Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
National Security and Defence

Issue 18 - Evidence, June 2, 2003


OTTAWA, Monday, June 2, 2003

The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met this day at 6:07 p.m. to examine and report on the need for a national security policy for Canada.

Senator Colin Kenny (Chairman) in the Chair.

[English]

The Chairman: It is my pleasure to welcome you to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. Today, the committee will hear testimony on Canadian coastal defence and security.

My name is Colin Kenny. I am a senator from Ontario and I chair the committee.

On my immediate right is the distinguished senator from Nova Scotia, Senator Michael Forrestall. Senator Forrestall has served the constituents of Dartmouth for the past 37 years, first as their member of the House of Commons and then as their senator. Throughout his parliamentary career he has followed defence matters and served on various defence-related parliamentary committees, including the 1993 special joint committee on the future of the Canadian Forces.

Also with us today is Senator Tommy Banks, who is well known to Canadians as one of our most versatile musicians and entertainers. His talents and dedication have earned him a Juno Award, a Grand Prix du Disque- Canada, and many other honours. Senator Banks is the Chair of the Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources, which is currently studying amendments to the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act.

Beside Senator Banks is Senator Norm Atkins from Ontario. He came to the Senate in 1996 with a strong background in the field of communications and with experience as an adviser to Mr. William Davis of Ontario. Senator Atkins is a member of our Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs and also a member of the Standing Committee on Internal Economy, Budgets and Administration. He serves as chair of the Senate Conservative caucus.

Beside him is Senator Jane Cordy from Nova Scotia, who is an accomplished educator with an extensive record of community involvement. This includes service as Vice-Chair of the Halifax-Dartmouth Port Development Corporation and Chair of the Board of Referees of the Halifax region of Human Resources Development Canada. She came to the Senate in 2000. In addition to serving on our committee, she has been a member of the Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology that recently released the landmark report on health care and is now studying mental health. She also serves as Vice-Chair of the Canadian-NATO Parliamentary Association.

Also with us is Senator Joe Day from New Brunswick, a successful lawyer and businessman, who was appointed to the Senate in 2001. Senator Day is the Deputy Chair of both the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs and the Standing Senate Committee on National Finance. He also sits on the Standing Senate Committee on Transportation and Communications and the Standing Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. As well, he serves on the Canadian-NATO Parliamentary Association as one of its councillors.

Beside him is Senator Meighen from Ontario who is a successful lawyer and businessman. He was appointed to the Senate in 1990. He has a strong background in defence matters and is Chair of our Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs. He is also a member of the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, which is examining ways to examine corporate governance.

Our committee is the first Senate committee mandated to examine security and defence. Over the past 18 months we have completed a number of reports, beginning with ``Canadian Security and Military Preparedness.'' This report, which was tabled in February of 2002, examined the major defence and security issues facing Canada.

The Senate then asked our committee to examine the need for a national security policy. Thus far, we have released three reports on various aspects of national security: First, the ``Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility,'' which was published in September 2002; second, ``Update on Canada's Military Crisis, A View From the Bottom Up,'' which was published in November 2002; and most recently, ``The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports,'' which was published in January, 2003.

The committee is continuing its long-term evaluation of Canada's ability to contribute to security and defence in North America. As part of this work, the committee has been holding hearings on the federal government's support to the men and women across the country who first respond to emergencies and disasters. However, the committee has decided to give priority to an ongoing evaluation of Canada's ability to defend its territorial waters and help police the continental coastline. These hearings update an earlier committee report: ``Defence of North America: A Canadian responsibility,'' published in September, 2002, which found Canadian coastal defence efforts to be largely ad hoc and fragmentary.

This evening, our first witness will be navy Captain (Ret'd) John Dewar. Mr. Dewar served in the Canadian Forces for 32 years. His executive level positions included appointment as Director General Maritime Development and Operations, in Canada's National Defence Headquarters. In this role, in addition to other duties, he identified emerging naval requirements and provided project direction for all major capital programs. He also has recent experience relating to shipbuilding. Mr. Dewar is appearing before the committee to discuss specifications for the construction of high-speed patrol boats known as cutters.

Mr. Dewar, welcome to the committee. I believe you have a short opening statement to make and we would be pleased to hear it.

Captain (N) (Ret'd) John Dewar, as an individual: Honourable senators, thank you for the privilege of appearing here once again. When I was here last, we had some discussion about the number of government departments that are involved in the jurisdiction for maritime security. I would emphasize that all the points of view that I express tonight are mine. I am not making this presentation on behalf of anyone other than myself as an individual this evening.

The complexity of the jurisdictional environment will take a considerable amount of work to sort out. In the shorter term, things can be done with the existing distribution of responsibilities.

The last time I was here we talked about the maritime operations centres that are operated by the navy on both coasts largely for defence purposes, but also for broader maritime security and law enforcement in the Canadian maritime areas of responsibility and interest. Those models of cooperation between the government departments can be extended to the enforcement regime. Certainly, this is the case now, although we use much larger ships in some cases than we would think are absolutely essential, but that is because they are available and intended for other purposes.

As we know, at this time, the navy is challenged to meet all of its obligations on those frigates, which leaves relatively less availability in Canadian territorial waters at any time. Those ships are, perhaps, more than is necessary for many enforcement functions. Clearly, they are designed as warships and, first and foremost, they have that capability. Because they have that capability, there are a number of other functions they can fulfil when they are not otherwise employed.

Tonight, though, I would like to talk about what I perceive as a gap in our maritime capability, and that is a function performed by what is generally a class of ship called a cutter. A cutter really has more to do with the function that the ship performs than the size and the nature of the hull and the ship itself. They are, generally speaking, ships that are engaged in law enforcement activities.

From a sovereignty point of view, there are three dimensions to exerting and enforcing sovereignty: First, surveillance, to determine what is out there; second, presence, to establish Canadian authority; and third, enforcement, the ability to do something when there is a need to do it.

New technology provides a number of options of efficient ways of conducting surveillance. That would include everything that the committee has already heard with regard to satellite surveillance, unpiloted air vehicles, UAVs, earth following radars, high frequency standing wave radars and other ways of determining what is out there.

Presence and enforcement, however, can only be achieved by human beings. In a practical context in the maritime environment, that means ships. Any vessel that flies the national flag can exert presence. However, certain capabilities are required if it is to have a credible enforcement function. Among these, my suggestions of what would typically be required are, first — and I know that many senators here are from the Maritimes and have some experience in sea states and the area off the coast of Nova Scotia, the Gulf of St. Lawrence — the ability to operate in high sea states, which is essential for any ship performing enforcement activities. Anyone who has had the somewhat dubious privilege of spending any winter months out on the tail and nose of the Grand Banks, would realize that there is much to be said about the size of a vessel in order to lend credibility to its capability in those waters. Foremost, the ability to operate in a high sea state is essential.

The next requirement for these vessels is the ability to carry out their functions at speed. That means a high level of speed for positioning — to get to the right place when it is necessary and, when necessary, to engage in pursuit.

A certain level of endurance is required. I can give what I think are some typical parameters for that. However, you need the time to be able to deploy and to remain in an area partly to exert a presence and partly because sometimes operations do not unfold as quickly as you would like. From that point of view, it is a little inconvenient if you have to go home for gas or groceries while the operation is ongoing.

I have suggested, and there may be differing points of view on this, that from my experience as a naval officer a helicopter is essential for the operation of a ship employed in these roles. In terms of compatibility with the other vessels that the navy operates — and I will give some reasons for thinking that the navy ought to operate these vessels — it means a large helicopter, something typically the size of the current CH-124, the Sea King helicopter, which is operated by the navy now, or whatever replacement may be deemed suitable.

Part of the function that is necessary is the ability to transport and deploy boarding parties. I do not know if honourable senators have had any opportunity to look at the operations that are conducted by the navy's boarding parties, such as they have been doing in the Persian Gulf. We have been doing them for a number of years in Canada in support of the RCMP for drug interdiction and for other activities in support of other government departments. It is a highly specialized skill and requires specialized equipment. The first essential piece of equipment is the platform from which you launch the operation. Again, that requires ships of a certain size and with certain capability.

The ship also, most likely, would require some ice tolerance. I do not think it necessarily has to be particularly robust in the sense of being an icebreaker, but it does have to be able to operate around the ice margins. In the wintertime and in the spring, the ice margins extend a considerable distance down the coast of Nova Scotia into the Gulf of St. Lawrence. Areas that are not necessarily Arctic or sub-Arctic have prominent ice fields and, in order to be effective, a ship must be able to operate in those environments. The ship would need sophisticated sensors. In this respect, it would need sensors that are complementary to the remote sensing apparatus that I mentioned previously, and also be compatible with the current censor fit that is fitted into the ships that we have now in the navy. These would consist of radar, electronic surveillance measures, both for detecting other radar and for detecting communication signals, electro-optical instruments for surveillance, including infrared, and also sonar.

The ability to participate in network-centric command and control regimes is important. This means receiving information from other ships, disseminating it to other sources, and participating in those larger links such as the Maritime Command operational information network that operates out of those maritime operations centres on both coasts.

This also requires a sophisticated communication capability, both in the traditional high frequency, very high frequency and ultra-high frequency ranges, but also with satellite communications. Part of the requirement for that now is the necessity to be able to exchange high volumes of video-quality information.

If it is going to fulfill an enforcement function, then it has to have some weapon capability. I would suggest these have to be scaled weapons, from small arms carried by the boarding party up through machine gun-like weapons, 50 calibre-type machine guns that are suitable for some activities, and some kind of weapon with stopping capability. I would think something in the order of a 57 millimetre or 76 millimetre gun would be adequate for that purpose. I do not think the ship would necessarily need a surface-to-surface missile system, nor do I think it would need an anti-ship or anti-air missile system. However, I would suggest that, given some of the things that we have seen being employed by non-military players in recent times, the ship would require a close-in self-defence weapon system to protect itself from something as simple even as shoulder-launched anti-ship missiles or shoulder-launched missiles.

I think it is clear that the only government department that operates any vessel similar to this is the navy. The last time I was here we had some discussions about the Coast Guard and Coast Guard functions. It is quite clear that the Canadian Coast Guard is not like the Coast Guard in the United States, though some people would like to make that comparison.

The United States Coast Guard is actually two services. Those services are colloquially referred to as the ``black- hulled fleet'' and the ``white-hulled fleet.'' The black-hulled fleet does essentially what the Coast Guard does in Canada. That is, it performs primarily transport functions. It does icebreaking and provides aids to navigation, much the same as our Coast Guard does, as well as the search and rescue function.

The other portion of the United States Coast Guard is more of a paramilitary organization. It does the offshore law enforcement and has ships that I think in any other country in the world would be classed as warships. They are very sophisticated vessels with a lot of heavy-duty armament and are specifically designed to be compatible with United States navy ships. As you are probably aware, and I am sure it has been raised in the committee, the United States Coast Guard has now embarked on a very large program to rejuvenate and update its capability with a whole range of cutters from high-endurance, offshore vessels, down through smaller patrol vessels.

It makes sense to me that the navy operate these vessels. It also makes sense to me that they do so on behalf of other government departments that have the enforcement responsibilities. There are paradigms for this in place at this point in time, a number of MOUs between government departments — for example, in terms of the navy providing support to the RCMP, Customs and Revenue, Citizenship and Immigration, and even Fisheries. In those cases, where officers of those government departments are brought on board, the ship provides the delivery platform and exercises such force as necessary under the direction of the appropriate officer. That is the sort of model I would envisage for these ships.

However, it would be a new activity and responsibility for the navy to operate these types of vessels on behalf of the other governments departments. As I am sure this committee is particularly well aware, the navy is currently challenged to meet all of its existing obligations under the current budget of the Department of National Defence. Any additional responsibilities that were given to the navy to exercise would have to be accompanied by a full funding envelope that not only covers the acquisition of the vessels but also any additional personnel costs through the life cycle, and also any of the life-cycle maintenance costs for the vessel.

In the interests of economy and efficiency, I would think that for vessels of this nature, a number of principles would have to be applied from the beginning. I would recommend adopting commercial construction and procurement practices. These ships would not necessarily be operating in the full spectrum of naval warfare activities that generate the requirement for a significant number of military specifications in some of the larger combatants.

There are also savings to be achieved by contracting in service support throughout the life of the vessel. The navy has experience in this regard. I think you have had some discussion on the maritime coastal defence vessels that are being maintained this way. Many of the specifications of those ships are to commercial standards.

It is particularly important to note that warships have certain levels of manning that are much, much higher than existing commercial vessels. There are a number of reasons for this, but for patrol vessels, adopting commercial marine practices and reliance on automation could result in considerable reductions for the manning of the ship. The crew size is not directly proportional to the size of the ship itself. There was a concept a few years ago — and I am not sure of the status of it at the moment — called ``a ship within a ship,'' in which a small ship's company operated a large ship. The volume in the ship was generally given to it in order to be able to provide those sea-keeping capabilities that we mentioned earlier and also because there is a lower power-to-weight requirement for larger ships than for smaller ones, so that one can go faster by extending the size of the ship.

I have some ideas on what I think would be typical specifications for a vessel of this size and nature. I have had some discussions with colleagues who are naval architects in the shipbuilding business, and some other people who have a perspective on naval activities, gained over time. Generally, I would see this as a vessel of about 75 metres in length, so about 250 or so feet, about 12 metres in beam. These requirements would give it the stability required to conduct boarding operations and, I think, would be the minimum necessary to operate a helicopter from the ship. A minimum displacement of about 1,600 tons would be appropriate.

The current Canadian patrol frigate is a little over 5,000 tons. These are considerably smaller. The maritime coastal defence vessels are about 1,000 tons. These would be somewhat larger than those vessels. For those of you, particularly senators from the Maritimes or on the Pacific coast, who saw the steam destroyers that the navy had in its inventory up until CPF was introduced, these ships would be slightly smaller. Those ships were about 2,500 tons and 360 feet long — a little smaller but with almost the same displacement.

As to the propulsion system, I think diesel propulsion is perfectly adequate. In my opinion, gas turbines are not necessary. The propulsion system would provide both extended endurance and could provide the necessary top range in speed which, in my recommendation, would be something in excess of 25 knots. Having a vessel out there that is too slow to be effective in pursuit limits the reasons you would have it at all. Typical time on station would be something in the order of about 30 days. This is typical of vessels. MCDVs are capable of that now, as are certainly frigates much longer than that.

I talked about reduction in crew size. I believe that a vessel of this size could be operated with a crew size of about 40. I would also recommend that it have additional accommodation on board — bunk space for an additional 40 people. Part of this would be for boarding teams, providing transport for other government department personnel. If you do interdiction operations, occasionally you need space to accommodate the people you interdict. Adequate room on board has historically been a problem with frigates and destroyers.

A helicopter is essential to be effective, and we can discuss the reasons for that. The capacity to have a helicopter land and take off again, such as a helicopter landing deck, is the minimum necessary. This can be done from a vessel of this size and from a MCDV, if it were configured properly. A hangar is desirable, but not essential.

Given all this, there is probable range of cost per unit. I will give you a rough order of magnitude, depending on the density of systems put into the ship. The low end would be something in the order of $50 million to $55 million per unit; the higher end would be in the order of $100 million per unit. That cost is not directly proportional to the size of the vessel. It is proportional to the density of the equipment that is installed in the ship. The propulsion system is also a factor in that, as are the sophistication of the weapons and sensors put into the ship and the control mechanisms put on board. There are a number of tradeoffs in terms of people over the life of the vessel and the degree of automation put into it.

These are the costs that I think one could expect for the construction of the vessel itself and the initial fitting out.

A number of designs currently exist in the world that fulfill similar types of functions, and I have listed some in my notes that I provided to you. Not all would be necessarily suitable — unmodified — for the Canadian requirement. Many go by different names, either offshore patrol vessels or coastal patrol vessels or Corvettes. Corvettes, generally, although they are vessels of the same size, have a more military application and would tend to have more sophisticated weapons and sensors. I believe the term ``cutter'' is appropriate in this regard because it has historically been associated with civil law enforcement activity as opposed to direct military applications.

That concludes my remarks. I hope I have given you an idea of what I think would be appropriate types of vessels to fill the gaps in the existing inventories of all current government fleets. With that, I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

Senator Forrestall: Welcome. It is a pleasure to fantasize.

Did you serve on the West Coast?

Mr. Dewar: Yes, I served on both coasts.

Senator Forrestall: What can you tell us about berthing facilities and capacity in the two yards?

Mr. Dewar: It would not be a problem in either one of the naval yards on either coast because the vessels that we have been talking about this evening are smaller than the existing frigates. They would be smaller than the steamships that were handled before. There is adequate berthing space available in both dockyards.

Senator Forrestall: What about the St. Lawrence River?

Mr. Dewar: You can take a Halifax class ship into Lake Ontario.

Senator Forrestall: It was not a question of transiting but of basing.

Mr. Dewar: It would be possible. In fact, there is a naval facility in Quebec City that I am sure you are aware of and have visited.

A ship of this nature would not necessarily require a lot of specialized shore infrastructure in order to support it, in fact, probably not much more than exists at the Coast Guard base in Quebec City, for example.

Senator Forrestall: The power of water.

Mr. Dewar: It would require standard shore connections to commercial standards.

Senator Forrestall: The North is another question. Do have you any comment or observations you might care to make about northern operations? I am talking about a class 2 or a class 3 cutter.

Mr. Dewar: The primary role for these vessels that I see is more on the enforcement side rather than just establishing presence. As I said, any ship that flies a Canadian flag is adequate to establish Canadian presence and sovereignty over an area.

What I am suggesting in terms of capability is that the ship should be able to operate in loose pack and brash ice with that first-year quality. What one typically finds around the ice margins and in spring time when the flows start to shift, if you were conducting an interdiction operation, is that few commercial vessels would be doing a great rate of knots under those conditions. Therefore, these vessels would be adequate for that purpose. I do not think I would see them as fulfilling any kind of ice-breaking function.

Senator Forrestall: I did not have ice breaking in mind. My question concerned sustainability in the North. That is all.

Of course, global warming may change the pattern of maritime movement significantly in the next 20 to 30 years. If we keep going at the rate we are going, it could be significant. I had that in the back of my mind.

Let me ask you a technical question. What kind of draught would these vessels have?

Mr. Dewar: Typically, a vessel of this size would have a draught of somewhere between five and eight meters, between 15 and 22 feet.

For most naval vessels, the draught is determined by how many protrusions there are in the hull, and, generally, the sonar dome that extends the draught. A vessel with that sort of displacement would typically have a draught in the order of about 15 to 20 feet.

Senator Forrestall: That would restrict it, would it not?

Mr. Dewar: It would, but other craft would be suitable for inshore operations. Shallow water tends to occur fairly close inshore. I think the gap is in exercising an enforcement capability further offshore.

Senator Forrestall: Are you a proponent of low cost or best value?

Mr. Dewar: It depends which hat I have on at the time.

Senator Forrestall: I asked that question facetiously because I want to talk about the size of the helicopter, and it has taken years to have decisions made in that regard.

Mr. Dewar: I will not comment on the helicopter programs. I think you must approach this by clearly defining the requirements and what tasks you want the vessel to execute. I have tried to outline the range of capabilities required, but precision in terms of defining requirements is difficult. Consider, for example, the ability to operate in high sea states. For the Halifax-class ship, very sophisticated numerical parameters were established to be able to quantify the performance of the ship in high sea states. That had everything to do with the amount of exposure of the sonar dome in high sea states, the amount of hull slamming force impacts that the ship had to withstand, and those sorts of considerations. People can become quite sophisticated in doing this.

From my point of view, the practical requirement is the ability to go out there and operate the ship in conditions rougher than the bad guys expect you to be able to do that. That would require pretty sophisticated sea-keeping capability, probably something less than a frigate has, but a good deal more than the Maritime coastal defence vessels have now. It would require more than the smaller Coast Guard vessels have and more than anything the RCMP operates. Some of the fisheries vessels approach the right kinds of sea-keeping capability in this; however, they tend not to be fast enough to be able to execute the kinds of pursuit and enforcement functions that I think this ship should be capable of doing.

Senator Forrestall: How can we achieve all of this on a smaller scale?

Mr. Dewar: I hate to use a cliché, but size matters in this. The ship must have the capability to do the sea keeping required at high speed, particularly in fairly high seas. The cost is not necessarily tied up in the physical dimensions of the ship. Even with warships and commercial ships, the steel the ship is made of is the least expensive part of the ship. The physical dimensions and volume necessary to have the right sea-keeping capabilities is only one aspect.

The real expense of building a ship, which I think is what you are driving at when talking about doing it smaller, has to do with the density and the sophistication of the systems installed on board. I am thinking of the radar, the communications equipment, the weapons and the other equipment.

The type of ship that I am suggesting would have considerably less equipment on board than a warship of similar size, although it would have some similarity to a warship. It would have more density of equipment on board than a typical commercial vessel. The cost issues arise when it comes to the speed of the ship, that is, the propulsion system and the automation that is applied to that aspect of the ship. This includes the weapons, the sensors and that sort of thing. The physical dimensions of the ship are a very small aspect of the total cost.

Senator Forrestall: Let us eliminate three things. On a scale of one to 10, why do we need a ``big,'' to use your word, helicopter?

Mr. Dewar: The reference I made there is to the size of helicopter that the navy typically operates. It is a compatibility issue. Whatever helicopter will replace the Sea King will be about the same size as the Sea King, although perhaps a little bigger or smaller. That is a large helicopter. They are designed to operate in a maritime environment. The helicopters that service oilrigs, for example, they are all comparable in size to the Sea King. Some are considerably bigger. The Coast Guard uses smaller helicopters inshore, and those can be used for support activities. However, they are not designed to operate autonomously a long way from the ship. If you have had the opportunity to fly in a maritime helicopter, you will know you want to be comfortable flying over large areas of water.

Senator Forrestall: We are tending to duplicate the role that is carried out by the navy. As you understand what we are aiming at, do we really need a helicopter? Do we need sonar? Do we need these probes that add another three to four meters to the draught of the ship?

Mr. Dewar: Let us address the issue of helicopters first. Typically, visibility is not always as good when you go to sea and, under those conditions, you may have a number of vessels you are tracking on radar. Sooner or later, and particularly if you are doing law enforcement activity, in order to provide continuity of evidence, you must make a positive identification of the vessel. That means that you have to sight it, get side numbers, and be able to identify it.

Once you have done that, you can maintain continuity of tracking by other means, generally speaking by radar. However, you have to make that specific contact. If you are going to exercise any use of force, it is absolutely essential that you have positive identification of the vessel. Helicopters are absolutely essential in being able to do that.

The other aspect is that a helicopter extends the visible range from a ship by a considerable margin. Typically, the range on maritime helicopters is 150 miles away from the ship. Depending on high the bridge on a vessel is, typically, you can see about 6.5 to 10 miles, so there is a lot to be said for having a helicopter. A lot of utility is involved.

I do not want to address the specifics of the capabilities of the helicopter, other than to say that, being able to operate one that is similar to that which the navy is already operating would seem prudent in this case. Smaller helicopters could operate from a ship, and it could even carry a smaller helicopter of its own, but I think it should provide landing and launching capability for a larger helicopter.

Senator Forrestall: Would you perceive it to be a military vessel?

Mr. Dewar: Do I think that this ought to be operated by the military? Is that the question? If you look at the vessels in the inventory of the government fleets now, the type of vessel we are describing closely resembles the types of vessels operated by the navy. From that point of view, it would minimize some of the training that would be involved. The navy could get some benefit out of it by having the platforms available. However, the real function is that these would essentially be operated like taxis with the navy providing the service, the basic infrastructure commands and the command and control support; and being able to exercise the application of force under the direction of the appropriate government department's jurisdiction.

The navy also has the right infrastructure to support these kinds of vessels in the dockyards on both coasts.

Senator Meighen: Welcome again. I am sorry I missed your first appearance. I heard great reports about it, so I am here tonight, as I did not want to miss the second time around.

I want to pursue the line that Senator Forrestall was exploring with you. Obviously, in this day and age of limited military budgets, $55 million is not inconsiderable. The maritime patrol vessels, from what I know, sound like they are not good for much, other than training reservists and fulfilling a minesweeping function. Is that fair characterization or is it a little sweeping?

Mr. Dewar: I do not think that is a fair observation on the capability of those vessels. In fact, currently, they are operating at sea in excess of 200 days a year and are fulfilling a lot of patrol work, particularly in the absence of a good portion of the frigate and destroyer fleet, which is currently deployed oversees. They can exercise many presence-type functions, in terms of where they go. They do some support work, I believe, in terms of fisheries protection on both coasts. They have picked up a large portion of that role, although they are not particularly well-suited to it, but they are certainly capable of doing it.

In fact, those vessels have been across the Atlantic. They have operated in Europe. They are quite seaworthy vessels and can get from one place to another. In high sea states, they do not get there very fast and it is not a particularly comfortable ride. You would not necessarily want to deploy boarding parties from those ships, but you make do with what you have.

Those vessels are turning in yeoman service at this time. In addition to training reservists, they are also involved in training regular force officers. They conduct some minesweeping exercises, and they do ocean surveys. They are very utilitarian and useful vessels from which the navy and, I think, the Canadian taxpayer are getting very good service.

However, they are not really suited to the kinds of roles that we have been addressing here.

Senator Meighen: I had hoped you would answer along those lines.

They do fulfil a presence function. They are out there.

Mr. Dewar: Yes.

Senator Meighen: You say they are not a good platform from which to launch a boarding party. Why not?

Mr. Dewar: It has to do with the stability of the ship as people are moved on and off of it. I am not sure how familiar you are with the operation of a ship, but a ship will generally try to launch a boat on the lee side. That provides it with some protection from the winds and from the seas. The larger the vessel, the more of a lee it can offer. As well, there is less motion on a large vessel, which means there is less motion alongside it which will affect the smaller boat. That makes it a safer operation if you are loading people into a smaller boat. It is safer to board from a larger vessel.

Typically, with frigates and destroyers, you can conduct boarding operations up to sea state 3 and certainly beyond that, depending on the exact nature of the conditions. I would think it would be very hazardous to conduct a MCDV in that sort of sea state. Sea state 3 typically has three-metre waves.

Senator Meighen: If the frigates are four times the size of the cutters that you are suggesting, what would be the relative size of the maritime patrol vessel to the cutter that you are suggesting?

Mr. Dewar: A maritime coastal defence vessel displaces about 1,000 tons. These would be roughly twice the displacement and somewhere between a third and a half the displacement of a Halifax class ship.

Senator Meighen: My instinct is to applaud and approve what you are suggesting, although there will always be those who will say it is too expensive and, as Senator Forrestall was intimating, they will ask: How can we cut down? If we have the presence factor covered off somewhat, do we absolutely need the vessel that you are suggesting with an ability to stay on station for 30 days?

The answer to that is yes. If you are going to have a vessel with these characteristics, you need the ability to stay out. Even to do something like a fisheries patrol off the nose or the tail of the bank, it takes you a few days to get there. Once you are there, you want to be there for some period of time. Thirty days is a typical number. It could be adjusted one way or the other.

The other detail, apart from the size and endurance of the vessel, relates to the numbers of vessels involved.

Senator Meighen: You were talking about four?

Mr. Dewar: I would say you need somewhere between four and eight.

Senator Meighen: Would those be split between the two coasts?

Mr. Dewar: Yes. If you wanted to employ them in the rivers, you would want a certain number to be available all the time. In that case, you would need three on each coast in order to ensure coverage. Six might be optimum. Somewhere between four and eight is about right.

Senator Meighen: I accept the need for speed, particularly. I accept the fact that, as you said, the size of the vessel does not have as huge an impact on the cost as does the sophistication of the equipment put on it.

On the subject of helicopters, I would agree that a helicopter does increase the range. However, if these vessels are there to investigate and in extremis to stop and board, could they not then call upon the navy — and specifically the navy's helicopters — once the target is identified, and have the navy pick up from that point on?

Mr. Dewar: They could do that if there were an able vessel in the vicinity. Typically, within 100 miles, that could be done, but the vessel would also need the capacity to at least refuel. To my mind, for a ship of this size, it is a false economy not to be able to operate it with a helicopter. I do not think a ship having its own permanent helicopter in the hangar is absolutely necessary, although it would be desirable. The ability to land and take off is key. One of the preferred methods for transporting boarding parties is by helicopter. If it is rough, it is much more pleasant and a drier ride to go in a helicopter than in a small boat.

To my mind, having a ship of this size without the ability to operate a helicopter would be a false economy.

Senator Meighen: You are not necessarily suggesting that each of the four or six ships would have its own dedicated helicopter, are you?

Mr. Dewar: I am talking about the ability to operate with a large helicopter. Would the ship necessarily have a helicopter all the time? No, I do not necessarily think so. Being a naval officer, I think that the more helicopters the better, under any circumstances.

Senator Meighen: I understand. The difficulty we are having now getting them onto our frigates does not give rise to a great deal of confidence, but that is another matter, as you said.

Finally, in referring to your list, ``U.K. Castle Class'' offshore patrol vessel does not mean much to me. I am an unsophisticated individual in terms of various ships' names. Forget for a moment our experience with submarines. If the owners of any of the vessels on this list came forward now and said that they have for sale four wonderful OPVs or Corvettes, that are relatively new, would you go and ``kick the tires,'' to mix a metaphor?

Mr. Dewar: They would have to meet the requirements. I do not think most of these would fit our needs without modification. I said that initially. For example, we could be talking about something on the order of 2,000 tons. The largest of these vessels is the Brunei vessel. I had the privilege of going to Brunei when I was in the navy. I noticed that environmental conditions are considerably different in Brunei than in the waters in which we operate. Would the vessel that is optimized for Brunei be perfectly suitable for operating around the ice margins that we were talking about? I do not think so.

These offshore patrol vessels and cutters are not particularly expensive vessels relative to major war ships. They tend to be optimized for the area in which they will be used. The U.K. vessels that are used for fisheries protection and that sort of activity have tremendous sea-keeping capability, but they are not particularly fast vessels. The vessels are optimized for what you want to do. That is why it is important from the outset to define your requirements and the results you want to achieve with the vessel. Sometimes you can get something pretty close and make it fit, but, if you have to start from scratch, then you have a problem. The key is defining what you want it to do.

Senator Meighen: Finally, did I understand you to say that you have no particular quarrel with the role of the Coast Guard as it is now defined?

Mr. Dewar: I do not think that the Coast Guard has an enforcement function at this time, nor, I would suggest, based on some of the testimony I have heard, do they particularly want one. They do not operate vessels similar to this. The only high-speed vessels they have are relatively small launches for search and rescue activities and some fairly small patrol vessels of less than 30 meters. There is not a lot of weapons-related activity. There is command-and- control information exchanged when in pursuit of another vessel or when compiling a large and complicated maritime picture, such as one wants to do typically when there is an active fleet out on the Banks or off the Queen Charlotte Islands. It takes a large skilled workforce to be able to do that. Duplicating those skills again in a department would not be the most optimum use of the resources.

Senator Atkins: Where would you build them?

Senator Cordy: In Halifax.

Mr. Dewar: That is interesting. The government has looked at shipbuilding policy in Canada. Certainly we have built more sophisticated vessels in Canada. Vessels of this size could be built easily in Halifax, as Senator Cordy said, or at West Coast yards, or even in the lakes or in Saint John. These are not large vessels compared to some of the larger surface combatants that the navy has, nor are they particularly sophisticated vessels.

Senator Atkins: Would you want to go to Asia to build this kind of resource?

Mr. Dewar: I would not, no.

The Chairman: That is, unless you wanted to save 30 per cent.

Senator Atkins: That raises another point. As I understand it, when they built the frigates, there was a notion that this was just building the economy on a regional basis, like in Saint John for New Brunswick and Atlantic Canada. I was also told that a good part of the equipment that went into those ships came from other parts of Canada.

Mr. Dewar: This is a broader topic than I thought I would discuss here, but I am happy to discuss it in general terms.

When money is spent on defence programs in general, if you buy the items offshore, the money stays offshore and you get a product back. If the item is built it in Canada, the money is spent in Canada. Yes, it may cost a bit more, but it circulates in the Canadian economy, and there are industrial offsets that mitigate those sorts of conditions.

The other consideration at the time of the frigate program was establishing some high-tech defence capability in Canada. Lockheed Martin Canada, which has offices in Kanata and Montreal, did the command and control system in that ship and it still supports the command and control systems in the ship. It created a viable business opportunity that went on long after the frigate program was over.

There are a number of good reasons for building the ships in Canada. It is something that is clearly beyond the scope of what I wanted to talk about here. That is a discussion you can have separately from the discussion on the nature of the vessels themselves. They could be built in Canada.

Senator Atkins: How are they powered? It is by diesel?

Mr. Dewar: My recommendation would be diesel, yes.

Senator Atkins: I gleaned from your comments that you are thinking of a minimum of six, which makes sense to me. Would it not require a different type of vessel to operate in rivers and the Great Lakes? What kind of equipment is necessary for that kind of patrolling? We are concerned about security. Do you need the kind of ship or the cutter you are referring to for the kind of duty that would not involve operating in an ocean?

Mr. Dewar: When we were discussing ships in the river, we were talking about the Gulf of St. Lawrence, which is a large chunk of pretty choppy water sometimes. In the rivers and lakes, even the Great Lakes, a vessel like this would probably exceed the requirement. In fact, something like an MCDV would probably be adequate for that.

The other thing to remember is that there is probably less of a direct threat of something impinging on sovereignty in the Great Lakes than there might be on the Atlantic or Pacific.

Senator Atkins: There would be other issues to consider, such as smuggling and drugs.

Mr. Dewar: Again, you are right, and other smaller craft could take care of a problem like that.

Senator Atkins: In terms of training, from what I hear you saying, you are really talking about a navy seaman and naval trained personnel who, at some level, would take advance training that would apply to this kind of duty.

Mr. Dewar: I do not think any specialized training would be required for this. It would be somewhat different in that the ship would be laid out differently. Certainly all of the skill sets necessary to operate a ship like this, including the boarding functions, would exist within the navy's present workforce. No specialized training would be required.

Senator Atkins: However, it is the navy.

Mr. Dewar: I suggested it because they already operate vessels very similar to this. That would be the logical way to proceed. When we discussed whether it could be done by the Coast Guard, if it were deemed appropriate to do it by the Coast Guard, I would say that, yes, it could be done, but you would have to impose a considerable training load and address many issues. The simplest solution is usually the best one. The simplest solution, in my view, would be for the navy to operate these vessels.

Senator Atkins: I do not know what an equivalent helicopter to the Sea King would cost. Senator Forrestall, is it $55 million?

Senator Forrestall: It is a little more than that, I think.

Senator Atkins: When you talk about $55 million for the kind of cutter to which you refer, I do not think that is excessive. It makes sense to me.

Mr. Dewar: For government programs — and I am sure everyone has been through this — there is not necessarily a direct correlation between the number of units you get and the size of the program. For example, on the frigate program, you could not just take the amount of money that was spent and divide it by the number of ships and get the cost per ship, because it included quite a bit of infrastructure. It included spare parts. It included personnel training costs. The entire program included not just the delivery of the ship, that is, the construction of the ship itself.

Senator Atkins: You talk about the necessity for a helicopter, which seems to make sense, but you say we would not need the same number of helicopters as ships.

Mr. Dewar: That was part of the discussion with Senator Meighen about helicopters. In my opinion, it would always be best if the ship had a helicopter with it. Is it absolutely essential? Perhaps not. Do you need one helicopter for each ship? No, because you only need the helicopter when the ship goes to sea, and they are not at sea all the time. You can rotate them. Would it make sense to have them compatible with and similar to the helicopters the navy already operates? Yes, because then you could do some of the trade-offs you were talking about. There are a number of ways to address the problem. The point I would emphasize is that it would be a false economy not to have a helicopter- operating capability in the ship.

Senator Atkins: Thank you for your comments.

Senator Day: Captain, as you can tell, each of us in our questioning is trying to test some of these various recommendations and the assumptions that you were making, and your list of requirements. It seems that we should take a step back and ask: ``What will the role be?'' If we define the role clearly enough, then maybe some of these issues will fall by the wayside.

Are you thinking that we have all the surveillance that we need? Have you included the answer to that question in your analysis? We have the radar, the high-frequency, surface-following radar, and we have satellite surveillance, if we need it, when we want it. We have periodic flights over the area, and we have commercial shipping that is sending out signals on a regular basis. We are able to identify commercial shipping. We know what ships are out there. If you have that, then what we are looking for and what we are likely to interdict is undeclared ships, undeclared vessels, maybe some smaller vessels that are coming in that look suspicious and that might be carrying contraband. There may be an immigration problem with a barge with a bunch of people on it, or that kind of thing.

Have you done any analysis as to what type of vessel we are required to interdict now in the various situations on our West Coast and given the East Coast fisheries issues? Where is the most activity? We are trying to define what we need. Where are the gaps?

Mr. Dewar: You have asked a number of questions there, senator. I will address the first part about surveillance first. Is there am adequate amount of surveillance? I think not, but it is probably progressing along the right lines. There are certain other aspects to consider, and I am sure your report will cover those as will other projects.

The surveillance cues you as to where you want to put a vessel like this for interdiction. I do not think it necessarily changes the characteristics of the ship that you want to go out there and do the job. However, it may determine how many you need. If you are confident enough in your surveillance and you are confident enough that you will never have more than one incident at one time, then you could probably have one ship on each coast.

What governs the nature of the ship is the conditions in the place in which you want it to operate. My experience is off the Queen Charlottes on the West Coast, anywhere in the Gulf of Alaska, off the Grand Banks — basically anywhere in Canadian waters. You ask: How do you define the requirement? One way is by going there. I invite anyone to go for a cruise in mid-winter on the Banks or off the Queen Charlottes. It gives you a pretty good idea of the conditions that will be encountered out there.

Senator Forrestall: We believe you.

Mr. Dewar: That is what I think determines the size of the vessel. Some of the other issues, such as the cost that comes into it, have to do with the sophistication and the density of the systems that you put on board. Does the ship need a radar? Yes, it does. Does it need a three-dimensional radar? That may be a question for debate. Does the ship need a gun? It probably does, if it is going to do some law enforcement. Should that be a 57-millimetre gun or a 76- millimetre gun? That depends on what you want it to do.

As I said from the beginning, getting the requirements right, what you want the ship to do, is the key to economy. As well, you end up with a vessel that will give you the capability that you need.

Senator Day: What I want to get back to is the capability that we need. When you talked about presence, you said that any ship can do that. We are not talking about ships that are out on patrol and creating a presence from a sovereignty point of view. We have other ships out there doing that, flying the Canadian flag. What is the capability we need? Have you done any analysis to determine what, typically, interdictions involve? Do they involve immigration matters? Nowadays, in any particular month of the year, would there be more immigration related matters or more fisheries related matters? What type of activities do we need to do? Once we know what those are, do we not go on to ask: ``What kind of ship could do that job for us?''

Mr. Dewar: There is a substantial historical record on what, typically, the activity has been, whether it was drug interdiction and support to the RCMP, or whether it was support to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. There are standing memoranda of understanding between DFO and the navy as to how many sea days they provide.

What has historically happened in those cases, though, is that, in order to be able to do the kind of patrol work, interdiction, and boarding work offshore and off both coasts, in winter and under rough conditions, you do it with the best ship you have available. Formerly, we did it with the steam-driven destroyers. Now we do it with the Halifax-class ship, when they are available.

It is like cracking a walnut with a sledgehammer when you send a frigate out to do these kind of operations. Is it capable of doing it? You are probably using 5 per cent of the ship's capability to carry those functions.

What we want is a vessel that will do that a little more cost efficiently, with a vessel that the navy would not guard quite as jealously and, therefore, we would have broader interdepartmental cooperation in terms of positioning and use in the ship. We are looking at something that is not going to be deployed elsewhere, as is the current situation, so that the fleet is taxed in meeting its distant obligations. We are filling in the gap with the MCDVs, which are not quite adequate. In an emergency, could you muster up another ship to do it? Yes, you could. Would it be available immediately? That is really the question.

Yes, there is a good historical record on the type of operations that are performed, where they are performed and under what conditions. I have not, perhaps, given enough detail on that. However, the cumulative result of my experience — and I guess I have some intuitive idea — is that it would not take long to document those. The navy and, for that matter, the RCMP, and Fisheries and Oceans can all contribute to answering the questions you are asking.

Senator Day: How often would our people be required to board another ship, as opposed to pulling up alongside and escorting that ship into port, or telling them not to come into one of our ports? As I understand it, that does not happen very frequently here. I recognize, of course, that it happening quite often in the Gulf because we want to examine the cargo. However, that is not the kind of activity that we typically would be involved in here; is that correct?

Mr. Dewar: It does not happen on a regular basis. As to some of the drug enforcement operations, it has been desirable to keep those guys under surveillance and allow them to come closer inshore. That is both because you want to be certain they are in our territorial waters because of jurisdictional issues, and sometimes because that facilitates the use of the resources we have, that is, putting mounted police on board the vessel.

Do we have to do it often? No. Do we need the capability to do it when we do need it? Yes, you do.

Senator Day: Given the assumptions I asked you to make about surveillance, if you had your choice between 12 more Maritime coastal defence vessels manufactured in Saint John or Halifax — or maybe both — and going somewhere and buying four or six of these ships that you have described, which could serve the Canadian needs better?

Mr. Dewar: Again, you are asking me two questions, senator.

Senator Day: At least.

Mr. Dewar: One is: Do I think that there is a gap between the Maritime coastal defence vessel and the frigate in terms of providing a ship that would do this kind of operation? I think the answer to that is, yes. Another question is: Do I think the optimal number would be about six? I think the answer to that is, yes. A further question is: Do I think we should buy them offshore or build them in Canada? That is an entirely different question. There is no reason we could not build these types of ships here in Canada.

Senator Day: Given the type of interdiction that we are typically facing in Canada, could a number of Maritime coastal vessels do the job? I have heard what you have said about heavy seas and wanting a platform for helicopters and that kind of thing, but, given the job that has likely to be done, would it not be better for us to have more of what we already have, as opposed to looking for another class of ship to fill the gap for a function that may or may not have to be performed?

Mr. Dewar: I do not think you need more Maritime coastal defence vessels. For what they do, the number you have is probably about right. These vessels can do something that they cannot do. The Maritime coastal vessels do not do as much as a frigate does. I am sure certain people in the navy would say that we need more of them. However, the reason for my suggestion is that these vessels will provide something that does not exist at the present time. I do not think the solution is more Maritime coastal defence vessels. I think it is a matter of the layers and depth that you want to be able to provide.

Typically, you consider two aspects in any military planning — the most probable case and the most dangerous case. Obviously, you gear your thinking towards the most probable situation, but you cannot afford to fail to consider at the most dangerous situation. The questions we are addressing here is: Is there a gap in our capability? Can technology address it? I think the answer to both questions is, yes. The real debate may be about how many you require. I do not think it is a matter of difference in capability among the different classes of ships that would be required.

Senator Forrestall: Given your career experience with all of the different fleets, of the six vessels how many would you predict would be available for operations at any one time?

Mr. Dewar: If you had six, I believe you could guarantee four would be available at any one time, setting aside any catastrophic and unpredictable incident.

The availability of the Canadian patrol frigate is about 70 or 80 per cent. The problem is, if you have two, you cannot have two available all the time, no matter how good they are, so you need three. As to addressing the most probable or the most dangerous, are you willing to accept that there will be some periods of time when you will only have one? The answer to that may be yes, but that is part of the process that has to be gone through.

Senator Forrestall: Is six an ideal number? What about crews? Maybe it should be seven or eight.

Mr. Dewar: You will probably get different answers on the optimum number. In saying six is because then there would be two available all the time on both coasts. Certainly, with the cuing information we have available to send them to the right spot, we would require three on each coast so that we would be 100 per cent covered. That seems adequate to me.

Senator Cordy: You have certainly done your homework and have provided us with a significant amount of information.

You mentioned in your discussions the concept of a ship within a ship. Could you clarify that and expand on it? Would one part deal with what is currently being done by the Coast Guard and would the other be enforcement?

Mr. Dewar: The ship within a ship concept had to do with providing a small ship with large ship characteristics in terms of sea keeping and speed. To describe it in simple terms, all the functionality of a ship might be contained in something the size of this desk. What makes up the additional volume in the ship is void spaces that are welded boxes that are in a ship to give it larger physical dimensions and a heavier displacement. There is some ballasting. However, it is operated as a smaller vessel still.

You could think of it as fitting a smaller boat inside a bathtub. The bathtub just adds to the dimension, but all the functionality exists in the smaller boat inside. That describes the ship within a ship concept.

Senator Cordy: Therefore you were not referring to as having two different roles.

Mr. Dewar: No, it has to do more with the physical attributes of the ship than the role or function it would perform.

The Chairman: Can you tell us what 25 knots is in relative terms? Is that a fast vessel or a slow vessel? How does it compare to a freighter that is carrying containers or a tanker?

Mr. Dewar: When the B.C. ferry between Vancouver to Victoria is in open water in Georgia Strait it moves at about 18 knots. That is fairly fast. Large container ships will operate at speeds of up to 22 knots for sustained operation. That is close to their maximum speed. It is the nature of the way commercial vessels are operated.

For warships, 25 knots is probably at the low end of what one would find with a Corvette or a frigate.

The Chairman: Could there be another 10 knots on top of that?

Mr. Dewar: The speed of most frigates and destroyers is said to be 30 knots-plus. A lot of that depends on how the power is transmitted into the water from the hull of the ship. To get the right combination of speed and manoeuvrability, for a vessel of about 350 to 400 feet, the optimum speed is about 30 knots for a maximum speed. Beyond that, a large amount of power is required to push it up an extra couple of knots.

To put it in perspective — and I am extrapolating somewhat from my memory here — for our current frigates to do about 20 knots they are probably using something in the order of 25 to 30 per cent of their full power. To get up to 25 knots, they are probably using about 50 per cent of full power. To get to 30 knots, they would have to use 100 per cent. It is an exponential curve in terms of the power required.

The Chairman: With respect to the home base on each coast, would it be desirable to have all three vessels in the same port, or would it be advantageous to have them in different locations?

Mr. Dewar: There is always an advantage in concentrating the infrastructure that is needed. You need one set of tools rather than a number of sets of tools in different places. Most of the maintenance would be done in one place anyway, regardless of what decision was made in that regard.

From the crew point of view, there is no physical reason why, for example, on the West Coast you could not have one home port in Victoria and one in Prince Rupert, for example. There is no reason why you could not have one in Halifax and one in St. John on the East Coast.

The real question concerns the most convenient way of operating and how long it would take the ship to get to a location. To get a ship from Victoria up to the northern end of the Queen Charlotte Islands takes about a day, or a day and a half.

I do not think that home porting is not such an important issue.

The Chairman: That seemed to be the case when you were describing the situation with regard to a commercial ship. I assumed that it would be taken in for an overhaul to Esquimalt or Halifax. What I thought I was hearing you say was that these ships could be based anywhere, and that if we spread them around we would improve their effectiveness.

Mr. Dewar: It is possible to berth them anywhere. You asked about berthing in Quebec City. That certainly could be done. There is probably sufficient infrastructure there to home port the ship. At this point in time, there is probably sufficient infrastructure to home port the ship in Prince Rupert, for example, if there were a reason to do so. Do you necessarily need to home port the ship there in order to be able to provide better response times to different areas? I suppose that could be the case. You could also do it by patrolling in different areas.

I do not see that as being a critical issue, but you might want to consider it. I would suspect the best approach is whatever is the most economical, most convenient and best for the crews.

The Chairman: You described the same paradigm that we have now in terms of this vessel being a platform to transport fisheries officers, environmental officers or the RCMP. Do you see anything inherently wrong with giving police powers to members of the navy to carry out this type of enforcement and eliminate the necessity to bring out the RCMP?

Mr. Dewar: There are two issues involved. The first is perhaps a constitutional issue. I am sure the people on the other side of the table have much more experience in that than I do, but do you really want the armed forces exercising law enforcement functions? That may, perhaps, be acceptable against other nationals but certainly not against Canadian citizens. There are already agencies in place that do that.

Beyond that level of discussion, there is the one of just shear practicality. The last time I was here I mentioned that there had been an exercise at one time in which naval officers were going to be given authority as fisheries protection officers, which meant they were in fact peace officers under a certain narrow set of constraints. The difficulty was that, to most naval officers, one block of frozen fish looked pretty much like another block of frozen fish. A sophisticated set of training and skills is required to exercise that function. To train one set of people to be all things maritime is probably not appropriate because sufficient numbers are already trained in those areas.

Would some cross-training be appropriate? Yes, I think it would. Boarding parties now carry out a number of joint exercises with the RCMP. They can fully support that boarding activity. However, the actual arrest has to be executed by a mounted police officer. They can certainly provide the force and, in fact, the use of the ship's weapons, if it is done by the officer and tactical commander, who would usually be an RCMP inspector in that situation.

The Chairman: At one time there was a fairly significant RCMP maritime component. Could you conceive of the RCMP controlling these assets?

Mr. Dewar: There would certainly be times when they would control the assets. However, I would think you would not want to develop a branch of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to fully man these. In fact, the degree of training an RCMP constable has in order to exercise his responsibilities as a peace officer is considerably different from the investment we put into training an ordinary seaman in the navy, even up to a certain level. RCMP constables are paid at least as well as junior officers in the navy, but there are some economic issues you would want to address that relate to how you would man these vessels. I would think the least expensive option would be to man them with navy personnel.

The Chairman: Captain Dewar, you have been most helpful to the committee this evening. Thank you for appearing before us again. We appreciate the work you have done to provide us with a sense of what would be involved in having this sort of capability off our coasts.

We will now hear from Mr. Gerry Frappier, Director General for Security and Emergency Preparedness, Transport Canada. He is also Chair of the Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group, which seeks to enhance coordination and collaboration among federal departments and agencies involved in marine security. Today he will respond to additional questions sent by the committee to Transport Canada.

I would welcome those who have just joined this hearing of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. Today the committee is hearing testimony on the subject of Canadian maritime security and coastal defence.

For those who wish to familiarize themselves with the background of our committee and its members, may I suggest that you refer to our earlier proceedings today where I outlined the exceptional qualifications and experience of our committee members and the work that has already been completed?

Our next witness this evening will be Mr. Gerry Frappier who last appeared before the committee on April 7 to discuss the activities of the Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group at Transport Canada. Today he will respond to follow-up questions sent by the committee to Transport Canada.

Mr. Frappier, welcome back to the committee. We understand you have a short statement to make but, prior to that, I must inform you of the disappointment the committee has in your not responding to our questions sooner than this and in your not providing this committee with a written transcript of your remarks. We specifically asked for that before you came, and we specifically asked some months ago for these questions to be dealt with before us. I would hope in the course of making your statement you explain why the committee had to experience this delay.

Mr. Gerry Frappier, Director General, Security and Emergency Preparedness and Chair of Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group, Department of Transport: Thank you very much for having me back. As you said, Mr. Chairman, you did send some questions, and we are now prepared to present some answers to those questions. With respect to the dates and times, I am not exactly sure when we got the questions. I would have to look at my notes. I did apologize to the committee clerk. However, I had not realized at the time that you were expecting responses before my appearance before you. I thought your questions were to help me prepare to respond to some of the issues you want to consider, although, as the clerk has pointed out, that is certainly what you did write. There is no good excuse. That is just the position we are now in.

The Chairman: Thank you. Do you have a statement for us now?

Mr. Frappier: The only statement I wanted to make was that I appreciate the opportunity to come back, and I will attempt to clarify these or any other questions that you may have for me, both as Director General of Transport Canada and the chair of the IMSWG.

The Chairman: If I am correct in understanding you, you do not have prepared answers to any of the questions we sent to you?

Mr. Frappier: Yes, I do. You should have them there.

The Chairman: Are you referring to the document that you just passed out?

Mr. Frappier: Yes.

The Chairman: Where are the answers to the questions that you undertook to provide at the hearing on April 7, 2003? Will we find them in this document as well?

Mr. Frappier: Some are in the document in the sense that some of the questions you did send us were tied up in some of the other questions. A few items that you requested are still ongoing with respect to getting them to your committee.

The Chairman: When do you expect that will be?

Mr. Frappier: The main request you had was for a matrix with regard to some of the scenarios, the lead departments associated with them as well as some of the support departments. We have had some difficulty preparing a formalized response package that would be acceptable to send to the committee.

The Chairman: Just so those who are watching the hearings understand, would this matrix we asked for indicate who was in charge of the coasts at various times during different incidents?

Mr. Frappier: We are specifically trying to put together for you some specific scenarios and then, following those scenarios we will outline the details respecting the lead department and the support departments.

The Chairman: At this time, are you, as chair of the working committee, not in a position to answer these questions? Does the government not have answers to these questions?

Mr. Frappier: It is not that we do not have answers to the questions. We can answer the questions asked. However, the Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group is still having discussions as to what would be an appropriate level of detailed scenarios, what level of detail you need, that type of thing. It certainly opens up many avenues for discussion.

The Chairman: If a parliamentary committee requests something on the April 7, how long should it expect to wait before it gets a comprehensive answer?

Mr. Frappier: I am not sure. You might have a better idea of the answer to that question. We are trying to put together a document that involves many departments. The document you are requesting is not one we have on the shelf, so that presents a difficulty.

The Chairman: Can you give this committee a date when we can expect a comprehensive written answer to this question?

Mr. Frappier: I cannot give you a date right now.

The Chairman: Will it be this year?

Mr. Frappier: That would be fair.

Senator Meighen: Good evening, Mr. Frappier. I did not have the pleasure of being here on April 7. However, I have looked at some of the testimony.

The chair referred to the matrix question. The delay in providing that particular answer has to do with, as you have indicated, the fact a number of departments are involved, which I think goes to one of our concerns in this whole area. You will forgive me, but if it takes this long to get an answer to the question of a matrix, Lord knows how long it would take to get an answer to other questions, given the number of departments involved. Clearly, the plethora of departments is, in itself, something of a challenge, if not a difficulty.

Is there any other reason, other than the number of departments, which is causing difficulty on your side? Is there any information that is debateable in your mind as to whether it should be given to this committee?

Mr. Frappier: No, there is none in my mind in that category.

Coming back to your earlier comment, it is important is to differentiate between getting several departments and the various authorities and approvals required to submit a document to a Senate committee versus what I think was implied, which is the ability to respond to various scenarios. There is a response capability. The difficulty is that we do not have a good description, if you like, of the various departments' operational mechanisms and how they interrelate. Creating a document like that is causing the delay.

Senator Meighen: If you will forgive me again, it sounds like we put our finger on a very serious problem. If the departments themselves do not know how they relate to various problems and how they interrelate, then it seems there is cause for concern. This just highlights it.

Others may want to pursue that, but there were two other items that I picked up in addition to the matrix question from the April 7 hearing. One was a request for an explanation regarding how the Department of Transport came to chair the Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group. I do not know whether it is in this list of questions, because I have not had a chance to go through it. If it is, could you point me to it? If it is not, could you tell me how the department came to chair it?

Mr. Frappier: Several of the questions that you have asked go to fundamental mandates of departments and ministers. As an official for the Department of Transport, it is not my place to comment on why certain decisions were made as to who was responsible. When you want to go into what we would call the machinery of government issues, you really must ask other authorities. In particular, you should ask the authority for setting mandates of departments, which is the Prime Minister's authority.

The Chairman: Mr. Frappier, that is precisely why we did not press you for an answer when you were here last time. You undertook to go away and get an answer for us, consulting whomever you had to consult and checking with whomever you had to check. We accepted that response. It is now June 2 now. We accepted this response on April 7. Between April 7 and June 2, is a lot of time for you to do exactly what you said and check with whomever you had to check, to run it up the flagpole to your minister, shoot it over to PCO, talk to anyone you like and send us back an answer in writing. We fully expected you to come back with these answers, because you had had so much notice. You had this opportunity to check with other people.

Mr. Frappier: I think the point is that it is not really within my authority to bring that answer to you. That is the stage we are at.

The Chairman: Whose authority is it?

Mr. Frappier: As I say, if you are looking at the fundamental machinery of government issues, those have to do with the Prime Minister's prerogative and so, in that particular case, I do not know exactly who you would go to.

The Chairman: Why did you undertake to bring us back an answer? Why did you not say, ``This is something I cannot respond to; go somewhere else''? We would not have been waiting since April 7, except for the fact you said you would bring us back an answer.

Senator Meighen: To be fair, Mr. Chairman, in the transcript I have, Mr. Frappier is quoted as saying, ``I am not sure I can answer that fully. You may want to talk to the minister on that.''

The Chairman: Fair enough, and if that answer had come back or we had had a letter from the minister, then I would be satisfied.

Senator Meighen: It sounds as if the question has not been investigated. You are now saying, Mr. Frappier, as I understand it, that you cannot answer it and you are not able or prepared to talk to the minister about it, and that we should do that. Is that correct?

Mr. Frappier: No, I think the substance of my reply is that I certainly cannot answer it.

Senator Meighen: Who could answer it? Are you suggesting the Prime Minister, or perhaps the minister?

Mr. Frappier: I would think those would be the appropriate avenues for honourable senators to pursue.

Senator Meighen: There is one other area that may or may not be included in your responses to the various specific questions. It has to do with your undertaking to provide the committee with written comments showing where the recommendations made in our February and September 2002 reports have been addressed by the Department of Transport. Does that appear in there, or is that another one that you are unable to answer?

Mr. Frappier: At the time, we talked about getting a written response to you on some of those things and, at this point in time, there is a letter being put together that should be coming your way within the next few weeks.

Senator Meighen: On that matter, it is difficult to understand why it was not provided, unless the responses are embarrassing, which they may well be, in terms of not much having been done. What other explanation can there be for it not being able to be completed in the period between April 7 and June 2? The request was to show the responses to various specific recommendations made in our two reports. My mind, which is not necessarily suspicious, concludes that you are having trouble in the department explaining why very little has been done. Is that fair or unfair?

Mr. Frappier: I think that is unfair, because you are implying that we are having difficulty explaining things and that very little has been done. A lot of work has been done and I think the program, as we have it, is not designed around the recommendations that you have made. Therefore, providing a response to the Senate report is something that gets done in a different manner than the work that is ongoing now within the marine security community.

Senator Meighen: That sounds to me like the Queen Mary response: We are going full steam ahead, damn the recommendations. You, in fact, are saying: We are going our way and it does not matter what your recommendations are, because we have a program that does not correspond with your recommendations. The two shall not meet.

It will be interesting to see what this letter that will come our way within a few weeks will say. Will it address some, if not all, of the recommendations made in our report? Alternatively, will it say, ``Sorry, we have our program here; you made your recommendations, and the two are entirely separate and distinct and we are not going comment on your recommendations''?

Mr. Frappier: I think the last government response to your Senate report took the recommendations as general lines of inquiry and considerations that should be thought about and included as we did our policy analysis.

The response, as I remember, was basically a thematic response associated with the areas that you were looking into. It may not link specific recommendations with date lines, because that is more difficult for us.

Senator Meighen: With respect, it sounds like you are not prepared to deal with the recommendations in a systemic way. That is disappointing, to say the least.

Senator Banks: Mr. Frappier, you will already have gathered that we have a degree of disappointment. I do not want to be seen to piling it on, but I will continue along the same line as Senator Meighen. It seems that everyone is going in a different direction. Everyone is saying, ``After you, Alphonse. After you, Gaston.'' It is like trying to nail Jell-O to the wall. We cannot get an answer to our almost-colloquial question: Who is in charge here?

Maybe we are having a semantic argument. I am being tongue-in-cheek here, but we have found that the Coast Guard does not, in the sense that we are talking about, guard the coast. Maritime coastal defence vessels, in the sense that we mean it, do not guard the Maritime coast and they are not defence vessels, neither are they coastal vessels.

You are the Chair of the Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group and the Director General of Security and Emergency Preparedness, yet, you cannot tell us about those things. You cannot or do not respond to us when we ask about those matters. That is leading us into a great deal of frustration. For example, the last three responses to the questions sent to you on May 6 are the same: ``This is outside the scope of my authority.''

You have just told us whose authority covers this scope. You are telling us that we have to talk to the Prime Minister. Is there no one other than the Prime Minister who can tell us about coastal defence? My tongue is still in my cheek, Mr. Frappier, because I know that is not the case.

Maybe we are having a semantic argument. Let me ask a specific question. Maybe I am missing this. On May 6, we asked this question about Transport Canada in question number two. We asked whether you saw Transport Canada as being the lead agency for Maritime security. You said that, yes, Transport Canada is the lead federal agency responsible for marine transportation and Transport Canada is responsible for acts of unlawful interference with the transportation system and the security of the Canadian national transportation system.

Then, a few questions later, it is revealed that the minister who would be in charge in the event of a terrorist threat having to do with any of this would be the Solicitor General, who has no resources to deal with coastal defence or coastal security. That is what we are trying to get at here. That is what is confusing us.

We know what the navy does if someone else's navy comes in and starts shooting at us. They are offshore. We know what happens as soon as an enemy hits the ground; we have an army to look after that. We know that the RCMP has a certain capability to get some small craft into certain places. However, there is what is called the littoral area which, in most other countries, is policed, if I can use that word, by some definable body. Someone is responsible for it. That is the Jell-O that we are trying to nail to the wall here.

Are we barking up the wrong tree when we are asking these questions of the Chair of the Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group and the Director General of Security and Emergency Preparedness — titles which reside in your person? When we ask you questions about who ``stands on guard for thee'' are you the wrong guy?

Mr. Frappier: I understand what you are saying. I certainly can feel the frustration present in the room. There is a point of semantics that should not be overlooked.

Senator Banks: Straighten us out, please.

Mr. Frappier: I will attempt to do that. When you are saying ``marine security,'' much of what you are talking about I would call ``naval defence.'' If another navy were invading the country, then our navy would respond to that. There is a certain clarity that comes from talking about navies fighting navies.

Senator Banks: You are right, but we do know that. Let me give you a scenario-example of what we do not know — and this is why we asked you for another scenario to see what you were considering. What if some bad guy in Rotterdam sends to our country a shipping container that holds a dirty bomb or that had hidden in it some people who ought not to be coming here? If the ship bearing that container comes into a Canadian port and if that bad guy intends to do something bad with whatever is in that container while it is in or on the way to a Canadian port, then who would be in charge? We found out that the Coast Guard is not. The navy is not. The RCMP would like to be but they cannot because they do not have any ships that can go there. To whom do we talk?

I want to make sure that we are not talking about a naval invasion. We know the answer to that question.

Mr. Frappier: I am I trying to show that there is a spectrum associated with marine security. At one extreme, we have what we are calling a naval invasion. At the other extreme, we have things like the provision of regulations associated with the physical security of a port. That is also an important part of marine security, but it is somewhat less exciting as far as scenarios go. Obviously a government must have systems in place to provide all those layers of defence.

Senator Banks: We found the question of port security very exciting and we wrote a report on it that I hope you have read.

Mr. Frappier: I have read it.

My point is that those regulations are also part of marine security as far as the government is involved. It is not surprising that different organizations are doing those two things.

Senator Banks: Of course.

Mr. Frappier: The other dimension is that many of the things we are talking about depend on the specifics. Until the specifics are known, it is not clear whether it is a terrorist incident or an organized-crime incident. Both incidents could involve trying to smuggle things in through containers. The government is organized such that certain agencies and departments look after different dimensions which come together in the term ``marine security.''

In the last example you gave, there are a couple of parts of the government's security associated there. First, there is an intelligence-gathering capability, an intelligence-analysing capability that, hopefully, would have told us something about the item leaving Rotterdam before it even set sail or certainly after it set sail. Certain departments and agencies have responsibility for doing that and are able to study that.

If you are talking about a situation where we know nothing about this container coming in, then the department that generally looks at containers coming in is involved, namely our Customs folks. Customs would have to do inspections for a whole bunch of different things. Do you call those inspections part of the marine security plan? Of course; they are critical to marine security. However, they are also very important with respect to preventing illegal drugs coming in, which you may not consider marine security.

Senator Banks: Yes, we do.

Mr. Frappier: You may, but others may consider that to be something different from marine security. I agree with you that drug detection is part of having good security. It is also the traditional role and maybe the appropriate role — getting back to who should decide — of Customs officials to inspect goods coming into the country. It is not surprising that they would be there.

You also commented that in many other countries, determining who is in charge becomes very easy. I am not sure that I would agree with that, depending on the scenario you look at. I do not think there is a country that does not have a customs department, section or whatever that has some operational requirements to do with customs.

The United States is currently going through a massive reorganization to try to pull together this Department of Homeland Security, which I am sure you have looked at as a model. They are certainly creating a large department that has a lot of the pieces, but it does not have all of the pieces for marine security. As we mentioned before, marine security also includes getting the intelligence that informs you that the container is coming in the first place.

Senator Banks: I can assure you that we are not looking at the Department of Homeland Security as a model. You mentioned a few items that concern us, things which were the reasons behind the questions that we asked you on April 7 about giving us a matrix and a sample of the kind of situations you are talking about so that we can understand in an emergent situation when certain things must come together. It is the coming together of them that concerns us. We are not so concerned about using the Department of Homeland Security as a model because we know we are better than that already. We know that we already have fewer disparate groups to bring together to answer those questions. We just want to know how they work, when they work and who is in charge.

We asked a question on April 7 about when one of these situations occurs, and it would be reasonable to call it an emergency. It does not give me any comfort at all to know that, when we ask a question about how this would work on April 7, we cannot get an answer by June 2, and today we still cannot get an answer. That does not fill me with confidence that we have the capacity to respond to an emergent situation.

I will not ask you another question, but I want to leave you with an indication of the nature of our frustration. The Department of Transport, which you described as being the lead agency for marine transportation, has no in-house intelligence gathering or assessing capability, as you have said in our written answers to us.

Mr. Frappier: No, we do not have an intelligence-gathering capability. We leave that for other intelligence branches. However, we do have an analysing capability.

Senator Banks: The Solicitor General, as I mentioned earlier, has no mechanical means of delivering an enforcement capability.

Mr. Frappier: I am not sure about that. How do you mean that?

Senator Banks: He has no ships available to him.

Mr. Frappier: The RCMP does have some boats.

Senator Banks: They have coastal vehicles, but they cannot go out 12 miles.

Mr. Frappier: They have access to naval ships, as was just mentioned.

Senator Banks: Could you write all these things down and explain to us in that matrix, in an emergent situation — and the choice of scenarios is yours — how this will work? You must have, given your office, compiled a model or a compendium outlining a number of possible scenarios. We would like to know what those are, and what action you have considered, and how all of these agencies — and we are sure they are all very capable people — would come together. We want to be assured that the information and the communication sharing and information sharing between those agencies will work in an emergent situation. That is not a question; it is a statement. Thank you.

Senator Forrestall: I think we should call it a night and ask Mr. Frappier to come back when he is ready to do so, and it should be sooner rather than later. So far, we have made little progress. We have discussing this for three quarters of an hour. Senator Banks is a shy and timid fellow, and would not want to insist on anything.

Mr. Chairman, the information I was looking for is fairly straightforward to address, as was the information requested by Senator Banks. I do not want to have to pick up the phone and call Mr. Frappier's office and ask who is looking after various things. An explanation from him or his officials would clear up any questions about the resources available, for example, to a fishing boat that might be called out. We do not know that. Is it too much to ask when we might have such information?

Mr. Frappier should be in a position to answer some of our questions or to tell us precisely who should be with him to answer our questions. For example, why are you here alone tonight? Are you the only one working tonight? The question is not rhetorical, although it might sound like that. I am seriously concerned. I have not been home for 10 days. I am sure you were home this morning.

Mr. Frappier: Yes, I was.

Senator Forrestall: I was not, and I must say that I do not appreciate sitting here at 9:30 in the evening and achieving nothing. If there is a reason why you cannot talk to us, tell us.

Mr. Frappier: You sent some questions. I am prepared to answer those questions. You are asking whether I believe that there should be changes in the organization of government. I have said those are not questions that I am prepared to answer.

Now you are saying: Prove to us that marine security is organized and that there is communications and so on. I am saying that the marine security area is a complicated one. It involves many departments. We have operational methods. We are using them as we speak on both coasts and in inland waters. That is different from saying you want to have a document submitted to the Senate committee. There are a lot of people who are going to want to make sure that is absolutely correct.

Senator Forrestall: Other colleagues may have questions.

The Chairman: Perhaps before your adjournment motion, I think that Senator Day has a couple of questions.

Senator Day: I do, Mr. Chairman. They are questions of clarification.

Mr. Frappier, I had a chance to read very quickly, as you were giving your answers to my colleague's questions, the answers or partial answers that you have given us in this document. I have two or three questions. It may save time to respond to them now to save some time when you come back, and you will obviously be coming back.

Could you expand on question number 10? You could do it now or later. You say that the Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group reports, as required, to the ADM level public safety committee. Can you expand on ``as required''? Is that when they ask you to report, so you only do so periodically, and how frequently is that? Is there an established time that you report? Do you give a full report? How does that work?

Mr. Frappier: It is the former. It is upon request, or upon our request to have an agenda item on the meeting. The ADM level public safety committee meets frequently. I am not 100 per cent sure, but I think it is monthly or more often than that.

Senator Day: In the past year, how many times have you been asked to go and discuss issues with that committee?

Mr. Frappier: Probably three or four times.

Senator Day: Are all of the ADM-level people members of that committee, or only a smaller, select group?

Mr. Frappier: Not all the ADMs are on the committee, no. It is a smaller group. I do not know off the top of my head whether it is identical, but it is similar to the sort of group of departments that belongs within the marine security world. Again, if you go through who is involved in public safety and marine security, there is a lot of overlap. Certainly, the core departments are overlapped.

Senator Day: Our question was: Is there a senior level committee that meets on a regular basis to address Canadian maritime security issues? You talk about the interdepartmental group.

Mr. Frappier: That is at the director general level.

Senator Day: Yes. You say, periodically, as required, and four times in the last year you talked to an ADM-level public safety committee. Is that correct?

Mr. Frappier: Correct.

Senator Day: Is that your full answer to that question?

Mr. Frappier: That is our answer as we have it there. You are talked about Canadian maritime security issues, and it is a committee that just deals with those. The highest-level committee within the Government of Canada that looks specifically at Canadian maritime security is the Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group. There are other senior levels, more senior levels, if that is what you are asking. That is why I put the ADM level at level one. We also have the deputy ministers' committee, which is associated with supporting the public safety and anti-terrorism committee, which also has a ministerial group headed by the Deputy Prime Minister.

More senior committees are overseeing things. As far as dealing with, on a regular basis, marine security, IMSWG is the highest-level committee.

Senator Day: You were turning our questions and responding about committees that meet on a regular basis. You were turning on that point.

Mr. Frappier: Those that meet on a regular basis, yes, but I also considered those with a specific focus on marine security. There are not many. There is, of course, the IMSWG.

Senator Day: It would be helpful if you could give us a list of all the committees and groups that are dealing with marine security so that we do not miss something. If you could expand on that answer for us, it would be helpful.

While you are making notes, there are a couple of points that I would like you to consider. Concerning question no. 15, the fourth bullet, you end the question with: ``See attached list of...'' The sentence was not completed. Could you finish that up for us and then tell us what list you were talking about?

Mr. Frappier: These were prepared for me. The attached list is the list that was given to you during my last presentation. It was more of a reminder to myself.

Senator Day: This was your reminder, not ours.

Mr. Frappier: That is right. It should not have appeared on yours. The slide I had last time I was here was ``new marine security enhancements initiatives'' and the seven themes associated with that.

Senator Day: I understand that now. We have that.

On the next page of your response, question 16, bullet 2, you say: ``(Note: can be provided to the Committee if requested).'' Is that a note from you, if we happen to request it? If so, could we have it?

Mr. Frappier: Yes, to both of those. The ISPS Code was an area I thought you might want to pursue. The ISPS Code is a formal code out of the International Maritime Organization. Because it is going to become such an important code across the country, Transport Canada has put together a helpful publication of 10 pages or so.

Senator Day: ISPS Code stands for International Ship and Port Facility Security Code; is that correct?

Mr. Frappier: Correct.

Senator Day: Has that been implemented or will it be implemented?

Mr. Frappier: Part of the initiative that we are undertaking currently is to implement that. The code itself was agreed upon at the last diplomatic conference of the IMO held last December. We were a pretty serious player in developing the code. At that point in time, Canada committed to implementing that code. As a matter of fact, that is why I could not make it here to appear before you the last time you asked me to come. I was in Halifax explaining the code to some of the stakeholders. We are developing regulations that will make the code a requirement.

Senator Day: Presumably when we get this publication that you are going to produce to us, we will understand the difference between the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code and the Automatic Identification System.

Mr. Frappier: Yes. I can give you that in a short time. The AIS system is essentially a ship borne system. It is an instrument that is put on the ship and it will automatically transmit information about that ship.

Senator Banks: Do you mean information such as its direction and its speed?

Mr. Frappier: Yes, and its identification. Information of that nature will be transmitted.

The Coast Guard will be putting in place the shore-based component of the AIS, if you like. What you have now is a ship transmitting not quite continuously, but once every few minutes and the information is picked up on shore by the Coast Guard. They then can keep track of who is where and they will know where a ship is headed.

The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code is completely different but it does have a requirement that you shall have AIS. In that sense, there is a linkage. It is associated more with the new regulations that will be put in place with respect to how to design security around port facilities; how to design security within the ship; and make it mandatory for ships to have plans that show how they are going to do that.

It will then mandate how the international community, both shipping and port facilities, will communicate with each other as they approach. Both port facilities and ships will always be at three security levels. As a ship approaches the port, there is a protocol for communication to ensure that the level of security required by the ship can be given by the port, or the level of security required by the port can be given to the ship. We have developed protocols for how to do that.

Senator Day: You indicate that the International Ship and Port Facility Code will be implemented.

Mr. Frappier: Yes.

Senator Day: Could you tell me, first, is the AIS already in place? Are ships sending signals out now?

Mr. Frappier: It is not a requirement, but it will be. They are just starting to do that. The Great Lakes have started to have it. Within the next year and a half, all IMO-registered ships will be required to have it. We are just kicking off our stakeholder consultation across the country now concerning the ISPS Code. We expect to have the regulations in place requiring that to be done by the spring of next year.

Senator Day: Is the ISPS in conjunction with any other countries, the United States, European countries?

Mr. Frappier: All IMO countries, which is certainly all countries that have ports or ships have agreed on a time frame. We have had a lot of interaction, and that has been sponsored, mostly, by the U.S. Coast Guard.

Senator Day: To each of our last three questions you responded by saying that this was outside the scope of your authority. You suggested we go talk to the Prime Minister. In each question, we asked you for your opinion. Are you telling us that it is outside your scope of authority to have or give an opinion on some of these issues?

Mr. Frappier: Correct.

Senator Day: I will look forward to having a chance to read this more thoroughly and visiting with you again in due course.

Senator Banks: Did you just say that it is outside the scope of your authority to have an opinion about these things?

Mr. Frappier: I was interpreting that to mean: ``to give an opinion.'' I am sorry.

Senator Banks: Since you are the director general, I hope that you have an opinion, Mr. Frappier.

Mr. Frappier: I certainly have opinions, yes.

Senator Banks: In question number 15, the third bullet, you are asked whether the goal of the group you chair, the Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group, is to establish a national marine security policy. Your answer was, no, an integrated national marine security policy is not presently one of the goals of the committee that you chair. Do you know whether an integrated national marine security policy is presently the goal of any department or body?

Mr. Frappier: This may be another semantic item. I do not know of anyone right now who is developing a national marine security policy that will be signed off as a policy and that will encompass — which is what I think you are making reference to — all the departments and all the different aspects of marine security. Currently, the structure is that individual ministers have certain mandated responsibilities and they would be expected to have their policies in place for those mandated areas. Therefore the role of the IMSWG is to ensure that those separate policies work well together and, in particular, do not conflict with each other so that, in the case of an emergent situation, as you called it, but even just with respect to programs, there is not interference between the different departments.

As far as producing a marine security policy that integrates all of those other policies, I do not know of anyone who does that now. I believe it would be us who would be doing it, if anyone were.

Senator Banks: I think, Mr. Frappier, that in some respects, and in respect of your answer to some of our questions, that you are exactly the right guy to whom we should ask those questions, so maybe we do have a semantic problem. Perhaps we have failed to clearly identify what we mean when we say ``marine security.'' Maybe no one is thinking of it in the same breadth of context that we are thinking of it. We may not have made ourselves clear.

Thank you, Mr. Frappier, for the answers to the questions.

Senator Forrestall: Mr. Chairman, we have some problems here. Might I suggest that we adjourn this session and continue in camera in the next room so we might further discuss the items on the agenda, as well as this impasse?

I wish to thank Mr. Frappier for coming. We hope when he comes back he can answer some of our questions, or tell us where to get authority. We might be able to do that, I do not know, but it seems to me it is a waste of your valuable time and a waste of our time to sit here having a little tête-à-tête. We are not learning anything, you are not learning anything, and so I move that the committee adjourn and continue in camera, unless there are other comments.

The Chairman: Is the committee comfortable with that?

Thank you, Mr. Frappier, we will be asking you to return.

Mr. Frappier: Perhaps I could make one comment. From the perspective of being a director general responsible for security, I have a very good knowledge of how marine security in broad terms is being run and I can go into a lot of depth with you as to the different interfaces going on and whatnot. When it comes to commenting on whether the design of the government right now is an appropriate design to optimize marine security or to move into the new era we are entering or that we are in with respect to marine security, puts me, as a public servant, at a considerable disadvantage. Therefore, if you really are going to go into machinery of government issues then it is probably not going to be helpful to put those questions to me.

The Chairman: We have not actually gone into machinery of government issues. We have asked you to outline a matrix of potential incidents off the coast of Canada, with the lead and support organizations and relationships, if any, and the existing policies for reference. We have asked you to describe what you are supposed to know about now. We have not asked to you redesign anything. We have not asked you to say whether it is good, bad or indifferent. We have asked you to tell us how it works. That is precisely what you said you would answer for us back on April 7.

Having said that, I would like to thank you for coming tonight. I want to put you on notice that you will be asked back again before the committee and we will be pursuing these questions again.

To our public who are watching on television, if you have any comments, please visit our Web site by going to www.sen-sec.ca. We post witness testimony as well as confirmed hearing schedules. Otherwise you may contact the clerk of the committee by calling 1-800-267-7362 for further information or assistance in contacting members of the committee.

This meeting is adjourned and will continue in camera in the next room.

The committee continued in camera.