Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
National Security and Defence

Issue 18 - Evidence (2:30 p.m. session)


TORONTO, Monday, June 24, 2002

The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met this day at 2:37 p.m. to examine and report on the need for a national security policy for Canada.

Senator Colin Kenny (Chairman) in the Chair.

[English]

The Chairman: Our first witnesses this afternoon are Mr. Paul Kavanagh and Mr. André Morency.

Welcome to you both.

Mr. Paul Kavanagh, Regional Director, Security and Emergency Planning, Transport Canada: In Transport Canada, there is a headquarters group that deals with policy and legislation and a regional organization that is charged with implementing that policy and legislation. I am on the implementation side.

I wish to talk about four main topics: I shall describe our partners in security; I shall talk about the roles of the various players in security; I shall outline our inspection program; and I shall talk about the powers that the inspectors who work with me have.

If senators want to follow along, the next slide talks about partners in Canadian civil aviation security. The group at the top are the principal players in terms of implementing security — the air carriers, the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority and the airport operators. I will get into more of their role later in the presentation.

On the bottom half of this slide, starting at the left-hand side, you will see Foreign Affairs. Their role is to deal with the particular clauses dealing with security in the bilateral agreements. They deal with incidents of a security nature that happen outside of Canada. The role of the Solicitor General is, obviously, the RCMP and CSIS. We will talk about Transport Canada security later. There is also the local police force, which exercises a number of authorities.

We are in a state of transition not only due to September 11. On April 1, 2002, the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority was formed, and I will talk about them in a minute. Although the authority was formed on April 1, it will not have true operational authority probably until the fall of this year. Therefore, Transport Canada and the airlines are sharing some of its responsibilities.

At Pearson airport, as of June 2002, the responsibilities are shared as follows. The air carriers are responsible for the security of checked baggage after acceptance. Acceptance by the air carrier is deemed when a baggage tag is applied to a bag. After that point, the air carrier is responsible for the security of a particular bag.

The air carriers are charged with the security of the cargo they are carrying on their aircraft, the security of mail, the security of the aircraft itself and the security of the air carrier facilities — a maintenance bay or something at the airport. The air carriers are also charged with having procedures to deal with bomb threats. There are specific and non- specific bomb threats. They have call out procedures to deal with those types of situations when they occur. Air carriers must also have a security awareness program. Such training primarily involves training crew on security — initial training and recurrent training on an annual basis.

There are incidents that air carriers must report to us under the legislation. They are charged with keeping us informed of those items. They are presently charged with the screening of passengers, personal belongings and carry-on and checked baggage. They are also charged with pre-board screening and personnel recruitment, training, supervision and quality management within the screening function. Those last two items will be transferred to the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority when it is fully operational.

The present mandate of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority is to deal with the acquisition, deployment and maintenance of pre-board screening equipment, including the explosive detection equipment. Eventually, the authority will take on greater roles, as it matures as an organization.

The airport operators are charged with property protection and the designation of restricted areas where people are required to wear an airport pass. They are required to put up security fencing around their facilities. Airport operators are required to have an access control system at their facility; they are required to have a restricted area pass system at larger airports. They are required to have ``authorized persons only'' or ``restricted area'' signage at airports, as well as at screening points, to indicate to people that they are subject to screening.

The airport operators must have a contingency plan to deal with security incidents. They have to have passenger isolation areas and aircraft isolation areas, to deal with bomb threats and other situations that could occur. They are required to have policing services and protective security services. The policing services are very narrowly defined requirements in terms of response to screening point incidents. That is the part that we regulate.

Airport operators are required to have security committees on the airport. They are required to keep a record of their security incidents so that we can do follow-ups with them. They are required to have a security awareness program at the airport, keeping all the employees of the airport actively involved in security and prevention. The larger international airports are required to have explosive detection dogs and hand-held trace detection equipment.

The Transport Canada Regional Inspection program is my work and that of inspectors who work with me. We do an inspection of the Canadian and foreign registered air carriers departing from Canadian aerodromes. Currently at Lester B. Pearson International Airport, approximately 65 carriers are operating. We inspect each one of those.

We are also responsible for the inspection of Canadian aerodromes. I am a regional director. I deal with the province of Ontario, not only Pearson airport but also other airports in Ontario. There are 13 other airports with passenger screening operations and 29 airports with commercial passenger services, not necessarily with screening.

We monitor the baggage reconciliation process. Our requirement is that a bag cannot be transported without the passenger on board the aircraft, except under very specific circumstances. We monitor that the airlines are following that requirement. We do inspections of cargo facilities to ensure that our regulations are being followed. We look at airside access control, and we monitor that the airport is inspecting that facility.

Presently, we do the certification and designation of security officers. By security officers, we mean the people at the screening points. After the guard company has put security officers through instructions and practical experience, we put them through a written test and then give them a practical test. If we are satisfied with the results, we issue them a certificate that allows them to operate at the screening point. We monitor the security equipment performance. We have test devices to ensure that the equipment is operating within specifications.

We monitor the performance of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority. We are not doing much monitoring currently as this organization is only getting up and running. Eventually, that will be a fairly large role for us.

The people who work as Transport Canada security inspectors have a fair amount of authority under the Aeronautics Act. We have the power to inspect. We have the power to enter an aviation premise to siege evidence. We have the authority to detain an aircraft.

My position has the authority to recall an aircraft if it has already departed from the airport. If we feel that there is something remiss with a particular aircraft, we can require it to come back to the airport.

We can levy administrative and monetary penalties. We are also authorized to suspend, issue, revoke or deny the renewal of documents of entitlement or certification primarily on the screening point.

Senator Banks: Regarding airside access control, we have heard that a person who works at Pearson and is issued an identity tag with his or her photograph who then goes through a control access point is checked against a list of either outdated or otherwise invalid passes through the number on the back. I gather that is fairly consistently done. Is that right?

Mr. Kavanagh: That is correct, yes.

Senator Banks: If I got to that point where a person is checking my ID card against the list of invalid cards and I had a card that did not appear on that list, there would be no way for that security person to know that I should not go through that point. Am I right?

Mr. Kavanagh: Not completely, no. The airport pass is specific to a number of zones that relate to particular facilities at the airport. Depending on the type of pass — colour of pass and zone — an individual may not be allowed access. It is not only a pass that is the ticket to a restricted area; the individual must have a need and right of entry to that area. If an individual is challenged, he or she must explain why it is necessary to get through that door to the restricted area.

Senator Banks: A green pass gets one to more places than a blue one. Is that right?

Mr. Kavanagh: Off the top of my head, I do not know. I have a red pass.

The Chairman: My understanding is that GTAA goes anywhere with a green pass?

Mr. Kavanagh: There are a limited number of passes that GTAA executives have. They are green.

Senator Banks: The validity of the pass itself would give rise to other questions being posed. That validity can be only determined against a list of passes that have been made invalid. If I have a pass that I received from someplace else, the number for which is not on that list, I have jumped through at least one of hoops to get through that door? Am I right?

In other words, if the number on my pass were not on the list of invalid passes, then the assumption would be made that the pass is good. I would then go through whatever the next part of the process is; correct?

Mr. Kavanagh: Yes, that is fair.

Senator Banks: In other words, the guard is not checking against a list of passes that are valid. The guard is checking against a list of passes that are not valid?

Mr. Kavanagh: That is correct.

Senator Banks: We heard testimony today that a pass such as the kind I am describing can be obtained easily for $2.50; in other words, the process of making the laminated passes with a digital picture is pretty easy. Is that right?

Mr. Kavanagh: I do not have any information about that. We monitor for forged passes. There is a constant challenge process going on at all the airports. We are monitoring this closely. We have not seen any evidence of what I would consider a significant amount of forged passes.

Senator Banks: Do you find the occasional forged pass?

Mr. Kavanagh: It is a very rare event.

Senator Banks: They do exist, however?

Mr. Kavanagh: Yes.

Senator Banks: You have found them in the past.

Mr. Kavanagh: We have found some, yes, and as soon as we find them they are confiscated and we take corrective action. We fine the source. It is very seriously investigated.

Senator Banks: Do you do follow-up to determine how the pass was obtained?

Mr. Kavanagh: Yes.

Senator Banks: Where have you found that people have been able to get these things? Where would I go if I were a bad guy to get a forged pass?

Mr. Kavanagh: We are getting into some of the material that it may not be appropriate for me to discuss in detail. We do investigations. We do take corrective actions, and we remove those passes out of the system as quickly as we possibly can.

Senator Banks: Why would it be inappropriate for you to discuss that?

Mr. Kavanagh: I do not want to give out too much information as to where or how people can manufacture passes.

Senator Banks: I can go to a quick printer to get a bunch of passes made, and to a photographer to get some pictures made digitally. I know how to do that. It is pretty easy to do. The fact that it is pretty easy bothers me. I wonder if it bothers you.

I happen to know how to make one and where to get one. You would have to be a dummy not to know how to get one if you wanted one. That does not get you through the rest of the hoops.

Would you rather that those passes had some kind of electronically imbedded capacity, to make them more difficult to forge?

Mr. Kavanagh: Anything that we can do to enhance the pass system is something that we would welcome.

Senator Banks: Who determines from airport authority to airport authority what the nature of those access passes will be? Is it the airport authority itself?

Mr. Kavanagh: I am not sure I understand what you mean by ``the nature.''

Senator Banks: Is the pass and the means by which it is manufactured at Dorval airport the same as the pass and the way it is manufactured at Lester B. Pearson airport?

Mr. Kavanagh: Transport Canada sets the basic performance standards for the pass systems. The actual implementation or the technology that the airport uses is a decision made by the airport.

Senator Banks: If the passes were to be made more tamper-proof or less easy to forge, that could be done at the specific direction of Transport Canada?

Mr. Kavanagh: Yes.

Senator Banks: You mentioned that 29 airports with passenger services within your jurisdiction do not provide passenger screening. Under the new regime, under the new stringencies and with the new money that is being made available by the security fee, do you anticipate that some of those 29 airports that deliver passenger services will be subject to screening?

Mr. Kavanagh: Yes, that is correct.

Senator Banks: Will all of them?

Mr. Kavanagh: Off the top of my head, I could not say absolutely all of them, but a significant number of them, yes.

Senator Banks: When I am getting onto an airplane, the persons who are screening my luggage and making sure that I am not boarding with something metal in my pockets are certified by Transport Canada; correct?

Mr. Kavanagh: Yes.

Senator Banks: I am sure you must have heard this a million times, but the fact that some of the people who operate the screening facilities have a certificate, which I presume conveys a degree of competence, is remarkable. Do you anticipate, when the new regime assumes responsibility for those people and for engaging them, that the level of competence that you will require for the issuance of a certificate will go up?

Mr. Kavanagh: That is something I cannot answer. You would have to refer that to CATSA, Canadian Air Transport Security Authority.

Senator Banks: They are going to operate under your aegis, are they not? You are going to supervise things?

Mr. Kavanagh: Yes, but the CATSA has not established its exactly how they are going to implement the security screening at airports.

Senator Banks: They have not? Do you have any idea when they will?

Mr. Kavanagh: We are expecting it to be the fall of this year.

Senator Banks: Do you have any idea when they will assume the responsibility directly?

Mr. Kavanagh: It will probably be sometime shortly after that.

Senator Banks: Do you sometimes revoke those certificates?

Mr. Kavanagh: Yes, we do.

Senator Banks: Rarely, frequently, sometimes? Does it happen when you find a breach?

Mr. Kavanagh: Yes. We can do it for a variety of reasons. We run tests of the screening points — we call them infiltration tests — where one of the inspectors or someone we have asked tries to carry an item through the screening point. If they succeed in getting it through the screening point, the individual guard or screener who allowed that item through would be decertified on that piece of equipment.

Senator Banks: Subject to retraining?

Mr. Kavanagh: Subject to retraining.

Senator Banks: How many inspectors do you have?

Mr. Kavanagh: At present, we have 12.

Senator Banks: The reason, I presume, that you said you ask other people to do those infiltration tests for you is that the 12 people would become known?

Mr. Kavanagh: That is correct.

Senator Banks: Do you sometimes use local police to do that?

Mr. Kavanagh: No, because the local police tend to be known as well. We have been trying to get co-workers from Transport Canada, friends, other people who are not known at all at the screening points.

Senator Banks: Do you indemnify them?

Mr. Kavanagh: Yes, we do.

Senator Banks: I presume you do. You said that the police services for which you have contracted are specific and quite narrow. I think those were your words. You use them specifically to be at those points of entry where passengers are going through the checkpoint to get into a loading area?

Mr. Kavanagh: The airport has the contract with the police, and we regulate that requirement. The requirement is to have a response time to the screening points within prescribed time parameters.

Senator Banks: It is your regulatory relationship with that particular police presence to which you referred as being narrow, correct?

Mr. Kavanagh: Yes.

Senator Banks: Who looks after policing the tarmac and the service areas?

Mr. Kavanagh: That can be done through a number of different people, but the airport authority is the one charged with that responsibility.

Senator Banks: Is that subject to your supervision? Everything at airport security, I assume, is subject to DOT?

Mr. Kavanagh: When you refer to policing at the tarmac, there are a number of things that the airport authority has to be responsible for, including certain safety requirements, security requirements and so on. We would only deal with the security requirements.

Senator Banks: Who looks after making sure that there is not a bad guy running around doing bad things to airplanes in the airside area? Whose responsibility is that?

Mr. Kavanagh: We would like to think it is a teamwork effort, because it is the employees that are there. Through the security awareness programs, they should be aware of someone who looks kind of odd and does not really belong there. Some employees of the airport are specifically tasked with going around monitoring what is happening on the airport. There are police patrols at various times on the apron.

Senator Banks: Those police who are doing that are under contract to the airport authority, are they?

Mr. Kavanagh: That is right.

Senator Banks: Are you concerned with access to airside of people who have no business being there and who have no authority to be there?

Mr. Kavanagh: Yes, we are.

Senator Banks: Is that the responsibility of the airport authority?

Mr. Kavanagh: Yes.

Senator Banks: We have heard testimony that access to airside, that is to say, ramps, taxiways and the like, is gained rather easily by lots of people who are not badged. Is that right?

Mr. Kavanagh: The airport operator is charged with defining the restricted area of the airport. There can be places in the airport that are not part of that restricted area. The areas outside of that restricted area are not controlled by Transport Canada's regulations. We control where they define the restricted area, and we monitor the process they have in place for people to move from that non-restricted area into the restricted area.

Senator Banks: What part of an airport would be non-restricted?

The Chairman: Perhaps we can go to the map. Could you define that on the map for us, Mr. Kavanagh?

Mr. Kavanagh: In the case of Pearson airport, there is essentially one area that is not part of the restricted area, and that is on the upper left corner of the airport. It is define as ``K.'' You can see an area marked ``K.''

Senator Banks: For example, the wildlife control building?

Mr. Kavanagh: Yes.

Senator Banks: That is 150 yards or so from Runway 23, or less, actually, than that?

Mr. Kavanagh: Yes.

Senator Banks: If I get down North Fire Hall Road somewhere near the wildlife control building with a vehicle, because this is an unrestricted area, that is painted the right colour with the right stripes on the side and says ``wildlife control'' on it, I could drive onto any of those glide path roads, the centre service road?

Mr. Kavanagh: No.

Senator Banks: What would I run into?

Mr. Kavanagh: That dotted line there is the primary security line of the airport. That is the main fence line of the airport, and there is a guard shack that is manned 24 hours a day, seven days a week. There is an entrance there, and it is also controlled with an electric eye that detects movement through that gate. Therefore, you could not get through that point without being subject to —

Senator Banks: Without triggering something?

Mr. Kavanagh: Yes.

The Chairman: I believe we heard testimony at the Vancouver International Airport that they have passes that can be electronically deactivated. Are you familiar with that, Mr. Kavanagh?

Mr. Kavanagh: I am not aware of exactly what they are doing at Vancouver airport. It is possible to integrate into the pass system a key card. A key card gives you access to a door. It has a code that is built into it. There is certainly technology that allows you to laminate the pass and the key card together and use them as one, in which case the key card component would be electronically removed from the system.

The Chairman: In the ranking of the airports, by however you want to rank them, after Pearson, what comes next in Canada in terms of volume or size?

Mr. Kavanagh: Vancouver would be second.

The Chairman: Do you not share information back and forth as to how you are handling passes?

Mr. Kavanagh: Yes. I am sorry that I do not know the specific details on that system. It has more to do with the access control at the airport. I am familiar with the technology, but I do not know how they have specifically implemented it at Vancouver.

The Chairman: I raise this because we heard testimony earlier today to the effect that some individuals believe that these passes that currently exist can be fairly easily recreated. It has been suggested to us that it can happen in virtually anyone's office if there is access to a computer, a laminating machine and a camera. The impression that we got when we visited Vancouver was that they had the capacity, when these passes were in fact used as a key card, to not only invalidate them but to identify who was holding an invalid pass, because when the individual came up to the entry point, a picture was taken of them. One is curious. If a system like that is available, certainly to a non-expert it would seem to be a more efficient and more effective way of dealing with the problem than looking at a list of invalid numbers. One wonders why that is not the minimum standard imposed by Transport Canada.

Mr. Kavanagh: We have to look at the technology and roll it out when and where it is appropriate. An airport is faced with a substantial cost when it has to replace a system. At an airport like Pearson, there is a key card system that does many of the same things that the system at Vancouver does. It is really whether the pass and the key card are laminated into one piece or the key card is a separate item, but the technology is there to do essentially the same job.

The Chairman: We also received information that in fact the check against the invalid number is something that happens intermittently. I would be curious to know the sort of auditing that you do. In the course of your audits, how frequently do you discover that people at gates are not checking whether the numbers work or not?

Mr. Kavanagh: I cannot give you a specific number on that. It is not a regular occurrence that we find that situation.

The Chairman: Would something like that be logged, sir?

Mr. Kavanagh: Yes, we would do an incident report and an investigation as soon as we found a deficiency of that sort.

The Chairman: Do you have records available that indicate day-by-day, week-by-week, every time you discover someone not checking an invalid number?

Mr. Kavanagh: Yes.

Senator Meighen: The question is, then, what do you do once you obtain that?

Mr. Kavanagh: We immediately bring it to the attention of the airport authority to rectify the situation. In some cases, we have the person at that check point removed and replaced by someone who is more qualified to do the job. We try to follow up as much as we can. We try to find out how long the situation might have occurred and what the repercussions might have been.

Senator Banks: You said the magic word, which is ``audit.'' When you audit things, do you also audit that checkpoint you were talking about going from Section K through the fence onto the tarmacs?

Mr. Kavanagh: Yes, we do.

Senator Banks: We have heard testimony suggesting that perhaps you ought to audit it more frequently.

Mr. Kavanagh: Okay.

The Chairman: We heard testimony this morning that Air Canada hires people who have had previous drug records. I have heard information to the contrary, that passes to work airside are not issued to people with drug records. Could you clarify that for us please, Mr. Kavanagh?

Mr. Kavanagh: I cannot comment on who Air Canada hires.

The Chairman: I will not beat around the bush. In my office a week ago, you told me that passes were not issued to people with drug records. Air Canada sat where you are sitting today and said, ``We hire people with drug records.'' Can you clear it up?

Mr. Kavanagh: At the request of the employer, we do background checks on people, security checks and credit checks. All of that is required before we give a clearance that would allow the airport to issue a pass to an individual. One of the criteria for the automatic refusal of a clearance would be drug charges, such as trafficking.

The Chairman: That is my point. We are confused, because I had advised the committee of what you had told me, that that is a guaranteed turn down, and yet we have just had people say something else.

Mr. Kavanagh: Not everyone who works for Air Canada or any other operator, for that matter, at the airport would actually need to have a pass. There are people who do not work in the restricted areas that do not need a pass and therefore may not go through a security check.

Senator Forrestall: They were much more specific than that. They said there was a zero tolerance with respect to hiring someone with a drug record.

Mr. Kavanagh: I am sorry?

Senator Forrestall: They said they would not hire such an individual under any circumstances.

Mr. Kavanagh: They would not hire anyone.

Senator Forrestall: They did not qualify it by saying that they had to issue a pass or anything like that.

Senator Meighen: I recall their position to be the following. I used the example of me being a convicted drug smuggler and asked them whether or not I could be hired, and specifically whether I could be hired to work in the cargo area where I allegedly mistakenly presumed there would be the highest incidence of possible drug smuggling. They told me no, there is somewhere else, but they would not tell me where. I presume cabin personnel or something. I do not know.

The witness then proceeded to tell me that once an individual has been convicted and has paid his or her debt to society it would be against labour legislation not to be given a fair and equal chance along with anyone else to be hired to work in the cargo area, which caused my eyes to roll back in my head. I am a lawyer, and if I were convicted of drug smuggling, I would not be able to practise law.

If an individual had smuggled drugs and had spent a couple of years in prison, would you not be astonished to know that that individual were working in the cargo area of Air Canada? Does that not astonish you?

Mr. Kavanagh: The policy on whether a clearance would be issued to an individual or not specifically says that trafficking, possession for the purposes of trafficking, exporting or importing under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act is deemed to be criteria for revoking or denial of a clearance.

The Chairman: Thank you for clarifying that, because we have been labouring under some confusion for a number of hours.

Senator Day: Gentlemen, thank you for the map. It is quite helpful in getting a picture of things here.

Just as a point of clarification, between runways 33R and 33L, Cargo Areas 1, 2 and 3 are found. There is a series of dotted lines inside the two runways. Does that mean that the Cargo Areas 1, 2 and 3 and Cara Foods are outside or inside of a designated area?

Mr. Kavanagh: At the time this was drawn, I believe those buildings were under construction. Basically, those cargo buildings form part of the security line. It actually passes through the building itself, and the building becomes part of the fence line.

Senator Day: Are they inside or outside the designated secure area?

Mr. Kavanagh: The main part of the building is inside the restricted area. Sorry, I have it backwards. The primary security line passes through those buildings, and the main part of it is outside.

Mr. Grant Quinlan, Security Inspector, Transport Canada: In relation to your question, the primary security line runs along the exterior perimeter of the building on the airside portion. The front portion of the building is on the public side, where the public would have access to drop off cargo, et cetera.

Senator Day: Mr. Quinlan, these building are between two runways. Which is the airside and which is the non- airside of the building?

Mr. Quinlan: There is a portion, generally the Cara facility and the cargo buildings as such, to which the general public has access. There is a fencing provision that allows for a corridor for the public to access those buildings and the front portions of them.

Senator Day: That is, in fact, the case?

Mr. Quinlan: That is correct.

Senator Day: I do not need a pass to get to the front end of the building?

Mr. Quinlan: That is correct.

Senator Day: The airside access control is one of the areas that you were asked some questions on before. Is that part of your responsibilities? Are your responsibilities to ensure that the airside access control rules are followed?

Mr. Kavanagh: That is correct, yes.

Senator Day: Is there a series of rules in terms of who can have access and what kind of a card he or she must have?

Mr. Kavanagh: That is correct.

Senator Day: How do you monitor that?

Mr. Kavanagh: We do a number of things. We take a tour of the airside perimeter fencing to ensure that the integrity of that fencing is in place from a physical point of view. We tend to check all of the manned guard posts, and there are approximately eight of them around the airport. We watch to ensure they are challenging people and checking things, all of that sort of thing. There are a number of places where companies have certain procedures that they have to follow to move from the unrestricted area into the restricted area, and we pull the records of those people and ensure they are following the procedures.

Senator Day: So you do a periodic quality control testing activity?

Mr. Kavanagh: Yes.

Senator Day: Looking at your map again, down in the lower right side near a conveyor drive, I see Esso and a couple of other businesses, Sky Service, for example. They are outside of the control area; is that correct?

Mr. Kavanagh: Actually, this map is about a year old. Those buildings are no longer in place. They were torn down recently because of the zoning associated with the new runway, and they have actually been relocated over in the infield area. The front portion of their building was on the airside, and the building itself was groundside. The front face of it where it opens up into the other side would have opened into the restricted area.

Senator Day: Would that still be the case in their new location?

Mr. Kavanagh: Yes.

Senator Day: If I am a corporate traveller, when I go in, I am okay, but when I pop out the other side, I am in a restricted area as I go on the apron to get on the plane?

Mr. Kavanagh: Yes.

Senator Day: Do you monitor these private companies that provide corporate aviation?

Mr. Kavanagh: We monitor their overall operation. We would monitor the Skyservice operation, not the individual companies that have business jets there. We would monitor Skyservice and how it is controlling access onto the apron.

Senator Day: If I were travelling with a corporate jet, I would go through Skyservice.

Mr. Kavanagh: That is correct.

Senator Day: You monitor the company that provides the service.

Mr. Kavanagh: That is correct.

Senator Day: Do they provide the same kind of X-ray machines that I would be accustomed to?

Mr. Kavanagh: Our regulations do not require the screening of passengers on business aircraft, but we require a log of the names of people going on the aircraft. They keep names as opposed to putting the people through a screening process.

Senator Day: In terms of what they are bringing on and off and what they are bringing in?

Mr. Kavanagh: There is no control on that. Again, it is up to the operator. We always tell them that they have to know their passenger. They have their own internal procedures.

Senator Day: That is the extent of it? You tell them they have to know their passengers, and please keep a list of what they tell you their name is?

Mr. Kavanagh: That is correct, under the current regulations.

Senator Day: What act do those regulations come under?

Mr. Kavanagh: All of our regulations come under the Aeronautics Act.

Senator Day: In terms of the inspection activity with respect to commercial carriers, the regulations that they have to follow for passengers and the kind of security, do you monitor that on a periodic basis or a continuous basis?

Mr. Kavanagh: We monitor that almost on a continuous basis, yes.

Senator Day: It is your responsibility to see that they, or whoever is hired to do that before the rules change, are looking after the security for passengers. It is your responsibility to ensure they are following the regulations?

Mr. Kavanagh: That is right.

Senator Day: In terms of the level of testing, et cetera.

Mr. Kavanagh: We do the testing of those individuals. We do the testing of the people at the screening points. We do the testing when they first come into the job to ensure that they are at an adequate level of training. Based on that, we will issue a certificate. There is a requirement for a recurrent retesting of these people, which we do. Then we do what we call ``infiltration tests,'' which are random tests through screening points. We do all of those.

Senator Day: In addition, do they report to you other than the periodic quality testing that you do?

Mr. Kavanagh: They do their own quality assurance.

Senator Day: Do they report to you in writing with respect to their quality assurance testing?

Mr. Kavanagh: They are not required to report to us in writing, but we can request their records.

Senator Day: They keep records, and you have access to them.

Mr. Kavanagh: Yes.

Senator Day: In relation to the security equipment performance that you listed on page 7 as one of your responsibilities, would that be the performance of the X-ray machines?

Mr. Kavanagh: That is exactly it. It is the performance of the X-ray equipment, the metal walk-throughs and the other equipment used at the airport. We test that it is operating within specifications.

Senator Day: What about ion detection machines?

Mr. Kavanagh: There is trace detection equipment, yes.

Senator Day: Do you monitor and ensure that that equipment is working properly?

Mr. Kavanagh: Yes.

Senator Day: Is buying that equipment a Transport Canada responsibility?

Mr. Kavanagh: That is the responsibility of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority.

The Chairman: When you are doing an audit of an ion scan, what level of false positives is acceptable?

Mr. Kavanagh: We are testing to ensure it operates within its performance specifications. False positives can be an indication that it is operating within its performance specifications. A number of items can trigger a false positive.

The Chairman: Someone who could have been painting his or her home that day carries a suitcase with trace chemicals on it could cause the machine to go off.

Mr. Kavanagh: A number of things can trigger a response, yes.

The Chairman: With respect to ion scanning in general, how often should one expect false positives to occur?

Mr. Kavanagh: That is information that I am not allowed discuss. I am sorry.

The Chairman: Why not?

Mr. Kavanagh: It is something that the minister has deemed he does not want revealed at this time.

The Chairman: Does the minister have access to the Internet?

Mr. Kavanagh: I presume so.

The Chairman: Is this information not freely available on the Internet?

Mr. Kavanagh: For Canadian situations?

The Chairman: No, for ion scanners. There are people selling them there.

Mr. Kavanagh: I think the manufacturers' claims might be available. I have not checked myself.

The Chairman: Why are you saying that publicly available information is classified, something that is secret?

Mr. Kavanagh: I thought you were asking me the specifics about the Canadian situation and the equipment we have in place as opposed to generalized information.

The Chairman: Are ion scanners in Canada different than those in the United States?

Mr. Kavanagh: Every manufacturer has different models, so every installation tends to be unique in terms of what it encounters.

The Chairman: Is every model unique or every installation?

Mr. Kavanagh: Every installation is unique.

The Chairman: Would you not expect, for the same piece of equipment, the same results in a variety of different places?

Mr. Kavanagh: It faces different challenges in every location it is in because of the composition of the people and the products they are carrying. There are many variables in what the results produce.

The Chairman: What security issue is in play when you are discussing the fact that sometimes these machines go off when there is not really a problem?

Mr. Kavanagh: We do not discuss the performance records of the equipment that we have in place.

The Chairman: Why is that?

Mr. Kavanagh: We do not for reasons of national security.

The Chairman: What national security element is at play when a system goes off when there is no problem?

Mr. Kavanagh: Having the equipment go off when there is no problem is not necessarily a problem. The purpose of the trace detection system is that it is an investigative tool. When it goes off, it triggers a series of procedures the screener is required to perform in terms of determining whether there is a threat there. Therefore, having a high, medium or low false positive rate is not a problem in itself. The proper procedures have to be followed once you get an alarm from the system, and people follow through the steps.

The Chairman: Bluntly put, Mr. Kavanagh, when people say, ``Oh, yes, we have devices — ion scanners — around that will detect bombs,'' and if they are unnecessarily going off a lot, our committee feels that you may need more space and other measures to check that baggage, to see why it has gone off. It may mean means that the whole system is being slowed down or that you are checking fewer bags than you might otherwise because you are going to slow down flights to do this. These sorts of issues are relevant to understanding the system. I think the burden is on you to demonstrate to this committee why you should not be talking to us about that matter.

Mr. André Morency, Regional Director General, Ontario Region, Transport Canada: Much of the equipment is new technology, and it is a matter of calibration of the equipment at various sites. It has been our experience that getting people knowledgeable enough, even from the manufacturers, to help calibrate that information system, to pick up a variety of signals that we need to continually calibrate — I do not think my colleague here is saying that if something goes off on a frequent basis it necessarily means there is an issue.

It could be a calibration issue in terms of what we are trying to examine and what the machine is picking up. Many components, whose source we do not know, in the air around machines might be triggering it.

It is new technology we are learning. Our counterparts in the United States are also learning at the same time, which is why we are trying to deploy it on a level that allows us to have confidence that as we are deploying this equipment we are better understanding it and making it effective in its use.

The Chairman: I agree. The issue before us is whether we are prepared to talk about this in a way that the Canadian public can understand and have confidence in it. No one expects you to work miracles or have a system that is foolproof from day one. We expect this to be a slow, difficult process, perhaps even learning by trial and error as we go forward.

Having said that, it is one thing for you and the department to say, ``Trust us, it is all in hand.'' It is another thing for you to sit down and share how you are working through the problems. If you say, ``Trust us, it is all in hand,'' you will find we are around for a long time asking many questions. If you want to share the issues and discuss them with this committee, so we have an understanding, and through us, the Canadian people have an understanding of the level of security they can expect at airports, the hearings will run in a different fashion.

Senator Day: The other piece of equipment we do not know much about is a fingerprint type of equipment that has been installed at the airport. Do you know anything about that, or does it have something to do with another agency, one that does not relate to you?

The Chairman: It is immigration.

Senator Day: Would it have anything to do with you?

Mr. Kavanagh: I am not sure. Transport Canada has an extensive research and development program. We test new equipment all the time, so I do not know exactly what you are referring to.

Senator Day: In terms of the protocol for inspections of carriers, et cetera, you say that is all with respect to the regulations under the Aeronautics Act, which will be easy for me to find. However, do you have any other protocols for inspection that are known by the carrier or the operator that you use as an inspection criterion that would not be in the regulations?

Mr. Kavanagh: Below the regulations, we have measures.

Senator Day: Could you share those with us?

Mr. Kavanagh: Those documents are unauthorized-disclosure prohibited. We can share them with you as the committee. Those are not public documents.

Senator Day: If we decide we want to pursue that, we will let you know.

Mr. Kavanagh: Putting them into the public forum is the concern we have, not holding them back from the committee.

Senator Day: I wanted to identify them and then categorize them, so we now know that.

Senator Cordy: This morning we asked representatives from Air Canada some questions about the responsibilities that the air carriers have. In many cases, we were not able to get information from them. Either they did not feel they were able to provide the information, or they said they were not aware of numbers and statistics. However, they have to report information to Transport Canada. I am wondering how much data you collect in terms of developing what we would call, perhaps, a ``risk assessment'' for particular airports in Canada, specifically, Pearson, since you are located there.

Mr. Kavanagh: We tend to collect a lot of data relating to various activities at the airport.

Senator Cordy: For what purposes do you use the data?

Mr. Kavanagh: We use it for enforcement. We are involved in threat and risk assessments, and we are using it in that context. We use it to feed back to our group in Ottawa in terms of changes to our regulations and measures. If we see a particular deficiency or problem area, we will feed it back to them to see if we can rectify it.

Senator Cordy: I am looking at the new Canadian Air Transport Security Authority, which has been in place since April 1. I understand they are still finding their way, that it will be a while before they determine what they are doing. You have said more will be added to their list. They have presently acquisition, deployment and maintenance of pre- board screening equipment, including explosive detection systems. Will money be spent on research or using the data that Transport Canada has accumulated to have a long-term plan for security at the various airports, specifically, Pearson?

Mr. Kavanagh: We are constantly reviewing the environment in which we are operating and ensuring that we can identify the vectors of threat and how the environment is changing.

September 11 was a very dramatic change in how things were done. We put through special measures that tried to deal with that situation. We are always reviewing and analyzing our legislation to make sure that it is dealing with the threat as identified. The short answer is yes.

Senator Cordy: Certainly, when you go through an airport now, you can see longer security lineups, and so on. When we travelled out West and visited airports, we heard about people who have access to the airside. Certainly, for me, one of the scarier aspects of security is the number of people who do not go through any of the security systems we see for passengers, yet who have access, directly or indirectly, to airplanes coming in and taking off.

Mr. Kavanagh: Do not forget that it is the general public who is going through screening. They are generally largely unknown to us. We have no background on any one of those people. The people who come to the aircraft from the airside have an airport pass. They have gone through a check. We have good background on those people. They tend to be more trusted by us. I think that is very much the difference between a group of unknowns versus a group of knowns.

Senator Cordy: We did hear this morning that there was evidence a couple of years ago — and I am not sure whether that is true today — that organized crime was within the Toronto airport. That would be a situation where you would have people working on site who are part of organized crime.

Mr. Kavanagh: I cannot say much about that. If specifics were brought forward, we would investigate those them. If our investigations turned up that, indeed, that was true, we would study what we could do to change our criteria by tightening it up or whatever would have to be done.

Senator Meighen: As I understand it, the handout you gave us indicates who has the primary responsibility for a variety of things. Are you not the auditor of those things? For example, if the security fencing was found to be two or three feet high in some areas, would it be your responsibility to draw that to the attention of the airport operator?

Mr. Kavanagh: Yes, that is correct.

Senator Meighen: Do you issue standards for them to follow? How do you know whether the fencing should be two feet or 20 feet high?

Mr. Kavanagh: Our standard is a seven-foot chain link fence with a one-foot barbed wire overhang.

Senator Meighen: Does that exist everywhere around the perimeter?

Mr. Kavanagh: It is the requirement around the restricted area.

Senator Meighen: I realize it is the requirement. Does it exist?

Mr. Kavanagh: At Pearson airport, the standard the airport uses is a 10-foot high fence with barbed wire overhang, so it exceeds standards.

Senator Meighen: Does that exist around restricted areas?

Mr. Kavanagh: To the best of my knowledge, yes, it does.

Are you aware of any place where —

The Chairman: We ask the questions here, sir.

Senator Meighen: Regarding access control, which is what it is described as, did I understand you to say that organizations such as Esso Avitat and Skyservice are now inside the perimeter? I have flown on a private aircraft, either Skyservice or Avitat, and as I recall those buildings are where they are indicated on this map, which is outside the perimeter. Are they not?

Mr. Kavanagh: Their original location was outside, yes.

Senator Meighen: They are now inside that dotted line?

Mr. Kavanagh: Their existing hangar forms part of the primary line, yes.

Senator Meighen: I see. What standard is there in terms of vehicle access across that perimeter line?

Mr. Kavanagh: First, the persons need to have right of access. They have to have a document of entitlement. If they are in the general aviation area, they would not necessarily have a restricted area pass. They would have to demonstrate they are going to — well, excuse me. I will back pedal a little bit on that.

The vehicular access that they have to have is an airside permit. A permit issued by the airport gives them access to the airside. The occupants have a need and right of entry to get past the fence line. There is also a requirement in our regulations to do a search of the vehicle to see if any unauthorized persons are in the vehicle.

Senator Meighen: Supposing you and I rented a jet to fly to the Bahamas to go fishing. You tell me to arrive at two o'clock, and I take a taxi that pulls up to the gate. What should happen then?

Mr. Kavanagh: If you are talking about an operation that goes into the restricted area, as opposed to Area K that we were discussing, the situation is different.

Senator Meighen: I do not understand the distinctions. Can you help me? I thought there was a gate right along where that dotted line is, or perhaps before it.

Mr. Kavanagh: You are talking about the old Esso Avitat operation?

Senator Meighen: I am. That dotted line now goes through the Esso Avitat buildings.

Mr. Kavanagh: It is now located on the infield operation, and the primary line goes through that building, yes.

Senator Meighen: I arrive by taxi. Does my taxi come up to the gate?

Mr. Kavanagh: Not any more.

Senator Meighen: Where does it come to?

Mr. Kavanagh: The tax would drop you off in front of the building. You would have to go through the building, where they would have to check you in.

Senator Meighen: They do not check me for what I am carrying in my fishing bag because you said they are not concerned with that.

Mr. Kavanagh: They would have to match you up with the aircraft and have someone verify you are the person.

Senator Meighen: Would there be any supervision of me once they have determined that I am who I am and out we go onto the tarmac? Does any one ensure that I board the aircraft you have leased?

Mr. Kavanagh: The operator of the Esso Avitat facility is charged with ensuring that you go from the door to the aircraft.

Senator Meighen: Is there still a gate that would provide access to the tarmac without going through the buildings?

Mr. Kavanagh: There is a gate that would allow you access, but that gate is controlled. The vehicle would have to be searched. It would have to meet all the requirements that I was talking about.

Senator Meighen: Is there a live human being doing the searching?

Mr. Kavanagh: It is a human being.

Senator Meighen: Security of mail is the responsibility of the carrier, as I read it.

Mr. Kavanagh: That is correct.

Senator Meighen: In your auditing of that, do you permit them to rely on third-party verification?

Mr. Kavanagh: We allow them to rely on Canada Post verification.

Senator Meighen: To your knowledge, do carriers do any screening themselves, or do they rely on Canada Post verification?

Mr. Kavanagh: I am not aware of anyone who does independent verification. They meet with Canada Post to verify what they have in place.

Senator Meighen: In the discharge of your responsibility to monitor the performance of CATSA, will you have established standards? I am interested in how you will do that.

Mr. Kavanagh: Right now we can only speculate what that will be, but we expect we will continue doing random infiltration tests to verify the quality of the staff, that they have employed the screening points. We will still be doing random checks to make sure the equipment they are operating is within tolerances, and so forth.

Senator Forrestall: With respect to mail, do you have a requirement to know from Canada Post where the mail it collects for air transport is sorted and checked? Do you have any idea how Canada Post does a security check on the mail?

Mr. Kavanagh: Our measures stipulate the requirements Canada Post must comply with. It is defined within the measures.

In terms of what postal facility it is sorted at, that is not part of the requirements we have.

Senator Forrestall: The post office is required to search?

Mr. Kavanagh: Yes. There are criteria in the measures they are required to comply with and to certify to the carrier that the mail is in compliance with them.

Senator Forrestall: They are reluctant witnesses like Air Canada and everyone else, including you, gentlemen.

The RCMP and the Peel Regional Police do actual policing because it is the area of jurisdiction.

Mr. Kavanagh: Peel has criminal jurisdiction at the airport.

Senator Forrestall: A private security firm is here doing security work. Presumably, they are all well trained. Do you know if they are equally well trained?

Mr. Kavanagh: Are you comparing the RCMP with Peel?

Senator Forrestall: I am speaking of the RCMP, the Peel Regional Police and the private security firm under contract to the airport authority. The nature of their work may differ, but they are all doing airport security work in one form or another. Does the security firm, to your knowledge, have police training? Are they peace officers, or are they police officers?

Mr. Kavanagh: I cannot comment on the quality of training for the RCMP and Peel. That would not be appropriate. However, for the private security companies, we stipulate a minimum training requirement.

Senator Forrestall: What is that minimum training requirement?

Mr. Kavanagh: Our measures do not define the length of time required. There are certain performance standards and topics they must comply with in terms of that training.

Senator Forrestall: That is sufficiently vague for me. You may not want to comment on this, but the Greater Toronto Airport Authority refused to appear before the committee. Why would it do that?

Mr. Kavanagh: I cannot comment on that.

Senator Forrestall: You cannot, or —

Mr. Morency: It is not our position to comment on any one else.

Mr. Kavanagh: I have not been privy to their discussion.

Senator Forrestall: How would you feel if you asked them to come before you and they said no?

An airborne U.S. cargo carrier flight crew uniform and identification have been stolen from a hotel here in Toronto. A note reads, ``Be on the lookout for any unfamiliar persons wearing an airborne express crew uniform.'' Do you know anything about that? Would that come to your attention?

Mr. Kavanagh: Was that very recently? I do not recall seeing anything.

Senator Forrestall: Apparently, it was very recently, perhaps last night, today; perhaps it is just a little bit of a hoax. The question I was asked is whether you would know about that.

Mr. Kavanagh: We normally get reports about those things fairly quickly. I have not seen anything on that as of today.

Senator Forrestall: We know what that is now; do we not?

The Chairman: Could you describe for the committee, please, Mr. Kavanagh, what standards Transport Canada sets for the handling of personal baggage that people take on board and check? In terms of safety, what do our airlines have to do to ensure they are handled safely?

Mr. Kavanagh: There are two aspects to it. First, the Aeronautics Act and our cabin safety group, which is separate from my organization, require air carriers to define the limitations on the size of baggage allowed on board an aircraft. My understanding is that the criteria are based on the type of aircraft the airline is flying, the size of the overhead bins, and that sort of thing. There is a cabin safety issue that deals with the size limitation and weight limitations of carry-on baggage.

There is also a dangerous goods aspect, where certain items are prohibited because they are dangerous goods and are not allowed on board an aircraft. Certain types of aerosol cans and other things are prohibited.

Our security requirements define the limitations on things such as knives, weapons and other things that are prohibited within the cabin of the aircraft.

Does that answer your question?

The Chairman: It does. Do you audit these?

Mr. Kavanagh: We audit the security aspects of things, yes. Other groups within Transport audit the other aspects.

The Chairman: There was a report out of the United States in March that of 32 airports checked in an audit beginning in the month of November investigators were able to get guns past screening checkpoints 30 per cent of the time they tried, knives 70 per cent of the time and false bombs through security checks 60 per cent of the time. What sort of results do you get when you do audits like that?

Mr. Kavanagh: We do not issue the results of our infiltration tests.

The Chairman: Why?

Mr. Kavanagh: In the interests of national security.

The Chairman: Is that because you are afraid of what people would do if they knew the system fails?

Mr. Kavanagh: As soon as there is a failure at a screening point, we take immediate corrective action in terms of de- certifying someone, and also dealing with the carriers in terms of corrective action. Our focus is on correcting the problems. Therefore, historic information may or may not be relevant, given the fact that corrective action is taken immediately.

The Chairman: Are our results better or worse than the Americans'?

Mr. Kavanagh: I cannot comment.

The Chairman: Certainly the risks in the United States seem to be pretty serious, and the level of screening there is enough to cause concern, or the level of success is enough to cause concern. A few per cent would cause concern, but when you are talking 30 or 70 per cent, these are very high numbers. If we do not have a system that can pick things up better than that, what purpose is being served by covering it up?

Mr. Kavanagh: The minister has declined to provide that information on a number of occasions; I do not think it is appropriate that I discuss it.

The Chairman: What authority are you citing, sir?

Mr. Kavanagh: Section 4.8 of the Aeronautics Act, I believe it is.

The Chairman: Regarding checked bags, can you tell us what happens to a checked bag when someone goes to an Air Canada counter with a ticket and says, ``I have two bags that I would like to take with me to Vancouver, and I would like to check them''?

Mr. Kavanagh: In very general terms, the person takes his or her luggage to the check-in counter. The individual is asked the three questions that are required at the screening point — whether the person packed his or her own bag, whether he or she is aware of its contents and whether the bag was left unattended. The baggage tag is affixed to it, at which time the luggage is deemed to be accepted by the air carrier. It goes down the baggage chute. At the end of the baggage chute, there are rooms where bags are sorted into various locations. It is usually put into a can or a unitized load device, ULD, for that aircraft and put on board the aircraft. Security checks could be carried out on that bag, depending on the airport, the circumstance, the nature of the flight and who is on the flight.

The Chairman: In terms of security checks, are the checks X-ray checks, orare they checks for bombs, or neither or both?

Mr. Kavanagh: It depends on the circumstances. It could be any or all of the above.

Senator Meighen: What happens if an individual, in answer to one of the questions, says: ``My wife or my brother or my sister packed the bag, and yes, I did leave it. When I went to the washroom, I left it by my seat in the airport for, oh, not more than five minutes.''

Mr. Kavanagh: The bag is supposed to be searched.

Senator Meighen: That is a rule?

Mr. Kavanagh: Yes.

Senator Banks: I am thinking about a situation where people who are on a tour are told to leave their bags in the hotel hallway at such and such a time, whereupon they will be collected and put on the bus. When those persons check in at the airport, the answer they must perforce give to the question, ``Have these bags been in your possession all this time,'' is no. Are all those bags therefore searched?

Mr. Kavanagh: There are specific methods of dealing with group check-in of luggage and other situations of that nature.

Senator Banks: In the case of the tour to which I referred, it is reasonable to assume that all of those bags have, for quite some time, been out of the care of their owners and have been accessible to many other people. Rather than treating that situation more leniently than would otherwise be the case, could it not be argued that it ought, if anything, to be treated more strictly than would otherwise be the case? I know that would be inconvenient.

Mr. Kavanagh: Convenience is not the factor that we take into account. We do have certain situations where the employees at hotels and other places have been cleared and therefore are able to handle the bags. There are other situations where we do not, and therefore we can treat them in a different way than other circumstances, and we try to deal with each one uniquely.

Senator Banks: There are persons off airports who are authorized to deal with luggage.

Mr. Kavanagh: Yes.

Senator Banks: Are they certified by you?

Mr. Kavanagh: We work with the company that is doing the operation to make sure that we have an equivalent level of security in that type of operation.

Senator Banks: The bellman at the hotel would be certified by you?

Mr. Kavanagh: That individual could be certified by us, yes. It is not automatic.

The Chairman: Do you audit these people?

Mr. Kavanagh: We do audit the situations where we have what we call waivers in place.

The Chairman: How frequently would that take place? How many people do you have in the region? Is it 13?

Mr. Kavanagh: At Pearson airport, there are 12 people.

The Chairman: How many report to you in the region?

Mr. Kavanagh: At the moment, we have 20. We have the authority and are in the process of staffing it up to 45.

The Chairman: Do you perform an annual audit, a monthly audit, a quarterly audit?

Mr. Kavanagh: On those particular operations, it is usually done probably every two years.

The Chairman: We talked about mail earlier. We have established that it is not the responsibility of the airlines, that they simply receive the mail in bags or in the unitized containers you were talking about. Does the mail check take place at a postal station somewhere?

Mr. Kavanagh: Yes.

The Chairman: How frequently do you audit that postal station?

Mr. Kavanagh: This is a relatively new requirement. We have not done any inspections at Canada Post's facility as yet.

The Chairman: Are you saying that, at present, unaudited mail is going aboard aircraft?

Mr. Kavanagh: It is being audited by Canada Post.

The Chairman: But not by Transport Canada.

Mr. Kavanagh: We have not done an audit as yet.

The Chairman: In the event of a problem on the plane, the liability is with the carrier, is it not?

Mr. Kavanagh: Yes.

The Chairman: Therefore, the carrier has entrusted you with the responsibility for what goes on the plane, and you in turn are trusting Canada Post to do the check, but you are not auditing whether or not they are doing the checks?

Mr. Kavanagh: No. We are saying the air carrier is responsible for the security of mail. We have made an arrangement nationally with Canada Post that they can certify the mail and the air carriers can accept that. The air carriers can go to Canada Post and verify the processes they have in place before they accept their certification. We have created a mechanism for the air carriers to feel comfort with Canada Post. What we are checking is that the air carriers are getting certificates from Canada Post that say that the mail meets the requirements.

The Chairman: We find it curious, Mr. Kavanagh, because when we approached Canada Post on this subject, they replied to our clerk that they did not understand why we were interested in talking to them about security of mail because they simply delivered it to the airports, that the airlines handle any checking of the mail.

Mr. Kavanagh: I cannot comment on how they expressed their views.

The Chairman: That is because you do not audit them.

Mr. Kavanagh: The obligation is on the carrier, and the carrier accepts the certificate from Canada Post, so the obligation is on the air carrier if they want to verify that process. We are auditing the carrier to make sure they have a certificate for the mail shipments.

The Chairman: It is confusing, because we talked to a mail carrier today, and the answer we got back was, ``We do not worry about what is in it because Canada Post takes care of it.''

Mr. Kavanagh: We will have to follow up.

Senator Forrestall: You will have to follow up?

Mr. Kavanagh: We will follow up.

Senator Forrestall: Will you report back to us?

Mr. Kavanagh: Yes.

The Chairman: If you could write to the clerk, that would be helpful.

We have been advised by a source involved in airline security that food comes forward with catering trucks and that they are not searched. Are catering trucks searched every time they come airside?

Mr. Kavanagh: The measures require that the food trays be searched before they leave the facility. The typical arrangement is that the truck is sealed at the food preparation facility and then the food is delivered. It does not have to be reinspected after it has left that area, having gone through the initial inspection.

The Chairman: Let's talk about Cara, for example, which is a well-known food provider. Are you saying that they search the trays and they search the truck at their plant?

Mr. Kavanagh: They search the food at their plant, yes, and the truck, yes.

The Chairman: They search the truck as well?

Mr. Kavanagh: Yes.

The Chairman: And you audit this?

Mr. Kavanagh: Yes.

The Chairman: How often? When was the last time you audited a Cara plant?

Mr. Kavanagh: Probably within the last month. We have been working very closely with Cara on exactly this issue.

The Chairman: When people are issued passes — is the phrase RAP? Could you tell the committee what an RAP is?

Mr. Kavanagh: Restricted area pass.

The Chairman: When someone is issued an RAP, what mechanism do you have in place to determine that these passes should be withdrawn? If, for example, someone was convicted of trafficking in drugs, how would you know that, and what mechanism do you have in place to deal with people who commit offences subsequent to having received a restricted area pass?

Mr. Kavanagh: There is a legal obligation on the part of the employer of that particular individual to report any charges of that nature to the airport pass office or any other conditions under which the pass should be revoked or rescinded.

The Chairman: How do you audit that, sir?

Mr. Kavanagh: It is the airport's responsibility to maintain that list, and we go in and verify that the airport is doing that.

The Chairman: What is your process for verifying whether someone has received a conviction and whether the pass has been subsequently withdrawn?

Mr. Kavanagh: We tend to do spot checks. That particular situation I would suspect is relatively rare, but we go through and pick several companies a year. We verify that a particular company has been notifying the airport when people leave the company and that the passes have been recovered. We verify that there is a process in place within the companies.

The Chairman: Could you tell the committee what a known shipper's agreement is, please?

Mr. Kavanagh: The air carriers have a procedure whereby a company that has shipped with an air carrier for a minimum number of shipments is considered by the air carrier to be a known shipper.

The Chairman: Is it true that someone with a known shipper's agreement ships goods without any security checks?

Mr. Kavanagh: All goods that are accepted for shipment are accepted by someone who has been trained. That is a requirement. Even if it is from a known shipper, they still have to be accepted by someone who is trained.

The Chairman: Yes, but is it true that there is no further inspection once that person who is trained has accepted the goods?

Mr. Kavanagh: Yes, that is true, but that is the point where there is control exercised.

The Chairman: What happens here beyond the individual filling out a form saying, ``I am shipping these goods''?

Mr. Kavanagh: The packages are usually examined by the person at the airline who is responsible for accepting it on behalf of the airline.

The Chairman: And the airline examines what is in the package?

Mr. Kavanagh: They examine the packages and the content, where it is going, how it is done.

The Chairman: Sort of a shake test?

Mr. Kavanagh: That could be one part of it, yes.

The Chairman: Could you elaborate for the committee as to what happens? How are known shippers treated differently than unknown shippers?

Mr. Kavanagh: Known shippers have a little more latitude in terms of directing their shipments or requesting their shipments be directed to particular flights targeting particular destinations, arrival windows, that type of thing. Unknown shippers do not have that prerogative.

The Chairman: A known shipper could specify that it wanted its package to go out on flight XYZ to Vancouver, leaving tonight. In that way, the shipper would know that the package would arrive in Vancouver at a specific time. Is that correct?

Mr. Kavanagh: Usually a shipper stipulates a desired arrival time as opposed to the flight and departure time it prefers.

Senator Meighen: Could you tell us how you get to be a known shipper?

Mr. Kavanagh: The actual process varies from air carrier to air carrier, but you have to have a history of shipping with a particular carrier. There are people who ship parcels daily. That is their business, and that is how they become known.

Senator Meighen: Do you do any auditing of the identity of known shippers?

Mr. Kavanagh: What do you mean by that?

Senator Meighen: Suppose it comes to your attention that the ABC company is now a known shipper on Airline 123 and you have information that the known shipper has been infiltrated by organized crime. What would you do?

Mr. Kavanagh: If we had that information, we would share that with the carrier.

Senator Meighen: Would you say, ``Please do something''?

Mr. Kavanagh: We have a lot more authority than saying that.

Senator Meighen: That is what I am interested in. Can you oblige them to take the necessary steps?

Mr. Kavanagh: We could indicate that that company is no longer to be treated as a known shipper. Depending on the nature of the business, we can influence exactly what the carrier will do with their shipments.

Senator Meighen: Do you recall ever having to intervene in that sort of situation?

Mr. Kavanagh: No, I cannot think of any specific example of where we have been called to do that.

The Chairman: Do you audit the employee records of known shippers? Do the employees of known shippers have security clearances? Do you know whether they go through criminal checks? Are you aware of whether all their employees have had a CSIS check?

Mr. Kavanagh: We do not audit the employment records of known shippers. The known shipper concept is something that the air carriers establish. We are holding the air carriers responsible.

The Chairman: Do you see some inconsistency of having CSIS checks and criminal record checks of people who are working around planes but not having checks of people who are handling packages that go forward with relatively less scrutiny?

Mr. Kavanagh: We are trying to balance the threat and the risk. I believe we have drawn an appropriate balance. A line has to be drawn with respect to who is going to go through the clearance program. The number of people would increase exponentially if we were dealing with the feeder companies into carriers.

The Chairman: No question, but having said that you are giving them a pass or a lighter ride. We have heard testimony to the effect that organized crime infiltrates organizations so that they can ensure that goods are shipped without getting greater scrutiny. Is that inconceivable?

Mr. Kavanagh: No, it is not inconceivable.

The Chairman: Are the employees who work airside subjected to the same inspection process as a passenger?

Mr. Kavanagh: Our current regulations do not require that employees be subjected to the same level of checks as passengers. Employees are required to pass a control point. The people at the control point verify that an employee has a pass and that the number on the employee's pass is not on the list at the control point. If the employee's number is not on the control point list, the employee is allowed to go forward.

The Chairman: If an employee had a box cutter in his or her pocket, would you know?

Mr. Kavanagh: We would not know. Employees who are employed on the airside are permitted tools of the trade because there is a myriad of work to be done on the airside. It is all part of the trust relationship one has to have with the employees, through the pass systems and security checks.

The Chairman: I understand that. A baggage loader does not need a box cutter to do his job; however, you still would not know if the baggage loader had a box cutter in his overalls.

Mr. Kavanagh: No.

The Chairman: Do you know what each employee has in his or her lunch box?

Mr. Kavanagh: No, we do not.

The Chairman: What about a rucksack, if they carry one?

Mr. Kavanagh: No.

The Chairman: With respect to employees who are working around aircraft, servicing aircraft, refueling aircraft, putting baggage on aircraft, going in and out of aircraft on a regular basis, do you know what they are taking into the airport on any given day?

Mr. Kavanagh: No. They are put through a security check, which gives them a pass, and we have a challenge process to ensure that they are in an appropriate place and not out of place on the airport, but, no, we do not do searches of employees.

The Chairman: Do you have standards in terms of response times for police to get to certain areas if there is a problem at, say, the check-in area? Does Transport Canada require specific response times for police to get to different places?

Mr. Kavanagh: Yes, we do.

The Chairman: Could you share them with the committee, please?

Mr. Kavanagh: I have to double-check whether that is covered under a regulation or in a measure. However, the response time is five minutes or less.

The Chairman: Five minutes or less for any key point in the airport?

Mr. Kavanagh: Yes. The response time to the screening point is five minutes or less.

The Chairman: To the screening point. How about to a gate?

Mr. Kavanagh: That specifically is not covered in the regulations.

The Chairman: How about to an airside aircraft parked on the tarmac?

Mr. Kavanagh: The only place we stipulate a response time is at the screening point.

The Chairman: Why is that?

Mr. Kavanagh: That was considered to be the most key response that is required at the airport.

The Chairman: Why was five minutes chosen?

Mr. Kavanagh: I could not tell you the exact rationale for five minutes.

The Chairman: As opposed to having someone on site, why would you not have a policeman standing there?

Mr. Kavanagh: Five minutes was probably considered to be a compromise. At most airports, that time is easily met. It was trying to set an upper limit.

The Chairman: When was the last time you audited that?

Mr. Kavanagh: We audit that on a very regular basis. There are log sheets kept at the screening points, and we monitor those log sheets. It indicates a response time for police, so we are probably doing it on a daily basis if not weekly.

The Chairman: At least once a week or perhaps once a day, you push a button to see how long it takes Peel Regional to get to the checkpoint person?

Mr. Kavanagh: We can do that, but typically we do not do that. We look at the actual response times recorded in the sheets for real incidents.

Mr. Morency: It is fair to say that whatever standards we established are based on a risk assessment, and if we feel over time that we need to change those the department certainly has the ability, either through measures or through the regulations, to change those. Obviously, the risk threat assessment is how we have established our measures today.

The Chairman: If I heard your answer correctly, you said, ``Trust me.''

Mr. Morency: No, I did not. I said that, based on the information we have, we have an established measure. We try them. We test them each day. We learn information. If we feel that we need to modify them, we will modify them.

The Chairman: Right, but you understand the criteria, and we do not.

Mr. Morency: Mr. Kavanagh has given you the parameters we have established based on an assessment of what we feel would be reasonable under the circumstances. That reasonable test is always tested, and that is how we react.

Senator Meighen: The chair asked why you would not have a policeman standing at each point. Do I assume the answer is financial?

Mr. Kavanagh: Yes.

Senator Meighen: If you had the finances, would you have a policeman? That would be better than a five-minute response time, would it not?

Mr. Kavanagh: There are some practical considerations. If you take it to its absolute limit, you would have to shut down the screening point if the policeman had to use the washroom. The policemen serve purposes other than the screening point. They wander around checking passes and performing other various functions at the airport. They are at the beck and call of the screening point, so they respond.

Senator Meighen: I have to assume it is financial. I have not travelled in the United States in the last month, but previous to that I noticed two National Guardsmen at every point I went through, all the time. Is it financial? As I understand it, you have come to the conclusion that a five-minute response time is satisfactory when weighed against the possible risks, which may well be right, but I have to think that an immediate response is better than a five-minute response. Am I right?

Mr. Morency: I think it is fair to say that if money were not a question, there are many scenarios we would consider. There are issues such as training and availability and qualifications of people. All of these things have to be considered not only by the airport operators but by those who establish regulations as well to try to find that balance that takes that risk threat assessment into consideration.

Senator Meighen: The committee became convinced in the military area that there was a shortage of funding for some critical functions. Some of my colleagues and I have come to the conclusion, listening to you gentlemen and others, that in the airport and seaport security areas that security could be substantially improved if there were more funding. It would be very helpful to us if, in your evidence, from time to time you would indicate where the highest priorities are for additional funding. I was trying to establish whether that was or was not an area.

The Chairman: We have some information from Saskatoon that says that the surtax on security will generate $4.8 million a year based on an average of 400,000 departing passengers, and that is 200,000 more than the entire airport's budget. How much money will the airport tax generate for Pearson?

Mr. Kavanagh: I do not know that information.

The Chairman: Do you know how many people depart Pearson in a year?

Mr. Kavanagh: Twenty-six million passengers a year.

The Chairman: It is a simple question of multiplication.

Do honourable senators have any other questions?

Senator Banks: You may have a specific answer to this. On October 11, the minister announced expenditures, including $750,000 for ongoing study of emerging technologies. When have you heard you might hear the results of that report?

Mr. Kavanagh: The report for internal consumption is expected almost any day.

Senator Banks: Will it be only for internal consumption?

Mr. Kavanagh: I am not the author of the report, so I do not know where and how it will be distributed.

Senator Forrestall: Over $1 billion has been allocated over the next five years to purchase employee explosive protection systems. Has a call for proposal gone out with respect to that yet?

Mr. Kavanagh: Already, there has been $55 million worth of equipment purchased through that, and the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority is in the process of developing the acquisition plan for further equipment.

Senator Forrestall: We are a long way from it, approximately five years, I suppose.

Mr. Kavanagh: The original schedule for the deployment of that equipment called for a five-year horizon. That was a year ago, so it is closer to four years, but CATSA is looking at a new roll-out schedule, and they are hoping to achieve better results.

Senator Forrestall: Do I have your undertaking that this will not be like the acquisition of helicopters?

The Chairman: Honourable senators, on your behalf, I would like to thank the two witnesses for appearing. Your comments have been appreciated. We look forward to seeing you again, and we expect to do that in the not-too-distant future.

We now have representatives from a number of groups here. We have Inspector Sam Landry from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Toronto Airport Detachment. From Citizenship and Immigration Canada, we have Ms Wilma Jenkins, who is the Director of Immigration Services. From Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, we have Mr. Norman Sheridan, Director, Customs Passenger Program, Mr. Earnest Spraggett, Director, Commercial Operations, and Ms Hébert, Regional Director, CCRA.

Inspector Sam Landry, Officer in Charge of the Toronto Airport Detachment, Royal Canadian Mounted Police: Ladies and gentlemen, I have a prepared text I should like to read to you.

The Toronto Lester B. Pearson International Airport is ranked as Canada's largest airport, the fifth largest in North America, and the twentieth largest in the world. It is also Canada's largest border point.

In one year, approximately 30 million travellers pass through this airport, as well as approximately 380,000 passenger aircraft and 43,000 cargo aircraft. There are approximately 1,160 flights in and out of the three terminals each day. All of this is serviced by close to 45,000 people attending to the daily needs and operations of the airport community.

The airport is a construction work in progress, and it will continue to be until the year 2010. At that time, it is projected that this airport will have the capacity to accommodate 50 million passengers per year through a massive internal infrastructure.

Essentially, this is a city within a city, with all the policing challenges that a city brings. It is also Canada's largest inland border point, making it a major intersection of opportunity for the importation and exportation of criminal activity.

Criminal organizations have penetrated many legitimate businesses throughout Canada to further their criminal enterprises. This trend is no different at Toronto's Pearson airport. The ability to move contraband undetected through the airport is essential to the success of their criminal activities. Of particular concern is the potential for internal conspiracy, coercion and intimidation of members of the airport community by organized crime groups.

Of the 45,000 people currently attending to the daily needs and operations of the Toronto airport community, if organized crime recruited 1 per cent it would represent 450 people. Of the 30 million travellers passing through the airport annually, if 1 per cent were affiliated with criminal organizations, that would be 300,000 people.

There are 82 agencies at the Toronto airport that have enforcement or regulatory responsibilities. Policing responsibilities are shared between Peel Regional Police, who are the police of primary jurisdiction, and the RCMP, who are responsible for the enforcement of federal statutes.

The primary concern to all of us is the criminal activity we have identified at Toronto airport that is linked to criminal organizations such as traditional organized crime, Eastern European-based organized crime, Asian-based organized crime and outlaw motorcycle gangs. We have also uncovered cells of individuals involved in illegal activity who are working with their counterparts in other countries. What is important to note is the trend for all of these criminal organizations to work together to facilitate their criminal enterprises and increase their profits. It is now very rare to find an organized crime group working alone.

On June 17, 1999, the Solicitor General of Canada approved funding for enhanced RCMP federal policing in Canada's three largest and busiest international airports, including Toronto's Lester B. Pearson International Airport. This initiative established 40 new uniformed federal enforcement positions at Toronto airport. These positions were created specifically to target organized crime. Their mandate is to expose, dismantle and disrupt criminal organizations active at Toronto airport and suspend the growth of their related activities. In addition, they provide assistance to other police services and law enforcement agencies in the Greater Toronto Area as well as other RCMP federal policing programs.

I shall now give you an overview of the current RCMP Toronto Airport Detachment. Current resources deployed on border integrity and security at the Toronto airport number 162. These include 59 RCMP members, 93 Peel Regional Police members and 10 members from police services in and around the GTA.

The RCMP service delivery responsibilities include the Toronto Airport Drug Enforcement Unit. With the introduction of 48 RCMP federal enforcement positions in 1999, the Toronto Airport Drug Enforcement Unit is able to focus on larger project-style investigations. That has been very successful for us.

For example, in November 2000, this unit shattered an alleged internal conspiracy within the airline industry that involved the importation of illegal drugs into Canada through Pearson airport. Dubbed Project Obooker, this 11- month investigation was conducted with the full cooperation and participation of our law enforcement partners and Air Canada. It resulted in the arrest of 10 individuals and the seizure of over 100 kilos of cocaine, hash oil and hashish. Another example is the unit's recent seizure of two tonnes of hash oil destined for the streets of Montreal being transported through air cargo.

In addition to the 10 RCMP drug enforcement members, there are also six officers from other police services, including Peel Regional Police, Ontario Provincial Police, Toronto Police Service and Canada Customs and Revenue Agency.

New trends in the movement of illegal drugs through the Toronto airport will continue to be a challenge — for example, heroin and cocaine dissolved with alcohol imported in bottles, as well as an increase in the amount of cocaine being imported from South America. Illegal drugs are found concealed in anything from shoes to suitcases. Recently, this unit seized 100 pounds of cocaine from an abandoned suitcase.

``Swallowers'' remain a constant problem. These are people who ingest illicit drugs, mainly in pellet form, and smuggle them into this country. Eight to twelve swallowers are referred to the RCMP each month by Canada Customs and Revenue Agency and other police intelligence. Many of these swallowers are young people, 18 to 24 years of age and even younger. Their desire to make a quick buck has the potential of ending in a quick death.

The Toronto Airport Special Squad is a federal enforcement joint forces operation. This unit gathers intelligence, conducts intelligence probes and responds to numerous requests for investigative assistance nationally and internationally. It is a completely intelligence-led operation. It is staffed by four RCMP federal enforcement members and five officers from other police services. These include the OPP, the Peel Regional Police and the Toronto Police Service.

Traditionally, this section has been the first contact source for other police agencies requiring assistance at Toronto airport and the development of contacts within the airport community. This squad is more than 35 years old and is the longest-standing joint forces operation in Canada.

Recently, this squad was augmented by the incorporation of the RCMP Toronto Airport Detachment Criminal Intelligence Section. This section gathers and analyzes intelligence from all aspects of criminal activity. The collection analysis of intelligence is an area of critical importance and need at Toronto airport. The Criminal Intelligence Section currently consists of one RCMP federal enforcement member. This additional resource has greatly enhanced the analytical capabilities of the unit. A further enhancement of this section is needed for us to be able to proactively target criminal organizations and their related criminal activities at Toronto airport. The current realignment of all these resources within ``O'' Division will meet this need.

Let me now talk about the Integrated National Security Enforcement Team, INSET. Counter-terrorism efforts require an integrated approach to help ensure early detection and prevention of any potential threats to national security. INSET is a five-person enforcement section that is dedicated solely to Toronto airport. It is responsible for intelligence gathering, investigation and enforcement as part of our national security mandate, including suspected threats of terrorism and hate crimes.

This team played a significant role following the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001. As part of Project Shock, this team already had in place the resources to facilitate anti-terrorist investigations in partnership with our Canadian law enforcement partners and in support of the American investigation. This team works off-site from the RCMP Toronto Airport Detachment.

With respect to Customs and Excise, an RCMP member from our Toronto West Detachment is working in a liaison capacity with Canada Customs and Revenue Agency at Pearson airport. This partnership has resulted in several investigations and seizures. Enhancement of this partnership will dramatically enhance our ability to seize illegal contraband, to identify the organized crime group members importing the contraband and to develop strategies to dismantle these criminal organizations. We are presently meeting with our CCRA partner to enhance this initiative within existing resources.

Regarding the Federal Enforcement Section, FES, members have two roles. They physically respond to calls for service from Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, Citizenship and Immigration Canada or any other agency that requires a federal police presence at Toronto airport. They also conduct federal mandate investigations into alleged internal conspiracies and organized crime activities within the airport community. Because of the volume of illicit drugs seized at Toronto airport, calls for service to other agencies require most of this section's time. With additional resources, this unit could expand its partnerships and target established criminal organizations active at Toronto airport. A reorganization of these resources took place on June 6, 2002, in order to enhance their effectiveness.

With respect to the Immigration and Passport Section, the prime responsibility of this section is the disruption of criminal networks that smuggle illegal immigrants into Canada. In 2001 alone, this unit identified three criminal organizations based in Asia and Europe that were smuggling illegal Asian immigrants into Canada. Through RCMP international liaison officers, this unit shared the intelligence on these criminal organizations with the countries involved for follow-up. This section also responds to referrals from Citizenship and Immigration Canada, then processes and charges illegal immigrant activity. It is supported by the RCMP Toronto West Immigration and Passport Section when there is need for proactive project-style investigations.

Regarding commitments between the RCMP and partner agencies, the strategic goal of the RCMP is to help keep Canadians safe in their homes and communities. Some of the ways we are doing this include an intelligence-led policing philosophy and practice that improves decision making, enhanced partnerships that facilitate the gathering and sharing of intelligence, and integrated policing efforts that effectively share resources.

Some of our ``bridge-building'' initiatives at RCMP Toronto Airport Detachment include the Peel Regional Police Service. Peel Regional Police is the police force of primary jurisdiction, although the RCMP has provided uniform assistance during extraordinary events. The RCMP Toronto Airport Detachment has an excellent working relationship with both Peel Regional Police officers and their management.

Canada Customs and Revenue Agency has provided one full-time person to our drug enforcement unit. This has proven to be mutually beneficial to both agencies. Our Federal Enforcement Section works closely with CCRA on processing seizures and conducting investigations. Some of these investigations are extremely time-consuming and require creative solutions. With both agencies working together, investigations are brought to a successful conclusion much sooner. Presently, we are developing joint initiatives for enforcement and training on such issues as intelligence- gathering and statement taking.

Regarding Citizenship and Immigration Canada, the RCMP Toronto Airport Detachment Immigration and Passport Section enjoys a very good working relationship with CIC. This is primarily a reactive role due to the limited number of RCMP resources in this unit. The RCMP works with CIC on a regular basis to provide training on such issues as exhibit handling and presenting evidence.

With respect to the Greater Toronto Airports Authority Security section, the RCMP Toronto Airport Detachment works closely with GTAA Security, sharing intelligence and closely monitoring the issuance of restricted area passes in order to make a pre-emptive strike against criminal organizations that may attempt to infiltrate the airport community.

The RCMP Airport Detachment works closely with Transport Canada in the appropriate exchange of information and intelligence. We were also instrumental in developing the Canadian Air Carrier Protection Program in collaboration with Transport Canada. RCMP Air Protection Officers are now on board selected flights departing from and arriving at Toronto airport.

In conclusion, as a result of new RCMP initiatives, the RCMP Toronto Airport Detachment has aggressively evolved over the past few years and will continue to progress in the future. Files that our members are working on and statistics show that there is significant organized criminal activity at Canada's largest inland border point. Along with criminality come the associated risks and costs to Canadian society. It should be noted that we have no concrete evidence to suggest that there is a direct link between organized crime and terrorism. However, any infiltration of our border at Toronto airport by the criminal element also has the potential of being exploited by those associated with extremism or terrorism.

In 1995, there were 250 uniformed and 40 plainclothes RCMP members at Toronto airport, a total of 290. This year, there are 59 RCMP members, 93 Peel Regional Police officers and 10 police officers from other police services, for a total of 162. While the police presence has decreased over the past 10 years, air passenger cargo traffic has increased more than 100 per cent, and it is projected to increase another 100 per cent in the next decade.

Without additional resources, police services and law enforcement agencies will continue to face the constant challenge of balancing resources to provide a proactive investigative service, as well as a reactive police response at Toronto airport. It goes without saying there will also be competing demands for resources given fiscal realities and changing priorities, as was witnessed after 9/11. This has necessitated the adaptation of intelligence-led, joint operational, integrated policing philosophies with our partner agencies.

We have been doing the best with our resources at hand. However, as we proceed into a world drastically changed by the events of September 11, we will need additional resources to protect this pivotal port of entry into Canada and keep Canadians safe from organized crime and threats of terrorism.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Inspector Landry.

We will now hear from Ms Wilma Jenkins, who is with Citizenship and Immigration Canada.

[Translation]

Ms Wilma Jenkins, Director, Immigration Services, Pearson International Airport, Citizenship and Immigration Canada: Mr. Chairman, it is really a pleasure for me to be here to discuss the work we do at Pearson airport. The role played by Citizenship and Immigration Canada is very important for Canada's security.

[English]

As Inspector Landry has said, Pearson is the largest airport in Canada, and it is the largest port of entry in our department. More than 60 airlines fly greater than 15 million travellers yearly, and those airlines fly directly from 46 countries. It is not unusual to have clients from all six continents in our office at one time. This creates demand for interpretation services and adds to the complexity of our work.

The number of points of service we staff has varied from three to four over the last three years. We have officers stationed at all three terminals. Terminal 2 currently has transborder traffic only and we staff that on a satellite basis from the crews at Terminals 1 and 3.

We are currently funded for 163 employees at Pearson. The majority are engaged directly in the provision of service to the public. There are 118 senior immigration officers, 12 duty managers and 14 shift clerks. These staff are divided into eight crews. In order to cover the required hours from 6:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m., officers work shifts. The shifts are divided into two sides so that only half of the employees are at work on any one given day.

Staff work 11.5 hour shifts and work a rotating schedule of two days on, two days off, and then three days on, three days off. While the hours are long, it results in a more stable schedule for individuals and for management. It also reduces overtime, although some is necessary for flights that arrive after 1 a.m.

Shift work creates additional costs that are not funded in a full-time equivalent of a person, and it also contributes to difficulties in retention of staff.

The remaining 19 staff at Pearson work in administration and information technology.

While I am not at liberty to discuss case specifics, I can say that the staff at Pearson demonstrated an outstanding degree of dedication and professionalism in the wake of September 11. While they have always shown the capacity to balance facilitation and enforcement roles in the course of their duties, it was never more evident than on that date. With the cooperation of CCRA, all passengers were referred to Immigration that day, what we call a ``full flight referral.'' Officers carried out their duties with composure and vigilance as many distraught passengers became aware of the tragedy.

In the months following September, total passenger traffic dropped sometimes by as much as 30 per cent. Immigration referrals, on the other hand, have increased by 6.3 per cent over the previous fiscal year. We examined 503,638 referrals in the fiscal year 2001-02; of those, 97,601 were new immigrants coming to Canada to be landed. Other types of cases include temporary workers, students, visitors, refugee claimants and inadmissible persons.

I would also like to touch on some of the initiatives we have implemented to improve our capacity to manage access to Canada. The first of these is training. Over the past two years, we have provided several courses to officers. These include training in defusing hostility, advanced interviewing skills, CSIS overview, organized crime detection and fraudulent document detection. We offer seats on courses to CCRA personnel, and we also deliver a local immigration training package to all new CCRA personnel.

Training presents a particular challenge in a shift work environment, but it is an essential activity given the turnover of staff. For example, we have recruited 28 staff since the summer of 2000 through the Post Secondary Recruitment Program alone.

In 1998, we established a mobile Disembarkation and Response Team, otherwise known as DART. It was formed to reduce the number of improperly documented arrivals at Pearson. The team has greatly enhanced our ability to detect people smuggling. The team will go directly to the plane to verify that passengers are in possession of documents. In addition to identifying improperly documented arrivals, valuable intelligence information is gathered for further dissemination.

We hope to have a joint passenger analysis unit established later this year. This unit will consist of employees from CCRA, RCMP, CSIS, U.S. customs and U.S. immigration and would analyze advanced passenger information to determine which passengers will be referred to Immigration secondary examination. Eventually, the capacity exists for interactivity with the airlines so that we can instruct them not to board a passenger overseas.

Another way in which technology can increase our capacity is through the use of AFIS, an Automated Fingerprint Information System. AFIS allows us to take fingerprints for greater accuracy and response time. AFIS will be activated as soon as specialized training can be delivered.

CIC works in various partnerships at Pearson, and excellent cooperation has been built over the years. Our main federal partners include CCRA, RCMP and CSIS. Since CCRA is responsible for the primary inspection line, we work with them very closely in exchanging information on enforcement cases. The Immigration and Passport Section of the RCMP works very closely with our officers and has assisted frequently in disembarkation. They also lay charges for us under the Immigration Act. CSIS assists us in security-related cases. We also coordinate with USINS and U.S. customs on removal and refusal cases. Peel Regional Police provide emergency response services for us at Pearson.

The Greater Toronto Airports Authority, or GTAA, is currently in the process of constructing a new terminal. An infield hold terminal is already completed and will be used to manage traffic during the construction period. We consult with GTAA on a regular basis to ensure that the new facilities will allow us to fulfill our enforcement role.

Before closing, I should like to comment on some of the measures to strengthen national security that will come into effect later this week with the implementation of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. These include the following: simplified grounds of inadmissibility; strengthened authority to arrest criminals and security threats; the elimination of appeal rights in cases involving security, organized crime and war crimes; a simplified certificate process for removing security threats; barring access to the refugee determination system by security threats, organized criminals or human rights violators; and we have a new offence for trafficking in persons.

That concludes my presentation. I hope I have provided you with an idea of the role that CIC plays at Lester B. Pearson International Airport, and I would be happy to answer any questions.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Ms Jenkins.

Mr. Norman Sheridan, Director, Passenger Operations, Canada Customs and Revenue Agency: Thank you for the opportunity to appear as a witness before the Senate committee. I have been with Customs for 23 years, and since April 1999 have been the Director of Passenger Operations at Pearson airport.

Customs Passenger Operations at Lester B. Pearson International Airport is accountable for the efficient, effective and responsible processing of all arriving international and transborder passengers at PIA and passengers who arrive at two other regional airports of entry, namely, Toronto City Centre Airport and Buttonville Airport. Customs Passenger Operations at PIA is comprised of three stand-alone terminal buildings, each with facilities to process international and/or transborder arriving air travellers. In addition, PIA Passenger Operations is responsible for the delivery of service to marine small vessel traffic arriving at 32 marinas located along Lake Ontario. The unit providing service to the small airports, marinas and on-site fixed base operators is based at the terminals, working both on-site and off-site. Approximately 380 employees, with a seasonal increase of approximately 80 employees, work in Passenger Operations, primarily at the three terminals.

In fiscal 2001-02, PIA Passenger Operations processed 8.2 million travellers, a decline of 11.85 per cent from the previous fiscal year. The decline in passenger traffic is clearly and directly attributable to the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, in the United States. Passenger volumes for the first five months of fiscal 2001-02 indicated an approximate 4 per cent increase over the same period in the previous fiscal year. Currently, PIA processes approximately 46 per cent of all arriving air traffic in Canada on an average of 280 flights each day. As stand-alone terminals, the three terminals at PIA rank second, third and fifth in overall volumes among Canada's busiest airport terminal operations. As a consolidated operation, PIA processes more than double the volume of travellers as the next busiest airport in Canada.

PIA Passenger Operations employs a Passenger Targeting Unit, PTU, which works closely with the airlines, the CCRA Intelligence and Contraband Division, Citizenship and Immigration Canada and other law enforcement agencies. By obtaining passenger information from an airline prior to the arrival of a passenger, PTU is able to conduct analysis and identify high-risk and targeted passengers for interception by line officers or the PIA Passenger Operations Flexible Response Team. In addition, primary inspection line officers, PIL officers, have access to the Integrated Primary Inspection Line automated system, IPIL, which permits the PIL officer to swipe or key passenger travel document information into an automated system to query against both Customs and Immigration enforcement databases. Usage of the IPIL system by Customs officers at PIA is at 95 per cent, as at May 2002. This has resulted in an increased number of referrals to Immigration Canada, including referrals for suspect terrorists or persons with suspected links to terrorist organizations or organized crime.

In fiscal year 2001-02, there were 356 drug seizures with an estimated street value of $78.6 million, 137 alcohol seizures resulting in 1,185 litres with an estimated value of $9,155 and 10 prohibited material seizures resulting in 317 prohibited items seized, of which there were six incidents that resulted in 112 items of child pornography.

Prior to September 11, PIA Passenger Operations was one of several locations being considered by CCRA headquarters as a pilot site to field test the Advanced Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record, API/PNR, systems. Following the terrorist attacks, CCRA headquarters decided to fast-track the API/PNR project. PIA Passenger Operations and divisional Intelligence and Contraband are currently working with partner organizations of CIC, U.S. customs, U.S. immigration, the RCMP and CSIS to develop a joint passenger targeting and analysis unit in Terminal 2. This initiative follows the lead from the Manley-Ridge discussions and the broader CCRA concept of threat-risk management as a means to provide for public safety through responsible enforcements.

In addition, CCRA currently utilizes several enforcement tools to carry out our role of responsible enforcement, including X-ray machines — both static and mobile — six detector dog teams, the Flexible Response Teams and roving teams.

We are pursuing enhanced training for all of our inspection staff, including anti-terrorist training being conducted by the Intelligence and Contraband Division. In addition, to supplement the Customs inspector position during the busy summer travel season student Customs officers have recently been hired. Each of these recently hired groups has received identical recruit training in order to carry out their primary inspection line functions.

The residual impacts of September 11 remain with PIA Passenger Operations. While passenger volumes remain down from the previous year, IPIL usage is at an all-time high, primary questioning is more intense and secondary examinations have increased. In the month of September, examinations went from a pre-September 11 rate of 6.71 per cent to a post-September rate of 11.69 per cent. The average across all terminals currently is about 8.25 per cent. However, the examination rate for overseas origins remains at about 13 per cent.

Post-September 11, all private aircraft entering Canada were subject to strict reporting regulations, including restriction of arriving airport and 100 per cent verification of persons and goods entering Canada by CCRA. Verification of non-CANPASS small aircraft arrivals and CANPASS-registered aircraft carrying non-registrants remains at 100 per cent.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Sheridan.

Mr. Ernest Spraggett, Director, Commercial Operations, Canada Customs and Revenue Agency: The primary goal of Commercial Operations, Customs, GTA Division, is to facilitate the movement of commercial goods through Canada. Approximately 275 employees work in Commercial Operations at various locations across the GTA. Their territory covers over 10,000 square miles.

Commercial Operations at PIA is responsible for the clearance of commercial goods imported into Toronto by rail, marine, road and air. Each year, more than 100,000 overseas and transborder flights carrying freight arrive at Pearson. Toronto is also the final destination for more than 80 per cent of all container freight arriving in Canada at various Canadian seaports, making Commercial Operations the largest inland port in Canada. Commercial Operations is also responsible for providing services at nine marinas, four airports, two truck terminals and 12 satellite offices. Each year, we process over 1.5 million commercial shipments, which generate duty and tax revenue in excess of $10 billion.

Our Targeting and Analysis Unit consists of 8 officers and one superintendent. They work in close cooperation with the airline industry to obtain pre-arrival information. Through analysis of this data they are able to identify high-risk commodities and clients prior to their arrival. This information is passed on to our FRT, Flexible Response Team, and Secondary Unit who are responsible for conducting the cargo examinations.

We also have a dedicated Marine Rummage Team. This team is trained at the Marine Centre for Expertise in Halifax and are responsible for the rummage of freighters and other large vessels arriving in the Toronto harbour.

In 2001-02, the FRT and Secondary Unit performed more than 17,000 examinations, resulting in approximately 300 seizures, including more than 10,000 kilograms of narcotics with an estimated street value of $87 million. The Secondary Unit also participates in the Low Value Shipment Courier Program, which is a streamlined paperless release process. Last year, the unit examined over 200,000 packages of the 5.8 million presented by the courier companies.

The events of September 11 forced Commercial Operations to review the way business is conducted — which goods should be examined, where to examine the goods and how examinations should be conducted. We increased verifications of conveyances that were previously thought to be low risk, such as small aircraft, non-CANPASS private aircraft, private marine craft and courier planes at first point of entry. Additional targets were input into our computer systems for goods or exporting countries now considered to be high risk.

Post-September 11 we upgraded security to our working facilities and revisited building evacuation emergency plans. Staff was briefed on procedures regarding any chemical or biological threat, and local health and safety procedures, safety equipment and procedures for the handling of office mail were updated to meet a possible threat.

Communications links with other Customs areas in the southern Ontario areas were reviewed to ensure that we had an up-to-date contingency plan in place to ensure that assistance would be available to area throughout the region to respond to a request for help due to an increase of volumes or processing times caused by a security or health safety threat. We are currently working on the implementation of a 24/7 plan for PIA cargo. This will allow for more staff to be on duty throughout the week to address our high-risk times and importations on a 24/7 schedule.

We are also working with clients to encourage them to apply for current agency programs, which will speed up the movement of their goods. Some of these programs include Customs self-assessment, CANPASS and advanced commercial information. These programs work with data from various service providers or the user to establish risk for the importation of commercial goods, the conveyance or the traveller. The new Administrative Monetary Penalty System will support these programs. We believe these programs will promote more voluntary compliance and allow us to establish risk and concentrate our efforts on high-risk importers and importations.

We have increased our examination rate of cargo arriving at Toronto, including those shipments that originally entered Canada at various seaports and land border crossings and were then shipped by rail to Toronto. Those shipments are being monitored by our Targeting Unit and suspect cargo is sent to our dedicated Cargo Examination Centre for examination.

Currently, the agency is working with the U.S. authorities in harmonizing their best practices with ours to speed up the movement of people and goods entering or leaving either country. The CCRA is committed to continuing our efforts to improving procedures, enhancing technology and integrating our services. At the same time, we are committed to ensuring that the smooth and efficient flow of commercial goods remains our priority.

The Chairman: I wish to thank all the presenters. The information you have given us is helpful; it has been a good overview.

Senator Atkins: My first question is a general one. At Pearson, are we almost back to where we were before 9/11, in terms of passengers and general activity at the airport?

Mr. Sheridan: Our volumes are still down from last year. The transborder sector is down more than the international sector. In fact, Terminal 1, for the month of March, had more travellers in March 2002 than in March 2001. The international sector is more robust. The transborder volumes are still down by about 13 per cent.

Senator Atkins: On average, by the end of the year, it is possible that you could be even greater than 2001?

Mr. Sheridan: Yes. By the end of the fiscal period, we will probably, if we do not have any other catastrophes, be above where we were for fiscal 2001-02.

Senator Atkins: The impression we have from previous witnesses is that there is a shortage of human resources to handle many of the activities that are taking place. For instance, in your area, Inspector Landry, you were talking about a need for further human resources.

Mr. Landry: There is no question that we all need more. As I said in my presentation, there are realities that we recognize.

It has become obvious to these people with me today that we are doing things jointly to try to maximize the resources we have, whether it is human resources, dollars or equipment. There will always be a need for more resources.

This airport is unique. I was here 30 years ago as a constable. It is a community that keeps building and building. It will be building long after I am gone. There will always be a need for resources for all these agencies. We will never have all the resources that we need. However, we have learned to maximize what we have to be effective.

Senator Atkins: The expected activity over the next 8 or 10 years forecasts going from 30 million to 50 million passengers. That will put incredible pressure on all organizations. Is there a way of coordinating the activities, particularly in your area?

Mr. Landry: In law enforcement?

Senator Atkins: Yes.

Mr. Landry: I am at this detachment because I have worked with these agencies in the 31 years I have been with the RCMP. I am trying to have resources work out of my area and vice versa so that we can cover as much area as we possibly can for law enforcement.

The types of investigations that are required in an environment like this are very resource-intensive. I am talking about undercover operations and legal authorizations. These are time-consuming and lengthy. Some of these federal agencies are helping out with cash. We will be able to afford to do things that we might have otherwise not have been able to.

That is how we are approaching these things and setting our target priorities. Within the RCMP, chart targets, depending on their influence within the community, their financial status and the size of the organization. We try to target that way to maximize what we have here. You cannot tackle every organization of which we are aware. It is not realistic. There are many of them in Toronto, and many of them have an influence on this particular airport and all of our mandates.

Senator Atkins: Did it work better before privatization?

Mr. Landry: I cannot really say. It works better today, and it will work better tomorrow because we have a commitment to utilize the resources as effectively as possible. Every day that goes by, it is working better for us.

Ms Jenkins: We are looking very much at threat and risk assessment and where best to put our energies. If we can have technology that allows passengers who do not present a problem to pass through quickly with card access, it would make much more sense. We can dedicate our resources to the enforcement activity that takes much longer to do.

Senator Atkins: Has the construction of the new terminals caused much disorder? Have you been able to work without any difficulty through this period?

Ms Jenkins: The staging is fairly complex, but we communicate with the GTAA. We consult with one another and the other inspection services to make sure our mandates are covered. It is a big job to build another airport. There will be issues we will have to deal, but so far it has worked fairly well.

Senator Meighen: Perhaps the last three presenters are more directly concerned with this question. My understanding was that in order to reduce delays we would be moving towards systems such as those in place in Heathrow. Passengers with nothing to declare would move to the green exit; passengers with goods to declare would move to the red exit. Are we moving towards that type of system?

Mr. Sheridan: Certainly, our headquarters are always looking at innovative ways to improve efficiencies. I am not aware of any plan to go to a red door-green door approach right now.

As Mr. Sheridan indicated, we are looking at an expedited passenger processing system with biometric smart card access. We are hoping to see implementation of that in the spring of 2003. Advanced passenger information and targeting information prior to arrival will allow us more innovative ways of processing passengers.

For example, a flight from Boston that has nobody of concern on board could perhaps be processed in a manner different from the standard.

Senator Meighen: What would be different?

Mr. Sheridan: We could process passengers in a different way. Rather than put them through the PIL counters in the different airports, say, we may be able to take advantage of having the pre-information and not even look at those passengers. We would put them through a domestic process, in effect.

Senator Meighen: Would there be passengers with special cards?

Mr. Sheridan: We would need to have API for everyone on the flight. We could satisfy ourselves that there are no concerns regarding anyone on that flight. We could process them through a domestic process.

Senator Meighen: What about a frequent traveller?

Mr. Sheridan: They could take advantage of smart card technology, similar to the CANPASS.

Senator Meighen: The use of students in your organization is a controversial matter in some circles. Are you using more or less students? Are you giving them more or the same amount of training as heretofore?

Mr. Sheridan: At Pearson, on the passenger side, we have less students this year than last year. The student inspectors receive identical training to that of our term inspectors.

To clarify, a term inspector is a full-time Customs inspector who we hire who has not yet been put through our training facility in Rigaud. Once we put them through that training, the Customs Inspector Recruit Training Program, they are made indeterminate. We do not want to hire indeterminate people if they are not going to be successful in Rigaud.

Senator Meighen: If they have not been to training in Rigaud, what training have they received?

Mr. Sheridan: They receive identical training to that of other staff at Pearson in primary processing only. It is a three-week training process. It is modelled after the Rigaud training, so they get double training. They are trained at Pearson for a period of time, they then go to Rigaud and get the same training again. They get the primary line training only and the training delivered on immigration as delivered by Ms Jenkin's people.

Senator Meighen: What is the definition of ``primary line''?

Mr. Sheridan: Primary Inspection Line, PIL, refers to those people who man the booths you go through at Customs when you land. The students get the exact same training as our term staff.

Senator Meighen: What about the coding system? Some concern has been expressed about cards having ``R'' for resident and numbers on it. Are you concerned at all that this could be compromised?

Mr. Sheridan: I am looking at having the coding system at Pearson changed. We have been talking about it internally for the last few months. We want to work in consultation with our headquarters to ensure that we do not get into some wild system that no one can understand or accept.

The coding is not the same necessarily across the country. We want to ensure that we do our best to get a new coding system as soon as we can.

Senator Meighen: You referred to the presence of organized crime at the airport, Inspector Landry. That does not come as a great surprise to members of this committee. I understood you to say that it is a growing problem.

Mr. Landry: It is a growing problem. We have to work very closely with the Peel Regional Police detachment at the airport. Overall, in our joint efforts we have recognized that theft of cargo, for instance, is big business. It is obvious to Mr. Sheridan's people and CCRA that cocaine and other types of drugs that are coming into this country are being facilitated internally at an airport outside this country. Those items are being taken off internally here and then processed out the back door.

Fairly frequently, we see what we call found drugs. There may be three or four suitcases of cocaine just left. The probable reason it is left is that those people aspiring to get it out the back door might have been spooked by the presence of CCRA, Customs, dog handlers or other CCRA officers present at the internal baggage systems.

We get called in after the fact to investigate those things. In some cases, we will find absolutely no baggage tag. That speaks for internal conspiracy starting at some point. We might find baggage tags that do not jibe with what should be there.

Senator Meighen: That is helpful. Presumably, one of the most effective methods of apprehending those on the inside who are facilitating importation of drugs is to infiltrate the organization or to place an undercover police person there. To do so, you have to have the full cooperation of the employer. Am I correct?

Mr. Landry: In some cases, yes. That is very true.

Senator Meighen: You do not always have to have that cooperation?

Mr. Landry: If we could get away with not notifying anyone, it would be best. In many cases, we do go to the employer, whether it is one of the airlines or service providers. We have had cooperation over the years from different agencies at the airport.

Senator Meighen: Is it not true that there have been instances where, if you decide to go the route of alerting the employer and obtaining their cooperation, you have not received full cooperation, where in fact you have been turned down?

Mr. Landry: I do not have personal knowledge of that. I can get back to you later.

I know in my previous life working in drugs in other parts of Ontario that we approached employers and there was a reluctance at times to be seen to be cooperating with the police. The employers have internal issues, contracts with unions and employees and so on, which scares them away from being as proactive as they would like to be with us. I have seen that.

Senator Meighen: I would not mind taking you up on your offer to getting back to us.

The Chairman: How long have you been in this particular post, sir?

Mr. Landry: Since March.

The Chairman: We have heard some contradictory testimony but it could have predated your arrival.

Senator Meighen: We did have sworn testimony to the fact that a police effort to place someone in the personnel ranks of a carrier was not received positively.

The Chairman: We also had a carrier that said it did not always say yes.

Senator LaPierre: The police work and the things you do must involve undercover agents. Do you have any difficulty implanting these undercover agents in the various agencies and employers you seem to have?

Let us say you go to company X and tell them you wish to put an undercover agent there. Can you do that by law? Can you force them to do it, or must you retreat?

Mr. Landry: First, we cannot force any company to cooperate with the police. We rely on their good corporate citizenship.

Having said that, it is not just the mere fact of them wanting to cooperate. Many times there are internal structures in certain companies where employees have been there for 20 or 25 years. To place an undercover operator or agent there is extremely difficult.

Sometimes, it is not feasible. Sometimes, the core of the criminals at whom we are looking would not trust an outsider even if he or she worked there for five or ten years. The environment is very closed. It is extremely difficult. Usually, undercover Asian operations are the most efficient way to do something, but you may have to rely on a Criminal Code investigation to accomplish what you cannot otherwise.

Senator Cordy: It is interesting to see your statistics on organized crime because one carrier witness was not aware of any organized crime working within the airport. Another carrier witness told us of an incident that happened in November 2000, as though they were very isolated incidents. We are quite inclined to agree with your observations since we have done a lot of work on the ports, which seems to follow the same line in these criminal aspects.

I am wondering about the Integrated National Security Enforcement Team that you mentioned in your brief. Could you clarify what you do in terms of countering terrorism?

Mr. Landry: I am only a landlord to that team. It has a commander outside of myself. That team is part of a larger team in Ontario and part of a larger structure through Canada. The team here is specifically for airport-related issues. When we get information from other agencies, countries or police departments that might relate to people travelling through the airport or activities at the airport, INSET will provide the investigative resources to look into the problem or the issue. They might merely track a suspect through the airport facility using Toronto as a transit point.

Senator Cordy: You work with police organizations within Canada. Do you also work with police organizations from outside the country?

Mr. Landry: Yes, very much so. The entire being of INSET is intelligence-led. They work extremely closely with other policing partners. It could be the Toronto Police Service, the York Regional Police, or whoever has information that they might be interested in, or they will work with them during the investigation. They will do those that as a matter of course. As well, through the intelligence network internationally, with our liaison officers abroad, information is fed to the RCMP, to INSET, to follow up.

Senator Cordy: Ms Jenkins, you talked about the DART, or the Disembarkation and Response Team. Is that in place currently at Pearson airport?

Ms Jenkins: Yes, it is. It has been since 1998.

Senator Cordy: You mentioned threat assessment. I am wondering about the data you collect to determine risk assessment or threat assessment. Who collects the data and what exactly do you do with it?

Ms Jenkins: It might come from any number of agencies. We have worked jointly in the past on occasion to look at what would pose problems for us. When we set up the passenger analysis unit, a group will be sit down to look at what criteria we should be using to assign which passengers would be referred to immigration.

It is very difficult to say that there is one place from which that information would come. If you do a risk assessment properly, you would look at the whole environment broadly to ensure you have covered all the possibilities.

Senator Cordy: The people on the front line are your employees. Would you ask them to gather data in terms of risks or threats that have been made to them because they are the people on the front line?

Ms Jenkins: Yes. We track any incidents that happen throughout the course of our day.

Senator Cordy: Would the employees be asked to gather that information?

Ms Jenkins: If an incident happened, yes.

Senator Atkins: Have you developed a practice as to when you receive the manifest? Using the example of a flight from Boston to Toronto, at what stage do you get a manifest? How can you analyze that so that you are prepared for that flight when it lands?

Ms Jenkins: I will have to ask Mr. Sheridan to answer that question. We will not have our passenger analysis unit in place until later this year.

Mr. Sheridan: The Passenger Targeting Unit at Pearson is currently doing some of that work, senator. We do not have the legislation in place right now to get all that information from all the airlines. We only get it by goodwill of working with some of the airlines. Not every airline can provide that information to us. When they can, they will give us passenger manifest information. It tells us who is onboard that aircraft. We can enter queries into our systems to determine whether there have been any infractions against a particular person. We can also do CPIC checks to look for infractions against that person.

Senator Atkins: I thought that bill had been passed.

Ms Jenkins: It will be on June 28. It is in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act that airlines will provide us with that information.

Senator Atkins: We do it for the Americans.

Senator LaPierre: You said that we have passed a law to force the airlines to pass this information to the Americans. Yet, we do not have a law of our own. They are endangering the Canadian people.

Ms Jenkins: If I understand it correctly, our legislation will require the airlines to provide the advance passenger information and passenger name record to immigration.

Senator Banks: What is the significance of June 28?

Ms Jenkins: The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act comes into effect on June 28.

Senator Banks: That date was selected by the Governor in Council.

The Chairman: The bill has been passed but not proclaimed. We are hearing that the proclamation date will be June 28.

Senator Cordy: I would ask again about risk assessment by staff. There could be training and increased numbers of staff on duty at certain times of the day. What do you do with the information that you receive from your front-line staff? I am not talking about information that has come from intelligence gathering, I am talking about information your own staff would give you about the toughest days of the week or the hours of the day when they would need more staff, or whether they need more training in specific areas.

Ms Jenkins: We do not canvass staff per se for that specifically. DART does an analysis of the various activities that they perform. We also look at which flights bring us the most referrals and which flights would be a higher risk.

It is not so much asking the staff specifically as it is looking at our past statistics.

Senator Cordy: On the issue of fraudulent documents, the main point is that those making fraudulent documents are making enormous amounts of money by doing so and, therefore, they have access to the latest technology. How can we possibly keep ahead of them, or can we?

Ms Jenkins: We can keep on trying. The permanent resident card that will come into effect June 28 is state of the art, as I understand it. Is the latest that we have available to us.

Senator Cordy: It also has a date.

Ms Jenkins: Yes. It is only good for a certain period of time — five years.

Senator Cordy: Do the computers used by the different departments talk to one another? We heard from the Auditor General in one of her reports that, in fact, the computers are not integrated.

Ms Jenkins: Since Customs provides our primary inspection function, all our immigration enforcement data is automatically available to them through the Integrated Primary Inspection Line system, IPIL.

Senator Cordy: I am wondering about uniform reporting. We have heard from people who work on the line that in some cases there is simply a call to watch out for so-and-so. In other cases, the call is to watch out for so-and-so who may be dangerous and is six feet tall with green eyes. As a result, you tend to get vast differences in the way people put the information on the computer. Is there any type of uniformity, or is it up to the individual inputting the information?

Ms Jenkins: We have a protocol for putting a lookout on the system. A lack of information is sometimes simply caused by the fact that that is all information we were able to gather. Therefore, we may have a more non-specific threat, in which case you put as much information on as you can get. Sometimes we have specific flights and specific names. Obviously, those are much more clear.

Senator LaPierre: Mr. Landry, you state in your presentation that there are 82 agencies at Toronto airport that have enforcement or regulatory responsibilities.

Mr. Landry: I cannot name them all.

Senator LaPierre: I do not expect you to name them. Who coordinates them? Is there a general coordinator? I am talking about security.

Mr. Landry: I would only hazard a guess at that, sir. I would say that is done through the Greater Toronto Airports Authority, which reports ultimately to Transport Canada. It seems from my experience so far that all roads lead to the GTAA.

Senator LaPierre: The Greater Toronto Airports Authority has the fundamental responsibility for coordination; is that what you are saying?

Mr. Landry: I do not know if they have the responsibility, but I do know that many of us deal with the GTAA in terms of internal issues.

The Chairman: Could you provide us subsequently with a list of the 82 agencies, sir?

Mr. Landry: Yes.

Senator LaPierre: Who coordinates the activities of the various police forces that seem to invade the airport? There is the RCMP, the Peel Regional Police and the 10 members from police services, whatever they are, in and around the Greater Toronto area. Who coordinates the activities of these people? Do you?

Mr. Landry: I coordinate anything that has to do with federal policing. In other words, some of those officers are working on our drug section or on our special squad, as I mentioned in my presentation. They would work out of my office under the supervision of my senior NCOs.

Senator LaPierre: A crime is a crime is a crime. Surely, a federal crime is one that involves the federal police and the Peel police, for example. Are you in charge of coordinating all the police activities that are on the territory of the Toronto airport?

Mr. Landry: No. The Peel Regional Police are the primary police of jurisdiction. Anything from traffic accidents, to assaults, to thefts, to day-to-day policing issues is their responsibility.

Senator LaPierre: If there is a terrorist attack or the anticipation of one, who will be in charge? Will it be the RCMP?

Mr. Landry: If there were an anticipated terrorist attack, a terrorist investigation of an imminent issue, I would say it would be the RCMP through its national security investigations.

Senator LaPierre: Further on in your presentation, you say there is no direct link between organized crime and terrorism.

Mr. Landry: Yes, that is what I say.

Senator LaPierre: It seems to me that you have an enormous amount of resources devoted to organized crime but lesser resources devoted to what Canadians fear the most about airports, which is that some terrorist will come and kill them. I think it is fair to say that Canadians are more concerned about terrorism, whatever that means, in its entirety, as opposed to organized crime and the seizure of illegal liquor in the amount of $9,175.

Why are you devoting so many resources to that when you have so few, when the concern of Canadians is terrorism and not cocaine?

Mr. Landry: The way you word that, sir, makes it difficult to answer. However, I will try.

The day-to-day policing of our communities involves all criminal activities, including the importation of cocaine, alcohol and cigarettes, and the use of those substances by our citizens, particularly our youth. I do not believe people would want us to ignore that. We do have resources. We have new resources that allow us to investigate terrorist activity through national security, NSI or INSET. All these other resources that are out there are used on the day-to- day police work, whether it is drug enforcement or what have you, and they result in sources of information that feed the bigger picture. In that sense, we require intelligence sources of information and agents we can use within the terrorist framework as well.

Even the RCMP has ``x'' number of resources for INSET and national security. At any given time, we have the capability of drawing more resources in as they are needed to conduct certain investigations.

You ask why we devote a lot of resources to drug enforcement. That is an issue that affects Canadians every day. It is something we cannot ignore entirely to the exclusion of terrorist activities.

Depending on what terrorist activity and intelligence tells us, we use our resources to deal with the threat.

Senator LaPierre: Ms Jenkins, I am concerned about your computers. We have been told over and over again that your computers, as Senator Cordy has said, do not talk to other computers. Therefore, do you have any direct information through your intelligence network, if you have one, which you pass on to Customs, the RCMP or any other authority? Do you pass on all the intelligence you gather?

Ms Jenkins: Yes, we do.

Senator LaPierre: The intelligence that others gather may not be passed on to you if your computers do not talk to each other. Am I correct in saying that your computers do not talk to others?

Ms Jenkins: I am not sure to which computers you are referring.

Senator LaPierre: The Auditor General mentioned in her report that these computers do not talk to each other. This is so absurd that Canadians must ask, ``What is going on?'' It is absurd that people responsible for security have computers that do not link up with computers used by other agencies. Is that a fact or not?

Ms Jenkins: I cannot say categorically whether it is or not because I do not have that knowledge. What I can say is that we are in the process of building a new platform, which is called a Global Case Management System, GCMS. Since I do not have that in my area of responsibility, I cannot answer your question.

Senator LaPierre: Whom should we ask for that information?

Ms Jenkins: I will have to get back to you on that.

Senator LaPierre: Sir, let us say that I am a Romanian and I arrive at the airport. I give you my Romanian passport. You put it under a machine of some sort. Do you know whether I am a criminal, a terrorist or just a banker living in Budapest? Do you have that information?

Mr. Sheridan: Yes and no. We do not have any criminality information when we run the passport through the passport reader.

Senator LaPierre: Why not?

Mr. Sheridan: We do not have a link to CPIC.

Senator LaPierre: Why not?

Mr. Sheridan: We do not have a link to the police information system because the Canadian Police Intelligence System for which the RCMP are responsible requires training and access by a particular user ID. That system is not available to us.

Senator LaPierre: Why bother these poor people from Romania, who are simple people visiting Canada, by having them go through these long lists if you have no information? It is a useless enterprise. We might as well not do it.

Mr. Sheridan: We do not have information on criminality. However, we have information on whether or not a person has any Customs infractions. We can identify someone who has been caught smuggling, or who has immigration infractions. We have access to the immigration system.

Senator LaPierre: However, you do not have the real information.

Mr. Sheridan: We do not have the criminal information.

Senator LaPierre: Which is more important, perhaps.

Mr. Sheridan: We have that information only when we get to secondary.

Senator LaPierre: I will give you another scenario.

The Chairman: You said you only have that information when you get to secondary. We have received information that that information is only available in one location in the airport and that, in fact, it is not shared on a regular basis. We heard that earlier today. Is that not true?

Mr. Sheridan: If you are referring to the CPIC information, we have CPIC terminals in all our terminals, and those are available to any staff member trained on CPIC.

The Chairman: At every place where you have secondary inspection you have CPIC terminals; is that correct?

Mr. Sheridan: That is correct.

Senator LaPierre: Let us assume that I am a rich oilman from Texas. I arrive in my jet at the airport with six people onboard. Who informs you that I am about to land so that a Customs official or a police officer can meet my passengers and take them to wherever it is they need to go to be inspected? Could I just sneak out like a Romanian?

Mr. Sheridan: Private aircraft are required to report to the telephone reporting centre.

Senator LaPierre: Let us say they do not, sir.

Mr. Sheridan: Are you saying they land the aircraft and leave the aircraft?

Senator LaPierre: Does that happen or am I creating a stupid scenario here?

Mr. Sheridan: That happens.

Senator LaPierre: Is there not a gap, then, in the security arrangements? If I come from Texas, I may be a terrorist, although I am rich and look like George Bush. Is that possible?

Mr. Sheridan: Anytime anyone arrives in Canada without being processed through the proper authorities there is certainly a concern, yes.

Senator LaPierre: Should you not be informed by the controllers?

Mr. Sheridan: When the air traffic control towers were privatized to NAV CANADA, the information about an aircraft as it travels through the various sectors and through the air traffic control points was no longer provided to Customs.

Senator LaPierre: That was a Conservative decision, if I remember correctly.

You say you have 1.5 million cargo shipments. How many of those shipments do you open and check?

Mr. Sheridan: Approximately 3 per cent.

Senator LaPierre: How do you determine 3 per cent as opposed to any other number?

Mr. Spraggett: On the basis of our finds. If we believe there is a risk and we start seeing certain things, then we will increase it.

Senator LaPierre: Give me an example.

Mr. Spraggett: If we target certain compliance levels from our trade partners who may want to look at certain commodities under SIMA, we will go out and look at those commodities. If we start finding that they are not complying, we will increase our examinations in that area.

Senator Day: You said that after privatization NAV CANADA's information is not made available to Customs. Has that been corrected since September 11 or is that still the case?

Mr. Sheridan: It has not been corrected, senator, since September 11. However, I understand there are discussions ongoing in headquarters with various agencies and departments. In fact, our Deputy Commissioner chaired the interoperability committee. They are looking at working with Transport in trying to find a way to get that information back to Customs.

Senator Day: That is a huge gap. I did not realize that.

Mr. Sheridan: I do not want to characterize it as there being planes all over the place that no one knows about. When the question was asked of me the answer was, yes, it happens.

Senator Day: It only takes one.

Mr. Sheridan: We do not see it every day, but it certainly can happen.

Senator Day: All the FAA information is available, but it is not in Canada.

Mr. Sheridan: I cannot comment on that.

Senator LaPierre: You mentioned a figure of 3 per cent. Let us assume that you have the decision-making power to determine how many cargo shipments will be opened. What would be the one check that would lessen the risk? I do not expect you to check 100 per cent of the shipments. It would not be possible unless you had the Chinese army to help you. What percentage do you think would be more secure than 3 per cent; or is 3 per cent secure enough?

Mr. Spraggett: It depends on the finds. It depends on what I find in that 3 per cent.

Senator LaPierre: You do not say to yourself that, as a policy, you will open 15 per cent of the shipments, do you?

Mr. Spraggett: I could if there were relevant data. If I start finding things, I may have to make more examinations. I would then ship my resourcing to a certain area. I may direct it to the marine area, if they were finding things. I would increase staffing in that area.

Senator LaPierre: There is a major problem at the ports.

The Chairman: There does not seem to be much sensitivity testing.

Senator Forrestall: What will be the price of the cards?

Ms Jenkins: It may be a minimal fee of $50, but I cannot say that for sure.

Senator Forrestall: I think we have heard that number before.

The Chairman: In fact, you announced it would cost your family $800.

Senator Forrestall: Mr. Landry, there are 82 different security groups at Pearson. Of those, are the RCMP and the Peel Regional Police the only armed personnel on the base or are there others?

Mr. Landry: To my knowledge we are the only two, sir.

Senator Forrestall: Are all of the RCMP armed?

Mr. Landry: Yes, they are.

Senator Forrestall: Are all of the Peel Regional Police armed?

Mr. Landry: Yes.

Senator Forrestall: In the event of a shootout, who is in charge?

Mr. Landry: After the fact?

Senator Forrestall: That is one of the better answers we have had to questions like that. Let us try after the fact, who is in charge?

Mr. Landry: At the end of the day, if there is a shooting, regardless of who is shooting, whether it is the police or someone else, it is a matter that comes under the Criminal Code. Violations of the Criminal Code fall to the police of local jurisdiction, which is the Peel Regional Police.

Senator Forrestall: The coroner would intervene.

Mr. Landry: Yes, and there would be a public inquiry and all of that.

Senator Forrestall: Is there any pressure from any of the other groups to arm? From time to time we hear that some of the Customs and Immigration people might wish that they were armed. Are there any others?

Mr. Landry: Not that I am aware of.

Senator Forrestall: Is it the case that everyone is pretty happy that only you and the Peel Regional Police are armed?

Mr. Landry: Most people are content that they do not have to wear a firearm in doing their jobs.

Senator Forrestall: I have a lot of faith in the cheapest tool we use in drug detection. I am referring to dogs. The world champion is a Nova Scotian dog. He is a beautiful animal. To this point in his career — and he will retire next year — he has detected $350 million worth of drugs. Do you know of any dogs that have performed better than that?

Mr. Sheridan: Senator, we have six dogs at Pearson, three on the traffic side and three on the commercial side. Our detector dogs have received awards for significant narcotic seizures, but I do not have the statistics for their seizures over their lifetimes.

Senator Forrestall: Later this year, we will have the distinct honour and privilege of awarding some of the Queen's jubilee medals. What can be done with a properly trained dog in the hands of a caring and competent handler is fantastic. I would like to see one of these dogs wearing a medal.

Senator Atkins: In view of our firearms laws, do you have any problems with American tourists who come in through Customs who insist on bringing weapons?

Mr. Sheridan: A lot of tourists come into Canada. The vast majority of the situations in which they have weapons with them is at the land borders. At the airports they would have gone through pre-screening before they got onto a plane to come into Canada. A lot of long guns, rifles and shotguns come in for hunting season. The airlines have a process for controlling those, certainly in terms of a declaration for Customs. Any weapons we come across that are not declared, are subject to seizure, whether or not they are prohibited or restricted. If they are declared as restricted, then we hold them and people pick them up when they leave.

Senator Day: In 1995, there were 290 RCMP officers at the Toronto airport. In 2002, seven years later, there are 59 RCMP officers.

Mr. Landry: At the peak number, we were contracted to Transport Canada to provide a myriad of policing services from trafficking enforcement on the levels to maintaining peace and good order inside the terminals. We dealt with issues on a daily basis with our partner agencies.

The RCMP discontinued performing that service when the airports were privatized. To my knowledge, the contracts for Criminal Code policing went to the police forces of local jurisdictions. For instance, here the contract went to Peel Regional Police, whereas Edmonton still uses the RCMP.

Other lesser types of regulatory duties, such as parking, went to private companies that specialize in that type of area. Hence, the numbers dropped.

Senator Day: Now you are spending half of your time integrating, coordinating and trying to keep all of the various policing organizations and law enforcement people performing a function that seven years ago could be done by the one major group, which is the RCMP. Is it unfair to say that?

Mr. Landry: I guess time changes things. Nothing stays static. The resources that we have today are much better focused than they were then. We are picking the cream of the crop, if you will, to be on specialized units at this airport. We are trying to hand pick the right people for the right job. Therefore, when we need a narcotics investigator or an investigator to go on to a special squad, we choose people who can work in an integrated fashion. They are people that have experience in undercover operations and in Criminal Code matters. I feel very confident with the group I have working with me today.

The 240 officers were officers with a wide variety of interests. We focus on the policing component and our partner agencies such as the Peel Regional Police, the Toronto Police Service and CCRA. Each has its mandate. There is always an overlap. We bring better expertise to the table.

Senator Day: I am probably making you uncomfortable pursuing that matter.

Ms Jenkins, could you help me, please? You did not mention the rush of refugee claimants that might occur before the law changes. I presume you do not have that problem at airports?

Ms Jenkins: We have seen a marginal increase. It has not been anything upon which to comment. Since the imposition of visas back in December, our refugee claimant volumes have dropped considerably from an average of 500 claimants a month to 200 a month.

Senator Day: The problem seems to mainly involve claimants from the U.S. Is your group here at the airport ready for the implementation of the new act?

Ms Jenkins: I feel confident that they will be. Our staff, with the exception of one group, has been trained. That last group will be trained next week. That is fine, because they will not be working on the floor immediately. They have had excellent training, and the system is ready to go. There has also been some considerable consultation with the regional committee. A national help desk is available to officers. A lot of work has been done in preparation.

Senator Day: The Automatic Fingerprint Information System, I think, encouraged some to proceed with the new legislation, and that will be part of what will happen when the new legislation is implemented at the end of this week.

Ms Jenkins: The automatic fingerprinting is not tied directly to the legislation.

Senator Day: I understand that, but was it not part of the selling package for the new legislation?

Ms Jenkins: I do not think so. The AFIS machines came as a result of additional monies for public security. It is simply a question of us setting up a training program for officers. It is very specific training. Individual keys have to be assigned.

Our immediate priority is training for IRPA implementation. When that is done, we will move to the AFIS.

Senator Day: Do you know how many automatic fingerprint system machines were purchased for Pearson?

Ms Jenkins: Four.

Senator Day: Do you know how much they cost?

Ms Jenkins: No. They are fairly sophisticated, so they must have been expensive.

Senator Day: If I suggested $150,000 each, would that seem unreasonable?

Ms Jenkins: It would be a guess.

Senator Day: Do you know how many Citizenship and Immigration Canada have purchased for across the country?

Ms Jenkins: They have purchased in the range of 150 to 200, if my memory serves me correctly.

Senator Day: How long have they been sitting around not being used?

Ms Jenkins: We received them just prior to the end of the fiscal year.

Senator Day: They have been here since the end of March. Your current plans are to implement the new legislation. Do you have a long-term plan related to when you will start using these machines?

Ms Jenkins: Absolutely. There is a national group coordinating the implementation.

I should be clear that the machines were purchased with monies that were in last fiscal year's budget, so receipt of the goods had to happen before the end of March. Normally, if that were not a pressure, we would have a more immediate implementation plan.

I must emphasize that it is a very sophisticated piece of equipment, and it would not be very responsible to just open it up and let people have a go at it because it would be quite simple to cause a problem. There will be a focused training program.

Senator Day: When will the first one go on line at the Toronto airport?

Ms Jenkins: I believe it is scheduled for early fall.

Senator Day: Of this year?

Ms Jenkins: Yes.

Senator Day: Could you get me some information regarding the cost of one of those machines?

Ms Jenkins: Yes.

Senator LaPierre: Does that mean that all 150 machines will be in use as of the fall?

Ms Jenkins: I think so.

The Chairman: Would you ask headquarters for some implementation information?

Ms Jenkins: Yes.

Senator Meighen: Is this the system that was first tried out at the Blue Water Bridge in Sarnia? Was there not a trial somewhere?

The Chairman: That was a pass system. This is a fingerprint identification system.

Senator Banks: Mr. Sheridan, you said that the disconnection of NAV CANADA on the one hand and your agency on the other is a matter of discussion at headquarters.

Mr. Sheridan: That is my understanding.

Senator Banks: This disconnection has now been in place for three years.

Mr. Sheridan: Since NAV CANADA took over responsibility for the control towers, yes.

Senator Banks: Do you think those discussions will bear fruit soon?

Mr. Sheridan: I do not know when the discussions started. I only became aware of the concern in the last six months. Certainly, I do not believe that this concern has been with our agency from the time NAV CANADA took over responsibility.

Senator Banks: We raised this issue more than six months ago with people from your agency. I hope someone will get to this soon. The idea of private planes landing ail over the place and nobody knowing about it, is frightening.

The Chairman: Senator Bank, perhaps we could ask that Madam Hébert question headquarters and send a report to us.

Senator Banks: I am not nearly as nice a guy as Senator Day. You are the policeman, so I will posit an idea and ask you to respond to it.

You described Pearson airport as a small city, and it is. There is the private security force that is contributed by GTAA. You have airline security people, the RCMP, the OPP, the Toronto Police, Peel Regional Police and the CCRA peace officers all trying to enforce the law in a small city. My remark has nothing to do with the competence of those people, the effort that they make, and what they sacrifice. The business of trying to interconnect those agencies would require another agency, and there is no such agency. We all understand human nature. We know that there is friction between police forces. We know that human beings tend to hold information so they can make the bust and get the credit.

It makes more sense to me that a police force would — and I do not care which one it is — look after the airport, including the tarmac, the passenger terminals, access to the airside areas and so on. If that were the case, I would know that officers would share information immediately. As it is now, it could be weeks before another officer would be aware of certain information. There are circumstances in which, even if it were minutes, it could cause a problem. I apologize for making a speech, but would you respond to the idea?

Mr. Landry: In an ideal world, everyone would work on the same page, all our systems would integrate and we would all have the information. However, that is not the case.

Forget about the 82 regulatory agencies. Three police forces, including CCRA, have a very specific front-line task. The general policing falls to the RCMP as related to federal statutes, and to the Peel Regional Police for enforcement of the Criminal Code. The other police forces you mentioned, the Toronto and the OPP, are here to assist in the two- way flow of information to meet their own mandates outside the airport and how that influences the mandate they have. We are really talking about two agencies.

We get our mandate from federal statutes and the RCMP Act. The Peel Police get their Criminal Code mandate from the province, which has the enforcement authority for the Criminal Code.

It is only a matter of having those two prime agencies work together.

The roles are different. The Criminal Code role is traffic accidents, assaults and that sort of thing. The federal responsibility, the role of the RCMP, relates to organized criminal activity. We have resources, equipment and monies to address those things, in concert with the other police agency, so it can be done as it is today.

To have one agency might be the most effective approach. On the surface it appears to be a good idea but I do not know if it would work in the reality of how laws are enforced in Canada.

Senator Banks: Mr. Spraggett, we have heard that there is organized crime at airports. Obviously there is, because organized crime cannot work very well if it does not have ports. Do you know of any instances where your officers have been confronted and have been in a situation that could have resulted in harm coming to them? Is physical violence directed against your officers?

Mr. Spraggett: Physical violence and verbal abuse, maybe.

Senator Banks: I was not thinking of verbal abuse. Are any of your officers ever threatened by physical violence by passengers or anyone else? I am assuming that you have certain inspection duties that may not always be with the nice guy from Bucharest or wherever.

Mr. Spraggett: In my commercial environment I provide counter service where people can come in off the street to clear commercial goods. Sometimes they do not agree with the levy of taxes or the information that they are require to provide for clearance. That can sometimes result in a verbal confrontation. The officer has to try to diffuse the situation. However, I am not aware of anyone being physically threatened.

Senator Banks: Mr. Sheridan, have you heard of that happening to any of your officers?

Mr. Sheridan: We have had assaults in passenger operations, yes.

Senator Banks: Is that an occasional occurrence?

Mr. Sheridan: It is a rare occurrence. I do not have any statistics that I can share with you today. We had an assault last winter, although I cannot recall the month. I may have been February. That is the last assault of which I am aware. Every morning I receive shift reports from my operations that tell me what happened the previous day. In that report I would receive information on assaults. I believe February was the last time I saw an assault report.

Senator Banks: Ms Hébert, have you heard of assaults against officers of CCRA?

Ms Barbara Hébert, Regional Director, Customs, Greater Toronto Area Division, Canada Customs and Revenue Agency: It happens very rarely. In such instances, we call the police.

Senator Banks: Mr. Sheridan, did I understand that the students you hire are given three weeks training? Is it on-the- job training?

Mr. Sheridan: No. It is local to our operation, but it is classroom training.

Senator Banks: Is it the same front-line training that they would get in three weeks at Rigaud? I am not referring to amount of time in training. the mean the same length.

Mr. Sheridan: Yes, the training we deliver at Pearson airport for our new hires, including students and new terms, is modelled after the training given in our training facility in Rigaud. We use modules from their course to deliver our course.

Senator Banks: Approximately how many people here would be term as opposed to indeterminate?

Mr. Sheridan: I would estimate 80 of my officers are term; the balance of the 300 would be indeterminate. We only do that, senator, because we want to ensure that we have enough money to pay bodies. We hire people on term as opposed to indeterminate in the event that there is a shift in funding. It gives us some flexibility.

Senator LaPierre: There is a discussion about arming Customs officials. Could you tell us how often in a year your officers may have been physically abused or threatened?

Mr. Sheridan: I can get that information to you. How would you like that — on a fiscal basis or a calendar basis?

The Chairman: Any way you choose will be fine.

How often do Customs officers crawl into the holds of planes?

Mr. Spraggett: On a regular basis.

The Chairman: Every day?

Mr. Spraggett: Yes.

The Chairman: In the new terminal, will there be dedicated pads between planes and your primary inspection line? In other words, will there be pads that people cannot duck out of?

To put it in context, we have heard evidence that the airlines shepherding passengers to your inspection line, do not always do a very good job. In fact, we have heard of situations where the entire contents of a plane have completely missed your inspection line, and you discovered it when people were coming to collect their baggage from the wrong direction. This has been attributed to the fact that doors are open or cords that are not very secure separate the area.

Have you reviewed the design of the new airport? Will you have secure corridors? Will you be less reliant on ground personnel from airlines getting people from outside of the country to you so you can process them?

Mr. Sheridan: The latest design of the terminal has a feature called Chicago doors that allow segregation of departing and arriving passengers. People cannot slip out of doors.

The Chairman: Is it like a Texas gate?

Mr. Sheridan: That is what it is called in the industry.

The Chairman: You are telling me that your needs are being met in the design of the new airport so that this embarrassing situation will not happen in the future.

Mr. Sheridan: The airlines, as you probably know, senator, are responsible under the act to deliver the travellers to Customs. We obviously are concerned about that, as are the airlines. The GTAA also has a tremendous interest in that. We all have an interest to making sure we get the people to Customs.

We had an opportunity to look at the design and to express our requirements to ensure that people could not get out.

The Chairman: Ms Jenkins, on occasion, late at night a plane will come in and your lock-up is full. A person will get a pass if he happens to be a refugee and does not have proper documentation. The impression is that you do not have the capacity to deal with an extraordinary number of people who may come in late at night. Is that the case? What steps do you plan to take to deal with it, if it is the case?

Ms Jenkins: We have had, again on rare occasions, a situation where we did not have the capacity at the detention centre for the people we wished to detain that evening. On those occasions, we have detained them in our facilities at the airport. We have cells at the immigration area at Pearson.

The Chairman: We were led to believe that there were circumstances where they were not detained. They were set loose.

Ms Jenkins: I am not aware of that. If we have determined someone needs to be detained, he or she will not be released.

The Chairman: Inspector, page two, paragraph 3, has an astonishing list of organizations. Could you help us with what they are and what they do? ``Traditional Organized Crime,'' who are they and what do they do?

Mr. Landry: Traditional Organized Crime refers to Italian organized crime; the Mafia.

The Chairman: What do they do, sir? What are they doing out at the airport as we speak?

Mr. Landry: These groups are involved in the drug trafficking that goes through this airport. Those drugs do not facilitate themselves on to the street. It takes groups like TOC or the federal motorcycle gangs to do that.

The Chairman: Could you name some of those for us? You say motorcycle gangs in the plural, so I assume you have some in mind.

Mr. Landry: It is a generic term we use. Hell's Angels and Paradise Riders are gangs. There are dozen of gangs.

The Chairman: Active at the airport?

Mr. Landry: I am not saying that they are active at the airport. I am saying that they have links to people working at the airport. There are associations there that facilitate criminal activity such as drug trafficking and importation and stolen goods from air cargo and other places.

The Chairman: You describe on page 3 a situation where 10 individuals were involved in the seizure of 100 kilograms of cocaine, hash oil and hashish. Did these 10 individuals all work at the airport?

Mr. Landry: I do not believe so. I was not here when that happened.

The Chairman: Did any of them work here?

Mr. Landry: I cannot be sure.

The Chairman: Can you find out for us?

Mr. Landry: Yes.

The Chairman: I am not sure why it is included in the information if it does not relate to the airport.

Mr. Landry: That investigation was specific to the airport.

The Chairman: These people did not work here, but they got to the airport somehow and did this. You refer to Project Obooker on page three.

Mr. Landry: I have modified my document. There were some employees involved in that, as I recall.

The Chairman: How do you attribute their being able to do this? Does it have to do with the lack of search and inspection of people coming into the airport?

We have had testimony by a preceding witness who told us that employees coming on duty have their badges checked, but they are not screened in the same fashion as passengers. Their bags are not looked into and their persons are not checked. Is that a problem?

Mr. Landry: Certainly, the employees that work the tarmacs and those areas have a lot of freedom.

To go back to your question about employees, I can now tell you that eight employees at the airport were involved. Two of the ten individuals were from outside the airport.

The Chairman: Presumably the eight had undergone a CSIS check and a criminal code check.

Mr. Landry: I could not answer that. They could have been working here for 20 or 25 years. Perhaps they were not checked at all.

The Chairman: Is there a system whereby people are grandfathered? Are only new employees investigated?

Mr. Landry: I do not know.

The Chairman: Can you find out for us?

Mr. Landry: I can ask.

The Chairman: You say that they may have come in earlier, that implies to me that there is a grandfathering system and that only employees hired after a certain date were subject to CSIS and CPIC checks.

Mr. Landry: I know that, if a new employee comes on stream, whether it is an employee for GTAA or someone doing some subcontract work, checks are done through Ottawa, CPIC, the RCMP and CSIS.

I have no idea what security arrangements are made to check those people who have been here for years on a periodic basis.

The Chairman: We received a complaint, if you will, from Peel Regional Police. You, however, commented on the excellent relationship you have, both at the executive level and at the working level. We heard from Peel Regional Police that they had difficulty getting adequate intelligence from the RCMP and from CSIS. Would you care to comment on that?

Mr. Landry: I am surprised to hear that. I know from O division and from the people I know who run the intelligence side of the RCMP that our purpose right now is to share intelligence. We are pushing that and trying to encourage the smaller agencies throughout Canada to share with us so that there is one integrated intelligence system. This is the first time that I have heard that Peel Regional Police is saying that we are not cooperating. I would certainly like to know about that.

The Chairman: My understanding is that they said that the intelligence flow is one way, from them to you and CSIS and not back.

Mr. Landry: It is strange that they would say that, senator, because the head of my my special squad, which is an intelligence led unit, is run by a detective sergeant with the Ontario Provincial Police.

The Chairman: I am only telling you what we are hearing.

Mr. Landry: I am responding to that. I would take exception to that. If there is a reason they are not being provided intelligence, it would have to be on an exception bases, based on a certain type of investigation. Overall, anything Peel Regional Police need from us they get.

The Chairman: You commented on providing police for flights. My understanding was that they were coming from SIRC teams. Are you saying that they come from your detachment?

Mr. Landry: We do not call them sky marshals. There is a team of —

The Chairman: Flying Mounties.

Mr. Landry: There is a team of 100. They do not come through my office. However, I am supplying some personnel until they have their whole system up and running.

The Chairman: Are they flying to places besides Reagan at this point?

Mr. Landry: Definitely, they are flying to Reagan daily. I am fairly certain that they have the odd flight not to Reagan, but I could not say more than that.

The Chairman: Are you satisfied with access to the airport? The thrust of your comments regarding organized crime and the level of activity seem to indicate that you need more resources to deal with these issues. Would part of these resources be improved checking of people who come to work here? Would it be improved control at the gates? Where would you suggest that the resources be assigned?

Mr. Landry: Certainly an enhanced examination of people that work at airports or may work at airports some day goes a long ways in assisting us to fight organized crime and criminal activity at the airports. There is no question about it.

The systems in place probably are not catching up quickly enough with the modern realities of life. It would be wonderful if we could find a system that would check everyone and allow us to know who is intent on criminal activity at our airports.

The Chairman: On behalf of the committee, I should like to thank all of you very much. You have given us a much better picture of the work you do here at Pearson International Airport, and we thank you on behalf of the Senate of Canada.

The committee adjourned.