Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
National Security and Defence
Issue 18 - Evidence - Meeting of May 25, 2015
OTTAWA, Monday, May 25, 2015
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met this day at 1:01 p.m. to examine Bill C-51, An Act to enact the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act and the Secure Air Travel Act, to amend the Criminal Code, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, and to make related and consequential amendments to other Acts.
Senator Daniel Lang (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: Welcome to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence for Monday, May 25, 2015. Before we begin, I would like to go around the table and introduce the senators present. My name is Dan Lang, Senator for Yukon. On my left is the clerk of the committee, Adam Thompson. I would invite each senator to introduce themselves and state the region they represent.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: Jean-Guy Dagenais, senator from Quebec.
[English]
Senator Wells: Senator David Wells from Newfoundland and Labrador.
Senator Stewart Olsen: Carolyn Stewart Olsen, New Brunswick.
Senator Ngo: Thanh Hai Ngo from Ontario.
Senator Kenny: Colin Kenny, Ontario.
Senator Runciman: Bob Runciman, Ontario, Thousand Islands and Rideau Lakes.
Senator White: Vern White, Ontario.
Senator Jaffer: Mobina Jaffer, British Columbia.
The Chair: Thank you, colleagues.
Before we introduce the guests today, there is one order of business I would like to bring forward to the committee. It's procedural.
On May 14, the Senate authorized this committee to examine the subject matter of those elements contained in Divisions 2 and 17 of Part 3 of Bill C-59, An Act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on April 21, 2015 and other measures.
As Division 17 of Part 3 relates to the Canadian Forces Members and Veterans Re-establishment and Compensation Act and the Veterans Review and Appeal Board Act, I would ask for your agreement to the following motion:
That the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence's authority to examine Division 17 of Part 3 of Bill C-59, An Act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on April 21, 2015 and other measures, be delegated to the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs; and
That the committee's authority to meet for the purposes of its study of that element even though the Senate may then be sitting, with the application of rule 12-18(1) being suspended in relation thereto, also be delegated to the subcommittee.
Is there an agreement to move this order of business to the subcommittee?
Hon. Senators: Agreed.
The Chair: Any disagreement? Carried.
The Senate has referred to this committee Bill C-51, An Act to enact the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act and the Secure Air Travel Act, to amend the Criminal Code, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and to make related and consequential amendments to other Acts. Just for the record, we have had over 46 witnesses over the course of our pre-study of Bill C-51, as well as conducting business today.
As part of our review of Bill C-51, we have invited back a few witnesses to the committee to expand on their testimony previously given, as well as representatives from the Canada Revenue Agency.
Joining us on our first panel are Michael Doucet, Executive Director, and Chantelle Bowers, Deputy Executive Director, from the Security Intelligence Review Committee; Caroline Weber, Vice-President, Corporate Affairs Branch, and Geoff Leckey, Director General, Enforcement and Intelligence Operations, Canada Border Services Agency; Mark Glauser, Executive Director, Threat Assessment and Intelligence Services Division, and Leeann McKechnie, Director General, Consular Operations Bureau, Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada; Cathy Hawara, Director General, Charities Directorate, Legislative Policy and Regulatory Affairs Branch, and Alastair Bland, Director, Review and Analysis Division, Charities Directorate, Legislative Policy and Regulatory Affairs Branch, Canada Revenue Agency.
Ladies and gentlemen, welcome. I understand there are opening statements. I invite Mr. Doucet of SIRC to begin.
Michael Doucet, Executive Director, Security Intelligence Review Committee: Good afternoon, senators, and thank you for having invited SIRC here to speak today. I send our committee's warmest regards. I am also pleased to say that our committee is now at full membership with the appointment of two additional members since our last appearance before you in late April.
Our new chair is the Honourable Pierre Blais, a former Solicitor General, Minister of Justice and former Chief Justice of the Federal Court of Appeal. Our fifth member is the Honourable Marie-Lucie Morin, Canada's former National Security Advisor. I state the obvious when I say their impressive backgrounds and diverse experiences will contribute to enhancing SIRC's work.
Today, with the increase in funding, SIRC's future looks more promising. I would like to begin my remarks by giving you a quick sense of the practical impact of Bill C-51 on SIRC's work. I will then discuss how our funding increase will help to enable us to meet our new legislative requirements. Finally, I will focus on two legislative tools that SIRC has called for publicly for several years: the ability to undertake joint reviews and to follow the threat.
The provision of threat reduction activities to CSIS contained in Bill C-51 will translate into a new and more complex workload for both the research and legal services at SIRC. SIRC will now have a statutory obligation to annually review at least one aspect of these activities. Clearly SIRC will be paying especially close attention to the warrants granted to carry out these activities.
Additionally, SIRC will be involved in determining the legality of those threat-disruptive activities where CSIS did not seek a warrant from the Federal Court. SIRC will include its first review of the threat reduction activities in our 2015-16 annual report.
Having said all this, you will not be surprised to hear me say that SIRC welcomed the announcement made in this year's budget that SIRC will be provided $12.5 million over 5 years, starting this fiscal year, and $2.5 million ongoing thereafter to enhance our review of CSIS's activities.
[Translation]
We have submitted a presentation to the Treasury Board in order to be able to access these funds as soon as possible. SIRC needs to rapidly increase its operational capacity to satisfy legislator requirements, face its workload, and fill existing gaps due to the constant decrease in coverage of CSIS activities. SIRC needs to show that it is capable of effectively reviewing the work of CSIS. We need to rapidly carry out major changes on the committee, both from a human resources and an operational standpoint. I can show you that SIRC will develop within a clear framework which reflects our mandate and priorities.
[English]
SIRC's new resources will help ensure that we carry out our mandate in the most effective and efficient manner. At the same time, we continue to speak about our need for additional legislative tools that would allow us to carry out more comprehensive review of Canada's security intelligence activities. I will take a few moments to explain why we believe these tools are needed in today's national security environment and what they would mean for national security accountability in Canada.
Thirty years ago, Canada's rather limited national security activities were carried out in silos. However, the national security activities of many federal entities have become largely intertwined in the aftermath of 9/11. In point of fact, CSIS now liaises and works closely with numerous federal partners on a daily basis. This increased integration and information sharing amongst national security entities, which is further fuelled by Bill C-51, has not been matched on the accountability front.
For a number of years now SIRC has been calling for amendments to its enabling legislation to give it the ability to conduct joint reviews with other review bodies and to follow the threat. Allow me to expand on each proposal.
First, joint reviews with other review bodies, such as the Office of the CSE Commissioner, or OCSEC, or the RCMP Civilian Review and Complaints Commission, the CRCC, would allow review bodies to cooperate on issues or questions of mutual concern. The objective in this case would be to provide Parliament with a more comprehensive picture on activities or investigations that involve CSIS's closest partners.
Under our current legislation, SIRC cannot conduct joint reviews or share operational information with other review bodies. There may be a misconception that there is currently no specific prohibition on sharing operational information or engaging in operational matters with other review bodies. However, under section 37 of the CSIS Act, the committee and its employees shall comply with all security requirements and shall take an oath of secrecy which specifically prohibits SIRC employees from disclosing, without due authority, to any person information acquired by reason of their duties and employment under the CSIS Act.
In addition, we are all subject to the Security of Information Act, SOIA, and take that responsibility with utmost seriousness. Without explicit statutory authorization to share operational information for the purpose of conducting joint reviews, SIRC employees would be in breach of the SOIA and the oath of secrecy if they were to engage in joint work at the operational level.
Second, SIRC has put forward a proposal designed to follow the threat. At present, in the context of reviews, SIRC cannot examine and assess national security matters that go beyond CSIS, even though they may be influenced by the services, actions or advice. I will give you a concrete example of this.
In 2010, following whistle-blowing and an investigation into Canada's role in turning over Afghan detainees, who were then mistreated and likely tortured by Afghan officials, SIRC reviewed CSIS's involvement and their role in the interviews of Afghan detainees. Canada's operations in Afghanistan were housed within DND's purview. CSIS was heavily reliant on DND's facilities to record and store most of its own intelligence collection. Therefore, SIRC was unable to construct a full picture of CSIS activities because it could not pursue any missing information, details of which were likely available within DND. Given that SIRC has access to information only in CSIS holdings, this meant that significant gaps in operational reporting, information exchanges and even basic statistics concerning the number of individuals involved were impossible to reconstruct after the fact.
Although SIRC found that CSIS had no firsthand knowledge of any detainee abuse, SIRC could not completely fulfill its function to ensure that CSIS acted according to statute and its own internal policies. SIRC was only able to provide a small piece, albeit one with gaps, to Parliament, who then had to piece together various investigations and reports in order to achieve insight into the issue of Afghan detainees overall.
An expansion of SIRC's mandate to follow the threat would allow us to investigate more comprehensive reviews of CSIS activities and interactions with domestic partners by following the trail across departmental lines. This would allow SIRC to be better positioned to advise Parliament on the functioning of the security intelligence system, as originally intended when CSIS and SIRC were created. Effective accountability lies in Parliament's ability to see the larger picture and context.
SIRC is currently working on its annual report for the 2014-15 fiscal year. Once our report is tabled, we would be pleased to return to this committee to discuss our findings and recommendations and address any questions that you may have at that time.
Thank you very much for your time today.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
We will now go to Ms. Weber.
Caroline Weber, Vice-President, Corporate Affairs Branch, Canada Border Services Agency: Thank you. Geoff Leckey will make our opening remarks.
[Translation]
Geoff Leckey, Director General, Enforcement and Intelligence Operations, Canada Border Services Agency: Good afternoon, Mr. Chair and honorable senators. Thank you for inviting the Canada Border Services Agency back as you finalize your study of Bill C-51.
As requested by the committee, I will take a few moments to summarize the impacts of this legislation on the agency.
[English]
With a few minor exceptions, the CBSA shares its information pursuant to the Customs Act or the Privacy Act. The proposed security of Canada information sharing act, SCISA, contained within Bill C-51 would provide the agency with two new authorities: one, an additional authority to share customs information, and a second to allow sharing of non-customs information.
[Translation]
Currently, paragraph 107(4)(h) of the Customs Act authorizes the agency to disclose national security- related customs information to non-federal government entities such as municipal, provincial or foreign entities, or international bodies, as long as the entity has a lawful authority to collect and use this information.
With respect to non-customs information, such as immigration-related information, there is no similar provision under the Privacy Act that allows for the sharing of this information for national security purposes, and without SCISA, no specific provisions to share non-customs information for these purposes exist.
[English]
SCISA contains an amendment to section 107(5)(j) of the Customs Act to allow the CBSA to share customs information with Citizenship and Immigration Canada "for the purposes of administering or enforcing the law of Canada respecting passports or other travel documents." Currently there is no provision in the Customs Act to allow such disclosures. This amendment would allow the CBSA, for example, to provide information such as an individual's travel history to CIC for passport purposes.
The second amendment with respect to the sharing of non-customs information would allow the CBSA and CIC to overcome difficulties in sharing information collected pursuant to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, IRPA, for broader national security purposes.
[Translation]
Mr. Chair, as the committee has heard from the Minister of Public Safety, Bill C-51 also seeks to amend the Secure Air Travel Act to provide the Passenger Protect Program with a mandate to identify, list, and mitigate threats to transportation security, and those who are attempting to travel abroad to support terrorism-related activities.
What this means for the agency is that it would be able to receive information pertinent to the 'no fly' list, alongside Transport Canada, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, the RCMP, CSIS, and others as prescribed, and disclose information to those same partners.
[English]
The CBSA would be authorized to disclose information it has obtained from air carriers' reservation systems and confirm to air carriers that there is a passenger name match with a name on the no-fly list. Only the Minister of Public Safety may disclose this information internationally, pursuant to a written agreement. As such, Public Safety would be the disclosing federal department unless otherwise delegated by the minister.
[Translation]
Mr. Chair, the CBSA's information sharing practices occur in the context of laws, regulations and policies. Review mechanisms exist for all disclosure activities under the current legal regime to ensure that a person's reasonable expectation of privacy is not breached.
[English]
Thank you. We would be pleased to answer your questions.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Now we will go to Mr. Glauser.
Mark Glauser, Executive Director, Threat Assessment and Intelligence Services Division, Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada: Mr. Chairman, honourable senators, thank you for inviting the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development back to speak to you about the proposed security of Canada information sharing act. We are mindful of the need to allow time for questions. We will therefore be taking this opportunity to underscore only a few of the points made when we appeared before you last time.
[Translation]
As you will recall, the department sees a wide range of threats to national and international security arising in many regions. We are particularly concerned about terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
[English]
Our international efforts to address these threats are complemented by our work with partners within the government to advance Canada's national and international security objectives.
The security of Canada information sharing act aims to ensure that information relevant to national security is shared within the Government of Canada both effectively and responsibly. The proposed act would create possibilities for sharing information relevant to national security. It would not create an obligation to share specific information.
The department is already able to share information that may be of national security interest with other Canadian government agencies and departments. We have established practices and arrangements to guide this sharing of information consistent with our obligations, including under the Charter and the Privacy Act.
However, there are information-sharing issues that the security of Canada information sharing act will address for the department. One clear example is the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act. Our earlier remarks indicated how the new act would permit the department to share within the government, where appropriate, information that is important from a national security perspective with that act.
The act would also provide some other departments and agencies with a clear authority to request from the department information relevant to national security. This could include information related to consular affairs. Those requests would continue to be considered using the process that DFATD has developed over the past several years to facilitate the appropriate sharing of consular information when issues of national security are at stake.
Processes and caveats are in place to ensure that only information that is relevant, reliable and accurate is shared as a result of a specific request supported by a clear national security rationale. The request must also be compliant with the legal parameters, including the Charter and the Privacy Act.
[Translation]
Finally, the new act would clarify the authority of other departments and agencies to share with our department any information that might bear on the safety of our staff or the security of our missions abroad.
[English]
In summary, to be clear, the proposed security of Canada information sharing act does not alter what information is collected by the department or how that information is collected. It also has no bearing on how the department shares information internationally. This act only deals with how information related to national security concerns is shared within the Government of Canada.
The act would allow the government to better address key national and international security interests, including those related to terrorism and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you.
Ms. Hawara.
[Translation]
Cathy Hawara, Director General, Charities Directorate, Legislative Policy and Regulatory Affairs Branch, Canada Revenue Agency: Thank you for the invitation to appear before you today. My name is Cathy Hawara and I am the Director General of the Charities Directorate of the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA). With me is Alastair Bland, Director of the Review and Analysis Division. We are here today to discuss the CRA's national security mandate, how it uses information sharing to achieve this mandate, and the implication of changes proposed in Bill C-51.
[English]
The Charities Directorate is responsible for ensuring that the more 86,000 registered charities meet the legislative requirements for obtaining and maintaining charitable registration. This ensures that the benefits of charitable registration are made available only to organizations that operate exclusively for charitable purposes and that charitable funds and services reach intended legitimate beneficiaries. The Charities Directorate does this through a balanced program of education, service and responsible enforcement.
The risk of terrorist exploitation in the non-profit and charitable sector has been recognized by the international community since the late 1990s. Since that time, the CRA has taken steps to protect the charity registration system in Canada from being abused by individuals or groups with links to terrorists. With the passage of the Anti-terrorism Act in 2001, the CRA became a partner in the government's Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorist Financing Regime. The charities' role in this regard is administrative and does not involve criminal investigations.
[Translation]
In addition to its general functions, which are aimed at protecting the Canadian tax base, the Charities Directorate carries out specialized review and audit activities specific to the detection and suppression of terrorist financing activities.
For example, it reviews all applications for charitable registration to determine the presence and level of terrorist financing risks. It also conducts audits of registered charities based on the potential risk of terrorist financing abuse that is posed to the charitable sector and Canadian society as a whole. Depending on the findings of these reviews and audits, the directorate may deny or revoke registration.
[English]
Information sharing is vital to the operations of the Charities Directorate. The CRA has the authority under current legislation to share certain information related to charities with the RCMP, CSIS and FINTRAC when it is relevant to their respective national security mandates. In turn, information from national security partners is used by the CRA in assessing the level of risk posed by applicant or registered charities. Information sharing assists the CRA in ensuring that its assessment of risk does not disrupt or discourage legitimate charitable activities.
While these information-sharing arrangements have proven successful, there have been occasions when CRA officials in the course of their ordinary duties have come across information that was relevant to a national security investigation but which could not be disclosed due to the existing restriction in the Income Tax Act.
Bill C-51 proposes to enact the security of Canada information sharing act, which would broaden the CRA's authority to disclose taxpayer information to designated government institutions. The proposed measures would not authorize the collection of additional personal information. Rather, they would allow the sharing of information already in the possession of the CRA as a result of carrying out its legislative mandate. This means that the CRA would be able to share more than just charities information with additional government departments, as designated in the act, for national security purposes.
However, the sharing of information would not be without limit and the threshold for disclosure would be twofold. First, information would have to be related to the investigation of a threat to the security of Canada or an investigation of a terrorism offence. This is under the Income Tax Act. Second, the information would have to be relevant to the receiving institution's national security responsibilities. This is under the new legislation contained in Bill C-51.
While designated government institutions would be able to request information, the CRA would not be obligated under the legislation to provide it. Under the proposed legislation, government institutions retain control over whether they share their information and what form the sharing should take.
The security of Canada information sharing act also proposes to list the CRA as a designated government institution. In the case of the CRA, only the Charities Directorate would be authorized to request and receive information from other government institutions and only as it relates to its mandate to protect the charitable sector from terrorist abuse.
[Translation]
The protection of Canadians' tax information is a CRA priority. The confidence and trust that individuals and businesses have in the CRA is a cornerstone of Canada's voluntary tax system. The CRA has strong practices to protect the confidentiality of taxpayer information, and has strict policies and processes governing its security.
Should the bill be passed into law, the CRA will implement the necessary procedures and controls to ensure that sharing of taxpayer information under the new provisions meets all legal requirements. Information would only be shared as permitted by law.
[English]
In conclusion, the CRA contributes to the government's efforts to combat terrorist financing by protecting the charity registration system in Canada from the abuse of terrorist financing. Information sharing assists the Charities Directorate in identifying and assessing risks related to terrorism, allowing it to prevent organizations with links to terrorism from being registered and to revoke the registration of those that are.
We would be pleased to take any questions the committee may have.
The Chair: Thank you.
We will begin with Senator Mitchell and then Senator Runciman.
Senator Mitchell: Thanks to all of you for being here.
My first question is to Mr. Doucet. You made a very powerful point about the limits to your ability, your powers, to pursue the thread. You are in effect saying that while a piece of information that might be used by CSIS would be subject to as much review as you wanted to put into it, when that same piece of information goes to the CBSA or DND or DFATD or other agency with national security and intelligence responsibilities like those that have no review process whatsoever, it would be without any kind of review that even resembles what you do for that information within CSIS.
Mr. Doucet: Yes, senator, that's correct. That being said, of course, I can't comment on the internal review and audit evaluation of individual departments.
I can tell you, as expressed in my opening remarks, that we have access to full and unfettered access to all information at CSIS, with the sole exception of cabinet confidences. We can see anything in their holdings. We can visit their locations nationally or internationally. But once information leaves CSIS to go to another member of the intelligence community or to another department that has an intelligence function, we cannot follow that thread of information to the other department.
Senator Mitchell: Somebody decided that it wasn't sufficient for internal processes for CSIS to review themselves, so they created SIRC, but the same can't be said of CBSA. For example, you're saying you don't know how their internal processes work. One would think they have internal processes. If CSIS needs more than internal processes, why wouldn't CBSA need more than internal processes?
Mr. Doucet: I think that's a good question.
Senator Mitchell: Thank you.
My next question is to Ms. Hawara. I'm very interested in the change in this bill to taxpayer information. It's been generally defined as designated taxpayer information. Immediately the "designated" is dropped. The issue is one of broadening that scope in one of the most sacred places of people's information security in our government processes. If ever there were a place for big government intrusion, it might fall somewhere between "designated" and "taxpayer information," "designated" now being gone. Why was it deemed necessary to drop "designated"?
Ms. Hawara: Thank you for the question.
As I mentioned in my opening remarks, currently the CRA does have information-sharing authorities with three of its partners: the RCMP, FINTRAC and CSIS. But under the Income Tax Act, we're only allowed to share specific information related to registered charities or organizations that have previously applied to be a registered charity. So the restriction is there. These provisions have been in place for some 10 years.
Through the course of our work, we have found that oftentimes we cannot share with our partners all of the information that would have been relevant in the context of an investigation under the CSIS Act or an investigation under the Criminal Code. For example, a registered charity might have connections with other kinds of entities such as with individuals, a for-profit business or a non-profit organization that is not registered. We have to do a bit of sorting of that information, and we can only share the information related to charities, which means we cannot present to our partners all of the evidence and information that would have been relevant, where we had reasonable grounds to suspect it would have been relevant.
What the act does is it says that we're going to provide greater flexibility for sharing. We're removing the definition of "designated taxpayer information," which is what I described, those specific items related to charities that can be shared, and we're going to say, generally speaking, all taxpayer information.
However, it's really important to note that the thresholds are still there, and there are two thresholds in the case of the CRA. Under the Income Tax Act, first and foremost, we must have reasonable grounds to suspect that the information would be relevant to an investigation of a threat to the security of Canada as defined in the CSIS Act or an investigation of essentially a terrorism offence under the Criminal Code. If we are satisfied that the information meets that threshold, we then must look to the new bill and satisfy ourselves that the information would be relevant to the recipient organization's responsibilities in relation to national security.
We take these responsibilities very seriously. The protection of taxpayer information is truly the cornerstone of the voluntary, self-assessment tax system we have in Canada. Our purposes are focused very much on national security issues, and they're always going to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. This is not broad access. It is on a case-by-case basis.
Senator Mitchell: You're very compelling and clearly you're capable of making a persuasive argument. I applaud you for that. I'm not trying to be condescending in any way, because it was very powerful, but the fact of the matter is, who's checking on you? What expertise do you have in the department to determine that this information is actually relevant to CSIS or to CBSA? If this information is relevant, then it can't be much less significant than the kind of information that CSIS uses, and CSIS is checked by SIRC. Who's checking you?
Ms. Hawara: There's no equivalent to SIRC in our circumstances, but certainly we have an internal audit and verification function within the agency, and we would be subject to the Auditor General's purview and the Privacy Commissioner's purview, of course, as other organizations would be.
As to your question about our expertise, the Charities Directorate has been sharing information with our partners for about 10 years. We have exchanges both with the service and with the RCMP, where we exchange staff to better understand each other's mandates. So we have officers currently seconded to CSIS and the RCMP. We do training together. We have regular meetings to better understand the kind of work each other is currently working on. There is a body of work and a body of experience in the Charities Directorate, and we will be building on that. If these authorities come to pass, there is a team in place with the right infrastructure to handle this kind of intelligence going backwards and forwards.
The Chair: What kind of case load are we talking about here? Are we talking 100 files a year or 10 files a year?
Ms. Hawara: In terms of disclosure, information-sharing back and forth, we've probably over a last —
The Chair: In a year.
Ms. Hawara: Maybe Alastair can give us that.
Alastair Bland, Director, Review and Analysis Division, Charities Directorate, Legislative Policy and Regulatory Affairs Branch, Canada Revenue Agency: Thank you for the question. Basically, over the course of the last 10 years, in the neighbourhood of 50 information exchanges either way have been made. For instance, in 2014-15, we received 51 incoming disclosures and we sent out 47.
The Chair: With the new legislation, what are you expecting in terms of case load? Do you have any idea? You must have been asked for information and had to refuse it.
Mr. Bland: No, we have no expectations in that regard.
Senator Mitchell: Is there any prohibition from you just running a search of your database for all people who contributed to a given charity and revealing that to CSIS? What would stop that?
Ms. Hawara: The Charities Directorate doesn't actually have donor information. Other parts of the agency deal with that. The Review and Analysis Division within the Charities Directorate is very focused on the charities themselves, so we personally do not have access to the databases with donor information. We do come across donor information if we're conducting an audit of a charity. We'll go in and look at the books and records and have access to that. Again, any disclosure would be done in accordance with the provisions set out in the act. We have to meet the thresholds I talked about earlier.
Senator Runciman: I have a couple of quick questions for Mr. Doucet. You were here a few weeks ago when the budget had just been tabled. You indicated to us that it was going to take a little time to assess the implications. You talked today about a study of threat disruption activities. I'm wondering if you could give us a few more specifics with respect to how these additional monies are going to impact your ability. You then moved on to additional tools. This is a significant increase in your budget. I think it was 80 per cent. Perhaps you could give the committee a few more specifics with respect to the impact on your ability to meet what hopefully we all are concerned about in terms of the terrorism threats.
Mr. Doucet: Absolutely. Thank you, senator. That's a great question.
As you mention, we're looking at an increase of roughly 80 per cent for SIRC. I anticipate in the order of a 60 per cent increase in staff complement. We're being very careful as to making commitments to hiring new staff. Most of the new staff complement will be in our research and our legal function.
As you can expect with the new powers that are given to CSIS, we need to, if nothing else, begin by building the lexicon of what is a disruptive activity. Experts may not necessarily agree on the definition of a disruptive activity. We'll have to begin at that base sense. We'll have to begin by looking at all disruptive activities that are carried out by the service, whether they're under warrant or not under warrant — because we expect them to be under warrant or not under warrant — and make recommendations as to their appropriateness.
As well, we will be increasing our corporate staff by a very minimal number, perhaps one. If I use the military term for that, most of the resources will be boots on the ground.
The other thing we're going to look at very carefully is, as you know, the service has increased quite a bit over the years. If you look at our new funding, it puts us back to roughly 1 per cent of services funding, which is where we were roughly 10 years ago. So we are going to run a research activity where we look at the waterfront of activities — I mentioned the waterfront when I was here a little while ago — the sum of CSIS activities. We are not only going to look at the sum of activities but at our ability to carry out effective review of those activities. That doesn't mean we will review every single activity they carry out, but we will develop a risk matrix to look at not only their activities but decide where we want to go in-depth. That's really where we'll be.
We'll then come back with some measure of our efficiency to look at those activities, and we'll be more than happy to come back to the committee to talk about those abilities and what we're actually looking at.
You can never carry out our type of function by looking at 100 per cent of their activities. What you aim for is to look at a significant number of their activities over a five-year period. We leave it to you to help us determine if we're looking at the significant proportion that Parliament wants us to look at.
Essentially, that's where we are. I mentioned in my opening remarks that we have submitted a Treasury Board submission. We are going very aggressively after getting those funds released, and, as I mentioned, a lot of our activities in the beginning will be research in nature.
We don't know under Bill C-44 or Bill C-51 how much our investigations or complaint function will grow. We expect it to grow specifically and potentially in disruptive activities, but we're also going to have to keep an eye on that side of the business as well, because it would be intuitive to expect that the number of complaints could also rise.
Senator Runciman: What about tracking activities outside of Canada? How do you see that being impacted?
Mr. Doucet: Great question. We talked in a recent annual report about CSIS's expanding footprint abroad. We've gone from our reviews being roughly 20 per cent foreign-based to roughly 40 per cent foreign-based.
We currently visit a foreign post every year. We feel that under Bill C-44 and Bill C-51, we'll probably have to increase that to potentially two or three foreign posts a year, to go to those foreign posts and have a full evaluation and review of the service's actions abroad.
Senator Stewart Olsen: I have a few questions for Ms. Hawara. These are almost uncharted waters for Canadians. I'm speaking about people who could be watching this and saying, "Okay, I don't understand what's going on."
With regard to the process that you might follow for delisting a charity, what would flag your attention? Do you proactively disclose to CSIS or the RCMP? How do you choose who to disclose to?
Ms. Hawara: Thank you for the question. I'm assuming that it's specifically in relation to our national security mandate.
Senator Stewart Olsen: Yes, the bill that we're dealing with.
Ms. Hawara: Wonderful, because we look at charities for a whole range of other issues as well.
Our expectation is that actually a very small number of charities are at particular risk with respect to national security. There are 86,000 registered charities in Canada. The vast majority of them are doing what they should be doing, good works, and the key is making sure that they are educated in terms of how to protect themselves from these kinds of risks.
There are a number of ways in which charities might come to our attention from an enforcement or a compliance perspective. We handle a workload of probably 10 audits, more or less, every year, so that gives you a sense of the order of magnitude. We're not talking about a lot of charities.
They could come to our attention through our own research. Charities have to file an annual return every year, and we review that. We do our own research in terms of open-source information that is available out there, and we receive information from our partners as well. There is a range of ways through which we can identify charities.
As with all audits of charities, we take an education-first approach. We provide the charity an opportunity to respond to any concerns we might have. We detail those concerns to them in writing and give them an opportunity to respond.
We have a number of tools available to us, not just revocation. We can sanction them, if that's an appropriate tool. We can also negotiate compliance agreements where we clearly lay out the kinds of corrective measures that need to be put in place by the charity in order to resolve the compliance concern we've identified. On a lesser scale, we have education letters where there isn't that kind of written undertaking on behalf of the charity.
We've used all of those tools in the context of the Review and Analysis Division's work in the context of our audits. We have identified files where there has been a concern that there was a risk of terrorist financing or abuse by terrorist organizations. We have the tools available to us to deal with it in the most appropriate way depending on the circumstances of every different case.
Senator Stewart Olsen: What you're saying, then, is some charities may be being used for illicit purposes that they're not aware of. Each case is individual, and you specifically try to deal with them individually.
Would you let the security agencies know that you're looking at these? When would you disclose?
Mr. Bland: Yes, we often will discuss our activities with them. We want to make sure that we're not stepping on toes or taking any action that would interfere with the ongoing concerns that they may have.
When we have concerns, when we identify a risk, we often exchange information to corroborate and to understand that risk more fully. That's usually when the exchanges of information take place, often when we're seeking information to establish the existence of risk.
Senator Stewart Olsen: Do you expect this bill, with its information-sharing aspect, will allow you to do a better job at that or you won't be so constrained?
Mr. Bland: Certainly it will give us the authority to ask questions more fully with other partners in the regime that are currently missing, other than CSIS, the RCMP and FINTRAC, yes.
Senator Day: My first question will go to Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada.
Mr. Glauser, I want to clarify the evidence you've given to us. You indicate that without this legislation, you are in a position to share information with certain other entities. As well, you indicate that this is not an obligation to go after specific information for those that request it from you. If it's not specific, does that mean that they would send a note to you and say, "Give us everything you have"? How do you be "general" in a request? Secondly, how do you test that against the Charter, which you indicate that you do? Who does that?
Mr. Glauser: Thank you for the question.
The authority to share comes from the department not legally being based on statute like other departments. The legal authority comes from — like DND, Foreign Affairs shares information under those authorities.
With respect to consular information, which is where we find this most frequently, the authority that we have to share information already exists. The act will make it easier for those organizations and the Government of Canada listed in the schedule to the act to ask the department for information, some of whom couldn't previously ask.
What I was setting out in the remarks is we would use the same procedures for answering those questions that we already have, for those who have the authority to ask.
Regarding the specificity, and I think this is something that my colleague can address on consular information, there is no requirement on the department that holds the information to automatically share information if it's requested. The request needs to be specific. The department that receives the request then evaluates it internally to decide if it meets the thresholds that each of us works under. My colleague can speak to how this works in the consular context more specifically.
It would certainly be the case that a general request would be very difficult to respond to because the national security rationale would be rather broad and not necessarily as focused as needed to meet the thresholds.
Leeann McKechnie, Director General, Consular Operations Bureau, Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada: To add on to what my colleague had to say, when it comes to the management of consular information, this bill would enable other government departments to request consular information from DFATD. We already have a well- established procedure and protocols. Any request that is received must have a national security rationale behind it. The request is reviewed by consular experts, privacy experts, as well as legal experts, and a decision is taken on what information, if any, can be provided, working within the parameters of the Charter and the Privacy Act.
I have the final sign-off on sharing of that information, and it is shared with a very clear caveat that that information is not to be forwarded or shared with any other entity.
Senator Day: That's interesting.
Ms. Hawara, this sharing of personal income tax information is a matter of great concern to Canadians, and I need some reassurance from you. You have three agencies — the RCMP, FINTRAC and CSIS — that you share information with already. Were you getting requests from the other 14 agencies that you'll now be able to share this with? Seventeen different government agencies will have no restriction with regard to who they pass it on to. How are you going to reassure the public that you needed this additional information sharing, and how are you going to control it?
Ms. Hawara: Thank you for the question.
The national security mandate of the Canada Revenue Agency has to do with protecting the charitable registration system from terrorist abuse. That is why the CRA is listed as one of the 16 or 17. The only information we'll be requesting will have to have a link to the charitable registration system and to our mandate to protect that system.
In terms of information going out of the agency, by and large, we expect most of that information to be somehow related to registered charities. In the vast majority of cases, I think that's what it's going to be. Very much like our colleagues at Foreign Affairs, it is going to be case-specific. It's not going to be possible to come in and ask for a whole list of detailed information about taxpayers where it's not clear to us at all how this is related to the requesting organization's national security mandate.
Our responsibility is to protect taxpayer information, first and foremost. To the extent that we meet the thresholds that are set out in the Income Tax Act and proposed security of Canada information sharing act, we will then be able to determine whether that information should be shared because, like others, there is no obligation to share, and if so, how it will be shared. We also use caveats and will continue to do so in terms of the further sharing of information beyond our partners. This is going to be managed in the same way that we manage the authorities we have today, within very strict controls.
Senator Day: As a point of clarification, you keep talking about charitable information. I'm looking at page 9 of the bill. This is clause 9, and it says "publicly accessible charity information," so that's fine. It's publicly accessible anyway. You're just making it easier by giving them a list rather than saying, "Find your own."
The second paragraph is the one that concerns me. It says "taxpayer information." That's not charities. That's the taxpayer information I've given you to voluntarily pay my taxes.
Ms. Hawara: That is accurate. Currently, we are restricted to sharing certain information about charities and that would be broadened, but, again, the thresholds have not changed. The organization requesting the information would still have to demonstrate they need to meet the threshold.
Senator Day: I understand that; that's all outlined there.
Ms. Hawara: You're correct. It is broader.
Senator Day: It is broader. That's the point I wanted to make. Thank you.
Senator Ngo: I'd like to continue with questions for Ms. Hawara. I want to follow up on Senator Stewart Olsen's questions.
What are the consequences for the directors of a charitable organization that has been found sending money to a terrorist organization such as Hamas, for example? What do you do? Are there any terrorist organizations that you have found?
Ms. Hawara: Our role is limited to registered charities. We don't deal directly with the directors of the charity. That would be for some of our other partners.
However, there is a very important exception to that. There are new authorities in the Income Tax Act around what we call "ineligible individuals." So if an individual was involved with the charity at a time where the charity committed a serious breach of the act that led to the revocation of the charity, that person would be an ineligible individual, and that would be grounds for refusing to register or for revoking a charity that was involved with that person, or that person was involved with that charity.
So there is a consequence from a charity registration perspective, but in terms of individual liability, that would be for someone other than the CRA to deal with.
Senator Ngo: Thank you.
The Chair: Who does deal with it, then? If you don't deal with it, but you've identified somebody who has committed a breach and has been involved in terrorist financing, who lays the charge? I don't think we've ever seen a charge as far as personal liability is concerned.
Ms. Hawara: I don't know that there has been such a case. Our role is to oversee the registration system. So we can register, revoke or deny registration to organizations, and then we can share that information with our partners, including law enforcement through the RCMP. That could potentially be something that they would want to look into, but it will all depend on the circumstances of the case. Our authority is an administrative authority.
Senator White: Mr. Doucet, you explained well the difficulty in your sharing CSIS information under the act with any other agencies. Correct me if I'm wrong — because I was going back to what the National Security Advisor suggested, I think — nothing stops you from going to other agencies and accessing their information if they choose to allow it. I guess it's a one-way street.
Mr. Doucet: We don't have any legislated ability to go to another agency.
Senator White: Agreed, but there's nothing stopping you from going to the RCMP or CBSA or Foreign Affairs, for that matter, and telling them you're doing a review and you would like information. Nothing stops you from doing that. It becomes their problem if they release it, but nothing precludes you from including in your review information from other agencies — just the reverse.
Mr. Doucet: It's a good question. We do engage other agencies. We certainly speak to the RCMP and others. We have limited our discussions around trade craft, technique, analytics — call it what you will. But I personally consider that it would be bad form to go ask them for what I would call operational information because I don't believe we have coverage for that information.
To be quite honest, if I was sitting in their chair, I wouldn't release it to us under the current structure because of course intelligence organizations, policing organizations, all gather and guard their information assets very carefully. I consider at this point in time it would be bad form to go ask for it.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: Mr. Leckey, I was with Prime Minister Harper last week at Pierre-Elliott-Trudeau Airport. The Prime Minister announced that new resources will be earmarked for the Canada Border Services Agency. How will these new funds be used?
[English]
Mr. Leckey: Thank you for the question.
I believe the resources you're referring to related to an additional investigative capacity under our criminal investigations division to pursue a greater number of investigations into abuse of the Temporary Foreign Worker Program.
If those are the resources you're specifically referring to, I can tell you that for a number of years now we have felt the need to pursue the potential abuse of that program more actively, specifically from a criminal investigations perspective. There has, until very recently, been an obstacle to the sharing of information to the CBSA from ESDC. The new resources and new authorities that we have been provided with are intended to enable us to conduct up to 50 criminal investigations per year.
I can tell you that since April 1 of this year, in terms of the number of referrals made to CBSA by ESDC, we're well on track to meet that objective.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: The CBSA is preparing a registry of travellers between Canada and the United States. How long will it take to implement such a system, which will take into account both travellers who come into Canada from the United States and travellers who exit Canada to go to the United States?
[English]
Ms. Weber: Thank you for the question. That was being rolled out in four phases and we have completed phase two. The next phase of that requires changes to legislation as well as regulations. We continue to look at the privacy implications of those exchanges, but it will require a legislative amendment before that can go forward.
Mr. Doucet: I wanted to offer a clarification to the answer I gave to Senator White's question. In answering that question I was speaking to our review function, our research function. In our complaint or investigation function, we have the ability to subpoena witnesses in a revocation of a security clearance, as an example. So we can ask questions of other government departments as it relates to an investigation of a complaint. I wanted to make that clear.
The Chair: Before we conclude here so we get this on the record, in respect to your authority versus other departments and other authorities within the government, with that ability to call for an investigation, you could follow up in other departments to find out what exactly happened in respect to a particular issue if you felt it was a public security threat. Is that correct?
Mr. Doucet: Senator, under sections 41 or 42 of the act where we investigate complaints against CSIS, if it is due to a denial of security clearance or a revocation of a clearance, we can go to the department to seek information. We do not go and we cannot subpoena information based on our review function.
The Chair: Colleagues, we have a full schedule here today and we're past our time, I'm sorry. We will call our next panel.
Joining us for the second panel of the day as we examine Bill C-51 are three witnesses who have experienced terrorism firsthand, including radicalization, glorification and the violence that comes with it.
I would like to welcome Dr. Bal Gupta, Chair, Air India 182 Victims Families Association and a strong advocate for victims of terrorism, having lost his wife on that fateful flight 30 years ago; Mr. Balraj Deol, a victim of terrorism and radicalization, and publisher of Khabbar Nama newspaper in Toronto; and Mr. Gurdev Mann, President, North York Sikh Temple.
Gentlemen, welcome to the committee. Thank you for joining us here today. We look forward to hearing your comments on the bill and relevant subject matter.
Dr. Gupta, please begin, followed by Mr. Deol and then Mr. Mann.
Bal Gupta, Chair, Air India 182 Victims Families Association: Thank you, chair, for giving us the opportunity to testify.
From the perspective of victims impacted directly by the most heinous violent terrorist crime in Canadian history — namely, the terrorist bombing of Air India Flight 182 — AI — on June 23, 1985 — the Air India 182 Victims Families Association strongly supports the passage of Bill C-51. A number of provisions in the bill, if enacted into law, will act as a deterrent against those Canadians who violently demonstrate their opposition to our freedom and democracy by engaging in acts of terrorism.
I speak to you not as an expert in legal or constitutional matters but as a direct victim of the worst violent terrorist crime in Canada. In the AI tragedy, I lost my wife, Ramwati Gupta, to whom I was married for over 20 years. In a moment I was left as a single parent with two young sons, 12 and 18 at the time. The AI tragedy was a result of a terrorist conspiracy conceived and executed on Canadian soil, not anywhere else, by criminals who brought their problems from India into Canada.
Lest we forget, terrorism hit Canada 16 years before 9/11 in the U.S. The terrorist bombing of AI killed 329 innocent persons. A majority of the victims were from almost all provinces of Canada. They came from all religious backgrounds, including Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Jain, Muslim, Sikh and Zoroastrian. Eighty-six victims were children under 12. Twenty-nine families, including husband, wife and all children, were wiped out. Thirty-two persons lost their spouse and all children. Seven parents lost all their children, and two children under age 10 lost both parents. A related terrorist act killed two baggage handlers at Tokyo's Narita airport on the same day. The terrorist criminals took away our Canadian democratic rights to life and liberty, peace and prosperity. Sadly — and that's the limitation of the Canadian system — the real culprits are still roaming free in Canada and elsewhere.
As families of the victims of the terrorist bombing of AI, we have suffered and continue to suffer grief and pain, which we do not wish to befall on any other Canadian in future violent terrorist acts. Part of our mission is to speak on the effects of terrorist crime, violence and terrorism issues to ensure that Canada is safer and more secure for its citizens.
Almost all provisions in Bill C-51 have been adopted, with some variations, by one or more of Western democracies like the U.K., U.S.A., Australia and France. We sincerely request your support to protect Canadians from ever- increasing acts of terrorism.
Now I will discuss only some specific provisions in the bill from the Air India 182 perspective.
One provision authorizes Government of Canada institutions to disclose information to other Government of Canada institutions that have jurisdiction or responsibilities in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada. The Air India 182 commission of inquiry, presided over by Justice John Major, clearly pointed to a lack of information sharing between the RCMP and CSIS before the AI bombing.
The families strongly believe that good information sharing between CSIS and the RCMP may have possibly prevented the AI bombing. It would have also helped in the expeditious investigation of the crime after the fact. Recall that it took 15 years before charges were even laid. And yes, if the wiretap tapes were not erased by CSIS without consulting and informing the RCMP, the results of the prosecution may have been quite different. The trial resulted in the acquittal of the two main suspects.
Another provision in Bill C-51 deals with the recognizances to keep peace relating to a terrorist activity or a terrorism offence. It is very well known to Canadians now that several potential suspects were under surveillance for terrorist activity for some time before the AI bombing. This provision of Bill C-51, if applied at the time, would have possibly helped to avert the terrorist bombing of AI.
Part 4 of the bill permits CSIS to take, within and outside Canada, measures to reduce threats to the security of Canada, including measures that are authorized by the Federal Court. Thus, CSIS will not only monitor the potential terrorist or security risks, but it will also take measures to disrupt them from being executed.
We all know that CSIS knew — probably everybody has heard, after the Major commission — about the testing of an explosive device by potential terrorists on Vancouver Island. The explosive device was not meant for any peaceful purpose by any stretch of the imagination. Under this provision, CSIS could have possibly disrupted the terrorist activity before it actually took place and, most likely, the 331 innocent men, women and children would not have been murdered.
It is also worth repeating that one or more of the other Western democracies — such as France, U.K., Australia, United States — already have some similar policies in place. This bill will bring us in line with them. Canada has a responsibility, not only to Canadians but also to nations worldwide, that it will do all it can in the fight against evolving globalized terrorism.
In summary, we sincerely believe that Bill C-51 will act as a strong deterrent against ever-increasing and evolving acts of terrorism. With the firsthand experience of the aftermath of the most heinous act of terrorism in Canadian history, the terrorist bombing of AI, we ask all senators to support Bill C-51 so that no Canadian may suffer what we have suffered.
Thank you.
The Chair: Mr. Mann.
Gurdev Mann, President, North York Sikh Temple: Mr. Chairman, most of the issues have been dealt with by Dr. Gupta, but I still have three more points to talk about.
First, religious organizations have learned to shield themselves from accountability by using the tolerance, the freedom and the legal system in Canada and also in other countries.
Second, glorification is very dangerous and, sadly, a lot of people get carried away just by that; that is, preaching in worship places and especially in some of the media. For example, there's one newspaper that printed this on the front page. These are the two Sikh bodyguards of Indira Gandhi who murdered her, and they're writing that they're the bravest people on the planet and that every Sikh should follow them. In Canada right now, a lot of the younger generations are preaching about that now. That is taking place. The government must be concerned about that.
The point I'm emphasizing is that the people who are creating it are not in Bill C-51. Those people should be added. If anybody, either in the name of religion or bravery, preaches this on the radio or in the newspaper, or even at a place of worship, they should be held accountable and should be charged under the law.
Second, a lot of people are coming here from outside countries under the cover of religious preachers. When they come to these places, they preach hate. The government knows that, but no one is going to say that. These places should be monitored. Most important are the religious schools being run by some of the religious organizations. Some of them are not religious organizations. Who is running them? No background check is done on them. Right now, they are running hundreds of those schools in the Metro Toronto area — hundreds of those schools exist now. Those schools are free to open anywhere they want. What do they teach; what do they preach? Nobody knows.
I know a couple of schools where I went myself and I heard with my own ears. I could not believe it. It has absolutely nothing to do with secularism but that is being taught. How do we control that?
I think Bill C-51 does not go far enough. We have heard outcries about individual rights, human rights, and so on. Sure, when you implement these things, some people may be caught wrongfully, but there should be a mechanism in place if there's anything like that. We must not, in any shape or form, allow those people to continue preaching hate.
Thank you.
Balraj Deol, as an individual: Honourable chair, members of the committee, good afternoon. In order to deal with the menace of radicalization and home-grown terrorism, we must find ways to deal with those who provoke, incite and radicalize Canadian youth using imaginary or overinflated victim mentality, alleged injustices and conflicts in foreign lands.
The federal government maintains a public list of terrorist entities such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, al Qaeda, Islamic State, Babbar Khalsa International, and the International Sikh Youth Federation. However, having membership in these entities has not so far been made a crime. We must change this and amend the Criminal Code of Canada so that we may deal with terrorism in a consistent way by prosecuting membership in terror groups.
It could not be clearer to those of us who have long struggled with extremism in our Canadian neighbourhoods and around the world that the glorification of terrorism is the root of a great deal of terrorism and tragedy in the world today. There are obvious reasons why Islamic terror groups, Khalistani terror groups and other violent extremists invest so much in videos and other propaganda: It works.
Whether for recruiting, inspiring attacks or for the purposes of long-recognized strategies associated with psychological warfare, terrorists and their friends here and abroad know that glorification of terror will motivate many and advance their bloody agendas. It is for us to give a similar sort of recognition to this fact by doing our part to bring this lethal propaganda to an end. In doing so, we must be sure to include in our thinking the terrible practice that we have seen in some of this country's religious institutions, of posting portraits of so-called "martyrs" — in truth, the terrorist murderers of civilians — in houses of worship.
There must be special attention paid to the ghastly fact that a considerable number of our Canadian children are moving through attitude-forming developmental years in the presence of these deadly images in some gurdwaras in my community. Many of these gurdwaras have weekend schools on site and one has a full-time elementary school attached to its building in the same compound. This gurdwara, a registered charity, has dozens of terrorist portraits, including that of Talwinder Singh Parmar, the mastermind of the Air India bombing.
When Khalistani extremist Ajaib Singh Bagri boasted to kill 50,000 Hindus at the 1984 founding conference of the World Sikh Organization, many of us, including intelligence agencies, did not take it seriously. The next year, Canadian-based terrorists planted the bomb that murdered 329 souls onboard Air India flight 182. Until 9/11, this Canadian mass killing was the biggest civil aviation terror slaughter in history.
Back then, most Khalistani extremists were Indian-born immigrants. Now first and second generation Canadians are leading this movement, who are equipped with modern tools of propaganda but know very little about India. This is a dangerous mix. Portraits of terrorists have become a permanent fix during annual Vaisakhi parades in many Canadian cities, including Surrey and Toronto. Floats and stages are decorated with portraits of terrorists. Terrorists are lionized and praised as heroes, and slogans are raised to stand guard to the "vision" of many terrorists. Children are led to shout such slogans and made to ride or walk behind such floats with terrorist portraits.
In the picture I have attached, this float was part of the May 3, 2015, parade in Malton. Children were sitting on the rear bumper of this float and shouting sectarian political slogans. They may little know about what they were being asked to shout.
I have a video clip marked 1A.
[Video presentation.]
These are Canadian-born children sitting on the rear of a float which has terrorist portraits. In the portraits you have murderers of Ms. Gandhi, murderers of a retired Indian general, murderers of the elected premier of Punjab, and some people who were arrested and are behind bars. Those pictures are behind them as they are sitting and shouting on this float.
I have another video clip where a Khalistani flag-carrying group is shouting that they will stand guard to the vision and thinking of certain terrorists. While they are shouting these slogans, they are naming certain terrorists and then saying, "We will stand guard to your thinking or your vision." I have that little video clip.
[Video presentation]
This is not a protest; it's a celebration. In the celebration, they're basically creating a protest. It's by religious groups. It's the annual Vaisakhi day, and they are naming certain terrorists and other entities, and then stating, "We stand guard to your vision."
I have a third video clip, also taken at a Vaisakhi parade, in the parking lot of a temple, which is a registered charity.
[Video presentation]
This was taken from the Internet. It was a 2012 Vaisakhi parade, which took place from Malton gurdwara to Rexdale Sikh Spiritual Center, which is a registered charity. It was recorded in the parking lot of that temple. The group that is shouting these slogans —
The Chair: Is it in Toronto?
Mr. Deol: It is in Toronto. Rexdale is part of Toronto. The group shouting the slogans is called Baba Deep Singh Gatka Akhara. Basically they are teaching Sikh martial art. Most of these youths are Canadian-born Sikhs. They are waving unsheathed swords and other traditional weapons in their hands. At the same time, they are saying the same slogans, that they will stand guard to certain terrorists whom they name, and they shout, "We will stand guard to your vision."
Teaching Sikh martial art is okay, but teaching political martial art calls for attention. I firmly believe that such acts are radicalizing Sikh youth, and it is becoming part of the landscape.
Part of the Canadian Punjabi media is also dedicated to promoting extremism and needs to be watched. Alarming growth trends in extremism and terrorist activity in Canada and elsewhere calls for creating a separate, specialized prosecutorial office in the Department of Justice. There is a need for a specialized and separate court system dedicated to terrorist subject matter. These tailored approaches to the prosecuting of terror offences would allow for the developing of the kind of expertise and security required to deal with radicalization and terrorism.
Thank you for giving me this opportunity.
The Chair: Thank you.
Senator Mitchell and then Senator Runciman.
Senator Mitchell: Thanks. I've been to the Vaisakhi day celebrations many, many times, and I've seen none of that. I'm not diminishing that's it's of significance to that extent, but I want to make it very clear that this is not the bulk of the Sikh people of this country, who have made a tremendous contribution and are wonderful, amazing, remarkable Canadians who contribute every single day. It may be that there are terrorists and violent criminals, but let's be careful how we portray the Sikh community. I find it very unsettling to cast aspersions so broadly.
Dr. Gupta, I appreciate the terrible experience you've had through. We can hardly imagine what you've been through. But do you understand that this bill may not end up creating the kind of deterrence that you think? It may, in fact, make it much more difficult — we've had legal advice to that extent — to prosecute people who have engaged in activities. In fact, one of the reasons that there wasn't a successful prosecution in the Air India case is exactly because of the way CSIS refused to reveal its source and, therefore, the source they guaranteed immunity to couldn't be a witness. What legal basis do you have for analyzing that somehow this bill will create greater deterrence? What legal basis or expertise do you have to counter the legal experts we've had here who have suggested otherwise?
Mr. Gupta: Right from the beginning, senator, I said I'm not a legal expert. I leave it to you and the lawyers. But what the families feel, I told you. Again, it's a commentary on our freedoms, our democracy and our Charter of Rights that the criminals are using in order to propagate violence against law-abiding citizens. A person who was in jail entertains a person at his house for a week, and he refuses to answer who that person was. I'm still waiting to get answers to questions like that.
We are talking about freedoms and privacy. To me, the privacy of a hundred people is meaningless if it affects an 84- year-old mother who cannot even cry after losing her son, daughter-in-law and three children who I saw off at the airport. People think rights are important. Sure, I also need rights, but when they infringe on the life and liberty of other people, we have to think.
Senator Mitchell: Well, we have to find a balance between civil rights and protections, and it's so easy to do that in this bill if we just took some steps.
You've said that this bill contains elements that are found in legislation in other countries. I'm assuming you're referring to Five Eyes countries, countries that are our allies. Well, they also have parliamentary oversight. Would you agree that we should have parliamentary oversight? Why would you not agree to that?
Mr. Gupta: I'm not agreeing or disagreeing. As I say, this is for you to decide. I want the passage of Bill C-51. If you have to change something, change it. But at the same time, to me, there are protections. There are federal courts involved for taking any action. CSIS is reviewed by SIRC, and I'm told the resources for SIRC have been doubled or likely to be doubled to keep up with the increased burden. Then you have an Attorney General requirement, and you have every right to grill the Attorney General in Parliament. There will never be 100 per cent oversight of anything. As a layman — I'm not a constitutional expert — to me, those oversights are enough.
Senator Runciman: Thank you, gentlemen, for your very interesting presentations.
You talked about the glorification of terrorists. I'm assuming, Mr. Mann, since you were quite specific about this, that you've looked at the Bill C-51 proposal that states, "Every person who, by communicating statements, knowingly advocates or promotes the commission of terrorism offences in general . . . ." You don't think that goes far enough? Is that what you're suggesting to the committee? Do you think it should go even further with respect to how we deal with people like the folks who ran that ad, for example, or the picture, that that may fall within the ambit of this section of the bill? I'm not sure it would, but it may.
Mr. Mann: In my view, that does not go far enough. The reason is that those people who are preaching it, they will not be easily detected.
Secondly, even if they are detected, most of the time the enforcement agencies are reluctant to — nobody can enter into the religious place. Certainly if you talk about anything like that, you will see a lot of uproar from people saying that they are being prosecuted without sufficient reason.
Senator Runciman: So it's a political hot potato.
Mr. Mann: That's the problem. We have to be very clear about that; once you cross a line, you're done.
Senator Runciman: Unlike Senator Mitchell, I have read of politicians in parades comparable to what you've talked about here today, with people who have been charged, for example, in the Air India bombing, being glorified in the parade and prominent or at least provincial politicians riding in those parades.
Mr. Gupta: May I add something?
Senator Runciman: Sure.
Mr. Gupta: It is one thing to have personal beliefs, whatever we may have, but publicly glorifying — not only that, but if I understand correctly, in Sikhism there's not supposed to be idol worship. By putting these pictures in the temples, I'm not sure if they're going against the Sikh tenets.
Second, I have worked at behind the scenes for the last five or seven years, and the biggest problem is political correctness. When we know things are being done wrong, we don't take any action. Not only that, but indirectly — and I'm not pointing to any particular party — our politicians are unknowingly participating in the glorification of terrorism when they appear at these parades without knowing what the picture means. Those guys responsible for it, they use it at the glory point and say, "Oh, such-and-such minister came. Such-and-such MP came to the parade. You saw that."
There should be maybe an unwritten code of conduct or ethics for politicians so that they don't unknowingly participate in the glorification of violence and terrorism by participating in events where they do not understand the underlying facts.
Senator Runciman: I encourage you, if possible, to be more concise with responses, because I know a lot of us would like to ask questions.
You talked about schools being utilized for the promotion of radical reviews. Mr. Deol, you talked about over 100 schools. Is this in the Greater Toronto Area? Did you mention that?
Mr. Deol: No, I didn't mention 100.
Mr. Mann: I mentioned that.
Senator Runciman: I think there was an implication there — I inferred it, anyway — that the teachings within these schools are, let's say, inappropriate. What do you base that on? Have you done anything to register complaints with authorities? That seems pretty significant to me if it is indeed accurate.
Mr. Mann: I'd like to point out one thing here. This person was a professor. He has passed away, but he was a professor, and he himself taught freely to the children at a temple the most possible hate he could create. All those children go there. The parents send them. It's free. There's no fee, nothing whatsoever. It's free of charge.
Senator Runciman: There are hate laws in Canada. Why is no one taking action?
Mr. Mann: It has been reported many times, but because this is a religious place, nobody will confront it. This is a problem.
Mr. Gupta: One of the accused in the Air India trial made the statement that they will kill 50,000 Hindus. That organization has never disowned that statement, and that organization is active at Parliament.
Mr. Mann: He went on video. We have video for that.
Senator White: Thank you for being here today.
Mr. Gupta, could you speak to the Kanishka funding that the federal government has? I know you have a perspective.
Mr. Gupta: The $10 million announced by Prime Minister Harper in Montreal in 2011 at the inauguration of the memorial runs out next year. We would like it to continue. At least that's what I'm hearing from the researchers.
That has made quite a significant impact on the prevention of terrorism. That's what I'm hearing. Projects are being conducted by various universities and organizations to minimize, to mitigate and to control terrorism promotion or radicalization. Those projects are continuing. Every year there is an annual meeting where all these researchers meet and present their results. That has been a very good program.
Senator Jaffer: I want to welcome all three of you to the committee. I want to say to you, because people are watching this program as well, you will agree with me that the majority of Sikh communities are peace-loving communities and are not a part of this. This is a very small element you're talking about. We should not be mistaken, because most Sikhs, like other Canadians, are very productive citizens of this country.
Mr. Gupta, I know you, and I know that for many years you worked very hard to bring the Air India prosecutions to attention because it wasn't even seen as if the people killed on Air India were Canadians. For you, it's very important that all Canadians are treated equally. It doesn't matter who they are or where they are hurt. Isn't that your quest?
Mr. Gupta: It is true that 99.9 per cent of people in every religion, practically, are peace-loving.
Senator Jaffer: You tried very hard to get this matter to prosecution.
Mr. Gupta: On Air India, there were at least 18. One day I counted. There were 18 to 26 on the victim list.
It's not any particular religion. Terrorism is terrorism, whether it's propagated or executed by a Hindu or a Muslim or a Christian or anybody. That 1 per cent or 0.5 per cent, whatever the minuscule portion is, is spoiling the whole community. Not only that, somebody else will complain. If he does, most probably he will be beaten up.
Mr. Mann: I was, actually, once.
Mr. Gupta: The problem is this political correctness has to go, and politicians have to be careful what they associate with, particularly when they don't understand the language.
Senator Jaffer: I'd like to follow up on what Senator Runciman was speaking about. Various places already have laws on hate. Basically, you're saying to use the laws to prosecute those who are breaking the law; is that correct?
Mr. Gupta: Yes.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: I would like your opinion on the following subject. We have looked at the videos. It is hard to understand, but I believe that certain Sikh temples glorify and promote terrorism and the martyrs who participate in it; as far as you know, how many of these organizations in Canada are considered to be registered charitable organizations?
[English]
Mr. Gupta: I don't think I have any particular numbers, but definitely it is not anything new. Even before the Air India tragedy, there were demonstrations. I'm not pointing to any one particular community, mind you. There have been reports — most of them were Hindu — of LTTE extorting money from local Canadians when they were active in Sri Lanka.
I don't think I can give you any numbers. At least in Toronto, I can put two or three temples — not all the Sikh temples are involved, by the way. But it is difficult. Again, it is political correctness and fear of the unknown that is probably responsible.
To give you an example, one of your own buddies — I'm using the word rather loosely — was a minister in the federal government, and he was beaten up — Mr. Dosanjh. Was it before the Air India tragedy or after?
Mr. Mann: After.
Mr. Gupta: It was after the Air India tragedy because he dared to open his mouth.
So the main problem arises from the fact, as was said by Senator Jaffer, that the rules are not being enforced and that gives them encouragement. Particularly when politicians participate in events organized by these people, it gives them quite some encouragement.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: Justice Major appeared before our committee, and he recommended the creation, within the Office of the Attorney General, of a separate section responsible for prosecuting terrorist acts. He also suggested that judges who are experts on terrorism be designated to hear this type of case. What do you think of these proposals? The question is for all three witnesses.
[English]
Mr. Gupta: I think the term he used was terrorism czar. That would have been good, and the families would have loved it, but you are the final authority to decide that. The families would have loved it. We did emphasize with the authorities and with the government that we would like to see it.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: Do the other witnesses have any comments?
[English]
Mr. Deol: I feel, sir, that that is the natural next step. Before 9/11, the Western countries never talked about terror laws. When we experienced terror, every country ran to enact new anti-terror laws. Soon the Islamic State appeared and again we rushed in to enhance those laws. I think the natural next step is specialized courts. There's no escape.
I must add one more comment. As Senator Mitchell said, most Sikh communities are hard-working; two of us are sitting here. Those who were arrested a few days ago in Montreal, 10 of them, were not part of any mainstream community. There are always odd people in every community. When I mentioned this and showed those video clips, I'm talking about those odd people who could be a threat to our security. I would never malign the whole Sikh community, which I am part of myself.
The Chair: I would like to follow up, colleagues, in the area of education. As you know, education is the responsibility of the provinces. In the region I represent, the education department has a responsibility to oversee the day-to-day operations of the education system, whether they are private or otherwise.
In Ontario, is there a requirement for the department of education to do a regular inspection to ensure the curriculum is being followed and what is being taught is what has been authorized by the department of education?
Mr. Mann: They have that authority and they can enact it when they do. The problem is that they are unable to control what is being taught on the side. When they are religious schools and the children are being taught on the basis of a lot of hate, that's not in the curriculum. That is outside the curriculum, but it's still taking place, and nobody can check that and nobody has the authority.
Secondly, as you mentioned, it is a provincial issue, but if the federal government decides that this should be for the whole country, these guidelines must be followed. Then the provinces would have to do it.
The Chair: I hate to say it's not quite that simple. I wish it were. Obviously, every province has their constitutional responsibilities and they have to work within that.
Governments can do only so much — the federal government, the provinces, the municipalities — but it's the communities themselves that have to be prepared to take on some responsibility, just as you are here today to bring forward you message.
What are your expectations internally within the broad aspect of your community, who are, obviously, hard- working Canadians, to be able to withstand this type of activity by a very few, yet who, at the same time, can do so much harm to the community you represent and Canadians at large? What more can we expect your communities to do with respect to working with various governments and the public at large?
Mr. Mann: There are two points I would like to make. Number one, the large majority of people simply get along with day-to-day life, and they don't want to get involved with any sort of politics.
But those people who are controlling especially the institutions are violent people, and if anybody even tries to talk about it — I am an outspoken person, and I have been beaten by those people because I say a lot of things.
Secondly, with regard to the CRTC, Mr. Deol and I have made many complaints. Right now, there are a lot of programs where hate is being preached openly on the radio and the TV. We have complained to the CRTC. Every time, nothing happened. Now, for the last year or so, we finally gave up. There's no point. If they're not able to control it, who will control it? And that's federal. That's not provincial.
All these problems are very serious, but I think that politicians have to take it seriously. If they don't, then the problem will go uncontrolled.
Senator White: I wonder if I may ask a follow-up to that, Mr. Mann. Have you as well reported such hatred to local police authorities to see whether or not they contravene the hate legislation in the Criminal Code?
Mr. Mann: We approached that, but they said go complain to the CRTC, which we did in writing — and not only once, more than once, many times, actually — and nothing happened. The police said it's not their department and, "Sorry, we can't do anything."
Senator White: Is that the same for others here? Have you reported such hatred to the police services to see if it contravened hate legislation?
Mr. Deol: For radio communications, when they have violated certain standards, I have filed complaints many times and usually nothing happens, back and forth letters. Only once I managed to get some sort of reprimand from the CRTC against one person. It took almost three, four years of consistent complaining to result in a reprimand. Otherwise, there is not much done.
Mr. Gupta: The attitude is still the same as it was at the time of the Air India tragedy: It's an Indian problem. I hate to say it. They say, "It's not our problem; it's the community's problem.
Senator Mitchell: Who is "they"?
Mr. Mann: There is another issue. When we are talking about the authorities, I was attacked by about 30 people and beaten up badly. One of the people was charged by the police, and after that nothing happened for a year or so. Then I tried to find out what happened to that case. They said the case was withdrawn. They never even told me the case was withdrawn. They said there was not enough evidence, is what the police told me.
I found out that actually some of the ethnic police officers, they're also involved with the departments and every police force, and they also use their influence to really promote those people. That's another problem we have.
Senator Runciman: I just want to emphasize that Bill C-51 creates a new Criminal Code offence, the glorification of terrorism.
Mr. Gupta: I don't think glorification is included. In Bill C-51 glorification is not included; it is only promotion and advocacy. Promotion means telling, if I tell you to do this thing. Glorification is such and such person and saying, "This thing is very good."
Senator Jaffer: A martyr.
Mr. Gupta: That is glorification: "I'm not asking anyone to do anything; I'm just glorifying the person who did something."
The Chair: To clarify for the record, basically you're utilizing people who in the past have been involved with terrorism directly, and have been recognized to be involved, have in some cases been convicted, and yet at the same time they're being glorified and put into a position of being a martyr in respect to the community itself. Is that correct?
Mr. Gupta: Yes.
Senator Mitchell: It strikes me that it's in this bill. I would agree with Senator Runciman on that.
What you're talking about is promotion, and it's in the bill.
Mr. Gupta: The bill deals with promotion and advocacy, as far as I can understand.
The Chair: The question is whether or not that interpretation goes that far.
Senator Mitchell: It begs the question — if you're right, and we have to get to the root of that — if the police are not exercising the powers they already have, what's the point of layering on more powers? Is that going to make it any better?
Mr. Gupta: That's a very good question. This does not go there.
Senator Mitchell: Especially when these increased powers may jeopardize rights of other people. The issue may be one of application of the powers they already have and they're not doing it.
The Chair: I think it's safe to say, senator — and we'll conclude this here — that obviously you have your opinion and others have theirs.
Senator Mitchell: I'm just saying.
The Chair: In respect to the legislation before us, it has been brought forward that most jurisdictions in the Western world are doing a major rewrite of their legislative base for their intelligence community and their law enforcement agencies so they can deal with the issues that you've just outlined here, plus many others.
With that I would like to thank you for coming. I would like to thank you for your courage. I know it's not easy to come into this public forum and bring forward the message that you just brought to us. I appreciate all your hard work. I can speak for all the senators when I say thank you.
Joining us for the second time as we consider Bill C-51 are the Honourable Steven Blaney, Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness; Mr. François Guimont, Deputy Minister of Public Safety Canada; Mr. Michel Coulombe, Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service; and Mr. Bob Paulson, Commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted Police.
Minister, I want to thank you for taking time out of your busy schedule to join us as we consider Bill C-51. As you know, we've had a series of meetings over the last number of weeks during the pre-study of this bill and well over 45 witnesses have appeared before us.
We're pleased to welcome you back for the second time and look forward to your comments about the amendments to the bill that were adopted in the other place, as well as other updates you may wish to provide the committee about the subject at hand.
Minister, the floor is yours.
Hon. Steven Blaney, P.C., M.P., Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness: Thank you very much, Senator Lang. Once again, thank you for dealing with this important bill in such a timely manner, but also exhaustive, since you have reviewed it thoroughly with the more than 45 witnesses. And as you have just mentioned, it has also been thoroughly reviewed in the House of Commons, where I also appeared.
I would like to thank you for your study and review of the bill, and also tell you that I come convinced, more than ever, in front of you this afternoon that this bill is much needed, particularly in light of what we experienced last week in Montreal. To sum it up, I have always said that there is no liberty without security. I'm now convinced that not only is there no liberty, but there's no prosperity without security. We have seen that by the target that the terrorists have identified.
[Translation]
Indeed, this is my second appearance before the committee, in the company of people whom I hold in high esteem: Commissioner Bob Paulson from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Mr. Michel Coulombe, Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, as well as my chief of staff, Mr. François Guimont.
Your work allows us to take an important step towards protecting Canadians against the terrorist threat.
[English]
Canadians know that the threats posed by violent jihadism, radicalization and terrorist attacks are not future possibilities in a faraway land. We saw it in Montreal last week, with 10 young individuals. We have also seen, as you know, an attack here in the federal Parliament. We have seen the B.C. plot, the CN Tower, the Toronto 18, the VIA Rail plot.
[Translation]
Terrorists have also struck in France, Australia, Denmark and elsewhere. The entity targeting us is a terrorist caliphate known as the Islamic State, or ISIS.
Mr. Coulombe stated that violent people and groups want to kill Canadians. A government's first responsibility is to close the loopholes that may be found in its laws and that can be exploited by people who wish to attack our citizens.
[English]
However, despite the fact that the threat is clear and real, some concerns have been raised. Whether these concerns are raised here or in the other place or in the media, the fact is they were mostly inaccurate. I am pleased to have this opportunity to take a step back and refocus the debate on the facts and what the anti-terrorism act 2015 is doing in reality.
[Translation]
We know that Canadians fall under the influence of recruitment campaigns led by terrorists, and that they leave Canada to participate in acts of violence in Syria, Iraq and other places throughout the world.
[English]
We are aware of the radicalization process. As studied this bill, you were able to realize that it will help to improve the tools we have to tackle radicalization. That is part of our strategy.
[Translation]
We know that our laws are not as rigorous as they should be and that our national security agencies need better tools to fight terrorism and reduce the threat of travellers on the move for the purposes of terrorism.
[English]
We have seen clear examples from the RCMP and others where national security information could not be shared in a timely manner because of bureaucratic silos. We will end the bureaucratic silos of the federal government. That's going to be one big achievement of this bill.
The proposed security of Canada information sharing act will address legal limits and prohibitions in addition to clarifying existing authorities that have previously contributed to a delay or an absence of information sharing.
The importance of timely information sharing cannot be overstated. Jihadi terrorists are successful when they are fluid and adaptable, adjusting their plans and action as needed to overcome obstacles. We need to be as swift, fluid and adaptable as they are. Bureaucratic silos pose a serious risk to the safety of Canadians.
[Translation]
Thanks to the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, government institutions in Canada will have the power to present essential information to our national security agencies when it is necessary to act quickly.
Secondly, the Passenger Protection Program, in its current form, only targets people suspected of being a threat to transportation safety.
[English]
This expansion is to give authorities the appropriate tools to deal with those seeking to travel for the purposes of terrorism. In this way, we can better protect both the lives of innocent Canadians and people around the world.
[Translation]
We also know that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service is in a unique position to use its expertise to take upstream measures to counter threats, but it does not have the mandate to go beyond collecting and sharing information.
[English]
We will close this gap, Mr. Chair. We are broadening the mandate of CSIS but also broadening the role of the watchdog of CSIS.
[Translation]
The government will therefore allow the Canadian Security Intelligence Service to leverage its expertise to take reasonable and proportional measures to counter threats, if necessary, and prevent them from escalating. It is a significant improvement we sorely need.
[English]
Mr. Chair, let me be clear: Contrary to some of the over-the-top comments made by so-called experts, CSIS will not become a secret police force. They do not have the mandate. They cannot make arrests. Many of the comments made in the public sphere on this point have been so ridiculous they do not warrant further comments. However, to ensure that everyone's mind can be at ease, the committee in the other place amended the bill to be clear that CSIS does not have law enforcement powers.
[Translation]
Moreover, CSIS will have to obtain a warrant for any measure deemed intrusive and disruptive, as it currently does when gathering intelligence.
In addition, the Anti-Terrorism Act, 2015, will give our authorities the means to thwart planned attacks in order to rid our streets of threats as fast as possible, eliminate terrorist propaganda and prevent terrorists from travelling and recruiting.
[English]
Our government makes no apologies for ensuring the safety and security of Canadians. It is our first and utmost priority. We will not allow terrorist groups to threaten our rights and freedoms. We will not soften our approach.
And we have made some changes. We moved amendments to this bill in the other place to make it clear that with respect to information sharing, advocacy, protest, dissent and artistic expression are not captured by the definition of "activity that undermines the security of Canada." CSIS is not receiving law enforcement powers, and there are limits placed on ministerial authority under the expanded Passenger Protect Program. These are the amendments.
As you know, there are additional resources for the RCMP, CSIS and CBSA in the budget. There are also additional resources for the watchdog of CSIS, and there is additional funding for the parliamentary security precinct.
[Translation]
These amounts will therefore be invested, Mr. Chair, to direct resources on the basis of priorities while continuing the fight against terrorism.
[English]
As I draw to the end of my comments today, I would like to address some points I noticed have been raised consistently in this committee. I have noticed a strong desire to require CSIS to report back to its review body on the execution of warrants on an annual basis. I would first like to note that SIRC already has the power to reach in and review this information should it desire. Further, this is something I would be pleased to consider as a ministerial directive once this legislation receives Royal Assent.
Committee members have also drawn attention to the proposed security of Canada information sharing act and a desire to ensure that departments consult with the Privacy Commissioner when developing information-sharing agreements. I am happy to point out that the departments will submit a privacy impact analysis to the Privacy Commissioner when developing these agreements. Should this legislation receive Royal Assent, this will occur over the summer.
[Translation]
In conclusion, when you take a step back from the false ideas and fears that are being spread, it is clear, in light of the facts, that the Anti-Terrorism Act, 2015, is a rational, reasonable and necessary approach to protect Canadians from the terrorist threat. We cannot afford to wait while terrorists plan their next attack. Let us pass the Anti-terrorism Act, 2015.
I am now available to answer your questions.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Minister, for appearing here today. We certainly appreciate the fact that you have been listening to our deliberations over the last number of weeks in respect to some of the recommendations that have been brought forward by witnesses.
Before we begin questions and turn the floor over to the deputy chair, could you and the witnesses please outline the threat that Canada is witnessing at the present time and give all of us an update?
Mr. Blaney: I will begin and invite Mr. Coulombe to comment further.
As you know, Prime Minister Harper was in Montreal last week, where we saw some young 10 individuals willing to travel for terrorist purposes. We are well aware that the threat is real and that we must remain vigilant. We must also move forward toward discouraging individuals who would be lured into terrorism to do so. That's why we need to move on with our four-pillar strategy regarding prevention.
Regarding the state of the threat, I will invite Mr. Coulombe to say a few words.
Michel Coulombe, Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service: Before I talk about the Islamic State, because that's the topic, we shouldn't lose sight of the fact we still face other terrorist threats. I have mentioned Hezbollah being one, but what we call the al Qaeda core is still a potent threat. We shouldn't lose sight of that, especially with some of their affiliates in Yemen and elsewhere in the world. It is important to keep that in mind.
Since the military campaign against ISIS by the coalition last summer in June/July, we have seen that it hasn't really slowed down their recruitment. They have lost some territory and it is slowing their expansion, but in terms of recruitment from foreign countries, it hasn't really slowed down. That's still a major preoccupation for us, namely, radicalization of young people and them attempting or successfully leaving the country, as we have seen in Montreal, where 10 of them were attempting to leave the country.
ISIS has, on a number of occasions, specifically mentioned Canada as a target. We have Canadians who are members of ISIS, and not just as foot soldiers. I can say that Canada is on the radar screen of ISIS. To believe that ISIS, because it is in Iraq and Syria, is far and away doesn't pose a direct threat to Canada I think is a huge mistake; it does — not only to Canada, but we have to remember our Canadian interests abroad and Canadians who were posted abroad or businessmen or Canadian commercial interests.
The threat, as I mentioned at my last appearance, is persistent and real. We certainly welcome additional tools that will enable us to tackle that threat.
The Chair: Are you telling us that the threat is growing compared to what it was six months ago?
Mr. Coulombe: It is growing in terms of sheer numbers. The number is deceiving. You cannot just look at the number growing and say that the threat is growing because certain people pose different threats. Some people are involved, for example, only in supporting recruitment or financially, whereas other people pose a more direct threat because they have the training and are actually planning.
The sheer number in itself is not a good indicator. The threat overall, when I look at the number indicator and the threat streams coming in, the threat, I would say, is certainly growing.
Senator Mitchell: Thanks very much, Mr. Minister, and each of the others with you. One of the issues that we keep confronting is the question of resources. The RCMP has made it clear that they have moved 600 people from a set of files to work on terrorism. You announced a $296 million increase over three years. If I divide that by three years, that's $100 million a year. Amongst three agencies, that's $30 million to the RCMP. However, if you take 600 staff that have been moved, you are talking $120 million easily. So you are giving them $30 million, but you have actually cut their budget. This is a budget cut from last year to this year of $22 million to begin with. If you straight line it and do the analysis that I'm doing, you are talking about an $8 million increase to the RCMP. How much of that $296 million is the RCMP actually getting year by year when it is split up amongst three agencies?
[Translation]
Mr. Blaney: First, thank you. Of course, I do not have the same perspective as you regarding your references, given the date used to assess the increase in resources. I want to be very clear about the fact that our government will never apologize for having managed taxpayer money responsibly.
It is an important approach. We have a responsibility to ensure that we are always optimizing our programs so that money is invested in the right place. I am confident that Canadians appreciate this effort and expect us to manage their money as if it were ours. That is what we try to do.
When we look at the file as a whole, we have increased the RCMP's resources by over a third since our government has been in power. We believe it is important to ensure that the RCMP is able to fulfil its many mandates. It is the national police. This role includes responsibilities in the area of the fight against organized crime, the fight against human trafficking, the fight against drug trafficking, but also the fight against economic crimes, terrorism and other offences that may be committed.
As you were correct in mentioning, additional resources are set out in Budget 2015. We think temporary reassignment within the RCMP should not be done at the expense of other areas of activity. That is why we have put forward additional funding, which will be spread over the coming years and which will have an elevator effect to allow the RCMP to distribute resources based on its means.
[English]
Senator Mitchell: Perhaps the commissioner can tell us exactly how much he thinks the RCMP will get out of that $296 million.
Bob Paulson, Commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted Police: Well, I think we know how much we're going to get. I think the Prime Minister announced that last week. I'm less worried about what I'm going to get than what I'm going to do with what I got. That's why you reference, senator, the moving around of resources, which is what we do. We're assigning our resources to the highest priority files. They have, as I've identified in the past, taken some of the resources away from other priority areas, but we're just going to have to live with that. As we go forward, we'll ramp up the areas in the Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams and start to build capacity there.
Senator Mitchell: It's clear that the government believes that CSIS needs SIRC to review it, because it has doubled its budget, and that the RCMP needs the CRCC to review it, because it restructured its powers. CSEC has a commissioner, which it's had for some time, but the government sustains it. If those three agencies need supervisory review agencies, then why is it that the Canada Border Services Agency doesn't have such a SIRC-type review? Why is it that DND's national security efforts don't have a SIRC-type review? What is it that DFATD's national intelligence activities don't have a SIRC-type review? Isn't it time to consider creating a super-SIRC that could review all of these intelligence services in an integrated way, particularly given the intensity of the problem that you've just outlined?
Mr. Blaney: Thank you. That is certainly an interesting question, but I would like to state up front that the Canada Border Services Agency has a recourse directorate, so there's a mechanism in place.
This bill is not about oversight or review. This bill is about providing the tools necessary for our law enforcement community to tackle terrorism. In the meantime, there are provisions in the bill that increase the resources with the budget but also the mandate of the watchdog of the intelligence agencies.
As you know, the Security Intelligence Review Committee is specifically mandated in Bill C-51 to look into the expanded activity that CSIS will be allowed to conduct. This is an extension of the current power of CSIS. Not only will they have a larger area of coverage that they will be invited to look into, but they are specifically mandated in the bill.
As you know, there are also other layers of mechanisms regarding supervision. The Auditor General can at any time look at any of those agencies, as he has done in the past. You have the Privacy Commissioner, who can conduct operations. You also have Parliament, which has a standing committee. As you know, SIRC sees itself as an extension of Parliament. You have your very own committee that can also exert review and oversight.
So as we go along, we are extending the power of an entity. I have become convinced over the course of the journey in getting this bill passed that it is a model that is the envy of the world. I was told this by experts who are involved in the domain. For example, some parliamentary direct oversight in Australia ends at the top level of the intelligence agency, whereas in Canada, on behalf of parliamentarians, SIRC is able to go to the operational level. It is able to go wherever CSIS is and look into their current and daily activity and have access to all the data. That's why SIRC is such a recognized model which has gotten praise from the Supreme Court.
Are we in good shape? I believe so. Can we do better? We are always looking at ways to do better. In this bill, there are additional provisions that increase the watchdog role of CSIS and also expand its mandate. As I just mentioned, there are more financial resources. We are actually doubling the budget of SIRC, which is significant, and it is telling of how seriously we are taking the mandate of making sure that our law enforcement agencies, and in this particular case the security agency, is fully complying with the law and respecting the rights of Canadians while fulfilling its very important duty, which is to protect Canadians.
Senator Mitchell: I'm not arguing with you about the value of SIRC. I'm just saying that if it's as valuable for CSIS as you say it is, why isn't similar supervision being applied to other agencies such as DND, DFATD and even the CBSA? Even the RCMP doesn't have that kind of review.
As my final question, under the IRPA, the change is going to be made that the government will determine what information goes to a special advocate who would represent the interests of a person applying for a security certificate when that person can't be open to what might be national security information. To this point, there hasn't been that restriction. How could it possibly be fair that only the government gets to say what information that special advocate, who has the highest level of security clearance, should get?
Mr. Blaney: If I may, it will always be at the discretion of the judge. As you know, the new provisions preserve the discretion of the judge to ensure fairness. When considering whether the minister can be exempted from providing information to the special advocate, the judge must ensure that the exemption does not impede a fair process and that the non-citizen is reasonably informed. We fully trust in our judges and in our judicial system to make the right decision and to find the balance, as it has always done in the past.
Senator Mitchell: Except when you argue with the chief of the Supreme Court.
Senator Runciman: I have a question for the minister and perhaps Mr. Coulombe.
Minister, you expressed your frustration. You mentioned policing powers. I guess I share that, with clarification after clarification, assurance after assurance, but the folks will stand up the next day and repeat those same lines. It is frustrating. There's no question about it.
You talked about the 10 young people in Montreal recently, and I wanted to pursue that with you and Mr. Coulombe. Radicalization in schools, some of which are publicly funded, is a significant concern. I was just wondering what role the federal level plays in that. We know that education is a provincial responsibility. With the individuals in Montreal, I think it was a story in The Globe and Mail that said there were 11 students from one school who aspired to join the jihad, and the officials in the school were saying there was nothing to worry about with respect to their curriculum or activities within the school. I'm wondering what we do.
I know we have the section 16 Criminal Code amendments, which hopefully will help in dealing with situations like this, but with respect to the education system and schools, how do you see the act assisting us, and what kind of cooperation are you getting from the provinces with respect to these kinds of issues?
Mr. Blaney: I thank you for your question, Senator Runciman.
As you've seen in the past, our government has been constantly at the forefront of the battle against terrorism and also moving forward with anti-terrorism measures. This began a long time ago but was certainly exemplified with the attack on the World Trade Center. We also saw the anti-terrorism strategy brought forward by my predecessor. We always have to evolve and adjust to the new reality.
What we're confronted with now are high-risk travellers, and that's why we had to move forward with our legislation to ensure that we are prepared to deal with the new challenges.
If I may just get back to the new phenomenon we're seeing of Canadian-born, sometimes first and second generation, or even not from immigrant descent, having a significant impact. We, in Bill C-51, will be able to shut down websites. Why? Because we are talking about radicalization, and that is, I would say, where we are willing to move forward. That is why I've declared that I want to have my provincial-counterpart meeting, because we're all aware that the whole of society has to take this challenge together. It's not only the federal government, law enforcement or intelligence, but the community as a whole has to come out together to fight terrorism and radicalization. How? By articulating counter-terrorism strategies and messages, by identifying individuals who are vulnerable to radicalization and by working with communities. We cannot achieve that all by ourselves with the federal government. We are all in the same boat.
Education, of course, is a provincial responsibility, but when it comes time to articulate the counter-narrative strategy, we can work together. This is where we're heading. Why? Because this is where we can attack this issue at the source, at the core of the problem. We are working with the beliefs of individuals. That's why it needs a broad approach.
On that, of course, again with Bill C-51, we are able to shut down websites and criminalize the promotion of terrorism. If there are individuals who are advocating for terrorism and sending messages that violence is a way to operate in this country, they will face the full force of the law.
As the Prime Minister clearly said last week, there is no reason for it in this country. We are a generous and open country. There is no reason for you to use violence to get to your means. If you do so, you will get the full force of the law.
As we work to fight radicalization, maybe we can find the space of pre-criminalization where we can prevent individuals from becoming further radicalized and further falling into terrorism. Society will benefit from it. We can prevent horrific potential things, but we will also be attacking the problem at the source.
To answer your question, we feel that we are part of the solution, but we need to adjust and evolve, and this is not the last step in our fight against terrorism and radicalization.
The Chair: I'd like the questions to be concise and, Mr. Minister, the answers to be concise.
Mr. Blaney: Sorry.
Senator Runciman: You gave a lengthy explanation with respect to the bill, and I appreciate that.
With these 10 individuals, I'm not aware of the circumstances, but I understand they weren't charged and there are no charges being contemplated. I understand if indeed family members tipped off authorities with respect to this occurring, you don't want to scare the community in terms of reacting in a similar fashion going forward.
I'm just wondering how you react to this now. These 10 individuals have been identified, three previous to that. What happens?
Perhaps Mr. Coulombe can respond to this in terms of determining how these individuals became radicalized, how they came to the point where they made a decision they wanted to join the jihad, and what are we doing to deal with that issue? Obviously something has occurred, whether it was in a school, on the Internet, wherever the process was undertaken to convince these individuals that this was the thing to do this with their lives.
Mr. Blaney: Counter-narrative, reaching out to the individual, working with the community, working with all the stakeholders involved, not only the police. We need to have an overall approach. We need to come up with a solution. That's the first pillar of our counter-terrorism strategy: prevention and preventing individuals from being radicalized.
Senator White: Commissioner, we've had a number of people return to Canada that have been involved in terrorist activity and supporting terrorist activity. Could you walk us through any arrests, charges and where those investigations sit today, or if there haven't been any, whether you see any barriers to successful prosecutions?
Mr. Paulson: Well, I won't talk through any specific cases, but I can say that one of the groups of people that cause us all concern are people who we have identified as having returned from areas they had gone off to in order to participate in terrorist activities.
The impediments to getting prosecutions would consist of just purely collecting evidence of intent, engagement with specific terrorist activities and the like, which is not to say that absent a charge, we're not doing anything. I was going to mention during the minister's previous answer that we have established in the government, among all partners, a joint operations centre where we're able to manage all of these people.
For example, the 10 people in Montreal are looked at. You're right, there are no charges as of yet, but we're working with our partners across government locally to see what we can do to engage with them, their families, to get in front of what represents an obvious threat that has been interrupted.
Primarily what we're doing is managing it through the joint operations centre where we get evidence. We can bring a peace bond.
One of the things proposed in this legislation is to lower the thresholds, which we welcome, because I think that would make it more expedient towards allowing us to get actions and controls on individuals for whom we can reasonably suspect their intent to participate in terrorist activities.
Senator White: Commissioner, thank you for that. I know you were here previously and identified the concerns around getting Crown approval. Very few charges in Canada require Crown approval, certainly nationally. Does this legislation get us to the point that you were searching for?
Mr. Paulson: No, but it was well argued and thought through in terms of the benefits, the pros and cons on Attorney General consent. I think the operative element to this change is the lower thresholds, both to the peace bond and to the recognizance. We welcome that, and we'll just have to deal with the rest of it.
Senator Jaffer: Thank you to all of you for your presentations.
There is no doubt that we are all worried about the threat. We want to keep our communities safe. I think we're all on the same page on that, but how do we do it?
Minister, you spoke about the four pillars: prevent, detect, deny and respond. I want to talk about prevention, because I think if we prevent, we wouldn't be sitting here.
I have spoken to all three of you about what is happening in different places in the world to deal with prevention issues. I would like you to talk about how you are dealing with issues of root causes. Why did the 10 get involved? How are we dealing with issues of root causes?
From what I understand about the 10, it was the parents that reached out. I'm really glad to hear you, minister, talk about pre-criminalization, because you and I spoke about privately, that it's really important. I would like to hear from you about that.
While I still have a few seconds, minister, when was the last time you met with the cross-cultural round table?
Mr. Blaney: It was in the Atlantic the last time I was there.
Senator Jaffer: What year?
Mr. Blaney: I'd have to check on my calendar. It's not static.
I also want to say that Bill C-51, although it's not a pre-radicalization package, by enabling CSIS officers to be able to disrupt the threat, this will be part of intervening at an earlier process when they have identified an individual at an early stage of radicalization, one who could be radicalized. I see the bill as providing a legal foundation for enabling the government to be more involved at an earlier stage in the radicalization when information is provided, and I would invite my deputy minister to give you an over-brief of what we are doing and where we are heading in terms of radicalization.
François Guimont, Deputy Minister, Public Safety Canada: The first point I would make, Mr. Chair, is that we have been active on the prevention of radicalization for a number of years. Both of my colleagues here, the commissioner and Mr. Coulombe, have had initiatives to engage and train not only law enforcement people but also first responders. That's the first thing. We have been active. We have had sessions measured in the hundreds over the last couple of years. We're trying to increase that tempo.
Second, we are looking at more focused intervention, and the terminology we've used is "re-direct," with a view to bringing individuals who could be on the margin of flipping on the area of doing terrorist-type activities or thinking about it, bringing them into a proper fold, if you wish. That will imply a whole-of-government approach as well as whole-of-society, as the minister said, meaning our working with the provinces, municipal governments and social services. The purpose of this is to take a very personalized approach to individuals where we engage with them directly and provide a counter-rationale to what terrorism activities are and the consequences of it. We're going to be working at augmenting that effort over the next couple of months.
Senator Jaffer: Minister, I understand the last time you met with the round table was on June 16, 2014. You haven't met with them since then; is that correct?
Mr. Blaney: I will come back with the date. This was an earlier meeting.
Mr. Guimont: I meet regularly with the cross-cultural round table. I don't remember missing any of the gatherings, and my deputy minister colleague from Justice does the same. We take the round table very seriously.
Mr. Blaney: Minister MacKay attended the last one. I will get back to you with the exact date.
The Chair: Senator Stewart Olsen.
Senator Stewart Olsen: I believe my question has been answered. I wanted to get you on the record about privacy. When you spoke about the privacy impact analysis, it was quite reassuring to people.
I'm happy to pass my time on.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: Let me congratulate you for last Thursday's announcement. I was there, by the way.
We just heard several witnesses from Sikh and Hindu communities tell us they had been victims of terrorist acts. Thirty years have gone by since the attack on Air India's Flight 182 cost the lives of many people, including 278 Canadians.
What can we do today to cooperate with these communities in order to fight terrorism?
Mr. Blaney: Thank you for your question, senator, and also for having been present at last week's announcement. You must have noticed the many representatives of cultural communities there.
It is essential that the government take the necessary measures to deal with the more radical elements of society. I would like to answer your question, which deals with preventing radicalization.
My deputy minister alluded to the Trans-Cultural Roundtable, but that is only one of the tools we have to reach cultural communities. The RCMP has organized over 800 training sessions to raise these communities' awareness of the realities they might face, and to make sure they have the tools they need to fight radicalization. Our intelligence community is also active in this regard. Our government has made significant efforts, within the Kanishka Project, to understand the processes and modus operandi of recruiters. Results have been extremely interesting. For example, the mother of a young man who lost his life in a terrorist attack took part in creating a video entitled Extreme Dialogue in order to raise the public's awareness.
We have built up an expertise and gained knowledge, and we will continue working with communities. It is critical that we work with all of our civil society partners and bring in other levels of government. That is why I intend to meet with Ms. Lise Thériault and my provincial and territorial counterparts. We have in fact already met. It is all about teamwork. I can tell you — and you know this well, being yourself a former police officer in Quebec — that it is reassuring to know that there is excellent cooperation among police services at the operational level. These efforts warrant recognition, because they have helped us foil a good many plots. I was in Montreal last week, and with the help of a parent, we stopped some youths from committing irreparable acts of violence. This was a concerted action, and we intend to expand our mission of preventing radicalization. We must work on debunking the myths used by recruiters and agents of radicalization to seduce those most vulnerable by offering them a different view of the fact that exposes the brutal reality hiding behind the impassioned rhetoric of radicals.
Senator Dagenais: I have a question for Commissioner Paulson.
As you said in your remarks, tabling budgets does not solve everything. You have to reassign resources. According to some media, you had to reassign people from Operation Condor.
With these new budgets set aside for you, how will you go about transferring resources to the project? It is not easy shifting people around from one unit to the next. You need specialized investigators.
Mr. Paulson: You are right, it is not easy. We are currently assessing our priorities and transferring staff where they are most needed. It is as simple as that. And we will carry that momentum forward, because it is all we can do.
[English]
Senator Day: Gentlemen, I would like to go first to the question of prevention. You have talked about that, Mr. Minister, and the commissioner has talked about those who are returning and have intent to cause harm. We're told that the best recruiting is social media. Maybe this is Mr. Coulombe's side of things. It seems to me if you could get on social media a few of those returning who didn't like the desert flies and the poor food that they had, and it wasn't as much of an adventure as they thought it would be when they left, that could well discourage the recruiting. Are you working on that angle?
Mr. Coulombe: Well, I'm not going to talk specifically about what the service is doing, but for sure, if you look at the experience in other countries — you are talking about counter-narrative — the counter-narrative coming from somebody who actually was a member of al Qaeda or ISIS and has now changed has a lot of credibility with young people who are looking at possibly going down that path. That has been used by other countries as part of their prevention program, and it certainly is something that should be considered in terms of that counter-narrative.
Senator Day: My next question deals with income tax information, taxpayers' information. Proposed subsection (b) of clause 6 of the bill at page 9 talks about taxpayer information. We had the Canada Revenue Agency here, and they just wanted to focus on the charity aspect. This is much broader. It is all taxpayer information. The "designated taxpayer" definition has been removed. The tests are for both CSIS and RCMP, either prosecution under the Criminal Code or CSIS investigation, yet this provision provides for sharing taxpayers' information with 17 different agencies.
Rather than filtering the 17 agencies' information to CSIS and the RCMP to determine, why aren't we saying we are taking taxpayers' information and disseminating it around 17 different agencies?
Mr. Blaney: Actually, we are already collecting information, Senator Day. I thank you for your question. Actually, that's not exactly the frame in which your question should be put. You have to understand that every piece of information is going from one agency to another. To have the information collected and shared, it has to undermine the security of Canada.
As you know, we already have the listing of terrorist entities. Currently, if a civil servant is aware of someone who is providing funding to a terrorist organization, he has the legal responsibility to share this information with the receiving agency. The receiving agency will take this information if it pertains to its mandate. That's how the law is clearly defined.
As I indicated in my speech, there will be a privacy impact statement. If you are breaking the law and there are financial implications, we will now be able to track those individuals who are contributing to the funding of terrorism.
Let me go back to those 10 individuals caught last week in Montreal. The question is who paid for their ticket? Who paid for their passport? Who enrolled them in this network that would potentially pay for an airplane ticket for them? Who is guilty? Is it the person paying the ticket? I think so. That's why we need to have the tools to be able to target those individuals who are funding terrorists. They are committing a criminal act. That's why the bill is set in such a form.
Senator Day: I have run out of time, so I can't pursue this, but the wording of this section isn't nearly as restrictive as you portray it.
Senator Wells: Thank you, minister and panel, for appearing. This is maybe a follow-up to Senator Day's question.
With respect to prosecution and convictions regarding Bill C-51 — and in comparison with Britain and France that have held over 500 prosecutions and convictions — I believe Canada has had 20 prosecutions and I believe about 14 convictions, even though FINTRAC has identified almost 700 terror financing cases from 2009 to 2014. How will this legislation help expedite that or make the prosecutions and convictions more efficient?
Mr. Blaney: The bill is targeting information sharing. It does not impact the prosecution side. Maybe Commissioner Paulson could comment on it?
Mr. Paulson: Although the relationship with FINTRAC and the quality of the information that we are receiving is very good, we still come up against thresholds and standards for prosecution. I think this bill will help in the information sharing, allowing paths into other areas that will corroborate and strengthen the belief and ultimately the evidence we will have to produce in court to demonstrate to a much higher standard that, indeed, it is terrorist financing.
You are right that the information coming from FINTRAC does suggest and elevate suspicion in these areas. It is up to us to go in and get the hard evidence to close the deal, as it were. Having this information-sharing arrangement is an avenue into strengthening that.
Senator Wells: Given that we are near the end of the parliamentary session and that there will be a gap before things start up again, how important is timely passage of this bill? What will we lose if we don't pass it?
Mr. Blaney: This is a bill that is important to my heart. This is a bill that I feel is important for the safety of this country. I fully expect and hope that we will be able to adopt this bill so that these gentlemen, whose mandate is to protect us, will have all the tools that they need to do their job in this evolving and growing threat environment which is not as calm as we would wish it to be.
The Chair: Commissioner Paulson, in respect to the question of the charities and the financing of terrorism, what I don't quite understand is there seems to be either no will or no law on the books in respect to the actual prosecution of those individuals that are directly involved as far as directorships are concerned with charities. Does there have to be a change in the law, or is there an interpretation of the law that doesn't allow us to do it?
Mr. Paulson: Well, I cannot identify a need for a change in the law right now.
One of the most difficult things we have seen, even in our markets outside of terrorism, is the difficulty in getting the evidence that will close the deal in court. We can have strong suspicions and reasonable grounds on which to suspect that people are doing things like supporting terrorism, but when we go to get that evidence, it is difficult.
It sounds like I'm complaining. I'm not. It's just hard work. It would benefit from better police work and from more covert techniques on our part, which we are bringing to bear. I think it is a police effort that needs to be sharpened rather than any laws.
Mr. Blaney: To get back to the question of Senator Wells, Senator Wells, you may recall that the sister of Patrice Vincent came to testify. She said:
[Translation]
If Bill C-51 had been in effect on October 19, Martin Couture-Rouleau would have been in jail and my brother would not be dead today.
These are the people I had in mind, including Patrice Vincent, when I tabled this bill. If we can save the life of a single honest Canadian because of this bill, we will have reached our objective.
To answer the senator's question, it was in January, in Halifax, that I attended the cross-cultural roundtable with Minister MacKay, who also attended a subsequent meeting.
[English]
The Chair: One last question, since we don't get the commissioner here that often. Could you update us in respect of when we can expect to see the full report to Canadians and Parliament about the Patrice Vincent and Michael Zehaf- Bibeau incident and the unedited video?
Mr. Paulson: We are on the verge of releasing our reports that the OPP has done on our performance outside of the house and our engagement inside. Assistant Commissioner Gilles Michaud is arranging to do that this week or early next week.
We also are preparing to release the remaining 18 seconds of the video, and that should be within a couple of weeks.
The Chair: We have come to the end of our time. I want to thank you, Mr. Minister, for coming here today. We certainly appreciate the fact that you have come here for the second time on this important piece of legislation. I will, therefore, excuse the witnesses.
Joining us for our final panel of the day are Mr. Robert Morrison, as an individual; and Mr. Gord Cameron, a partner at Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP.
Gentlemen, welcome. I understand you each have an opening statement. I would invite Mr. Morrison to begin, followed by Mr. Cameron.
Robert Morrison, as an individual: Thank you, Mr. Chair, and committee members. I have come here not only as an individual but specifically in terms of a prior role that I had with the government before I retired. A few years ago, it was determined that there wasn't really any overarching coordination to ensure intelligence collaboration within the federal government. As a result, I was seconded to the Treasury Board Secretariat from the RCMP to be the director general of the information-sharing environment in 2012.
My career: I did 35 years with the RCMP. I was a liaison officer in Islamabad, Pakistan, as well. I retired at the rank of a chief superintendent.
As a result of my secondment to Treasury Board, I was there to establish a program for intelligence sharing across Canada. The program, which we called the ISE, which was the information-sharing environment, was to collaborate with agencies like CBSA, CRA, CIC, DND, RCMP, CSIS and others.
After eight months, due to priorities at the Treasury Board Secretariat with the Shared Services Canada initiative, the funding was withdrawn. But I can give you examples of projects that worked while we were set up as the ISE.
In one pilot project, I worked with two different agencies over a 400-kilometre stretch of the border between Canada and the United States. We wanted to share intelligence files between the two agencies in a controlled environment. The control was one group was in one room and the other group was in another. Neither agency could see the other agency's intelligence information. We wanted to demonstrate whether both parties knew what investigations each were working on and what they were doing, each one of them, and also demonstrate, if there were any, missing links between the two agencies. It was really a small, controlled environment.
We found that there were over 40 files that neither agency knew the other one had. The files were things like organized crime, gang involvement, importation of drugs and guns, weapons importation. It demonstrated that although we thought we were doing a good job sharing information, we really were not doing a very good job at all.
The proposed anti-terrorism bill, C-51, will enable the creation of the Canadian information-sharing environment. The program will increase security for Canadians by supporting intelligence and information sharing within government and supporting provincial, territorial and municipal agencies. By sharing information in a manner that is consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and with the protection of privacy, it will enable intelligence partners to support information-sharing initiatives nationally and internationally, with the right information to the right person at the right time.
C-51 will enable effective and responsible intelligence sharing by driving collaborative intelligence initiatives so it will be accurate, timely, reliable and proactive. What I'm talking about here is suspicious activity reporting. For an example, we might have an oil refinery. The company reports that there was a hole cut in the fence around the perimeter. Alone, is that really a big issue? A municipality next door to the oil refinery reports that, overnight, a laundry and dry cleaning facility had a break-in, and 40 uniforms were stolen that belonged to that oil refinery. The next municipality over reported that there was a large theft of fertilizer. That on its own doesn't mean anything. Add to that that there was an intelligence agency that had information from one of their sources that there was going to be some action taken against an oil refinery in northern Alberta. If we look at all of those independently, it really doesn't mean much. When you start putting the pieces together, it means a lot.
Bill C-51 will enable efficient sharing through standards and shared technology to address common intelligence- sharing needs. What I'm talking about here is accuracy. Good data in, good data out. Garbage in, garbage out. I'm talking about ensuring that databases are accurate. It will improve nation-wide decision making through secure, trusted sharing between partners being proactive, accurate, timely and reliable.
The information-sharing environment will protect the privacy of Canadians by developing a strategy for information sharing and protection. When I talk about protection, I'm talking about accountability — to have an independent third-party, non-partisan, expert group of individuals to be an oversight group that monitors the information sharing.
I was in an airport a couple weeks ago and some weather came in, so I didn't get out. I happened to be sitting beside two gentlemen who I have never met before, and we were talking about C-51. They didn't know who I was. One of the fellows was a retired school teacher, and he said to me, "Well, I can't agree with C-51. They're going to be sharing information with everybody in Canada." So I talked to him, and I said that's not actually the intent of C-51. I explained that it would be a very controlled environment and that it would be intelligence agencies using information to work toward anti-terrorism investigations only.
The creation of the ISE will achieve the following outcomes.
It will support the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to ensure effective coordination of Canadian intelligence information in a security or intelligence community.
It will establish an ISE senior-level interagency advisory group to enable governance relating to information-sharing standards and initiatives.
It will establish a cross-government ISE privacy accountability committee to ensure information intelligence sharing and privacy compliance with legislation.
It will promote information sharing across all the partners through training and supporting initiatives.
It will support Canadians' participation in Beyond the Border and other information-sharing initiatives.
It will develop a national strategy for information-sharing and protection.
It will encourage the use of data standards amongst agencies and support and encourage provincial, territorial and municipal involvement.
It will demonstrate successes by involving agencies in projects to identify information intelligence gaps and inefficiencies and identify leaders in business processes, operations, standards, architecture, security, access control, privacy protection and accountability.
Bill C-51 will ensure accurate, timely, reliable information sharing while protecting the privacy of our citizens.
Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Morrison.
Mr. Cameron.
Gord Cameron, Partner, Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP, as an individual: Senators, I'm speaking here on behalf of a group of special advocates. I'll get to exactly who they are in a minute, but they are the special advocates who have actually acted on security certificate cases in confidential proceedings before the Federal Court. We prepared a statement, which I believe has been circulated to you, and I have very brief opening comments.
So that you understand our concern with this legislation — I'm speaking here to a fairly narrow part of the legislation — the special advocates understand that Canada has to have a process by which we decide which non- citizens are allowed to stay in the country and which are going to be told to leave. Our courts and Parliament have said that the person who is going to be deported has a right to know the case against them and to answer it. The problem comes when part or sometimes all of the case against the person who is to be deported is secret and can't be shown to that person. That's where special advocates come in.
We get security cleared. We are all at least 20-year senior trial lawyers. We get to see the secret information and act in a way as if we were that person's lawyer in the closed Federal Court proceedings where the security certificate is tested. We answer what the Supreme Court says was a constitutional gap in the process, because if it weren't for the special advocates, there would be nobody in the closed courtroom to speak on behalf of the named person and challenge the government's case.
Because it matters to what I want to say about the legislation, I'll describe briefly how the special advocate works. The first thing "he" or "she" does — in theory there are some female special advocates, but so far it has all been male special advocates and male deportees, so I tend to use the male pronoun. The special advocate starts out by having an intensive interview with the named person, the person to be deported, before the special advocate sees any of the secret information. The reason for that interview — which can go on for days, and in my case once went on for more than a week — is that once the special advocate sees the secret information, he can't go back to the named person and ask for an explanation for it, which is what a lawyer would do in a normal case. You would look at the Crown's case and go back to your client and ask, "How do you explain this?" He says, "I was in Brazil at the time," and you say, "Okay, there is our defence."
You can't ask that question as a special advocate. You learn the allegations against the person and then you're on your own. You're on your own in this way: The government delivers you cartons and cartons of documents. It's also put on an electronic database. You go through it and determine whether this page or that report might be relevant to the government's case or might be relevant to the named person's case in a way that would help test the reliability of that information.
You're mainly looking for two things when looking at this information. You're asking yourself if this information is reliable. Perhaps it's from a foreign government, a foreign intelligence agency. Does that government have another agenda? Is Canada being used as a pawn to implement some other government's agenda? Is this reliable information that impugns the named person?
Perhaps you're looking at a human source who has ratted on the named person. You ask yourself if there are other motives for this evidence. Is what is being said about this person reliable?
It's the same kind of thing you would do in a criminal defence but without access to your client, so to speak, to get feedback and help you through the process. You're in a room by yourself looking at a computer screen for weeks and weeks or, in some cases, months and months, sifting through this information and seeing what you can do to test the government's case.
As you might know, five cases have gone through the Federal Court so far. The government has an uneven record; they've won some and lost some.
One of the cases they lost is the case of Hassan Almrei. His security certificate, the first time it went through the system in the old days without a special advocate, was upheld. He languished in jail for seven or eight years waiting for the courts to digest the legalities of it.
The second time the security certificate came around, the new regime was in place, and special advocates were appointed to test the government's case. This time, the special advocates found the information in the government files that were disclosed to them that basically caused the government's case to fall apart, and now Hassan Almrei's certificate was found not reasonable and that part of the proceeding against him was terminated.
The reason we're concerned about this new legislation is it would introduce new provisions that would restrict the information given to the special advocates. We wouldn't get that information that we used to take apart the government's case in that example. The government filters what is given to the special advocates on the basis of what the government considers to be relevant, which in the case I just described didn't include all the stuff the special advocates used to take apart the government's case.
Now, you might ask: Does the Conservative government want all their information on Bill C-51 filtered by Thomas Mulcair as to what is relevant to their decision? Probably not. They probably want to look at the information themselves and make their own decision. So, too, do the special advocates have no objection to information being filtered on relevance. We don't want to be putting irrelevant information before the court. We just don't want the other side deciding what we see.
The minister, with the greatest respect, misunderstood the question that was put to him by Senator Mitchell when he said, "Well, a judge will decide when that happens." Wrong. The judge doesn't get that information, either. The government does the initial filter of all the information that goes to the judge and the special advocate. We get the same package.
What the minister was talking about was something different. After that process has gone through its initial phase, then the government can ask for a special exception about some of the information the judge got that they don't want to go to the special advocate. There's no explanation, never has been, about why that might be appropriate, but that's a different thing. At least in that case, a judge will rule on whether this information should go to the special advocate or not; the government needs it cleared.
But at the initial phase, when 10,000 or whatever documents have gone through for what's relevant and what goes in the garbage, that is done for the government, and the same package goes to the judge and the special advocates after having been filtered by the government. That's the main difficulty we have with these IRPA provisions.
Thank you.
The Chair: We'll start with Senator Mitchell.
Senator Mitchell: I'm very troubled by your analysis, not because I think it's wrong but because I think it's right. It is very difficult to fathom why the government would want this change, why it would want to inflict a real restriction or inhibition on due process, where the special advocate is not allowed to release information, in any event, if it's top secret information. What could the government possibly achieve within the realm of proper due process by it being the one that gets to review the information that both the judge and the special advocate get? What could they be thinking?
Mr. Cameron: Well, there are different motives you could ascribe to that. One is the government likes to control the information its adversaries might have to work against them, but let's put the best possible colour on it and say the government doesn't want to waste people's time by giving them a bunch of irrelevant information on which to assess the situation.
I would say to give me the information. I'll decide if it's irrelevant. We have document management software. It's a fairly efficient process by which we can go through these documents and decide what's relevant and what's not. I'd say don't worry about saving my time. I've got time to do this. I can save the judge some time if he or she asks me to do the initial cut at it.
To answer your question, the only thing I can think of is that they're trying to avoid a document dump, where people get buried in irrelevant information, and make it an efficient process. I would say, "Don't you decide how to make my process efficient. I'll look at the documents and do my own filtering."
Senator Mitchell: It just can't be fair to have one side in this process making those kinds of decisions. That is essentially what you're saying.
Mr. Cameron: Exactly.
Senator Mitchell: It defies the logic and the imagination.
Mr. Cameron: Senator Mitchell, it's easily fixed by just a few words in what is now, I believe, clause 59 of Bill C-51, where instead of talking about giving what is relevant to the case — this is in our submission — you would say "all information or other evidence related to the named person." It's going to be related, then let the special advocate and the judge decide whether it's relevant.
Senator Mitchell: Thank you.
Mr. Morrison, you're quite convinced that this is going to be the panacea for the sharing of information. What thought have you given and what have you gotten out of this bill from your analysis that, one, there are enough resources to set up the databases properly; two, that there's any kind of review for the reliability of the information shared; three, that once shared, that information can't be shared with some other third party, such as a nation, as was the case with Maher Arar; and, four, what security for privacy will there be for this information that's in some broad database?
The Chair: I think that's enough questions.
Senator Mitchell: Blacklock's, a website news service, points out that CIC is already sharing fingerprint data on immigrants, temporary foreign workers, without authorization to do that at all. What confidence do you have that this will work right if nobody is checking on these people?
Mr. Morrison: If I miss a question, I'll have to come back to you.
Senator Mitchell: The chair has been very patient with me.
Mr. Morrison: On the human resource issue or funding, you're absolutely right. If the government is going to form an information-sharing environment, it's going to have to be funded.
Part of that information-sharing environment would have, for example, an individual from the Privacy Commissioner's office embedded in that team. That answers two questions maybe. One is how we effectively ensure that the privacy legislation is under control, and that's by having an individual part of that team come before the Privacy Commissioner, who understands the rules and what information can be released or not released. It sort of gets into that third party.
What I'm talking about is the information-sharing environment is a group of individuals that are experts in information sharing. They would understand releasing information to third parties. They also understand that once you release information, it's very difficult to get it back, as we've found historically.
When I'm talking about the panacea, I think there's the ability here now to have a group that effectively manages information sharing or intelligence sharing in a very controlled and expertise type of way.
I think there was another question in there.
Senator Mitchell: That's great.
Senator Runciman: I have a couple of questions for both witnesses. I thank them for being here.
Mr. Cameron, I think you mentioned that the minister was wrong. He may well have been, I'm not sure, but I was searching for the section of the explanation of that provision in the act. It reads to me that if "considerations of fairness and natural justice require it," the judge may ask the special advocate to make submissions regarding the exemption of information. I'm just wondering how that applies to the concern you expressed here.
Mr. Cameron: There are two things going on here. One is what information is given to the special advocate and the judge as a package. That is filtered by the government as to relevance, and that's our concern.
There's a separate, very real concern, which is once that process has been gone through and it has been sent to the judge, the ministers can say, "We want you to carve out some of that information, even though it's relevant" — even relevant information — "and not let the special advocate see it." On that point, the judge does decide.
But if it's something that's still back in the government's offices that never got delivered to the court, then no one looks at it. The judge doesn't and the special advocate doesn't.
Senator Runciman: You say there's no requirement of a Federal Court judge in a process like that? There's no potential involvement?
Mr. Cameron: No, that's the point. On the process of what documents get filtered out, there's no Federal Court judge involved. He and the special advocate get documents filtered by the government under this process.
Senator Runciman: But those documents are going to be, I assume, utilized during the process itself.
Mr. Cameron: What does make it through the filter gets used in the process. What never makes it is never seen.
Senator Runciman: I see. You're talking about what never makes it out of the minister's office, essentially.
Mr. Cameron: Exactly.
Senator Runciman: Mr. Morrison, thank you as well for being here. I wanted you to take a minute or two to tell us more about your background because you've emphasized the importance of information sharing among national security agencies and how critically important that is.
I think it's fair to say that you have lauded the government with respect to the provisions of Bill C-51 and how they're trying to improve the area. I know we've had accusations that this could result in a fishing expedition and those kinds of things, which I think have been effectively dealt with but consistently ignored.
I'm just wondering if you could talk a bit about your background in the intelligence community, which I think would lend emphasis to the importance of the provisions in Bill C-51.
Mr. Morrison: As a liaison officer, the primary role of the RCMP abroad is to assist Canadians who might be in trouble or to assist a country that has citizens in Canada that have law enforcement issues.
When I was in Islamabad, I was responsible for 17 countries, so I was in central and southwest Asia and some of the Middle East. I effectively travelled to 17 different countries.
I gave a presentation at a Middle East police law enforcement meeting in Dubai in 2003, and my topic of conversation was information sharing internationally, realizing that everybody is afraid to share information, especially internationally, because some countries have rules where once they get that information, they can do whatever they want with it.
It would be maybe a vision to have a group of people who are all at the right security clearances to be able to share information to see if we could put the dots together to effectively combat terrorism and organized crime. Terrorists and organized crime individuals are pretty crafty and they're international, so it's really hard to get a full picture, the same as Mr. Cameron is talking about, without having all that information.
So my travels abroad and also working within Canada is where I became more passionate on the information intelligence sharing role and, really, where our responsibility as Canadians is to be sharing information at the right time with the right people effectively — "effectively" meaning accountable.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: I would like to thank our two witnesses for having agreed to appear today. My question is for Mr. Morrison. As you know, certain things have been announced within the government's next budget. Do you believe that the Security Intelligence Review Committee will have all the tools it needs to effectively fulfil its mandate, including overseeing CSIS?
[English]
Mr. Morrison: That's a pretty difficult question. I could say "maybe," but on what CSIS's role would be, I think they've commented on that. I think they feel they have the resources. You're not talking SIRC; you're talking CSIS. I think so.
I think maybe a year or two after Bill C-51 and there's a review as to the causes and effects of Bill C-51 would probably be the time to address whether the agencies have the resources that they require. Do they need more resources? Will resources be put in place for the information-sharing environment team to start with, which may be a better question?
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: I am a former policeman, so I understand the situation. Normally, a police force has all the tools it needs to monitor the work of police. Allow me to say it was also hard for me to ask the question.
[English]
Senator Jaffer: Thank you to both of you for being here. My first question is to Mr. Cameron.
I read your brief earlier and I have also looked at the bill. When I was listening to you, did I hear you say that there are three lenses or three roles: the judge's role, a role for the prosecutor and a role for those called to be representing the client? I know you don't quite represent the client. You're the special advocate. I was a criminal lawyer. I know there are different roles to be played.
To start with, what's happening here is that the prosecutor is playing the role of everybody and deciding which piece information he should be sharing. His lens is different from yours.
The other thing is that when you're looking through documents, you already have the narrative of the person that you are representing. You are looking at the documents with that narrative in mind. If you're denied all those documents that would help you support the narrative — that is, you haven't even been able to see those documents — that's the issue.
There are three different lenses looking at the documents. If you don't even get to see that narrative that could help you in defending or looking after the interests that the person you're representing is talking about, is that not the issue?
Mr. Cameron: That's the difficulty, yes.
Senator Jaffer: So the person prosecuting is deciding what the narrative should be.
Mr. Cameron: They're deciding what tools the special advocate gets to challenge their own case. If I had to arm my opponent, I'd know how to do it. I'd give him a peashooter and give myself a machine gun.
To address a comment made by Senator Mitchell, namely, why they would do this, I would say the converse is true. They should not object to the type of amendment we are proposing where we say, "Don't give us what's relevant. Give us what's related to it. Let us do the filtering." What can be offensive about that? Just give us your files.
Senator Jaffer: Mr. Morrison, I listened to you carefully. You make a compelling argument about sharing documents. I come from British Columbia. As someone who was very much affected by Air India, the issue was about not sharing. The minister called them silos.
My anxiousness is not about sharing documents. It's about where the documents end up. I would like to hear from you about the memorandum of understanding. My bigger angst is sharing documents with foreign governments. Everybody remembers the Maher Arar situation. I'd like you to comment on whether those memorandums of understanding should be in place beforehand and what they should look like.
Mr. Morrison: When I spoke about what safeguards should be in place and forming the information-sharing environment team, if you want to call it if a team, once Bill C-51 passes, I think that's where the MOAs would be developed in a manner consistent with our Charter, the minister and the Privacy Commissioner so that we know where the shared information is going.
You're right; we had a downfall where we shared the information and we lost it. Somebody got it and it shouldn't have been there. It's like source information that isn't reliable. When you share that, where is it going to go?
If that source information is from one agency who says their source told them something that happened but that source has never been involved in any information sharing before, you wouldn't put that source as reliable. It's unknown reliability because you don't know for sure. You couldn't really share that. However, if another agency had that same individual and they had a statement from that individual saying they were involved in some terrorist activity, all of a sudden you're starting to build a case where now that informant information that you didn't know was reliable is becoming more believable. That's where you need to have the right group of people together to ensure you're not releasing that unknown reliability information until you get all the pieces together. Without having that oversight or a committee to do that, you're running the risk of who's sharing what with whom, especially internationally.
Senator White: Thanks to both of you for being here.
Mr. Cameron, I recognize there's a difference in the manner in which the hearing is held. But what you describe when it comes to the Crown sharing information with the advocate is exactly the way it works with the defence under Stinchcombe today in Canada. The Crown determines relevance in each case. It's not left to the defence to go through the entire police file and say, "I believe this is relevant." Stinchcombe was clear in that it put the pressure on the Crown in the first place.
Mr. Cameron: I take the point, but whenever we have an analogy to the criminal law, you have to understand the differences in the contexts.
In the criminal context where there's Stinchcombe-type of disclosure, you have a proceeding where what's happening to the accused is happening in open court and he sees everything going on.
The special advocate can't consult with the named person. The named person isn't in the room, so that special advocate needs every piece of information he or she can get in order to understand how to mount an effective challenge.
Senator White: I do understand the difference. When we look at these cases, it's not as if it's an individual with an individual crime either. It's a large amount of intelligence that might have a small sliver that pertains specifically to the individual. I would be challenged that we would allow full access to the advocate to go through this information which absolutely may not be relevant in any way. I guess I have a higher level of trust for the Crown prosecutor, who doesn't represent the government, by the way. They're not there for a conviction in the case of a criminal case or even for success. They're there to ensure that the evidence is presented to have a fairer decision. I certainly don't have as jaundiced a look at the Crown as you might, maybe because of my background. I'm challenged by the fact that they should have greater access to greater unknown relevance. I think someone has to determine relevance.
I do trust that the Crown representing the interests of Canadians is there.
Mr. Cameron: The useful filter, we think, is that the information be related to the named person. We're not just asking to wade it willy-nilly into the government's documents. In all cases it would have to be related to the named person. In the security intelligence context, given that it's so much more difficult for anybody to decide what is relevant, we think "related to" is a more appropriate standard. If that means I have to look at ten boxes instead of two, it's a burden I'll —
Senator White: We'll try not to put too much of a burden on you. I do have another question, though.
We've had people recommend that we have special teams of terrorism prosecutors and even specific federal judges who are trained specifically to deal with terrorism manners. In fact, one of them was Justice John Major. Where would your thinking be in relation to those two areas?
Mr. Cameron: Do you mean for criminal prosecutions or for national security cases like warrant cases such as these?
Senator White: Both, actually.
Mr. Cameron: The Federal Court recognized that requirement a while ago and they established a subset of the bench. They're called "designated judges," which is short for designated to hear security intelligence measures. They're already there on that.
Senator White: From the Crown prosecutor perspective?
Mr. Cameron: The national security litigation section at the Department of Justice is specialized in that area.
Senator White: You feel both have already satisfied those concerns?
Mr. Cameron: In the national security context, yes. On the criminal side, I don't know of any special subset of the bar or the bench that has criminal terrorism specialization.
The Chair: Perhaps I should follow up, because you seem fairly knowledgeable about that. Have there been 10 judges designated for that particular area? Do you have any idea?
Mr. Cameron: That's in the ballpark. As people come and go, the number fluctuates, but there's one judge who is appointed by the Chief Justice to be in charge of the designated judges, and then a half a dozen or 10 other judges hear the secret warrant cases. They're familiar with handling intelligence matters. They know what a CSIS file looks like. It is a specialized bench.
The Chair: This is the most specific response we have had in our hearings in respect to this type of domain.
Mr. Cameron: They operate in a physically special facility that has security and is soundproof, and nobody goes in who isn't security cleared. They check their phones at the door. The Federal Court is well set up to handle exactly this type of information.
The Chair: You have been involved as a participant in those types of proceedings?
Mr. Cameron: Many of them, yes.
The Chair: I would like to follow up in respect of the special advocate. We have been told that one of the concerns in the area of public security and national security is the interchange of information from country to country. There are concerns by other countries that if Canada allows their information to become public in any manner at all, that could put their intelligence at risk. Subsequently, they're reluctant, obviously, to provide that information if Canada is going to do that.
It would seem to me that, in this particular case where we have an individual who has been clearly identified to the point that there's a hearing, if there's information from another country that there are concerns that that information may well be misused, then doesn't it make sense that the judge would make that decision to hold that information from the proceedings, or at least in confidence?
Mr. Cameron: It would certainly be held from the named person or any public disclosure. The question is, should it be withheld from the special advocate? That would be a question of whether any foreign agency would respect the fact that once they give their confidential information, which they have a good reason for not wanting disclosed publicly, they want to be confident that CSIS runs a tight ship. They only give that information to people who are security cleared and will look at it in premises that are secure, and special advocates fit that bill. As a matter of fact, among the world of Canadian security intelligence information management, there aren't many places I have seen that are as tight a ship as the special advocates.
Secure information from other foreign agencies goes to first-, second-, third-year intelligence officers at CSIS who just got their security clearance. In the case of special advocates, you are talking about lawyers who have a minimum of 20 years at the bar and who pass all of the security intelligence requirements. They have to go out of their office into a special secure — I will say lead-lined, for want of a better description — windowless premise to look at it. They can't leave with anything. If you were defending yourself to another agency, you could well say that this is one of the most secure places your information will go. We're generally secure, but don't worry about the special advocates, because they're a very tight group.
The Chair: Mr. Morrison, I want to pursue for a minute your background that Senator Runciman referred to and the technical area and surveillance you were involved in. Perhaps you could give us a brief update in respect to the question of surveillance and the technology and the way it has changed and the need for a new legislative base to be able to meet some of the technological changes that have taken place.
Mr. Morrison: Again, further into my background, I was in a section called Special "I" in the RCMP, and that's covert electronic surveillance. I was involved in that program for quite a while.
What has changed in the last few years, of course, is the amount of data out there. That has changed dramatically due to open-source information on the Internet, et cetera. There is also the complexity of investigations in relation to organized crime getting smarter. Organized crime and national security are basically same thing. Those people are very organized, very smart, and worldwide. That's extremely complex. They know the techniques of law enforcement or intelligence agencies in how they gather intelligence, so that's where you have to be a step ahead and keep changing. You can't keep putting that microphone in the same coffee cup. You have to start changing your tactics to be ahead of the knowledge of the organized crime people you are dealing with. When you look at how worldwide these organizations are, if you are not sharing information or intelligence, it is really difficult to get all the pieces of the pie.
Senator Mitchell: Mr. Cameron, in the case of the new CSIS warranting for disruptive activities, there is no specified provision or requirement that a special advocate be considered in that process. If I'm not mistaken, no special advocate is required in the decision to put somebody on the no-fly list. The minister said that a judge can call a special advocate any time. What is your answer to the minister in that case? Is that true?
Mr. Cameron: What a judge can do is ask someone to act as his or her amicus, friend of the court, and give them powers roughly like a special advocate.
We would feel more comfortable and frankly the legislation is more likely to survive a review by the Supreme Court of Canada if the appointment of a special advocate is mandatory in both of those situations. The absence of a special advocate in relation to the no-fly list has already been identified by a number of commentators as a potential Charter Achilles tendon to that provision.
In both situations, the warrant situation and the no-fly list, the judge's role should include consideration, at least. He should be instructed by the legislation to consider the appointment of an amicus to consider the interests of the person who can't be present, and also the constitutionality of what the judge is being asked to do.
If it's in the legislation, then he has some both moral authority and legislative authority to combat what we are seeing in the courts these days, which is strong resistance on the part of Department of Justice lawyers to the appointment of an amicus. You would think they would say, "Bring it on; we're not afraid of someone challenging our case." But they're fighting us. They're fighting the judges when they try to appoint an amicus to challenge the government's case. If you could put it in the legislation, as we propose, that the judge has the opportunity and the right to appoint an amicus and should consider doing so, then the judge doesn't have to face such a battle when he's considering that point.
Senator Mitchell: Is an amicus the same thing as a special advocate?
Mr. Cameron: The short answer is no, because an amicus is given a set of responsibilities right from the get-go. An amicus is told, "You will do one, two, three and four, but not five, six, seven and eight." An amicus could have the powers of a special advocate, but might have less.
Senator Mitchell: It is the judge's decision.
Mr. Cameron: That is the judge's decision.
Senator Day: Mr. Cameron, flowing from what Senator Mitchell was just asking, do you draw a distinction — there obviously is in terms of the hierarchy — between constitutionality, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the laws of Canada generally? In here, they talk about both. Previously, and existing now, warrants authorize an activity which would otherwise perhaps breach a Canadian law.
Mr. Cameron: Yes.
Senator Day: They're going further here by saying that the judge would authorize the breach of a Canadian law as opposed to authorizing the activity, but the breach of Canadian law and constitutional rights or Charter Rights? How do you square that here? How can we deal with allowing activity that might potentially breach a Canadian law but not interfere with Charter rights?
Mr. Cameron: I would not predict that that provision of the bill will survive review by the Supreme Court of Canada, that you can't smuggle a notwithstanding clause into legislation. If the government wants to pass legislation that it intends to result in a violation of the Charter rights of Canadians, it has to say right up front, "Notwithstanding the Charter, a judge may do X." I just don't see how that's going to survive a Charter challenge.
The Chair: We are coming to the end of our time. I would like to thank the witnesses for taking the time out of their schedule. We certainly appreciate you coming before us.
(The committee adjourned.)