Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
National Security and Defence
Issue 3 - Evidence, May 3, 2004
OTTAWA, Monday, May 3, 2004
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met this day at 5:25 p.m. to examine and report on the need for a national security policy for Canada.
Senator Michael Forrestall (Deputy Chairman) in the Chair.
The Deputy Chairman: It is my pleasure to welcome you to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. Today we will be hearing testimony regarding the upcoming foreign policy and defence review.
My name is Michael Forrestall. I come from Nova Scotia. I am the deputy chair of this committee. Our chairman is unavoidably out of town this week in Western Canada. Let me introduce the other senators on the committee.
Senator Norman Atkins is from Ontario. He came to the Senate in 1986 with a strong background in communications. He also served as an adviser to former Premier Davis of Ontario. During his time as a senator, he has concerned himself with a number of educational and poverty issues. As well, he has championed the cause of the Canadian Merchant Navy veterans. Over the years, Senator Atkins has been involved in the community and with a number of charities, including the Canadian Diabetes Association. Senator Atkins is also a member of the Standing Committee on Internal Economy, Budgets and Administration and our Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs.
To my left, Senator Joseph Day, from New Brunswick, holds a Bachelor of Electrical Engineering from the Royal Military College in Kingston; an LL.B. from Queen's University; and a Master of Laws from Osgoode Hall. Prior to his appointment to the Senate in 2001, he had a successful career as an attorney. His legal interests include patent and trademark law and intellectual property issues. He is also the Deputy Chair of the Standing Senate Committee on National Finance and our Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs. He is an active member of the Canadian-NATO Parliamentary Association.
Senator Jane Cordy has been delayed and is not with us at this time.
Next to Senator Atkins is Senator Tommy Banks, from Alberta. He is well known to Canadians as one of our most accomplished and versatile entertainers and as an international standard-bearer for Canadian culture. A Juno Award- winning musician, Senator Banks has achieved national and international renown as a conductor or music director for many signature events, such as the opening ceremonies for the 1988 Winter Olympics. In 2003, he was Co-Chairman of the Prime Minister's Task Force on Urban Issues. In addition to serving on this committee, Senator Banks chairs the Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources as well as the Alberta Liberal caucus.
On my right is Senator Jim Munson, from Ontario. He is best known to Canadians as a trusted journalist and public affairs specialist. He was nominated twice for a Gemini for excellence in journalism. He reported news for 30 years, most recently as a television correspondent for the CTV network. After a brief period of consulting with the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs, he joined the Prime Minister's Office, first as a special communications adviser, and then as director of communications. Senator Munson is also a member of the Standing Committee on Internal Economy, Budgets and Administration and the Standing Senate Committee on Official Languages.
Senator David Smith is from Ontario. Senator Smith was a councillor in Toronto and then deputy mayor of that great Canadian city. He was subsequently elected to the House of Commons and served as a minister of state in the government of Pierre Elliott Trudeau before being appointed to the Senate in 2002. During his legal career, he became a foremost practitioner in municipal and regulatory law. At the time of his appointment to the Senate, he was chairman and partner of Fraser Milner Casgrain. He serves on the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs and the Standing Committee on Rules, Procedures and the Rights of Parliament.
Our committee is the first permanent Senate committee mandated to examine security and defence. Since the committee's inception in mid-2001, we have completed a number of reports, beginning with Canadian Security and Military Preparedness. This study, tabled in February 2002, examined the major defence and security issues facing Canada.
The Senate then asked our committee to examine the need for a national security policy. Thus far, we have released five reports on various aspects of this vital national question. First, ``Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility,'' in September 2002; second, ``Update on Canada's Military Crisis: A View from the Bottom Up,'' released in November 2002; third, ``The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports,'' released in January 2003; fourth, ``Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World,'' in October 2003; and, fifth, ``National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines — An Upgrade Strategy,'' released a few weeks ago, in March.
The committee is continuing its long-term evaluation of Canadian security and defence policy and is in the process of preparing an assessment of the government's responses to recommendations to date before proceeding with new phases of our evaluation.
Our first witness tonight will be MGen. (Ret.) MacKenzie. Gen. MacKenzie is a research fellow at the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. For 33 years, the Major-General served in Canada's Armed Forces, retiring in 1993. The former military commander is known for his work as a peacekeeper, having served nine tours, in Egypt, Cyprus, Vietnam, Central America and the former Yugoslavia.
MGen. MacKenzie has also authored a highly regarded 1993 book, Peacekeeper, The Road to Sarajevo, a chronicle of his peacekeeping experiences around the world.
Welcome to the committee, general. I understand you have a short opening statement.
Major-General (Retired) Lewis MacKenzie, As an individual: Honourable senators, I wish to start off — and soldiers would call this brown-nosing and I want you to realize it is not — by saying that you do really good work. The committee has done some really good work. I say that not from the perspective of just the military, but from that of my previous incarnation as a security adviser to Premiers Harris and Eves; and Ontario had further to go than any other province.
Much of the work you have done on border issues, and particularly ports, has been critical to our nation's security. I would be much happier if more of your recommendations were implemented. For what it is worth, I believe that would enhance our nation's security dramatically.
I wish to emphasize that I am here as an individual. Contrary to the previous Prime Minister, I have no association whatsoever with any arms industries. That was a very unfair comment that was made way back when. I have had other options since I left the military, and therefore I am not passing judgment on my colleagues who did get involved with the arms industry. That can be a most honourable undertaking.
I am speaking to honourable senators today as an individual who comments on military and foreign affairs. I will not talk about money. I will not talk about numbers. You know more about them than I do.
Your reports clearly indicate that you understand the crisis facing the current Canadian Forces if you insist upon the current status quo by way of taskings found in the 1994 white paper. Therefore, I will not address that.
I would like to use my time to address an issue that we voluntarily gave up in 1969, when we had just spent about $3 million refitting the Bonaventure and flogged it off for razor blades, for $800,000, and lost our expeditionary capability in the Canadian Forces. We voluntarily gave that ship up. That was something that struck me between the eyes when I was in my 20s and an army lieutenant on Course I at the staff school in Toronto, when I wrote a paper stressing that of all of the countries in the world that should have an expeditionary capability, a joint force, army, navy and air force working together, it was Canada. That is still the case, for a number of reasons.
First, look at our coastline. Even more important, look at where we get involved around the world. There are very few missions on which we have proceeded that did not have a coast either right at or close to the problem. Therefore, it seems to me that the recommendation from this and many other committees, and statements from policy and decision makers, that the military needs a pause and cannot deploy overseas for the next 10 to 15 years, is naive. It just will not happen. Government will be faced with crises around the world where, in the national self-interest, representing our interests or our values, we will get involved. That is the reality. You cannot park the military and say that we have to regenerate it — and we do — and not use it anywhere in response to the government's needs. Therefore, we need a way to regenerate it while maintaining a capability of participation in a meaningful way in the world's trouble spots, which is the Canadian way.
I think that can be done by creating a joint expeditionary force that I would recommend ultimately reach formation size of 4,000 to 5,000 personnel. This force would consist of three battle groups, and in NDHQ parlance a battle group consists of around 1,000 personnel. One battle group would have a company that was air deliverable by parachute, and the remainder air landed, and two battle groups deliverable by sea. I would start with only one of them because I am wise enough to realize that we cannot bite off the 5,000 all at once, but we start with one of the sea deliverable battle groups.
I endorse the recent announcement of the purchase of three joint supply ships, but it has been much misunderstood by some of the Canadian population as giving us an expeditionary capability. It does not. The primary role of the JSS is to supply our navy at sea. It can carry 200 additional personnel, with no space whatsoever for soldiers. The space will be taken up by the people who look after and fly the helicopters, by medical personnel, and by a command and control headquarters. This is an extremely valuable and absolutely essential addition to the Canadian Forces' capability. However, it does not create an expeditionary capability. For one thing, it can only carry a battle group's worth of kit if all three ships are used at the same time, which means that they are not available to do what they are supposed to be doing with the navy. Therefore, it is a valuable complement but does not create an expeditionary capability. It is however, a step in the right direction.
There are ships today — and more keels are being laid — that can carry 800 to 900 soldiers and their kit and air support, be it attack helicopters or jump jets, and we can lease them. It will not take 12 years, like the JSS. Lest some think they cannot be leased, give me a week in the Pentagon with an old contact, Colin Powell, and I will come back with a contract to lease a ship that will be much cheaper than buying one. They would be happy to lease us one rather than give the next one to the United States Marine Corps, because there is a geopolitical benefit for them.
The ship is available. That should not stand in the way and it will not drive us into the poorhouse.
A ship like that needs a lot of infrastructure. It needs jetties, dock loading and offloading equipment, a big runway, airhead, railhead and barracks, which cost a lot of money — $1 billion-plus.
It exists at CFB Shearwater, providing that the Canadian Lands Company does not sell it off. I understand that a hold has been put on that, and I hope that is true. We have a crying need for such a force, and the location for it is staring us in the face. Please, do not let it go.
You probably find it surprising that a brown guy is arguing for more resources for the blue guys — the navy. That is the problem with unification. The moment we unified, all the money in the defence budget went into the same envelope and the three services had to fight like mad for their share. As a result, on some issues, the walls between the army, navy and air force became higher than they were before — and we are supposed to be a joint force. We do not penny packet. We should not be sending bits and pieces around the world to join up with some other force.
I was upset with my friend Art Eggleton when he said that we would send some Coyotes over. When you send a troop of Coyotes, the Canadian flag disappears. They join a British brigade or something like that. It is a big deal in Canada, but it is not even noticed in the rest of the world. I argue that geopolitical brownie points are gained by sending a balanced, meaningful force, in this case, a joint force.
We have an army that is hurting but can do a job; it just cannot get there. It is parked here at home and cannot get there unless it hitches a ride.
Since the end of the Cold War we have seen Cambodia, Croatia, Bosnia, Somalia, East Timor and, if we had gone, Iraq. They all have coastlines. Only Afghanistan would have needed some supplemental transportation, and not all that much because the Americans were taking the country on from their seaborne positions.
A good recent example is Haiti. When you have an expeditionary force, it slows down the decision-making process. There is no longer the same degree of urgency because the force is already there, waiting for the word to go.
People have to rush through the decision-making process in Canada because we know that after we make up our mind to send them, it will be three months before they get there, as was the case in Afghanistan. It was three weeks in Haiti, and it is in our hemisphere.
When you have an expeditionary force you can keep it in international waters, and when the Government of Canada decides to get involved, it can be there within hours, if not minutes. That is the way to respond, not in months.
There is a more detailed paper being prepared on what I am saying by a group of eminently qualified individuals with a lot of credibility, both inside and outside the military. That paper will probably be completed within a month, and I will happy to ensure that you receive a copy.
Do not misunderstand. This is not it. This is not the Canadian Forces I am talking about. This is merely the pointy end of the bayonet. While this force exists and is carrying out not only domestic responses to emergencies in Canada but also international commitments, the rest of the military is taking the pause that you so wisely recommended to regenerate itself. A lot of middle management leadership is leaving the forces because they are at the point of 20 years of service or 40 years of age, whichever comes first, and the military will have a hard time training their replacements. That will not happen overnight, but while it is happening, a rapid reaction force would maintain and enhance our international reputation.
I hasten to add that the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Spain and Italy are all enhancing this very capability, and Australia is in the process of creating it.
I said that I would not mention numbers, but I believe that around 80,000 is the optimum strength of the Canadian Forces, when all is said and done.
President Bush's security adviser, Clarke, had it wrong. He was much too generous to us. In the paper he said that the New York police force of 39,000 is bigger than the Canadian army.
I am an honorary chief of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Services. We have 2,000 more cops in Toronto than infantiers in the Canadian army, from private to general. We only have 15,000 deployable soldiers in the Canadian army. The New York police force is two and a half times that size, almost as big as the Canadian Forces — the army, navy and air force combined. Thus, he was being generous in his comments.
Twice a year, for the last 12 years, I am invited to lecture in Montgomery, Alabama, in the United States flag officers war-fighting course. I do not tell them how to fight wars, but they ask me to come down and talk to them about commanding a multinational coalition force and all the problems attached thereto. You are only invited back if the class recommends you for the next class. I am delighted that Newt Gingrich and I have been the only two who have been invited back for 12 years.
Every year I go down with the same message. I thought I would be thrown out in the first year, which was 1993. Gen. Powell had arranged it. When I said, ``Americans, do not touch this in-between stuff with a 10-foot pole. Save yourself for the heavyweights of the world, such as China, Russia and North Korea. Light a fire under the leaders of other countries, like mine, for us to do the in-between work for you because we do it better than you. Hold yourself, and your war-fighting skills, for the big challenges that will arise.'' I still believe in that.
Frankly, as an international commander commanding a multinational force, I would kill to see a force like I am recommending show up on the horizon, and not with chartered ships, chartered civilian aircraft and having taken three months to get there. I would see them on their own vessels, with their own support, their own logistics, their own medics and their own fighting capability. If that is a niche role, then I will argue for niche roles. If it is sending coyotes off somewhere to tap into a British brigade, then I say, ``No thanks.''
Senator Atkins: General MacKenzie, as you know, our deputy chair is chairing our meeting tonight. I know that he would want me to ask the first question: How would you resurrect the Halifax Rifles?
The Deputy Chairman: While you are at it, give that serious thought.
Mr. MacKenzie: I will take an opportunity to insert something I did not include in my opening remarks. It would throw a cat amongst the pigeons. I recommended this when I was advising on security in Ontario. At this stage of our nation's crisis — threat, war on terror — I would like to see the reserve forces respond more quickly to the provincial premiers. You could call it a national-guard type of structure, but that is what I would see happening. People would not have to come to Ottawa to ask permission to use them. Planning, support and allocation of resources allows the premier, until mobilization occurs, to control the units within his provincial jurisdiction.
There is a very serious role for the reserves right now. After we have our first terrorist attack, the public will realize it. So, up the Rifles!
Senator Atkins: You are clearly in favour of a greater investment in our reserves.
Mr. MacKenzie: Absolutely. Every time the military as a whole is asked to do more with less — and that ``more'' involves overseas deployments — it is only natural that the leadership has to steal from the reserves to accomplish the tasks that the government gives it and take advantage of that manpower pool, which they do not like. It is helping to sustain our military abroad by using a significant number of reserves.
As a commander who had some of them reporting to me, I could not tell the difference as long as they are trained for that specific task. I could not care less when they go home if they cannot do a proper guard, or something like that. As long as they were there in uniform doing the work, they were indistinguishable from the regular force people.
I am not terribly pleased with the way we treat them after they come home.
Senator Atkins: That was my next question. What incentives would you give to attract reservists and make them feel a more significant part of the military?
Mr. MacKenzie: Senator, that is a broad question because it goes back to recruiting. The military recruits from the most mobile, unstable sector of society because we like university students, et cetera. However, that is not necessarily the group that will stay with us. When you get into the communities, à la the old days, then you are starting to recruit people who are stable, from the various professions, whether they are mechanics or schoolteachers. The military does not do that well. It is easier to recruit from the student body, which needs extra money. Thus, the targeting of the recruiting would have to be adjusted.
I am embarrassed to say this because it reflects on my own profession. More respect has to be shown to the reservists, because it is totally wrong for a reservist to come home and then be forgotten about.
I use Jim Calvin's 2 PPCLI battalion as an example. Jim had been a captain in my unit for a while when I was commanding officer. He was a great officer. He was honest with me when I phoned him before he deployed. I said, ``What can you do, Jim, when you get over there?'' He said, ``I can do platoon work. The company commanders and sergeant majors are good, they will get them through, but do not ask me to do a battalion road move because I would not be able to. I have not practised it because I have 400-and-some augmentees coming into the battalion. The vast majority are reserves. They do not know each other.'' He ended up in the Medic Pocket about two months later.
The point is that homogeneous units do not suffer from post-traumatic stress, says this amateur. Why is it the R22eR battalion that came to me in Sarajevo did not have any of those problems? They were under as much stress as any Canadian battalion that served over there. That is because they came to me from our NATO brigade in Germany, where they had been sleeping, playing, exercising and training together for two and a half to three years. They were cohesive. They trusted their chain of command and knew everyone by name. That is what a unit is supposed to be, like this unit sitting onboard this ship. It is not a bunch of individuals.
I was deflected there for a minute. When this battalion came back from Croatia, when the planes arrived in Trenton, the reservists on those planes had disappeared back to their hometowns in upper Saskatchewan or Western B.C. before the next plane arrived. That unit that had done such a great job disintegrated. People went back to their bar in Salmon Arm or somewhere, all by themselves, and tried to talk to people about what they had done in the Medic Pocket. Who knew?
Senator Atkins: There are other issues as well. They have a hard time, in that they are reservists who want to transfer to the regular force.
Mr. MacKenzie: They should have priority.
Senator Atkins: Unlike the Americans, their jobs are not protected when they go back to their hometown in Salmon Arm.
Mr. MacKenzie: I am not sure if I have changed my mind on that or not, which shows that I am terribly indecisive. I have argued long and hard that we should not have inflexible legislation that says they get their jobs back, along with their seniority and all of that. Why? Because when they go to get the job and the boss has a choice between someone who is in the reserve, with whom he will have to compromise and perhaps let go for a year, and someone who is not, he will not hire the potential reservist. My Australian friends tell me that was the pitfall when they did it.
Somewhere between that extreme view and what we do now, there has to be a better solution.
The worst culprit for not letting them off for reserve training or reserve deployment is the Department of National Defence, unless the situation has changed since I got out.
Senator Atkins: I have one other question. We heard from Professor Granatstein last week. He suggested they resurrect the COTC.
Mr. MacKenzie: I was in COTC for a year. The concept of uniforms on the campus, during my period, was extremely distasteful because of the Vietnam spillover. That is not the case now. I would endorse the idea of reintroducing military training through a civilian university degree. I have the greatest of respect for RMC, although I am not a graduate.
Senator Atkins: You have to be careful; there is one here.
Mr. MacKenzie: Some of the civilian universities had every bit as much military discipline within their old COTC and other programs as RMC had.
Senator Atkins: The developers of the white paper of 1994 obviously had no crystal ball. They came up with a concept that has been more or less the guideline for the military even up to this point. Yet we have gone through 9/11. No one would have predicted the demands that the Canadian government has put on the military in the last year.
You have made your point about an expeditionary force. I would ask whether that also means an all-purpose force. Does that fit into the existing white paper or should there be a redesign?
Mr. MacKenzie: The existing white paper is ignored. I used to get instructions from the Security Council in my bunker in Sarajevo. You could drive a truck through the interpretation. It was done that way on purpose, because the decision was made by a 1945 committee consisting of China, Russia, America, France and the U.K. — the world of 1945 — that was driven by national self-interests. They would send instructions to the field at which a commander would look and say, ``This is ridiculous.'' He would then do anything he wanted to do, as it fit within this broad guideline.
It is the same with the white paper. We never were able to do what the white paper asked us to do by way of deploying a force of 10,000. What, then, is the value of the white paper? Everyone talks of sovereignty. We are even committed to supporting the UN now, over and over, in capital letters. The UN has had a series of unmitigated disasters since the end of the Cold War because this 1945 Security Council cannot adapt to the current challenges around the world; yet we are still sworn to the UN process. The other parts of the UN, such as the General Assembly and the executive branches, UNHCR, UNICEF, World Health, do great work, but the Security Council is a disaster. A white paper that is not funded, that is not audited, that does not provide true guidance — while at the same time we have the military saying that it is following the general concepts of the white paper — I do not think is all that valuable.
Senator Atkins: Which comes first, the foreign policy?
Mr. MacKenzie: Yes, absolutely. It can be in such general terms that you can get away with anything. I am delighted that this time, the two subjects are being looked at concurrently. I am uneasy that some people are suggesting it has already been written and it has already been decided what will happen. You know that better than I. I hope that is not true. However, if it is a genuine look at the foreign policy and what the foreign policy people feel the military should be capable of doing, then yes, I buy into the holistic notion that you will have to get involved in a cross-section of jobs. You talked about multipurpose forces. Good soldiers, sailors and air persons can perform multipurpose roles providing they are well trained. You can flick a switch from peace operations to war fighting, providing you have the training and the kit. That used to be within our capability.
Senator Atkins: Are you satisfied that our military still gets as good training as it should?
Mr. MacKenzie: No, and it is not their fault. If you are going to take a direction that requires large groups of people to work together as a team, you then have to exercise that team. If you are going to take a soccer team to the World Cup and you can only practice six of them together at any one time, then you will face a problem. As a chief of staff under John de Chastelain, I ran the largest exercise since World War II in 1985, in Wainwright, with 14,000, a divisional exercise, and that was the last one. They ran an exercise last year — at significant cost — and they called it a brigade level exercise. A brigade was in the field but the brigade commander was not being exercised. That was a brigade running an exercise for its battalions and regiments.
The money does not exist. When you have these overseas deployments, you have to ensure they are paid for. Therefore, training has suffered. That applies to the other two services in arms, the navy and the air force. We have all been so proud of winning top gun, which is marvellous, but you have to spend time in the air in order to reach that level. Flying hours have been chopped dramatically. Unfortunately, so have sailing hours. The navy has been spending 95 per cent of its sailing hours on operational duty.
Senator Atkins: You touched on off-the-shelf purchasing.
Mr. MacKenzie: I would say, ``leasing.''
Senator Atkins: What is your general view of off-the-shelf purchasing?
Mr. MacKenzie: It is easy for me to say that I am for it. I know all the political arguments against it. However, because of the unbelievable ramp-up in technology, and the way something new is discovered every day — and no one does it better than military contractors — and our unbelievably slow procurement process, we are always lagging behind. As a result, something as simple as flak jackets and helmets can be a problem. All of a sudden, in 1992, we were in an operational theatre in Bosnia, and we were getting ready to go into Somalia, but we still did the research to get the whole package together. We wanted everything to be complementary. ``Sorry, guys, we are being shot at; can we please have a decent helmet?'' You could go and buy them off the shelf.
There are some instances, such as small ones like that one, or large pieces of equipment, when I think it would make more sense from an operational capability to buy off the shelf, all the political issues aside.
Senator Atkins: You touched on the ballistic missile program. I assume you are in favour of some participation with the Americans?
Mr. MacKenzie: Never fight a battle you are going to lose. The reality is that we share this continent with the world's sole remaining superpower and we are the only country in the world that can turn living next door to that superpower into a problem. There are another 190 members of the UN that would kill for the privilege of living next door to the United States, but it is a problem for Canada.
Accept that it will happen; get involved in the planning, to use the oft-quoted phrase, so that you have some influence. It will happen anyway. The shortest distance between two points on the earth is not a straight line but a curve. It normally goes over Canada; so you had better deal with it. Yes, with all the political sensitivities that go along with it, stay at the table. Do not get to the table — stay at the table.
Senator Smith: General, you spoke in a rather broad format. That is what I like to do. I do not know a lot of the details, but in discussing, for example, the expeditionary force, my reaction to that was very open-minded; that does seem to have the potential to fit the niche for which Canada developed a specialty over some decades now.
I want to go back to the question of how you rationalize the money we have to spend in a post-Cold War era and how big a change that was. When I was doing graduate work back in the late 1960s, our group of 17 students from England went by train to Moscow, going through Checkpoint Charlie. We travelled around the East Bloc countries for three weeks. When you came back, you were very aware of the Cold War and the huge military apparatus to which the NATO countries had to respond. About 20 years later, I remember being in Estonia when they were tearing down the Berlin Wall. You would be walking down the street and total strangers would come up and hug you. What dramatic changes I have seen in my lifetime. Also 9/11, there is another big event. This past weekend, we had all those former Warsaw Pact countries join the EEC. It is incredible.
These things always come back to money. What kind of savings, for example, can we achieve from rationalizing how money is spent as a result of no longer having to respond to the Cold War? Are there still bases — and it is hard to rationalize — that are there more for political than strategic reasons? Do we have a lot of big tanks, and things like that, which never seem to get used on the peace missions we take part in? I spoke to one fellow in Bosnia who had been on six missions and had never yet been on one where they used a tank.
I have always been a cynic about all the money that has gone into the submarines. They seem to symbolize the Cold War mentality and the sort of thing you were talking about, namely, having an expeditionary force appeals to me more than the subs that we got into. These things always come down to money. We have to recognize that health care spending will always be the number one priority by far, and we should not ignore that. If we want to do things like this expeditionary task force preparation, are there places where we can still find money and rationalize our resources as a result of the post-Cold War era we are in?
Mr. MacKenzie: It is a dilemma that faces everyone who looks at this issue. Frankly, please, give me back the Cold War. Michael Ignatius said it better than I did. A couple of glues held together two sides in the conflict, the Warsaw Pact and NATO, and everyone knew what side they were on. That is, other than Switzerland and Yugoslavia, who tried to play the neutrality angle. The fact was that it was fairly simple and straightforward. At the time, we had a whole bunch of equipment facing off at the central front and in the Atlantic waiting for the implications of failure, which would have been horrendous. Fortunately, that did not happen.
Who would have guessed that the world would become a more unstable and dangerous place, and in addition, who would have guessed that following the Cold War, the demand for Canadian services would have gone up? That is what is happening. We did more missions at the behest of the Canadian government in the eight years following the end of the Cold War than in the entire Cold War, as far as deployments went, because we have the type of military and the type of people, with a multi-ethnic makeup, that is extremely attractive to send into these middle areas — not peacekeeping. We are not a peacekeeping nation. Sorry. There has only been one pure peacekeeping mission since the end of the Cold War, Eritrea and Ethiopia. All the rest have been something else, bordering on peace operations and peace enforcement, which means, ``Keep the peace or I will kill you.'' That is what it boils down to. It is getting pretty close to warfare. That type of challenge — and I cannot see it changing — calls for a much more flexible, mobile, balanced force than what we had parked on the central front in Germany all those years during the Cold War.
Can you start to phase out some of those capabilities? The Canadian Forces are already talking about replacing the tank in a grammatical sense. It does not replace the capability of the tank, but the mobile gun system will fill that role — nowhere near as well, however. I have concerns about that, but that is talking about specific equipment.
You could put the entire Canadian Forces on one base and I think it would be the eighth largest base in North America. When you talk about all the money being spent on tanks, for most of the period following the Cold War, for five or six years, the Germans and British had more tanks in Canada than we did. We are not a big military threat with our tanks. We did deploy them to Kosovo, but only a troop. More despicably, we deployed the Cougar, with a 76- millimetre gun, to the Balkans. I was one of the seniors officers standing in front of my soldiers when they were bought saying, ``Do not worry. They will not be deployed to an operational theatre. They are a toy to get us through the Trudeau years.'' Trudeau did not like tanks, so we had to get this little toy. We ended up deploying it into an operational theatre.
There are ways to save. However, the recommendations of your committee, the recommendations of the Auditor General, the recommendations of David Pratt, God rest his soul, Chair of the House of Commons Defence Committee, are all looking, at a minimum, at enhancing the defence budget by $1.5 billion for five years to bring up the baseline. That is just to maintain the force, not to change direction, not to enhance it. I am suggesting an ability to create a rapid reaction force that would be eminently qualified, equipped, manned, et cetera, to better do the type of work we have been doing in the last 12 years, rather than patching together units before they go abroad. They do great work, but they are patched together.
Senator Smith: When I was in Bosnia, for example, in the fall, and spent some time with the troops, the sorts of things you would hear were — and there is nothing new about these — ``Why are there so many white shirts in Ottawa compared to uniforms in the field?'' Quite frankly, I could not answer that. I was sympathetic to what they were saying, particularly about the high tech equipment. I do not know, maybe you can tell me. They were very keen, not so much on the tanks, but on Hummers and bigger and heavier LAVs. In the early stage of the war, there was a need for tanks. At the moment, however, it is to get quickly to incident areas. They were talking about that.
I do not want to put you on the spot, but quite a few of them brought up all this money that is going to these subs and asked about the rationale there.
Mr. MacKenzie: As far as Bosnia goes, we could have had tanks there in six hours because the initial force came from Germany. We only pulled our force out of Germany in late 1993. You must remember the paradox of what the UN, this wonderful Security Council, imposed on us. While the war was on, and while we were dealing with one of the largest military forces in the world — that is, the Yugoslavian National Army, with heavy artillery, aircraft, tanks, et cetera — we were a lightly armed, intervention, peacekeeping force.
Brave old NATO did not come into Bosnia until there was a ceasefire. Then they rolled in with tanks and artillery and aircraft. They got it backwards. The one thing UN Secretary-General Boutros-Gali said was that they got it backwards; they should have started that way. However, that was just after the Cold War was over, so we were not used to handling that type of situation. There was no requirement for, no way to accept, tanks in the initial UNPROFOR deployment to Yugoslavia.
As far as the subs go, I would ask you to understand that our navy — and it could well change — has a primary responsibility in anti-submarine warfare and it does very well. The navy contributes that particular skill when it joins with a, normally U.S., task force. In order to enhance that capability, you must have something to chase and detect. In other words, they are important for the training of our navy. We also have many people snooping around on the sovereignty issue in our northern reaches. There will be more as the icecap melts. Subs have a role there.
It was a pretty good deal, for once. I always said, ``When you are dealing with the British military, do not bend over the barrel.'' We got a pretty good exchange for training in Suffield with the subs. I tend to agree with my naval colleagues that all the publicity given to the problems happens with most new equipment, let alone slightly used equipment. Time will tell. The capability was deemed to be something we should retain, within the broad guidance of the 1994 white paper.
Senator Smith: Yes, that was in 1994. Maybe now there would be a stronger case for transport equipment, rather than the Cold-War-built subs that they saw fit to mothball.
Mr. MacKenzie: It is not a zero sum game. It is not one or the other.
Senator Smith: I was intrigued by one thing. When I was there about five months ago, they were starting to wind down. It was my reaction — and these are my words, not those of anyone over there — that in the earlier stages, the Serbian element had an agenda. The Croatians and Bosnians more or less reacted to what the Serbs were doing. To some extent, those governments were monkeying around; now they are not. The reason they are not monkeying around so much is not because we have heavy equipment there. It is because the one thing they want more than anything is to get into the EEC. The EEC has made it absolutely clear that if there is any screwing around, those governments will not see the inside of the EEC chambers for a long, long time.
It is interesting that in Europe, the emerging mentality in enforcing these things is to use the economic muscle. At the end of the day, that pressure is really as powerful a lever as anything else, once the initial, emotional period of warfare is over and they begin to think long term. It is interesting to observe that.
Mr. MacKenzie: It is interesting that you say that, senator. Five years ago, I said we should be pulling out of Bosnia. Why? When a mission gets boring, routine and safe, it is time to leave. A small observer force of unarmed observers could have done the job. Do not forget that NATO was looking for work. Afghanistan had not happened yet. As a justification role, Afghanistan is now high on the list, so they are pulling out of Bosnia.
I completely agree with you. The issue is not only the EEC, but also the assignment of foreign aid and whether that aid goes to a particular side of the border between the Republic of Serbia and the Bosnian-Croatian federation. That is a big stick.
Senator Day: Gen. MacKenzie, could you expand on the type of ship, the troop carrier, that you were talking about earlier? I think you are right that many people are thinking the three supply ships will double as troop carriers and that is why it will take so long — to come up with a design that will do everything.
Mr. MacKenzie: It needs to be manageable bites — therefore the first group of 800-plus soldiers. I hate to use particular names because I am not that familiar with all the details, but the San Antonio class, which is a landing platform dock, in army parlance, has a flat roof. You can park attack helicopters and jump jets. It has a number of layers underneath to park vehicles, and logistics for the 800 troops. It has cells for medical containers and operating rooms. It has the ability to launch air-cushion vehicles out the back end to deliver troops. I am not talking about an opposed landing with some heavily armed enemy resisting you on the beach. You cannot do that all by yourself, but you can get your troops ashore by chopper or by air-cushion vehicles. Keels are being laid for the Marine Corps, for example, in the U.S. as we speak. There are similar ships overseas with the Spanish and the Italian forces. It is not unique.
Senator Day: Are the keels being laid in the United States?
Mr. MacKenzie: Yes.
Senator Day: That is helpful.
Mr. MacKenzie: It is too bad Elsie Wayne is not here.
Senator Day: Unfortunately the Saint John shipyard is no more. It will have to go to Halifax, I think. I would like clarification on the expeditionary force. That takes me back to the First World War. Is that like a rapid-reaction force that is self-sufficient, that has everything with it, as you were just describing in terms of the troop carrier?
Mr. MacKenzie: I would not want to overstate it, but it certainly has the capability to be sustained from its sea base. In fact, these days, with the types of things happening to forces being deployed in the built-up areas, troops could also live on board if they had to. Americans are developing a concept of stationing forces at sea to deploy ashore for specific tasks, whether in Afghanistan, Iraq or wherever. They do not have to be in a barracks, being bombed at night.
We used to treat the brigade of 4,000 to 5,000 as a group with self-contained logistics. The battle group has been more used than any other size of organization since the end of the Cold War. It would have the capability to feed itself, fuel itself, supply itself with ammo and be sustained from offshore. I would imagine that offshore, along with the ship carrying the force, there would also be one or two supply ships, with tremendous capability to carry logistics, supplies, and sustain themselves. Yes, it is more self-contained than any other battalion-sized unit that we have had in the recent past.
Senator Day: Can you compare that to the concept floating around now, of a standing army within NATO or a standing, rapidly deployable army within the United Nations structure? That is if we can avoid the veto power of any particular country.
Mr. MacKenzie: That would never happen; that is right.
Senator Day: The concept is moving toward specialization, especially with the smaller countries wanting to specialize in one area. You seem to be suggesting that Canada should remain in a position to do everything.
Mr. MacKenzie: Nationally, we should produce a self-contained force. I can hardly conceive of a scenario in which we would not be operating in a force with other nations. Nevertheless, we would not be inserting bits and pieces into that force and losing our Canadian identity. As far as a standing NATO force goes, no. That is very much a political issue. They are still debating whether it will be deployed out of area or just restrict itself to the European area of interest.
The UN will never have a rapid reaction force, for a number of reasons. The Security Council would never permit the Secretary-General to have his or her own army. It would only be rapid once, because it would rapidly go somewhere and they would not be able to replace it, so it would be stuck there and no longer be rapid. You cannot have a mercenary force. Therefore, what they have done is by far the best compromise. They have an inventory. They say to Canada or any other nation, ``In the event that we have a problem and it is in your national self-interest to participate, what would you be prepared to contribute?'' They have that list in New York. They can put a force into the field in about six to eight weeks, as opposed to six to eight months, which was the case at the end of the Cold War. That is the best compromise.
More importantly, they have a number of headquarters earmarked. It used to take a year to get your headquarters to work together because they had all these languages and personnel coming together. Now, they say to the Norwegians, the Canadians or the Dutch, ``You guys go and set it up and run it.'' They can do that almost immediately, as they did in Eritrea and Ethiopia. They have come a long way, but a rapid reaction force? No, that is the world's leading oxymoron. That will not happen.
Senator Day: This committee had a chance to visit Kingston, Ontario, and the deployable headquarters unit down there. We had a good visit.
The final area I should like to talk about is the process of developing policy. As you know, our committee is looking into the national security policy, the foreign policy and the defence policy and how this all unfolds. We all agree with your earlier comments. The 1994 white paper and the policy statement with respect to defence at that time seemed never to have got the necessary government support. In the last few years, we have seen each of the elements within the Armed Forces come forward with what seemed to me to be a policy statement, but based on the resources that they had as opposed to looking at where we would like to be, what we see as our role in the world and what our needs are.
Would you comment on the evolution of a policy statement with respect to defence that will work? How do we get the government to buy in to it if that government does not say, ``This is our statement?'' When the military makes a decision to go with a Striker, is that not a policy statement — to abandon heavier armament than a tank — that is being made for pragmatic reasons, as opposed to people back home sitting down and thinking about this?
Mr. MacKenzie: Yes.
``They are coming off the line. The Americans are buying many of them. We can get a good deal, so we had better strike now, and by the way, we think that maybe in the future it might fit into the transformation plan.'' That is being terribly unkind, because more thought goes into it than that, but I want to highlight your point that it is done very much within the military family as opposed to with the foreign policy folks, who presumably will drive the policies that will deploy this force. What do you want it to be capable of doing? That should be clearly articulated, and that then will drive equipment choice. It takes 10 years. It is 12 years for the supply ships you are talking about. It is not an easy relationship between the two, but the primary responsibility rests with the Foreign Affairs folks determining what this country wants to do abroad.
Senator Day: When we have someone from National Defence Headquarters saying the policy for national defence is already written, what does that tell us about this whole process?
Mr. MacKenzie: It disappoints me greatly. I have been telling tales out of school, but I have told them before. Before I appeared in front of one of your committees, when I was still serving, I was given a list of talking points. I said, ``Send a monkey. You do not need me to go. If this is what I am supposed to read, I will not do it. I will give my personal opinion.'' I did not go that particular time. I went another time. Yet when I went in front of the United States Congress, the United States House of Representatives, and Senate, and combined Congress and Senate, I was told to go and give my personal opinion. It was great. I answered every question that I was asked. However, in front of our own committee here in Canada, I had to be very conscious of toeing the party line. Frankly, I did not think that was the way for you folks to absorb unfettered military advice. If you do not like it and tell us to get on with it, we do, but you should at least receive unfettered military advice.
The Deputy Chairman: Yesterday, I witnessed one of the finest tributes that our Armed Forces personnel could extend to one of their own. It was in Parade Square on Sunday, in front of city hall in Halifax — the Battle of the Atlantic — when the rear admiral went to the dais.
Mr. MacKenzie: Was it extemporaneous, or can we get a copy of the script?
The Deputy Chairman: There was no script.
Mr. MacKenzie: Those are the best.
The Deputy Chairman: You had to be there and put it in your pocket. It was magnificent.
Senator Atkins: You talked about the 20-40 rule. The experience of this committee, when it travels and talks to intermediate officers and colonels, is that we get a different story from them than we do from the people who come from headquarters. Are the people who come from headquarters not at high risk if they give personal opinions?
Mr. MacKenzie: Paul Hellyer called me about six years ago and said, ``Would you stop slamming me for integrating the headquarters of the Department of National Defence, Canadian Forces?'' There was a pregnant pause. He said, ``Can I come and see you?'' He dropped by and said, ``Look, I unified the force, and I still think it was the right thing to do, but I would have fallen on my sword if the PM had told me to integrate the headquarters. That was Defence Minister Macdonald, who followed me.'' I checked it out, and he was right.
The Granatsteins, the Bercusons and the Mortons of the world were asked by Minister Young to prepare papers and recommend how to improve the Canadian Forces, and their first recommendation was to de-link the civilian and military components of the Department of National Defence, because the Canadian Forces headquarters does not exist any more. Funnily enough, that is the only recommendation that has not been implemented.
I speak as a guy who almost made the Guinness Book of World Records, one year in National Defence Headquarters in a 33-year career, so I am looking at it as an outsider. You brought those people together side by side, and civilians started using these terrible terms, ``two star equivalent,'' ``three star equivalent.'' They worked side by side, and the civilians were making more money than the military in the same position. We bastardized the rank by making more generals because then the pay was equal, which is probably the only reason I made general. However, the generals come and go every couple of years, as do the admirals, but the bureaucrats, good people, stay there for six or seven or nine years. The power shifted in that direction.
The generals who were good at what they did here in town and understood how the town worked, small ``p'' politics and all that, guess how we rewarded them? We kept them here. That was their reward. General Boyle, who came here as a one-star general and became the Chief of Defence Staff, wearing four stars, has never gone back to the field. He was a good guy before he came here, and he went from brigadier to four-star general. He could walk on water and still would not have credibility with the soldiers in the field, because they said, ``Brigadier to four-star, never left Ottawa.''
We created this system. It was forced upon us. Since the end of the Cold War, at least there has been some attempt to create a joint headquarters, and they are doing good work within the constraints.
I always said, because I had to cut a headquarters down in my own unit, that you do not turn to Ottawa, National Defence Headquarters, and say, ``Reduce by 20 per cent,'' because they will find reasons not to. They will shift things like training and recruitment out of Ottawa to, say, Borden, and it looks like they reduced in size, but they just moved that cell somewhere else.
You turn to them and say, ``You have 2,000 people, organize your headquarters.'' You do not try to cut down from whatever it is, 5,000 or 6,000. You say, ``There is your cap, 2000; now go and design the headquarters.'' I would recommend separating the two functions.
Senator Atkins: The point I am trying to get from you is, if an officer in National Defence Headquarters were to give his personal opinion rather than the party line, would he risk maybe either being dismissed or never getting a promotion?
Mr. MacKenzie: Yes, he would be very unpopular. You remember the famous statement a couple of years ago that the Canadian Forces is more operationally capable today than it was 10 years ago. At the Canadian Defence Association, where I was giving a presentation, I asked people to put up their hand if they agreed with that statement, and not one hand went up. You can be a wordsmith and say that in this particular area because this is the equipment we have bought, the training we have done, and so forth. However, we are talking about our enemy being more scared of us today than they were 15 years ago, that is, operational capability. Some of them do marvellous work. I avoided it like the plague, but that is a failing on my part. The systemic structure is wrong and greater minds than mine have looked at it and said to separate them.
Senator Atkins: If you had been offered a promotion to Lieutenant-General, would you have stayed in the force?
Mr. MacKenzie: I was not fluently bilingual.
If I could just say probably not, because 99 per cent of the Canadian population thinks Major-Generals are senior to Lieutenant-Generals.
Senator Day: From your experience within the military, or since, with your extensive engagement in quasi-military activities, why does it takes so long in Canada to procure military equipment?
Mr. MacKenzie: The Department of Supply and Services is the large team that has been put together wanting to get it absolutely right. While I am not involved with anything to do with armaments or whatever, I am on the board of Medemerg, which provides emergency medical services for medical rooms across Canada, Corrections Canada, the native population and DND. Guess who takes longer than anyone else to respond to contracts, invoices and all of that? We point our finger at DND, but it is really Supply and Services. It is a very bureaucratic organization, and frustrating to deal with.
Senator Day: What would you recommend we do? We all feel that it takes far too long.
Mr. MacKenzie: We cannot throw money at the problem now because we do not know what we want the military to do. We have to establish what the military is supposed to do in support of national security, North American security and foreign policy. Once you decide that, then you can design a force. Once you design a force, you will know what kit you need, and then there are ways to accelerate the process, but they are politically unpopular. It means that in a particular warehouse in Germany, Italy or the United States is exactly what we want, at a good price. ``You mean we are not going to take the plans and build it in Canada, in somebody's backyard?'' ``No, we will buy it there and introduce it within two years.'' That is unpopular. You know much better than I how to get around that.
Senator Munson: Does the present military command buy into your rapid deployment force? Have you given them your feedback?
Mr. MacKenzie: I cannot answer for them. I spoke to a senior army general yesterday who said not to bother; I was talking to the converted. He just came out of Norfolk, Virginia, with the Americans. He totally agreed with me. I cannot speak for the remainder.
I am under the impression that there are good vibrations in the navy. Paradoxically, on my own army side, I do not know. The army commander is enjoying himself over in Afghanistan right now so he is not thinking about things like that.
Senator Munson: You are a persuasive person.
Mr. MacKenzie: I do not deal with those people first. I am trying to deal with, first, the public, just to sell the concept, and second, with government, with Parliament. The military will end up doing what policy-makers decide it should do. At least, that is the way it is supposed to work.
Senator Munson: Iraq is in a mess these days. Do you see a role for the Canadian military, or are we just wasting our time?
Mr. MacKenzie: I saw a role for the Canadian military in Iraq. For any number of reasons I will not bore you with, it is difficult for me to see a role for us in Iraq today. However, I see a role after the symbolic hand-off of power on June 30, or whenever it happens. Certainly, there are areas where we could assist.
I am upset with the gloating going on within elements of Canadian society, where people are saying, ``Are you not glad we did not go, because look how difficult it is?'' Is that the criterion? That is the wrong basis for foreign policy decisions.
Certainly there are roles. We have a deputy commander there right now. There are policing roles, there are patrols, there is the famous Coyote and there is reconnaissance. If the government decided that we were to make a contribution, there are areas where we could do that.
Senator Munson: Is this the same thing that Richard Clarke, the former counter-terrorism expert adviser to Presidents Clinton and Bush, was talking about, about policing?
Mr. MacKenzie: I disagree very much with him. He was going down the road of niche roles. As I mentioned, if a niche role is to be a balanced force at sea, ready to intervene when the Government of Canada determines the time has come, I can buy into that.
It is not right to say, ``Oh, we are good constabulary people,'' or, ``We will run your prisons for you,'' or ``We will provide the communications.'' The Canadian flag must be seen. It is not seen in niche roles. Frankly, I would not agree with Mr. Clarke on that. I believe he was twisting our tail somewhat on that subject.
Senator Munson: I believe he said we were getting a free ride.
The Deputy Chairman: On the question of a niche role, the role of the navy in the coastal defence zone in 2004 is very different from the days when the Americans did not want us within 20 miles of their fleets.
How could that be a niche role? Could you use that phrase when we are still concerned about the surface, the air above it and the water beneath it? We are doing quasi-police work. We have not deputized or made sheriffs out of our naval types, so far. It is not a niche role; it is a very compact role, but nevertheless much broader than it was 20 years ago, when they were looking for submarines and telling people what to do with them.
Mr. MacKenzie: When I talk about a niche role, Mr. Chairman, that is not all; that is not it. If you want to call a rapid reaction force a niche role, I can live with that. However, the rest of the force is still training to do what you are talking about. The coastal force now has a much greater challenge, based on our responsibility for our own security, North American security and national security.
What Mr. Clarke was saying was, ``Here are some niche roles for you and that is all you will do.''
The Deputy Chairman: I did not like it and tended to resent it when he would presume that he knew what we are trying to do with a surface fleet.
Mr. MacKenzie: He had given up on us. He said that we do not have a serious military any more.
Senator Munson: The Canadian Forces seem to have a difficult time attracting visible minorities. We are a multicultural country. What has gone wrong and how can we do better?
Mr. MacKenzie: I had the same concern in 1993, when I was commanding the army of Ontario, so I met with a number of the ethnic communities in the most multi-ethnic city in the world — Toronto. The response was interesting. The Sikh community said, ``If you want a battalion, we will get you a battalion.'' I served with the Sikhs in Gaza in 1962 and I know how good they are.
Other communities said, ``It will take us at least a generation before we look upon the military as friends and role models. We are not used to that in some of the countries we have come from.'' I am talking in particular about a response I got from the Pakistani community. They said, ``Give us time; we will be there.''
I do not know how the percentage has changed. I think it is going up, but it is nowhere near representative of the country. Do not forget that the majority of the military come from Atlantic Canada and Newfoundland, where there is nowhere near the multi-ethnic makeup we are used to.
Premier Wells called me when I came back from Sarajevo and asked why all the casualties there were from Newfoundland. As I explained to him, anywhere else in Canada, when people go to the recruiting office and the quota is full for that month, they come back the next month. In Newfoundland, when the quota is full, they start hitchhiking. If they find an opening when they get to Winnipeg, they join up there. The percentage is extremely high. The RCR company that was with the Vandoos battalion had a phenomenal number of Newfoundlanders. They are outstanding soldiers, I might add.
Senator Banks: I do not like what that American fellow said either, and I do not like the particular niche that he suggested. However, it is like the old gag: We have already established what you are; now we are talking about the price. We have niche forces. Our navy is a niche navy. We do not have cruisers; we do not have aircraft carriers. Our air force is a niche air force. We do not have heavy bombers; we do not have heavy lift capability.
We are already playing niche roles. That may have been imposed on us for reasons we do not like, such as not spending enough money, but in the present circumstances we have accepted the fact that we have niche roles.
Apropos of that, we suggested in this committee last week something very similar to what you said, although we said 2,000 rather than 1,000.
Mr. MacKenzie: My 1,000 was only the first of four.
Senator Banks: We were talking about being able to deliver a highly specialized, best-in-the-world service. We were talking about a JTF2 x 10.
I do not think that ``niche'' is necessarily a dirty word, because no one pretends that — absent an actual attack on us, in which case we will perform a miracle such as we did in 1939 — we will be able to double or triple our defence capacity.
I think that a niche role is not necessarily a bad idea, but we must define it very carefully.
Mr. MacKenzie: I could not agree with you more, and I will go along with your niches. I am happy with those. My problem is that certain people have, in the recent past, described niches as just military police, or just reconnaissance vehicles. We are diminishing the niche to a purely constabulary type of activity. If niche is what our army, navy and air force can do, I will absolutely buy into the niche force idea.
Senator Banks: We do not pretend, either, that a committee of the Senate will start designing the Canadian military. It all boils down to money, sooner or later. It is a big circle.
We have, to a degree, discounted things that have been said to us in answer to questions that we have asked of senior military officers in Canada because they have been — would ``co-opted'' be a fair word to use? — by the government, the bureaucracy or whatever. What you have said today reinforces that. I hope that we will seriously consider a recommendation for the separation at the headquarters level that you talk about, because we have been moving in that direction.
Things do boil down to money. I think I understood you to say that the parallel, simultaneous foreign affairs study and defence study were okay. I do not understand that. I have always thought that it would make a lot more sense to first finish a foreign affairs policy study, which would answer the question, what kind of military do we need? Can they both go on at the same time and arrive at the right conclusion?
Mr. MacKenzie: I would not want to overstate my understanding of the process, but I am aware that they are consulting on a regular basis. I hope they have not already decided on what the end state will be, but I know that Foreign Affairs and Defence are consulting regularly.
I cannot say whether that should ease your concern, because I do not know how much they are consulting and what the phases are, but I know that some of us here in this room had input as individuals into the process, to people who assure us they are consulting within the two institutions.
In Australia, Spain, Italy and the U.K, they formulate their foreign and defence policies while, figuratively speaking, locked in a padded room with their finance representatives. Why come up with grandiose plans if there is no chance they will be funded?
Senator Banks: We are phasing out main battle tanks and buying Striker gun systems instead. However, I do not think we would want to send an infantry advance across an open field following a Striker gun.
Mr. MacKenzie: Strikers could be carried by the ships we were talking about.
Senator Banks: I am talking about in a field. Battle tanks are a phalanx for infantry advances, are they not?
Mr. MacKenzie: It would depend on who the enemy was. With the type of enemies we are currently dealing with, particularly in Iraq, where RPGs, small arms and some missiles are the main weapons systems, we can do it. It is better than roaring around in a Hummer. It may not be a lot better, but at least you have a big gun and there is not a guy sticking out the top with a 50-calibre machine gun.
It depends on who your opponent will be. I presume that, for reasons with which I am not familiar, it was decided to take the good deal and buy the Striker.
The Deputy Chairman: I want to draw to the attention of my colleagues the meaning of the word ``niche.'' According to The Concise Oxford Dictionary, Tenth Edition, completely revised, it is a noun that means a shallow recess, especially in a wall, to display an ornament. It also means a comfortable or suitable position in life or employment. It is also a specialized, but profitable, corner of the market.
We are not niche people. We will do our job. We expect you to do yours and we have a responsibility to do ours.
Thank you very much for coming, General MacKenzie. You remain as much as, if not more than, any other Canadian, the voice of understanding and reason. Canadians have found themselves offshore in the last 15 or 20 years and we are a richer nation for it. God knows we are poor in our understanding of what happened, but we are learning. You have been a great educator. It has been a pleasure to have you here, sir.
I hope you will come back to visit.
I extend to BGen. Don Macnamara a warm welcome from the committee. Gen. Macnamara has had a 37-year career in the Canadian Armed Forces, including staff and academic appointments in the areas of national and international security affairs and strategic analysis in his last 15 years of service. He is the Honorary Colonel of the Canadian Forces College. He also serves on the minister's education advisory board, the DND human resources advisory board and was appointed Officer of the Order of Military Merit in 1978.
Brigadier-General (Retired) W. Don Macnamara, President, Conference of Defence Associations Institute: Mr. Chairman, it has been twice now that I have followed Lewis MacKenzie at a parliamentary committee. Another time, I followed him and Jack Granatstein, which is real double jeopardy.
The Deputy Chairman: I must suggest to the committee that you do come to us with a very good reputation for being a brilliant strategist.
Mr. Macnamara: I do not know how to live up to that. If I had been practising my strategy, I would have been ahead of Lewis MacKenzie. On the other hand, however, it is easy to say that I agree with everything he had to say.
Thank you for the opportunity to meet with your prestigious committee. Lest you think that Mr. MacKenzie and I have been colluding, I agree with his opening comments. I have followed your work over the years and I have found it not only interesting, but also exceptionally relevant and well done. The recommendations have been absolutely outstanding. I can honestly say that we can see the results of your efforts in last week's national security policy statement, at least in part, and at this stage of its development, because I think it is still in its early stages.
Although I do not wish to get involved in definitions, I do think it is important to be clear about what national security really means. It is a term that has been thrown around rather loosely and with different meanings, and with, particularly, a different meaning in Canada, traditionally, compared with the United States.
To me, national security is simply a matter of guarding our national values and interests from both internal and external dangers.
There is a more elegant definition in our national security framework paper for IRPP several years ago. I will not pursue that matter, but some of the elements of the proposed framework in that paper are reflected also in the national security policy statement of last week.
I consider that to be a good basic policy, but the international security component is yet to come.
When it comes to guarding national values and interests, I also want to be clear that by ``values'' I mean those essential core values that people die for: democracy, freedom and justice, and not medicare and free education. Medicare and free education are second-order values that are available only if the fundamental core values are assured.
It is protecting and advancing those core values that must be fundamental to our security policies. Some people talk about whether values are relevant in foreign policy or security policy, but they are fundamental and the most relevant elements. They are the starting point for all of our policies.
When it comes to Canada's national interests, there seems also to be some reluctance to state clearly what they are. Certainly we can say at the outset that the defence of Canada and our sovereignty, the defence against an attack of any kind on our territory, is of vital national interest. That is not difficult to determine. Also, taking a look at a map of the world also helps define some of our interests. I commonly show a satellite view of the world and a satellite view of North America at night to my classes. When we look at those, we get a lot of help. There are three primary conclusions that I draw from that: location, location and location. As Mr. MacKenzie said, most of the rest of the world would die for the opportunity to live next to the United States. We are situated, as he said, adjacent to the most powerful country in the world, in both economic and military terms. Our interests must take their interests into account. To fail to do so would be strategically naive. Dealing with them currently has three components as well: security, security and security. That is the way they are looking at things.
To miss that point could be damaging to Canada in many ways, but especially in terms of our defence and economic interests. We recognize that our trade dependency on the United States, representing 40 per cent of our GDP, is an imposing reality in terms of our standard of living. The fact that their security interests are essential to our security interests is also an inescapable fact.
When we look at the current issues in the world, we see terrorism, regional conflict, failing states, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, energy and other natural resource issues, population migration, HIV/AIDS and other pandemics, environmental degradation and climate change, and, not last and far from least, the issue of organized crime, which includes drugs and money laundering. We cannot escape the conclusion that such global issues have a direct impact on our own physical and economic security.
This means that we must have the means to protect our interests, either alone or in concert with other like-minded nations or the United Nations, and that certainly must include military means.
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty produced a report called ``The Responsibility to Protect'' in 2001. That also clearly extends to the world community the responsibility for the relief of the conditions of peoples who are oppressed by their governments. It is an extension of the UN charter, the declaration of human rights. We see such things as the failed state phenomenon, which is an extension of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect, if you wish. We must recognize that these failed states can harbour terrorists and organized crime and contribute to some of the refugee movements, as well as a host of other disruptions.
Haiti is an excellent example. Haiti is one of those in-between places that Mr. MacKenzie referred to in terms of what the United States may not need to get involved in.
In the international environment, as well as in North America, security has to be the starting point, because without security, nothing else matters. Without security, there will be no economic development, which is necessary to provide the means for social development and support and social services. Security is the fundamental. It is the sine qua non. Both economic development and social development subsequently feed back into and reinforce security, but it is important to recognize that without security at the outset, nothing else follows. I believe that particularly applies to our understanding of our relationship with the United States.
I also believe that our national interests must be clearly stated for all Canadians to know and understand, because that is what military forces are supposed to be looking after and defending. It is equally important that they understand that defending our interests as far as possible away from our homeland can thus preclude our having to fight here. To fight here would be at considerable risk to our population and assets.
The population also must understand that the Canadian Forces, both regular and reserve, represent Canada's capacity to apply ordered force, up to and including the ultimate violence of war, in the name of the Canadian state, and in the name of the Canadian people and their interests. In executing this responsibility, the nation, through its democratically elected government, entrusts to its military leaders its most precious and valuable resource — its youth — for training and preparation for military service in the interests of Canada. The military accepts that these young people will be expected to do so, and the population should also be expecting that these young people would do so under a contract of unlimited liability, which means that they are prepared to lay down their lives in the name of their country, if called upon to do so.
I suggest that this particular situation is not as well understood in this country as many people would like it to be. It confers upon Canada's national, political and military leadership a double responsibility. The first is to ensure that the Canadian Forces have the resources necessary to be trained and equipped for the missions expected of them. This includes ensuring that our military leaders are educated and trained, responsive to the nation's needs, and very much grounded in the nation's fundamental values of democracy, freedom and justice. The Canadian Forces do represent Canada and are expected to be effective and professional in conduct, in ethics and in leadership. That has been reinforced by all of the outcomes of the Somalia inquiry.
The second responsibility, which is very important, is that neither Canadian political nor military leadership will permit a capricious commitment or deployment of the Canadian Forces, or otherwise place our nation's young people in harm's way, either when the nation's interests are not being served or if the forces do not possess the training, experience and equipment necessary for their assigned tasks. This is a moral obligation on the part of the government and the country.
A further moral obligation or responsibility of all citizens of a democracy includes being an informed electorate. This should comprise an awareness and consideration of what the nation's interests are that must be defended and the immediate physical defence of the homeland and sovereignty; so, too, the capability to contribute to the protection of its interests far from its borders. That is the deployable capability of Canadian Forces.
This latter contributes to international stability in defence of our political and economic interests, and thus, as I said earlier, precludes our need for direct homeland defence.
When it comes to dealing with the United States, I think it is also important to understand their security needs and interests. I expect that all of you have had an opportunity to look at the United States' 2002 national security strategy document. It is a good starting point. It is interesting because it echoes so much Canadian language. Their stated national security goals are: first, political and economic freedom; second, peaceful relations with other states; and third, respect for human dignity.
The chapter headings are more interesting. The chapters are headed: ``Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity; Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and to Prevent Attacks Against the U.S. and Friends;'' and, ``Work with Others to Diffuse Regional Conflicts.'' Does that sound very Canadian? They continue with, ``Prevent Enemies from Threatening the U.S. and Allies with Weapons of Mass Destruction; Ignite a New Era of Global Growth through Free Trade; Open Societies and Build Democratic Infrastructure; Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action;'' and, finally, ``Transform National Security Institutions to Meet 21st Century Challenges.''
The goals and the chapter objectives sound very Canadian. Yet many people say, ``Why is it that we are always following American foreign policy?'' One of the reasons is that if you look at these national security objectives, they are very similar to Canada's national security objectives, or what I believe they should be. It should not be a surprise that theirs come out similar to ours. We deal with the same kind of world.
From all of this I have drawn the following conclusions: First, we must recognize that Canada is living in a turbulent world and is vulnerable in physical, political, economic, socio-cultural and military terms; second, Canada, unfortunately, has no clear statement of national interests — that is as important to Canada and Canadians as it is to our adversaries and our allies; Canada has a new, coherent national security policy, but there is more to come; as I mentioned, Canada must be mindful of U.S. national security interests and policies; in Canada, interdepartmental national security direction, cooperation and coordination have, historically, been limited or non-existent but it is now improving; overall, Canada's defence policy remains seriously underfunded and the Canadian Forces over-committed.
I know it is your responsibility, right or privilege to ask the questions, but I thought I would ask a few as a conclusion to all of this, because these are some of the questions that must be answered in our forthcoming policies. How should and can Canada respond to the complex, interdependent security environment? We can ask that question in a simple way: what kind of forces for what kind of Canada in what kind of world? Who should decide and coordinate the national response in this new environment? That is what we are talking about in this new security and defence policy. What are the real differences, if any, between the national security interests of Canada and those of the United States?
Do Canada's values demand that Canada intervene, with coalition partners, if necessary, to free or support oppressed people? In humanitarian operations such as those described in the report, ``Responsibility to Protect,'' who leads, who supports and who decides who goes where and when?
What are the roles and responsibilities of the Canadian Forces in operations other than war, especially in post- conflict environments? I have already spoken to some of the situations we see in Bosnia. What are the roles and responsibilities of non-government organizations in conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction? We see efforts being made in this regard in Afghanistan. Who decides and coordinates the national response in these cases? How much should Canadians pay for their military and public security services compared to their health, welfare and education services? Is there, in fact, a national security policy system in this context? I look forward to the discussion.
The Deputy Chairman: Perhaps it would be interesting as well to ask who would make that determination? I am referring to the amount of money we spend on social services, et cetera.
Senator Banks: I like your point that defence is a social responsibility. I will remember that and use it often.
I wish to talk about intervention, because that is one issue on which Canadians sometimes disagree with our most important neighbours and best friends. When it comes to intervention in other people's affairs, the criteria that we use are sometimes a little different. I am leading up to a specific question here because I am looking forward to asking you as a strategist. The British, to use Iraq as an example, had an evangelical streak and believed that they needed only to show the magic of the British way of life and things would be wonderful. Maybe when you are riding the big horse with the big saddle, you have that view of things. Canadians, however, might not have that same view.
What about the informed electorate? A substantial part of it — and I do not know the numbers; I do not think we would hold a referendum on this because the government must govern — is saying loudly these days apropos missile defence systems that notwithstanding the practical arguments that it will happen anyway, they do not want us to get into bed with that particular continent-wide initiative. As a strategist, what do you think we ought to think about that?
Mr. Macnamara: Mr. MacKenzie also pointed out that this is not a difficult answer at all. If the United States is to go ahead and contribute to the defence of North America — and we are living in North America with the United States — they will do it whether we participate or not. However, they will be doing it in their interests only. If we do not participate and cooperate, then they will do exactly what they feel is necessary for them. If we do have an opportunity to contribute and participate, then we at least have some say.
There are a number of issues here. People talk about the practicality questions, for example, that it will not work, it will be too expensive and things of that nature. On the other hand, 100 years ago people thought Orville Wright was crazy in thinking he could fly anything more than 300 feet. The systems that they are thinking of deploying are perhaps of limited capability. The reality is that the technology can develop. If we are contributing to the development of that technology, we will have a say in the direction that that may go.
Senator Banks: Will we? That is the question. There was an old gag about the election. A guy said, ``They warned me if I voted for Barry Goldwater the war in Vietnam would accelerate. I voted for Barry Goldwater and the war accelerated.'' You said that they are going to do it anyway, but if we participate we will have some influence on the outcome. Is that true?
Mr. Macnamara: I think we can. I think that the United States, particularly in the way they have behaved towards us in NORAD, has been very supportive in listening to Canadian views. By using our territory judiciously for the placement of radars during the Cold War and providing forward operating bases for defence and their strike forces, we have contributed to North American defence — and done that well — for the security of both Canada and the United States. Our geography gives us an incentive to contribute to that activity.
In the absence of our geography being used as we would like, it may well be that the United States would use their geography in a way that may not coincide with our interests — for example, ending up in intercepts occurring over Canadian territory.
One of the significant issues, of course, is whether they would intercept a missile that appeared to be headed for Winnipeg or Toronto.
That may not be the question. The question may be: If a missile is aimed at New York and it runs short of fuel, causing it to land on Toronto, should we not have been part of a system that could preclude that occurrence?
We need to look at this in the context of the long-term capability, the long-term interests of Canada, the reality that we share this continent with the United States and that if we are not in agreement with them, we know we will have no say in the outcome. We have much to contribute technologically, too. There is more technological capability in Canada than many people believe. We have an opportunity to contribute in that area.
Many people are also concerned about whether this will lead to the weaponization of space. If we are not part of the discussion, we will not be heard. It is very important to be at the table.
Senator Banks: The Prime Minister has said loudly that we oppose the idea of weaponization of space. Do you think that will be a factor? If Canada contributes its ``flag'' to the idea of the missile defence shield, will that view prevail? In the end, assuming a platform existed to allow the weaponization of space, could Canada stop it from happening if the United States thought it was necessary?
If we had such platforms, ostensibly, in the beginning, as part of a missile-defence system and if a threat arose that we would like to oppose with the weaponization of space, do you think that we could, out of pure moral compunction, decline to do that?
Mr. Macnamara: That is a very good question. Do you feel a need to defend your assets in space? How important are those assets? Canada now has a substantial dependency on space-based systems in terms of satellite communications. We would probably want to defend our space assets, one way or another. Whether defending them from space would be the best defence is part of the discussion. If you are part of that discussion, you may be able to contribute to the alternatives, as opposed to leaping into space.
Second, many of the space-based assets that would contribute to these interceptions are in fact surveillance and early-warning systems. If we are not part of the process, we will not have access to the information from those surveillance and early-warning systems. That is the importance of the discussion between the Prime Minister and the President of the United States last week about ensuring NORAD continues to be part of that early-warning system. Not having surveillance of our own territory through joint sensing systems would be a serious loss of sovereignty.
Senator Banks: Especially if somebody else did have that surveillance.
Mr. Macnamara: The United States would have that.
Senator Munson: General, I am curious about the fourth paragraph in your statement:
When it comes to guarding national values and interests, I also wish to be clear that by values, I mean those essential core values that people fight for and die for — democracy, freedom and justice...
Why is there no political will in this country then to pay more for democracy, freedom and justice? The United States does.
Mr. Macnamara: I do not know the quick answer to your question. I do feel one of the reasons is that most of our population does not think in those terms, unlike people in the United States.
I have taught several thousand of the brightest and best students in this country at Queen's School of Business. We get into discussions of the fundamental values that run our country. The vast majority of them have never even thought about them. They have not been taught them. They do not know anything about them.
We fail to emphasize the real foundations of our society and how those values affect everything that we pursue. If we do not have freedom, if we do not have democracy that provides freedom of choice and the rule of law and, for that matter, a sense of justice, then we may not have those other things that we want, like medicare or education and social services. Those programs depend upon those fundamental values being in place and being supported.
To a substantial degree, it is a failure of our education system to ensure that all our citizens understand where that comes from.
Senator Munson: Do you agree with Richard Clarke, the former counter-terrorism adviser, when he said that we are on a free ride and not paying our way?
Mr. Macnamara: That is a point I have heard a lot from Americans over the years. Looking at it from their perspective, how much do we pay on a per-capita basis? We pay about a third of what they pay. How much do we spend as a percentage of GDP? We spend about a quarter of what they spend. Do they have a perception that we are on a free ride? In those terms, they are probably right.
Could we have done more? Could we have done something better to allay their concerns or suspicions about this? I think the answer is yes.
You can manipulate numbers and statistics to prove anything you want. If someone is making a point based on those statistics and you have nothing to refute them, then the case rests in their hands. They have made that point and it is very difficult to refute.
Senator Munson: There is so much money going into medicare, health programs. Do you feel Canadians would have to pay more taxes to pay for all this new machinery that we feel is needed for the Armed Forces? Sometimes, I do not understand where the money will come from.
Mr. Macnamara: If you agree that security is the first and most important responsibility of government to its people, we spend a whole lot less than other nations seem willing to in terms of their own security interests.
We are also a very wealthy country. We make some choices, but compared to other countries of much lesser means, we spend a whole lot less. That is the inescapable conclusion from the point of view of the Americans, and many Canadians. I can tell you I have heard this from countless Canadians when giving lectures: ``Well, why should we bother spending anything because the Americans will defend us whether we want them to or not?'' That is true. They probably will, but they will do so in their interests, not ours. They will only defend us because they will want to make strategic use of our geographic space.
Yes, you can be sure that the United States would be defending North America in their interests, but is that any reason for us not to pay our own way? As Minister Manley said, ``When you eat the meal but go to the washroom when the bill comes around, it does not look too good.''
If we see ourselves as global leaders in whatever terms — promoting democracy, promoting our values, trying to contribute to the security and stability of the world — we will not to do that by under-spending on what is necessary to secure ourselves and our allies.
Senator Munson: Speaking of interests, you made a blunt observation: Canada has no clear statement of national interests.
Could you expand on that?
Mr. Macnamara: Other countries will state clearly their national interests. The national interests of the United States are, first of all, the defence of the homeland. The survival of the United States is based on defending the homeland against all or any attacks.
The next most significant interest of the United States will be to promote its economic well-being and security. They will then talk about the promotion of their values as a national interest.
It is important to have national interests because they are the standard by which you judge whether you are prepared to commit your blood and treasure in defence.
If you do not know what they are, and the public does not know what they are, how can you justify sending people off to defend them? Unless they are stated clearly in advance, how do you know how much you are prepared to spend to defend them or what you are prepared to do to defend them? For that matter, how do you know from whence they might be threatened?
A clear statement of national interest is extremely important, and is probably not the first, but the second step of our foreign and defence policy formulation, or, for that matter, our national security policy calculation.
Senator Munson: Would it then be in our national interest to play a role now in Iraq?
Mr. Macnamara: Now, maybe not, but ultimately. There were a variety of reasons for not going in the first instance. The reality was that there was precious little capability for the Canadian Forces to go.
Two things were apparent in the situation in Iraq. The first was the concern about the weapons of mass destruction, whether or not they were there. It was clear that there were no nuclear weapons, but there seemed to be some doubt as to what may have been there or not.
The second issue was the oppression of the people and the way in which Saddam Hussein had in fact systematically put down various components of the people, whether Shia Muslims or Kurds. Coming back to this responsibility to protect issue, at what point do we decide to go along with an international coalition to try to intervene and stop this kind of behaviour? We did not have a particularly good history pre-World War II, but when we found out what was going on, we were quite prepared to fight to defend human interests in that war. It is important to determine whether we are prepared to intervene to protect oppressed peoples or not.
Senator Munson: To close, then, I will ask the question that you asked. Do Canada's values demand that Canada intervene with coalition partners to free or support oppressed people, and under whose guidance and who makes that decision? It is a tricky slope to be on in some parts of the world.
Mr. Macnamara: It is, but we could use Haiti as an example. If you have a definition and clear statement of what your national interests are, and those do clearly state that we are out to promote democracy, freedom and justice, and there are circumstances in which we may want to commit our forces to promote that in parts of the world because it would lead to the future stability and enrichment of the people involved, so be it.
Senator Atkins: I assume you have read our report and recommendations with regard to the Coast Guard. Have you any comment on our recommendations?
Mr. Macnamara: I do not want to get into the detail of the recommendations because I remember them only in general terms. I do agree that our Coast Guard is currently in a shameful state.
Senator Atkins: Should it be armed?
Mr. Macnamara: I believe it should be. The Coast Guard, in its present incarnation, which is essentially a safety and navigation system, as you know, will be hard-pressed in the homeland defence rubric to contribute as much as it can and should. I would say that, in particular, the Great Lakes region will have some difficulty in measuring up to the expectations of the United States for homeland security.
I do believe the Coast Guard requires expansion in terms of both numbers and equipment, and probably should have some armed capability, depending upon the relationship with the navy.
Senator Atkins: That also depends under whose department it is.
Mr. Macnamara: Exactly.
Senator Atkins: We recommended that it should be independent and not under any department, neither Transport nor Fisheries and Oceans. We looked to the navy as a possibility, but in the end, we recommended that it be an independent force.
Mr. Macnamara: Did you call it a separate agency?
Senator Atkins: Yes. I take it you agree with Gen. MacKenzie, that we should work with the Americans on North American security. You stated that in doing so, we get to sit at the table. I am American-born, by the way. I think that whatever support we show, the Americans will be absolutely delighted. I also do not think they would ask very much in return, because they are looking for partners and friendship. From having just been to Washington a month ago, their priority in terms of North American security and homeland security is clear. You do not see it as any threat to our sovereignty?
Mr. Macnamara: On the contrary, I see that our sovereignty is more threatened by not cooperating with them because it limits our freedom of choice.
I am also strongly in favour of a perimeter security context for North America. I feel that way because I live in Kingston, and I can see the United States from my living room window. I know that in 15 minutes someone can land on U.S. soil without anyone in the United States knowing it. Beefing up 150-odd border points, when over half of our border is either water or trackless waste, does not make sense. If people want to get into the United States and do damage to either the United States or Canada, there are easier ways to get across.
To maximize our security insofar as the border is concerned, we should be looking more at the perimeter level, maximizing the security of our sea approaches and air approaches and, indeed, our airports, in terms of who is arriving and where they are coming from.
That is my strong feeling about our relationship with the United States in terms of perimeter security.
Senator Atkins: Polls have been asking the question, ``What do you consider to be the most important issue facing Canadians today?'' National defence and security would be low on the scale of public opinion. My question is whether part of the reason for that is that Canadians are not asked to make any sacrifice and there really is no strong leadership directing public opinion when it comes to national defence. Would you agree or disagree with that?
Mr. Macnamara: I would generally agree and say one other factor is that the average Canadian does not feel threatened. Immediately after September 11, 2001, I believe the polls showed, within a month, that 80 per cent of the Canadian population did indeed feel threatened and that security was the most important thing in their lives at that point. That percentage drifted down to about 15 per cent over the next six to eight months, but in the intervening period, from September to November, the Anti-terrorism Act was quickly passed; then the Public Safety and Security Act was delayed somewhat as the interest and feeling of threat decayed in the Canadian population.
There are two issues here. One is lack of public awareness of what the security concerns are, and therefore people do not feel particularly threatened and are not particularly interested.
I will tell you that I have been doing a small poll, because I have been very interested in what last week's security policy release has meant to people. I asked over 100 people, and I found one person who knew that there had been a new security policy released last week. That one person only knew it because they read the last line of an article that Hugh Segal wrote on Saturday.
Senator Atkins: Which paper was that?
Mr. Macnamara: It was in the Kingston Whig-Standard.
Senator Atkins: I wondered why I did not see it.
With respect to procurement, there seems to be a feeling in Canada that if the government were to purchase any major equipment, whether ships or what have you, Canadians would not support that investment.
In our recent history, when the military bought CF-18s, there was no strong hue and cry. When we went out and purchased frigates, there was no strong reaction to that. Do you not think that the time has come when we must make major decisions on the purchase of Sea Kings, ships and whatever to ensure that our military is properly supported?
Mr. Macnamara: Absolutely. Not only has the time come, it is long overdue. I have seen many polls in the last couple of years showing substantial support from the Canadian population for exactly that kind of spending. I have not seen evidence of criticism of spending for renewal. The Sea Kings purchase has been strongly supported in the public polls that I have seen.
Senator Atkins: That has always been in the forefront of the public mind.
Mr. Macnamara: That is what the public knows about.
Senator Atkins: They do not really know about many other possible purchases.
How would you increase public opinion in favour of support of the military?
Mr. Macnamara: Senator Munson is sitting here. I do not know. He is an expert on this; I am not. From the point of view of the Conference of Defence Associations, we are putting out one or two reports per year and trying to maximize the publicity we get from these to interest the Canadian population.
In the same way that the feeling of threat dissipated rather quickly after September 11, 2001, the interest in these reports decays rather quickly as well.
We put out a report last fall called ``Canada Without Armed Forces?'' The release of that report and its immediate conclusions were on the front page of every major newspaper in the country the next morning. However, they were nowhere to be found two days later and there was no discussion or follow-up of that report.
One of the issues is that generally speaking, in a big country, local issues will take priority, especially if the other issues, for example, health care and education, affect people directly at home. They will respond to that before they respond to national security issues.
Senator Banks: Is that not a human state of affairs? You talked about this in your ``Canadian Defence Policy — A Contemporary Historical Perspective,'' that it is the responsibility of all Canadian society. However, is it not true that, excepting in dictatorships, unless there is a clear and present threat or danger, all of the people in all of the countries in the world do not put military or defence spending or priorities anywhere near the top of their list? Is that not a natural condition?
Mr. Macnamara: By and large, you are correct, senator. The additional factor is that those countries that do support the military more strongly than we see in Canada have a larger military and a larger percentage of the population is involved. In terms of the percentage of the population involved in the military, we are 118 out of 160 countries in the world.
The average Canadian does not come in contact with the military. That is why I think the reserves are such an important element. We do not have enough reserves to meet the immediate emergency response demands the new policy papers are projecting.
The reserves are really the contact between the military and the Canadian population. On the two coasts, where the navy is evident, everyone in Victoria or Halifax knows much about the navy, but the army and the air force are in remote areas.
Senator Banks: Excepting Edmonton.
Mr. Macnamara: I will not comment on the remoteness of Edmonton.
The average Canadian does not come in contact with the military and does not see a military uniform except on television.
The Deputy Chairman: That irritates me to no end. The only unexpurgated, uncensored, straightforward access to the Canadian people that we as a Senate committee looking into a very serious matter have is that little box there. The press does not think we are valuable. A story a week out of the Senate is good enough. In terms of protecting Canada, the press will do it. They do not need us to help them. CPAC is our only unsullied, direct, pure access to people.
Senator Munson: Thank goodness for CPAC.
Senator Atkins: Following on from that, we have come out with five reports. There seems to be somewhat of a disconnect with other organizations that are interested in military spending, reorganization and so forth.
If a good report comes out, we do not hear a reaction from these committees in support, even though, when witnesses appear before us, there is very little disagreement on many of the things we are saying. It is astounding to me.
Mr. Macnamara: The Conference of Defence Associations has been very supportive of your reports.
Senator Atkins: I was not specifically relating my comments to your organization.
Mr. Macnamara: In regard to your reports, invariably, we have issued a press release saying that we support the conclusions, with particular note of this or that.
I do agree that this is also a reflection of a lack of interest in military and security affairs across the country. There is nothing in it for the media; there is nothing there.
Senator Atkins: Is there not a lack of interest, for instance, among senior military officers who are now retired and know something about the military, given they do not stand up and support some of the things that are coming out? I find that surprising.
Mr. Macnamara: I cannot answer for that.
On the West Coast of Canada, for example, there are hundreds of retired senior officers. They are very active. Through our clipping services, we see the comments in the newspapers out there. The rest of the country does not see it. We see it because we have a news clipping service.
I would put in a plug for the Canadian Forces College. If anyone wishes to know what is happening in the world in regard to military affairs, just dial up to www.cfc.dnd.ca. There is a spotlight on military news that covers the world. It is the world's best military Web site. You can get news from across the country, but it is very local.
Senator Atkins: Would you support getting a COTC back in the universities?
Mr. Macnamara: Absolutely, especially if it was a university training plan for the air force and a university naval division for the navy. I am a product of that process. I strongly believe in that. As a university professor, I lament the fact that we do not have those people on campus.
It is a tremendous opportunity. I think you asked General MacKenzie how could we motivate people to participate in this. I was motivated to participate in two or three ways. First, I got excellent training. I was able to fly, became an air traffic controller and was paid for it. I earned enough during the summer to pay my university fees.
There is now a system by which we can subsidize university fees for reservists. That would be an appropriate process. That would also feed the reserves. It does not matter whether someone goes to the University of Toronto, Queen's, Dalhousie or Victoria, because given our mobile population, we will be spreading these people across the country. With a little organization, they could move around and be part of the militia and reserve units wherever they may go.
It is a great opportunity to rejuvenate that.
Senator Atkins: It teaches leadership.
Mr. Macnamara: Absolutely. You are quickly given responsibility out of all proportion to your age in those organizations. Among my own air force classmates of 1952 there are presidents and vice-presidents of just about every major aircraft manufacturing company in this country, as well as vice-presidents of Bell Canada, glassworks, paint manufacturers and industrial and real estate development organizations. Our reunions include quite a collection of very well placed people, and they all got their leadership education in the air force. The same is true for the army and navy.
Senator Day: I believe I heard you say during the earlier discussion that in the development of values and national interests, the second thing to do is define a national security policy for Canada. What is the first thing?
Mr. Macnamara: The first thing is the values, and the interests that would flow from those.
Senator Day: We now have a national security policy that defines national issues. The next step will be the international activity. Flowing from that will be a foreign policy, presumably based on it, and then a defence policy that all fits together.
How long does this go on and how frequently should we be doing this kind of exercise?
Mr. Macnamara: It can be done rather quickly with a relatively small group of specialized people. There are a number of people in this country with no particular vested interest who could contribute to it. You want to identify the values and goals of the country, thereby defining the national interests. You then find out what is going on in the world and what trends, issues and events have an impact on those interests, and in which direction. You separate these issues into political, economic, military, social, cultural and technological, and then you formulate the ways and means by which you will get around these impacts.
The questions are: Where do we find ourselves now, where do we want to be and how do we get there? It is not rocket science. Business does this every day, as you know. This is done at the national level and it is a relatively straightforward thing.
I was at the hemispheric security conference that the U.S. army ran a few weeks ago. The deputy defence minister from Argentina gave a lecture, and it was my lecture on how to build a national strategy starting with values and goals. It was amazing to hear that from a country under reconstruction after a devastating past. They are going about it in an orderly way, which is what must be done. If it is done in an orderly manner, you will get some very good and interesting answers. The United States and Britain do it that way, as do France, Germany and Australia.
Senator Day: Are you confident we are moving in that direction?
Mr. Macnamara: So far so good, as far as the national security policy is concerned. With the international security policy yet to come, I do not know. I do not know how that is coming together at all, but so far, they are following a pretty good pattern.
Senator Day: I have two questions that come out of what you just described. How do we engage the public in this process? You indicated that there is a group of experts at the national level who can generate this information. How do we engage the public and at what stage? Is policy driven by the dollars available and the state of the Armed Forces at the present time, or do we ignore those things, create the utopia type of situation and ask what we have to do to get there?
Mr. Macnamara: It is wrong to present a certain amount of money and ask for that much worth of security. You must identify your security needs and what risks you are prepared to take in not dealing with some of those because you do not have the money to spend on them.
Five years ago, the British went through a process of iterations. Within the government, the Foreign Office, the defence and development departments were all involved in the process of sorting out what things had to be done. They then went to the government with their findings. The defence people said, ``We find that there are many areas of the world where Britain has interests that you want to defend. Tell us what interests are most important to defend.'' The government listed what it thought was important. The defence people proposed four or five task forces. The government asked how much that would cost. The defence people stated a figure and the government said, ``That is too much. What are the risks if we do not have that?''
I watched that for hours on television in Britain. The discussion was televised. That is how you can involve the public. However, if you go out and ask the public, who are, by and large, in terms of both international and strategic issues, somewhat naive, it is possible that they will derail the process by making it much more time consuming, and probably add very little to it.
However, having this discussion on television would be very useful. The British did that and it was very effective.
Senator Day: Is that U.K. process available to us in film form?
Mr. Macnamara: Brigadier Chris Day, of the British Defence Liaison Staff, has it.
Senator Day: Perhaps our clerk can obtain that.
I am struggling with what comes first, the money or the values. You described the values and the principles. I do not see much difference between Canada and the United States in terms of protecting those fundamental values. Are there some fundamental differences?
Mr. Macnamara: No.
Senator Day: There might be differences in how far we are prepared to go offshore to protect things at home, but that seems to be along the lines of the annual business plan, as opposed to the long-term plan that we are talking about now in terms of policy.
Mr. Macnamara: The long-term plan provides the capabilities, and those capabilities provide you with the opportunity to make the decisions when the events occur, but you must take into account that these events may occur. Let us take the example of Haiti. Haiti is a failed state. We know that. We have troops in Haiti for the second or third time. The United States has been in Haiti for a long time. The situation there will not get better in the next six months. In fact, it will probably not get better in the next six years. It may take 30 or 40 years before we see a difference.
First and foremost, Haiti must have security, so there is an armed forces intervention, followed by police and courts to maintain the rule of law, followed by investment to maintain some kind of economic development, with an education system to educate the people. Two generations on, we may find that Haiti is coming to some kind of reasonable outcome. Otherwise, we will be going back there every few years.
This is a long-term investment process in security and projection of values, if we really believe in that.
I was speaking with an American general a couple of weeks ago. I said, ``If we really get involved in Haiti, when my 15-year-old grandson is my age he will be voting for a government that is keeping Canadians in Haiti,'' and he said that I was absolutely right.
My quick research on this subject shows that we have 550,000 people from the Caribbean region in Canada. That is more than from the entire Middle East, Africa and Latin America, including Mexico, combined.
We have 100,000 Haitians in Montreal. We have 200,000 Jamaicans in Toronto. We have many from Bermuda, Trinidad, Antigua and the like. Is the Caribbean an area of interest to Canada? We have somewhere between 10,000 and 30,000 Canadians there at any given time. Do we spend much time talking about that? Are we prepared to invest in that? Is this not the kind of environment in which the much-vaunted three Ds, diplomacy, defence and development, can work wonders?
That is an example of when we take what our values and our interests are, and looking around, we see that there are things that we can do.
By the way, that would relieve the United States of having to worry about Haiti. They might thank us for that as well.
Senator Day: I hope we will have an opportunity to explore this more. However, we are running out of time and I have a couple of areas to touch on. It is important for us to try to get your reaction when we have the advantage of your expertise here.
I believe you heard the discussion earlier about separating civilians from the military at the National Defence Headquarters level. What is your reaction to that proposal?
Mr. Macnamara: I agree wholeheartedly with what was said earlier. I worked in both the old and the new system. The old system had a lot to recommend it.
Senator Day: Different committees have spent a lot of time over the past several years leading up to the Reserves 2000 policy that, unfortunately, did not progress, much the same as the white paper of 1994. A lot of work goes into a plan, a policy statement, and then there is a lack of political will, for whatever reason, to support that plan. Does this process we are describing bring in all of the parties so that we come up with something that will be supported?
Mr. Macnamara: Do you mean the policy development process?
Senator Day: Yes.
Mr. Macnamara: One of the first things I try to get people to understand is the definition of ``policy.'' Policy is the reaction of a government department or agency to the impact of issues on its perceived interests. They set the policy, which tells you what and why.
The plan, which is often confused with the policy, tells you what, who, when and how. It is what and why that comes out in the policy. The remainder comes out in the plan.
It is important that the plan be given appropriate resources. With those resources has to come the appropriate leadership, management and commitment to implement.
You asked earlier how often we should do these examinations of strategy. I would suggest that strategy is the dynamic process. We are just taking a snapshot at any given time. You know from your own business interests that although you put out a five-year strategy, you take a look at it every year to ensure your projections are going according to plan. You have to keep going back into the circle, ensuring that the implementation is going according to plan and that the policy is doing what it is supposed to do. It is a dynamic process.
Senator Day: That is something we have not been doing in the past, have we?
Mr. Macnamara: I would suggest that some of it has been done, but only within the Department of National Defence and not in government in general.
Senator Day: Or maybe even on a lower level, within each element of the Department of National Defence and their particular envelope.
My final question concerns another comment earlier from Mr. MacKenzie, to the effect that it might be good to think of the reserve force as something like the U.S. National Guard. He went further and suggested that such a force might even be under the direction of the provincial premiers, which I thought was quite an interesting statement. I wondered if you had done any thinking along those lines, about running it parallel to the situation in the United States.
Mr. Macnamara: As you know, the National Guard is under the direction of the governors in the United States.
It will be interesting to see how that will play out in our national security policy. The policy released last week talks about the first responders and where the levels of responsibility are. However, the plan has not yet been enunciated. It is clear the role of the reserves will be central to some of the response at the provincial level. As to how the command and control is affected, there will be an interesting discussion.
I think that we will have to have much better coordinated control of our various assets. For example, if there is a blackout in Ontario at the same time that there are forest fires in B.C., and there is a need for troops in both locations, who decides which troops will go where? If it were left to the individual provinces, of course, the troops from Ontario would not go to B.C., but then where would the troops from Manitoba go, to Ontario or B.C.?
We have to be careful about the command and control of these kinds of assets.
The Deputy Chairman: Where are all these troops being hidden?
Mr. Macnamara: These are the troops we will have.
Senator Day: There was a change in the National Defence Act to provide that the aid to the civil power will no longer be at the request of the provincial premier directly to the Chief of Defence Staff, but now will also be in consultation with the Minister of National Defence, for that very reason — to try to create some coordination. That is all part of the proposed legislation we are dealing with now.
I appreciate your comments. I look forward to trying to get some of this documentation and the film that you suggested that Brigadier Chris Day might be able to help on.
Mr. Macnamara: He could speak to you on the process. It was very interesting and informative. Indeed, it is one that I would certainly commend to our government.
The Deputy Chairman: This is why I keep insisting on a revival of the Halifax Rifles. There is a role for them. We do not see it today, but I can plainly see it tomorrow.
Senator Smith: The witness has raised a number of issues. It is tempting to explore them all, but I will explore just one.
I want to touch on the militarization of space issue. It will be a big policy, ethical and philosophical discussion that we as a people will be having on the degree to which we will cooperate with it, if at all.
I will take a couple of minutes to tell you my thinking, the way I look at it, and then get your reaction. One of the things that you articulated very ably was the question of whether Canada is paying its share. For example, you say, ``Well, if the U.S. spends four times more per person in terms of percentage of GDP than Canadians, is that right and fair?'' I guess that is one way of looking at it. Perhaps another way of looking at it is if the U.S. is doing that, it is because they have chosen to do so as a country, as a people and as a society. I think it is because they have chosen to be the most powerful country in the world, which they are. Quite frankly, God bless them for it, given the degree to which we share values. To some extent, they have chosen to be the policemen of the world. They have discovered that that can be a painful role, but they have chosen to go that route.
It is not even that simple, because within American society itself I do not think we are hearing too much from Democrats about going down that road. There was Eisenhower's great phrase of almost 50 years ago, about the military industrial complex, which, generally speaking, I think is a little more Republican. I suspect that is where it is coming from.
I have been fortunate to travel a great deal nearly all my life. I was in Uganda for a week just about 10 days ago. Sometimes I feel I have to take off my Canada hat and put on my human being hat and think about the civilized world and the direction in which I want to see it go. That is a country where you see millions of people dying.
Last summer, I was at a legal conference that I attend every couple of years, at the University of Cambridge in England. The law is my real profession, not this stuff.
One of the big questions we dealt with is what Western countries should be doing to try to ensure that drugs are affordable for Third World countries, in Africa in particular. The drug companies are owned by shareholders who want dividends and profits. There are real ethical issues to deal with there.
When you think about such things and the extent to which Canada might influence the direction in which civilization is going, and when you think of the scientific brain power we have, do we want to encourage it being used to weaponize space, or would we rather see it used to save the lives of fellow human beings throughout the world who cannot afford these existing drugs?
We may accept Mr. MacKenzie's proposition that it probably is just not worth the pain and aggravation not to cooperate to some extent. However, there maybe two different ways of cooperating. One involves our airspace. I can live with us cooperating with regard to airspace. I am not too worried about whether missiles headed for New York will be intercepted over Toronto, because if this system cannot intercept them well north of that, in relatively unpopulated areas, it will not be any good anyway.
I am comfortable with cooperating on the airspace, but not with laying out hard cash for the weaponization of space. We have other military spending priorities, such as the expeditionary force that we heard about tonight. It would be great to send them to Haiti and other troubled nations. I will resist spending hard cash on the weaponization of space, and I wonder if we can get by with that.
When the Americans went into Iraq, you would hear about some coalition countries that did not have a single person there but said, ``We are with you.'' Can we get by with the airspace part and not have to lay out cash that we really do not have, and when we have other priorities that seem more meaningful to us as citizens of this planet?
Mr. Macnamara: How much have we got?
First, I do not think the United States is asking us to lay out a lot of cash. We are being asked to participate in discussion and in an agreement. It will be a long time before we get to the business of weaponization of space.
The degree to which we would be involved in this may be in providing some sites, some geography, some airspace and other assets, in the first instance, but also in contributing our brain power and diplomatic capability, and doing what we can to prevent nuclear missiles from entering our territory. I do not necessarily see this as a cash outlay, and certainly not weaponization of space. We are not headed in that direction.
My major point is that to not discuss this with the Americans, given what they are doing, and to not be on board for the defence of North America, to me is a non-starter. It does not work that way. We would be left out in the cold on many other things.
I also hasten to underline that in my experience, and in talking with people in the United States, if we do not understand that security is their first step we will not understand many other things. If they do not see us contributing to our common security, then why should they contribute to our common well-being, whether it is with beef, lumber or what have you? Why should they contribute in any way to our common free trade area in the future?
We must understand that the United States does involve itself in, if not frank, at least in psychological, linkage. This is not simply an issue of defence. I agree that we should be looking at the other things we want to do in the world. As for the price of drugs, I had my strategy class last year do a strategic analysis of drugs in Africa. There are 210 different factors to be satisfied, and price was only one of them. We must be careful not to oversimplify some of the other problems we want to deal with at the expense of those that may appear to be more complicated and expensive. The real cost of dealing with HIV in Africa can be much more than simply supplying drugs. It has to include education, building roads and infrastructure, and sending in people to deliver the drugs and monitor the dosages. It is a complicated process. We have to be careful in comparing the either/ors.
Going back to my earlier comment, if we do not provide for and are not seen to be contributing to the security of our homeland, if something then happens — and I think that it will not be ``if'' but ``when'' — who will be responsible?
Senator Smith: Those are valid points. I understand there are many factors. I used the cost of drugs as an example. If the price is so prohibitive, you cannot afford them anyway. My question was somewhat rhetorical, just because I wanted to get some balance on the table in terms of values.
Senator Banks: With regard to projecting our values, which we have never done alone but always with allies, look at the Haiti situation. You said, realistically, that we are talking about several generations there. There is a point at which, in many parts of the world, after we or whoever has been there for 10, 15 or 20 years, what started off as a boy scout undertaking to do good suddenly starts to look like imperialism. Where does that change come? When that happens, do we tough it out, hang in and impose what we think is right, or do we abscond?
Mr. Macnamara: The quick answer is that we do not do it alone. In the case of Haiti, we can provide the leadership, but the rest of Latin America is sorely looking for leadership. Latin America is having trouble with democratic values as well. If we provide the leadership and they provide resources — teachers and so on — that can make a difference all the way around. It gets away from the apparent imperialism, particularly if the United States is not the leader. Canada can be a trusted leader.
I do not believe we are paying enough attention to what is going on in the Western hemisphere. We spend much more time dealing with things in Africa than in South or Central America. We should be looking more at home and what leadership we can provide for the future development of other countries in our hemisphere and the future well- being of people. Our values of individual freedom, democracy and justice, combined with our belief in a market system economy, have proven to be the most rapid way to enrich a population. Look at what is happening in countries such as China and India. Although we do not see China as being the most democratic country in the world, there have been many changes and people are much richer than they were.
The Deputy Chairman: Sometimes, it opens up more questions than it answers.
We express our deep appreciation for your time this evening. As always, it has been informative. As always, you reflect the philosophy and thinking of the Conference. The Conference is much appreciated by members of the Senate, not just of this committee. I can speak for the House because I was there for a long time. We wish the Conference of Defence Associations good luck, and you with your professorship.
If our listening audience has any questions or comments, please visit our Web site by going to www.sen-sec.ca. We post witness testimony as well as confirmed hearing schedules. Otherwise, you may contact the clerk of our committee for further information or assistance in contacting the members of the committee by dialing 1-800-267-7362. That number is probably in the back of every telephone book in Canada.
The committee adjourned.