Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Social Affairs, Science and Technology
Issue 22 - Evidence for October 1, 2003
OTTAWA, Wednesday, October 1, 2003
The Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology met this day at 3:50 p.m. to study the
infrastructure and governance of the public health system in Canada, as well as on Canada's ability to respond to
public health emergencies arising from outbreaks of infectious disease.
Senator Marjory LeBreton (Deputy Chairman) in the Chair.
The Deputy Chairman: Honourable senators, I welcome our witnesses today from the Canadian Public Health
Association, Dr. Christina Mills, and from the University of Ottawa, Dr. Joseph Losos. Dr. Mills, please proceed.
Dr. Christina Mills, President, Canadian Public Health Association: Thank you for inviting me here today to speak
on behalf of the Canadian Public Health Association. As you may be aware, the Canadian Public Health Association,
CPHA, is a national, non-profit, voluntary organization with a broad membership from many professions and areas of
interest. For nearly 100 years, we have been in the forefront of efforts to promote health and prevent disease in
Canada. Our members include the public health professionals whose daily work protects and promotes the health of
Canadians, ensuring drinking water safety and safe foods, preventing infectious disease through immunization,
promoting health through education and advocacy for policy change — seat belt legislation, bicycle helmets, tobacco
reduction, et cetera. We work in partnership with individuals and organizations in many sectors. I understand that,
tomorrow, you will hear from the Canadian Coalition for Public Health in the 21st century, which was convened by
Among the many achievements of public health in the past century are the eradication of smallpox; elimination of
polio; control of the many vaccine-preventable diseases; declines in motor vehicle fatalities, thanks to seat belts and
safety seats; and reductions in drinking and driving. However, perhaps we have been a little complacent about some of
these successes and in our zeal to cut deficits and protect access to necessary treatment services, we have neglected
public health. The just-in-time mentality has left us with empty warehouses in our time of need.
We have neglected public health and are now seeing the consequences in under staffing, lack of surveillance and
communication systems and lack of a surge capacity when we see threats such as SARS. The tragedies of SARS,
Walkerton and the Battlefords are the wake-up call. We must act to strengthen the public health system as a whole and
we must do it now.
There will be no quick fixes for this. Canada cannot prevent SARS or whatever infectious disease outbreak comes
next by cherry-picking a few recommendations from among the myriad that you are bound to hear at this table.
Prevention is a fundamental precondition of sustainability and unless we pay more attention to prevention, the best
treatment system in the world will eventually be overwhelmed by rising demand.
In our written brief, we describe some of benefits of prevention in terms of health outcomes, savings to the treatment
system in indirect costs and examples from immunization and chronic disease prevention. I will not speak to that in
detail because I want to emphasize now that to realize these benefits, we urgently need to develop system capacity. We
need to prepare for the future by planning and investing now with an immediate and substantial investment in the front
lines of public health in the current system. To give you an idea of the scope of the gap, we are suggesting $1 billion.
In the mid-term, we would gradually increase the proportion of health spending dedicated to public health so that it
doubles over five years from — estimates currently vary from less than 2 per cent up to 4 per cent. The Canadian
Institute for Health Information, CIHI, has acknowledged that our systems, which identify the amount spent on public
health, are in bad need of an investment.
Part of this increase in public health spending should be directed to a coherent public health human resource
strategy, one that would explicitly address training, recruitment and retention needs for a broad range of the disciplines
needed for public health. The first ministers recognized the need for a health human resource strategy in the 2000
accord, and again last February, as did the Romanow commission. Public health human resources need to be explicitly
addressed within any national health human resource strategy. We have not observed that the needs for public health
human resources have been adequately considered in any of the proposals to date.
It is important to note that we would not be starting from zero. We have many existing elements, much strength and
a great deal of expertise but we need to consolidate and build and expand on those. We recommend, therefore, the
creation of a national, independent public health agency that would be at arm's length from government and report to
Parliament through the Minister of Health. Dr. Losos will speak in more detail to the desirable characteristics and
advantages of such an agency that would be headed by a national public health officer — a national focal point for
public health expertise and leadership — which is so badly needed.
Along with these, we need legislative reform to modernize and harmonize the existing regulatory patchwork that
sometimes acts more as a hindrance than help to ordinary public health operations, let alone emergencies such as
We need new funding and reporting mechanisms to ensure accountability to Canadians for the investment of their
tax dollars. The return on their investment would be improved health and well-being. We need surveillance and other
information systems to ensure that those who need information for decision-making get that information when they
need it and not with the advantage of hindsight. We need communication systems and protocols so that the system acts
as a smoothly coordinated whole in critical times.
If we learned anything from the SARS experience, I hope we learned that jurisdictional turf cannot and must not be
allowed to block the road to public health. Mr. Romanow heard that message loudly and clearly. Canadians are fed up
with federal/provincial/territorial wrangling. They do not care whose job it is, they just want it done.
There is one indisputable role of the federal government in this — leadership. Leadership can be exercised in many
ways. For example, it can be accomplished through your own choices about how health decisions are made in the
public service workforce and within your ranks. It can be accomplished through using your financial powers in
targeting transfers to specific public health functions so that Canadians health is protected in all provinces. It can be
accomplished by collaboratively leading a process to develop, together with partners in other jurisdictions and sectors,
a comprehensive set of strategies to address the gamut of public health challenges facing Canadians and to ensure a
system that can meet the challenges of tomorrow. I think Canadians expect and deserve no less from their federal
After Dr. Losos speaks, I will be happy to answer your questions.
The Deputy Chairman: Dr. Losos, please proceed.
Dr. Joseph Losos, Director, Institute of Population Health, University of Ottawa: Thank you, it is an honour to be
invited to address these hearings.
Honourable senators, Canada's public health system has evolved over decades of success through immunization
programs and numerous disease control and response activities. As a result, Canada's state of health and well-being is
among the best in the world — not in all indices, but in very many. However, it is vital to note that our system of
human public health and health in general was addressed in the Constitution. It evolved, in large part, as provincial
responsibility, shifting gradually over the decades to investment in the health care system, as opposed to public health.
The public health system was designed for decades past. Although it is certainly true that adjustments and
improvements have been made over time, it is a long-standing system.
The SARS outbreak demonstrated two main issues to us. The dedication of our public health officials and workers
was exemplary, and jurisdictions did absolutely the best they could with the machinery they had to work with. The
second observation is that our capacity in a globalized world is now too limited in a number of ways. I would like to go
into these a little bit.
Globalization dictates that quick travel by anyone in the world can happen within hours. Transmission rates of
infection occur beyond our previous comprehension; we saw that in the AIDS epidemic. Global commerce dictates
food outbreaks occur from the same source across continents simultaneously, and that has never happened before.
Ecosystems have been changed and are degrading, causing everything from Lyme disease to similar types of outbreaks,
with the migration north now of vectors of horrible viruses such as West Nile.
Behavioural change: migration into cities and away from rural areas, the mixing of cultures and change in cultural
values because of urbanization add to that kind of behavioural change, and changes our very approach to diseases.
There is also the evolution of microbial adversaries, such as the emergence of pathogens, as we saw in SARS, and
antibiotic resistance, with which we are all too familiar, as it increases.
Public health is an effective, silent sentinel for health, but we cannot remain with 13 largely fragmented jurisdictions.
The public expects and demands effective public health, and public health seems to become visible only when things go
It is not, in my view, that we must be transformative because we have not worked hard enough, or because
historically our systems have failed. I do not believe that is true. We must change because we must not try to anticipate
and manage 21st century globalized problems, such as SARS, with systems designed decades ago. It really is time for us
to upgrade these. We cannot stop at involving only the health sector, but must include other sectors such as agriculture,
environment, the Department of National Defence as far as operations are concerned — there is no one more efficient
— and other sectors.
Public health by definition is multi-sectoral and we must be multi-sectoral. We cannot rely on one department, one
sector, in order to respond. If we do, in my opinion, we will be doomed.
In my written brief to this committee, which is short, I have outlined my vision of what a world-class system needs. I
do not know if it has been handed out, but it is a quick read, honourable senators. I believe that we need an agency or a
governance position of some kind like that, outside of a direct departmental reporting relationship, because of the
flexibility it gives — flexibility in leadership, as Dr. Mills has suggested, in decision making, so that decision making
can be quick and not rely on a series or steps of permission giving. Management systems in such a governance model
are much more flexible, and one can be much more competitive for the type of scientists that one will need.
Also, for planning purposes, an agency such as this would not be bound to the planning cycles of the government
systems that exist, but could plan for longer term risks such as chronic diseases of 15 or 20 years. That is difficult in
today's system. An agency would be able to mount a quick response and would be able to coordinate communication
as is necessary, and I will come back to that in a second.
It needs primacy of the federal minister. There is no question that this agency must report to Parliament through the
Minister of Health — or to the Minister of Health, if that is what this committee recommends. There must be
harmonization of legislation and infrastructure with the provinces and other partners. However, at the same time as we
do this harmonization, there must be an ability for this commissioner or director, whatever we end up calling it, to act
nationally by the power of legislation when that is needed.
With this legislation, there needs to be a flexibility to manage locally. We have excellent institutions in some of the
provinces. The National Institute for Public Health in Quebec is exemplary; we have the B.C. Centre for Disease
Control, which is a really interesting mix of academia and governmental capacity. We must allow those capacities to be
part of a network, or a coordinated system, that is this public health network that we are talking about.
I suggest that the commissioner should be a public health professional, and that that professional run this and lead
this agency and be accountable for the performance of this agency to the minister and to Parliament. I was on the
scientific advisory board of the National Center for Infectious Diseases of the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, CDC, for nine years, and health professionals run all of their programs. Throughout the system, they have
a lot of MBAs who actually make things work and balance the books and do everything managerial that it takes, but
there is no question that the thinking and the direction and leadership comes from health professionals.
We must increase the development of more experts and a surge capacity in Canada so we can respond to greater
threats, or multiple threats if they occur. We saw in the SARS epidemic that we were virtually on the edge just with one
outbreak. If we would have had two, the people on the front lines tell me we would not have been able to handle it. It is
vitally important that we have professional communication coordinated by the commissioner or by this agency for
correct, consistent messages for credibility with the public, which is vital; for the professionals, so that the message goes
out consistently; and for international partners, who expect this of us constantly.
Honourable senators, at this time I will stop and answer any questions that you may have.
The Chairman: May I say to the witnesses and committee that I was speaking in Niagara Falls this morning to a
coalition of four major mental health groups, and the question and answer period went so long I missed my plane,
which is why I am here late.
Senator Roche: I thank the witnesses for a very stimulating presentation.
Dr. Mills, you drew our attention, as others have also, to the need for a Canadian public health agency. How do you
see the agency being operated in a jurisdictional way? You said, Dr. Mills, that it should report to Parliament. I am
wondering how you see it in relation to the provinces. I will leave that as an open-ended question before I pursue some
Ms. Mills: I agree with Dr. Losos that we need a national public health leadership focus. In certain situations it will
be necessary to have the legislative underpinning so that there will be sort of a command and control function for a
public health emergency. That function would be supported by legislation so that it had the power to actually set into
place a train of events to respond to emergencies. I do not think it can be a multi-jurisdictional entity. It must be a
national entity, but there also must be agreements and protocols with the provincial jurisdictions so that it functions as
a networked system. I do not think Canadians expect or hope for some kind of monolithic thing that will be the be-all
and end-all and be able to have every single function brought inside. However, there must be some way of harmonizing
and coordinating the elements that we already do have, and adding what is needed. We need sort of a mandated or
regulatory glue to hold the system together as a networked, coherent system.
Senator Roche: You talked about harmonizing and coordinating, and I certainly agree, but the history of the
relationship between the federal government and the provincial governments is anything but harmonious and
I would like to pursue my question by taking up Dr. Losos' points. When you talked about 13 fragmented
jurisdictions being incompatible with the needs of globalization in the 21st century, I think you hit it right on. You said
that the system that we are operating under was designed decades ago and is not satisfactory to deal with 21st century
globalization questions of health. SARS was a dramatic example. You added that the public health agency should be
under the primacy of a federal minister.
I want you to know, Dr. Losos, that I agree completely with every word you said, but I come from the province of
Alberta and not everyone in Alberta, including important officials of the Government of Alberta, agrees with you and
me. We have to figure out a way to get a public health agency that will be satisfactory in the sense that it can deal from
a federally led capacity with 21st century globalization, while at the same time we are entrenched in the results of the
Constitution a century ago. Will we have to change the Constitution of Canada to adequately deal with the problem of
federally led public health supervision in the modern era?
Dr. Losos: The type of governance model that I have been thinking about is represented by the Canadian Institutes
of Health Research, CIHR. It is an executive agency of Health Canada, so it is in the orbit of the Minister of Health. It
reports to Parliament through the Minister of Health, but it has the flexibility of running the whole academic research
machinery according to its own strategic planning and is not taken up by the planning cycles or the time frames of the
It is also very important, and CIHR does it, to mobilize the very considerable provincial infrastructure that Dr.
Mills alluded to earlier — the B.C. Centre for Disease Control and the public health machinery of the provinces.
Where that might be weak, or where that might need supplementation, then I think that it really calls upon a minister
with primacy and selected investment to augment that capacity, such as in the Atlantic provinces, perhaps. Whether
Alberta is or is not self-sufficient, I am not directly aware nor would I want to comment, but we have in Canada a very
sizeable capacity. The problem is that it is not coordinated, and it has been relying on consensus coordination for
decades, and that does not work. They may like me today, but tomorrow they might not, and we cannot leave the
importance of the public health of Canadians to that level.
I draw your attention to the technical analysis done by the Canadian Medical Association in their brief to the
Naylor committee. They actually did a review of the legislation, and they come to the conclusion that without opening
the Constitution, which would be, of course, almost a non-starter, there are enough legislative tools on the table that
this could happen. You would have local response where that was necessary or logical. However, when it reached a
certain level — interprovincial, national, or the potential for national or international spread — that is when the new
legislation would come in.
I also draw your attention to the documents that have just been circulated by Health Canada on the consultation on
the Health Protection Act, where they have actually added several very important variables. These are excellent
documents, in my view. They will consult on whether we should have national surveillance under the legislation that we
have. They feel that they can do it without opening the Constitution. Should we have a national research priority
setting agenda? They think they can do it. Should we have an emergency response mechanism with the present
legislation? They can do it.
Senator Roche: I hope you are right in the expression of your optimism. I do not want to pour cold water on it
because I think you are headed in the right direction, but you talked about consensus coordination as the way to move
ahead. We now have a pragmatic that we are facing in which Alberta and British Columbia, the governments of those
two powerful provinces, are going together in a semi-structural manner to deal with Ottawa on these questions of, inter
alia, health. They take the position that because they have the responsibility of spending huge amounts of money on
health, they want to have responsibility also in determining how that money is to be spent. That brings us back to this
constant conflict we have between Ottawa and the provinces. Our committee recommended a national body, and it
cannot get off the ground because of this wrangling. You and Dr. Mills point to the need of this. We know the need of
it. However, I am still at a loss to figure out how we will be able to implement a national council to cope with 21st
century crises in the present constitutional set-up that we have in Canada at a time when the provinces are escalating
their demands for control. This seems to me to bring us into even more conflict. I am not quite sure how it will all play
Dr. Losos: I will answer that question directly. I am sorry, senator, but I omitted one part of my answer. I think this
entity/agency must have a board that includes the provinces.
Senator Roche: They want majority control on the board.
Dr. Losos: That may have to be the reality because of the capacity that they have and the amount of expenditures.
Senator Roche: If it were a reality, how would the federal minister have primacy of jurisdiction?
Dr. Losos: I would urge a look at the Canadian Medical Association's analysis of the legislation. Once it got to a
certain level of risk to the country, then the primacy of the federal minister would have to come into play. The majority
of the daily activities would be handled effectively by the local capacities, as they are today. If an issue arose of
international import or interprovincial import, then the legislation would kick in. They have a five-tiered response
mechanism. The first two tiers are local and then the more serious responses would occur. Without question, the
provinces would have to be major players.
Ms. Mills: I would not want to minimize the hurdles for this, but there is a precedent, or at least there is a ray of
hope. There is such a thing as a Chief Veterinary Officer for Canada who has certain powers. I do not know if this is a
proper legal term but, in certain situations, this office has peremptory powers that span provincial boundaries. If there
is a problem with an animal-health outbreak, this Chief Veterinary Officer can put into train actions that have weight
with the provinces. The constitutional considerations have not been a barrier to that happening for veterinary health. I
do not think we can allow them to be an insuperable barrier to human health.
Senator Roche: If the national agency or, as you call it, the national public health agency, had been operating in
force at the time of the SARS outbreak, how would SARS have been handled any differently than it was? Would the
creation of such an agency, operated in the manner in which you have described, have alleviated some of the distress
over the SARS incident?
Dr. Losos: In my opinion, senator, the data would have been shared automatically because this was an
interprovincial and international incident. The commissioner — for lack of a better word and if you would allow me to
use that word — would have been in charge. Outbreak investigation teams would have offered to go and perhaps
would have been promulgated to go and manage the outbreak in Toronto. They would have helped in Vancouver. The
communications would have been far better coordinated, not only within the country but also with the World Health
Organization where everyone had different case definitions. The agency and the commissioner would have brought all
of this together.
The research capacity of the country would have been much better coordinated. There is no reason why the
Canadian Institutes of Health Research, for example, should have to wait for requests for applications two or three
months later. With Henry Friesen, the previous president of the Medical Research Council of Canada, the antecedent
of Canadian Institutes for Health Research, we actually talked one time about setting up an emergency fund where
Health Canada and CIHR, and perhaps a few others, would put in a pot of money, several tens of millions of dollars.
The turn-around time for requests for applications would be quick. The questions would be promulgated: We want a
screening test on this pathogen and we want a screening test for blood and we want those as soon as you can possibly
That is not the regular daily business of large organizations such as CIHR, but the coordination of the research
machinery, either the public health research machinery of departments, the academic research machinery, the National
Research Council Canada or even perhaps private industry, could be mobilized under the auspices of an agency like
this, brought together and, within a very short period of time, you would have the best shot at an answer that one
In the AIDS epidemic, we waited and waited until LaMontagne or the National Institutes of Health, NIH, one of
those two came up with a test. It is still unclear who actually came up with it. We had to wait for that, and there is no
reason with the amount of capacity this country has in research capability that we cannot adjust to emergency
situations like this.
Senator Morin: Dr. Mills, the Canadian Public Health Association, if I understand correctly, is a voluntary
association that would involve most professionals. Do you have within your association people who are not involved in
the field or who are not professionals?
Ms. Mills: Definitely. In fact, the past-president of one of our territorial branch associations is a clerk in the
Department of the Environment in Whitehorse. I would not say it is a huge proportion of our membership, but, yes, we
have people who share the aspirations and values of the association.
Senator Morin: Do you see your association as having a role in engaging the public decision-makers? Since I have
been in politics for three years, I realize that excellent causes can exist but if there is no public support and if the
decisions-makers are not engaged, excellent decisions cannot be made. We constantly see the Heart and Stroke
Foundation and other organizations like that here on the hill. Does your association have something similar to that?
Ms. Mills: Are you referring to a broad outreach strategy to the public?
Senator Morin: Yes, and I refer to decision-makers, whether provincial or federal or municipal.
Ms. Mills: I do not know how much background to give, but our association has some of the same federal-
provincial tensions that our government has. Our board consists of nationally elected members and of the presidents of
the provincial and territorial branch associations. Those are autonomous associations and their presidents are on our
board ex officio. We constantly must balance the big national picture with the needs of the provincial and territorial
branch associations who often have much fewer resources.
We usually have a strategy to advocate at the national level to federal bodies, whether health, environment, finance,
whatever. We ask our provincial-territorial branch associations to advocate in their own jurisdictions with their own
governments and also to educate their own members. We try to help them to build capacity to do that in their own
areas so that there is kind of an upward ferment in the provinces as well as a national advocacy approach.
Senator Morin: I do not want to get into the mechanics of it, but public health is an extremely important field that
has been neglected over the years; there is no doubt about that. The results are seen with SARS and so on. Some of that
neglect is the fault of politicians, but how much is the fault of the people in the field who themselves perhaps did not
promote the cause as other organizations have? That is the question. I am not saying that is so but I think your
organization should look at that.
I would like to turn to the financial part of your brief and the amount of $1 billion, which is a great deal of money.
Where does that money come from at the national level? You based that amount on the CDC's budget, if I understand
correctly, at page 9.
Dr. Mills: Yes, it is a rule of thumb to estimate the scope of that.
Senator Morin: How much are we spending at present? The $1 billion that you talk about is not new money and the
federal government is already spending some. How much of the recommended amount of $1 billion would be new
Dr. Mills: As I alluded to earlier, the Canadian Institute of Health Information, CIHI, has acknowledged that it is
difficult to tease out what is actually spent on public health versus the amount that is spent on other health
administration. It is not a separate line item in provincial budgets; it is grouped under the general term
``administration.'' The actual amounts are not available to us.
Senator Morin: It is difficult for us to recommend additional resources if we do not know, because you do not know,
the division of spending. It is difficult for us to help. That is an important exercise. An amount of $2.5 billion has been
floated around as the total amount spent on public health in Canada. The same remark applies to the $1 billion that
you recommend at the local level.
As you know, most provinces are unable to spend that. It has been recommended that the federal government
should fund this indirectly with flow-through funds. Again, where did you get the figure of 1$ billion?
Dr. Mills: We deliberately chose an amount to get your attention to illustrate the scale of the gap. The figure is not
based on an economic study but rather on anecdotal information from people in the provinces about the kinds of
challenges they face. A study was done for the conference of deputy ministers of health a few years ago that took
almost three years to complete. They did not come up with satisfactory numbers about the total amount of spending.
Certainly, with our resources we would not be able to undertake such a study.
Senator Morin: Someone somewhere should be able to provide us with the answer to that. You are recommending
additional resources and so we should have a clear idea of what is needed and how much. I think that is important.
Perhaps you or someone else could help us with that.
Dr. Losos, I have two short questions. In the last paragraph of your brief you said that in your view, the governance
model is more suitable for Canada than a replica CDC. Could you tell us how different this model would be?
Dr. Losos: I will begin with CDC, which I know well. CDC is successful because of its 40 years of credibility. When
we have credibility problems in the public's view and in the media, the public goes to the CDC in the United States and
asks questions. CDC replies that there is no problem and there is not a word in the media. They have built a lot of
credibility over their 40 years; it was not done in a crisis.
CDC is also successful because it has such deep, scientific expertise. It is, in fact, equivalent, in a public health sense,
to the NIH in basic research. They pride themselves on the quality of their work. I have some excellent scientists who
are global leaders in their fields.
The mass of its capacity is great. The National Center for Infectious Diseases alone employs about 1400 people and
its budget is well over $1 billion. It does not have statutory powers over the U.S. any more than we do. However, it
does administer certain legislative directives on investment of specifically targeted public health funds for sexually
transmitted diseases, ``immunizable'' diseases in the inner cities and for tuberculosis control. That kind of leverage
makes it more efficient.
CDC also provides training for the U.S. and places staff there. Officers from the Epidemic Intelligence Service, EIS,
are front line in most American states. Whereas CDC has to wait to be invited to an epidemic, the reality is that when
there is an outbreak or a possible one, CDC staff is there anyway. They are involved immediately. The tradition in the
United States is that they call in the CDC within days. We do not have that tradition in Canada.
The model that I am suggesting relies on the considerable infrastructure that exists in Canada that simply does not
work together and that does its own mandate — CIHR, Health Canada, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency,
Agricultural and Agri-Food Canada, the National Research Council Canada, et cetera.
If that capacity were brought together to develop national priorities in applied research and if some money were
allocated to those applied research priorities under a harmonized legislative framework that did not impose on the
provinces, we would be able to match, or come close to, the capacity of CDC and be able to respond as quickly.
Senator Morin: Both cases report to the government and they both have boards of directors. The governance of this
agency and CDC is somewhat similar. I understand the capacity, the history, the expertise and the training but the
governance between what you are recommending as an agency and what the CDC has is similar.
Dr. Losos: It is similar but they do not have a legislative override over states.
Senator Morin: It is an invitation. That brings me to the last question. No one has addressed this point and I think it
is important, from what you are saying.
If I understand correctly, there are two bits of information. One is the new health protection act from Health
Canada that is being worked on. The second is the CMA brief and their ideas. Are you familiar with the health
protection act? Did you have a chance to go through that? Do you think the existing act would be satisfactory to meet
our goals? Should we recommend another layer of legislative process in addition to that? If so, could you give us some
advice on how that should be done?
Dr. Losos: I have documents, which certainly the committee could obtain, that show the original target was product
safety — health protection, food safety, drug safety, blood, environment, et cetera — when I was Assistant Deputy
Minister of Health Protection some years ago. However, to this particular consultation, they have added: Should we
have national disease surveillance mandatory? Should we have a research priorization scheme where we bring the
groups together? Should we have outbreak response that is coordinated under legislation? Should the minister have
emergency powers when that is necessary?
By adding these questions to the Health Protection Act, they have added a layer that says: We, as a country, will do
this surveillance on this priority disease or risk, mandatorily.
Senator Morin: Is this in the form of questions or is it in the act?
Dr. Losos: No, these are questions, senator. This is a consultation
Senator Morin: We do not have a proposed bill yet.
Dr. Losos: Not yet.
Senator Morin: In addition to that, or is that included — what is the CMA proposal? We are trying to get some
information here in the committee that will help us. Just summarize it.
Dr. Losos: I will leave my copy with the clerk.
Senator Morin: No, just summarize it.
The Chairman: It would be helpful, Dr. Losos, if you summarized it. The CMA will be testifying next Wednesday,
and they will deal specifically with this point.
Dr. Losos: The analysis that they had done by their legal department states that under the legislation available to
Health Canada — that is the Food and Drug Act and the Department of Health and Welfare Act — there is enough
flexibility to add regulations and alter the legislation to, in fact, demand or promulgate national surveillance, national
response, prioritization and targeting of applied research and emergency response, not having to use the emergency
response powers of the federal government, which stops after the emergency. We do not want it to stop. We want that
surveillance to continue.
As ADM of the Health Protection Branch, I could never understand why it was my responsibility under the
Criminal Code to make sure that food X was safe, but never have the power to go in and find out why people got sick
from that food.
I could never understand that. I still do not understand it. If I have the power over food safety in ensuring that the
establishments live up to good manufacturing practices, if there is an outbreak I should be able to move in. I have
never understood the difference. Therefore, I think that by harmonizing the legislation, by adding to the legislation as
it is, without being overbearing — opening up the Constitution as an example, we can achieve the same ends.
Senator Morin: Coming back to what Senator Roche has raised on the matter of federal provincial relations, I
remember you telling me in another life, and that struck me, that in matters dealing with public health and epidemics
and so forth, there was remarkable unanimity and lack of conflict between the feds and their provincial counterparts in
matters of public health. Is that still true? I remember you telling me this.
Dr. Losos: There is a lot of congruence. There is a lot of agreement on notifiable diseases, on policies, with respect to
immunization. However, the ultimate decision on what immunization one gets in province X really relies on the
provincial epidemiologist or the chief medical officer of health. It varies from province to province. You can go to one
province and go to another one and get two different sets of immunization schedules.
From a national perspective, if we are going to eliminate measles — for awhile, Canada had the highest measles
rates in the western hemisphere because the Minister of Health did not have the authority to tell everyone in the
country that they will get a second dose of measles. Whereas everyone in the hemisphere — Guatemala, Cuba, you
name it — were all giving second doses of measles, and were controlling the outbreaks. Measles is not a minor disease.
Whereas that consensus works much of the time, it does not work all of the time. We have had outbreaks; we have
had major policy issues where all 13 jurisdictions went off in all directions, and the international community will not
tolerate that. They will want one voice and they will assume that the federal minister is in charge.
Senator Keon: Assuming that you can put together a public health agency and get a commissioner — and frankly, I
think you can because something very similar has been done before — I think your biggest problem still will not be
addressed. That is the huge holes in the global safety net. We have talked about this before. — at least Dr. Losos has —
but I would be interested in Dr. Mills also commenting on this. We have to find a way of dealing with infectious disease
so as a country we are not sitting and waiting for it to happen, for it to be imported and this kind of thing. I would like
to hear you both comment on how we can participate in the global scene to have some input so that we can have early
interventions. For example, as you know very well, there are countries in the world with infectious diseases running
absolutely out of control. Canadians go there to visit and come home. There is a little bit of control, but very, very
little. I know, Dr. Losos, you have thought about this. I do not know how much you have, Dr. Mills, but I would like
to hear you talk about it.
Dr. Losos: WHO's global response and the setting up of global networks for response is reasonably recent. When the
plague ``outbreak'' in India occurred, WHO was unready. It did not have a response mechanism. I do not know
whether Dr. Chisholm, way back when, had global responses. These things wavered over time but we tried at that time
to raise WHO, to find out what was going on in India. It turns out that the debate still goes on whether there was an
outbreak of plague in India. At least it stimulated WHO, under David Hayman, an exceptionally good epidemiologist
trained out of CDC who worked out of Africa and has set up several mechanisms. One is a global response team that
can go anywhere at any time on specific diseases. At one time, they had teams specified for types of diseases. A team
for cholera, for example, was based in Switzerland, and these people were ready to go at 24 hours' notice anywhere in
the world to investigate a cholera outbreak.
The other thing is they have created a network of agencies that can be called upon in international crises to be part
of a global response mechanism — research agencies, public health agencies and the like. They are starting to become a
little better at global response. They are nowhere near as capable as one might think as far as response is concerned.
Rather, they are trying to rely on agencies, such as centres for disease control, and a new entity in the European Union
that seems to be taking shape. If we can get it together in Canada as far as what I have described in bringing together
the capacity and give it some muscle, they will let us sit at the table. If we do not, they will never let us sit at the table.
They will create their surveillance systems without us. We will get our data later, our information later, because we will
not be at the table.
I personally believe that Canada has enough expertise that with the adjustments that we are talking about today, we
will be part of the surveillance networks that occur. We are already part of some of them — salmonella networks, these
are food-borne bacteria, that we are steadily becoming part of, as far as surveillance is concerned. However, the reality
is that someone has to take charge as far as creating international surveillance networks.
WHO was in big trouble until about 10 years ago, maybe even less time than that, when there was a big push by
many professional organizations around the world to say that WHO had perhaps outlived its time and was not the
coordinator of international response that it should be. The international health regulations are not good enough. No
one ever reports on them. They only cover three diseases. They are coming out with a new version shortly.
To answer your question, senator, I think that the surveillance systems not only need to be national in Canada, but
we need to bridge and make these international, North America which includes Mexico, hemispheric, or global in other
ways. Many people are working on that. We have the informatics. You can go to Trinidad and put your card in and it
will give you Trinidad dollars. Why can we not do that in health?
Senator LeBreton: You talked about food contaminants simultaneously going across continents, knowing no
borders. I wonder if the same contaminant could have a different reaction in different countries, based on
environmental conditions. For instance, does a contaminant on a food from the tropics have a different impact on the
population in a colder climate and another impact in another type of climate, or a place with different waters? Is there
a system in place that deals with the same contaminant having different results in different countries?
Dr. Losos: Theoretically, the answer to your question is yes. Let us say a food substance is produced in bulk. The
distribution systems are so sophisticated now in the commercial sector that you can have these products in various
countries within days. Mangoes from Mexico or Costa Rica are good mangoes and no longer green. They have it
together as far as distribution is concerned. You could have a contamination of those. There have been examples of
these bean sprouts being contaminated. You could have a pathogen or bacterium contaminate these, which one
population in Scandinavia might not have any immunity to, and the outbreak there might be worse than in another
country where there might be some immunity.
These surveillance systems have to be global. Several years ago, there was a spill of engine oil in Belgium. The
Belgian ambassadors will be on the phone to me tonight for sure. I hope the telecast is delayed. This amount of oil,
which was not a huge amount but contained PCBs and various other dioxins, which is one of the most carcinogenic
chemicals known to man, was poured into this vat which was pooling fats used for all kinds of things — truffles and
chocolates and things like that. This stuff was distributed. The person who did it, I believe, did it knowingly. Why, I
could not tell you. However, the tracing of this distribution of contaminated oils was almost impossible. We had the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration and the European Union looking at it. The Belgians were desperate to trace it
and find it. We had to shut down the sale of all Belgian chocolates for some weeks in Canada until we did the analysis.
I got to know the Belgian ambassador very well during those two weeks. That is an example of why our surveillance
systems have to be global. The private sector understands this as well. They do not want their customers to get sick.
They are bringing in, therefore, a much more automated, information-technology-based system to be able to track the
lots of their foods that go out. The tracing should be easier, therefore, for the public health agencies involved.
We are at the cusp, as I said before, of having to adjust our systems to the 21st century, because things are so
Senator LeBreton: So it is true that bacteria can have different effects on different populations.
Dr. Losos: It can certainly well do, yes. You can have a parasitic contamination — not common, but possible — that
would be exposed to a population that has never been exposed to that particular parasite. There would be no
resistance, and that would run wild through the population.
Senator Keon: To both of you, as you know, WHO has its severe critics, but I take it from what you have been
saying that you are comfortable that they could provide the structure and framework now for the integration of a
Dr. Losos: I think they can, and I think that under the current leadership and the realization that there is no one else,
they are trying hard to be that. Canada has been influential in setting up some of these global surveillance systems and
the like. I am not sure that everyone believes in that. There is still quite a strong movement in the United States, and
there certainly was five or six years ago, that something else needed to replace WHO in global response and global
surveillance. WHO has some real strengths in being able to come up with monographs and analyses of professional
papers and the like. However, its experience in global surveillance and global response is relatively new. There are some
very influential people who believe that other mechanisms could replace them.
Senator Trenholme Counsell: Once again, this is a most interesting and worthwhile presentation. I am a great
believer in public health. I more often use the term ``health prevention.''
In the provinces, we do have many people working in public health, often with great frustration. The medical health
officers are the people who feel the greatest level of frustration and perhaps a lack of connectedness. There are also
public health nurses, nutritionists, and people involved in early childhood development. It is a broad network. How
much these people feel connected, I am not sure, but I sense that perhaps they feel alone at times, although they have
relationships with Health Canada through their provincial departments of health.
What you are speaking to us about is very important and timely. From my point of view, I am pleased to hear the
option being presented of something akin to the Centre for Disease Control. I like to think of prevention as a more
positive and modern theme, that is, health prevention. Although public health is an old name, with all due respect to
the Canadian Public Health Association, I wonder if that is the best name for the time. For a commissioner or new
agency, whatever might be set up, ``population health'' or ``national health'' might be more meaningful.
I do have many concerns about how this would evolve in Canada in the near future if it were to happen with the
national health council, which I see as more of a body related to medicare. We need to get a huge drawing board and
put the pieces on to see how we will do this in 2003 and beyond. We are talking about a number of things that are
national, and health is provincial, so I think the drawing board is very necessary to see how all these pieces fit together.
In addition to the coordination of infectious disease outbreaks such as we have just experienced, and that is what
has perhaps made all of these meetings and discussions so relevant, I think one has to took at the great array of non-
profit organizations in Canada, all of which are doing wonderful work. I believe there is a lack of coordination
amongst government and all those very important and wonderful groups. I know there is a need for coordination with
government and with all the national bodies across the land. I think most or all of the agencies have national bodies
along with provincial bodies, but I sense that we would do a better job if the work they are doing were coordinated. We
all know those groups — heart and stroke, osteoporosis, mental health — the list is very long.
I applaud you for coming forward with this alternative idea. I certainly do not think we could ever do what the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta are doing. That would not be our goal. There is a great deal of
research that goes on there.
In that respect, I wonder how this agency would relate to the lab in Winnipeg, which is controlled by Health
Canada, I believe. We had a presentation from that lab. They are a player in this whole picture.
Could you elaborate on how you see yourself being perceived at this time while the National Health Council is so
much on the drawing board? Is there a relationship or do you see the two organizations as being quite distinct?
Dr. Losos: I had not thought about that at any length, but as a gut reaction, I would see the National Health
Council as being pretty well oriented to health care and to ensuring that the principles of the Canada Health Act and
the transfers are correct. They should ensure that any upgrades resulting from the Romanow Commission are, in fact,
implemented. There needs to be an evaluation and an accountability and a continuum there. I see a public health
agency as very separate.
As far as the medical officers of health, nurses and nutritionists, we are totally under-supplied. We have been
overwhelmed by what was in reality a moderate outbreak. I know it was a tragedy that 41 people died and so many
people were sick. There were probably another few thousand who had a mild disease that remained undetected.
However, it was a moderate outbreak and it overwhelmed us. We must mobilize ourselves better and utilize our
Here the academic sector comes in. The academic sector is looking at schools of public health and networks of
universities that give degrees in operational public health and theoretical public health and everything in between. We
must utilize the capacity of the academic sector to increase the human resource capacity to meet our public health
Ms. Mills: I want to comment on several things but I do not want to be too long-winded. I want to say something
about the ideas of population health and public health. Population health is a conceptual framework, which helps us
systematize our thinking about what affects health outcomes, positive and negative. You hear talk about the
determinants of health which are broader than the specific behavioural or environmental risk factors.
Public health consists of the tools that we actually use to do something about that situation. Population health is
how we think and public health is what we do. We have always worked with a population health conceptual
framework in public health because our patient is the society, the community. Some people have said to me, do you not
practise? I say, yes, I practise but I do not see individual patients.
On the issue of voluntary agencies, I am happy to tell you that voluntary associations are getting together around
many of these issues. Two coalitions exist and I believe both will appear before you. The Coalition for Public Health in
the 21st century is, I believe, presenting to you tomorrow. The Chronic Disease Prevention Alliance of Canada started
very small, with the Cancer Society, the Heart and Stroke Foundation and the Diabetes Association. They added some
risk-factor-based associations who are involved with smoking, physical activity, obesity, and so forth. Now the
coalition even includes organizations like the Federation of Canadian Municipalities. They are building a very broad,
multi-sectoral constituency. They are pulling together the best thinking from the past few years about what it really
takes to influence health on a population basis in Canada, as opposed to depending entirely on clinical approaches.
We do need clinical approaches and not just for treatment. We need to make the best use we can of opportunities for
clinical prevention. Using clinical prevention will only ever reach a tiny minority of high-risk people. Population-based
approaches can make a substantial difference to the whole distribution of health and disease in the population. I am
happy to see broad-based collaborations being formed in the voluntary sector to address all the issues of public health.
We must address not just chronic disease across chronic and infectious diseases. We are seeing more cross-interests
in terms of infectious causes of what had been understood to be chronic or non-communicable diseases. There is
increased susceptibility to infectious disease in people who suffer from chronic diseases. For example, in a recent study
of 29 people admitted to ICU with SARS, every single one had some chronic co-morbid condition, such as diabetes.
Very few people with no other chronic problem became seriously ill from SARS. For healthy people, SARS was a
relatively mild infection. For someone with diabetes, heart problems or respiratory problems already, SARS became a
serious clinical problem.
There is an interaction between the clinical individual level and the population or public health level of work. We
must improve prevention in upstream versus care in downstream but also in clinical and population-based
interventions. The theme of the day is integration.
Senator Trenholme Counsell: I do not know whether my province of New Brunswick was unique in this. Our
Minister of Health is now called the Minister of Health and Wellness. Perhaps other provinces have made a similar
change to focus not just on hospitals and doctors but also on a wellness concept.
To me, it seems ideal, since there is only one pot of money — and we know it is never big enough — to have some
national body that could coordinate treatment and prevention and education. Part of that would be infectious disease
outbreaks. In a country like ours, that would be the ideal thing. In an ideal world, planning in advance, perhaps a
national health council should have two arms, one dealing more or less with medicare and the other with public health.
I do not expect that ideal can or will come to pass, but, nonetheless, I compliment you on your presentation. It
certainly is what we need to hear.
Senator Callbeck: I have a question for Dr. Mills that stems from your association's brief presented to the National
Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health. You made a number of recommendations and the one that I am
interested in concerns improvements in the laboratory systems being accomplished by strengthening connectivity
among all laboratory-related sectors — public health and health care.
Now, it is my understanding that there is a national network of public health laboratories that was set up two years
ago. I come from a small province and I am concerned about the smaller labs being well connected and having good
communication. Is the network effective or is it too soon to know? Do you have recommendations for improvements
to the network?
Ms. Mills: I do not have direct knowledge of how well that network is functioning. Perhaps Dr. Losos might know
from his experience at Health Canada. My field is chronic disease prevention and not infectious disease, so I am
remotely associated with those issues.
Dr. Losos: Senator, there were impressive public health laboratory networks in Canada in the 1940s. There were
some leading public health experts globally in the Canadian laboratories at that time. However, the labs were built for
the 1940s and in respect of the communications, there was no informatics technology. Mandatory surveillance systems
were not in place. Rather, it was a matter of the telephone between the labs. There was no formal, structured,
sophisticated, surveillance system. Lab scientists responded as best they could and did a good job. They were world
leaders to quite a degree, although they did not have the automaticity that some of the informatics technology can now
build, such as thresholds.
If you reach a certain threshold, the bell will ring to indicate that you have found more salmonella than you did last
year and so you investigate it. These sophistications were not in place back then but networks of laboratories have, in
fact, existed for quite some decades in Canada.
Senator Callbeck: The National Network of Public Health Laboratories is effective. Is that correct?
Dr. Losos: It is getting there. It could certainly be strengthened by help from groups such as Canada Health
Infoway, which has the resources for strengthening the informatics — the computer linkages and the data management
linkages — between the laboratories. That is still rudimentary in some laboratories. A network of laboratories is
actually crucial. Laboratories are the radar rooms of public health. This laboratory is laudable in its creation and it has
come up with some terrific guidelines and standards. It could stand to have an infusion by working with some of the
capacity around it like Infoway to strengthen it even further.
Senator Cordy: Thank you for an interesting dialogue. I know you both commented on how dedicated health
workers are and certainly, members of this committee would agree with you. That was particularly noticeable during
the SARS epidemic when health care workers went above and beyond their duties. In some cases, they put themselves
and their families at risk of illness.
My question is for Dr. Losos. You made a comment about setting up the agency in respect of amalgamating or
developing agreements with various other federal government departments including the Department of National
Defence and Agriculture Canada. I assume you mean ``emergency preparedness'' from the Defence Committee.
Dr. Losos: Yes.
Senator Cordy: You used the word ``agreements.'' How do you see the departments working together? Would that
be done with written agreements? Would there be interaction?
Who would be in charge if we were to have an emergency situation? Would it be the agency or would it depend on
what the emergency was?
Dr. Losos: I know that can be confusing in a crisis situation: who is in charge and is it a health crisis? If it is health,
then it should be the Minister of Health, period. The capacity of some of these other departments is incredibly
significant in biotechnology. For example, Agriculture Canada and the National Research Council Canada have huge
capacities. They should, more systematically, link to and work with the health sector as far as that particular field is
concerned. There are numerous others. Health Canada will be working on infectious agents. The immunology centre of
the NRC will be looking at infectious agents. They have made some major breakthroughs in infectious diseases but the
linkage has not been systematic enough.
Many scientists will make connections with other people in the field because they know who they are and that they
will do a good job in networking. My suggestion is that we need to make it systematic.
Senator Cordy: In fact, the linkage would be strengthened more formally. Is that what you are saying?
Dr. Losos: Yes, for example, you could have a standing committee on infectious diseases or any other aspect.
Senator Cordy: An AIDS committee, for example, would have representatives from various government
Dr. Losos: That is right. We have an AIDS committee populated mostly by health professionals. However, AIDS is
a zoonotic, SARS is a zoonotic, and mad cow disease is a zoonotic. The veterinarians have very sophisticated
surveillance systems. They certainly are first on the wire with 5,000 inspectors across the country, when it comes to
some of these problems. Dr. Mills alluded to the chief veterinary officer, who can mobilize 5,000 people in one hour
and can close down any farm in Canada.
Senator Cordy: In fact, there is a first step. It is being done informally and you suggest that it should be more
Dr. Losos: That is right. We defined some of these roles and we cut back the number of committees in an effort to
make it more efficient. However, it still ends up being a kind of voluntary, let's-get-together-and-manage-the-situation
system, which very often works well. It could work better if it were mandatory.
Senator Léger: I have heard bits of responses to my questions as we have gone along. For public health, you
suggested that we would need $1 billion and that is because of the basic consumerism of our society. That is the angle.
I understood you to say that we should create a new agency. Should those efforts — money, human resources and
highly trained specialists — be restricted to work in Canada or should there be a connection to the World Health
Organization? Would we be creating another system with all the same weaknesses of the previous systems? We have
only a certain amount of money and a certain number of specialists. Should we keep them for ourselves again?
Dr. Losos: My opinion is that we should get our house in order first. When we have our house in order, and we are
functioning at the level that I believe we are all talking about, then we can help the World Health Organization out in
three ways. First, we can fund specific projects — we migrated our global public health intelligence network to them,
which is an Internet crawler that found SARS, I believe, three or four months before it actually was picked up by the
systems in North America and Europe. We constantly do that, so we can migrate technology to them. Second, we
could probably fund targeted activities. We could create an outbreak team that would target a specific area that
Canada might have expertise in — meningitis, as an example — and have it at the ready and make it available for
global response if there is a meningitis outbreak in sub-Saharan Africa or whatever.
Third, once we have our own human resources picture in order and we have enough people trained in Canada so
that we have a surge capacity — so that we are not under-serviced and under-manned in our capacity — we could
actually place people with WHO to supplement their expertise, because they are really thin. If you go to Geneva and
you actually look at the capacity that they have to respond globally, it is really thin. It is 15, 20 people in their
infectious disease group.
Senator Léger: If I understand well, it most interesting. We are in globalization. If we do our part here, it can be part
of WHO almost automatically.
Dr. Losos: Yes.
Senator Léger: If the need be.
Dr. Losos: If we get our house in order, we will be asked for participation in global systems, to address Senator
Keon's point again. If we have it together, then we will be at the table when international systems will be created. I
predict that international systems will have to be created, because it is a globalized world. If we do not do it now, our
successors will do it.
Ms. Mills: I agree with Dr. Losos, that the best way to contribute to global public health — both for selfish and
altruistic reasons as a developed country — is to create capacity in our own country. When I was at Health Canada, I
would get a call from Pan American Health Organization almost yearly, because I happen to speak Spanish, asking if I
could go down there and help them with some things. I would have to say no, because we did not have the salary
dollars to replace me if I left my position at Health Canada. We need to have capacity to be able to both fulfil our own
public health obligations here, and to hold up our moral responsibility to contribute to global health in the broader
sense. That requires having some depth to our workforce.
The Chairman: I want to ask two questions. Dr. Losos, what are our international reporting obligations? There was
a lot of criticism of China for not reporting the SARS epidemic until several months later. Do we have legal
international obligations that require that we inform the rest of the world if something is happening in Canada?
Dr. Losos: Cholera, yellow fever and plague are the only three diseases covered by the international health
regulations — none of which, to my knowledge, have we seen for quite awhile, although they get an occasional case of
plague in California.
The Chairman: To that extent, if SARS had started here, we would not have been under any international obligation
to tell anyone.
Dr. Losos: No, but that is where leadership comes in. A proactive commissioner, a proactive agency, would have
contacted WHO and said this is what is happening, this is what we are doing to control it, and I believe that they never
would have shut down Toronto.
Senator Morin: We were blaming China without reason. That is a good point.
Dr. Losos: Yes.
The Chairman: Related to that — assume for the moment that we have at least a moral obligation, if not a legal one,
to tell the rest of the world — is that the real justification for having essentially a national network of epidemiologists
funded by the federal government? It is impossible for us to fulfil our international obligation if we do not have the
information, so we have to have the people who can get us the information. Is that right?
Dr. Losos: One of the cornerstones, senator, of the CDC's capacity in the United States, despite their mass and
everything I mentioned before, is their Epidemiology Intelligence Service, EIS — their epidemiologists in the States. It
is an informal communications network, where one picks up the phone and says I found this, and then the whole
system gets triggered. In Canada, we have had field epidemiologists, as we call them, but very few; and when they were
put into the provinces, they ended up, at least in the earlier years, doing scut work and adminis-trivia as opposed to
doing the outbreak investigation. In my opinion, it is a federal role, and also a human resource development role, to get
people of enough seniority and place them with the provinces as outbreak investigation officers, as epidemiologists.
The Chairman: I guess I am asking whether this argument is correct, that in fact that does not constitute the federal
government interfering at either the local or the provincial level, because it really constitutes the federal government
doing what it has to do to fulfil its international responsibilities?
Dr. Losos: That is right, and the provinces have always been very welcoming to this added capacity.
The Chairman: The head of the British Columbia Centre for Disease Control made that argument.
You talked about the governance of CIHR, the Canadian Institutes of Health Research. Remind me what that is —
that board has five provincial representatives and five federal, is that correct?
Dr. Losos: It has a lot of academics on it. I cannot remember the exact number, senator, but it does have provincial
and federal representation on it.
The Chairman: One might end up with different numbers, but basically it is the same principle that you have argued
for your board.
Dr. Losos: Yes, and to go back to the senator's question over here, I think a board of capacity like I am talking
about should include the voluntary sector. There is no reason that the Cancer Society, with the size it is, and the
National Cancer Institute that it funds, would not be represented on a board like that. The Heart and Stroke
Foundation has $100 million worth of research a year, which may not be as big as CHIR, but is no small pittance. It
should have something to say when it comes to the public health of cardiovascular disease.
The Chairman: What is the nature of the board of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta?
Dr. Losos: Usually, it is made up of deans of medical schools, but they have broadened their look on life just as
CIHR has. They have consumer groups, advocacy groups and voluntary organizations.
The Chairman: But no state representatives?
Dr. Losos: To my knowledge, no state representatives.
The Chairman: There are two items I would like you to think about. In politics, selling an idea is often the hardest
thing to do, so I would like you to reflect on the following observations.
First, to get back to the discussion that you had, Dr. Losos, with Senator Roche about what the provinces will allow
you to do, I would like you to think about the title for your organization, for the following reason. I think if the word
``emergency'' is in there, it is impossible for a provincial government to get upset because at that point you are dealing
with a health emergency and no one is going to stand on constitutional nicety. I would like you to reflect on whether
there is a way to do that.
The second comment is to Dr. Mills, and it picks up on Senator Trenholme Counsell's point. Outside of the
intelligentsia, I can guarantee no one knows what population health means; and I bet you very few people know what
public health means. I do not care what you do with the name of your own organization. Can you reflect on a way to
describe what you are talking about in your brief, which is old-fashioned public health — not in a derogatory sense?
We have to find a way to describe that to the people so that just from the name of the organization, they know what it
does. Right now, a commissioner for public health would cause people's eyes to glaze over. If, somehow, what they saw
in their mind was an organization responsible for dealing with immunizations which prevent outbreaks, and dealing
with emergencies, I think you would get a totally different reaction from the public — and more importantly, from
I ask the two of you to reflect on that and see if you can give us your thoughts on that. I know it sounds odd and not
academic, but I mean political in the best sense of the word — the small ``p'' political in selling it to the public. What we
call this animal will really matter, and I would like you to reflect on that.
I thank you all for coming.
The committee adjourned.