Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner

Honourable senators, the Senate is resolved into a Committee of the Whole in order to receive Anton Boegman respecting his appointment as Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner.

Honourable senators, in a Committee of the Whole, senators shall address the chair but need not stand. Under the Rules, the speaking time is 10 minutes, including questions and answers, but, as ordered, if a senator does not use all of their time, the balance can be yielded to another senator. I would now invite Anton Boegman to join us.

(Pursuant to the order of the Senate, Anton Boegman was escorted to a seat in the Senate Chamber.)

Mr. Boegman, welcome to the Senate.

As I have informed my colleagues, the question-and-answer period will be divided into 10-minute blocks.

Some of these blocks will be shared between two or three senators and will include time for your responses.

I would ask you to make your opening remarks of at most five minutes.

Thank you. Good morning, senators.

It is my pleasure to appear before this committee meeting in relation to my nomination as Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner.

Canada’s institutions and interests are increasingly under threat from foreign interference. Malign foreign actors seek to exert influence through covert means, shape public policy, change public opinion or interfere with our democratic processes, all to support their own interests.

The critical measure to counter these activities is transparency. Canadians need to know who is trying to influence them and why.

The Office of the Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner is being established to enable this transparency, to enforce the rules and regulations that will govern what types of influence activity need to be disclosed and to support the efforts of other agencies and offices in protecting Canadian institutions and interests.

I am honoured to have been nominated for the position of commissioner. I have devoted my entire career to protecting and supporting our democracy, first as a naval officer and then, for the past seven years, as British Columbia’s Chief Electoral Officer, an independent and non-partisan role.

I became aware of the risks associated with disinformation and foreign interference in our elections in 2018, following the Cambridge Analytica scandal. My reports to the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia on these issues led to the passage of groundbreaking legislation against deliberate disinformation, while maintaining Charter protections.

I believe that, while effective legislation is necessary, a multi‑faceted approach is better.

In 2023, in response to evolving risks to elections, I established an election integrity working group, unique at the provincial level, bringing together other provincial and federal agencies with roles in protecting democracy. I believe this experience is directly relevant to the mandate of the office and demonstrates my ability to build the kinds of partnerships and information-sharing pathways that will be essential for consistent application of the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act nationwide.

My service as an independent officer of the B.C. legislature has provided me with the necessary skills, knowledge and experience to be successful in the role of commissioner. I’ve administered elections, implemented registers, regulated election advertising and campaign finance, carried out large-scale communication programs and interpreted and enforced the rules in a fair and non-partisan manner.

My values of accountability, accessibility, integrity, transparency and service guide my decision making and are aligned with what I believe is required in the commissioner role.

This is a new office in the process of being established. If I have the honour of being appointed commissioner, my priorities will be to launch and operationalize the office and registry, engage with communities likely to be targeted and build public awareness of the office registry and rules.

It is critically important to ensure that there is clarity about the rules and that they are understood. I would also work to establish and operationalize partnerships required to support this mandate, for example, with CSIS and the RCMP. I believe it is essential to start enforcing the rules promptly and to report publicly on that activity.

Citizens need to see this work in action. Only then will it work to support efforts to strengthen public trust in our democratic institutions by making transparent foreign influence activities and reinforcing fairness through a non-partisan approach to enforcement.

My message to Canadians is as follows. If I am appointed as Canada’s first Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner, I promise I will work tirelessly to ensure that activities seeking to influence political and government processes in Canada are publicly disclosed, that foreign actors are deterred from secretly carrying out clandestine influence operations in Canada and that the regulations currently being developed are enforced.

I hope that I can count on your support. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Boegman.

We will now proceed to the first block of questions, which goes to Senator Yussuff. I was informed you will be sharing your time with Senator Woo and Senator Simons.

Commissioner, first, welcome. We’ve been waiting a long time for you to get here. I’m glad to see you have finally arrived and that you have been chosen to take on this responsibility.

Canada is one of only a small number of democracies, including the U.S., the U.K. and Australia, that have created a foreign interference integrity registry. That’s a serious step in the right direction given the challenges we face in this country.

What safeguards are in place to ensure your office operates independently and isn’t subjected to political direction? How would you measure success in a way that builds public confidence, not just enforcement statistics?

Thank you for the question. I agree with you that this is a very necessary step that we’re embarking on here.

I’ll speak first to the outcomes and not merely statistics. I think it’s important that the information bulletins and rules are clearly explained to people. I think that needs to be very broad and go to all reaches and peoples of Canada. That needs to be done in a number of different languages. People need to know the rules. They need to be engaged in understanding what those mean so that they can see that they’re being implemented effectively.

There will, of course, need to be action. There needs to be enforcement when enforcement is necessary.

However, it will be important for Canadians to know that there is a system in place and that the rules are working, and it’s important that they understand what the rules are, such as which activity is permissible, which activity requires registration and which activity is not necessary to register for.

Could you touch back on the specifics of the first part of your question?

How will you ensure your office operates independently of political direction?

Yes, thank you.

I have operated as an independent officer of the B.C. legislature over the last seven years. I’m very well acquainted with both the need to be independent and the perception of being independent. In this legislation, the office is established not as an independent agent of Parliament but as an embedded agency. But there are mechanisms to ensure independence.

Part of the independence is in the reporting structures. Although the reports go through the minister, I’m able to report on any matter that I see as relevant to the jurisdiction and the mandate of the office, as well as annual reports on activities. The way that the office is being set up will allow for independent review, action and decision making of the commissioner.

Mr. Boegman, welcome to the Senate. Thank you for your work at Elections BC.

I want to start with your understanding of what we are trying to create here. You talked about malign foreign actors, but the registry we are trying to create based on the law we passed in this chamber is a whitelist, as we were told in the debates. It’s meant to be country-neutral and country-agnostic. It’s meant to be irrespective of the issue concerned. The point is to get as wide a net as possible to capture all kinds of foreign influence, not bad influence as such. Do you agree with that characterization?

Yes.

In that case, is it correct to say that the registry will exclude non-state actors, except in the case where foreign economic entities are controlled or owned by foreign states? Therefore, is it correct to say that private actors — such as private foundations, private companies, lobby groups, foundations and activist groups, as we know of many — will be excluded from the registry?

My understanding of the requirements for registration in the registry is that three criteria need to be met. One criterion is there needs to be an agreement. There needs to be an arrangement between an individual, an entity and a foreign principal. That activity has to be done in relation to that agreement, but the activity must be directed at a political or governmental process, and that’s across Canada. That’s regardless of whether it is a federal, provincial, territorial, municipal or Indigenous process. That’s the second criterion.

The third criterion is the influence activity has to be directed at a public office-holder. It has to be directed broadly at the public in relation to political or governmental processes, or it has to involve an exchange of some value, including disbursements of money or things of value.

I’m getting at the question of the foreign principal. The law, as you probably know very well, is defined through the Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act, which talks about state actors principally.

In the consultation paper we received on the draft regulations, there was a question raised about whether foreign-funded institutions or media outlets would be required to register. The suggestion was that they would not. This is extraordinary to me. Is that the case?

I can’t speak to the finalization of the regulations. I have not had any association with that or any input into that. My understanding is that exceptions under the regulations are part of that development process, and they may come into play, but I can’t speak specifically to that. I don’t have awareness of that.

Non-state actors should be included in the foreign influence transparency registry. I want to refer to the news we’re getting of support from certain countries and private groups for secession in this country. Regarding private groups, on the face of it, they will not have to register?

Again, all I can speak to is my understanding of what the legislation is currently. My experience in British Columbia as the Chief Electoral Officer was often there will be a statute that will have requirements. As it is implemented, it may be possible to determine that there needs to be changes, amendments or enhancements if there are things that are happening. I can’t commit to what has come to this point, but I would commit to clearly focusing on that area, should I be fortunate and honoured to be named and confirmed as commissioner.

My understanding is the law is applicable across Canada. It’s not just in federal processes. The law would be applicable in provincial, territorial and municipal processes. If it’s a provincial or territorial referendum, it would be a provincial political process, so the law would be applicable. If there are these activities that meet the criteria that I outlined previously, then registration will be required.

Yes, we would be asking them. It applies to anyone who meets those criteria. The purpose of the registry is simply transparency. It is simply so that people know who is speaking to them if they’re acting on behalf of a foreign principal.

Thank you, Mr. Boegman, for being here. If you receive the privilege of taking on this role, you’ll be one of the most important guardians of our democracy.

Less than a year ago, during the general election, the Prime Minister identified China as Canada’s greatest national security threat. We had a public inquiry that highlighted the same thing. We’ve had countless public reports from the RCMP, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and so on highlighting China as our greatest national security threat.

Given certain political realities, we recently saw the Prime Minister go to and re-engage in commercial discussions with Beijing. Geopolitical issues are one thing. National security and transnational repression are others. Will you be influenced by political realities from time to time in your execution of Bill C-70, or will you stay focused on the clear question of national security and transnational repression?

Thank you. My experience and my intention, should I be confirmed for this role, would be to act as an independent commissioner and to look at each instance vis-à-vis the legislation and the requirements under that, as well as enforce the legislation as it is written. That is my intention and how I understand the role has been set up.

I have been in positions where political influence has been attempted. I’m pleased to say that I’ve withstood that. I’m very proud of my previous service as Chief Electoral Officer in a role where it’s critically important not only to be strictly neutral, non‑partisan and free from any political influence but also to be perceived as the same.

Thank you, sir. The Liberal government has yet to fully implement Bill C-70 — that’s why we’re still here — in establishing the registry, despite broad cross-party, partisan and public support. A year and eight months after its passage, here we are. I hope that in the final steps of this prolonged process, your nomination will get us to the finish line.

Could you outline what remains to be done before the registry is fully operational? Do you currently have an office, staff and the necessary infrastructure in place to establish and maintain the registry?

Do you have the necessary resources to get up and running quickly, effectively and efficiently? Can you give us a bit of background, from your point of view, on whether that is the case right now?

I’m certainly happy to give what background I can, though I would preface it by saying that right now I am just a private individual. I’ve been brought forward to be nominated for this position. I have thus far had no formal relationship with or involvement in any of the work that’s ongoing by Public Safety Canada to take the steps necessary to establish an office and these sorts of things.

I do know that steps are currently being taken and that work is at play. “Play” is, perhaps, not the correct word, but a lot of work is being done to prepare the office for the moment when the law will be brought into force and the requirements will be there to register. A technological solution is being developed, staffing models are being developed, procedures around the investigative side are being developed and communication materials are being developed. These sorts of things are happening as I speak.

I’m not in any position to oversee that. As a private citizen, I don’t have any role in that, per se, but I certainly know the focus is on getting the office ready to administer when the law comes into effect.

Our Five Eyes security partners, through the years, have, on a number of occasions, made public declarations, reports and studies saying that Canada is one of the poorest democracies when it comes to transnational repression and foreign interference. This is, obviously, again, why we’ve been trying for years to ensure that Bill C-70 gets implemented and that we take action.

It took a decade before we had this legislation come before this institution. It will now be almost two years before the registry is implemented.

In your view, has this delay created opportunities for transnational repression by actors such as Beijing, Iran, Türkiye and others? What could be the possible consequences of a decade-long delay?

I think that foreign interference is something that has been going on since time immemorial. I remember reading a report of an attempt during the 1796 U.S. presidential election, when France used both overt and covert activities to try to ensure a Thomas Jefferson win.

I am not so naive as to think that the establishment and operationalization of the registry will put a stop to these activities, but I do think that it is a critically important tool to have greater transparency around these activities. I think the range of penalties being established will serve as a deterrent to these types of activities taking place.

I really think that the best way of addressing complex issues like foreign interference and transnational repression is a whole‑of‑government and whole-of-society approach. It will involve many different agencies, which have different levers and ways to approach it. I think that education about the issues and about the tools that are available is important, and that must happen within community groups and broadly across civil society.

Thank you for that answer.

As we all know, these entities — nefarious forces that engage in foreign interference — often invest more resources in terms of money in their operations, and I use the United Front Work Department as an example. If you look — and it’s quite public — they spend billions of dollars around the world in order to infiltrate our democracies in all areas, be it culture, universities, academia or religious institutions, and they even engage with our political institutions.

Does the registry, as it is currently written, give you the tools, latitude and leeway required to go into all the corners of our society where we know these nefarious forces are operating on a daily basis?

I certainly believe that the way the office has been established and the way the legislation is set up will serve a very important role and will be a very important tool, but it’s not the only tool.

As I said in my previous response about there needing to be a broad-based response involving many different agencies, I think that the Office of the Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner will rely on partnerships, particularly with other security agencies and with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, who have expertise, understanding and insight into things that are taking place. As a potential commissioner, I would not have that insight.

You need to establish those relationships. You need to understand the levers that they will be using. You need to understand specifically where one mandate starts and another mandate ends to ensure that things don’t get left in between.

I’m confident that I’ll be able to develop the necessary relationships and partnerships to use those agencies effectively to support the work of the commission.

Thank you again.

I’m happy with the legislation. It is a little bit late, but better late than never.

I have one last question. I would have preferred something like a task force to deal with this particular issue. Will you be calling out security forces and police services in this country if, in your opinion, there’s a lack of action on evidence that you provide?

I think that depends on the nature of the evidence. Obviously, I would be under requirements of secrecy and other things, depending upon what I hear.

I think it’s critically important for there to be effective partnerships and for every agency with a role to play in this sphere to do the work that’s necessary.

Mr. Boegman, thank you for coming before the Senate and for your transparency.

Thank you.

Welcome to the Senate of Canada. I’m enjoying your answers so far. I hope that continues for my questions as well.

When the special report of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, or NSICOP, was released in June 2024, it stated that foreign actors cultivated relationships with:

. . . members of Parliament and senators – with a view to having the Canadian act in favour of the foreign actor and against Canada’s interests. . . .

Every leader in the House of Commons who wished to do so was given the opportunity to read the unredacted report, a courtesy that was not offered to any leader of any group in this chamber, not even the government leader at the time. Thus, members of the Senate were treated like second-class parliamentarians.

My question is this: Will you assure senators today that your office — and you, personally — will demonstrate equality of treatment in every respect between the Senate and the House of Commons?

As far as I am able to, yes, I would do that.

Thank you. We’ll follow up if there is a problem.

As you’re aware, Canada, unfortunately, is not a leader on foreign interference legislation. Many of our allies have introduced legislation, and we’re playing catch-up, but better late than never.

Australia, for example, had legislation in 2018, but it was criticized as very weak. Since its passage eight years ago, five people have been charged, all of whom were agents of the Communist government of China.

Have you compared the Australian legislation with ours, and do you see any opportunities to ensure that ours will be more effective?

Again, as I said in a previous response to a previous question, currently, I’m just a citizen. I’ve been nominated for this position, but I’ve had no role in relation to the work that has been done to date in getting the office up and running, to develop regulations and so on. Of course, I’m very interested in the file. I have read the reports. I’ve had a look at the legislation. I have read various reports that have assessed the effectiveness of the different statutes.

I think that it is imperative that we learn from the lessons that other nations, particularly allies who have similar schemes, have put in place. I also think that, of course, each country is different and is looking at perhaps slightly different risk factors and different vectors. So there does need to be some focus on what is needed for Canada and how that can be best put in place.

I’m also a firm believer that you need to start, and you need to start with something and get that in place. You need to start communicating about that, implementing it, enforcing the rules, those sorts of things. It is only at that point that one will be really able to see if it’s working as intended. Are there other areas that could be brought in? Is it too broad or too narrow? That would certainly be a focus of mine should I be confirmed in the role and once the legislation is brought into effect and the office is operationalized.

The U.S. legislation, as an example, FARA, or Foreign Agents Registration Act, is very broad and includes anything that really impacts public opinion. Having a mandate that broad at the beginning would be extremely challenging for a new office to implement. However, I think that the approach and the legislation that we have here are clear. Through further elaboration of some definitions, terms, interpretation guides and bulletins, it will be clear to those who fall subject to that legislation what the requirements are.

Will it catch every single behaviour it is intended to? That will not be known until it has been in place already. I am confident there is support for the work that this office is intended to do and that there would be support for changes should those changes be necessary. I would not hesitate to table reports if I believe that there need to be a different approach, adjustments or amendments in the future.

Thank you. I am glad you have given some thought to that because one of my concerns is like the old saying: Locks are for honest people. People who really want to get through a lock will find a way. The question would be how we avoid catching people who are trying to follow the rules but are in violation, as opposed to a foreign country who will consider a fine or even a prison term as the cost of doing business to undermine democracy in Canada. What you have just told us is that, as we go through this, you are prepared to address this in a very public manner if necessary. Is that correct?

That is correct, yes.

I wonder if you have given any thought to the role of social media companies, mostly foreign-owned, which use their platform to direct and focus news and commentary based on their biases and priorities that may be against the interests of Canada. Have you given any thought to how to deal with that if you get this new position?

I have thought about social media and the role that social media plays in our lives. It was certainly front and centre for me when I was the Chief Electoral Officer in British Columbia.

A lot of the political debate is carried on through social media and new media. Certainly, it is both the means through which information can be passed and the means within which misinformation or disinformation can be spread, whether that is deliberate or unwilling.

In the case right now, my focus to this point has certainly been trying to make sure that I have a clear understanding of the legislation as it is written. I have been following closely the development of the regulations, which, of course, will further elaborate that legislation in the requirements.

My sense is that, right now, social media can be used as a means via which the influence activities are taken. That in itself would not be sufficient for registration. You would have to determine that there is an arrangement between an individual or an entity in the foreign principal and that it is targeting these processes. But should social media be the avenue via which the public is being targeted, then those activities would be registerable.

As to the role of the social media companies themselves, I think that is one that broadly is captured by the act, but has not specifically been targeted by the legislation.

I’m wondering if you are aware of what level of security clearance you will have. There are many beyond “top secret.” It is my experience that many of these agencies work in silos, and depending on your level, they will not want to share information. They may be reluctant to share information anyway, but the reluctance will be compounded if you don’t have a senior-level security clearance. You will need some very sensitive information to do your job in a responsible manner.

You don’t have to tell us the level. Sometimes the level itself is a secret. But do you have comfort that you will have the capacity you need on the security side to get the information you need to do the job?

At this time I do have comfort, yes.

Thank you, chair.

Thank you, Mr. Boegman.

Mr. Boegman, thank you for being here. You have been good with your answers so far.

As you probably know, Canada was the first country in the world to pass laws regarding crypto-currency. Yet, recent reports suggest unregistered crypto-to-cash services are operating nationwide, often without ID checks or proper records. These systems can be exploited for money laundering and potentially for terrorist financing or foreign interference in our political processes.

How will your office ensure that the long-awaited foreign influence transparency registry captures financial activities conducted through crypto-currency, particularly when these transactions are opaque, rapid and cross borders?

Thank you for the question. If I understand it correctly, my sense is that the types of things you are describing would cross over the mandates of a number of security and law enforcement agencies. The role of the Transparency Commissioner would be to make sure that those entities or individuals who are doing the influence activities, if they are doing so at the behest of and in association with or under the direction of a foreign principal and they meet the other criteria, then they would register. If crypto-currency was part of that, either in terms of disbursing funds in some way, then that would also meet the requirements for that.

As I think I have stated before, those are the sorts of things that I would rely on partners for in terms of specific intelligence or other factors suggesting that these activities fall under the mandate of the Transparency Commissioner. But if they meet those requirements, then registration would be required or they would fall under the range of penalties that are necessary.

They have always been there. What I’m focusing on is that we have been waiting a long time for this transparency registry, and I hope you can leverage that up and get the full benefit of the intent.

As a supplementary question, given the rapid growth of crypto‑based finance and the limited enforcement history in Canada, do you see a role for your office in coordinating with the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada, or FINTRAC, the RCMP and other agencies to detect and investigate terrorist financing and crypto-related foreign influence activities before they affect our elections or democratic institutions?

Again, from my understanding, those types of activities would also come under the jurisdiction of other agencies. Certainly, any election financing related types of things would fall under the Commissioner of Canada Elections to investigate if they are foul, if they run counter to the current Canadian financing laws.

If they are used to sponsor terrorist activities or things such as that, then there would be other agencies and other laws that those would apply to. If they are being used in some influence scheme at the direction of a foreign principal, they would be things that would be required to be registered.

I see the registry as an important tool, but it is one tool that is part of a range of measures that are necessary to truly address these threats and risks.

Welcome, Mr. Boegman. I would like to continue the discussion about the registry as noted in sections 5 and 8. I have always thought the registry is a bit of a naive approach and that the bad actors are probably not going to register. How do you deal with those who do not register and engage in problematic behaviour? I also want to know when you think the registry will be ready.

What about cyberwarfare? Whether it is state actors or non‑state actors who engage in trying to influence elections or referenda through cyberwarfare and cyber-activity, what do you do about it?

Thank you. That is a broad set of questions. Certainly, I realize that those individuals who are doing covert activities may not be inclined to register. I think if effective partnerships can be created and some insight into that can take place, then once they are identified, there can be activity. Whether it is on the administrative penalty side or through the courts, there is the ability for criminal prosecutions under the statute as well that may be applicable in those cases.

I am pleased in terms of the proposed range of administrative monetary penalties. It is very substantive, from a low of $50 up to $1 million. It is far greater than the maximum under U.S. law, under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, or FARA, which is capped at $250,000.

That range of penalties allows for flexibility on one side if there is really inadvertent activity that should be registered but isn’t, but it also provides a significant deterrent. Having that as a potential penalty may deter some actors who employ covert means currently to do these types of things.

When is it going to be ready? That’s not a question that I have a clear answer to. As I said before, I am a citizen. I’ve been brought forward here, but I have not been involved in the work to date to establish the office, to get the technology solution in place to create any of the communication materials. That, of course, would be a key focus for me, should I be named to the role, and would be necessary to ensure that the office is ready to go when the law is brought into force.

In terms of cyberwarfare, I must admit that I’m not an expert in it other than my understanding of hybrid threats to elections specifically. I guess there are some parallels here. I know that it can be used as a tool to influence, a tool to harass and a tool to threaten. Similar to the question that I received in terms of social media companies, if it is being used as a channel through which influence activity is taking place that meets the requirements under the legislation, then it would, of course, be registerable and would be an entity I would require to register.

Good afternoon, Mr. Boegman.

The registry is intended to ensure transparency in activities carried out on behalf of foreign governments. These days, however, interference often occurs through relational influence approaches, such as university partnerships, cultural funding, strategic philanthropy or a network of diasporas that don’t always have a formal mandate. How would you handle these grey areas without stigmatizing communities or curbing legitimate exchanges?

Thank you for the question. I will try to answer in French. It’s a good opportunity for me to practise, since I don’t use French every day. Living in B.C. for the past 30 years, I’ve had the opportunity to speak with my son, who was in French immersion at school, and use apps like Duolingo and Babbel.

Allow me to assure you that you speak French very well.

Thank you.

I think it’s very important to understand the grey areas and the nuances of the relational influence you talked about.

I think it’s possible to have exceptions in the rules for some types of activities that aren’t foreign influence operations. I think it’s important to develop relationships with academics and groups —

Thank you, Mr. Boegman.

Welcome, Mr. Boegman.

Having read your CV, I wanted to ask you questions about Bill C-4, but I’ll save that for another time.

Experts say that Canada’s response to foreign interference is currently fragmented, leaving democratic institutions highly vulnerable. Can you tell us how your office will ensure that the registry addresses these gaps and provides actionable intelligence to protect Canadian democracy?

Thank you for the question.

I think we have a good opportunity now with the new office, as well as with other agencies. Foreign interference is a higher-profile issue now. For example, the Chief Electoral Officer understands that this is a concern, and we can actually look at their act to see if it needs to be improved in some way to address this. The foreign interference transparency office has to work alongside all the other agencies. The office has a specific mandate, but it has to work with the other agencies to combat foreign interference.

When you say “other agencies,” do you mean CSIS, CSE and national security advisers?

Yes, the RCMP, but also returning offices.

Okay.

Will the registry include mechanisms for monitoring and addressing foreign interference in real time, or will it be limited to producing retrospective compliance reports?

The registry is simply a transparency instrument. If activities that meet the criteria are being carried out, they have to be entered in the registry. Activities can be carried out if they’re entered in the registry within 14 days. It’s helpful not in the moment, but later, and it also ensures greater transparency.

It is nice to meet you. I also come from British Columbia, and I want to recognize the good work you have done in that province.

Thank you.

I know you haven’t yet begun your work and might not answer with specifics, but may I ask you about these stats? The government estimates that nearly 1,550 businesses and 872 individuals will be required to declare their foreign influence activities in Canada. Do you agree with this estimate?

It is hard for me to agree when I have not yet seen the work that is behind that. I am confident that the estimate was based upon the best information available, so it likely represents a realistic number of entities and individuals that would be required to register under the legislation.

I do know from my examination, as a matter of interest, of the models and mechanisms in other countries that there have been varying numbers of registrants initially in the U.K., which has a different scheme than Canada has — I think within the first six months, there were only something like six registrants.

Obviously, it will impact entities and organizations. I think my role coming into it is going to be making sure the guidance and the understanding of the rule is clear for all who may fall under the model and be required to register so that they know when they need to register. It is going to be important to ensure there is accessibility to the registration mechanism through a complete technological solution or under the interim model — that it is clear what they have to do when they come in to register.

You are assuming that these numbers are somewhat accurate. To me, it seems like quite a high number of potential registrants. Do you think this underscores how overdue this registry is and that it could be detrimental to delay its implementation? We have delayed it. It is time to do it; it was long overdue.

Do these high numbers indicate such concerns?

I’m on the public record in B.C. that I do believe this issue of foreign interference and influence has been happening in Canada. It has been happening at all levels. It probably happens more frequently in some of the more Northern communities in Canada and in some of the territories. I do think it is happening.

I am very pleased that the legislation is under development. It is an area that I have been watching closely, as I said. Should I be appointed as commissioner, I look forward to commencing that work.

I know the purpose of your office is to increase transparency, detect and deter non-transparent attempts by foreign states to influence Canadian political and governmental processes. Assuming what Senator Cardozo asked, and that we assume the truly malicious and clandestine actors will not voluntarily register their activities with your office, I want to ask you again about deterrents. What are some of the strategies? Have you thought about what you can do as a deterrent? It will be very critical to what happens.

Certainly.

The main deterrence mechanism in the legislation that would be available to the commissioner is the very wide range and significant financial penalties that are available under the administrative monetary penalties scheme. I think that information would be reported publicly. Not only is there the impact of a potential fine, but it would also have a professional deterrent on these types of activities.

I’m not so naive as to think there will still not be efforts ongoing after the registry is in place. For those, the office is being set up with the capability to do investigations. As I have said in this Committee of the Whole, it is going to necessitate the support of the work of other agencies and other organizations in Canada that also have a role to play in preventing foreign interference.

They will need to be working in partnership, using the best levers that are available and possible for deterrence. Specific to the role of the commissioner, though, the wide range of penalties is the primary deterrent mechanism.

Thank you, Mr. Boegman, and congratulations on your career. I had the opportunity to observe elections in Moldova in which Russian interference was a factor. I witnessed disinformation, cyberattacks and influence operations carried out by non-state groups. In response, Moldavian authorities adopted certain security measures that stemmed entirely from legitimate intentions, but that nevertheless ended up restricting voter access in certain pro-Russian areas, both within Moldova’s borders and among certain diaspora communities.

Could there be a conflict between security and accessibility in Canada? How would your mandate ensure that any measures taken here are transparent, proportionate and respectful of democratic rights?

Thank you for the question. Transnational repression is an important factor, and these events pose a more serious threat here in Canada. The effectiveness of the transparency registry will therefore depend primarily on deterrence, but public education will be just as important to its effectiveness.

That’s why I think it will be important to connect with minority groups or communities in order to understand their perspectives on the matter. We’ll also have to see how this part of the law is going to be implemented. Without these communication opportunities, it will be difficult to understand how the law will affect these communities.

You mentioned the existence of transnational institutions capable of contributing to Canadian democracy. Could you briefly tell us what new structures or mechanisms would be needed to fill existing gaps?

That’s outside the commissioner’s mandate. The office of the commissioner would not be able to answer that question. It’s important to engage with communities to understand that destigmatization is possible, for example.

Thank you, Mr. Boegman.

Mr. Boegman, welcome and congratulations on being proposed as a candidate for the position of Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner.

I know you are quite familiar with the work of the Public Inquiry Into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions and Commissioner Hogue’s findings. She cautioned that governments are not known for reacting quickly and stressed that the machinery of government must facilitate action, not paralyze it.

In your view, are Canada’s national security institutions and coordinating bodies truly agile enough to respond to rapidly evolving foreign interference threats? How will you assess whether the system is not only better organized on paper but also capable of acting decisively and in real time when events demand it?

Thank you.

I can certainly give you an example of the work that I did in British Columbia with other agencies that had responsibilities in this area, particularly around threats to elections. At that time, there was great interest in working together. There was great interest in federal agencies supporting the work of a provincial agency. I had support from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, from the RCMP and from the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security.

At the beginning, while it was easy to understand the respective mandates, there were also specific legal barriers at the time that prevented information from being shared. There have been subsequent changes to the laws to ameliorate that situation, particularly between provincial and federal agencies. Of course, as commissioner, I would be part of a federal agency that would have memoranda of understanding with other federal agencies. There are not the same barriers that there would be at the provincial level.

I believe there’s capacity to do the work. Certainly, this new office is being set up to address a capability that wasn’t previously available in Canada — a capability that some of our allies already have. It is one that I think is very important for us to have in order to have greater transparency in these activities.

There may be other threats, however, which, of course, are outside of that and are the responsibility of other agencies. Other than my experience of having them very interested in working together previously, my hope and expectation are that this will continue, and there will be the ability to respond as necessary. It may be that some activities are best addressed through the work of one of the other agencies that may not meet the specific requirements for registration under the transparency registry —

Thank you, Mr. Boegman.

Welcome, Mr. Boegman. Thank you for being with us this afternoon. I would like you speak to the Senate’s role specifically.

In its final report, the Hogue Commission assigned senators an active role in the foreign influence detection ecosystem. Recommendation 25, along with recommendations 21 to 24, positioned senators as stakeholders actively working to detect foreign influence. In order for this role to be carried out effectively, what do you think would be the most meaningful actions our chamber could take to make an agile, transparent contribution to your mandate?

Thank you for the question, senator. I can talk about the strategies I will need to put in place as commissioner in order to be effective in my role.

First, it is important to educate the public and adopt a robust approach. I’ll need to publish online guides in different languages to explain the requirements in detail and to clarify these issues, particularly for high-risk sectors such as minority communities, but also for the media, academia and other such sectors. It is important to clearly define what influence is in order to reduce the deterrent effect on legitimate collaborations.

Second, it is important to have healthy engagement with communities —

Honourable senators, the committee has been sitting for 65 minutes. In conformity with the order of the Senate, I am obliged to interrupt proceedings so that the committee can report to the Senate.

Mr. Boegman, on behalf of all senators, thank you for joining us today.

Hon. Senators: Hear, hear!

The Chair: Honourable senators, is it agreed that the committee rise and I report to the Senate that the witness has been heard?

Hon. Senators: Agreed.

Honourable senators, the sitting of the Senate is resumed.