Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
National Security and Defence
Issue 12 - Reports
REPORT OF FACT-FINDING VISIT: 5-6 NOVEMBER 2001
PREPARED FOR THE SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE
ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE
MONTREAL DORVAL AIRPORT
Staff Sergeant Charles Castonguay demonstrated an ion
scanner, a small portable piece of equipment which can be used to detect the
presence of explosives or drugs inside closed containers, such as packages or
luggage. While ion scanners are heavily used by Customs officers, the RCMP is
the first police force to begin to use them.
Racial or ethnic profiling is not used to screen travellers
at airports; instead, travellers are evaluated on the basis of their responses
to questions, their body language, etc.
The RCMP mandate at airports is focused on the activities of
organized crime and enforcement of the federal laws dealing with contraband,
drugs, illegal migrants, Agriculture Canada, the proceeds of crime, copyright
and patents, controlled substances, etc. There are RCMP organized crime units at
the largest international airports. The largest, with staffs of 40 police
officers, are based on Toronto and Montreal, while a 20-person unit is based on
The organized crime units include officials from other
federal government departments. The Montreal unit includes:
· 40 police
· 1 criminal intelligence analyst
· 1 prosecutor
· 1 food inspector
· 1 Customs intelligence officer
· 1 immigration officer
· Special equipment includes an X-ray truck and the
The most common illegal drug intercepted at the airport is
marijuana, followed by cocaine and ecstasy.
According to the Staff Sergeant, the unit could use another
Mr. Pierre-Paul Pharand, Acting Vice-President,
Mr. Pharand began by noting that not much had changed
following the 1999 report on airport security by the Senate Transport Committee;
this was precipitated by 11 September attacks in the United States. Despite
tightened security, two major problems remained:
· Control of restricted area passes – while
employees needing a pass are subject to a background check, a pass could be
obtained even by those with a criminal record;
· Screening of passengers and baggage.
According to Mr. Pharand, the Airport Authority is
responsible for all security except screening passengers and baggage, a task
which the airlines contract out to a private security firm. The best and
quickest way of improving airport security would be to make the Airport
Authority responsible for screening.
· Under the Airport Authority security officers
could do screening one day, traffic control the next and then inside work.
Rotation would ensure that the staff on screening duty was more alert;
· In Quebec the pay for security officers is
$11.00/hr, a lot more than the $7.00 paid in Ontario
· More interesting work and better pay should help
reduce staff turnover.
Mr. Pharand believed that Transport Canada should not be
responsible for both regulating air safety and screening passenger and baggage
screening. The airport Authority would find it much easier to discipline or fire
security officers who fell down on the job. Any extra costs of increased
security should be incorporated into the price of the ticket.
ISSUING AND CONTROL OF PASSES
According to Mr. Pharand, security screening of all workers
on the air side of the barriers is carried out by the RCMP and the Security
Intelligence Service (CSIS) at the request of Transport Canada. The RCMP and
CSIS report back to Transport Canada which then decides whether or not to issue
a pass. All told about 40-50 people are involved in the control of passes of
which there are two kinds: blue for access to restricted areas inside; and, red
for access to outside security areas. At any one time there are about 15,000 –17,000
passes in circulation, including some that have been lost by employees, or that
have not been surrendered by employees when they left their jobs.
· The chip in the pass that allows the holder to
pass through locked doors can be de-activated;
· Employees of employers with high rates of
employee turnover can be given a pass good for only 1-3 years instead of the
usual 5 year;
· Flight crew must now pass through security.
Control of those who work in, or in the vicinity of aircraft,
is still too weak.
· Conditions for these passes should be made more
· Passes should only be given to these workers if
they agree to be subjected to random searches on entering or leaving the
NAVCANADA is responsible for security in the control tower.
The Airport Authority is responsible for 1st
Response in the event of an incident. The response would be controlled from a
· Emergency Response Room
· Airport Authority
· Representatives of police forces with separate
· Health official
· Public relations official
Mobile Command Post – a special truck has been outfitted as
a mobile command post complete with small kitchen and bathroom and
desks/communications for essential staff.
The airport security/intelligence bureau works to identify
weak points in airport security and to evaluate potential threats.
A special committee on safety/security meets regularly to
co-ordinate the work of police, NAVCAN, airport authority, airlines, etc., to
exchange ideas about security weaknesses and possible threats, etc.
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MONTREAL URBAN
AND QUEBEC PROVINCIAL POLICE
The representatives of both the Montreal Urban police and the
Sûreté du Québec praised the level of co-operation and co-ordination which
existed between the three police forces. A RCMP Joint Task Force provided
co-ordination and established the responsibility of each of the three forces in
the event of different incidents/emergencies.
· The local district of the Montreal Urban Police
had assigned officers to patrol inside and outside the terminal when the RCMP
withdrew from policing in 1996. They enforced non-federal laws; the most
common offences were possession of forbidden items and for making threats.
(The costs of this policing and the costs of the additional policing made
necessary by the attacks of 11 September, apparently absorbed by the Montreal
Urban Community, seemed to be something of a sore point with the local
· The role of the Sûreté du Québec was quite
limited. It attached 6 officers to the RCMP Organized Crime Task Forces at the
Dorval and Mirabel Airports and at the Port of Montreal. It also was
responsible for patrolling the local highways leading to the airports and
THE PORT OF MONTREAL
The breakfast briefing was given by Assistant Superintendent
Mr. Pierre Droz of the RCMP with the assistance of criminal intelligence
officers from the RCMP, Canadian Customs and the Montreal Urban Community
According to Superintendent Droz the most important policing
was done by the small Organized Crime Task Force staffed by officers of the
RCMP, the Sûreté du Québec and the Montreal Urban police.
· Very little was being done to control crime since
the Port Police were disbanded. Only Customs officers are now actively trying
to prevent crime;
· Most criminal offences – theft of containers,
theft of contents - were not being reported by companies, hence there are no
· Security guards provided by company hired by Port
Authority unarmed, no power of arrest and no intelligence capability. Probably
easy for organized crime to penetrate (previous company with the contract had
links to the Hell’s Angels).
· Develop a better understanding of crime in the
· Exchange information-intelligence nationally and
· Make an in-depth study of Crime and the Port
· Arrest and charge the leaders (i.e., the dominant
crime family, many of whom work as checkers, or as inspectors, and even in
· End union control over hiring, firing and
assigning dock workers – stevedores and checkers. Checkers should not decide
who unloads container. The union is "closed" to outsiders;
applicants must be sponsored by insiders i.e., the dominant crime family and
their friends, hence it is very difficult to infiltrate. At present about
15% of stevedores have criminal records, 36.3% of checkers and fully 54% of
the employees of Urgence Marine, the company with the contract to pick up
garbage, do minor repairs and to operate the tenders servicing ships moored in
open water outside the harbour.
· Improve control at exits from the Port by having
Port Authority re-establish check points to control truckers. At present it is
too easy for Matticks family checkers to crowd a terminal in the early morning
as a screen for the pick-up of contraband.
· Customs and police have tried inspecting a
greater percentage of containers. By itself this does not necessarily work
because criminals can re-route containers, and then conceal them until they
have arranged to remove the contents or move the containers off Port property.
All that is required is the complicity of two checkers – one to
"loose" the container when it is un-loaded from the ship and before
it is sent to the customs shed, and another to help get the "hot" or
"targeted" container out of the Port before its disappearance is
· Must develop better intelligence – network of
contacts – which takes time and which requires a regular police force with
an intelligence capacity;
· Customs receives manifests 72 hours before ship
docks. Customs targets about 15-20 containers for detailed checking per day,
based on the profile of the shipping company, the exporter and importer, and
the stated contents of the container.
· Must give smugglers longer prison sentences –
at present, men sentenced for smuggling contraband are back on the docks
within a few months. (This goes back to the problem of union control of hiring
and assignment of stevedores and promotion to checker– those with serious
criminal records or who associate with known criminals or criminal
organizations should be banned from Port property.)
THE LAND FORCE RESERVES (MILITIA)
There was no formal briefing session with the officers
and-non commissioned officers of the 3rd Battalion of the Black
Watch, but members of the Committee were able to speak to a number of them. Some
of the points raised were the following:
· The local Militia is increasingly short of
instructors, and consequently cannot quickly increase its numbers;
· Sending large numbers of a Militia unit to serve
with regulars compromises the ability to train recruits and others;
· Reservists are not guaranteed jobs when they
return from serving on missions because employers are not required by law to
hold the job open;
· Why does it take longer to take on strength
someone with previous experience in the Militia than a new recruit?
· Recruiting of officers and men impeded by
centralization, generally inadequate promotional budgets and material. Very
little effort is made to appeal to the idealism of young people or to attract
young women to the infantry; it is also very difficult for local units to get
permission to recruit on their own at local secondary schools, colleges and
REPORT OF FACT-FINDING VISIT: 19-22 NOVEMBER 2001
VANCOUVER, VICTORIA AND WINNIPEG
PREPARED FOR THE SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE
ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE
NOTES: TESTIMONY HEARD
IN VANCOUVER, VICTORIA AND WINNIPEG
19-22 NOVEMBER 2001
19 NOVEMBER 2001: MARITIME FORCES PACIFIC (MARPAC)
In his opening remarks Rear Admiral Fraser said that his
principal task as the Commander of Maritime Forces Pacific was to prepare ships
and men to participate in the war on terrorism. For this reason the Esquimalt
base and the ships were under very high security as they prepared for the next
deployment. A major step in the deployment was to screen about 700 officers and
men to ensure that their training, mental and physical condition as well as
family circumstances would meet the requirements for deployment abroad.
Captain (Navy) Harrison outlined the mission and capabilities
of Maritime Forces Pacific and its 4,000 military and 2,000 civilian personnel.
Their mission is first, to generate, employ, maintain and sustain balanced,
combat capable, multi-purpose maritime forces and second, to provide Search and
Rescue service in the Victoria Search and Rescue Region.
1. The core of the multi-purpose forces consists of a naval
task group of up to three combat ships and a replenishment ship, supported as
necessary by maritime air support and/or a submarine, capable of being
deployed anywhere in the world.
§ The task group would be drawn from a force of
5 Halifax Class frigates, one Iroquois class destroyer, and one Protecteur
class replenishment ship. In late 2002, a Victoria class submarine is
expected to join the fleet.
§ 1 Canadian Air Division allocates 6 Sea King
helicopters and 5 maritime patrol craft (Auroras) to support of the
Maritime Forces Pacific. The helicopters can fly off the decks of the
destroyer and frigates.
2. With these resources Maritime Forces Pacific carries out
a number of roles and operations, including
§ surveillance drawing on its own naval and air
resources (the Aurora aircraft can only afford 2-3 patrols a week) as well
as reports from the U.S., civilian ships and aircraft, remote sensing,
§ Support to other government departments (30
ship days to Fisheries and Oceans, 60 ship days, 25 Sea King and 800
Aurora hours to the R.C.M.P. as well as support to Immigration and to
§ Asia-Pacific Engagement: even year
deployments to the North Pacific, odd year, to the South Pacific and /or
South East Asia. Deployment in support of UN sanctions against Iraq,
peacekeeping in East Timor and the war on terrorism.
§ Naval diplomacy. Visits by naval ships are
used to develop diplomatic and trade as well as military relations.
§ Search and rescue
3. Although the Victoria Search and Rescue Region, which
includes British Columbia and its coast and off shore as well as the Yukon, is
the smallest of the three (the others being Trenton and Halifax) in terms of
physical size, it generates the largest number of missions and twice as many
of the most serious missions (about 850 Category 1 missions, the most
threatening to life, as opposed to about 400 cases for each of the other
regions). Available for search and rescue are the following forces:
§ Canadian Coast Guard Ships and Auxiliary
§ Ships of Maritime Forces Pacific
§ U.S. Coast Guard
§ Vessels of Opportunity
§ 442 Transport and Rescue Squadron with 3
Labrador helicopters and 6 Buffalo aircraft
§ Civilian air search and rescue volunteers
§ U.S. Coast Guard
§ Aircraft of opportunity
· Current deployment to Arabian Sea expected to be
for six months, but may be longer for some ships. Muslims/Pakistanis would be
included if they formed part of the ships’ complement.
· Search and Rescue Cormorants: the two already in
Canada should be operational sometime in 2002. Reason for delays in delivery:
there is a problem with the contractor about incomplete maintenance
· Interoperability. Canadian ships are can be
integrated into a US Battle Group and frequently participate in joint
exercises and missions. They are controlled by the Commander of Battle Group
within the rules of engagement established by the Canadian government. The
Commander assigns missions based on capabilities of Canadian ships and the
parameters set by the government. Only Ottawa HQ can amend permissible
missions, rules of engagement.
· Not all ships have their full complement of
officers and men. The ranks of junior officers are particularly thin; some
technical trades are very short-staffed.
· The current recruiting drive is going well,
attracting potential officers; the signing bonus of $10,000-$20,000 is
attracting the interest of technicians. Traditionally, very few Asians respond
to recruiting drives, but there is no specific plan to recruit them either.
· While women are increasingly common shipboard and
serve as junior officers, no woman is in command of a ship – it takes about
22 years to train an officer for promotion to Captain in the Navy.
· Search and rescue at sea is very expensive but
unlike land missions, no effort is made to recover costs from those whose
reckless behaviour has got them into trouble.
· When the Navy aids other government departments,
it offers the ships and/or aircraft, crews and training to board and take
control of a ship from the sea or air, but its officers have no powers of
arrest. Operations tend to be complex. They might start as a search and rescue
mission and later involve immigration (migrants) or the R.C.M.P. (drugs).
The Committee toured HMCS Algonquin and was briefed on the
combat capability of a task group.
Command and Control of the Task Group is exercised by the
Commander and a staff of about 31 on board the destroyer Iroquois which has a
complement of 280. The Commander and staff must plan on a world-wide basis and
integrate the work of the destroyer, two frigates and a replenishment ship plus
the helicopters and possibly a submarine.
Air War: the Task Group is equipped with radar and
missiles capable of engaging aircraft at a range of up to 80 Km.
Electronic War: the Task Group is equipped to locate
enemy vessels and aircraft, to jam their electronic systems, and to mislead and
draw off their missiles;
Anti-Surface War: the deck gun has a range of about 8 Km
while the Harpoon missile has a range of about 70 Km.
Anti-submarine War: the Task Force is equipped both to
work with and to hunt submarines with a combination of sonar locators and
Sea King helicopters and the Auroras act as the eyes of the
Task Group extending its defensive zone and allowing it to engage targets far
beyond its normal range.
The Task Group also plays an important diplomatic role and a
role in the environmental policing of the oceans.
Since the Navy is short about 1,000 officers and men, its
personnel must spend more time at sea- 60% at sea and 40% on land - than other
NATO Navies which split their time 50%-50%.
· The ships of the Task Group are designed to
resist Nuclear, bacteriological and chemical warfare
· The Navy has a one-in-three-system of
deployment, one deployed, one preparing for deployment, and one being
outfitted. As a result, a ship’s crew are not supposed to deploy in the
year following their return.
· The Navy only budgets for enough fuel for 60
sea days a year, other NATO countries spend 125 days at sea. Next year,
however, it might spend as much as 240 days at sea.
· Only 60 % of the fleet can be kept at the
highest level of readiness.
Captain Pile briefed the Committee on the role of the
Reserves in manning the Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels of which there were 6
on the West coast and 6 on the East coast. With the exception of two Regular
Force technical experts, these vessels are manned and officered (38 Reservists
including the Captain) by reservists from across Canada who are on 3month-3 year
contracts. They are very versatile and can be easily given different
configurations i.e., they can be equipped with weapons, to conduct Route Surveys
and inspection of objects on the sea floor, and as the Ready Duty Ship for
Search and Rescue.
The Navy has implemented the Total Force concept, expecting
the same standards, expectations, level of leadership and professionalism from
Reservists and Regulars alike.
· Three levels of Reserve pay: Class A for those
serving an evening a week and the occasional week-end; Class B, manning
coastal vessels on contract; Class C, on full-time call out doing the job of
a regular. In April 2002, deployability will distinguish between Classes B
and C. Those who are deployable will receive 100% of the Regular pay, as
opposed to 85%.
· There are two reasons for delays in taking on
Reservists: if the applicant has a criminal record and where the applicant
has previous service and the records must be searched before an offer is
made. Cutbacks have reduced the staff available to search records.
· Generally Captain Pile, like other officers, is
opposed to US style legislation governing Reservists: major employers will
give time off, even "top up" Naval pay, but smaller employers
might be disinclined to hire Reservists if they had to hold the job open.
· Major problems: shortage of staff – could
only man 5 of the 6 vessels; training; lack of at sea time for training.
Most at sea days are allocated to training officers.
QUALITY OF LIFE
The recent pay increases and the adoption of an allowance for
Post Living Differentials have done a lot to improve morale.
The tempo of Operations is now the major source of complaint
instead of pay and allowances. It is having an impact on morale, stress
(individual and family), physical health and group cohesiveness. The 60%-40%
time-on-ship to time-on-shore shore ratio does not apply to navy reservists who
spend much more of their time at sea.
Generally speaking, the Reservists spoken to had high praise
for their training and for life in the Navy. Newcomers found family housing very
Visit to 443 Squadron, Esquimalt
443 Squadron is supposed to have 6 Sea King helicopters to
support Maritime Forces Pacific, but one is unavailable.
§ The mission of 443 Squadron is to provide a
"helidet" or helicopter detachment to each high readiness ship.
On the West Coast there are therefore three helicopter detachments each
consisting of a serviceable helicopter, two crews of 4 personnel, and 11
§ Because of its age and the way its
electronics were designed and installed, the Sea King requires 30 hours of
maintenance for every hour of flight.
407 Squadron, Comox
The Committee was briefed about the responsibilities of
Squadron 407 which operates Aurora Maritime Patrol Aircraft out of Comox, B.C.
The Aurora aircraft are being upgraded one-at-a-time, a project which will give
them state-of-the-art electronics and which should be finished by the end of the
§ Aircrew, not contract workers, are
responsible for maintaining the Auroras. This is considered more effective
and efficient and is also good for morale.
§ The Auroras fly surveillance patrols lasting
for 6-8 hours to counter smuggling of contraband, to monitor shipping for
compliance with environmental regulations, and to report the location of
driftnets and their mother ship.
§ The Auroras are also responsible for Northern
Patrols, but the frequency of these patrols has been reduced to save
§ The Auroras play an essential role in Search
and Rescue missions because of their ability to search vast expanses of
· To ensure the interoperability of aircraft and
crews – their ability to work with allies –some training has to be
conducted in other locations.
· Because of budgetary restrictions, the pilots
of the Auroras fly only 400 hours a year, close to the minimum number of
hours necessary to maintain their competence and confidence.
· The shortage of airworthy helicopters limits
pilots to 300 hours flying at sea and 150 hours on shore.
TUESDAY 20 NOVEMBER 2001
Brian Bramah, Regional Director, Security and Emergency
Preparedness, Transport Canada, outlined the provisions of the Maritime
Transportation Security Act which governed operation of cruise ships with 100
and more berths. At Vancouver Port there were memoranda of understanding with
the Port Authority and cruise lines governing:
§ establishment and composition of a security
§ security training;
§ the exchange of information.
Chris Badger, Vice-President of Operations, Vancouver Port
Authority outlined the importance of the Port of Vancouver, the largest in
Canada and one of the largest in North America, and the mission of the Vancouver
Port Authority which was only established in March of 1999. Unlike the Port of
Montreal, for example, which has a continuous waterfront, the Port of Vancouver
has separate locations for terminals handling bulk or loose cargo, Cruise Lines,
container ships, etc. While responsibility for policing the Port of Vancouver is
divided between a number of police jurisdictions, the Vancouver City Police is
the most important.
The Port Authority has relatively little responsibility for
security in the Port. It operates a system of closed circuit television cameras
which monitor the various parts of the Port 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. It
has acquired a mobile scanner that can produce an image of the contents of a 40
foot container in about 40 seconds, hence it is possible in theory to screen
100% of the containers moving through the Port. The Port Authority also pays
$250,000 a year for increased security patrols around the perimeters of the
· The cruise lines are responsible for screening
all the passengers and baggage boarding their vessels.
· The Port Authority has established a small
intelligence unit to co-ordinate the work of the 8 municipal police forces
with jurisdiction over Port territory. There is general satisfaction with
the status quo which is considered an improvement over the Port Police
because there are more officers on patrol and because they have a mandate
beyond Port property.
· The Port Authority claims not to have any
knowledge about the activities of organized crime in the Port. (Customs
officials report tactics of intimidation as they inspect containers and say
that the Hell’s Angels is the dominant criminal influence within the
Port.) This is the responsibility of the provincial Organized Crime Agency.
· The Port Authority subjects its employees to
security screening, but it hires only 121 of the 27,000 persons working on
Port property. Companies which lease Port property are free to screen or not
screen as they choose. In conjunction with the private companies the Port
Authority is trying to develop an identification card system common to all
· The British Columbia Marine Employers
Association hires and trains dock workers, but workers are dispatched to
their assignments through a hiring hall.
POLICING ARRANGEMENTS – PORT OF VANCOUVER
Policing arrangements in the Port were also discussed
with Deputy Chief John Unger of the Vancouver City Police and Inspector Doug
Kilo, Major Case Manager, E Division Criminal Operations, R.C.M.P.
They discussed with the Committee the public interest in
policing private property and the problems that arose. There is an agreement
with the Attorney-General of British Columbia to cover police activities on Port
property, but compensation for the policing is a sore point with local
A large number of municipalities are involved in policing
Port property, not to mention the involvement of provincial and federal police
forces, departments and agencies, and private security companies. Consequently,
there is seldom a clear division of responsibility. Nevertheless, the police
officers were satisfied that policing was co-operative and effective through:
§ the formation of waterfront teams combining
the various police forces and agencies, each of which contributed sources
of information and intelligence to the combined effort;
§ the private security company responsible for
closed circuit monitoring of Port property functioned as the eyes and ears
of the teams;
§ modern communications helped to unite the
various forces and agencies involved in Port security.
An Intelligence Analyst from the British Columbia Organized
Crime Unit noted that all the elements of traditional organized crime were
involved in the Port, as well as the more modern Asian Triads, Russian
Gangsters, and Narco-Terrorists, etc.
The range of criminal activity was much the same as in the
Port of Montreal. Motorcycle gangs are very active and visible, linking criminal
activities in the eastern and western ports. The various elements of organized
crime tended to have specialities, but they all participated in the
import/export of illegal drugs as the most common and lucrative activity. In
addition, Asian and Russian gangs exported stolen luxury cars; the Russian gangs
were also active among chandlers; and Mexican and Columbian gangs were involved
In conclusion, the witnesses noted that federal and
provincial expenditures on controlling organized crime were completely
inadequate in terms of the proceeds of crime – the $4 million the governments
spend represents a minute fraction of one percent of the proceeds of crime.
The Vancouver police are very satisfied with the co-operation
they get from the Port Authority and the private companies who lease the
terminals, as well as with the provincial and federal agencies involved. They
not only patrol, but undercover officers also circulate, and the private
security officers call in the detachment to investigate anything suspicious.
The responsible police officers decide the issue of who is
responsible for security on a task-by-task basis – that is, the nature of the
crime and the nature of the security operation determines the lead agency.
The insistence that the Ports Authorities established by the
legislation act on a strict commercial basis may impede public security:
· the systematic checking of containers and cargo
causes delay and irritates importers and exporters alike;
· all parties have a financial interest in
expediting traffic; security is expensive and time-consuming.
There was no agreement that making one authority responsible
for Port security across Canada would be an improvement:
· about 5 federal departments have to enforce
laws or regulations in the Ports;
· each Port is different and the
one-police-force-fits-all model is not appropriate;
· the different viewpoints of the various forces
and agencies are both valuable and valid, and are worth the extra hassle
involved in co-ordinating their work;
· must have three level policing to match the
interests of the three levels of government in the Port; the Joint Forces
model draws in those operations/individuals with expertise or an interest in
an issue and the waterfront teams include representatives from all the
Asked about legislative issues, the witnesses noted that in
the United States, access to the docks was controlled by Customs law, and
expressed concern about court enforced disclosure of police sources, techniques
Canadian Ports have to be brought up to the level of security
that exists at major airports:
· employees must be security screened and access
denied to those with relevant criminal records or known criminal
· movement on, into and out of Port property must
· there is no central reporting of theft of
containers and their contents because 300-400 separate insurers are involved
Rob Johnson of Canada Immigration gave a very brief
description of how illegal migrants were handled at the Port. Their enforcement
§ terrorists, war criminals and criminals;
§ removals of those persons previously
deported, those who have failed to appear as directed for proceedings, and
failed refugee claimants.
Despite a few very high profile attempts to land large
numbers of illegal immigrants from offshore ships, the number of ship jumpers
and stowaways discovered each year is relatively low, ranging from a total of
60-83 per year over the past six years. Immigration depends on the officials of
Canada Customs to decide whether they should investigate a passenger or crew
In response to questions Mr. Johnson noted that illegal
migrants rarely choose ships as their means of gaining illegal entry; potential
terrorists are identified by intelligence sources, their response to questions
and their background.
CANADA CUSTOMS AND REVENUE AGENCY
Danielle Evans, Chief of Marine Operations, Vancouver, told
the Committee that she had 60 full-time equivalent staff with which to interview
passengers and crew and to inspect containers and general cargo. Her personnel
were the primary inspection officials for a number of federal departments and
Her crews have the best interdiction record on the west
coast, a record substantially better than their U.S. equivalents. Their success
is built on
§ superior intelligence and Canadian and
international contacts which allow them to target the area from which a
ship comes, particular importers/exporters and particular ships and
§ interviewing skills;
§ technology; they use a "Mobile
Vacis," a Gamma Ray scanner which gives them a two dimensional image
of the contents of a container within a minute;
§ vessel "rummaging" or inspection;
§ training and the exchange of information
about successful techniques.
The major challenge they face is the number of locations they
must cover and the number of entry points to the Port of Vancouver. They use a
number of techniques to check for contraband:
§ the pier or tail-gate inspection of a
container by officers assisted by dogs;
§ vessel rummaging, or a thorough inspection
conducted by 2 or more customs officers and taking up to 6-8 hours;
§ before 11 September, selective boarding of
vessels to determine whether they should be "rummaged." Since 11
September, every vessel is boarded and its crew interviewed;
Given the extra demands placed on her crews since 11
September she requires additional technical and personnel resources to prevent
MEETING WITH CUSTOMS OFFICERS
An informal meeting with some customs officers gave an
insight into some of the pressures and problems of their job. While there had
been a marked improvement in the quality of their uniforms and personal
equipment, and management had recently begun to issue flak jackets, much of the
clothing and equipment had not been designed and sized with women in mind.
The officers felt that their organization was both
understaffed and that during peak periods in the summer they were too dependent
on under trained students. Staff shortages had led to a reduction in the number
of containers inspected and in the size of "rummaging parties" sent
aboard vessels to interview the crew and conduct a search. Since a single
officer was at risk, no inspection team of less than two persons should be sent
on board a vessel, even a fishing boat or pleasure craft.
Back end inspections, which match manifests to goods actually
landed, had been discontinued.
Customs officers could do a better and more efficient job
with better equipment. The computer network was considered inefficient; it did
not give them all the information necessary to "target" inspections or
passengers, officers did not have terminals in their vehicles and had to return
to the office to get information and file reports. There was a need for more
state-of-the-art technology to allow them to inspect a higher percentage of
containers and baggage. At some of the locations where they worked, particularly
the terminal for cruise ships, a lack of Customs facilities made working
At the airport officers felt they were increasingly being
asked to do potentially dangerous work for which they had received little or no
training – interview potentially violent passengers and crew, search baggage
for explosives and chemical or bacteriological agents. They needed more training
and better personal equipment.
While promotions seemed to be based on merit, the time
allowed for appeals (7 calendar days) was too short. Frequent transfers and
promotions in management caused stress and inefficiency among the staff.
In general, the officers felt their jobs had become more
dangerous and that they were more at risk; consequently, they asked that they be
given batons or mace for their personal protection. They also believed that
there were not enough differences between their jobs and police work to justify
the $15,000 salary differential.
WEDNESDAY 21 NOVEMBER 2001-11-28
VANCOUVER INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
Craig Richmond, Vice-President, Airport Operations,
Vancouver International Airport noted that the Airport Authority already is
responsible for most aspects of airport security, including:
§ hiring a private security company to control
access to restricted areas and to patrol these areas;
§ contracting with the Richmond RCMP for
policing -responding to security incidents and providing armed response to
passenger screening points.
It was logical and desirable, therefore, that the Airport
Authority assume responsibility from the airlines for passenger pre-board
screening, acting as the agent of the Government of Canada.
The Airport Authority wants to see establishment of a
national, non-profit government-industry organization to develop and oversee
national standards for technology, training and delivery of passenger pre-board
screening and oversee the management of pre-board screening at smaller airports.
This would result in the following benefits:
§ unity of command among airport security
officials and staff – all would report and be responsible to the Airport
§ more varied and interesting work for security
staff because they would rotate between pre-board screening, patrolling
restricted areas inside and outside the terminal, and monitoring the
closed circuit television system;
§ better pay and benefits and promotion
opportunities for those doing pre-board screening as part of an integrated
airport security force whose higher rate of pay would reduce the very high
turnover rate among those doing pre-board screening;
§ local accountability within a national
On behalf of Transport Canada, Brian Bramah gave a brief
outline of the legislation and regulations governing the three programs of air
safety: the safety of the flying public; the security of terminals and runways,
etc.; and, the security of aircraft.
Before a pass to a restricted area is issued, the employee is
subjected to a ten year background check. A red pass allows an employee to enter
a restricted area alone while a blue pass means that the employee must be
accompanied. The passes of foreign airlines are honoured, but crew members must
pass through security screening.
About 28-40 individuals can ask that a pass be issued.
· The Airport Authority makes a preliminary
series of checks on the applicant and then issues a blue pass.
· The request for a restricted pass is forwarded
by Transport Canada to the RCMP and the Security Intelligence Service. Since
work at the airport is seasonal, at times Transport Canada, the RCMP and the
Security and Intelligence Service are deluged with requests and it takes
months for them to inform Transport Canada of the results. On the basis of
the information supplied by Transport Canada, the Airport Authority issues
the pass or informs the applicant of the reasons why it has been denied.
· The program of security screening for
restricted passes is national –the information made available to one
airport will be available to all airports where an individual seeks
Security guards at entry points to restricted areas have
lists of invalid passes whose "chip" (which unlocks the door) has been
cancelled because the pass holder no longer works at the airport or because the
pass has been lost or stolen.
· A problem arises, however, when employers are
negligent about reporting and recovering passes which are invalid. Penalties
for these employers should be more harsh.
· There is also a problem recovering the passes
issued to employees of airlines like Canada 3000 which have gone bankrupt.
· If lost or stolen passes exceed 3% of the
total, Transport Canada must be informed.
The Airport Authority believes that all airports should meet
the same standard of security, hence the involvement of the federal government
in a joint industry-government body to regulate and oversee pre-board screening,
but that airports should be allowed to meet the standard in different ways,
hence the responsibility of the Airport Authority for delivering the service.
The system can be made both safe and effective:
· With a larger staff capable of conducting
pre-board screening, the Airline Authority can open additional lines by
drawing staff from other locations. This would help meet the service
standard for maximum time in line without sacrificing screening standards.
The Airport Authority admitted that on very rare occasions
when a large backlog developed at Customs, management was asked to instruct
Customs officers to move passengers through the lines more quickly.
· Long lines could normally be avoided by
improving communications with the airlines and getting accurate information
about the next day’s passenger bookings.
The Airport Authority believed that the various departments
and agencies with responsibility for security, such as the Airport Authority
itself, the airlines, Transport Canada, Customs, Immigration, the RCMP and the
private security company, worked well together and knew each others’
The Airport Authority exchanges information on a routine
basis with a wide range of U.S. and Canadian authorities. The small Transport
Canada intelligence unit is in daily contact with the Security Intelligence
The RCMP is responsible both for enforcing federal law at the
airport and, under contract, their local Richmond detachment is responsible for
policing the airport.
Inspector Jim Begley outlined the organization and tasks of
the organized crime unit at the airport. In 1999 it was given 20 new uniformed
positions and now integrates the work previously carried out by a number of
sub-units active at the airport. With a combined strength of 47, its mandate is
to enforce federal laws and disrupt the activities of organized crime. In the
first year of its existence, the unit has concentrated on developing
intelligence sources and information banks about the activities of organized
crime at the airport. It has begun to move against the smuggling of humans into
the country and the traffic in drugs through the airport. The Vancouver airport
is a major transfer point between Asia, the United States and other parts of
Canada for both drugs and the proceeds of crime – large amounts of cash being
moved without legal explanation. Some of the Sub-units include:
§ Federal Enforcement (Plain Clothes), which
currently is particularly interested in intellectual property crime
involving the import of pirated copies of designer clothes, movies,
§ Federal Enforcement (Uniformed) provides back
up to other units, surveillance, and public re-assurance during periods of
§ Drug Enforcement, which works in close
partnership with Customs;
§ Immigration, which works closely with
Immigration officials and has a particular interest in the for-profit
smuggling of humans, frequently for the purposes of prostitution;
§ Airport Integrated Intelligence Unit which
normally monitors the travel of criminals, but is now heavily involved in
counter-terrorism, interviewing and tracking the travel of passengers who
have raised suspicion. This sub-section also draws on the resources of
other agencies and departments (Customs, Transport, Immigration, etc.)
with an intelligence component.
Inspector Tonia Enger, RCMP Richmond Detachment, briefed the
Committee on the responsibilities of her detachment as the police force of
jurisdiction. Under contract to the Airport Authority, her detachment provides
general duty policing and is expected to respond to a call from a screening
point in 5 minutes or less. As the responding police force, her officers
co-operate with the RCMP stationed at the airport, but are not responsible to
Brian Flagel, Director, Airport Operations, Canada Customs
and Revenue Agency. His staff of 232 Full-time Equivalents carry out three
§ Traffic Operations operate 24 hours a day, 7
days a week processing over 4 million passengers and their baggage through
primary, secondary and rover interviews and examinations.
§ Airside and Special Enforcement Operations
deploys a variety of special teams in the traffic, commercial and ramp
areas, to interdict the movement of contraband, monitor exports for
compliance with regulations, search aircraft and develop the intelligence
necessary to target specific flights.
§ Air Cargo Operations processes international
cargo, courier packages (including express mail and documents) and
supervises sufferance and bonded warehouses as well as the duty free
operation. It also clears small private, corporate, and charter flights on
an on-call basis.
Airport Customs and Revenue Officers face a number of
§ Increasing public and business expectations
for both safety and speed of service;
§ Increasing government expectations for
controlling the movement of contraband, criminals and terrorists,
preventing the import of disease contaminated food stuffs and products,
§ Increasing sophistication of organized crime
The Airport Authority holds regular "table top"
exercises to practice and develop emergency procedures. The Emergency Planner
calls meetings and chairs the committee.
There are regular meetings of the Security Committee to
co-ordinate the work of the Airport Authority, the RCMP, Customs and the
security firm. Authorities from the US can also be called in, and there are
meetings and conferences with US counterparts.
The Airport Authority cannot search holders of a restricted
pass on entering or leaving the area, but Bill C-23 will authorize the early
release of the passenger lists for flights.
The RCMP organized crime and airport security unit could use
twice its current manpower. It is very costly to keep up with the capacity of
organized crime to purchase new technology-false documents are increasingly
difficult to detect, and criminals now use cell phones for a brief time and then
throw them away to avoid having their calls monitored.
Customs is adequately staffed for the post 11 September
volume of traffic. During the summer, 60 students are employed after a training
course of 3 ½ weeks. When Customs is flooded by a combination of early and late
flights, the order is given to expedite on the revenue side, not the security
side of the Customs operation. The order to expedite was given about 4-5 times
this past summer.
The Supervisor of Corporate Security for Air Canada spoke
about the corporation’s approach to security. To improve security Air Canada
§ Placed a new, more strict, limit on carry-on
§ Required passengers to show proof of identity
at the boarding gate;
§ Started to reinforce the doors to the
§ Asked that an agency like NAVCAN be
established to take responsibility for pre-boarding screening;
§ Supported the presence of "Air
Marshals" on flights;
§ Supported the work of the Air Travel Advisory
Group of government and industry representatives to institute seamless
airport security and identify the best practices across Canada and
throughout the world.
Security measures must balance facilitation and enforcement
and their effectiveness should be subject to ongoing evaluation. The
introduction of more technology on the ground can help, as can the use of Air
Marshals on flights. 100% of baggage should be screened, but all of these
measures would be expensive to implement and raise the issue of how to recover
Air Canada supports creation of a separate agency to
implement and enforce a national system of passes to restricted areas. As a
carrier, Air Canada wants recourse from a decision of the Airport Authority.
There should be a system for the "risk assessment"
of passengers from the time they make a reservation, and more strict screening
at the boarding gate.
In his opinion, given the level of risk to which Canadian
passengers are exposed, the Canadian security program is, overall, better than
THURSDAY, 22 NOVEMBER 2001-11-29
1 Canadian Air Division, Canadian Region NORAD Headquarters,
Major-General Steve Lucas gave an overview of the
capabilities of 1 Air Division. These are:
§ Aerospace Control with Wings located from
Comox, B.C. to Goose Bay, Newfoundland and Labrador;
§ Support to Maritime Operations on the West and
East coasts with Sea King detachments assigned to the Navy and maritime
§ Support to the Land Forces with helicopter
squadrons based at Edmonton, Petawawa, Borden, St. Hubert, Valcartier and
§ Air Mobility with a squadron of transport
planes based at Yellowknife, and Wings based at Winnipeg, Trenton and
§ Search and Rescue, organized into the Victoria
Area (including B.C. and the Yukon), the Halifax Area (covering the Maritime
provinces) and the Trenton Area (including the North and interior);
§ Air Training.
As Commander of 1 Canadian Air Division, he is responsible to
different headquarters for different roles. To the Chief of the Air Staff; to
the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (for Search and Rescue), and to NORAD
Headquarters in Colorado. The latter responsibility has been particularly
important since 11 September, but he does not have to consult Ottawa about
routine or agreed upon NORAD missions.
Cutbacks in funding have reduced every kind of training,
whether individual, group, national or international. As a result, the general
level of readiness has declined as only a small number of pilots is at the
highest level of readiness and training for a number of missions has been
· Thus CF 18 pilots no longer practice low level
flying to partially compensate for the reduction in annual flying hours to
180 from 210; new simulators and the elimination of anti-submarine training
has allowed a reduction in the flying hours of the pilots and crew of the
Aurora patrol aircraft.
Generally satisfied with how contracting out of pilot
training has worked. Bombardier supplies everything, including food and housing,
as well as aircraft, simulators and software. The training is considered world
class and many NATO pilots come to Canada for training.
Contracting out the maintenance of the Radar sites has also
seemed to work. Somewhat wary about contracting out the servicing of aircraft
because the air force must be able to service and maintain the aircraft when
they are deployed abroad.
· In general, contracting out reduces flexibility
– the contract workers and technicians cannot be assigned other tasks in
an emergency or when under-occupied, and cannot be asked to work overtime
except at punitive rates.
The Canadian Air Force lacks a strategic air lift capability
and must depend on charters (when available) or on allies to deploy its forces
rapidly. Lack of strategic air re-fuelling capability also limits the speed with
which aircraft can be deployed abroad. Tactically, only US Navy aircraft can be
re-fuelled by Canadian tankers because their air re-fuelling systems are the
same "basket" style used by Canadian aircraft, and only some US
tankers are equipped to re-fuel both "basket" and "probe"
Chief Warrant Officer Danno Dietrich briefed the Committee on
the background of the "Flight Plan for Life" initiative to enhance the
quality of life. It started as a Working Group in 1996-1997 whose objective was
to seek out the concerns of airmen and their families and suggestions for
improving morale. It undertook not to turn down any suggestion without a hearing
and to respond to every concern and suggestion. To-day the Command Chief Warrant
Officer acts as Chair of the Air Command FPfL (Flight Plan for Life) Advisory
Committee which has representatives from the various units. Some successes
· The Military Family Resource Centre which
offers spousal second language training, emergence child care and spousal
· Compensation and Benefits which include Post
Living Differential allowances, compassionate travel assistance, and
maternity and parental benefit improvements;
· Improvements to private married quarters while
holding rent increases to 9% over 5 years (salaries increased by 28%);
· The 12V concept for deployments to
Bosnia-Velika/Kladusa provides for a 12 month Squadron deployment with
variable personnel tour lengths – 16 core personnel deploy for 6 months at
a time while most remaining personnel serve two 56 day periods and a few
serve three periods. This is not only less disruptive of family life, it
makes it easier for reserve personnel to participate in the rotations;
· Adoption of a special uniform for work and
The tempo of operations and a shortage of critical personnel
were the major challenges facing 1 Canadian Air Division. The new system of
rotation had eased the pressures of the tempo of operations, but operations and
staff shortages both impeded training, setting up a vicious circle.
The lack of training time was identified as the major source
of stress. The airman had become "a jack of all trades, master of
none." Retention was a more critical problem than recruiting because of the
time required to train a recruit. Retention bonuses, if approved, should help to
The Air Force lacked the resources to treat Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder and had to establish partnerships with non-military clinics.
There was still a problem getting airmen to come forward before their stress
became chronic. Most commonly effected were those who had served with the Army
and their problem was made worse by their isolation when they returned to their
unit. The Israelis had had success with a program of repeatedly questioning
soldiers about their experiences until they began to talk of their own volition.
Family violence had been reduced by the development of the
family resource centres and a significantly reduced tolerance for family
There were different kinds of drug abuse. The major problem
remained alcohol abuse (prescription drug abuse was also a problem). Abuse of
illegal drugs would end the career of the senior ranks, junior ranks would be
given the opportunity of addiction treatment.
Visible minorities were hard to recruit because most recruits
came from smaller communities rather than big cities.
Lieutenant Colonel Gord Reid, Commandant, Canadian Forces Air
Navigation School, gave an overview of its operations. The School offers a
number of aircrew training courses:
· The Basic Air Navigator course teaches the
basic skills necessary to direct tactical missions and manage air navigation
and communication systems;
· The Basic AESOP course develops the skills
necessary to employ sensor and communication systems
· The Staff Air Navigator Course teaches aircrew
to identify and document operational capability deficiencies, and to
· The Flight Instructor Course trains qualified
aircrew to perform both classroom and flight instructional duties.
Any excess capacity in the Basic Air Navigator Course is sold
to airmen from foreign countries, including Singapore, Australia, Germany and
Lieutenant Colonel Bert Doyle, Commanding Officer, 402
Squadron, spoke to the Committee about the role of the Squadron and the
"total Force" concept which it embodies.
402 Squadron conducts pilot training on de Havilland Dash 8’s
and provides the aircraft which the Air Navigation School uses for training air
crew. Regular and Reserve Force members work side-by-side to fulfill 402’s
roles and duties – the only difference is that Regular Force personnel are
used wherever they must be used, Reservists are used wherever they can be used.
The major concern of the Reservists was their lack of legislated job protection
during periods of service on operations or training.
· About 10% of the Reservists with 402 Squadron
worked full-time. Reservists could benefit from their reserve status when
Corporate-Reserve relations were good.
There was some reluctance to support the US model of
legislation although it was noted that all provinces except Quebec had
legislation allowing public servants to take time off for Reserve duties. The
Federal Government had not adopted such legislation.
REPORT OF FACT-FINDING VISIT: 21-24 JANUARY 2002
HALIFAX AND BASE GAGETOWN
PREPARED FOR THE SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE
ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE
Report of the Fact-Finding Trip to Halifax and
Base Gagetown, 21-24 January 2002
Monday 21 January
Captain (N) Greg Burke, Acting Commanding Officer, Maritime
Forces Atlantic, briefed the Committee on the Challenges facing the command:
· Financial budgets 26%
less than 5 years ago;
· Reduced equipment and
fewer personnel had led to tension about the tempo of operations and the
quality of life;
· Force protection at home
· Adaptability – the
fleet had to move between Blue Sea and littoral operations;
· Maintenance of fleet
impacted by shortage of some technicians – at the moment the shortage of
technicians was more critical than the shortage of money;
· At present he was
staffing two of three ships; the rotation planned for January will therefore
impact on quality of life.
· It was normal for a
sailor to be at sea 100 days a year, but the coastal patrol boat crews were
at sea 120-150 days.
Captain (N) Christian Preece briefed the Committee on
personnel and quality of life issues:
· The number of harassment
complaints have dropped because of better training and more familiarity; and
quality of life issues have generally been better handled;
· Formal clothing for female
personnel well fitting, but operational clothing still needs work;
· 3 women have applied to
serve on the submarines and will be assigned to the same one after their
training, but lack of privacy and the occupational categories required still
leads to a problem in recruiting women into the submarine service;
· The military housing in
Halifax was substandard – the PMQ’s were built in the 1950`s to the
standards of the 1940s. About 70% own their own homes in Halifax. There was
not much demand for the smaller military apartments because of local market
conditions, but there was still the need to make larger (3-4 bedroom)
Quality of Life Issues raised by ordinary service personnel:
· The PMQ’s were not worth
the rent charged which was more than the PIT on a house;
· The pay was generally O.K.,
but there were complaints about the pay and pension rights of retired staff on
· There were complaints about
the length of time it took to get needed equipment, and the mattresses on the
frigates and submarines were compared unfavourable to those in jail cells –
thin and hard.
Captain (N) Richard Payne, Commanding Officer Fleet
Maintenance Facility, Cape Scott briefed the Committee about the importance of
· With 900 civilians and 200
military personnel, the maintenance facility was responsible for servicing the
submarines and carried out running repairs to specialized equipment on
frigates and destroyers;
· Civilian employees unhappy
with pay because civilian employees on the West coast were paid 20% more;
· An effort had been made to
keep military occupations so that Navy personnel could have shore jobs.
· With the cutbacks of the
1990`s the training program had been eliminated. The work force was aging and
an apprentice program had to be launched.
Tuesday 22 January
Colonel Joe Hincke, Commanding Officer of 12 Wing Shearwater
briefed the Committee on his command. He faced two major issues:
· The tempo of operations,
especially overseas deployments, was placing tremendous pressure on the time
available for personal training and family. In support of Appolo, or the war
against terrorism, his wing had deployed 120 personnel abroad for 6 months
to crew and maintain helairdets, a tempo that could only be sustained by
reducing shore, training and family time. 24 of the 37 available pilots were
deployed outside the country. When they returned they would require family
time and time to refresh their knowledge of tactics they had not used on
deployment. Some pilots and maintenance personnel would be forced to
"jetty hop," move immediately to another assignment, when they
returned. To a certain degree, however, a very high level of deployment was
to be expected in his wing because after serving with it pilots would spend
4 years with a non-deploying unit.
· Deferred recruiting would
lead to a severe shortage of specialized personnel until new recruits could
be trained and had acquired experience.
Colonel Hincke was emphatic about the safety of the Sea King
helicopter and about the ability of his technicians to keep it flying safely.
Following cancellation of the EH 101 contract morale was low and there were
shortages of spare parts for the Sea King as an effort had been made to run down
inventory in anticipation of getting a new platform. Since then morale and
confidence of pilots and maintenance crew in the airworthiness of the Sea King
Tuesday afternoon the Committee heard briefings from the
union representing Customs officers and from the Regional Director of the Canada
Customs and Revenue Agency.
The Union representatives argued that the Customs Agency
· More customs officers.
Understaffing forced customs officers to work alone in isolated circumstances.
Some border crossings were staffed with just one officer who was at risk
because there was no nearby police back up.
· The right people. The union
opposed the heavy use of poorly trained students and term employees on the
primary inspection line. Permanent staff needed to take and pass an
8-14 week course, while students were given only two weeks of training;
· The right training. While
the permanent customs officers received 8-14 weeks at the beginning of their
careers, there was little training thereafter. Thus the Auditor General had
found that 60% lacked adequate training in immigration legislation. They had
received little additional training when the officers at 30 posts had been
given the power to make arrests and detain people at the border for certain
offences – suspicion of kidnapping, drunk driving, in possession of a stolen
· The necessary equipment.
The union representatives argued that at least some customs officers should be
allowed to wear side arms, particularly those working alone and without
back-up. US customs officers and State troopers wore side arms, as did the
RCMP on the Canadian side. Only Canadian customs officers were unarmed.
According to the Union:
· 60% of the containers
passing through Halifax are in transit to the United States and are not
checked by Canada customs;
· On an average day customs
would look at about 12 non-targeted containers. Containers are targeted on the
basis of intelligence, but not all of those targeted can be checked;
· Union favours joint
inspections with the US customs because it would be-more efficient not to
check same container twice.
Customs and Revenue Agency
Their current pre-occupation is to implement the 30-point
Action Plan for a "smart border." Representatives of the Agency will
meet with their US counterparts to work out the details of the plan. The Agency,
however, had no flexibility in its budget to make changes in the balance between
term and permanent employees.
· In Atlantic region balance
between term and permanent employees 40/60 to 50/50 depending on the time of
· Longest serving term
employees –about 3-4 years. There is a training capacity limit at the school
in Rigauld, Quebec.
· The 10 day training period
made necessary by the new powers of arrest takes place in the regions, not
· IBETS Integrated Border
Enforcement Teams include representatives from Canadian customs and
immigration, RCMP and US border patrol.
Wednesday 23 January
Chief Superintendent Ian Atkins, Criminal Operations Officer,
RCMP H Division outlined the various elements of the Port of Halifax, noting
that the container terminals 1, 3, and 9 are the most prone to crime. He noted:
· The most common types of
crime are the trade in narcotics, stolen vehicles, tobacco and alcohol, theft
from containers and illegal immigration (ship jumpers-39 in the current year).
· His detachment is also
responsible for covering a great number of small ports. His detachment is
assisted by a civilian volunteer ‘coast watch’ which reports suspicious
landings and movements along the coast. He estimated that about one half of
the illegal drugs were landed on the coast and in small ports and harbours
from small craft.
· The Police have done a
survey of the backgrounds of dockyard workers. The results showed that a very
high percentage of longshoremen had criminal records.
· In the Port of Halifax 187
of 500(39%) longshoremen whose records were checked were found to have
criminal records. In Charlottetown 28 of 51 (54%) had criminal records.
· A 12 person integrated team
monitored/probed organized crime in the Port of Halifax. There were links
between organized crime in the Port of Halifax and organized crime in Quebec
Chief David McKinnon, Chief of Police, Halifax Regional
Police Force briefed the Committee on the contribution his force made to port
· After the disbandment of
the Port Police, the Port Authority contracted for a dedicated force
consisting of a Staff Sergeant, an intelligence officer and 8 policemen.
Intelligence collection was critical because it helped decide which of 250,000
containers to subject to inspection
· In his opinion, port
security was understaffed and poorly equipped. There was a need for more
police, more customs officers and more and more modern equipment to inspect
John Fagan, Director of Intelligence and Contraband, Atlantic
Region, Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, briefed the Committee about the work
· At Halifax, customs was
already giving a complete inspection to 3% of containers and subjecting more
to a "back end" inspection. This met the proposed national
objective, and was a higher rate than in other Canadian ports and almost twice
the US rate of inspection.
· Security weaknesses
included inadequate security on the gates and no system of identity passes to
control movement on the docks. There was growing cooperation with the Halifax
police and the RCMP, particularly in the sharing of intelligence.
· Priorities were to improve
targeting and to acquire a site at which containers could be quickly unloaded
and their contents stored during a full inspection. A greater emphasis on
intelligence might recover more of the stolen cars being shipped abroad
through the port. Advance information about the crew and 138,000 passengers on
cruise boats would improve immigration control.
· In his opinion the policing
status quo is a great improvement over the port police – police are united
in their efforts and work closely with Customs.
· The Hells Angels are the
dominant organized crime organization on port property in Halifax. The
problems on the wharves can begin in the office when it is infiltrated by the
Halifax Port Authority
Representatives of the Halifax Port Authority outlined port
· There was a port-wide
contingency plan under which the Halifax authorities, the Department of
National Defence and the Canadian Coast Guard would coordinate their
response to a whole series of emergency situations. These plans were
regularly up-dated and exercises carried out.
· The Port Authority had
plans to introduce a port-wide system of photo identity cards and to upgrade
both the fencing and camera surveillance of the port. The Halifax Employers
Association already screens new employees and the Halifax police will be
called upon to assist in a security check, but existing workforce will have
to be "grand fathered in." Stevedoring companies hire from a list
of basic workers with the skills required, and only resort to union hiring
halls for additional workers.
· They had no personal
knowledge of the activities of organized crime on port property – they
were just a landlord, but they nevertheless agreed that more security would
enhance the business of the port and they would re-visit the concept of
"in bond" shipments and pre-clearing shipments to the US.
Thursday 24 January
Brigadier General Mitchell and Colonel Barry MacLeod,
Commander 3 Area Support Group briefed the Committee:
· There were about 4,000
personnel at Base Gagetown, some 3100 of them military. This community grew
by about 2,000 during the summer with the influx of students and
They faced a number of challenges:
· There was a shortage of
single rooms even in the winter and 200 had to live two-three to a room. In
the summer, staff and students had to live in tents.
· The base infrastructure was
rusting out and some buildings were actually dangerous.
· Medical services were
lacking for the families of service personnel, particularly those facing
problems with a spouse suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, or
children with special needs. The medical services situation for francophones
on base was so bad that some refused the posting or did not move their
families to the Base. Responsibility for medical treatment of families should
rest with federal government because of growing disparities between provinces
vis-à-vis medical care and availability of social services.
· The base training areas
needed about $100 million of renovations for which there was no money.
· Since their training
establishment was cut, they must augment their permanent staff with staff
taken from the operational units across Canada. This robs these units of
critical staff and denies training staff family time and time to pursue their
own professional training.
· The Army lacks the
personnel to both sustain the high tempo of operations and modernize itself.
· Cooperation with the
Veterans Affairs liaison office on the Base was termed "fabulous,"
but there was little that could be done for Reservists returning from
deployment – once they left the Forces they became the responsibility of the
provincial health care authorities.
Thursday afternoon the Committee was briefed by Colonel Mike
Ward, Commander of the Combat Training Centre, and by the Commandants of the
separate infantry artillery and armoured schools. Their briefing was
particularly candid and clearly expressed – in their collective opinion they
faced a situation that was untenable and unsustainable:
· The equipment of the
schools and the training of the instructors had to be constantly upgraded. The
schools were short at least 300 permanent instructors, a shortage which had to
be made up by augmenting from operational units. The demand for courses was
constantly increasing. While permanent staff had been reduced by 25%, the
number of students taking courses at the schools had increased from 1429-2342,
while training days had increased from 50,000-100,000. Dealing with this
increase in demand has forced the training schools to increase their
augmentation from operational units of the Regular and Reserve forces from
350-2,000. The situation promises to get worse before it gets better because
the newly recruited officers will require immediate training, and once the
other ranks recruited finish their basic training, they will need occupational
and specialized training at the schools.
· The dilemma of the Army was
expressed clearly: "We have too much Army for the budget we’ve been
given, but not enough Army for what is expected of it"
The final briefing of the fact-finding trip took place at the 403 Wolf
Squadron which trains pilots to fly the CH 146 Griffon helicopter used to
support the Army. The Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Black, outlined a
list of "challenges" well-known to the Committee, including personnel
shortages which forced him to rely on the Reserves for staff, a shortage of
technicians which forced aircraft technicians to do the work of computer
technicians, etc. Notwithstanding the problems, the hope was to modify the
Griffon to give it some of the reconnaissance and fire support capabilities the
Report on the Fact-Finding VISIT: 4-7-february 2002
PREPARED FOR THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON
NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE
Report on the Fact-Finding Trip to
Washington, February 4-7, 2002
Monday, 4 February
In the morning the Committee was briefed by officials from
the Canadian Embassy. The material presented was brief and succinct. It covered
the following topics, among others:
· Canadian activities since
11 September with a particular emphasis on Canada’s contribution to the war
on terrorism and on the steps that both countries have agreed to take to
increase security at the border and to focus attention on the people and
shipments that might pose a security problem. The theme of this part of the
briefing was that Canada was not part of the security problem of the United
States, but part of the solution. Nevertheless, there remains a well-embedded
image of Canada as a weak link in United States security.
· Security of energy. The
United States is aware of its dependence on off shore energy. It is not
well-known that Canada, not Saudi Arabia, is the largest supplier of energy to
the United States market, nor is much known about Canada’s vast energy
reserves – the tar sands, gas fields and untapped hydro potential.
· Trade irritants, such as
softwood lumber and steel exports.
· The mood on Capitol Hill
was described as tense with a strong bipartisan consensus on security issues
and prosecution of the war against terrorism. Beyond these issues, Congress
was narrowly divided and its work had been disrupted for three months by the
· Defence expenditure will
rise quickly and Canadian-United States relations will be dominated by
security issues involving: security at the border, the Missile Defence System,
and Homeland defence. The build-up of United States conventional forces will
be powered by technology and will exacerbate the problem of interoperability
with its allies.
· The United States is
appreciative of Canada’s role in accepting 30,000 stranded travellers and of
its military contribution to the war on terrorism. This balances questions
about Canada’s low expenditures on defence, the "wide open
border," "hundreds" of terrorist organizations, etc.
· Missile Defence has been
voted a large increase this year by Congress. Administration officials
understand the non-committal position adopted by Canada, but are irritated by
On Monday afternoon the Committee heard presentations from
Commander Steven Flynn, United States Coast Guard and Senior Fellow with the
Council on Foreign Relations and from Dr. Jane Alexander, Deputy Director of the
Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).
A. Commander Flynn
Over the past several years Commander Flynn has become very
concerned about the security problem posed by maritime cargo containers. In
2000, 11.6 million of these containers passed through the United States border
inspection systems. The vast majority of these containers, however, were never
inspected. Very little is known about many containers – their cargo manifest
has only sketchy information about the contents and may include no information
about the original sender or the ultimate customer.
Roughly 2% of the containers are subjected to some form of
inspection which usually just involves opening the back-end and looking inside
rather than actually unloading and inspecting the contents. Choosing which
containers to inspect is too frequently based on a simple study of documents
rather than on intelligence about the shipper, the shipping line, the
ports-of-call or the ultimate customer.
Anything which caused United States authorities to stop the
movement of containers to inspect the contents of each one would have a
devastating impact on Ports like Halifax which receive and forward thousands of
containers whose ultimate destination is the United States.
Commander Flynn presented a plan to the Committee to separate
the vast majority of containers which are low risk from the 2% which must be
subjected to careful inspection. Most of the world’s overseas trade passes
through a handful of mega ports such as Long Beach, Los Angeles, Hong Kong,
Singapore, Hamburg, Antwerp and Rotterdam. If these ports agreed on common
standards for security, reporting, and information-sharing for operators,
conveyances and cargo, these standards would become universal almost overnight.
The standards would require that containers be loaded in approved, high-security
facilities, that they then be equipped with high-security seals and sensors to
determine whether the seal had been tampered with. The movement of containers
would be monitored to and from seaports and onward to their final destination by
the global positioning system.
B. Dr. Jane Alexander
Dr. Alexander briefed the Committee about the work of the
United States’ main research and development agency. DARPA has a budget of
more than $2 billion to fund the search for "radical" solutions to
technological problems that might arise 10-15 years in the future. Its
investigation of the technological aspects of biological terrorism, for example,
began 8 years ago – as a result, while the United States was not completely
prepared for something like the anthrax incident, its preparations proved
adequate. In the same way, a project has been underway to determine whether and
under what circumstances a particular group might engage in acts of terrorism
and what kind of events might trigger an attack.
In a discussion of the growing technological superiority of
the Unites States Armed Forces over their allies, including Canada, Dr.
Alexander noted that problems of interoperability exist within the US forces as
well as between them and their allies.
Tuesday, 5 February
On Tuesday morning the Committee met with the United States
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Select Committee on
Intelligence. Senator Kenny, Chair of the Canadian Committee began by noting
that Canada considered the attacks of 11 September to have been an attack,
not just on the United States, but on North America as a whole – Canadians had
also died in the World Exchange Centre. He further noted that Canada was not
part of the security problem facing the United States, but part of the solution.
Both Canada and the United States had to work together to enhance border control
and improve their intelligence cooperation.
The United States members expressed their appreciation for
Canada’s friendship and co-operation, particularly the cooperation of the
Canadian Security Intelligence Service in identifying the terrorists of 11
September. The Canadians pointed out that each country had to work on unifying
the product of their intelligence agencies –at present there was a high risk
that vital information would not be passed on in a timely fashion, and hence
could not be shared internationally.
Both parties agreed that good intelligence and the sharing of
intelligence were key to both improving security at the border and to ensuring
the free flow of goods and persons. To achieve both free trade and security,
means had to be found to identify the 98% of low risk border traffic. Discussion
turned to some of the technology – biometric means of identifying persons –
and the possibility of a single inspection system for containers and joint
border patrols that could make the border both more secure and more efficient.
The members of Congress asked for a briefing on the Canadian
anti-terrorist legislation and discussed how the two countries would treat
potential terrorists. Members of the Canadian delegation brought up the issue of
refugees passing through the US on easy-to-get tourist visas and then applying
at the Canadian border for refugee policy – interest in the US reluctance to
agree to a 3rd country safe haven to stop "shopping" for a country of
refuge. The differences in US and Canadian treatment of refugees were noted.
Tuesday afternoon the Committee heard briefings from Michael
O’Hanlon, a Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies with the Brookings Institute
and Joseph Cirincione, Senior Director of the Non-Proliferation Project of the
Mr. O’Hanlon analyzed the recent $48 billion US increase in
the United States defence budget, noting that the latter will increase from
about $350 billion US this year to $450 billion by 2007. Procurement had dropped
as a percent of the budget, but would rise from about $60 billion to $70
· Questioned by the
Canadians, he admitted that the issue of the treatment of the Taliban and Al
Queda prisoners had become a public relations disaster – the Taliban met the
criteria of POW, the Al Queda prisoners did not.
· In terms of Missile Defence
he noted that both Iraq and North Korea had Scud missiles and were working to
develop longer-range missiles nuclear missiles. Initially allies were strongly
opposed. Value of a ballistic missile much greater than the threat of a
suitcase bomb as an instrument of blackmail. Canadian participation would be
useful in both Homeland defence and Missile Defence because of NORAD.
Mr. Cirincione noted that he Bush Administration was turning
away from the arms limitation treaties of the 60’s and later –
non-proliferation, the ABM Treaty, etc, in favour of the 1950’s Eisenhower
policy of export controls on technology. Bush Administration believed too many
countries were cheating and not observing the treaties.
· Russia sold nuclear
technology to North Korea, which diverted fuel from power plants to weapons
· Iraq known to have
violated chemical treaties and non-proliferation.
· Iran suspected of
violating biological and nuclear treaties.
He characterized the nuclear status of the three members of
the Axis of Evil as North Korea, closest to becoming a nuclear power; Iraq had a
plan, but lacked material; Iran had neither plan nor material.
Late Tuesday afternoon the Committee met with members of the
Senate Armed Services Committee. Attention was drawn to the difference in US and
Canadian expenditure on their Armed Forces with US expenditures approaching 3%.
Canadian level of expenditure based on different level of security/insecurity.
The Canadians noted the importance of improved security to
the future of ports such as Halifax, to the fact that the anti-terrorist
legislation had sacrificed a degree of individual rights, and to the necessity
of each country to unify communications within their own agencies as a prelude
to exchanging information internationally.
The Americans raised the issue of North Korea’s nuclear and
missile capabilities and missile defence. The Canadians responded that Canadian
support for missile defence/widening the war in Afghanistan would be based on
convincing arguments, but that Canada would approach the question with an open
mind. Treatment of the Taliban and Al Queda prisoners was raised.
In terms of Homeland Defence, it was noted that Canada likes
the NORAD model with its binational command structure. The proposal that would
be placed before the President would include Canada, but little was known about
Wednesday, 6 February
The meeting the Committee had Wednesday morning with the
House Armed Services Committee was extraordinary. It was attended by both the
Chair, The Honourable Bob Stump, and the Ranking minority member, The Honourable
Ike Skelton, as well as by a number of other members.
In his opening remarks Mr. Skelton spoke of how in good times
we all tend to take our friends for granted; nevertheless, when we really need
them, they are there for us. Discussion then turned to a number of different
issues such as: the need to work together to meet the terrorist threat; border
issues and the need to ensure the safety of containers; reductions in defence
expenditure by NATO allies; the Missile Defence System and how any
"weaponization" of space would set off alarm bells in Canada, etc.
A member of the United States committee then proposed the
establishment of direct committee-to-committee relations – a binational ad hoc
or permanent task force on terrorism which would meet on a regular basis to
discuss anti-terrorist policy and tactics and to ensure that the United States
committees developed a sensitivity to the concerns of the Canadian and European
allies of the United States. Members of both the Canadian and United States
committees agreed that regular meetings would be very useful.
At the end of our discussion with members of the House Armed
Services Committee, defence Secretary Rumsfeld joined the discussion. He opened
his informal remarks by saying he still remembered the role Canada had played in
protecting Americans during the Iranian hostage taking incident and then thanked
Canada for its support since 11 September. He outlined his current thinking
about the creation of a unified military command to include North America and to
complement the civilian homeland defence organization being put together by
Secretary Rumsfeld noted than any proposal put before the
President would be sensitive to Canadian concerns about command structure,
particularly of NORAD. The latter’s command structure would continue to be
binational and to respect the sovereignty of each nation. Within the new command
it would be possible to have both United States and Canadian air and naval units
because they were already accustomed to training, exercising and fighting
together. With regard to interoperability he noted that NATO budgets had been in
decline as a percent of GDP and that even the United States’ expenditures were
down from the 6% level of the era of President Eisenhower. Other than increase
defence spending, he suggested increased specialization: within a broad range of
capabilities, each country should choose something – air lift, special forces,
etc. – to do exceptionally well.
At the end of the discussion the Committee was invited to
listen the Secretary Rumsfeld’s opening address to the hearing. Once again, at
the hearing a warm public tribute was paid to Canada for its friendship and
After its meeting with the House Armed Services Committee,
the Committee was also warmly received by the officials of the Canadian section
of the State Department’s Western Hemisphere Affairs. The officials went out
of their way to say that no country had responded to 11 September as well as
Canada and that they had excellent relations with Mr. Manley and his staff as
well as with the Canadian security organizations, particularly the Canadian
Security Intelligence Service and the RCMP. Defence cooperation was described as
"fighting shoulder-to-shoulder in Afghanistan." The officials were
also open in saying that in terms of the negotiations over security issues, they
did not see a "deal breaker"; joint facilities/inspection, integrated
border patrols, refugees, the NEXUS pilot project (whose expansion was
considered almost certain once agreement was reached on a biometric identity
card for frequent border crossers), everything was on the table.
With regard to defence issues, the officials noted that all
the NATO allies had to develop their capabilities and increase their
expenditures. This having been said, they acknowledged the large increase in
Canada’s expenditure on security and that in certain respects the Canadian air
and naval forces were the most interoperable among the allies.
Following its briefing at the State Department, the Committee
met with Major General Dunn and defence officials at the Pentagon. General Dunn
began by asking the members of the Committee how they saw the future of the
Canadian Armed Forces. The response was that while Canadian public opinion saw
the need for increased expenditure on security, it had yet to be convinced of
the need for major increases in defence spending. In terms of homeland defence,
the new command would pull together into a command military units and establish
links to the Coast Guard and the separate National Guard forces. Certainly,
Canadian air force units could be integrated into this structure, but the United
States Department of defence was also open to expanding NORAD to the sea and
land. The Canadian response to this was that Canada had to have a clear idea
about the "architecture" so it could be put before public opinion.
Wednesday afternoon concluded with short briefing sessions on
the United States view of NATO expansion, the Missile Defence System and
Dr Crouch seemed to suggest that the Baltic countries,
perhaps Bulgaria and Romania as well were closer to admission than Slovenia and
Slovakia and that Macedonia and Albania were definitely not ready. Expansion
would make reaching a consensus more difficult and would exacerbate the problem
of the existence in the alliance of different levels of interoperability. The
challenge will be to move toward greater interoperability.
The Missile Defence System was represented as a turning away
from a strategy based on offensive nuclear weapons which would be systematically
reduced, and toward a strategy of building a limited defensive capacity to
intercept the handful of missiles that rogue states might develop within the
next decade or so. The implications of this for Canada were that neither
missiles nor their nuclear/biological warheads would respect borders.
The new command for homeland defence was presented as a way
of pulling together air defence capability and of establishing more clear lines
of communication with the Coast Guard and National Guard to position the
Department of defence to better assist the civil authority with emergency
preparedness. Although in theory emergencies are dealt with first at the local
level, then at the State level and finally, the State Governor asks for federal
assistance, in practice the Department of defence becomes involved very soon as
local commanders react in anticipation of a request for assistance.
The Committee met for a second time with the United States
House Committee on Intelligence Wednesday evening at the request of its Chair,
the Honourable Porter Goss. He began by noting how important Canadian sympathy
and support had been to the United States, psychologically just as much as
materially. He also expressed pleasure that Canada had substantially increased
its expenditure on its security forces, the Canadian Security Intelligence
Service in particular, because the backbone of the anti-terrorist campaign had
to be intelligence.
His Committee had been warning for years that United States
intelligence was being underfunded. He characterized intelligence cooperation
between the United States and Canada as being excellent and noted that as
federal countries we shared many of the same problems, in particular, the flow
of information from the local to the federal level, and the difficulty of
overcoming the culture of secrecy and turf wars.
He claimed that the Taliban and Al Queda prisoners were well
treated – he had made a surprise visit to the compound – but had to be
interrogated. He also claimed to have access to classified information that
justified the references to the "Axis of Evil." In response, members
of the Canadian delegation pointed out that Canadian public opinion was turning
critical of the denial of prisoner of war status to at least the Taliban
captives and that a public case would have to be built against each of the
countries considered to be a threat – North Korea, Iran and Iraq before Canada
would consider any expansion of the war.
Thursday, 7 february
In the morning the Committee met with members of both the
Senate and the House Judiciary Committees. It was noted that terrorists
exploited Canada’s more liberal immigration laws and that if Canadian and US
refugee and immigration laws remained un-harmonized, the US might be forced into
a more restrictive policy. Suggested formation of a joint Canada-US joint task
force to catch Bin Laden. In response the Canadians noted that other than Ressam
there was no record of a terrorist entering the US from Canada and that 20,000
were turned back at the Canadian border with the US. Both countries had to put
more resources into the border.
The US will put $50 million into the border, about equal
amounts into technology and more personnel. At the same time the Canadian
anti-terrorist legislation was praised.
The US legislators raised the question of at least overseas
airlines sending their manifests ahead and recording the number of a traveller’s
passport before the plane left for the US.
Discussion turned to the project for a smart border and the
necessity of improving security at ports. It was noted that Canada was
inspecting a higher percentage of containers and that almost 40% of refugees
crossed from the US. Pre-clearance works, but more has to be done to integrate
data from various sources.
Substantial discussion of 3rd country refuge. Very strong
expression of frustration of US legislators with their immigration service, its
backlogs and inability to remove those ordered deported. Different figures for
the rate of acceptance of refugees in each country, suggestion that more should
be done to harmonize refugee determination process. Agreeing to 3rd country
refuge would be a problem to the US because the administration sets quotas.
The Committee completed its fact-finding with a briefing on
homeland defence from Frank Miller, the President’s Adviser on Military
Matters and Ambassador John Maisto. They fleshed in some details of the remarks
Defence Secretary Rumsfeld had made.