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Proceedings of the Special Senate Committee on

Issue 3 - Evidence

OTTAWA, Monday, June 14, 2010

The Special Senate Committee on Anti-terrorism met this day at 1 p.m. to examine matters relating to anti- terrorism.

Senator Hugh Segal (Chair) in the chair.


The Chair: Honourable senators, welcome to the fourth meeting of the Special Senate Committee on Anti-terrorism during the Third Session of the Fortieth Parliament. We are continuing our hearings into the dynamics of terrorism, how they have changed, and how our security forces are able to address those changing dynamics. We are fortunate to have three expert witnesses today to help us with our examination of these matters. They have agreed to travel long distances, in some cases, and have provided written statements. Following opening statements of 10 minutes each, I will open the floor to questions by senators.

Our first witness, Mr. Dwight Hamilton, author and former member of the Canadian military intelligence, has written extensively on terrorist related issues. He is the principal author and editor of Inside Canadian Intelligence, which exposes the new realities of espionage and international terrorism; and a co-author with Kostas Rimsa of Terror Threat: International and Homegrown Terrorists and Their Threat to Canada.

He will be followed by Mr. Michel Juneau-Katsuya, who is a former senior officer of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. He has been involved as a criminal investigator, intelligence officer and strategic analyst. He was in charge of contingency and emergency planning for CSIS and his knowledge of Asia earned him Directorship of the Strategic Analysis Unit for Asia-Pacific. He is now with the Northgate Group Corp. and offers advice and counsel to both the public and private sectors.

He will be followed by Professor Ronald Crelinsten, who has a PhD in criminology from l'université de Montréal. He is a founding member of the editorial board of Terrorism and Political Violence, the leading academic journal in terrorism studies. He is on the international advisory board of the International Journal of Conflict and Violence. He was a professor of criminology at the University of Ottawa from 1982 to 2004, and principal researcher on a research project on gross human rights violations at Leiden University in the Netherlands, and is a senior research member of the Centre for Global Studies at the University of Victoria. We are fortunate that you have made time in your busy careers to help us through some of these issues. Mr. Hamilton, please proceed.

Dwight Hamilton, Author, Terror Threat: International and Homegrown Terrorists and Their Threat to Canada, as an individual: These remarks are intended to provide insight for the subcommittee into the evolving nature of terrorism in Canada, the activities of the security services managing this threat and suggestions on how various stakeholders might improve the effectiveness of a broad-based counterterrorism agenda in Canada.

Due to space and time considerations, I will not cover the activities of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the Babbar Khalsa International, or Canada's involvement in the Afghanistan theatre of military operations.

The primary security threat facing Canada in 2010 is the continuing dilemma of Islamic jihadist homegrown terrorists. The chance of physical harm to Canadian citizens and property is highest from this group. With respect to the organization of individuals who are drawn to this activity, the basic concept of cell structures, support networks and affinity groups, as discussed in detail in chapter 10 of my book written with Kostas Rimsa, still holds. Despite their name, homegrown cells nearly always have links that cross international borders. With Islamic jihaddism possessing a transglobal appeal unlike anything seen since the days of the Comintern, this is a key issue as seen by the case of the Toronto 18. Not only can senior operational advice and leadership come from abroad, but also we see young Canadians from even moderate families venture to overseas conflict zones for a primer in jihad. Upon their return, they could bring invaluable experience to any homegrown operation.

Homegrown cells have become increasingly important to the al Qaeda leadership due to the changing circumstances of the post-9/11 environment. On the international stage, many senior and middle level al Qaeda commanders have been and are being killed and captured by security forces. Most recently, there were the internal and external operations chiefs in December 2009 and the group's number three man Mustfa al-Yazid earlier this month. This has created pressure to gain success via methods that do not necessarily trump the kill count of the 9/11 operation and that do not have the risk associated with their highly trained operatives crossing borders. One leader has stated that many small strikes, including failures, may have the same desired result in keeping up the momentum of the message. Keep in mind that while only three homegrown terrorist attacks have caused mass casualties — Madrid, London and Fort Hood — there have been over 200 foiled plots around the world since 2001.

Much time has been spent by opinion leaders attempting to ascertain a single root cause that is evident from al Qaeda belief systems that would explain the motivation for jihadist actions. Such simplicity is a fallacy. In chapter 6 of the book, there is a sliding scale of beliefs from conservative to extreme and an overview of broad jihadist motivations can be found in the section entitled ``Basic Facilitators.'' The evolving global situation virtually guarantees jihadists no shortage of ammunition to support their world view. There seems to be nothing on the immediate horizon that would cause them to turn their swords into ploughshares.

With the firebombing this May of an Ottawa bank and the vandalism of Toronto-area banking machines as a result of the upcoming G8 and G20 summits, the question arises whether these acts might be the precursor of something more serious than the socio-political activism and property damage. A group referring to itself as the FFFC claims responsibility for the Ottawa attack.

This event sequence reflects the example of the early days of Direct Action, which was a leftist anarchist group of terrorists active in Canada during the 1980s. Two points are relevant to today's situation. First, Direct Action's attacks became larger and more sophisticated with time. Second, not one person from the direct support arm of about 40 operatives from cells in Vancouver, Winnipeg, Toronto and Montreal was ever charged.

Over two decades have passed since then, but the appeal of multi-cause and anti-establishment adventure has not vanished. It can only be predicted to increase, given the uncertain economic position the Western world now finds itself in. Today, in a society that many of various political stripes feel has lost its vision, we see increasing numbers of technically sophisticated, underemployed youth looking for someone to set an example. Jihadists are not the only ones looking for a mission. There are many to choose from. As recently as two weeks ago, a veteran activist from Victoria, who had been trained as a human shield and who had previously undertaken similar missions in hostile environments, was reported missing from the Gaza-bound ship Challenger II after it was stormed by Israeli commandos. The press report included a quote from the friend of the human shield: ``It is what he does; it is what he believes in.'' This source was a former convicted Direct Action cell leader who had served seven years in a Canadian prison for the group's activities.

Regarding the readiness and capabilities of security forces to deal with the current emerging threats due to the situation described above, it is my assessment that the Kenny reports coupled with ongoing monitoring by the Auditor General have been excellent in pointing out the shortcomings in the nation's defences. However, if these recommendations are not followed through by government and simply gather dust on the shelf, Canada could be in for an unpleasant surprise someday soon, given the likelihood that groups will employ complex terrorism tactics aided by increasingly sophisticated weapons technology. It is certain that homegrown groups will improve their effectiveness with time. Numerous small strikes can add up to something significant if conducted simultaneously. Remember what 15 mailbox bombs planted around Westmount in 1963 led to.

In my opinion, the most important positive change in the national security landscape since 9/11 has been the development of a task force approach to intelligence and law enforcement by our various agencies.

Institutional siloing has always been the Achilles heel of Western security services, and the Americans are still dealing with their classic divisions in the uproar over the Detroit bomber earlier this year. We should strengthen inter- agency bonds and ideally strive for a seamless approach.

Further strengths include attempting to forge a community-based policing approach at the ground level in response to Islamic jihadism. Security forces must continue to increase recruitment from the Muslim Canadian population yet be especially careful with infiltration in their ranks, since that is a tried and true terrorist tactic. Keep in mind that a member of the Toronto 18 trained in our military.

Immigration levels in Canada will continue to increase in the near and medium terms due to the fact that we do not have enough workers to drive the complex economy Canada has put into place over the last half century. The effect of this demographic trend will include increasing screening duties for CSIS, amongst other things.

I believe it is a platitude among those of us who follow this issue that the security certificate regime must be replaced with a procedure to deport undesirables. Perhaps a third party diplomatic arrangement would work, whereby a host country would accept these people in return for something Canada can offer of equal value. There has been a tremendous waste of taxpayers' money so far in this battle. Government lawyers have had years to come up with a solution, yet we are no further ahead than when the procedure was introduced.

Further trouble is evident in a continuing court drama with persons launching litigation against the government regarding their treatment in international affairs. Already a growth industry, suing the government for its perceived sins within the murky world of international terrorism will soon be an established part of Canadiana. In order to prevent judges from bankrupting the federal treasury with escalating damage awards, perhaps a formal compensation for grievances regime, similar to what was established in the wake of the October crisis, would be pragmatic.

As for our courts prescribing anger management courses for convicted terrorists, with all due respect, not only does this send the worst kind of message to the public, it is wrong. Terrorists are not angry. This is no street fight. Terrorism is a tactic of unconventional war and terrorists and their sympathizers are highly motivated individuals, some of whom would calmly kill us with pleasure, not anger. So the Toronto 18 convict who completed such a course, rather than spending a decade behind bars, which sentencing permits, is now free as a bird; but at least he is not angry. Indeed, his lawyer has said that he is ``very happy,'' and wants to study engineering.

Many experts believe that terrorists cannot be rehabilitated, so if what I have stressed in my earlier writings that an ideas war needs to be won, it is imperative to concentrate on reaching the young before the seed has been planted.

Therefore, it would be wise to develop an anti-terrorism community outreach and public relations infrastructure of some sort. This would not only attempt to destroy the romance of extremism via communication initiatives and dedicated activities but would also include an innovative route that gives conscientious parents the opportunity to receive help if they find their young turning to jihad. It is imperative that this be tied in to the school system.

Very strong leadership in this area is required. Explore ideas like public-private partnerships or tax breaks for corporations that show badly needed vision and throw some serious money at this problem. Turn prominent moderate Muslim Canadian business leaders into anti-jihadist ambassadors. So far, Canada has been lucky to have had less civil strife from jihadist sympathizers than nations such as Great Britain, France and others in Europe, so this is a window of opportunity to keep it that way.

Finally, it could well be argued that the greatest strategic problem Canada faces with terrorism lies in the court of public opinion. It is here that we must look to the media to set an example. Unfortunately, some of its members have been setting a terrible one. In October 2009, CSIS director Richard Fadden spoke publicly of a loose partnership of non-governmental organizations, lawyers and advocacy journalists creating a new hero for our age, a sort of freedom fighting jihadist akin to left-wing undergraduate icon Che Guevara. Here are the director's words:

It sometimes seems that to be accused of having terrorist connections in Canada has become a status symbol, a badge of courage. . . .To some members of civil society, there is a certain romance to this.''

Nothing would enhance anti-terrorist effectiveness more in our lawful society than the discrediting of this misguided mindset. The Toronto 18 were not a bunch of kids, as a senior television news producer once opined to me. They were wannabe mass murderers. It was not a ``hapless winter camping adventure'' that took place in Ontario cottage country in 2005, as a columnist for the country's largest newspaper seems to want the Canadian public to believe. It was practice.

Look at it this way. If the battle of Toronto had succeeded, the loss of life on our soil would have exceeded anything in the country's history. It would have made the Dieppe raid seem like a strawberry social. Perhaps today those Canadians who lie beneath that bloody beach in France should be angry.

Michel Juneau-Katsuya, Chief Executive Officer, Northgate Group Corp.: I wrote a text for today, but true to my French genes I probably took twice as much time as I have been allotted. I will ad lib to touch on my points. Basically my points will be the same as the text have you received.

I would immediately put in context my comments by mentioning that since 9/11 over $900 billion has been spent worldwide in the fight against terrorism. As just mentioned by Mr. Hamilton, there have been hundreds of terrorist attacks and plots for terrorist attacks and literally thousands of people have died. The question that any logical person would ask immediately is: Are we any closer to the end of terrorism. Unfortunately, the answer is no, not at all.

You asked three specific questions I will address directly. The first one is about the nature of terrorism. Has it changed and evolved differently? Back in 2002, in a series of interviews I mentioned, I predicted there would be four waves of terrorism. Unfortunately today I am coming to announce there is a fifth one that just emerged on the horizon.

The first wave was the al Qaeda soldiers, al Qaeda people who have been trained by al Qaeda in their camp who were sent abroad to conduct attacks on the Western world. The second wave was other terrorist groups that did not necessarily get trained by al Qaeda but embraced their cause and decided to pick up the torch with al Qaeda. The third wave was the so-called homegrown terrorism, kids who grew up in the country, who were born in the country and decided to attack that country, again embracing the cause of al Qaeda.

The fourth one was mentioned also by Mr. Hamilton just a moment ago, what I refer to as the special interest groups, groups that do not necessarily embrace the al Qaeda cause, the extremist cause but, inspired by anarchists or anti-globalization ideology, have decided to push the agenda a little further. In the last five years, just to give you an example, there have been 11 bombings in Canada directly related to those incidents: two in the province of Quebec related to anti-globalization and anti-American ideology; six in B.C. that are linked to eco-terrorism, particularly; two in Alberta linked to eco-terrorism and neo-Nazism; and one in Ottawa that we suffered about three weeks ago. All those are done by groups other than al Qaeda or religious extremists, but they want to push, like I said, society over the edge and rebuild a new society from its ashes.

Unfortunately, this leads us to talk also about the issue of the G8 and G20 summits. As we know, in a couple of weeks we will have the two summits, and already we have indications that they will be ugly. I believe that these meetings will go down in history for a multiple of negative reasons. One will be the violent clashes that will take place between the police and protestors. Since 1999 we have been witnessing a trend that is constantly going in the wrong direction. Unfortunately, albeit with the intention of doing a better job of controlling the crowds, I think the police have become more a part of the problem than a part of the solution.

We decided to remove from the site demonstrators who are legitimately trying to exercise their democratic right of airing their grievances with elected officials and to park them in a corral where they can demonstrate unheard and unseen. This has contributed to the frustration of the most extremist elements within these groups, justifying their taking action on their own, as we saw in Ottawa recently. We have already been witnessing this in Toronto with the acts of vandalism that have already taken place. I believe that this is only the tip of the iceberg and that we will see much more.

It is important that I speak of a new form of terrorism that has been emerging, which is Al Qaeda narco-terrorism. In West Africa, where I work quite extensively, we have been witnessing more and more cooperation between Colombian cartels that have decided to move cocaine into the area because there is no coast guard or defence of any kind on the entire western coast of Africa. The boats can come very close to shore and dump cocaine into the water to be picked up by fishermen who bring it ashore. These drugs are destined for either Europe or Asia.

Through intelligence sources, we have confirmed that Al Qaeda's African branch has been linked with these people. The danger is that this is a phenomenal source of revenue, recruiting capabilities and weapons acquisition for these groups. We can easily imagine that, just like the current experience in Colombia with the FARC or the ENL, narco- terrorists will see this as their business.

The difference between criminal activities and terrorism is that terrorists are not in the business of terror. They exist because they have a cause and want to express a grievance. Narco-terrorism and criminality is another thing. They are in the business of crime. The moment that terrorism and criminal activities mix, terrorism becomes a business. Although this is quite grave, it does not represent an immediate threat to Canada because it will probably happen in Africa, but the spill-over of such practice will definitely reach us.

Recall the attack by a young Nigerian on a flight going to America on December 25. He was trained by this specific group, which is now linked to the Colombian cartel. That is an extremely worrisome connection that we had not anticipated.

I was talking about the nature of terrorism earlier. There are various opinions about the causes of terrorism and where it comes from. I agree that it is a form of military intervention of a kind, a war tactic, but we must understand where terrorism comes from, which leads me also to speak to your second question, which is, have the law enforcement agencies advanced significantly in fighting terrorism. My answer to this question will be yes, in part.

The problem is that every intervention we have made with the police, the military, with sending troops to Afghanistan, and even in the intelligence world, has been treating only the symptoms, only the surface of the problem. We will not be capable of resolving the issue of terrorism in this way alone. As a matter of fact, I dare say that we could triple the budget of CSIS, the RCMP and the military and still not stop terrorism because, at the end of the day, when one terrorist gets through the net, even if he or she does not succeed in their attack, they make a mockery of all the efforts and money we have expended and sacrifices we have made.

For example, three years ago when we had the liquid bombing in London, not a plane went down, not a person was killed or hurt, yet we changed the way we travel and we spent millions of dollars changing the way we do security. Even when they do not succeed, they succeed, so terrorists always have the upper hand; thus my recommendation that we must address the root cause of terrorism.

Terrorism, in my view, comes from an element of grief that has not been heard or dealt with properly. I think we all share a certain amount of responsibility for the situation that currently prevails worldwide. We know where those elements of grief come from. They come from the situation in Palestine and the occupied territory, the situation in South Lebanon, the situation in Iran, and the support that we give to corrupt governments in the gulf because we want access to their oil, et cetera. If we could remove those elements, we would remove their motivation for fighting. When there is no motivation to fight, no one has a career path of blowing themselves up.

The third question is whether civil society and private business can do more. We can definitely do much more. Unfortunately, I do not think there has been enough encouragement to do more. To use a popular expression, security is everyone's business. Unfortunately, in this country we are used to having the government foot the bill for security all the time. I am now in the private sector, and my clients are saying that they are ready to play a part, but that they need support. We are currently in a reactive mode.

The old Solicitor General's department did a study about five years ago that demonstrated that 80 to 85 per cent of the critical infrastructure in Canada is either owned or operated by the private sector. When the government said that they would protect the critical infrastructure, the private sector said that they had not waited for the government but had already done so themselves, but they needed to move from a reactive to a proactive position.

There are some solutions that we can implement ourselves in this field. For example, the Information Sharing Analysis Centre in the U.S. groups companies together and share information with a third trusted party, and the information is shared with the community as intelligence. The bill is shared on an economy of scale by all the companies.

I will speak for my last minute to two topics that I believe are very important for Canada, albeit perhaps a little out of the scope of this committee. There are two security issues that I would like to bring to your attention. One is foreign espionage. It has been proven that we are losing billions of dollars. Yes, terrorism kills. However, in my view, foreign espionage activities in Canada are creating much more damage to our ability to compete internationally.

Finally, in the spirit of the great legacy left by Prime Minister Pearson, I think Canada could and should take the lead in global security. This country needs a national vision, and this could be it. Unfortunately, by all accounts, analysts are saying that this world will get much worse before it gets better. Our natural resources have been depleted and there is global warming, et cetera. Therefore, Canada could give itself the leading role, as we did with South Africa with apartheid. We were able to get rid of apartheid without a single gun being fired. I believe we are capable of that again, if we give ourselves that vision.


The Chair: Thank you for your contribution.


I will now call on Professor Crelinsten.

Ronald Crelinsten, Senior Research Associate, Centre for Global Studies, University of Victoria, as an individual: Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today.


I could easily spend at least an hour on each of your questions.


My remarks today are dealt with in much greater detail in my recent book Counter-terrorism, where I try and develop a comprehensive framework for countering terrorism in the 21st century.

Your first question deals with what might be called ``the new terrorism thesis'', which argues that there has been a rise of religiously motivated or inspired terrorism in the mid-1990s. One variant of this thesis is David Rapoport's wave theory — not the same as our previous speaker — where he argues that there have been four waves of modern terrorism: 19th century anarchists; early 20th century anti-colonialists; mid-20th century left-wing revolutionaries; and then late 20th century religious fundamentalists.

Besides this religious motivation, other features of this new terrorism include: increasing lethality; wanting a lot of people dead; lack of interest in political goals but more interested in religious or millennial goals; a transnational and globalized phenomenon that acts across borders all over the world; fanatical, willing to die, and unwilling to negotiate, particularly in the context of suicide terrorism. This all necessitates pre-emption and targeted killing as the best response. It is argued that old antiterrorism methods just will not work.

There are facts that do not fit this new terrorism thesis, what we might call counterfactuals. First, religiously motivated terrorism is actually very old, dating back at least to the Jewish Zealots of the 1st century AD. There are late 20th century secular groups, such as the Tamil Tigers, which also use suicide attacks. Some terrorist attacks with large numbers of casualties pre-dated the supposed mass casualty terrorism of the 1990s; most notably the 1985 Air India bombing.

The first wave of anarchists were transnational, acting across borders and in many countries, while third wave groups like the FLQ were inspired by a transnational ideology of national liberation and urban guerrilla. On a tactical level, terrorists remain rather conservative, favouring the traditional tactics of bombing, assassination, armed assaults and hostage taking. Religiously inspired groups such as Hamas often have clear political goals. Even al Qaeda has political goals: the overthrow of apostate regimes in Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, among others. Suicide bombers are smart bombs and, as such, may not be deterred although even that is debatable. There are many others involved who may be, especially communities where they live. Deterrence or negotiations may also be possible. What we have is old wine in new bottles.


The more things change, the more they stay the same.


Terrorist groups tend to innovate within the same rather limited arsenal of tactics. For example, the 9/11 attacks combined skyjacking with suicide bombing. The 2008 Mumbai attacks combined armed assault and hostage taking with the use of BlackBerrys, GPS navigators, CDs full of high-resolution satellite images obtained from Google Earth and multiple cell phones with switchable SIM cards that were difficult to track. The attackers spoke to each other using satellite phones and kept tabs on their fellow terrorists by watching live TV reports in the hotel rooms they occupied, while their handlers back in Pakistan egged them on and gave them feedback on the police response, also gleaned from live TV reports.

In short, then, rather than a new terrorism, today's terrorists operate in new contexts using new variations, new technologies, relying on new combinations of old tactics. Old threats persist or transform while new threats emerge. The result is a combination of new and old. I would argue the biggest game changer is the Internet and electronic technology.

As for the nature of al Qaeda, is it a global insurgency or a brand name? Pre-9/11 al Qaeda was hierarchical, leader- directed, well organized and enjoyed state sponsorship by the Taliban. Post-9/11 and Afghanistan invasion, al Qaeda became diffuse and disorganized with no safe haven or state sponsor. They outsourced to like-minded regional groups and propagated an ideological narrative that promotes self-directed operations and attacks. Al Qaeda has become a brand name, which inspires self-radicalization.

The concept of global insurgency masks local contexts and agendas. Many governments use the concept to lump their insurgency problems into the global anti-terrorism effort, such as Russia with Chechnya, China with Xinjiang and Uzbekistan with its Islamic opposition.

Self-radicalization takes many forms and does not always lead to violence. When it does, it can take different forms. In the case of some Americans or Canadians of Somali origin, for example, a parallel can be made with Canadians who went to Spain to fight in the Spanish Civil War. The home-grown threat relates more to citizens or landed immigrants going abroad to receive terrorist training and coming back home to launch attacks, aiding and abetting others to launch terrorist attacks elsewhere, such as in the Khawaja case, or planning and preparing for attacks at home without going abroad for training such as the Toronto 18. Al Qaeda leaders have recently posted appeals on the Internet, encouraging individuals to plan simple attacks that do not require a lot of knowledge and preparation. This highlights the threat of the lone wolf who prepares and acts alone.

In short, there is a blurred boundary between al Qaeda-directed plans and activities and self-directed ones. Al Qaeda is trying to stay relevant and engaged while seriously degraded in capacity. This does not mean that all communiqués are heeded or that they lead to plans or attacks.

In relation to your second question, anti-terrorism activities and plans can be short, medium or long term. They can be tactical or strategic, reactive or proactive, coercive or persuasive, offensive or defensive. They can be local, regional or global.

The legislative and structural changes in Canada since 2001 have tried to be more proactive and strategic. There appears to be recognition of the importance of an all-of-government approach as reflected, for example, in the creation of Public Safety Canada. NATO, too, is increasingly aware of the importance of this approach.

Enhanced power should always be matched by enhanced oversight and accountability, especially when the requirements of secrecy conflict with those of transparency. There is evidence that this principle has been recognized, if not always adhered to. Security intelligence and proactive policing pose special challenges to democratic societies and care must be taken to infuse security measures with democratic values and practices.

Democratic practice tends to enhance security, though many believe the opposite to be true. The best anti-terrorist plan will never completely eliminate the risk of terrorism as our previous speaker said. For this reason alone, democratic principles should not be abandoned lightly and anti-democratic practices must be subjected to enhanced oversight and sunset clauses that demand accountability when the sun sets.

From a fiscal perspective, elaborate anti-terrorist equipment, programs, plans or even analytics designed to out- think the terrorist can be expensive in terms of money, time and personnel. In an era of economic turmoil, cost/benefit considerations become more acute. From a political perspective, quick fixes and harsh rhetoric sometimes appear more attractive than long-term solutions and nuanced explanation. Political will and human capital are just as important as financial resources in determining how best to act for the safety interests of society.

Looking at the short term, strengthening cyber capabilities of the police and intelligence agencies, increasing port security and the screening of containers and air cargo are all important. Ensuring or improving information sharing among intelligence and law enforcement agencies is related to the tricky question of when to arrest. This issue continues to present difficult challenges, such as the proper relationship between intelligence and evidence, the protection of sources and methods versus the prosecution of a criminal case, and balancing the needs of security and justice.

Our closest allies, the U.S. and the U.K., have different approaches to this problem. Where does Canada come down on the issue? Increasing the representation of Canada's culturally and linguistically diverse communities in its security and law enforcement organizations should be a top priority in the immediate term.

In the medium term, antiterrorism measures can have unintended consequences in terms of facilitating or accelerating radicalization processes and enabling terrorist recruitment. An anti-terrorism strategy that includes human rights and cross-cultural education for communities at risk and for state officials dealing with these communities might avoid this trap. Public education about the nature of the terrorist threat to Canada both at home and abroad and the limits to what government can do about it can strengthen public trust in government. It can also prevent unrealistic public expectations concerning the government's capabilities in dealing with radicalization and terrorism. This could serve to inoculate the public against the kind of media sensationalism that break out during a real crisis so that they are less prone to panic or demand quick solutions that, in the long run, create more problems than they solve. An added benefit of educating the general public would be to prevent the kinds of scapegoating or fear- driven prejudices that play into the hands of radical ideologues and terrorist leaders who seek to justify their own hate- filled rhetoric and their violent actions.

De-radicalization efforts that include providing communities with the tools and knowledge to counter terrorist narratives and to recognize and report the signs of radicalization and the move towards violence are important, and here I echo other speakers saying that a community policing approach to anti-terrorism is the most conducive to this approach, including education of control agents who deal on a daily basis with the very people who are presently perceived as most likely to be susceptible to radicalization or involved in terrorism.

In the long term, resolution of the most persistent conflicts abroad must become a top priority for Foreign Affairs, development and aid and peace building. Canada used to punch above its weight in this area and should do so again. This is in Canada's security interest since it is such conflicts that provide fanatics and ideologues with the material to spin their narratives of hate and violence and to seduce alienated individuals onto the path towards terrorist violence.

Your third question deals with what might be called the comprehensive approach, or all-of-government approach. There are many different models of anti-terrorism other than the traditional coercive models of criminal justice and war. Each one implicates society, business, labour and non-security agencies in different ways. I will list them and highlight a few of them, in the interests of time, and we can come to this in questions.

The criminal justice model and the war model are the basic approaches. The citizens and communities play a role in reporting crime. The media plays a big role in promoting public support for war. The intelligence model speaks for itself. I will also say linguistically and culturally diverse communities are crucial here. The defensive model stresses infrastructure protection, target hardening, emergency preparedness, disaster management, public health and citizen resilience. The private sector is crucial, as are public health agencies and environmental protection agencies and those agencies responsible for government revenues and expenditures, as well as politicians and the media.

The persuasive or communication model, or hearts and minds approach, deals with de-radicalization. Diaspora communities are crucial, as is the media, and business groups and trans-national corporations can also play a role here in ensuring that their practices conform to environmental, cultural or labour practices and regulations.

Less traditional models include the development model, which focuses on capacity building in post-conflict and failed states, as well as foreign aid and development. NGOs are important. The human security model deals with improving the lives of individual citizens through poverty reduction, education and professional training.

The gender model recognizes that most terrorists are male, that women terrorists are often motivated by revenge over the death of their male relatives, and that mothers, daughters or spouses can play an important role in de- radicalization and disengagement. International and trans-national cooperation means the involvement of civil society and the private sector, as well as IGOs, NGOs and trans-national groups and business groups. A truly comprehensive approach means combining all of the above. It is not which model to use, but when to use which model, in which combination or order, and for how long.

Senator Joyal: I know that my colleagues have many questions to ask of our witnesses. Thank you for your contribution today.

You have centred on many initiatives that deal with a number of departments that are mentioned in your paper, but none of you has stressed the role of Parliament or parliamentarians in this context, be it at the provincial or federal level, since security is not an exclusive field of jurisdiction. Would you care to comment on that?

The Chair: It is possible, senator, that we are not as important to this process as some of us might think. However, I will let our experts address that matter.

Mr. Crelinsten: Thank you for that question, Senator Joyal. I rushed through my comments, but I did refer to the role of politicians at several points.

Politicians are the favourite source for media as well. The media run to politicians for the official take on things. In fact, I have studied terrorism in the media as well. Margaret Thatcher coined the phrase ``the oxygen of publicity'' for terrorism. That is, without publicity, it would die. She criticized the media often for privileging the terrorists' point of view. I have done quantitative and qualitative work, and found that it is not true. Most of the time, the media echoes the politicians and the official line of law enforcement.

Parliamentarians at all levels — and I am glad you mentioned provincial as well, and even municipal governments, because with the communities, it is important at that level, too — can play an important role in public education, in openness and transparency about the kinds of things that law enforcement and security agencies cannot be as open about. You have access to the oversight reports. You have excellent committees like this as well. Through your reporting to the public, you can try to make clear what the real threats are and how limited government is. Several of us have emphasized the role of the private sector. The nongovernmental agencies are very important.

The other role would be networking with those people — networking with parliamentarians in other countries to learn best practices, doing field trips, networking with business, as Mr. Juneau-Katsuya said. In your daily work, through networking contacts and public education, there is a huge role to play.


Mr. Juneau-Katsuya: That is a very important issue, because unfortunately we are also confronted with some naïveté on the part of members and elected representatives. We see that in the area of counter-intelligence and antiterrorism.

Take for instance a community of great significance in Toronto, the Tamils. For a long time, and still today, the LTTE dominated the Tamil community. Given the size of the community in Toronto, they cover three electoral ridings.

For a very long time, too long, political parties and governments over the last 20 years had ignored the alarm bells and calls for help from the community. The LTTE had literally taken its own community hostage.

The LTTE, in other words the Tamil Tigers, had no intention of harming the Canadian people in general, but had found a way to take money from their people. The authorities estimated that on average $10 million had been extorted from the Tamil community and sent away to support Tamil terrorist activities abroad. This happened despite constant appeals from the authorities to government to warn them of this hostage-like situation. It is our responsibility to protect our citizens.

Fortunately, the situation changed a few years ago when the government finally decided to list the LTTE as a terrorist group. Immediately, in the span of two weeks, the RCMP started carrying out searches to find essential information which would serve to bring the group's leadership to its knees.

My example illustrates the extent to which it is important for elected representatives to get information from CSIS and the authorities.

We have a great deal of information available to us. It is very important to access it so as not to give tacit, direct or implicit support to groups that do not deserve it nor want it. The information is important also because we do not want to look ridiculous being at a photo op or taking part in things. In reality, the rest of the world is looking at us and wondering what is going on over there when the United States, Europe, even the UN took 10 years to find the LTTE was a terrorist group. That is the first point.

Another important point regarding politicians is that they should listen to the community and business people who are prepared to financially contribute to doing this so long as they get something in exchange. There needs to be something in it for them, but they are prepared to engage in the fight and to contribute.

Politicians need to translate these demands into concrete action where the authorities can support private sector initiatives.


Mr. Hamilton: I have a specific role to recommend for parliamentarians and enthusiastic backbenchers, to spearhead this outreach program that I talked about before. I am aware that the Mounties and CSIS have such a program, but I was envisioning something much more comprehensive. MPs would be great in spearheading the coordination of business and teachers into one. Let us do it at the microlevel to see if it works; start locally. Get the MP to bring all these things together. Business will be crucial because my plan would see 100 per cent of the money come from business. The government has its hands full and should spend its money on what it is doing with enforcement, et cetera. I want to come up with something that does not cost the government a cent, so parliamentarians would have to be the lobbyists, which they are good at doing. It would not take much to shame these people into compliance to find the money to start the programs. That would be my role for parliamentarians.

Senator Wallin: We have been discussing this over the course of a couple of weeks. As we do each week, I will try to deal with this question.

Mr. Crelinsten has laid it out specifically. We have the criminal justice model and the anti-terrorist model in terms of how we see the behaviour of those involved in acts of terror. You will see my biases here. My question is about crime versus terror. I would like each answer to be in the context of Mr. Hamilton's remarks that terrorists are not angry and, therefore, we cannot placate them by being nicer or by changing the way we deal with them or by understanding them or by lending them an ear. We know it is harder to prosecute acts of terror in a transparent media-saturated democracy. Is that why we have opted for the criminal model or is there some other justification that I am missing?

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya: When we face the issue of terrorism, as I tried to state in my comments, we are working on two different planes. When we talk about forced intervention by authorities, we are confronted with an immediate threat. We are ``under siege'' and the threat is real. Unfortunately, that only treats the symptom because the root cause of the problem is elsewhere.

The criminal element versus the anti-terrorism element creates a challenge for our society. In a sense, we want to use both in a way, yet have two avenues. That confusion will have to be resolved in due course through the justice system. Along the way, it will be challenged all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada, who will define what is what. Perhaps that is part of the problem that we created with the anti-terrorist element versus the criminal element. At the same time, it was not criminal action. We needed something different.

Senator Wallin: That is what I am trying to get at. When we have acts of terror, I know it is difficult to prosecute, and they end up suing us. At some point, we have to make a judgment about this. If we are to pursue it as a criminal matter, then we have to toughen the criminal model. If we are to pursue it using the anti-terrorist model, then the separate legislation will have to be more transparent to be acceptable. We are moving by default if we put it in the criminal justice system and, thereby, creating a whole host of other problems.

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya: Our safeguard mechanisms have been built into the criminal justice system, within which we have some fundamentals that prevent us from doing what the Bush Administration did, which was to go supra-judicial. That is the dangerous problem. We will have to be accountable to someone for that one day.

Senator Wallin: It is just different.

The Chair: As a supplementary, Mr. Hamilton said that a grievance adjustment system outside the courts might make more sense. My question, which is consistent with what we have heard so far, is: Would that grievance adjustment system be notwithstanding the Charter of Rights and Freedoms? Would we suspend the operation of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms — i.e. bring in legislation? The Supreme Court of Canada has just ruled that not only does the Charter of Rights and Freedoms apply to all court activities but also to federal and provincial administrative tribunals across the country. What you suggest constitutes a potential bridge between Senator Wallin's concern about two different streams and the constraints we have with the different models that Mr. Crelinsten has referenced in terms of our approach. Is there a kernel of a new idea that you want the committee to reflect upon more seriously? We would appreciate your advice on the matter.

Mr. Hamilton: I will work on the question and get back to the committee. With the Criminal Code system, intelligence services have a problem. I know this is not classified but I do not know whether the public is aware that the Toronto 18 strike was at least the third cell in Toronto. The first cell was Algerian and the second cell al Qaeda. The problem that the Mounties and CSIS had was that they could not produce Criminal Code evidence, which is needed to hold up in a criminal court.

Senator Wallin: That is what I was saying.

Mr. Hamilton: The problem in this world of terrorism is that often when you reach that point, it is too late because the terrorist momentum has gone past the chance to catch these people.

CSIS and the Mounties followed a standard operating procedure: they performed a disrupt action. Some of the guys in the cell left the country and some of them did not leave. Basically, CSIS and the RCMP make the cell aware that they are being monitored and they try to put pressure on them. I know that the Mounties and CSIS did the absolute best they could do but, quite frankly, we have to fix the system because it is not good enough.

I believe that I speak for many Canadians when I say that we do not care if they are disrupted terrorists; we simply do not want them running around. We have to find some way that law enforcement agencies and intelligence agencies can deal with some of these people without having to produce that much.

Historically, terrorism wound up in the Criminal Code system. Since more recent events, what has changed is mostly a loss-of-life issue so that they resemble acts of war.

The Chair: Senator Wallin, did you want to add to that?

Senator Wallin: I think we are getting at it. I do not know whether Mr. Crelinsten has anything else to say, but I think we are getting to the heart of it right there with Mr. Hamilton's remarks.

The Chair: Professor Crelinsten talked about the different models but, I think it is fair to say, as I read through the actual written presentation, did not tilt towards any particular model but seemed to imply that a mix of different models was necessary, depending on the context. Is that a fair reading of your advice to the committee?

Mr. Crelinsten: It is a fair reading, and as you talk about criminal justice and war, the history is interesting. In the 1985 Senate hearings William Kelly chaired, terrorism was not in the Criminal Code. Murder was and all the things that terrorists do were in the Criminal Code, and I actually testified and argued that it is good that way because the minute you create special offences you get into this mess.

After 9/11, I was not in the country and I would not have stopped it anyway — I could not have because the momentum was just too huge — and many countries went that way. Australia went that way, as did the U.K. Germany did not, somehow. They do not have specific anti-terrorism offences; they use procedure. However, I referred to the ``when to arrest'' question, and this is really it. The U.K. goes as long as possible with their intelligence. They even risk an attack coming. They will go as late as possible, and the 2006 liquid plot in fact was finally broken up because of a media leak through Condoleezza Rice's press conference and they just had to act quickly, but they were very angry. The U.S. is now using law enforcement for disruptive practices. They will arrest quickly just to keep them off balance.

As a criminologist I would argue for a return to pure criminal justice. It performs a deterrence function, but in cases to avoid all the problems you have, you have to beef up your intelligence and rely on intelligence much more until you can get a good case. In cases where you cannot, then the U.K. tried control orders, house arrest, and the courts do not allow it because we are democracies.

In that case, you do your best, and that is where the other list comes in. Solving the Palestinian conflict would ultimately solve a lot of the problems, but that is foreign affairs and is much longer term. The gender model I mentioned, educating women and girls. Ziad Jarrah, the man who flew the plane that was crashed in Pennsylvania, had a Turkish girlfriend. Against orders of Ramzi Binalshibh, he insisted on going back to Hamburg to say goodbye. There was a chance he would have been dissuaded. The head of al Qaeda in Maghreb quit because his wife told him to, so women play a role here. Educating women, they have fewer kids, they have fewer what the Chinese call bare branches around — these idle men who wander into anything from skydiving to terrorism. Development, all these other models are crucial. To avoid the problems we have now, rely on the intelligence model as long as you can until you have good evidence and then hit it with criminal justice.

Senator Jaffer: I have a quick comment on what Professor Crelinsten said about women playing a role. I worked with women in the tribal land in Pakistan. We are trying to dissuade young men from becoming suicide bombers, speaking to their mothers, but it is a long-term process. It is trying to direct our resources to another area.

There are so many questions I could ask, but we have limited time, so I will concentrate on one area which causes me great anxiety, and that is what we call homegrown terrorists. It was encouraging to hear from all of you that we need to deal with the symptoms. If I get a second question, I will ask you about that aspect.

You have all addressed the issue of homegrown. You have talked about other terrorism, but I want to concentrate on the jihadist. If you were to do a list, what do we need to reach out to people in the community? For example, some time ago, we set up the terrorism round table. I do not know what happened to the terrorism round table; we do not hear about it anymore. A round table of community leaders had been set up. Today, I am not sure what we are doing in the community to reach out to young people. You talked about the teachers.

If there was a to-do list, if we were doing a report, what do we need to look at to reach out to these young people to make them inclusive? You have talked about them being part of the security force, and I was encouraged with the great strides CSIS has made. I think we are doing that, but what else do we need to do?

Mr. Crelinsten: From the government perspective, we are in a bit of a dilemma with the homegrown terrorists, because the more it looks government-led, the more you have problems of trust. It has to start in the communities with community leaders, teachers, schools. Some of the de-radicalization programs in Singapore and Malaysia and some of those countries use what is called a mentoring process. Here might be a role for parliamentarians at the very local level too, to go back to Senator Joyal's question. You have to work with the communities so that they trust the authorities to come to them when they see problems happening.

Let us not forget that it was the father of the Christmas bomber who warned people. It was the system that failed. Families are concerned and they should know which number to dial, who to get to, and parliamentarians could work on that in maintaining open lines.

It has to start through the community through education and through trust building. You used the word ``long- term.'' This is the most important thing to mention. It goes way beyond an electoral horizon. On a one-to-one level, they found creating a sense of belonging, a sense of empowerment, a sense that they can get a job, do something useful and fruitful works best. I was being flippant when I said you can do something from skydiving to terrorism. Many of these young men are risk-seekers. They are thrill-seekers and could easily be channelled towards skydiving. I would not underestimate something like allowing communities to have skydiving programs, thrill-seeking programs, something else they could do. Perhaps soccer — the World Cup — sports, education, and religion of course is very important in terms of countering the inaccurate interpretations of the Quran and Islam. There are many specific concepts that are misrepresented.

I will give you one example: that all Muslims should distrust non-Muslims. I forget the Arabic phrase for it, but it is wrong. Muhammad was very respectful of the King of Persia, for instance, so it is just wrong, but they say it. How do you educate them? Most of the young jihadis do not know Islam. They do not know Arabic. They listen to radical preachers on the web or in illegal mosques and they speak in English, and they learn a mishmash and use it to justify things. We need counter-narratives

I was at a conference in Australia where the Victoria police work very well with the communities at risk. It is a very good model. The RCMP is looking at similar things. Mr. Hamilton mentioned it as well, but one woman at the conference said, ``I am a Muslim; I am part of the Victoria community, and when they come to the religious leaders, I am an atheist, I never go to the mosque, I feel left out.'' Privileging only religion is not right. We have to know who the communities are and who all the leaders are.

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya: When we talk specifically about homegrown terrorism, we are talking about young men and women who are feeding themselves, just like we have been told a moment ago, with ideas coming from abroad. They are not necessarily people who are experiencing oppression. They are not necessarily people who saw their homes destroyed by a military commanding officer or anything of that nature. They are people who have been recruited intellectually, ideologically, and eventually, because they are young, emotionally, and that represents a phenomenal challenge.

The community can do a lot. We need to extend our perspective. Our natural tendency is to look at Al Qaeda and Muslim radicals, but there are many more. For instance, there was an incident in the Sikh community in B.C. recently where a parade was held to glorify martyrs, bombers and terrorists. This cannot be tolerated by the community. We have laws that enable us to step in immediately and stop this. It was community leaders who organized that parade, and we cannot tolerate that.

Unfortunately, within the psychology of a terrorist, in addition to seeking the thrill there is a romanticized idea of being a freedom fighter, of fighting for one's brothers and sisters. They have not even experienced the things against which they are fighting, but they get totally engulfed by them.

We need to work with the community leaders and somehow demonstrate that Canada, and the Western world at large, is serious in trying to address some of the grievances I talked about. When there is no tangible action, the moderates have no voice. It fuels the extremists, who say, ``See, we told you that they are doing nothing.'' We have to give a voice to the moderates.

Mr. Hamilton: I have been hearing from the community that many of them are very scared to speak out, which is understandable.

The Chair: Are you saying that moderates and people who would have no interest in violence in many of these communities are frightened to speak out?

Mr. Hamilton: Yes. From Tarek Fatah, a spokesperson in Toronto, we have heard that we must come up with a way of directly communicating with them without creating fear or risk to them. We have to put them at ease. Moderate Muslim Canadians are the future of our country. Unless we seize that now, we could be in a lot of trouble.

Senator Tkachuk: I am not a big fan of the grievance theory. I do not think a person becomes an anti-Semite on his own. There is a culture that helps make a person believe what he believes, and it is all around those people. Bin Laden was not interested in the Palestinian cause. Before 9/11, he said he gravitated toward terrorism because the Americans were in Saudi Arabia. It was a foreign policy question; it was not a big deal. It was not that people were being killed or starved to death in Saudi Arabia. He went nuts and recruited all these people because the Americans were in Saudi Arabia. It is difficult to overcome a man like that who is able to recruit people. I think he was able to recruit those people because of the milieu in which those people live, which is totalitarianism, anti-democracy and lots of hate to go around about Jews, White people and Christians, all of which makes them easy pickings.

What is our narrative to the homegrown people who are being fed the same stuff and are responding to it?

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya: That is an accurate comment. Before becoming an anti-foreign policy element, bin Laden was a creation of the CIA. He was created to serve a purpose during the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. He became disillusioned when the CIA abandoned that group.

I agree with you that terrorists will pick whatever cause will help them. Sometimes they will use the Palestinian cause to recruit, sometimes the promise of 77 virgins, and sometimes Saudi Arabia.

Senator Tkachuk: He went back to Saudi Arabia and took part in his family's business. They were wealthy construction people. He did not become a revolutionary because the CIA made him one; he already was one.

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya: I agree that he was recruited because of his inclination. I said earlier that these young people are recruited intellectually. Homegrown terrorists are not recruited because of what they have experienced. The terrorists that come from abroad are recruited for a multitude of reasons. However, there is a common denominator. I believe that religion is a minute component of recruitment. A larger component is the political-ideological perspective that is fed by some of the events that they witness.

You are talking about ideology, anti-Semitic attitude, et cetera. That is rooted in the culture that comes from historical events. That is how a culture evolves. It does not appear suddenly; it is nourished and built over time.

In the Israeli-Palestinian situation, probably all families on both sides of the fence have experienced grief and loss of loved ones. Some people may think that that makes it impossible to reconcile these people, but I do not think so. I think we can reconcile them by demonstrating certain actions within our community.

As an example, President Obama recently asked that the term ``Islamic extremist'' no longer be used, because not all Muslim people are extremists. It is very important to be sensitive and careful about what and who we are talking about. Being careful about the discourses that we have can go a long way.

Senator Tkachuk: Not using the language does not make it so. In other words, they also no longer use the word ``terrorist'' down south, but that does not mean that there are not terrorists. There is such a thing as Islamic extremists, and they are a particular group within the community that is causing the problem.

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya: Why not call them ``religious extremists'' so we can include the Christian militia also?

Senator Tkachuk: That is not true. There are no Christian militia bombing buildings like the World Trade Centre. No Christian group has gone to war.

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya: The Oklahoma City bombing was done by a militia.

Senator Tkachuk: The Oklahoma City bombing was done by a person inside but not for religious reasons. It was for political reasons. He was a nutbar who thought the government was too powerful and he wanted to blow it up. The fact that he happened to be of a particular religious persuasion does not really matter.

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya: When we look at their recruitment and their discourses and other aspects, Christianity, White power and so on had a lot to do with it.

Senator Tkachuk: Are you saying that this particular person, this one person —

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya: McVeigh.

Senator Tkachuk: — who caused that criminal act in Oklahoma, can be correlated to the group that took the flights on 9/11, to al Qaeda? Are they the same thing?

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya: There is a very similar pattern in terms of discourses, motivation, in terms of the generation of the will to do what they have done. They are not the same words but the same pattern.

Senator Tkachuk: That is very interesting.

I have one more question. I am not familiar with how Revenue Canada treats charitable donations to religious groups, except that religious groups can write receipts for charitable donations. How are Muslims organized? An imam can open up a place in a shopping centre and call it a mosque. Does Revenue Canada then treat him as a charitable group?

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya: There is an application process. If they qualify during the application process and everything, yes.

Senator Tkachuk: How does a religious group qualify? How does our Ukrainian Catholic church in Saskatoon qualify? Do they send that application in as a national organization, do they have the same income tax number, or do they send it as an individual church in that parish?

The Chair: It might also be helpful, independent from the answers from our panellists on this question, for us to request a detailed research note on the precise point. Therefore, the way various religious groups go to CRA and are approved, and what the tests and thresholds are going forward about their activities. That would be helpful and I would appreciate that very much.

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya: In two lines, basically they have a process, they can apply, and it is a fairly rubber stamp, easy process to obtain this kind of nomination. One of the problems that we in Canada face is that many sects have been able to obtain that privileged status. Similarly, we also face the problem that there are not enough CRA officers to investigate those organizations. That loophole has been used and abused for a long period of time by various terrorist groups to funnel money through various perspectives, and even criminal organizations to a certain extent.

Since 9/11, much emphasis has been put on trying to break the back of terrorists by breaking their financial capabilities. Unfortunately, this will come to an end to a certain extent. It might work in Canada for a time but it will come to an end very soon due to this new trend I just mentioned. If narco-terrorism now is becoming a wonderful source of wealth through moving cocaine for cartels, they will not need necessarily as much as they used to from this source.

Senator Tkachuk: Money is big in all of this. If bin Laden had not been worth a couple of hundred million dollars, I do not think he would have been as successful as he was.

Senator Nolin: I want to go back to the fundamental question that was asked by Senator Wallin: Which model should we pursue, criminal or otherwise? I liked your answer, Professor Crelinsten, because I am of a similar view. When we were first studying the law, many people around the table felt that we should work with the Criminal Code, because we are better at working within it than creating new crimes.

Mr. Hamilton, I was intrigued by your answer when you mentioned that in Toronto there is a problem with the Criminal Code and quality of evidence. I do not know the answer. If law enforcement faces a problem of enforcing the law maybe the law is not clear. That is probably the problem. Maybe we will have to change and amend the wording of the crime itself. Otherwise, should we create a parallel system? Who will referee that system?

That is the question Senator Wallin asked. I think we have a good system.

Mr. Hamilton: The term ``parallel system'' makes me nervous.

Senator Nolin: Likewise; we are still a country of law. The rule of law is critical.

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya: The security certificate was a parallel system. It was a total failure. The right for a country to protect itself and to remove undesirable elements is a totally acceptable right.


Senator Nolin: I fully agree with you.

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya: On the other hand, CSIS is now faced with a situation where they are called to testify; and rather than reveal the evidence they have amassed, because they have not acquired it in the context of criminal proceedings, we see that after having spent millions of dollars on legal proceedings, some may accuse us — the United Nations do so — of having misused the law in going after certain individuals.

So, CSIS is in a position where it has to withdraw charges at the last minute rather than go ahead because it does not want to reveal its evidence. That is quite problematic. Some would say that it has led us to a dead end and that perhaps we should have let the RCMP continue to do the work that it was doing in the past.


Senator Nolin: The question raised by Senator Wallin is fundamental to the work of this committee. Should we pursue the criminal model? That model was not started last week. Jurisprudence has been built over more than 120 years. In 1982 we made the Charter part of our structure. Because we have hurdles in the system do we create a new one? I personally do not agree.

The Chair: Just as a point of history, if we think about the War Measures Act, it was basically an instrument to set aside all the protections of the criminal law.

Senator Nolin: We have had some experience with that.

The Chair: Indeed. Then if you think about the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which emerged in the post-War Measures Act period, and then if you think about the way in which they have been invoked at various times, legitimately by defence counsel on behalf of their clients — which is what an open system of jurisprudence provides — and then if you think about the requirement to break up something before it happens on a prophylactic basis, whether you have sufficient evidence to prosecute or not, we get to the nub, I think, of the question you are dealing with.

Senator Nolin: That is law enforcement. If they need more powers then that is probably a good question. Do they need more power and more flexibility in enforcing the law? That is something we may discuss.

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya: One of the challenges that exist is within the education of the judges. We have seen some pretty strange conclusions. We have seen it in the Air India trial. We have seen it in the Khawaja trial. One of the problems we are facing is perhaps the education and knowledge of judges.

From the law enforcement point of view, personally my position is criminal. We should revise and fine-tune the Criminal Code if necessary, because we have, as I mentioned in my previous answer, some of the safeguard mechanisms within that system. As you pointed out, it has been around for 120 years, and we have polished that ``furniture'' for quite a while.

Senator Nolin: We have made some errors, we have corrected them and still some errors exist.

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya: It is a work-in-progress.

The Chair: Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Crelinsten, do you want to respond to the question put by Senator Nolin?

Mr. Crelinsten: I said before that if you want to stick with criminal justice, you have to rely on the intelligence to get as much as you can to build a good case. The first trial of anyone implicated in the 9/11 attacks was in Germany, and the trial failed ultimately because the U.S. refused to release any evidence that could be used in court. The proof is usually there, but it is protected. The RCMP commissioner said at a conference last year that you have to educate intelligence and law enforcement people about how to share, and intelligence people should perhaps collect intelligence with criminal prosecution in mind so they can share more. There is also the foreign intelligence, which is crucial. You do not want to ruin your relations, which can become another reason to step back. You have to work with foreign agencies, too, to create a culture of law enforcement and respect for intelligence sharing across the spectrum. All these stovepipes were created — the Church commission in the U.S. and the McDonald commission here — and we have our histories where we try to separate intelligence. Now, 9/11 has brought them back together again.

Mr. Hamilton: Are legislators comfortable with the notion of tinkering with certain things with in the Criminal Code? That would be a lot better than throwing out the baby with the bath water, because at least you have a grid work to start with. You can foresee problems if, for example, for this offence, you get so much, but if it is terrorism, you get an extra penalty or something. You can foresee many gray areas. Is the potential harm that a terrorist could do to the country greater than the potential harm a criminal could do? If it is multiplied by 5,000, policy-makers have a real sticky wicket to deal with. We have been raised to value life as being sacred. One life equals 500. I do not know how, ethically, we could get our heads around that subject, but pragmatically, given the potential harm one terrorist could do, it does exceed what a criminal act would be.

Senator Nolin: Mr. Juneau-Katsuya, the definition implies an element of intent. We had hours of discussion around this table in the previous committee, talking about whether or not intent should be an aspect of the crime. When you start with the intent, you create a nightmare for lawyers.

Senator Wallin: However, that element is in the law right now, and that is important.

Senator Nolin: We were wondering whether we should keep intent in the law.


Mr. Juneau, you were talking to us about the protection of critical infrastructure. You were referring to the fact that over 80 per cent of this infrastructure is privately owned. You seemed to elaborate on the fact that there are modes of interaction between security services and the private sector that have not worked. I would like to hear you expand on that.

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya: They have not even seen the light of day.

Senator Nolin: I understand; is it because there is a wall there?

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya: That is it! Resistance comes from the authorities. The responsibility for critical infrastructure protection is that of government, the owners or operators are mainly from the private sector. When the time comes to move from being reactive to being proactive, we then ask the authorities to provide information, so that we can get an idea of the problem ahead of time so as to diminish its impact. Unfortunately, the authorities say that they cannot share information for a variety of reasons such as national security, a lack of security clearance, et cetera. Any excuse works so as not to have to share information.

Senator Nolin: In your document, you referred to models that had been suggested to them. What were these models?

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya: The main one is mainly inspired by something that is already operational in the United States, the ISAC, Information Sharing Analysis Center. This is more or less how it works. It began under the Clinton administration. You bring together companies from certain industrial sectors, establish a price for each company, which amounts to taking on the cost of operations — and these companies share information with a team responsible for analyzing it. Once you add in the information coming from government, you are able to bring the various components together.

I will give you an example of an incident that occurred in 2002. A group of 25 security heads of major Alberta oil companies meet once a month to discuss security matters. The goal is not to be competitive or work against other companies, but to help each other. At one of these meetings, one security head raised his hand to say that his company had just received a bomb threat letter and that anyone hearing of anything similar should let him know. Someone else replied that three weeks before, someone had broken into one of his warehouses and stolen dynamite sticks. Each head had reported to its own RCMP detachment, but the RCMP had not made the connections.

That said, it all turned out well. Following the meeting, this most recent information was handed to the RCMP, which proceeded to make some arrests. The dynamite sticks were found. Everything is fine, but if someone had stolen this dynamite in Nova Scotia and had brought it by bus, for instance, to Alberta, things would have been different, as one of the members said, that link would not have been made. The conclusion is that we must share this information amongst all of us.

The problem is that the authorities do not want to share this information because it is too sensitive. So, we will be basing ourselves on the American model and create a similar entity. The American government provided $3 million to create these groups, of which there are 12. The rest of the cost is privately funded.

Senator Nolin: By the members because it is their property.

The Chair: Does anyone want to add anything?


Senator Furey: My question is along the lines of Senator Nolin's. Any time we talk about this particular issue, it always revolves around trying to balance security needs with Charter rights. As you said, Mr. Hamilton, if we tweak the Criminal Code, we cannot tweak it without bumping up against the Charter. You talked about Director Richard Fadden of CSIS when mentioning a loose partnership of various groups. Another witness quoted Director Fadden as well. I guess you cannot be director of CSIS and not be oft quoted. One quotation that was brought to our attention is that he said, in effect, there is an accidental cabal of single issue NGOs, advocacy journalists and lawyers that has succeeded in inhibiting our counter-terror effectiveness. Do you agree with that? Where do you see this balance? Do you see it going in favour of our need for security, or do you see something more on respect of the Charter rights side?

Mr. Crelinsten: That type of talk worries me, I have to say.

Senator Furey: You mean Director Fadden's talk?

Mr. Crelinsten: Yes. Not yours. Thank you for raising that.

The Chair: Many of us worry about Senator Furey, but not to that extent.

Mr. Crelinsten: Maybe one day.

In any case, people do their jobs. Defence lawyers have to do their job. The media has to do their job. I did refer to the media earlier. I do not know what was in Inspector Fadden's head when he said that or in what context he was speaking or whether he was trying to be provocative.

It reminds me of the time I was interviewed by a CJOH reporter in Ottawa. CSIS had just been formed in 1984, and most of CSIS was former RCMP security officers. A Soviet diplomat was being tailed by CSIS, and he did the classic trick of slowing down at a green light and speeding off when it turned red. CSIS followed through the red light and Ottawa police stopped and ticketed them. His question was, ``Is this not outrageous? Is our security not threatened?'' My response was along the lines of: There are rules for civilian security agents; they have to follow the law. They should have more equipment so that they can say, ``I lost them; you pick it up over there.'' There are solutions other than breaking our laws. If they do not like it, they can go back to the RCMP. The reporter was not happy because he was looking for a certain angle.

We live in a democracy. It is much easier to fight terrorism in a totalitarian state. Someone might have referred to Israeli Justice Barak's famous phrase about fighting with one hand behind our back. As I said in my remarks, the democratic approach ultimately strengthens our security. We have to then think about how we deal with this aspect. We have to let the defence do their job.

I was asked to be a witness for the defence in a Palestinian case. Someone was accused of terrorism, and the defence lawyer asked me if I would testify in a trial involving an attack on a plane. The plane belonged to EL AL and was used for a civilian purpose sometimes and for a military purpose sometimes. It was attacked when it was in civilian use, but the attack was considered an act of war. I said I would not testify because I do not agree.

Lawyers try to find the best case. It is the same with the media. That is their right. If they make mistakes, as we all do, they should be called on them. Transparency is important. Maybe CSIS's job is harder because they are under the spotlight, but then they have to train better and develop things better.

The Chair: Mr. Hamilton, do you want to add anything?

Mr. Hamilton: I certainly do not want to quote Mr. Fadden for the third time. I received a phone call when that comment went out in the paper, and my boss, who was an editor for many years, said, ``This guy sounds like you. All you do is say this all the time.'' I said, ``Yes, it is more than just a one-off.'' I used to do it for a living, and I know how to juxtapose headlines, utilize neuro-linguistic programming to get an effect. Basically, I know how to not tell the truth by telling the truth and vice versa, like anyone who would be in the media.

The Chair: Are you forcing me to defend the integrity of the media? Are you putting me in that situation as chair of the committee? I am asking the rhetorical question so I am prepared for when that moment comes.

Mr. Hamilton: No, I am dead against press censorship, of course. I think there could be a window of opportunity. Back in the 1980s when Reagan and Thatcher were in power, and there were many airline hijackings. There was the famous TWA one, the guy up in the cockpit with the pilot and they would not let the plane leave the tarmac. The Americans did it this way. The media was not trying to be obstructionist but were letting things leak and screwing up the negotiations for the hostage release. The Americans wanted to work on a set of guidelines, and believe it or not, the press went along with it because the press did not want to be seditious or whatever.

I am not saying it will be that easy, but there needs to be some sort of initiative because censorship is not possible because you cannot break down that pillar because tyranny begins when freedom ends.

The Chair: Not to be provocative, but to add historically, when Ambassador Taylor was so helpful in getting the Americans out of Iran, the Canadian media did, I believe, show remarkable restraint. They had the story long before it was written. They were asked to show restraint. Their own judgment led them to show restraint, and that restraint was vital to a successful execution of the operation to get those folks out of Tehran. It is not a one-sided story, to be fair, and I am not suggesting you are implying that.

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya: As Mr. Crelinsten just said, everyone has a job to do. I do not know what Director Fadden had in mind when he spoke, but his statement was criticizing a certain critique that comes from certain individuals. This critique is healthy in our system. If anything, I would say that CSIS has to carry its own cross because they do not talk enough. When journalists call and try to be informed about what is going on, the only thing they get is ``no comment.'' That does not help. Somewhere, somehow, the cynical perspective, which I may have sometimes, will reason that maybe it is because it serves their own purpose when they do that.

We were talking about the private sector a moment ago. I am in the private sector. For 31 years I have been a practitioner in the field of security and intelligence. If I am on contract and I fail, it is not long before my client will cut me off. If CSIS fails and there is another terrorist attack, their budget doubles. What is the incentive to work harder here, to a certain extent?

The Chair: You are not questioning the motivation, just the judgment they apply on occasion to their execution, just so we are clear?

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya: Exactly. Thank you very much. In that perspective, my preoccupation is with not sharing or educating the general public. For example, immediately after 9/11, popular polling was done. Surveys revealed that over 50 per cent of the population were ready to let some of their civil rights go in order to feel safer. I would say, ``Time out. Some of those civil rights take generations to come to fruition.'' We have to be able to educate the general population.

I think the journalists, lawyers and so on ask the right questions because these are the beacons that we have in these moments of fog and challenge. If anything at all, I would like CSIS to educate more — not turn out propaganda but do more to educate the general population.

Senator Tkachuk: We have talked about the parallel system and a number of questions were raised by Senator Furey and Senator Nolin, but when the terrorists attacked on 9/11, it was not an act of murder, although it was murder. They were committing an act that they believed was the beginning of the end of civilization, of the end of the right to have civil rights, of the end of the right to have a charter of rights. Their goal is not to kill someone; their goal is to kill so many people that all our rights are lost. There must be a crime that is so terrible that we would need to treat it in a totally different manner and say this is not a normal crime committed against an individual because they do not like the individual. This crime is a threat to all of us and to the very essence of a free and democratic society.

I do not want to get to the point of saying that we should suspend civil rights but there are certain crimes that require us in democratic societies to look at them in a totally different way. It has nothing to do with protecting civil rights. It is to protect us so that we can protect civil rights.

The Chair: Mr. Crelinsten, would you engage first on that?

Mr. Crelinsten: This is a key question, and it relates to understanding what terrorism is all about. You hit it on the head when you said that the aim is not murder per se because the people who are attacked are just vehicles for something else.

However, I think you are a bit blinded by the numbers involved. Going back to the October crisis, I have always said the October crisis teaches us everything we need to know when we are talking around this table because we learned everything there. When Pierre Laporte was kidnapped, some of you might remember the reports of a Nelson cell. The way in which Paul Rose wrote his communiqués and operated made people think that the FLQ were much bigger. It was not 9/11 but it caused panic in all levels of government and the War Measures Act, which had not been used since WWII, was invoked and soldiers patrolled the streets. The solution came from the police, despite all the people who were rounded up.

To Trudeau's credit, the special emergency regulations under the War Measures Act were removed in several months; so there was a sunset. When you look at it from this perspective, a huge crisis was dealt with in an emergency way, then it was over and we went back. In fact, we co-opted many of the separatists and helped them with many programs in the long term. Many of them went to the Partis Quebecois and took the political route, which has had its consequences. The main goal of 9/11 was not to end civilization as we know it; it was to trigger a reaction that would raise revolutions in apostate regimes in the Middle East. It was not related to the faraway enemy at that point.

A political scientist by the name of Jeanne Knutson once said that there are two thresholds that terrorists have to be concerned about: One is a threshold of attention in that they must do something interesting enough or they will be ignored. The other is the level of violence in that if they go too far, they will provoke a backlash. From al Qaeda's point of view, 9/11 was a mistake because they triggered a backlash — the invasion of Afghanistan. Iraq was a mistake that gave victory to al Qaeda. They grabbed victory from defeat because 9/11 went too far and triggered the correct response, the invasion of Afghanistan and the overthrow of the Taliban. If we had stopped there and forgotten about Iraq, we might be better off today.

Senator Furey: My question is to Mr. Juneau-Katsuya is a bit off the beaten track but important. You mentioned in your opening comments that foreign espionage is having a huge impact on our economy. Can you elaborate on that?

The Chair: There might even be a book to reference on this. I will not do that because that would be inappropriate, but our guest might do so.

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya: Thank you for offering me this marketing opportunity. I co-authored a book entitled Nest of Spies: The Startling Truth About Foreign Agents at Work Within Canada's Borders. To quantify what I am talking about, there are five types of espionage activity in Canada: economic; industrial; foreign interference, whereby countries send their police to manipulate, intimidate and control communities; political, whereby people manipulate the democratic process and our elected officials; and military. All these forms of espionage affect our society. The greatest financial impact is with economic and industrial espionage. Economic espionage occurs when a country sends its intelligence service to steal our trade secrets. Industrial espionage occurs when one company steals secrets from another company. At the end of the day, such activities do damage to our country.

In 1995, I was with CSIS as the Chief of Asia-Pacific. I asked one of my analysts at the time to perform an assessment based on fact: How much money are we losing annually because of economic or industrial espionage? We were able to demonstrate that at the time we were losing on average $10 billion to $12 billion per year in Canada. In the U.S. a similar study was conducted. They estimated a loss of $24 billion, which is twice as much. However, their economy is 10 times bigger than ours, so per ratio, we were losing five times more than the U.S. A small country like ours cannot afford such a loss. To my knowledge, no other study of that nature, to try to quantify and qualify how much money we are losing, has been produced. Unfortunately, the U.S. has prepared more studies. The director of the FBI recently revealed that in its estimation, the U.S. currently loses $250 billion per year. They have experienced an exponential increase. We can only speculate that if we double what we lost in 1995, we are probably close to the reality.


The Chair: I remember that, as I had an opportunity to read your book in detail.


I do not think that you made a connection between the espionage issue, which is real and compelling, and an approximate terrorist threat. Is that fair to say?

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya: I did not make that link. The two issues function on different planes.

The next question is: Why Canada? Why do we have so much? There are myriad reasons. First, there is a lack of discussion around the subject. All governments, one after the other, refuse to talk about it. They practice the policy of speak no evil, see no evil. That goes to the detriment of our industries because companies are not aware that they have been spied upon. They come to Canada because Canada is a knowledge-based society. We have phenomenal research centres, and we offer a lot of cutting edge technology in many fields, but we do not have a law to protect us. Two short sections were added in an impromptu fashion when we revised the Official Secrets Act, but they have never been used. There is no law so law enforcement does not devote any attention to that perspective and, therefore, there are no resources to investigate.

At the end of the day, the private sector is left to its own devices to try to protect itself, which it is capable of doing. That speaks to the business culture, more than to anything else, which comes from awareness. In my humble estimate, if not for the fact that terrorist acts kill people, foreign espionage would be and should be the most pressing national security issue for Canada.

Since no one has looked at it, I humbly suggest that this committee address these issues. You have the capability to investigate and to call witnesses. We cannot pretend to be capable of determining solutions if we are ignorant of the issues.

Senator Patterson: I would like to raise something that was not focused on much in the presentations but is significant: the role of the Internet in promoting terrorism. Investigations using the Internet have been effective in identifying back to source and prosecuting child offenders. Do you have comments on the role of the Internet in radicalizing our youth? Putting aside the question of criminal law versus other approaches, should there be provisions against promoting terrorism on the Internet?

Mr. Hamilton: The Internet is so significant that you could say it is possibly the new spine of how a terrorist organization would go about executing some of its strategies. That will accelerate. Since I wrote the last book, there have been changes that fundamentally altered the way in which people communicate, such as YouTube and Twitter. Those applications are only a couple of years old. If technology is growing at that speed, we will probably see more things in the next five years. In other words, it is growing exponentially. The rate is the same with weapons technology. Both of those elements are danger zones. I have no idea what sort of weapons we will have on the street in 10 years. I can walk into Radio Shack today and find stuff selling for $4.99 that the best armies in the world did not have 10 or 20 years ago.

I hesitate to predict. We should give it ten years, but getting the checks in place now would be a very good idea.

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya: You are totally right. Communication at large, and the Internet in particular, is a phenomenal challenge for the intelligence and law enforcement agencies. With the data that we can send through an iPhone or any device of that nature we can take a picture of someone getting off a plane and send it immediately to a hit team that will then have the exact description of the person they are looking to hit. Terrorists now have encryption to which we do not have the key, because it is mathematically impossible to break their codes.

The young generation is phenomenally agile in employing those technologies. This is a phenomenal challenge for law enforcement. They can communicate across borders without interception.

As someone once said, ``It is not the message, it is the medium.'' The medium is being used to manipulate the minds of all sorts of radicals. That has happened to many young people. We see various groups exploiting this medium. About two years ago, an al Qaeda-related group sent a message that Canada should be attacked and, more specifically, the oil industry in Alberta. Next to giving a street address, it is somewhat difficult to stop there. That is a way to communicate at large with an audience that welcomes those messages. We do not know who will pick that message up and who will be the next lone wolf to do something.

Mr. Crelinsten: This is a great question. In my presentation I said that the Internet and electronic technology were the game changer. Look at all the technologies involved in the Mumbai attacks.

Research has shown that in 2007 email was surpassed as the way of communicating among young people. Email is passé now. Twitter and Facebook have taken over. It is predicted that by 2015 mobile will take over from desktop, that is, mobile phones and other new technologies.

The Chair: It strikes me that the other side of that is that all mobile technology is based on radio signals that are much more easily monitored than the old hard line proposition. Therefore, the challenge, as you rightly define it, and as Senator Patterson has referenced, also represents a remarkable opportunity for lawful observation on a prophylactic basis by our security services. Am I being too optimistic?

Mr. Crelinsten: No, that is a very good suggestion, and that is why I called for, in the short term, increasing the Internet capabilities of law enforcement and intelligence. You mentioned pornography, and that is an excellent point. What has been done in the area of child pornography should be emulated in this area as well. Law enforcement is getting up to snuff on this medium, although I know that computer technology in government is lagging way behind because of budgets.

All types of people, including members of the royal family, have been caught because of cell phone technology. Messages were heard that should not have been heard. It should be a very useful way of collecting information. It has been done in anti-radicalization, for instance.

Momin Khawaja wrote a blog, and it was available in court and has become a source for research. A Canadian researcher has done a study of Momin Khawaja's blog in which he talked about how he got radicalized. It was in 2002 and the second intifada. He was a secular Muslim and he started looking at videos and reading blogs about what was going on in Palestine. He then started reading half baked theories of jihad and became radicalized through the Internet alone. He was not recruited.

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya: The problem and challenge is that the terrorists adapt very quickly and very well. They learn from the examples that Mr. Crelinsten shared a moment ago and are more careful the next time.

In a lucky incident, in a raid in Colombia in which they were trying to capture some cartel members, they had the wrong address, went across the street and accidentally stumbled upon the cartel's communication centre. They called the NSA, and the NSA found some equipment that they had never seen. The cartel was better equipped than the NSA itself.

Another problem is that the encrypting capabilities that are readily accessible on the Internet makes things very difficult for law enforcement. The United States has tried to pass a law providing that the key to all encryption technology will have to be given to the government. However, this impinges on the right to privacy.

Senator Furey: I appreciate what you are saying with respect to the use of the Internet as a tool for spreading the message. Is it, in your view, also perhaps the weapon of the future for creating chaos among institutions, organizations and government?

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya: I mentioned that terrorists are extremely conservative in their technique. So far we have been lucky, because our Achilles heel is not the killing of people; our Achilles heel is our economic system. Cyber-spys, from China in particular, have pinned us on a regular basis. They understand that all our critical infrastructure can go down in one shot. If terrorists come to understand that, they might shut down our air control system, for example. If they do that, planes could not land, although we would have planes in the air. That would be an incredible terrorist attack with many victims. They could cripple our financial institutions or our communications systems, et cetera.

Yes, that could be a weapon of choice. In every terrorist attack is a logistical element. When a terrorist group prepares for an attack, they must consider the probability of succeeding with their technical capability, their understanding of the target and the opportunity they are taking to conduct the attack, among other things.

Mr. Crelinsten: On the conservative nature of terrorists and looking at their goals, we have seen cyber-attacks in Estonia in terms of the political realm, and states are using it. We suspect that China has been doing it with Google, that is, industrial espionage.

Terrorists can do so many things on the cheap that they do not necessarily need that element yet. Again, it relates to what I said before about putting the threshold too high. I cannot imagine a group really wanting to completely disrupt the infrastructure of the West or where they would go with it, unless they were truly millennial and trying to bring about the second coming of Christ or something.

Senator Joyal: Returning to the issue of the criminal justice model, how would you react to the possibility to establishing within our criminal court a division that specializes in terrorist activities? There could be a special prosecutor who is sworn in and trained in intelligence. With that, perhaps CSIS and the RCMP would feel more at ease opening their files.

The Chair: I believe that the French have a separate division focused on this issue.

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya: That was exactly what they had been doing and it was extremely efficient. However, we still have a challenge when we present the evidence. In the Canadian criminal justice system, you are allowed to see the evidence in order to prepare your defence.

The Chair: The presumption of innocence is not as compelling in the French system.

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya: Yes, which is contrary to the French.

Senator Joyal: The position of special advocate that we have established in this system is a way to filter the intelligence that normally the court would have access to. After the decision of the court on the security certificate and the one by the court in Britain, in my opinion, the position of special advocate is a halfway point between showing nothing and walking away with the file under your arm and showing the court that there was an element of security that could not be disclosed to protect the sources or protect other investigations and so on.

It seems to me that there is a flexibility that could exist in the system that would give us a better option in prosecuting terrorism within the confines of the criminal justice system under the protection that the Charter affords, yet in a way that would put the court in a better position to adjudicate on the case.

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya: The solution is somewhere in that zone. I do not think it has been found yet. We have not come to that balance that needs to be present. One of the problems is with the authority, CSIS in particular, which has been ill prepared because the culture has evolved faster than their court system or preparation because they were not capable or ready to deliver enough evidence.

It infuriated one of the judges, who said, ``Okay, share some. I will give you the chance to decide what you want to share, but share some evidence.'' They did not share anything, so the judge got angry and said, ``All right, you do not want to share anything? You will share everything.'' That is where they had to bow out and say we will not share; we are not pursuing anymore. There is a balance.

I know there has been a lot of discussion and debate among law societies about the value of those advocates. Somehow, they got access. However, how much have they shared and how valuable was it to the defence to be able to prepare themselves? To be capable of offering enough while respecting some of the boundaries that we rightly self impose remains a challenge for us, if you want to allow individuals to prepare their defence to confront your peers that are accusing you and the evidence presented against you.

Senator Joyal: Professor Crelinsten, do you share those views?

Mr. Crelinsten: Yes, it is part of these intractable problems. Education is one part. Maybe even before it gets to a court room, intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies need to work together and try to decide together, perhaps, what evidence could be used and how to develop a strong case, even as you collect intelligence.

It is that ``when to arrest'' question. It could be generalized to when to switch over from intelligence gathering to prosecution. Everyone should commit to it. CSIS would have to commit to it, knowing that they could give enough evidence that it would hold up in court, then they would go ahead. Otherwise, they say ``Let us collect some more and see where we can go.'' Once you have gone that way, security clearances for judges and defence lawyers arise.

Could we create someone who looks at the evidence who is not involved in the trial? The media and supposed cabals say that a lot of the stuff is held back to cover up mistakes. We all know that happens.

We never know why they are holding back. Can we get someone to figure it out; SIRC or maybe the inspector general or someone? They could say, ``You are holding back to correct this mistake. Someone will be hung out to dry for that, but it has to go forward.'' That is the dilemma.

Senator Joyal: Yet I do not think our system has been able to adjust to that approach. I still feel we are frozen in a context whereby there is no capacity, as you said, in the system, at one level or another, to judge the seriousness and the substance of the argument that the intelligence should not be provided or could be provided to a certain point. We are left in a state of limbo which could lead to the conclusion that, because we cannot prosecute under the usual Criminal Code sections, we need another system.

Mr. Crelinsten: It relates to a previous question about the number of lives lost and things like that. The British broke the Nazis' Ultra code, and they knew that Coventry would be bombed. They could not do anything to prepare because it would tell the Nazis they knew the code, so they let Coventry be bombed.

The human rights violations project I was on was run by an NGO founded by a Dutch admiral. He once argued against torture in this way. He said, ``If there were a mine on one of my ships and the only way I could get that information was to torture someone, I would let the ship blow up.''

These are political decisions. From an intelligence-versus-law-enforcement point of view, maybe we have to say we have to reveal certain evidence even if we blow a source or reveal a procedure, if we want a conviction. That has to be the decision, but who makes it?

Senator Joyal: I think we have to have within our judicial system a way for that adjudication to take place, before going in front of the judge. In that way, the Crown knows to which point it will be able to rely on that file and not find itself left in the cold because CSIS has withdrawn saying it does not want to give anymore.

They take the risk when they enter into a file because they do not know at which point they will have to say no. We do not have an intermediary level whereby we vet the intelligence before we start.

That is why I think that, within the present criminal justice system — which I totally support, personally — we need to have that capacity at a level whereby the public would know there has been a real process of adjudicating, hearing two conflicting views and so forth. That is where I feel something is missing in our system, and it finally led to the conclusion that the system works half and half. We are dissatisfied with the end result, so we should look for something else. I think the system could be improved.

Mr. Crelinsten: I think they say the guilty person prefers the Anglo and the innocent person prefers the French.

Senator Nolin: It is a good system to evaluate the evidence. That is the principle.

Senator Jaffer: I started this line of questioning earlier. We are all talking about how to deal with the disease but not how to prevent the disease. You spoke about the symptoms. One of the comments was that it is Foreign Affairs, but it is everything to us; we cannot just say Foreign Affairs looks after that. It affects the community.

In your explanations you have spoken about the second intifada and how it affects people here. We are a small world now and we hear things.

I would like to hear from you as to how to prevent terrorism through the policies we set. I will give you an answer: We must get the communities involved in our democratic system. In the end, our politicians have to listen to what the community wants. That is a long-term goal.

What do we need to do and how do we deal with that?

I do not know if you completely gave me an answer as to how we get the community involved to prevent homegrown terrorism. What are we doing now to prevent that?

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya: I totally support the idea of being careful to not look only at the symptoms to the exclusion of the cause. When it comes to cause, the community has to be involved because one of the problems that exists currently is that the moderates do not have a voice any more.

Some countries have been capable of going on and performing certain actions that everyone agreed to condemn but no tangible action is done to change the course of action. We just have to take the recent intervention of the Israeli navy against the flotilla that was sent. We let situations degenerate to such a point that if you dare to talk about it you will be accused of taking a side. It is not a question of being on either side. It is a question of finding reasonable people capable of meeting other reasonable people and allowing them to gather together. This is where we could help quite a lot.

Of course, it is difficult sometimes to get involved in foreign countries, in policies from which we are far removed, and someone will always accuse us of not taking care of our own business. However, there are things that can start right here, that can be the seed of what will come later.

We have to be well educated about which group represents what and carries which message or which political agenda. That is an enormous start. There are situations that will necessitate financial intervention, because some of the grievance and the root cause of terrorism, in my point of view, comes from political, economic, and even legal perspectives.

This panel is well educated, and you know very well that we will not reinvent history, but at some point we have to be capable of departing from it and be able to write the future in a different perspective.

I am conscious that I am not necessarily giving in my answer immediate tangible aspects. It demands greater assessment to come up with concrete answers. We will be judged on our concrete actions. We will not be judged on our intentions or words. We will be judged, as the British saying goes, by the proof that is in the pudding.

Senator Jaffer: You said we need to play a leadership role. I am not trying to put words in your mouth, but you spoke about the role we played in apartheid. Therefore in our foreign policy we could play the kind of role we played to end apartheid; is that right?

The Chair: As a supplementary question, are you suggesting that if the casus belli disappeared, if the Palestinians and Israelis reached a mutually agreeable consensus about how to sort things out and there was peace, and all the Gulf cooperation states became appropriate democracies by your standards overnight, and Iran stood down from the nuclear threat that it is in the process of imposing, and all those tensions diminished, that would by definition end the terrorist threat?

Do you think that the terrorist proposition, even the narco-terrorist proposition that you were arguing earlier, is actually a self-contained business model, would all evaporate when all these difficulties, Sri Lanka, et cetera, evaporated, that they are only tied to that and there is not in fact a group of people for whom the terrorist option in any community is the most compelling one for a whole bunch of other reasons? I want to be clear that that is what you are saying because it is a very interesting, a touch utopian, but encouraging proposition.

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya: That is exactly what I am saying. Remove the motivation, remove the will to fight because when you remove the motivation you remove the will to fight.

The Chair: This is critical. I ask our colleagues on the panel to offer their perspective on that.

Mr. Hamilton: I see the point. I do not know if I would be quite that optimistic, but with jihadism what we are dealing with, as you may know, there was a classic great power contrast between Christianity and Islam. It goes back long before any sort of zealous jihadists got an idea to kind of hijack a sliver of a religion. That would be a good way to put it.

The Chair: Do you think the Sunni-Shia issue would disappear when these other questions were resolved? That has been the source of some violence in the mix.

Mr. Hamilton: That is a good one.

The Chair: Same framework perhaps. I will let Mr. Hamilton reflect. Professor Crelinsten, do you want to add anything?

Mr. Crelinsten: I will give two examples. In regard to the IRA question, when Gerry Adams went the political route, it was a sea change and most people went along with it, but the real IRA split off. There are some people who talk about risk taking. They love it. With the Kurds in the southeast of Turkey, there was a point when Abdullah was captured, when things looked hopeful, but then new people came along and decided to continue to fight. I would say if all those things were resolved, it might take the wind out of the sails of most jihadists but some of them might find another excuse to continue.

The other example I want to give you is from Action Directe in France. Mitterrand pardoned all the imprisoned Action Directe members. He was highly criticized, especially when a few of those people went on to commit serious violent acts. The fact is that the majority did go back to civilian life and renounced violence, and those who committed the crimes were easily caught by police. In the long term, it was a good policy, and the same can be applied to the Red Brigade.

However, it is more complex than that. It depends on the type of terrorism and the context. Some people will want to continue the fight. The IRA went into drug running and business. Some people like power.

Senator Jaffer: The second part of my question is: What are we doing now to reach out to the communities?

The Chair: Are we doing enough? That is implicit.

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya: My answer was going to be not enough, which is obvious. Unfortunately, since the early 1990s Canada has been pulling back more and more from a position of influence that it used to have. We used to be capable of being the broker in a lot of discussions and negotiations between different parties.

One of the great challenges we are currently facing is that we are facing a non-state adversary. That is a great challenge. We will not have someone across the table, thus, again, the need to try to give voice to the moderate element within the community. I think to some extent that echoes the approach of reaching the wives and sisters; reaching the people who are capable of saying no.

It is in human nature, without being an adaptation of Rousseau, to go for peace and harmony and seek happiness. The abnormal manifestation that we see in society of some people who are thrill-seekers, and some outright nut cases, has a compound effect. That is because of one element that I have mentioned in my text though not in my comments, which is the appearance of the non-Muslim terrorists who are inflating the ranks of the terrorists. The Jihad Janes, with blond hair and blue eyes, are starting to appear more and more. We are now seeing some disenfranchised people who are seeing terrorism as a vehicle that used to be, in the 1960s, found in more radical political groups. Now suddenly they are seeing this group as perhaps the one that will be the megaphone they need to express their anger.

The Chair: I want to thank our guests for taking time from their busy lives to help us through this. The analysis they have brought and the reflection they have helped us with has been of immense value to the work of the committee.

Senator Jaffer: May I ask the chair if we could consider requesting the Library of Parliament to provide us with information on what is being done for outreach programs and what is the status of the round table that was created by the government.

The Chair: The question is duly noted. I will ask our staff to respond to that as promptly as possible.

(The committee adjourned.)