THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Thursday, February 21, 2019
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met this day at 10:35 a.m. to study foreign relations and international trade generally.
Senator A. Raynell Andreychuk (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: Welcome to the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. I would ask honourable senators to introduce themselves.
Senator Boehm: Peter Boehm, Ontario.
Senator Dean: Tony Dean, Ontario.
[Translation]
Senator Dawson: Dennis Dawson, Quebec.
[English]
Senator Bovey: Patricia Bovey, Manitoba.
Senator Coyle: Mary Coyle, Nova Scotia.
[Translation]
Senator Massicotte: Paul Massicotte, Quebec.
[English]
Senator Greene: Stephen Greene, Nova Scotia.
[Translation]
Senator Saint-Germain: Raymonde Saint-Germain, Quebec.
Senator Housakos: Leo Housakos, Quebec.
[English]
The Chair: I am the chair, Raynell Andreychuk, from Saskatchewan.
Today we will begin under the authorization to examine such issues as may arise from time to time relating to foreign relations and international trade generally. Under this mandate, the committee will hear today testimonies on the present situation in Venezuela.
The committee heard witnesses back in 2016 and 2017 about the political situation and the growing economic crisis in that country. Two reports were published, one in June 2016 and one in July 2017, which generated a government response that was tabled in the Senate on March 20, 2018.
The committee mentioned it would continue to welcome opportunities to keep apprised of the developments in Venezuela, the challenges facing the Venezuelan people, and the implications for the region. Accordingly, we are meeting today.
On behalf of the committee, I am pleased to welcome Ben Rowswell, President and Research Director, Canadian International Council; by video conference, Michael Camilleri, Director, Peter D. Bell Rule of Law Program, Inter-American Dialogue; and Sébastien Dubé, Professor, Universidad del Norte - Barranquilla, Colombia.
Welcome to the committee. Your short biographies are being circulated, but we want the maximum time for presentations, questions by the senators, and answers.
Mr. Rowswell, the floor is yours.
[Translation]
Ben Rowswell, President and Research Director, Canadian International Council: Thank you very much. It is an honour to be here today. It is a historic time for Venezuela, but also for Canadian foreign policy.
[English]
In the face of a profound political crisis in Venezuela, Canada has called for the restoration of popular sovereignty in that country. In doing so, I believe our government is articulating an approach to democracy promotion that is uniquely Canadian. From my observation, this approach is based on three fundamental principles.
The first is that sovereignty rests ultimately not with governments but with citizens of each country.
The second is that the role of foreign governments like Canada is to follow local actors and not to lead them in a democratic movement.
The third is that when we choose to support local democracy movements, we do so with the countries of the region so that there’s a collective and multilateral approach.
This approach has led the Government of Canada to stand with the National Assembly, the last remaining democratically elected body representing Venezuelans, as that assembly laid out a path to putting citizens back in charge of their country. That legislature designated Juan Guaidó as interim president while elections are organized. Canada joined with most of Latin America in supporting that strategy.
Four weeks later this crisis grinds on. Canadians have begun to debate this approach. I believe that’s entirely appropriate, given the stakes for Venezuela, given the stakes for the hemisphere, and given the stakes for Canadian foreign policy.
Popular sovereignty means that the people of Venezuela should determine their own fate. How do we know what Venezuelans want? This is the contribution I would like to make to the debate this morning because I believe it is possible for us, as Canadians, to listen to the people of Venezuela and to make a judgment about what they are telling us, even if it differs radically from what their autocratic ruler wants us to believe.
I spent close to four years in Venezuela. As Canada’s ambassador, I led a team of talented professionals whose job it was to listen to Venezuelans and to make sense of what we heard.
How did we, as Canadian diplomats, assess what Venezuelan citizens were telling us? We had a variety of methods. Let me start with polls. They are not easy to run in a repressive country, but public opinion polls are still feasible in Venezuela. We followed all of them. Our observation of the polls we followed was that by 2015 support for Maduro had dropped to between 15 and 25 per cent and never rose beyond that, with opposition to Maduro consistently in the 60s, 70s and sometimes even 80s.
The most credible firm is Datanalisis. Its most recent poll in November 2018 found that 63 per cent of Venezuelans want Nicolás Maduro removed from office.
Venezuelans are also heavy users of social media. This presents another way for us to assess what most of them think. If you analyze publicly available data from Twitter and Facebook, you can see that the majority of accounts supporting the government are being directed in a coordinated campaign, while those supporting the National Assembly are dispersed and organic.
The principal method by which we listened to Venezuelans was by using the oldest tool in the diplomatic handbook. We talked to hundreds and hundreds of them. Our embassy made a determined effort to engage Venezuelans of every walk of life, of every political opinion, and of every socio-economic class.
We went out of our way to engage working-class Venezuelans, since they are the hardest group traditionally for most diplomats to engage with. We made an effort to visit every barrio or every shantytown as possible. We wanted to make sure that we understood how the poor and marginalized felt, not just the privileged.
When I first arrived in 2014, we found a country that was still polarized between Chavistas and opposition supporters now led by Maduro. Those divisions faded quickly as the economic crisis deepened. As residents of these poor neighbourhoods found it harder and harder to put food on the plate, as they found public hospitals more and more bereft of medicine, sympathy for the government fell. Those suffering this economic calamity were clear on who they blame.
It’s not difficult to understand. If Canada suffered the loss of half of its economy, if its maternal mortality doubled and tripled, if the average weight of Canadians dropped by 20 or 30 pounds, most Canadians would hold the government of Justin Trudeau to account.
We started to delve deeper and deeper into areas where Chavismo used to reign supreme in Barinas, the state where Chávez was born on 23 De Enero and where Chávez used to cast his ballots on TV at election time. In the neighbourhoods of La Vega, Valle, Coche and Antimano, the famous slums of western Caracas, it became harder and harder to find working-class Venezuelans that supported Nicolás Maduro.
When there were protests we sent embassy representatives to both the anti-government and pro-government rallies. By 2017, the anti-government protests were huge, spanning dozens of city blocks, filled with people from every age group, every profession, rich and poor. The pro-government marches were small stage-managed affairs held in downtown blocks where tall buildings prevented TV cameras from seeing empty streets just one block away.
When we interviewed Venezuelans about what motivated them to march, those supporting the National Assembly would talk of their love of country and willingness to risk tear gas to make the country better for their children.
I’ll never forget one participant in a pro-government march who told me she participated because a party official managing her government-supplied apartment intimated she would be evicted if she didn’t. It frightened her to appear in public in the red T-shirt of Chavismo, supporting a president that her fellow citizens increasingly blamed for the spike in infant mortality, but she needed to keep a roof over the heads of her own children.
As Canada’s criticisms of growing human rights abuses grew louder and more frequent, many Venezuelans began to thank us for the stand we were taking. In one visit to the foreign ministry where all of the diplomatic corps was called to hear Foreign Minister Rodriguez criticize the diplomatic corps for the international criticism that the regime was beginning to endure.
After the meeting I made my way back to the embassy car. Some of her more junior employees approached me to thank me discreetly for what Canada was saying about human rights in that country. The risks to their careers must have been immense.
By the time I left Venezuela in 2017, it was no longer a polarized country. It was increasingly united in the desire for change. This is not a country divided between two equal camps of citizens. The division lies between the vast majority of the population and a regime that population rejects.
Let us continue to debate how we can support Venezuelans. Let us debate what measures will help them to restore their popular sovereignty peacefully and constitutionally. Let us debate which other countries we should align with or not in supporting them. Let us not doubt what Venezuelans want. They are loud and they are united in their insistence for change. They support their democratically elected leaders in the National Assembly.
Stability will only return to Venezuelan once it has a government with legitimacy that is accepted by its citizens. We hasten that day, not be second-guessing Venezuelans but by standing with them.
Michael Camilleri, Director, Peter D. Bell Rule of Law Program, Inter-American Dialogue, as an individual: Thank you for the privilege of addressing this distinguished committee. It is a particular privilege in light of Canada’s leadership on the democratic and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela. The ambassador’s remarks are a testament to that leadership.
As the committee is no doubt aware, the political landscape in Venezuela has been transformed since the turn of the year. Indeed, a successful democratic transition now seems possible for the first time in recent memory. However, it is by no means a foregone conclusion.
While Venezuela’s future must ultimately be decided by Venezuelans, the international community, led by key actors such as Canada, will play an important role in shaping the future sequence of events.
National Assembly Leader and Interim President Juan Guaidó represents the most significant challenge to Nicolás Maduro since Maduro succeeded Hugo Chávez in 2013. Guaidó has united the opposition, rallied the international community behind him, and brought Venezuelans on to the streets for the first time since protests were crushed in 2017.
Nonetheless, Maduro remains entrenched in Caracas and continues to control the security forces. While Guaidó has gathered considerable strength in recent weeks, the current state of affairs in Venezuela remains tense, uncertain, and potentially volatile.
This Saturday, February 23, Guaidó and his supporters have pledged to force humanitarian assistance across the border into Venezuela, in defiance of Maduro’s shameful attempt to deny such aid to his sick and starving people.
In recent weeks, repression of anti-Maduro protests has diminished, possibly indicating a declining willingness on the part of the armed forces to employ force against innocent citizens. Nonetheless, efforts to break Maduro’s humanitarian aid blockade could provoke a potentially violent standoff with the security forces or with militias loyal to Maduro.
While developments in coming weeks will likely be fast moving and unpredictable, we should expect further escalation to occur within an ever more combustible context. The challenge for the international community is to sustain the pressure on Maduro and his cronies while avoiding impulsive actions that could be counterproductive or splinter the existing coalition for democratic change in Venezuela.
I will offer five broad recommendations that I believe should guide policy-making by governments such as Canada’s in this challenging environment.
First, keep the region united. The Lima Group in particular has proved a crucial forum for coordinating pressure on Maduro, synchronizing recognition of Guaidó, and drawing attention to the humanitarian and migration crisis in Venezuela. A strong and unified Lima Group can be the glue that binds and organizes potentially competing approaches to international engagement on the Venezuelan crisis.
Second, continue to increase the pressure on Maduro and his inner circle. The Lima Group has already called for its member states to institute visa bans and asset freezes. These actions are long overdue. Additional steps such as asset seizures that allow stolen funds to be repurposed for humanitarian and refugee assistance should also be considered and could be closely coordinated with the Guaidó government.
Third, avoid overreach. The widespread regional consensus on Venezuela took a long time to build. It could easily unravel. Maduro will not pass up an opportunity to exploit any overreach by actors inside or outside Venezuela to foment divisions in the international community or indeed within the Guaidó coalition itself.
The Government of Canada in particular can play a potentially unique role in counselling those in the U.S. government who may be tempted to escalate the conflict with Maduro in unproductive ways. Threats of unilateral military intervention by the Trump administration are a particular concern in this regard.
Fourth, keep open the paths to meaningful negotiation. Guaidó and his advisers have rightly rejected a return to negotiations with Maduro, who has used past dialogues to buy time, divide his opposition and consolidate his position.
However, most transition scenarios in Venezuela will involve negotiations of some kind with some actor, if not with Maduro himself. The International Contact Group, created by the EU, has offered one path to such negotiations conditioned on early elections and an implicit recognition of Maduro’s lack of legitimacy.
Other paths may exist or may emerge as events involve. The key is to ensure that well-meaning efforts by the international community to generate an off-ramp incorporate lessons from the past and do not inadvertently provide Maduro an opportunity to gain breathing room.
Finally, do not neglect the humanitarian consequences of the crisis. The suffering of millions of Venezuelans will only end when there is a political transition in Venezuela. In the interim, however, the rightful focus on political change should not diminish or displace the urgent support required for Venezuelans inside and outside the country. I was in Colombia last week and migration authorities there reported that the emergence of a potential new dawn for Venezuelan democracy in recent weeks has had no effect whatsoever on the flow of Venezuelans across the border, some 50,000 per day. It is a reminder that conditions in Venezuela remain critical and will only grow more desperate as U.S. oil sanctions begin to bite.
Even if democracy is restored tomorrow, the task of rebuilding Venezuela will be long and arduous. Supporting Venezuela’s neighbours as they absorb millions of refugees into their communities will remain crucial and Canada’s continued leadership by example will be sorely needed.
The Chair: Now we’ll turn to Sébastien Dubé. Welcome to the committee.
[Translation]
Sébastien Dubé, Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Universidad del Norte - Barranquilla, Colombia, as an individual: Thank you very much for inviting me. My presentation will be in three parts. I will summarize the situation as it stands one month after Guaido was proclaimed president, then identify a few short-term outlooks, and close with a few concerns about Canadian foreign policy.
It has been one month since Guaido was proclaimed president and I would say that the opposition has not made a very big impact. First, there was no domino effect or any high-profile political resignations within the regime. A few diplomats and military officials outside the country stepped down, but nothing more.
Second, there has been no real sign of weakness or intention to negotiate from Maduro, who outright rejected and mocked international calls to hold free and transparent elections —
[English]
The Chair: Professor Dubé, I am sorry to say the sound is intermittent and the translators cannot accommodate us.
I think we will have to discontinue your presentation until we can solve this problem. We have two options. We can either invite you back at some point or, if you’re patient, you can wait to see if we can resolve the problem.
Thank you for your patience. Will you stay on to see if they can correct it?
Mr. Dubé: Yes.
The Chair: Thank you. We’ll go to questions.
[Translation]
Senator Massicotte: Thank you all for being here this morning. As citizens of the world, we are deeply affected by this situation that is causing a great deal of suffering. It is a very, very serious problem.
My question is: what is being done about it at this point, Mr. Rowswell? Mr. Dubé thinks our intervention did not have a major impact, which could undo our efforts. How far should we go as a country, as Canadians, to try to help the people in a more tangible way, especially if Maduro is resisting any voluntary participation? What are your thoughts on the United States, on President Trump, who gave a speech two or three days ago in which he said that he might potentially manage the situation that could result in military action? Where do we draw the line between exceeding our authority as a country and respecting that country’s sovereignty?
Mr. Rowswell: Thank you very much for your question. I believe that Mr. Camilleri set a very interesting agenda with his five points. I want to build on some of those points and add a few others.
The most urgent thing to do is address the lack of food and drugs and relieve the humanitarian needs of the population. That is the priority for this weekend with the action being carried out by the National Assembly. I believe that Canada has already made a significant contribution of $53 million, and coordinating delivery of this aid is extremely urgent.
We may start establishing a longer-term international plan to address the economic needs of a country that has experienced tremendous loss over the past few years. This could also motivate leaders around Maduro by showing them there truly is serious aid being offered, not just short-term humanitarian aid, but also a longer-term plan with billions of dollars being provided to Venezuela to help rebuild that country.
It is also important to maintain unity in the diplomatic approach to this crisis. The Lima Group has established a position with other countries that represent the vast majority of the population of Latin America and other efforts, such as those of the International Contact Group, are welcome, but only if the population follows regional leadership and they manage to get support from the people of Venezuela.
There is not much point in having negotiations if the vast majority of the people in the streets of Venezuela does not accept the results of those negotiations. It is important that these negotiations win public support, and the public has been very clear about its conditions.
The threat of military intervention goes against a democratic transition. I believe that Canada did well to rule out that possibility and the Lima Group did well to renounce it in the statement it made in Ottawa on November 4. The threat of military intervention not only would be a violent option resulting in the loss of lives, but it would also likely produce a government that lacks legitimacy in the country. Government transitions involving military intervention do not have a very good track record around the world.
However, there is another short-term reason these threats of military intervention are bad. The only way there will be a transition of power is if the other leaders around Maduro are divided, but they will unite in response to the possibility of humanitarian intervention.
President Trump’s statements might be helping to keep Nicolas Maduro in power. It is important that we continue to rule out and even denounce that option and to take it off the negotiating table.
[English]
Senator Massicotte: Mr. Camilleri, if you look at what is happening, there is a significant amount of food and aid basically being delivered to Venezuelans, but it’s stuck at the border because Maduro doesn’t want to accept any form of aid or help.
What do we do next? What is the next step? How can we get there?
Mr. Camilleri: I would associate myself with all of Mr. Rowswell’s comments.
First, Venezuelans have to take the lead. It can’t be stated enough that the Venezuelans themselves need to be the owners of their own future and that we need to be following their lead.
The Guaidó forces have assembled a plan for this Saturday to try to force aid into the country. Their calculation is that essentially they will win, no matter what happens. If they manage to bring aid into the country, they will help to feed and provide medicine to needy Venezuelans and convey the reality of their ability to serve the Venezuelan people. If Maduro is successful in blocking the aid, the reality of his cruelty and insensitivity to the plight of his own people will be even clearer. Of course, the risk of escalation of provocation is there as well.
At this point, the role of the international community is to continue supporting the efforts of the Guaidó government, to counsel where needed, and to largely stand behind and continue to provide support, legitimacy and resources for the only democratically legitimate organ in Venezuela, which is the National Assembly.
The Chair: Mr. Camelleri, just for clarification, the aid is stuck at the border. I guess that’s the phrase I would use.
We heard from witnesses before that there were attempts. There was some discussion with Mexico. They were bringing in some medical aid. I am not sure if there was food. There may have been. What happened was that it had to be directed through the army. The reports I read subsequently was that the medical aid was dispersed among the military and was not given to the populous.
Is there any room for the aid to come in? Is the impediment that the Maduro government wishes to have conduct of that aid, or are they simply saying no, knowing that the other side will not give it to them in that form?
Mr. Camilleri: I am not familiar with the specific incident you are referring to, but certainly there has been a policy on the part of the Maduro regime of politicizing in a very insidious way the distribution of humanitarian aid, food and medicine.
The clearest example of this is the so-called CLAPs, the monthly food rations that millions of Venezuelans receive. As a condition of receiving these rations, they are registered in a system with a card called the Carnet de la Patria, which is used to measure their loyalty to the regime. The ambassador mentioned people going to protests, for example, for fear of losing these benefits.
It would not be at all out of character or out of the general thrust of the Maduro government’s policy to be employing humanitarian assistance in a way that strengthens its own political control. The military has been the conduit for the distribution of such assistance, at least in the case of the collapse.
There has been an ideological opposition, dating back to Chávez and now with Maduro, to accepting the need for humanitarian assistance. It is seen as somehow a Trojan horse for foreign intervention in the country. That is one obstacle. Certainly the additional fact that forces opposed to Maduro would be in charge of the distribution of this assistance presents an additional obstacle in terms of Maduro being willing to accept such a challenge to his control.
Senator Coyle: I really appreciated your impassioned presentation, Mr. Rowswell. I know this situation must be very painful for you to watch, but I can feel some hope.
My first question is to either one of you. Perhaps you know Canada’s plans for aid beyond this immediate moment, both in terms of the large refugee population outside of Venezuela and then, hopefully once this blockade is broken, in terms of a solid plan for humanitarian aid, reconstruction and development.
I well imagine, Mr. Camelleri, that they are not just afraid of a Trojan horse. To its poor neighbours, reputationally Venezuela, has been a wealthy benefactor in terms of what they have done with the PetroCaribe supports.
My first question is about aid. I will ask the next two in sequence, to give you a chance.
Everybody is worried about loss of life, and violence. Everybody wants a peaceful transition of power, if that can happen. We already know that even though there is some shooting in the streets, it isn’t only shooting-in-the-streets violence. Starving people is violent, as is people having to leave their homes and people not having access to a livelihood or health care. Poverty is a form of violence.
I am sure there is talk about the lesser of all these evils and how long we perpetuate a situation that is causing so much suffering. I am curious where the conversation is on those points.
How far do you go? How long do you tolerate these kinds of suffering? How are we trying to work with the folks to ensure a peaceful transition and obviously some kind of an escape valve for Maduro?
I know there are probably diplomatic things that you cannot say about a back-door escape valve for Maduro out of the country to somewhere else so that this can happen. I would like to hear about that.
Finally, this is not just about Venezuela. Mr. Rowswell, you mentioned our Canadian approach. I know our chair knows that I have a question about where sovereignty rests with the citizens as opposed to the government. I am a supporter of following the lead of citizens and doing it in concert with the priorities of those in the region.
However, in the case of Venezuela, you have somebody elected to the National Assembly. You have a potential and a legitimate other leader, a popular leader of the people who is getting support. You have done your polls, et cetera.
In other places in the region such as Haiti you see popular uprisings. Some are actually linked, but not exclusively, to the money that came from Venezuela to that country where we don’t necessarily have a clear, legitimate other leader in place.
What is the approach? I see this applying very nicely actually to the Venezuelan situation. How do we carry this out into other environments? I am not asking you to speak specifically to Haiti.
The Chair: You have asked a lot of very valid questions, senator, and we have two responders.
Senator Coyle: They both don’t have to respond to all the questions.
The Chair: Mr. Rowswell, I will turn to you to answer first the very valid scenario that Senator Coyle has presented, and then I will turn to you, Mr. Camelleri.
We always encourage reflections. If you can give them to us in writing, we would very much appreciate it.
Mr. Rowswell: Let me address those in reverse order, if I may.
On the applicability of what I am describing as the Canadian approach to supporting popular sovereignty, I believe it is applicable to other countries in the region and internationally. In saying that we believe in popular sovereignty, we believe the country should be sovereign. That rules out military intervention, which is a violation of popular sovereignty.
Within that, it’s not the citizens against the government. It’s that the government is accountable to the citizens.
A few things that make the Venezuelan situation quite unique in the clarity of the situation with the majority of the citizens clearly rejecting the authority of the government.
There has been a departure from the constitutional order, a coup d’état, essentially, from the summer of 2017 when Nicolás Maduro imposed a body that was on top of all the rest of the democratically elected bodies of the constitution. A plebiscite was organized that year when seven million citizens came to polling stations run by the National Assembly to explicitly reject that. In a population of 35 million, that was an absolutely massive demonstration of support. There is that unity among the population.
With those three factors in place, it is possible to say that there is clear leadership from the people of Venezuela, through their elected representatives, that we can clearly follow.
I don’t know very much about Haiti, but I think we should place emphasis on the legitimacy of democratically elected actors and on the clarity and constitutionality of the action they propose.
The principal source of violence in Venezuela is criminal. Caracas is either the first, second or third most dangerous city in the world, depending on which year and how you measure it, with a murder rate that is something like 40 or 50 times what it is in most major Canadian cities.
There is some political violence. It’s kind of striking that there isn’t more political violence, given the high levels of criminal violence and number of guns in that society.
In the period that I was there, there was violence during protests. We tried to ascertain the source of the violence as much as possible. In general, we found that somewhere between 60 and 70 per cent of the deaths during those protests were caused by excessive use of force by security forces against participants in the marches.
In a small number of cases, protesters responded violently to tear-gas attacks or other attacks. Neither side was completely free of blame, but the vast majority of the violence was being committed by those who had the mandate to prevent violence from happening in the first place.
There are certain things the security forces could do to prevent that from happening in the future. Their rules of engagement are far below international standards for when a soldier is allowed to open fire on a protester. There are quite well-established international regulations, and the Venezuelan armed forces do not follow those rules of engagement.
I believe there should be mechanisms between the security force and the National Assembly to try to build confidence and establish in advance what protocols might exist if there is an outbreak of violence. That would be a useful topic for negotiations.
Finally, I am not an economist. I remember hearing at the time I was in Venezuela that a reconstruction aid package would probably be in excess of $30 billion. Putting that size of an aid package together would require pretty extensive negotiations.
One principal obstacle up until now is that the Maduro government rejects the legitimacy of the international institutions that tend to organize those kinds of aid packages, favouring instead bilateral deals with Russia and China which actually impose far harsher conditions on loans. Yet it has prevented a starting point in the negotiation of how you organize a $30 billion aid package.
Mr. Camilleri: On the issue of an escape valve, the National Assembly has passed or is in the process of passing an amnesty law. Juan Guaidó has sent both public and private messages to members of the military.
There is a very clear sense on the part of the interim government that they need to be extending a hand and making clear that theirs will not be a government of transition bent on vengeance. Rather, it will be one that sees a role for the Venezuelan armed forces, especially to the extent that they break with Maduro and cooperate in the restoration of constitutional order in the country.
I have just come from a meeting with Carlos Vecchio, who is Guaidó’s appointed ambassador to the United States. He was also quite articulate in stating that Chavistas, the Chavista political movement represented in the National Assembly as a minority force, will have a role to play in the political transition through the National Assembly, the only legitimate democratic organ in the country.
They are saying the right things. They have a pluralistic vision of Venezuela’s political future. This bodes well in terms of providing some of the escape valves and off-ramps for a dissident military and Chavistas who are willing to break with Maduro for the good of their country.
Senator Boehm: Ben Rowswell, I have known you a long time. Your service in Venezuela is a great credit to your country. I wanted to put that on the record.
I have three quick points. Let us look at a post or a transition scenario. Guaidó is the interim president. He is charged under the constitution with ensuring that elections take place.
Is there a role for a regional organization such as the OAS? The OAS has been debating Venezuela for many years. Certainly when I was there two decades ago it was a big theme. Is there a role or has the OAS marginalized itself because of internal divisions, whether it’s the Caribbean states that rely on the PetroCaribe program or others? That’s one point.
The second point is the other pro-Maduro actors. I am thinking particularly of Cuba and Russia. Will they have a role to play in a transition-type scenario, or will they resist to the bitter end, as it is often said?
My third point is perhaps more for you, Mr. Camelleri. I admire the work of the Inter-American Dialogue. There has been an exodus of Venezuelans for decades now. The richer Venezuelans left. Most of them went to the United States. They are in Miami and other large cities.
Are they a significant group in sort of a transition scenario or are they exerting pressure, shall we say, the way the Cuban community has in Miami over the decades?
Mr. Rowswell: In my opinion the role of the OAS is inescapable because of the various regional groupings of countries in Latin America. There is only one that has the depth of technical expertise.
When you’re engaging in a democratic transition in reconstruction programs in international observation missions, there is expertise in the UN and there is expertise in the U.S.
There is no expertise in UNASUR or even the Lima Group, which is a coordinating mechanism between foreign ministries. Once there is a clear path forward and once there is a degree of regional consensus beyond the Lima Group, the OAS will have to be the actor that will actually implement division.
Given the divisions that you mentioned, it does not seem able to generate the common vision. Once that vision is accomplished elsewhere, they should be the ones that execute and implement.
I am not a Cuba expert by any means. From exposure to many, many debates about the role Cuba played in Venezuela, it appears that the two governments see themselves as a survival mechanism. The survival of one is directly linked to the survival of the others.
It seems it might be useful for other countries in the region and for Canada if we could convince the United States to provide reassurances to the Cuban government that what is happening in Venezuela won’t happen in Cuba.
When applied to Cuba, the three-point approach I laid out would not lead Canada down any kind approach to trying to seek political change in Cuba because of the absence of a wide mass movement of Cuban citizens calling for political change. If we’re to follow the Cubans, we wouldn’t be pursuing any kind of political change.
Any reassurances that could be provided to the Cubans might help them in listening to the voices of Venezuelans instead of backing Nicolás Maduro.
Mr. Camilleri: On the diaspora question, the role of the Venezuelan diaspora in any transition and reconstruction of the country’s institutions is critical. You allude to the wealth of talent. Many of the best oil professionals left the country fairly early on after Chávez came to power. Many politicians are exiled. A group led by Ricardo Hausmann at Harvard has been working very hard on an economic and institutional transition plan.
All that intellectual and professional capacity will be critical to Venezuela’s transition. It is to be hoped that many members of the diaspora who have things to offer the country will return in short order.
The risk you mentioned is real. We know well the particular dynamics of diaspora politics in Florida from the Cuban experience. They are to some degree repeating themselves in the case of the Venezuelan diaspora. To some degree the Trump administration is feeding that.
Obviously the risk is that politicization or the imposition of party politics in a diaspora dynamic could lead to a tendency to look forevermore for escalator and provocative actions or positions to appeal to the most radical elements of the diaspora.
That risk is there. The Guaidó coalition is aware of that risk and is actually taking smart steps to try to maintain a bipartisan approach in the United States to the Venezuelan issue. In some ways it is kind of pushing back on the domestic politicization of the Venezuelan issue.
I am hopeful we can avert the sort of thing we have seen in the case of Cuba, but the risk that you mention is certainly a real one.
The Chair: I am going to recognize three more senators to put their questions. I am going to ask our witnesses to respond as succinctly as they can provide us with some further written responses.
As you can see, this is a very complex situation. The interest in this committee has always been to do something positive if we can for the people of Venezuela. Of course we have to touch the politics within that. All these issues are extremely important, and anything you can do to give us more information would be helpful.
I would really like all of the senators to have an opportunity to put their questions. Respond now with whatever you think is the most important that we hear and respond later in a written form if you can.
Senator Dean: Thanks to you both for hugely insightful presentations. Thank you, Mr. Camilleri, for sharing your five thoughtful recommendations with us.
My question is for Mr. Rowswell. I want to look back. We have spent a lot of time looking forward. Are there notable precedents for the approach Canada is taking here?
I am comfortable with it. Have we done it before in this fashion? If so, where? Is there anything unusual about Canada’s approach in this case?
You noted the recourse to the notion of popular sovereignty. As the country does this, to what extent are we resting on the argument that we’re supporting a regionally led initiative?
The bottom line: Is there anything unusual about Canada’s approach to this Venezuelan situation right now? Are we resting at all on anything we’ve done in the past in similar situations?
[Translation]
Senator Saint-Germain: I have a question. You both emphasized the importance of the multilateral aspect of the whole Lima Group. No reference was made to the fact that Mexico and Uruguay both opted for neutrality and decided to maintain contact with both parties. Mexico, among others, did not break its diplomatic ties. Considering Mexico’s relations with and influence on the United States and this neutrality that has been maintained by both countries, will they have an important role to play in ending this crisis?
[English]
Senator Housakos: What are the chances or the probabilities of Venezuela falling into a civil war? We see Maduro has a clear grasp for the time being on the military.
For us, from a distance it’s pretty hard to gauge what support he has from the public, but he seems to have some when we listen to the news outlets.
Is that polarization serious enough where there might even be a remote chance of the country falling into a civil war?
Mr. Rowswell: I believe there’s very little chance of a civil war. A civil war requires two armed groups. All of the arms are on one side of this conflict.
The National Assembly has been admirably consistent in advocating for peaceful approaches. There is no call to arms. There is no attempt to build a militia. There are no fissures within the armed forces. Spectres of a civil war are greatly overblown. I believe they’re actually used by the Maduro government as a way to change the political dynamic. I believe we can rest assured that it is unlikely.
There is some chance of political violence, but nothing on the scale that could be called a civil war. The violence we need to worry about is the deaths of tens of thousands of Venezuelans and the economic situation that has been imposed on them.
To Senator Saint-Germain’s question on the Mexican role, Mexico is an incredibly influential country in the region and a close partner of Canada. We should always welcome their role. They will be an essential part of any resolution of a crisis of this magnitude in our shared hemisphere. We should respect their position and pay close attention to it.
I don’t believe neutrality is an accurate way of describing a situation when a vast majority of a population is demanding political change. It’s not a question of two different political factions. It’s whether we are listening.
[Translation]
Here we are listening to the public. I believe that Canada is, but I question whether Mexico is truly listening to the people of Venezuela. I’m not criticizing them, but they have a different approach to foreign affairs and I think that they can play an important role in convincing the Maduro regime to listen to its own people. I’m not sure the term “neutrality” is being used to define this position.
[English]
Finally, on the issue of whether there is anything unusual about Canadian policy, this is a highly unusual situation. It’s extremely rare that a country has lost 50 per cent of its economy in the course of five years. It’s extremely rare that you have tens of thousands of people losing their lives due to policies imposed by a government. It’s a man-made economic emergency. It’s extremely rare to have such a massive set coming together to reject the authority of a population.
To the extent that the Canadian response might be unusual or the response of the Lima Group in Latin America might be unusual, it’s in response to an unusual situation.
It’s very much in the traditions of Canadian foreign policy, all the way back to Pearson, an ardent defender of democracy; to the role we played in drafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and some of the democratic principles that at the heart of it; to the regional diplomacy we have played in the transition to democracy in Chile; and to the transition to democracy Peru in 2000.
The policy approach to Venezuela fits within that tradition. It was recognized as such by my Latin American counterparts. The Peruvian ambassador to Venezuela would often tell me that Canada had played a positive role in their transition to democracy after the dictatorship of Alberto Fujimori. Perhaps it is time for Canada to play the same role in Venezuela as we had played with diplomats such as Senator Boehm in 2000. I believe there is a tremendous amount of continuity in what the Trudeau government is attempting to do in Venezuela.
Mr. Camilleri: I will associate myself with all of Mr. Rowswell’s comments.
On the civil war question, I agree it is very unlikely. The opposition is not armed. The Guaidó National Assembly coalition is not armed. The only scenario which a civil war might be possible would seem to be a split in the armed forces. There’s nothing to indicate that the Venezuelan military has any desire to fight against itself.
The presence of well-armed government aligned or Maduro aligned militias and Colombian guerillas, particularly from the ALN, add some volatility to the security environment, but here is little to think that a civil war scenario is likely.
On the question of Mexico, clearly Mexico’s withdrawal from the Lima Group was unfortunate. It was a blow. Mexico has a significant weight in the region.
Mexico is finding out that neutrality in this context is equivalent to complicity. There is no comfortable neutral ground on the issue of Venezuela’s human rights violations. I expect Mexico may take a slightly more forceful position even if they don’t come as far as rejoining the Lima Group or recognizing Juan Guaidó as interim president.
Could they play a role going forward? I think they probably could. Mexico has the diplomatic heft and the wherewithal to play a potential conflict resolution role in the right circumstances. I do not think the so-called Montevideo mechanism is the right channel or venue for that.
As the EU with its contact group has clearly established, there have to be certain premises and certain conditions established for any negotiation to take place. They need to include a pathway to early elections. Maduro cannot be part of the transition.
The way the Montevideo mechanism has set up the off-ramp, so to speak, is fundamentally flawed. Mexico will need to shift its approach if it is to play a productive role going forward.
The Chair: We have covered an awful lot of ground. I would have wanted to pursue the term “popular sovereignty.” Originally it talked about constitutional validity and that what happened in the National Assembly was valid according to law within its own nation and according to international standards.
You might want to reflect on that debate and provide some comments to us, if you wish.
I thank all the senators. Clearly everyone has added different perspectives to the debate. We have heard a lot. The single most important message is that it is our hemisphere. It affects us, but fundamentally it has affected the people of Venezuela in a very dramatic way particularly in the last five years.
Many years ago Ethiopia was in a similar situation where they fell from a high point of productivity, health care, et cetera, to a very low point, from which they are still trying to recover.
It is the first time that we’re seized so graphically with something in our hemisphere. I am pleased that as the Senate and the Foreign Affairs Committee particularly we were able to shed some light on it and transfer it for the public in Canada to understand more deeply the crisis that is evolving there.
Please, to both of our presenters, any further comments, suggestions or recommendations would be welcomed.
As I indicated we started to follow Venezuela, I must say to the credit of this committee, much earlier than when it was on Parliament Hill. I am confident that it will continue to be one of our main issues as we go forward.
Thank you for enriching us with your experiences and your opinions.
This is our second panel. We had three witnesses in our first panel but fortunately, the video did not work with one. However, we intend to continue.
We have by video conference two members who have come forward to assist us in our study. Gabriel Hetland, Assistant Professor of Latin American, Caribbean and Latino Studies and Sociology, University at Albany, and Donald Kingsbury, Lecturer, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto.
I apologize that we are running behind. If we could have your opening statements, there is no doubt that the senators will have questions for you.
We’re pleased to hear from you, and we’re pleased that you were able to accept. The floor is yours, Mr. Hetland.
Gabriel Hetland, Assistant professor of Latin American, Caribbean and Latino Studies and Sociology, University at Albany, as an individual: As I am sure you know, the present situation in Venezuela is extremely tense and dangerous. I will highlight three facets of the situation: the acute social crisis, the intense political conflict and the international dimension.
Since 2015, Venezuela has been in a profound social crisis. The key features of the crisis, with which you may be familiar, are a 50 per cent contraction of economy; escalating rates of poverty and malnutrition; shortages of food, medicine and basic goods; severe hyperinflation; and a major migratory crisis, with the UN estimating that three million Venezuelans have left in recent years.
Government policies have played a primary role in creating this crisis in two main ways. First, the government has badly mismanaged its currency policy for a number of years, which has exacerbated shortages, inflation and corruption in the public and private sectors. Second, the government has failed to reduce Venezuela’s extreme dependence on oil.
However, the government does not bear sole responsibility for the social crisis. Unfortunately there have been violent episodes of protests by the hard-line opposition, leading to dozens of deaths in 2014 and 2017 and significant damage to public institutions. This also plays a role. Pointing this out doesn’t excuse the government oppression, which also occurred and led to dozens of deaths in both of those waves of violence.
Finally, another cause of the crisis right now is sanctions by the United States government that have exacerbated the crisis. That’s not my opinion but that of the United States Congressional Research Service that stated in its November 2018 report that although stronger economic sanctions could influence the Venezuelan government behaviour, they could also have negative effects and unintended consequences. It went on to state:
Analysts are concerned that stronger sanctions could exacerbate Venezuela’s difficult humanitarian situation, . . .
The Chair: I am sorry I have to interrupt you. I think you’ve moved in some way where the sound now is breaking up. I don’t know where your microphone is. You were doing very well and we can hear you; but when you turn to your paper it is moving in and out and we can’t hear you or get the translation. I apologize for that.
Whatever you were doing at the start was perfect.
Mr. Hetland: Just to summarize, in November 2018, the Congressional Research Service stated:
Analysts are concerned that stronger sanctions could exacerbate Venezuela’s difficult humanitarian situation, which has been marked by shortages of food and medicine, increased poverty, and mass migration. Many Venezuelan civil society groups oppose sanctions that could worsen humanitarian conditions.
A lot of those analysts are actually opposed to the Maduro government.
Of particular concern are recent oil sanctions by the U.S. government. Francisco Rodríguez, a leading Venezuelan economist and a deep critic of the Maduro administration, stated that they could lead to a “famine” in Venezuela. That summarizes more or less the economic and social crisis.
The second feature of Venezuela’s current situation is the intense political conflict, of which I am sure you’re all aware. It pits Nicolás Maduro and his government on one side and the opposition, led by National Assembly President Juan Guaidó who on January 23 of this year declared himself to be Venezuela’s interim president, on the other.
It’s important to recognize that Maduro and Guaidó both enjoy significant support inside and outside of Venezuela in terms of the numbers and, more importantly for Maduro, in terms of the sectors supporting them. Many Venezuelans undoubtedly support Guaidó. The governments of the U.S., Canada and many European and Latin American states have recognized Guaidó as Venezuela’s legitimate president.
Maduro, however, also continues to enjoy support, very importantly from Venezuela’s military and from a not insignificant number of Venezuelans, especially those in the so-called popular sectors of the working class and the poor. This support is greatly reduced from years ago in response to popular concerns about government mismanagement and the government’s authoritarian turn, but the popular support for Maduro remains a factor in Venezuela. Additionally, Maduro is still recognized as Venezuela’s president by a majority of countries throughout the world.
That brings me to the final issue I will discuss, which is the international dimension. The U.S. is openly pressing for a regime change in Venezuela, with President Donald Trump and top U.S. officials repeatedly saying that all options are on the table by which they mean, to specify, a military option. Given Venezuela’s situation, this talk is dangerous and counterproductive for several reasons.
First, if the U.S. were to invade Venezuela, it is unlikely the conflict would be swift, given the support Maduro has within the military and among significant sectors of the population. It is not a huge sector, but they are significant sectors, including popular movements which in some cases are armed. They have rallied around Maduro and would likely further rally around Maduro even more in the event of a U.S. invasion.
Second, violent conflict would undoubtedly bring more suffering to the Venezuelan people and to Latin America as a whole.
Third, if a new government took hold in Venezuela following a violent conflict, we have to consider two risks. The first is that the government would be considered an illegitimate outside imposition by certain sectors of the population. The second risk is that the new government might take repressive actions against grassroots Chavistas that have unfortunately been demonized to an alarming extent.
Another element of the international situation is the debate over humanitarian aid. The U.S. is currently leading efforts to bring such aid to Venezuela, and the country could undoubtedly use it. As I said, the social crisis is severe. However, U.S. actions have been seen as counterproductive by important factors, including the Red Cross and other international agencies that have correctly pointed out that aid is profoundly politicized. The U.S. has basically openly declared that the aid is a tool for political change, which means that its primary purpose is not to serve the Venezuelan people who very much need it, but to try to get rid of Maduro. That factor is very difficult.
In closing, fortunately there are positive paths toward a peaceful transition in Venezuela. Most important are efforts of countries such as Mexico, and particularly Uruguay, through initiatives such as the International Crisis Group. This is an initiative designed to pressure Maduro to accept very tough negotiations which in their view would lead to free and fair elections.
Polls indicate that a majority of Venezuelans want Maduro to leave office, but the same polls indicate that they want this to occur through a peaceful process involving negotiations between the government and the opposition, and not through foreign military intervention. Venezuelans have been clear about that.
I end by emphasizing that there is a very real risk of catastrophic civil war in Venezuela today. However, this outcome is not inevitable. It depends to a significant extent on the type of action taken by international actors, including the Canadian government which has a clear history of supporting peaceful efforts to negotiate difficult solutions. That would be a very productive role for the Canadian government to take in this difficult situation. Thank you very much.
The Chair: Mr. Kingsbury, the floor is yours.
Donald Kingsbury, Lecturer, University of Toronto, as an individual: I thank the members of the standing committee for the invitation to speak today. I was asked to discuss the crisis from an “academic perspective.” My comments will be thematizing a lot of what was already covered by Mr. Hetland. I would like to start by echoing that I agree with everything he has said. His assessment of the situation strikes me as right on.
I base that judgment on the work I’ve been doing in Venezuela since 2007. I’ve been living, working and studying in Venezuela. My work has primarily focused on the practice of direct participatory democracy and the challenges that movements oriented around social justice face in Latin America today. My research finds that these challenges come from what we might call traditional obstacles like traditional entrenched elites, an unequal global and local economic system and racially and gender discriminatory social codes. They also come from ostensibly or so-called allied progressive governments as well.
I also emphasize that this research and my thematization of the situation in Venezuela today are as a result of research with both pro-government people I would describe as allied to but not beholden to the government, as well as opposition sectors in Venezuela.
In many ways the present crisis is an escalation of established local and geopolitical dynamics concerning Venezuela. The political opposition, by which I mean political party and economic elites, has used for a long time whatever parliamentary or extra-parliamentary tools were available to them to overthrow or destabilize the governments of Hugo Chávez and now Nicolás Maduro.
From around 2005-06 to 2013, reformist and moderate voices within the opposition led a highly divided opposition. Hard-liners are now determining strategy. It’s with these hard-liners, I should add, that Canada has aligned itself over the past five years especially.
These tactics have included violent street protests known as las guarimbas. They are explicitly modelled to elicit a violent response or crackdown from government. The opposition has also maintained an international campaign of appeals to friendly governments such as those in Ottawa and the United States and a growing number of conservative administrations throughout Latin America to isolate and sanction regime officials and state assets, particularly those associated with the oil industry. These sanctions could and indeed are already having disastrous consequences for average Venezuelans regardless of political affiliation.
The opposition has finally utilized, at times opportunistically, whatever constitutional or institutional venue is available to them to undermine the government, including the National Assembly in which they won a majority in 2015.
The government, particularly after the death of Hugo Chávez in 2013, has increasingly relied on the military for support while deepening its dependency on extractive industry for revenues. Maduro has also increasingly used non-democratic, violently repressive and manipulative measures to maintain his control over state power. These manœuvres have deepened the corruption endemic in the Venezuelan petro-state for decades, long before the election of Chávez in 1999.
These tendencies have also occurred at the expense of the social movements of the poor and the marginalized that once animated what is referred to as the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela. We have seen a closing of the state in response to the crises that have unfolded, especially over the past five years.
We have also seen an intensification of social crises of recent memory. It’s estimated that upward of 10 per cent of the population has fled economic and social instability, triggering throughout the region rather ugly xenophobic and racist backlashes against Venezuelan refugees. As opposed to previous departures, however, this wave of economic refugees is much poorer and working class in nature.
Similarly, the political divisions between the opposition and Chavismo supporters of the government within Venezuela continue by and large to follow racial and class lines. The rich and the white support the opposition, more or less, while the poor and the non-white portions of the populations are more likely to be Chavistas.
Shortages in basic goods and services and frustrations with the government have seen anti-Maduro protests emerge even in traditional Chavista strongholds. I hasten to add that these protests have by and large not as yet translated into blanket support for the opposition or for the self-declared presidency of Juan Guaidó, adding to an already complicated picture.
Finally, the present resembles the past in that a majority of Venezuelans identify neither with chavismo nor with the opposition. As Mr. Hetland noted, a majority wants Maduro out but that does not always or even often translate into unconditional support for the opposition before or after Guaidó’s announcement that he was assuming the presidency on January 23.
It is, however, the geopolitical escalation of the present that is most striking and most concerning, particularly for states like Canada. The United States and the coalition that Canada has been key in coordinating through its work with the Lima Group have much more overtly calling for and executing regime change than they have in previous moments.
The orchestrated and instant recognition of Guaidó as interim president and the seizure of state assets aims to limit Maduro’s room to manœuvre and to encourage officials in the military to defect to the opposition. These moves are also part of a larger effort by the United States to curtail the influence of Russia and China in the region. These influences have been enhanced by Venezuela’s attempts to build what it describes as a “multipolar world system” and by the commodities boom of the early 2000s.
While the efforts to contain Russian and Chinese influence go back decades, the Trump administration, an ally in the United States, and allied governments in Latin America make an already complicated situation even more unstable.
As a result, the present crisis brings with it the very real threat expressed explicitly by key Trump administration officials in the United States of overt military intervention. Given the history of U.S. led interventions, both in Latin America and throughout the world, as well as the underlying social dynamics in Venezuela, the result of any such action would all but certainly be civil war. Such as a scenario will be disastrous for the people of Venezuela and for the region as a whole.
Despite the many significant flaws with the Maduro regime, any calls for a military solution to the present impasse, as well as any and all escalating steps in that direction, should be vigorously opposed.
Senator Boehm: Your very interesting presentations have stimulated a number of questions. I was struck, Dr. Kingsbury, by your comments regarding participatory democracy versus representative democracy. This debate has been ongoing for some time certainly in the OAS, as you well know. It was also what prevented Hugo Chávez from signing on to the communique at the Quebec City summit in April 2001. Subsequently, on 9/11 in Lima, there was the adoption of the Inter-American Democratic Charter.
The participatory democracy that was shown as a different model to our own, can one say that it has failed? Is it is still active in terms of the identified middle that is neither pro-Maduro necessarily nor pro-Guaidó and the opposition?
The other question is on whether President Maduro really wants to have room to manœuvre. You mentioned that his room to manœuvre might be curtailed. Does he really want room to manœuvre? My view is that he wants to stay in power and damn the torpedoes, as it were. I would be interested in your comments.
Mr. Kingsbury: Thank you for your very interesting questions. My interpretation is that the experiments in direct democracy that drew many observers to Venezuela in the early 2000s have been overshadowed by larger geopolitical concerns. There is something of a crisis or a rallying of the troops that happens every time Trump, Obama or Bush made statements about Venezuelan politics. They sound the alarms and force people to put aside the very difficult and often contentious and complicated slow work of direct democracy in favour of mass rallies in support of the president against what have been very real attacks on Venezuelan sovereignty.
There is a way in which direct democracy has been overshadowed, curtailed and pushed to the side. I wouldn’t say it has failed. Although it’s something that inevitably exists when humans interact, it’s just the realized level of institutionalization that shifts.
Whether Maduro wants room for manœuvre, he is really living day by day, given the challenges he is facing. He knows full well that he needs the support of the military to maintain power. That’s why he is ceded increasingly large swaths of his authority and the authority of his ministers to figures in the military. He would certainly prefer to have more options on the table than he is currently allowed. I think he wants more room for manœuvre.
Mr. Hetland raised the sanctions regime. Not only does it harm and bring the potential of famine to Venezuela. It gives Maduro and his inner circle less reason to negotiate. I am talking particularly about the targeted sanctions and the promise or threat of legal human rights trials after a transition.
It also gives administration or regime supporters very little reason to negotiate. It gives them little incentive to believe that they will see a post-Maduro outcome that doesn’t look like jail or that doesn’t look like something worse. Rationally Maduro wants more room for manœuvre, but the international community should want there to be more room for manœuvre to find a peaceful resolution to the crisis.
The Chair: Could I pick up on that? Perhaps Mr. Hetland will want to add to the army staying loyal.
I am sure Senator Boehm has thought about some of the previous situations in different continents. The army sometimes stays loyal for fear of the consequences of what might happen. They don’t switch or even take into account the others. It’s self-preservation.
There are now calls for moving President Maduro to investigation in the International Criminal Court or maybe other avenues even within the OAS human rights factors. The army tends to support until it believes it is the losing side.
Is some of that going on here, or is it really the army being the army professionally? We heard in the previous panel that they are well schooled and well trained. I would like to follow up on that.
Could you provide a little more elaboration? Certainly when Chávez came in, Canada and those engaged at the time saw elites fighting it out. Chávez was new input, with the support of Cuba? Those elites controlled a lot of the property and other assets in Venezuela. Has that dynamic changed now? Have the elites left the country? Is it now more chaotic?
You could go into Venezuela and you could see who owned what. There were traditional families with traditional blocks of land. Is that breaking down? Has that broken down? Is that part of the equation among the Chavistas, the poverty and the elitists?
Mr. Hetland: I will start with the military question. It’s undoubtedly the case that the military has reasons other than just professionalism for supporting Maduro right now. For one thing, the military was sort of ideologically trained to support Chavismo for a number of years. That wasn’t pure manipulation. There was a project that many people believed in. Chávez obviously came from the military. There was a nationalist bent to it.
Through 2012, the Chavista experiment was successful in reducing poverty and inequality. That didn’t negate problems or contradictions, but there were achievements that happened. That is part of it.
Another part of it is the networks of corruption within the Venezuelan government, which extend very thoroughly into the military. There are military officials, particularly high-ranking officials, and mid-level officials that have a lot of stake in the current corrupt regime within Venezuela. Particular policies have facilitated that. The military and many people in the military are worried about their material interests, if Maduro leaves.
There is a factor of repression. Professor Kingsbury mentioned quite well that the military has engaged in repression against peaceful protesters. Certainly there have been violent protests, but there has also been quite a bit of peaceful protest. There are worries about that. All of this goes to the point that a negotiated solution is very important. If you have a hard-core military sector that has interest in staying, you really need to deal with it.
We’re not dealing with a sort of best world. We’re dealing with the real world that we have. That will dictate the type of strategy that could work and could lead to the best solution.
In terms of the question of elites, I’ll briefly say that important transformations happened in Venezuela over the course of the Chávez and Maduro years, but private property certainly wasn’t eliminated. Actually the extent of private property as a percentage of the economy amazingly increased during the Chávez years of power. It has certainly not gone away now.
The faces changed to some extent. There are new sectors such as the Bolivarian bourgeoisie. Some of them had connections to old sectors and some didn’t. The current opposition of Juan Guaidó and the Popular Will or Voluntad Popular are clearly connected to traditional families that were part of the older opposition within Venezuela.
That doesn’t negate the many poor people and workers who are against Maduro right now, but the leadership of the opposition is clearly connected to the previous anti-government, hard-line opposition. That creates certain major challenges because that opposition doesn’t have a whole lot of credibility in the eyes of poor people in Venezuela. There really needs to be multiple players involved in anything moving forward.
Mr. Kingsbury: On the military question, the way in which the military has become both officially and unofficially entangled in corruption having to do with illegal mining and practices within the oil sector, all the way up to narco-trafficking and the trade in contraband goods, absolutely makes the military question sticky from a self-interest point of view.
At the same time I recall interviews with friends who had joined the military. These were not formal interviews but they would always insist they believe in human rights. After a series of conversations, what comes out is that the Venezuelan military has not engaged in bilateral training agreements with the United States, most notably not in the School of the Americas. This means it lacks the institutional culture and organic linkages between individuals and groups of individuals that have facilitated military coups or military participation in civilian-led anti-government movements elsewhere.
There is a history of belief among many in the Bolivarian project. There is a dedication or a belief in the discourse of human rights, but there is not that organic “having come from.” There are not the consequences of their having been trained by U.S. counter-insurgency officials.
In terms of the elites, they were 100 per cent. One of the striking things about Venezuela, precisely because of its dependence on oil and its lack of diversification, is the elites within the import-export sector. They were the people bringing in the consumer goods, food and medicine. On a good day during the boom years, Venezuela actually imported over 85 per cent of the food that its citizens consumed. It’s nowhere near food sovereign. Nor has it been since the 1950s. This sector actually made quite a handsome living off what I describe as the democratization of consumption or the redirection of oil revenues toward the popular sectors. Elites actually did quite well during the Chávez years.
Something that we have seen elsewhere in Latin America is after the commodities boom of the early 2000s died down, elites very quickly turned on the government. This happened elsewhere in the region as well.
Senator Coyle: Thank you for your presentations. There were several counterpoints to what we heard in our previous panel. It is very important for our committee to hear from you.
Mr. Hetland, you spoke about the importance of Mexico, Uruguay and the International Crisis Group. I would like to hear a bit more about that importance. How do you see that playing out? What, if any, communication channels or relationships are there between those groups and the Lima Group?
Mr. Kingsbury, when we talk about Maduro leaving, stepping down or stepping aside, many different scenarios are possible. The one scenario that doesn’t look like it will happen is that he will stay long. We all hope for a peaceful transition.
What are you finding in your research? He has been vilified in many circles as somebody who actually deserves very serious sanctions for his behaviours, criminal and others. There are allegations in those directions. I am curious what your take is on that. Given that, where can he go and what are the various options?
Mr. Hetland: The efforts of Mexico and Uruguay are not limited to the International Crisis Group, although it is one of the latest initiatives. They have been pushing for an earlier process of negotiation and dialogue, which has been criticized by some because it was more open ended. It didn’t have any conditions. It was seen as not tough enough on the Maduro administration.
The International Crisis Group is different from that because it is explicitly geared toward pressuring Maduro to accept free and fair elections. There are relatively new legitimate critiques about the electoral process. Through 2015, there were other problems in Venezuela, but the fairness of elections, at least in a technical sense, was pretty bullet proof. I have been down there to observe the system, but since then it has certainly gone downhill and there is a very legitimate concern.
The International Crisis Group is not just Mexico and Uruguay. Some European states are involved in it. Some other Latin American states are thinking about it. It’s very different from the Lima Group. The Lima Group has been much more aggressive and militaristic, to be frank.
Canada, as a government, has been tending toward the Lima Group solution which is more in line with the U.S. pressuring for regime change. Governments that are conservative in Latin America such as Brazil with Bolsanaro, an obviously far-right government, have been important actors within the Lima Group. As far as I know, there is not much dialogue between those groups, but I think establishing channels for them would be important.
Another important possibility of an initiative I didn’t mention is the Pope getting involved. Maduro invited him to do so. The opposition does not seem to be as interested in that, but the Pope would clearly have some moral authority. I think the Canadian government has more moral authority in the eyes of a lot of countries compared to my government in the United States, given the highly problematic history of U.S. actions and the legitimate perception of the U.S. as an aggressor in many cases within Latin America.
The possibility of tough-minded negotiations that are not entirely open-ended but have peace and dialogue as their end are very important. The question you’re raising about bringing the International Crisis Group and the Lima Group together is a very important role that Canada could play very constructively.
Mr. Kingsbury: In many ways the question of what to do with Maduro actually resonates with what Mr. Hetland just said. One of the major claims of legitimacy and pride among supporters of the Venezuelan government, particularly during the Chávez years, was that everything was done democratically. Everything was done through a vote in a way that could be both inspiring and tedious to observe, to be quite frank. This is good. It’s a different way of doing politics than we are used to. That is what is important about it.
Drawing on that history and calling for free and fair elections, as many have pointed out, in the aftermath of the 2015 National Assembly elections in which the government lost handily, nearly losing a super majority, it is again relatively recently that the government has turned to manipulation, deception, and anti or extra democratic means to secure power.
Drawing on that older legacy can in many ways force Maduro essentially into living up to the legacy of Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution. Increasingly, as the crisis intensifies, that is being trumpeted through Venezuela. Maduro is riding on Chávez’s legitimacy and increasingly less effectively so.
As in any crisis or conflict situation, there will be people who will be extremely unhappy that Nicolás Maduro is not imprisoned or punished for especially the last three years in Venezuela. Conflict resolution or peaceful transition means that both sides have to come to the table and be willing to engage in dialogue and a negotiated solution. It doesn’t mean that one side gets everything it demands.
The Chair: We have come to the end of our time. I thank both of you. As I think it was stated by Senator Coyle, we have heard many perspectives. You have certainly given us some new perspectives on the issues in Venezuela. We will continue to follow and study this issue. Your evidence has been very helpful.
Any other thoughts that you have as the days go forward which may be useful in our understanding of Venezuela today and the plight faced by people, particularly on the humanitarian side, would be helpful. Thank you for your patience in waiting to start this panel, but it was worth it from our point of view to have you here. We appreciate it very much. Thank you to the senators for staying.
(The committee adjourned.)