand what the problem is in this area. Procurement has often been criticized in this country as taking far too long. It would appear that there is a list of capital equipment that does not require new money, that falls within budget, and that has been drawn up by the military. I gather it is an agreed-upon fact that this list has been on Minister Pratt's desk for four months and the minister himself said it did not require his signature.
Can you help me understand what it is doing there if it does not require his signature?
Mr. Granatstein: No, I cannot help you. I expect that we may see some of the announcements during an election campaign.
Senator Meighen: You are more partisan than I. That would never cross my mind of course but perhaps you are right. It does seem an added hurdle and delay in the process of acquiring equipment.
Mr. Granatstein: What are a few months when we have been waiting 20 years?
Senator Meighen: I do not think we have been waiting 20 years for. It is more mundane, run-of-the-mill stuff.
You have advocated that we get more involved with our American friends in defence of North America. If we do that, must we necessarily reduce our interest in and commitment to NATO and the UN, or is it just in addition to?
Mr. Granatstein: In the first place, we have very little interest in NATO now, in any case. We have moved a long way away from NATO. We talk a good game but we do not do much about it. The UN is — forgive me — increasingly irrelevant, incompetent, and does not matter in real terms except for political purposes in this country.
The simple truth is that the Americans matter. The Americans feel that they are under threat, and the Americans are very concerned about our lack of attention to what they see as a serious situation. By and large, I think the Americans are right. The government has effectively turned a blind eye to the situation in which we find ourselves.
The simple truth is that if we train a soldier, sailor or airman for home defence, for continental defence, or for working with our friends, the United States, that same individual is able to operate with NATO or with the UN in a variety of roles. It makes eminent sense to me to focus on the main political-military concern that we face, understanding the dollars you spend, the resources you create and the people you train can be used for other things down the road.
Soldiers are multi-task people. They can put on a blue beret or a steel helmet. It is the same person as long as that person has the same trained skills and the right equipment.
My concern is that with 40 per cent of our gross domestic product dependent on trade with the United States, with one-third of the jobs in Canada depending on that trade, we have paid remarkably little attention to our superpower neighbour's concerns. We have so far managed to get away with this but I do not believe that luck will continue.
Senator Meighen: Do you think it would help to get the concerns of the Armed Forces across to the highest levels of government, if the Chief of the Defence Staff had a reporting relationship or regular meeting with the Prime Minister?
The Chairman: Once a year, say?
Senator Meighen: More than once a year. For instance, in respect of the whole question of tasking and over-tasking, everyone agrees the Armed Forces have been over-tasked. However, successive governments use them improperly, in my view, for political purposes. I am not so sure that there is a forum where the highest levels of the military can make their real concerns known to the highest political levels.
Mr. Granatstein: ``Truth to Power'' is a very important principle and we need that. It was a very useful event when a major-general resigned. I thought that made a very useful point to the government. It was, of course, a 20-second wonder on the news and then it disappeared but it is the kind of thing that must be done if government is to have truth spoken to it.
One useful change that has come about is that the Chief of the Defence Staff now produces an annual report. The reports have been generally quite blunt in saying what is needed and what is wrong, and pointing to the problems the forces face. Frankly, that is as, and maybe even more, effective than a rote meeting with the Prime Minister on a scheduled basis. In those reports, the chief is speaking to the Canadian people. Those reports have had a good deal of resonance. They reinforce what various groups and parliamentary committees have been saying. That is very useful.
Essentially it is very important that the military has said there is a problem here, because when government does not pay attention and sends people somewhere and there is a mess, someone will point to that report and say, ``You were told; it is right here, in print.'' That is very useful, to hold government to account.
Senator Meighen: The military will probably end up getting blamed, as they were in Somalia.
Mr. Granatstein: They always will, but maybe historians 25 years later will point to the fact that it was the government's fault, as it was in Somalia.
The Chairman: I hesitate to amplify or translate for Senator Meighen, he is so articulate, but I think his question was almost: Do you think it is unusual that we have not had prime ministers that have wanted to have a more regular chat with their Chief of Defence Staff? Does it not strike you as a bit peculiar that the prime ministers have not thought it would be interesting to have lunch with this fellow once in a while to discuss what our situation is like?
Mr. Granatstein: Canadian prime ministers since Louis St. Laurent, have not wanted to think of the military — period. It is not something that concerns them, because they have believed — and rightly most of the time — that it is not something that concerns the electorate or their members of Parliament or their cabinet. They have frankly had very little interest in the military.
That will not change over time. A prime minister might, as Mr. Martin did, make one speech at a Canadian Forces Base, but that is simply for optics and not out of a real indication of interest or concern for the military. I do not think Canadian politicians care, frankly, about the military. They may talk a good game but as you said earlier, they are pieces to be used. They are players to be used, but not players to be very interested in or concerned about.
Senator Banks: That is not new or unique to Canada, is it? I am thinking of Rudyard Kipling who wrote, ``For it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' ``Chuck him out, the brute!'' But it's `Saviour of 'is country' when the guns begin to shoot.''
That has always been the case, has it not? You are a historian. Has there ever been a country that, other than when the Huns were at the gates, paid sufficient attention to its military.
Mr. Granatstein: Our neighbour does.
The Chairman: The Huns are always at its gates.
Mr. Granatstein: Certainly, for the last 50-plus years the Americans have paid serious attention to their military —
Senator Banks: I grant you that, since 1940.
Mr. Granatstein: I think the British have, to a substantial extent, as well. After that, you start running out of countries.
Senator Banks: Empires take care of this and others do not?
Mr. Granatstein: No, it is countries that recognize that military force is something that might need to be used and that it is worthwhile keeping that capacity at hand. I guess the Soviets were another country that took it seriously.
Senator Banks: Yes they did, while they could afford it. I will ask you a couple of argumentative questions, not only because I love to hear you argue, but also because the answers will be most informative and useful to us.
You have argued that we need to maintain, in response to Senator Atkins' question, a sort of full-service military, with tanks and infantry and submarines. Is that not fighting the last war? Is that not assuming that the next time around we will need a traditional army fighting a conventional symmetrical war?
Mr. Granatstein: Yes, to some extent, because that is still a realistic prospect for us. It is not a year ago that American main battle tanks were operating in Iraq and racing toward Baghdad. However, as that particular event has turned out in the year since, main battle tanks worked in that particular operation. It is only a decade ago that main battle tanks were working in the first Gulf War. It is too soon to say the tank is finished.
What worries me is that we have a capacity that we have spent 65 years developing in this country, and working out methods of operating and training people and acquiring skills and learning how to use this particular weapon. Now, on the basis of, as near as I can tell, no serious studies — on the basis of a single Defence Minister's decision — we will do away with them.
Maybe that makes sense. Maybe all you need is the MGS, which is essentially an armoured car with a gun. However, I worry about a capability that, once lost, can never be reacquired except at huge cost and a lot of time.
It is the same with submarines. A lot of people thought it was silly to buy the British submarines that we did — for a very good price — but we had there 40 years of skills that we had developed and remain useful. If we had not acquired those submarines, those skills would have been lost. Those skills may never be used again, but they might, and I think they probably will. You simply do not easily throw away hard-earned skills.
These are tough decisions, I grant. If the government picks its niches correctly, all my concerns may not matter a bit. However, all I can say is that in this country, we have never made defence choices sensibly, ever. I see no reason to assume we will this time.
Senator Banks: The tank question certainly is one that strikes home with me, because the Strathconas are where I live. What about the argument that we simply cannot afford any longer — we once could — because of increases in the cost of technology and material to be a mainframe player; and that we must, therefore, by definition, if we are going to be effective anywhere, if we are going to avoid spreading the butter so thin that we are ineffective on every front, we need to specialize.
The idea, for example, of taking JTF2 times 20 with a lift and delivery capability so as to be able to provide — you have heard this argument before — the world's best first-strike force to go into certain kinds of situations, and use it throughout the world. To say we will not have conventional infantry any more, someone else can do that, is there any sense to that argument at all?
Mr. Granatstein: Not in my mind. I have never understood the argument that we are a country that cannot afford things. This is one of the richest countries in the world. This is a country that is prepared to pour billions of dollars down a medicare rat hole that still results in huge lineups and two-year waits for a MRI. We all know, even if we put more money into it, the lineup will still be two years long because there will be more use.
If we want to do something, we can do it. If we wanted to have a full-service military, we would pay for it and do it. In the Second World War, we spent 45 per cent of our gross national product on the war because it was important for us to do so. Here we are spending 1 per cent and moaning about it.
We have to decide what we want to do. We have to decide what our interests are, what we want to protect, and decide what we need to do those things. Then let us pay for them. We can do that, if we want to do it.
It is a matter of making hard choices. Governments are elected to make choices and to take those hard decisions. If they make the wrong ones, then we, the electorate, should hold them accountable. We should all argue and state our points of view at the time the decisions are being made. That is why this review is very important.
It is absolutely critical that for almost literally the first time in this country's history when we do a defence review, we need to relate it to our national interests — no more of this nonsense about values, which come and go with the wind, but interests. What is really critical to us? What kind of military do we need to protect what matters? That is the kind of review we need.
Senator Banks: Do we want to be in the missile defence business?
Mr. Granatstein: In my view, yes, we should be, primarily because the Americans have already said they will do it. It does not really matter whether it is going to work or not. It does not even matter if there is much of a threat or not. The point is that the U.S. government is doing it and it affects us. It simply must affect us. The only question is how can we get some say in how this ballistic missile defence, BMD, system will operate. We may not be able to persuade the Americans to give us much say. We are coming in rather late.
Senator Banks: Nor are we prepared to spend any money.
Mr. Granatstein: They are not even asking for any money at this point.
Senator Banks: Then they are certainly not going to give us a say, are they?
Mr. Granatstein: They probably will, because it suits their interests to see this as continental defence and to involve us. That has political importance for the United States. It has political importance here, too, because there is rampant anti-Americanism in the country right now. We saw advertisements placed in The Globe and Mail by one of the political parties on BMD, listing a whole series of points as to why this was Star Wars and weaponization of space. It is not, but that whole pitch in the papers was framed around the idea of running against the United States in the coming election.
That is nonsense. The simple truth is, if we do not go into this we will have no say, and it will affect us. If we do go in, we may not get much influence on the shaping of the BMD, but I do know if we are not at the table with the Americans talking about this, we will have no influence at all. That is simply true. It is important to us to have some influence on that.
Senator Day: I would like to comment on several points that have been made already, and then I would like to talk a little bit about the military technology and some education and research that is going on in that area.
You commented that the military are merely players to be used. I think the COTC point that you made is an excellent one. It was clear from the earlier comments that all of our committee is interested in that. One of your points was that the COTC helped with respect to knowledge of the Armed Forces.
The military and military issues are not major political issues, except in times of emergency, because there are fewer bases that people see on a regular basis? There is a small reserve force, fewer people serving in the Armed Forces because we do not have conscription, and now we do not have the COTC or the university presence. Therefore there is no political focus on hit because fewer people know about the military?
Mr. Granatstein: That is true. The military is not visible in Canada. Part of that is that we, by and large, put our military bases in out-of-the-way places — Petawawa, for example.
Senator Banks: Excuse me!
Senator Day: Edmonton.
Mr. Granatstein: The centre of the universe — but Gagetown, Val Cartier or Petawawa are not major population centres. People by and large do not see much of the Canadian Forces most of the time; and that hurts.
Another factor, which you did not mention, is that the forces recruit extraordinarily heavily from one part of the country only: the Maritimes, particularly Newfoundland. In large parts of the country not only are the forces not visible but also no one knows anyone who is in the forces. That also hurts.
Senator Day: You also noted that the reserves are not nearly as plentiful as they should be. As a result, there is no community footprint.
Mr. Granatstein: The footprint is there but it is an under-strength footprint that needs to be made stronger and more visible.
Senator Day: I am pleased to inform you that part of your recommendation with respect to protecting the civilian jobs of reservists when they are called up on a national emergency is in a bill currently before the Senate. With the cooperation of senators Bill C-7 will soon become law. It proposes to protect reservists called up in event of a national emergency.
Mr. Granatstein: Good.
Senator Day: We are working on it; good things come to those who wait.
I know your role on the Board of Governors of the Royal Military College. For the record, I would suggest that in addition to COTC there is an important element of the reserve entry program at the Royal Military College that, for some reason, the Armed Forces seems to resist. It is almost impossible to obtain any information on the program. Is there a reason for that?
Mr. Granatstein: One reason may be that there is no obligation on the part of people who go through RMC in the Reserve Entry Training Program, RETP, to go into the reserves when they graduate. That point exercised me when I was on the special commission in 1995. I wanted to make it a requirement that a graduate of RETP, who receives a highly subsidized education at the Royal Military College, has an obligation to do some service in return when he graduates.
I think the way to get the military more interested in sending people into that program at RMC, which is a good one, is to have an obligation at the end of the program just as there is for the regular officer-in-training program graduates of RMC.
Senator Day: I hope that our committee will visit the Royal Military College in the near future. I would like to give them a heads-up on that existing program.
That leads me into the subject of education and training in military technology, and, in particular, a focus on the research. You commented that around the world there are many graveyards of soldiers who did not have to die because, perhaps, they were not properly trained and because, perhaps, they did not have the right kind of equipment.
In your extensive work and study of this area, have you made any observations as to whether the mindset of the Canadian Armed Forces at this time is to acquire advanced equipment? Are we so preoccupied with maintaining 40- year-old equipment that we are not thinking in terms of the advanced equipment such that our soldiers in training cannot communicate with fighter aircraft that are sweeping over a field, thereby allowing things to happen that should not happen? Are we doing enough?
This committee had a wonderful visit to the United States to meet with a committee that is doing advanced research. Many new, commercial, advanced, high-tech inventions have come out of military research in the past. Where does Canada stand in that respect?
Mr. Granatstein: I have no doubt that the forces spend their time maintaining the old equipment they have. It takes a huge amount of time and it is very expensive to maintain obsolete equipment.
In my opinion, the military knows what it needs and what it wants, if it only had the money to acquire it. It knows the kind of equipment it needs to operate. Essentially, some of our allies have that equipment already and we would very much like to have it too.
In respect of the area of research, there are a number of companies doing highly advanced military research, but they do not sell most of their product to the Canadian Forces, of course, because we are not usually in the market. Rather, they sell it to the Americans or the British, in some cases. However, we have good people doing good research. It is a matter of not supporting them in the home market because the money has not been available or at least in sufficient quantities.
Will that change? I am not sure whether that will change but probably not.
Senator Day: In respect of interoperability, it is important that our military have equipment that will interface with that of our allies in support of our commitment. I assume that the new white paper that will come forward will make a commitment to participate jointly with other military forces.
Mr. Granatstein: In his speech at Gagetown, the Prime Minister made a point of including interoperability as one of the goals. I was heartened to hear that because it is absolutely critical. We will almost always be fighting with our allies. We need to train with them. We need to have equipment, systems and methods that fit with theirs.
The navy has been far and away the best of our services in interoperable functioning in action. The army has lagged a bit, I think, but it was a useful event for Canada's army to have a battalion working with an American division in Afghanistan in 2002. We need to encourage more interoperability.
The air force continues to work, as best it can with its unfortunately obsolete equipment, with the American air force.
The Chairman: Dr. Granatstein, on behalf of the committee, I thank you for appearing before us today. As in the past, your presentation has been provocative and helpful. We follow what you have to say with great interest. Sometimes we recognize a good idea when we see one and incorporate it into our reports. We have done that in your case a number of times.
Mr. Granatstein: Thank you.
The Chairman: If you have any questions or comments please visit our Web site at www.sen-sec.ca. We post witness testimony as well as confirmed hearing schedules. Otherwise, you may contact the clerk of the committee by calling 1- 800-267-7362 for further information or assistance in contacting the members of the committee.
The committee adjourned.