Proceedings of the Subcommittee on
Transportation Safety
Standing Senate Committee on
Transport and Communications
Issue 4 - Evidence - Afternoon sitting
EDMONTON, Tuesday, December 3, 1996
Upon resuming.
The Chairman: I am pleased to welcome this afternoon our first witnesses, who are from Canadian Pacific Railway.
We have before us Mr. Ed Dodge, Executive Vice President of Operations, and Faye Ackermans, General Manager of Safety and Regulatory Affairs, which is, of course, the topic with which we are concerned.
I welcome you and thank you for being with us. We will listen to your presentation, and then perhaps the senators will want to join you in dialogue through questions.
Mr. Dodge, please.
Mr. Ed Dodge, Executive Vice-President of Operations, Canadian Pacific Railway: Mr. Chairman, senators, thank you for allowing us to make a presentation to your committee.
Safety is a very important aspect of our business. We have three pillars in our operations: safety, service, and productivity. Safety is one of the primary focuses in our business. Indeed, we find that if you are not a safe railroad, you will be very successful in terms of being profitable.
Safety, as you are probably learning, is a very complex subject. You have an even more challenging job in that you are looking at safety on many modes. We are focusing on rail. As we get into safety and try to understand some root concerns, we find some interesting events or facts.
This afternoon, I can understand that people are apt to nod off because of the natural circadian rhythms of your bodies. It is quite natural for people to feel tired between 2:30 and 4:00.
The Chairman: Actually, it is 4:30 for us, so we are through that.
Mr. Dodge: As a matter of interest, we participated, along with CN, VIA, and Transport Canada, in a safety alert study called CANALERT. That study broke a great deal of new ground, not only in Canada but in North America. It dealt with how you crew our trains in a safe manner so that the crews are attentive, et cetera.
These are some of the facts that came out. We brought a colour show this afternoon to hopefully try to keep your attention.
With me is Faye Ackermans. Faye is the General Manager of Safety and Regulatory Affairs for Canadian Pacific Railway, reporting to me in Operations. She is one of the senior members of our operating team.
Also with us is Dan Clark, one of Faye's people. He will not only be running the technical side of it; he also is part of Faye's team in drawing together many of our safety manuals that we provide to our employees.
Although you have a paper copy before you, I should like to take you through the slide show. If you have questions as we go through, I would be glad to field those questions then, or we can wait until the end. Faye will be doing part of the presentation as well. It should take us about 20 to 25 minutes to go through this, if this is satisfactory you.
The Chairman: Please.
Mr. Dodge: If you do not mind, I will stand. I think you should be able to hear me without the microphone.
The Chairman: We need the clarity of the tapes, Mr. Dodge, so I might ask you to take the microphone. Like CP, the Senate of Canada is always prepared.
Mr. Dodge: We call that contingency planning.
I will give you an overview of Canadian Pacific Railway's operations. I will talk to you about our safety management -- the people and the technology that we bring into play for safety on our railroad. I will speak about some of the safety results and observations that we have had this year and last year in comparison with other industries and other railroads in North America. I will also talk about the legislative and regulatory climate that we have here in Canada and some of the imbalances that we see in it. Finally, I will conclude with a summary of the issues.
This is a schematic map of Canadian Pacific Railway's operations. The red line is what we call our core operations, which runs from Toronto to Vancouver and Chicago to Moose Jaw and into Louisville. We do have a line at Kansas City which we are in the process of selling, and hopefully that will be concluded at the start of next year.
The blue line is a new company that we incorporated this year. It is the St. Lawrence & Hudson Railroad. It was part of CP, and it is still part of CP, but it is legally a separate entity now. It serves the corridor from Quebec City to Chicago and then aligns into New York, Albany, and to Washington.
This slide gives you a cross-section of where our people are located across Canada: Alberta and Saskatchewan have almost 5,000 people; British Columbia, 2,638; in Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec we have a substantial number of employees; and in New Brunswick we have four. That is rather unique, but we do have a little section of railroad that we still own there. We are working our way out of that.
Let me give you a rough idea of our activity. I find that since people no longer travel on trains, they do not see our freight trains and are not as knowledgeable about freight trains.
In the British Columbia corridor, which is our busiest corridor, we have anywhere from 28 to 34 trains on our mainline between Golden and Mission, B.C. We move up to a million gross tonne miles. This produces a level of density of 76 to 88 million gross tonnes, which is a very heavy density. For a single track system, it is very heavy.
Going across the prairies in our mainline, say between Regina and Calgary, we will have anywhere from 15 to 21 freight trains a day in that corridor. In Manitoba, say to Thunder Bay, we will have anywhere from 14 to 21 trains; northern Ontario, 11 to 15 trains a day; and then between Montreal and Toronto anywhere between 18 and 20 trains. That gives you a rough idea of the level of activity that we have in our operations.
All of that translates into how many people are required to report to duty every day. For the operating crews, we have the road crews or those crews that take it between stations like Calgary to Field or from Kamloops to North Bend. We have 560 crews reporting every day to work. In the yard, such as Coquitlam or Calgary, we have 275 yard crews reporting to duty. While they are on duty, we have anywhere from 47,000 full loads to move and 36,000 empty. That is all moving every day.
As to what those cars are moving, 50 per cent of our business is almost a bulk business almost. We call it agri-bulk. It is agri-products -- potash, grain, fertilizers, anhydrous ammonia, and coal. Resource products such as lumber, wood pulp, plywood, and some chemicals, that type of commodity, is approximately 25 per cent. The other 27 per cent is intermodal: the containers you see on trains and automotive cars, the bi-levels and tri-levels.
That gives you a pretty good overview of our mix. As you can see, much of our business is in western Canada, and that is how the trend in the traffic has moved in the last 30 years.
I will talk a little bit about safety management. As I said, Faye is our General Manager of Safety and Regulatory Affairs; however, we also have, as part of our operating group, our four VPs. As we start to work down in the organization, you see that many of our people are there to maintain the plant in a safe condition. We have about 4,000 people that work on our track all the time.
We also have inspection cars which we take over tracks. They have on-board computers and sensors that can detect trail flaws. They measure the gauge between the track and the super elevation of the curves. Rail wear is simply how the rail is wearing. We do replace a lot of rail. When we look at the infrastructure, the rail, the track, the ties, et cetera, not only do we have people on the ground, but we also make use of technology to inspect for safety.
Visual inspections are done on the track according to the density -- the number of trains we have per day. In a section between, for example, Revelstoke and Kamloops or Kamloops and North Bend, we perform visual inspections every day just because of the density of traffic. We have a large track force in that area because of the density of traffic and the geography.
As part of the track infrastructure and safety, we have a fail-safe signal system and train control system. If we have a track that is signalled and breaks because of temperature, a signal will go on so that we know there is something wrong with that piece of track. The same is true with crossing and warning detectors. If there is a power interruption to a crossing protection, whether it be bells or barriers, there is sufficient battery capacity to carry that on for eight hours. We try to build in some contingency planning in our safety systems.
When we look at the equipment -- that is, the rolling stock, the locomotives and the cars -- we have roughly another 4,000 people dedicated to doing overhaul or maintenance of equipment. These tend to be in our centres like Winnipeg, Moose Jaw, Calgary, Coquitlam, and Minneapolis.
When we start a train, once we put a train together, for instance, coming out of Vancouver and going to Toronto, the train is inspected visually, the brakes are tested -- that is, applied and released -- and the air is measured. When we start a train, we visually inspect it, and it gets a thorough inspection.
As well as that starting inspection, as you go through our system, we have detector equipment like this which will detect for trailing equipment. Also, we detect for wheels that are heating up. If an equipment defect is found, there will be a voice communication to the train as to the wheel or the place in the train where there is a problem, and the train will come to a stop. The frequencies of these vary depending on whether we are in an urban area or in the countryside. They are roughly 42 miles apart on our main track and roughly 21 miles apart in the urban areas. Thirty years ago, this did not exist. In fact, it did not exist 20 years ago. Over the years, we have placed quite a bit of coverage on our main track system to ensure that we detect equipment that has defects.
As well, we are installing equipment to measure wheel impacts. If you have a flat wheel that has been skidded by a brake or if it is too flat, it can crack track, so we setting up equipment that will measure those impacts. Once again, it will identify the axle, and we will be able to service that equipment.
This shows the defect rate that Transport Canada does when it audits us. The rate for the locomotives is 20 per cent, and for the cars it is 39 per cent. Although that seems high, if there is oil on a platform, that is a defect which we must correct. If there is a bent bar for climbing on the train, that must be replaced. When you compare this to trucks and other modes of equipment, although this rate seems high, I think you will find that this is actually a very low rate.
Ms Faye Ackermans, General Manager of Safety and Regulatory Affairs, Canadian Pacific Railway: May I interject? That is 3.9 per cent.
Mr. Dodge: I apologize, 3.9 per cent.
When we considered how to manage safety from an office perspective, we found that, through technology, we are able to bring a great deal of information into one centre. As part of our restructuring and moving to Calgary, we created a network management centre in our building, one floor below me. It is state of the art in terms of the amount of communications that we have coming into this centre. This allows us to plan our operations in a more effective manner and to react to any incidents that may happen in a timely manner. We have found it effective in responding to track incidents.
By the end of this year, we will be dispatching from our Calgary office all trains between Toronto and Thunder Bay and between Swift Current and Vancouver. At the end of next year, all trains between Thunder Bay and Swift Current will be moved into that centre. We will be dispatching all of the Canadian operations from that centre. The U.S. operations will still be dispatched out of Minneapolis. This means that we will have better contact in terms of management and in terms of reacting with our trains.
In this slide showing the computers and the screens, the person is actually throwing the switches for the trains. He is in radio contact with all the trains in various sections across Canada.
As far as our crews coming to work, we have something like 560 crews, and if you multiply that by 2.5, you get the average size of the crews. We have ample people who are called to work. It is not like an airline which runs a schedule from 7:00 to 9:00. We run 24 hours day, seven days a week. We must cope with variance in operations, whether caused by snowstorms or by coal trains that can not unload at Roberts Bank because there are high winds. There is a great deal of variation through which we must manage. Part of that is how we get our crews and call our crews and manage our crews. We have centralized that, and that makes for a more effective crew management. Therefore, we know when the crews are rested and not rested. We are seeing some significant improvements.
This should allow us to implement more effectively the CANALERT study to which I referred earlier when it comes to our next collective agreement.
Shipment management is the movement of, for example, a car of lumber from Edmonton to Minneapolis. The paperwork is done on the screen now. Once again, that allows us also to ensure the appropriate papers. If it is a car of ethylene glycol or an LP gas car, we will ensure that the papers and information which must follow that are in order.
Finally, for the people on the ground, the employees who operate the trains, we have a front-line manager focus. In our recent downsizing where we downsized 25 per cent of our management, we excluded the front-line manager from that. We wanted to ensure that we had more management on the ground, and indeed we increased the number of managers who are on the ground managing crews and other employees.
How does this manifest itself into what are they managing? We do a proficiency test. We check a train to ensure that it is running and operating at the correct speed, that it is doing the whistling that it should be doing, and that they have checked the hand brakes to ensure that they are tied down.
On this slide you see that we have proficiency tests for riding a train where the front-line manager will ride with the crew and check them on how they operate the train and their competency. They do a speed check. They do a communication check to ensure that they are using the right protocol when communicating the train orders and other sorts of communication between the train and the dispatcher.
The securement issue is important for us. This year we have well over 1,200 tests on securement of cars -- that is, that cars which are set out in a shipper's siding or in a passing track are secure and that a sufficient number of hands brakes are tied. We had put a focus on that back in 1994.
To date, we have done about 29,000 proficiency tests compared to a total last year of 27,300. By the end of the year, we will have done 35,000 proficiency tests. This is just basic railroading to ensure that we have this required focus on safety.
I will now turn it over to Faye, and she will talk about the safety results.
Ms Ackermans: I have tried to be a little innovative and draw data from different sources for comparative purposes. I know you have had presentations from Transport Canada and the Transportation Safety Board, and I have tried to not repeat anything that was presented by them.
One way we measure safety in our industry is through personal safety. Statistics Canada does keep industrial safety records. I have drawn some comparative information out of a 1994 report, which is the latest data available. I did some conversion on it so it relates to the per centage of people. This graph shows that, in the rail mode, we actually have a lower per centage of our people claiming injury and taking time off work.
The same thing is true when you compare to us other industries in Canada. We operate a very heavy industry. We have back shops with a great deal of heavy work, welding, and heavy machinery. We try to measure ourselves against other heavy industries. We are quite comparable. We are approximately double the public civil service, and most of those people are sitting in offices, so we think we are doing fairly well.
I have done the same thing for the National Safety Council data available in the U.S. These are U.S. rail results. You see a similar pattern, with rail being the least injury-prone transport mode. In fact, everyone there and here spends a great deal of effort and time ensuring that employees do not get injured. I have compared it against various manufacturing types of industries, and rail operations, which is on the left in the blue, has a better record than even the people who manufacture railway equipment.
One of the questions which has been asked of this committee and has been asked in previous committees looking at safety is whether the Canadian railroad industry is safer than other industries and other modes and the U.S. mode. I have a Federal Railroad Administration report that was presented to Congress in October of this year which goes back prior to 1984, but it shows the pattern of rail accidents in the U.S. When we talk about accidents in the U.S. and accidents in Canada, we measure different things. Our regulations in Canada require us to report different things to the Safety Board than the Federal Railroad Administration requires the U.S. railroads to report. We are always playing this game of who is reporting what to whom.
However, even without looking at the absolutes, it is striking when you look at this graph that the trend line is the same on both sides of the border. Therefore, in absolute terms, whatever is being measured, the trend in the industry is to an improvement.
You will notice a split in 1992. The Safety Board put forth new reporting requirements, and we must measure ourselves against the old and the new since that was a fairly major change to the number of occurrences that we are required to report.
Rail accidents from main track has had a lot of focus in Canada this year. This graph goes back to some work that the Safety Board did and republished in the On Track Report from the Rail Safety Act Review. The Safety Board tried to recalibrate, if you will, the Canadian accidents and use the same terminology and the same reporting of those accidents as in the U.S., and they came out with an absolute difference where Canadian railroads had fewer main track derailments.
I went back to 1991 Safety Board data and tried to modify that data myself based on what they have in the back of their book. Do not forget that the reporting regulations changed in 1992. I have changed their 1992 data to 1995 data based on what they say is now being reported that would not have been reported before. Although I did not come down to the same level in 1991 that they did, the trend line remains the same and we are continually improving. That is to the end of 1995.
This year, what Canadian Pacific Railway has reported to the Safety Board is in the upper line. We reported 66 main track derailments this year to the board. However, when we measure ourselves against our U.S. counterparts using FRA criteria -- which we do quite routinely by the way, as the only way to measure ourselves against our U.S. competitors is to use their terminology and their measuring system -- you will find we are practically flat. It was 35 two years ago, 33 last year, and 36 this year.
In absolute terms, we are doing better. Our train accident record, not just mainline accidents but all train accidents, has actually improved this year. You will notice we had a rather bad first quarter. Those of you whose memories are long enough will know that we had one of the coldest winters on record. In fact, I have a graph which follows this showing some weather data. We have done better overall this year than we did last year in terms of absolute number of accidents.
This is the weather map I mentioned. The red line is minus 25 degrees Celsius. This is the number of days during the first four months of the year where we operated well below what would be considered normal temperatures. We had many problems with rail breakages this past year. When you consider that and try to marry the two together, you will see that there is quite a correspondence between the times when we had rail breakages and the times when the temperature was below minus 25 for a sustained period of time.
Mr. Dodge showed you a graph which spoke to rail inspections. This year we increased the number of rail inspections in January so we can try to catch rail flaws earlier in the process and avoid some of the breakages.
Another issue that is usually of some interest to people is transportation of dangerous goods. This shows 1995 incidents for the industry reported to the Safety Board. In fact, there were only 35 mainline accidents involving dangerous goods last year, 250 in the yard and 14 others. They were probably customer sitings and things such as that. If you relate that to the total number of moves, 99.95 per cent of all shipments in this country move without an accident.
There is another piece of the puzzle, though, and that is shipper responsibility. NAR is a non-accident release -- a tank car leaking from the valves. That is the responsibility of the shipper because they load and unload this equipment, but the leak may be found on railroad property. If you factor in those occurrences, 99.9 per cent of all shipments still moved incident free.
You may or may not have heard of the non-accident release program. In approximately 1992, the Chairman of the Safety Board expressed concern to the executives of both CN and CP as to what he saw as the increase in these leaking tank cars. The industry got together with the shipper community and spent approximately two years hammering out a program. You can see that it was quite effective in reducing the number of non-accident releases. At the same time in the U.S., the number of leaking tank cars continued to increase.
In 1995, when we realized that we had levelled off and were not getting any further bang for our buck in this program, we approached the U.S. shipper communities and the American Association of Railroads, and they are now in this program with us. We have a North American program going on, and we expect in 1997 and beyond to see these incidents go down as well.
From 1990 through 1995, we had 11 accidents on CP where there was a loss of product from the tank car. That is out of over 750,000 loaded cars and probably an equivalent number of empty cars which still move with placards because they have product left in them.
I have used some data available from Transport Canada's road safety database and compared that to Safety Board data for crossing accidents. On the commercial vehicle side, you see a fairly substantial decrease in the number of fatalities over the last five, six, or seven years. In rail, 1989 happened to be a very bad year, and we have a relatively flat absolute number of fatalities. It settles somewhere in between 50 to 60 people being killed at railway crossings.
When you consider railway crossing accidents and relate that to workload, which is the number of million train miles, in fact our rate is going down. However, I cannot find data for and cannot put into this equation the motor vehicle part of the equation since motor vehicle traffic goes up and the exposure is a combination of both rail and road traffic.
Although we have far fewer accidents at railway crossings than occur at the highway mode, when you encounter railway equipment when you are not supposed to be at a crossing, the risk of injury is far greater. This is the per centage of people who are injured in commercial vehicle accidents, and that rate is somewhere in the 20-per-cent range. In the rail mode, if you are in an accident with a train, there is a 60-per-cent chance that those people will be injured. There is a threefold difference in the risk to injury. The risk of death is many times larger than that. There is nine times difference between the two modes. This simply means that rail traffic is much heavier and less forgiving.
There have been a few attempts made in the past to compare the absolute safety records between rail and road. I do not have good data, but I thought it would be worth showing some data prepared for the Rail Safety Act Review Committee's On Track Report. This tries to relate workload, in this case billion tonne-kilometres, between the two modes. Rail has what looks to be a substantially better safety records than trucks, both for accidents and fatalities.
From a safety regulatory perspective, we like to look at this as a systemic approach where the railways are responsible for managing safety. The Railway Safety Act promoted in 1989 that you put safety management back in the hands of the railroad. Transport Canada's role is to monitor and ensure that we stay in compliance so that public safety is safeguarded, and the Safety Board is there to investigate failures.
We are of the opinion that the Safety Act is progressive. It has allowed the gradual removal of non-safety impediments. We are still working on more, and I have a few to show you. This does involve the unions. I must say that allowing the unions at the table talking about safety was a change in heart for the railroads. However, the process works well.
We are not there yet, but we are trying to move towards a process where we manage relative risk so that we put our money where it will have the most benefit for the whole system rather than trying to tackle each issue specifically according to people's opinions of what would be best.
One of the modal inequities which still exists is speed restrictions through metro Toronto. We have just inaugurated a new service called "Iron Highway" which takes 20 trailers at a time and puts them on a continuous ramp. The ramp folds out in the middle to load and unload. We are trying to compete in order to get highway trailers off the road in the Toronto to Montreal corridor.
I would say that approximately 80 per cent of the trailers on the highway carry goods which cannot be transported by regular rail equipment. The in-train forces are too great, and the boxes are not built for it. Therefore, we have designed equipment which will handle road vehicles.
Through metro Toronto, if this equipment is carrying cans of paint, it is limited to 55 kilometres an hour. The same trailers on the road are going 100 kilometres an hour, and these are operating about five miles apart from each other through the same area of the city.
The Chairman: If they are going 100 kilometres an hour, I want to talk to you.
Ms Ackermans: That is the official speed limit.
Another modal inequity which we wished to bring to your attention is that the Safety Board has complete data on rail accidents and other modes -- air, pipeline, marine. However, equivalent data from our major competitor, the motor vehicle, is extremely difficult to find. The provinces keep the information. They do not keep it the same way, and they do not report it the same way. When you are doing safety comparisons, there is a data problem in trying to get the information.
There is also an accident focus disadvantage. It seems that we have become inured to motor vehicle problems on the highway. We look at individual cases, but we do not look at them collectively. With rail, the Safety Board investigates accidents. A year or two or three after we have had the accident, it is still coming out with recommendations to the regulator or to the railway association or to the companies about how to fix their problems. There is not that same kind of focus in the motor vehicle area.
We also have some fiscal inequities. The top line here is the rate of return on capital, which the Canadian Transportation Agency has determined to be at a replacement capital cost. The CPR has consistently over a ten-year period run at less than that. Part of this translates to the tax burden we have and the comparative tax burden both between U.S. and Canada and between each of the modes. We are at a tax disadvantage in our mode compared to our U.S. competitor and compared to the motor carrier industry as well.
Senator St. Germain: Were you profitable?
Mr. Dodge: Last year, no; this year, yes, so far.
Ms Ackermans: I would say the last four years, no.
Senator St. Germain: Were you writing down anything?
Mr. Dodge: Yes, we were.
Another way of looking at it is: Have we had a positive cash flow? The answer is no. We have been spending a significant amount of money investing in our track infrastructure, rail, ties, ballasts, and locomotives. We understand we have a problem.
Senator St. Germain: That is an investment into the future, though, is it not, sir?
Mr. Dodge: Yes and no. For instance, when we replace locomotives on the coal trains that go into B.C., we are replacing five old locomotives. We are not moving any more coal. We are putting new locomotives in place there. That is an investment in the future in terms of trying to continuously serve that business. It is not a growth capital.
The problem we have as a rail industry is that it is capital intensive in terms of having to maintain our own track infrastructure, unlike the highways, unlike the marine modes, and unlike the air modes. Not only do we have the day-to-day maintenance of it, we have the responsibility to put new track infrastructure in place to replace the track infrastructure that is worn out. That is a significant disadvantage.
As well, if we look at our depreciation rates as compared to other modes, after four years, we have only written off on locomotives 6.9 per cent. If it were a truck, you would have written it down to 17 per cent. If you happen to own a shipping line such as a Great Lakes bulk carrier, you could write that off after three years. In the U.S., after four years you have written your equipment down to 31 per cent. All of this comes to play in terms of the cash flow and the investments that we are required to make.
We are attempting to show that there is an imbalance with other modes. I do not think either CN or CP are earning rates of return equivalent to some of the U.S. carriers. As the capital market floats around, unless we can improve our position, we will find ourselves not being able to get capital.
One of the reasons we separated out that line between Quebec City and Detroit, or really Windsor, is that we realize that line has a challenge just because of the competition it has with the trucks that travel the 401 and with CN. There is an overcapacity there. We realize that we must find a solution in that area because it is not profitable. However, it still has to provide its own track infrastructure in order to compete with the highway infrastructure.
That is a long explanation to say yes, we lost money last year because we wrote down, and yes, we are making money this year. Our cash flow is still in a negative position. We realize we cannot go on forever in this way. We are, as you might say, investing in the future. I think we are catching up in some of the investments that we did not make in the past just because we were not generating a sufficient cash flow. We have gone through a great deal of pain in reorganizing ourselves, downsizing, closing shops, doing all those painful things -- and we had to do them -- in order to try to improve the profitability of this investment so we could generate the cash flow.
Ms Ackermans: In the rail mode, it is quite simple to make it safe. You simply slow everything down. That has been one of our responses over the past 10 or 15 years. Because we do not have the money to put into the plant, we slow the whole thing down. You become less competitive as you do that, and you get into a vicious cycle. Mr. Dodge has been talking about our attempt in the last year or two to try to break that cycle and put enough money into the plant and into the equipment in order to get ourselves out of that cycle.
Mr. Dodge: I will close with a summary of issues that we have talked about. Rail is a safe mode when compared to others, whether you look at it in terms of personal safety, the transportation of dangerous goods, or the total operations safety aspect. When we compare it to the U.S. rail safety performance, we find that we are even better them.
The majority of crossing accidents are due to driver behaviour. Oddly, an interesting fact is that more than half of them have occurred at crossings where there are automated warning devices, whether they be bells or crossing barriers.
I happened to be travelling on a section of track with which the B.C. senators might be aware, and that is the former B.C. Hydro section through Langley, et cetera. They have a highway stop sign at every one of their crossings. I gather Ontario used to have that, but they took them away.
When you consider that the majority of accidents are due to driver behaviour and that 50 per cent occur where there is an automated warning device, you say to yourself: What is the best and most cost-effective way of trying to increase driver awareness? As Ms Ackermans said, if you have an accident with a train, the risk of risk of death is significantly higher simply because of the sheer weight of the locomotive itself. As we say here, Transport Canada needs to do research on defining the risk to the road user at some of these crossings with various warning devices.
As to the target groups for our crossing safety and awareness program, part of our operation group is our police force which reports through to the Operations group. We also have what we call Operation Life Saver. We take constables to the schools to try to talk about safety around the rail infrastructure, the right-of-ways. We do that both in the U.S. and in Canada. We also take locomotive engineers to these schools to try and give them the experience that these engineers have had. Indeed, we have taken some groups on our trains so that they can see the performances of drivers trying to cross as the train is coming and almost playing chicken with our trains. Anyone from the press who has gone there and seen this comes away with a better understanding of some of the day-to-day risk that our locomotive engineers face as they operate. One of the worst corridors is between Edmonton and Calgary, where we have many crossings and trains.
When people get their driver's examination and test, the railway crossing aspect should have a higher focus so that they understand and do not simply take it for granted. I am sure we have all people trying to go around barriers which are down.
Ms Ackermans talked about the modal equity with respect to the Transportation Safety Board and the rigor with which they investigate our accidents and those with the pipeline and the airline. We feel that some of that rigor should also be applied to our competitor so we all have a clear understanding of safety risk and the movement of goods.
Finally, the regulatory inequities with which we work should be addressed and dealt with so we do have a balanced playing field.
The Chairman: I will exercise my prerogative with several questions, because time is getting short.
Thank you very much for an excellent presentation.
Could you tell us your three major safety issues outstanding with respect to rail?
Despite your work on safety at level crossings, we still had 66 derailments. That seems to be a bit on the high side. I am sure it is being addressed, but could you tell us how you are addressing these derailments and something on the nature of them? What caused the majority of them?
Could you tell us how you see the industry in the year 2010 or as far out as 2025? Will you be completely computerized, for example? What type of trains will we be thinking about? We must think in terms of safety for the trains you want to see in 25 years time. What will they be carrying, and what do you see the safety issues to be in that period?
I will ask you to respond to those at some point in the next few minutes, but I will first turn to Senator Bacon.
Senator Bacon: Mrs. Barbara Butler appeared before our committee, and in her book Alcohol and Drugs in the Work Place, she writes on page 14 about drug and alcohol abuse in the railway industry. There was a survey done in 1987 by a federally appointed task force on the control of drug and alcohol abuse in the rail industry. She wrote that although every effort was made to design and deliver an accurate survey, it was very difficult because people did not want to give their names because of their employers. Still, 20.6 per cent said that they had come to work feeling the effects of alcohol, 15.2 per cent said they had reported to work within two hours of having a drink, and 4.4 per cent had reported to work within two hours of having four or more drinks.
Do you believe there is a problem with drug and alcohol abuse among railway employees? If so, are you in favour of random or mandatory drug and alcohol testing for your employees? Do you require federal legislation in order to implement a drug and alcohol testing program?
Mr. Dodge: We do have a U.S. operation. I have lived in Minneapolis, and I was CEO of that operation. In the U.S., we do have random drug testing of our crews -- not alcohol, but drug. This was as a result of a Con Rail/Amtrak accident. There was speculation that we would observe that 15 per cent of our employees had consumed drugs. In actual fact, we observed that in 1 per cent or less than 1 per cent of our employees who work in safety-related jobs. That would be the crews, the people that inspect the cars, the dispatchers, and that type of individuals. They would not be the shipment management clerk that you saw there.
In answer to your question, we observed 1 per cent. I personally think that the random testing probably has a good effect. I cannot give you statistics of how many employees would have used it or would not have used it. Ms Ackermans will probably tell you that when it comes to drug testing, it is not quite as simple as it seems. It is quite difficult to do drug testing in an accurate manner such that you are addressing the root cause.
We have started some random testing in the U.S. for alcohol. You might recall they had to change the law in the States because it is an interventionist type of testing; that is, there is no cause. We are doing it randomly. In the U.S., we do have compulsory testing after an incident. If there is a derailment or anything like that, the crew must submit itself to a test. That is not the case in Canada.
Indeed, there was a recent case where there was an incident in Ontario, not on our line, in which the OPP had the crew do a test. They blew 0.04, which is by highway standards okay. By our standards, it is not okay, because we have a zero tolerance for alcohol. When they finally got to the hospital and were asked to do a blood test, they refused, and they were within their rights to refuse.
If we see people that are obviously intoxicated, yes, we have a reason to discharge them, et cetera. It is more of a visual test than an incident test.
In answer to your question about people coming to work after drinking eight hours previously, we have no way of knowing that. We have no way of knowing whether they are fit to work. It is a problem with which we deal, and we try to do it in terms of the front-line manager. I have three roles for the front-line manager. One is safety, one is communication with the employee, and one is to understand the employee's personal side so we have a better understanding of the employee where he might have a personal family problem. The chairman was asking about some of our causes for our derailments, and certainly human error is a major cause. I think part of that is people focusing on the job, and that could be related to family difficulties or other difficulties.
Senator Bacon: Do you have any special resources within your staff to deal with problems like that to prevent accidents?
Mr. Dodge: Yes, we do. We have an employee family assistance program which we run or manage in conjunction with the unions. We finance it; they participate with us. Our chief medical officer, who is also part of our Operations group, is on that program. It is a formal program in which we set up a network of people who are available to assist the employees, whether the problem be alcohol, drugs, or just the family home.
Ms Ackermans: In addition to what Mr. Dodge said, we also offer counselling whenever a crew has been involved in an accident with a motor vehicle or pedestrian. They are the hidden victim in those accidents, so we do offer psychological counselling which helps them get through being part of an accident like that.
Mr. Dodge and I have debated the drug question back and forth. We have probably as much of a problem with drugs and alcohol affecting sleep and coming to work tired as will actually having the drug affect performance while you are working. We also have people out there on prescription medications which affect performance, and random testing would not begin to touch that. We have approached this after some six or seven or eight years of arguing with the government over what we would want to see in a testing program and not getting anywhere because of human rights legislation.
From my perspective, and I still have not convinced my boss entirely, we are better off dealing with this on a policy basis and using our EFAP process and getting to our employees through a change in culture and attitude in the workplace rather than coming down with the stick of the random testing.
Senator Bacon: Prevention would work well.
Ms Ackermans: Yes.
The Chairman: Do you feel any need for federal legislation in this area?
Mr. Dodge: We are still debating that.
Senator Bacon: I thought you did not want any.
Mr. Dodge: No, we are still debating it. I would like to have that post-incident.
Senator St. Germain: Is there anything peculiar about the railroad, and is there anything you could do?
You have the airline industry, and you have the trucking industry, and you have rail. They are three different industries, but they are all in transportation. They are not really different industries, but they are in three different modes. Yet, it does not seem to be a problem as much with the airline. Is it more predominant with rail workers, and is it a culture which is changing? I do not want to put you on the spot, and I do not want you to get into trouble with the union. If you cannot answer, you cannot answer.
Ms Ackermans: I am going on soft feelings rather than hard facts. Within our industry, people have told me that they think track gangs probably have the greatest problem because they are out working 14-day stretches, they are away from home, and they are partying with their fellow workers when they are not on the job site. There may be more of a problem in that.
I do not believe we have a big problem with people who man our trains. As much as there has been a cultural shift in not driving after you have been drinking, that same kind of cultural shift has been going on inside the rail industry for the people who are actually driving the trains. There are pockets where we might have problems, but I do not think the public is exposed.
Senator St. Germain: My question relates to the Canadian Chemical Producers' Association who were here earlier. I asked them a question in regards to me being approached by the Vancouver Fire Fighters Association and the Fire Fighters Association right across the board in regards to the system that is used in the U.S. for identifying dangerous and hazardous goods. What is your view? You operate in the U.S.; you operate in Canada.
Ms Ackermans: I believe the system you speak of is a pilot project in the Texas area.
Senator St. Germain: Possibly. Is their system different than ours? We have a system here.
Ms Ackermans: I know the firefighters have made a large issue of getting information quickly. They need information right away.
Senator St. Germain: That is exactly what they say.
Ms Ackermans: We have a computerized system. Our entire system will be shortly run out of Calgary. One call to our Calgary network management centre can give anyone a list of what is on the train and where it is on the train. Firefighters have for years wanted the list with the train, but that does not do you any good if that front-end locomotive is gone. They need the information; we need to have a way of getting them the information that we have in our computer systems.
Senator St. Germain: Is this similar to the system in the U.S.?
Ms Ackermans: The system in the U.S. is a pilot project that is going on in the Texas area. I am fuzzy on some of the details, but, in general, all railroads there have similar types of systems to the ones we have in terms of knowing what is on their trains and where it is.
Senator St. Germain: Is the mentality such that if they have the best system, we would adopt it right away, or vice versa?
Mr. Dodge: Is your question whether, if we see something better, we will use it?
Senator St. Germain: It is not necessarily only you using it. It is a question of the entire regulatory system in Canada being in position. Our role is not to tell you how to run your business but to implement regulations or bring forward a system that everyone can use to the optimum.
Ms Ackermans: A few years ago, the idea was floated that every time a dangerous good moved, or any kind of shipment moved, there would be a record filed in some sort of central data base. We move 99.5 per cent of the time without any incident, so that is a lot of effort to go to cover off the 0.05.
A better way to look at it is the exception and to have that information available immediately when there is an exception.
Senator St. Germain: In percentages, you could only have 0.5 of 1 per cent, but it could be a Bhopal disaster. That is the danger of the whole thing.
Ms Ackermans: Yes, and the first responder needs to know what is there.
The Chairman: It is the quality, not the quantity, that scares people.
Senator Perrault: There has been a roaring controversy in recent years over the elimination of certain crew member positions. What size were the crews in 1960, and what is the average crew in 1996? Do you have those figures?
Mr. Dodge: I can give you the order of magnitude.
In 1960, the crew was probably a four-person crew, and some of them were five. There would be one locomotive engineer, steam locomotive, then probably a conductor, a front-end brakeman, and two tail-end brakemen.
Senator Perrault: Was there controversy about the rear brakeman?
Ms Ackermans: Not in Canada.
Senator Perrault: I remember a controversy in our country regarding elimination of positions in Canadian railways, not just in the United States.
Mr. Dodge: That was a controversy. There were two opinions as to whether it was effective to, in today's operation, put both people up on the head end.
Senator Perrault: You have automated the rear end, have you not?
Mr. Dodge: Correct. We can release the air. We can do the same thing at the tail end of the train that we can with a caboose. Indeed, you saw that track detector equipment. They were not around in 1960. They provide us with a far better source of data than simply trying to observe out of a caboose.
Senator Perrault: What if you have an electronic failure? There is no live human being at the end of that train. Does that not pose dangers for the passengers and the goods you are transporting? The union makes these claims, of course.
Ms Ackermans: If there is an electronic failure or a communication failure, the head-end crew knows about it right away. They can take precautions based on our operating procedures. However, that is very rare.
Mr. Dodge: Are you asking what happens if the train comes apart?
Senator Perrault: I am asking about any incident which would risk the goods being transported or the human beings aboard. The allegation is made that there is no substitute for a human being. You have heard the arguments.
Mr. Dodge: Yes, senator.
Senator Perrault: Do you believe them? Has it worked out? Do you have doubts yourself now?
Ms Ackermans: In the work we did with CANALERT, we began to realize that the weakest part in some of our systems is the people. It is people who cause failures, whether it is the way people design a system or the way we expect people to use it. You cannot expect someone in a caboose to be as alert as an electronic device which is on call every second of a 24-hour trip.
Senator Perrault: Do you envisage something like Sky Train in Vancouver where there are no operators and no personnel, but it is all done with a computer board?
Ms Ackermans: Theoretically, it is possible.
Senator Perrault: Is that really down the line for our major railroads?
Mr. Dodge: The Chairman asked what it would look like in the year 2030. It could be. I cannot see it in the next five or ten years, but it is possible. I see more computerized safety equipment going into the locomotive and the whole train and the monitoring of it.
However, 2030 without anyone at the head end of the train? Probably not, but it is possible. You are probably aware that in the Quebec North Shore railroad, they are trying to operate with one person in the cab. I think that is possible in that particular terrain.
Ms Ackermans: I should like to answer Senator Forrestall's question about the 66 main track derailments this year. You will notice that 66 is what we report to the Safety Board, and I have 36 that would have been reportable if we were a U.S. railroad, FRA reportable. The difference between those two, the 30 derailments, are derailments that cost less than $8,600.
The Chairman: Madam, I am not terribly interested in that. I am simply saying there were 66. What caused them?
Ms Ackermans: You are talking fender benders. You are talking one wheel off the track. You are talking going over the stop block.
The Chairman: How can you have a fender bender with a derailed rail car?
Mr. Dodge: How do you define a train accident? The Federal Railroad Administration in the U.S. has defined a railway accident. If a wheel comes off a coal car that is in a yard and it destroys ten ties and you have to replace a set of wheels and it costs more than $8,000, then that is a train accident.
Senator Perrault: An accident is not running into a herd of cattle?
Mr. Dodge: No.
Senator Perrault: What would you describe that as?
Mr. Dodge: Well, we only hit prize cattle, I can assure you.
Senator Adams: You were comparing accidents between the CPR and American railways. I have been on the Amtrak train between Washington and New York, and we were going over 150 miles an hour on a passenger train. I am sure there is a difference between a cargo train carrying stuff and a passenger train.
Is there a difference in speed between the railways that are American and Canadian? Do you have regulations?
Mr. Dodge: They have more commuters, and therefore the commuters are a higher speed operation. However, by and large, we have the same type of track infrastructure. When we go across the prairies on our mainline, we are going 50 miles an hour to 60 miles an hour as a freight train. When we get into B.C., we are down to 20 miles an hour until we hit the lower mainland, and then around the Hope we can speed up to about 60.
We have commuter operations that will go up to 70 miles an hour. In fact, in our operations in the U.S., we have Amtrak that does 79 miles an hour on a freight territory.
Your question, though, is a good one in terms of how you mix freight and passenger operations. I can assure you that if I had something that was going 150 miles an hour, or 300 kilometres, I would want to try to have as much separation as I can between the freight operation and the commuter operation. Indeed, the trend is towards letting the high-speed rail have its own corridor, its own track, and trying to avoid sharing of track infrastructure with freight.
Senator Adams: I remember a previous Senate committee hearing where CN said that their locomotive operators, because of union regulation, were only allowed to drive so many kilometres. Do you have the same type of regulation in CP?
Mr. Dodge: Yes. Right now, a normal trip for a locomotive engineer is about 125 miles. If he is on the prairies, he can do that in about three hours. If he is in B.C., he can do that in about five hours if he is going between Revelstoke and Kamloops.
The hours of service for locomotives engineers in the U.S. is 12 hours. You are probably aware that the airline pilots have 14 hours. Indeed, with some of the train crews we have now, we can go between 10 and 12 hours. I believe they were referring to the variance between what they can do and what they do do.
Senator Adams: We also heard that these operators made something like $60,000 to $70,000 a year, as well as have a standby. Someone could be there for eight hours a day, simply sitting there in case something happened to the other engineers, and they would then take over. Is that kind of approach used at CP?
Mr. Dodge: A locomotive engineer making $60,000 to $80,000 a year is not uncommon. This goes back to work rules when we had steam and you had to put water in a steam locomotive every 100 miles, when we had conductors, when we used to have way freights and the so-called milk runs, et cetera.
We now have intermodal trains that run intact between Toronto and Vancouver. We have coal trains that run intact between the southeast Kootenays and Roberts Bank. We have potash trains that run intact.
There is a great deal of room for productivity improvement, but there are many collective agreements which we have to cover.
Our challenge, in terms of trying to run a safer railroad, is to ensure that when people are at work, they are operating a train and not waiting to meet another train. There is room for us to improve our productivity and improve safety by taking some of the work rules that we have for engineers and conductors and adapting them to today's marketplace and today's technology. I certainly have that as a high priority when it comes to then next round of collective negotiations, because I think it will result in a safer railroad.
The Chairman: Would you pay for your own double tracking?
Mr. Dodge: We did pay for our own double tracking.
The Chairman: Would you continue to do so? You have some major problems there.
Would you care to address my question about where you want to be?
Mr. Dodge: In the year 2030?
The Chairman: Or 2025.
Mr. Dodge: The way life is going today, I am trying to get to the year 2000 in a safe and profitable fashion.
The Chairman: Where do you want to leave the company to your successor?
Mr. Dodge: I have been in the rail business now for 27 or 28 years. I have seen some significant changes in containerization and how it is handled. I have seen growth in the bulk commodities and the resource products in Canada. I have seen us go through a transformation where we have seen the highway take over as the major carrier of goods, especially finished goods.
In the year 2030, I see us loaded with computerized equipment, but still having a diesel electric type of propulsion system and still having track. I see more sophistication in how we manage the track, how we do the work, and how we measure where. I see communications with trains and communication between customers improving.
The Chairman: Do you see any material changes in terms of quality of steel?
Mr. Dodge: I see the quality of steel improving. We have better steel today than we did 15 years ago. The Japanese brought in better steel. We have seen Sydney produce better steel. I see better steel on our wheels.
Senator Perrault: Is it more durable?
Mr. Dodge: Yes. The metallurgical properties are significantly improved. Many of the cracked rails we see are from metallurgical faults. Some of the steel is 1947 steel, 1930 steel, but not on our main line. Even Algoma steel produced in 1980 has metallurgical flaws that create problems when we see the temperatures drop below minus 25 for a sustainable period of time. We need to replace that.
I do not know whether I answered your question as to the vision of 2030.
The Chairman: If you do not tell us where you want to be and how safe you want to be, how will we know?
Mr. Dodge: I will let Ms Ackermans speak on the safety. I thought you were looking at the operation and the marketplace.
Senator Perrault: What about U.S. competition?
Mr. Dodge: Yes, I think there will be two railroads in the States. It is shrinking.
The Chairman: Will you be one of them?
Mr. Dodge: We could be part of the merger situation that is happening in the States.
Senator Perrault: Farmers are now able to ship their grain by almost any route.
Mr. Dodge: Yes. They can truck it to CN; they can truck it to CP; and they can truck it to Burlington Northern.
Senator Perrault: Are you losing any business?
Mr. Dodge: I do not think so. Our rates are regulated, among other things, but we do have an efficient system. We are 30 per cent below the U.S. rates. It could be they are trying to bypass the wheat board and market their own grain.
Ms Ackermans: In terms of vision, there are still some new technologies coming. There are new air brake systems that are being worked on now which will improve stopping distances and efficiency of operations.
You wanted to know about three major issues. I could mention the two biggest ones.
One is human failure, no matter where it occurs. It is human failure that is behind many of our accidents, and we are putting effort and safety focus into determining what causes the failure and getting the failure out of the system, because it is generated by the processes we expect people to work to. We are looking at that very carefully.
One of the focuses brought to the meeting today here was crossing accidents, but we did not talk about trespassers. That does not really affect the safety of rail operations, but crossing accidents do. Our crews die. There is human life lost from crossing accidents. There is nothing we can do about it. We cannot stop that train. It is physically impossible.
Senator Perrault: Is that the overpass and underpass situation?
Ms Ackermans: That is correct. That is the only way to do it safely. The absolute safe way is not to let any roadway cross a rail, as we do not let roadways cross airport runways. That is the only thing you can do.
Senator St. Germain: Do you have to keep people thinking? If you over protect them, will they quit thinking and die?
Mr. Dodge: It is the awareness of the individual.
The Chairman: Thank you very much, both of you. We could probably be here until midnight tonight, but we must move on. We appreciate the professionalism of your report, and your candour as well.
I now call on the Transportation and Emergency Response Association of the Propane Gas Association of Canada. Mr Bill Kurtze, the Managing Director, is with us today.
Could we have your presentation and perhaps we will have a chance for a few questions. We are running a little late as you will appreciate.
Mr. Bill Kurtze, Managing Director, Transportation and Emergency Response Association of the Propane Gas Association of Canada: Senators, recognizing it is late, I will be brief.
The Propane Gas Association of Canada appreciates the opportunity that you have extended to us to be here this afternoon. By way of introduction, I will explain what the Propane Gas Association is and what the LPG Assistance Corp. Emergency Response program is.
The Propane Gas Association consists of 165 to 170 member companies which are involved in the production, transportation, and retail and wholesale marketing of propanes, butanes, and mixtures of propanes and butanes. Member companies range from PetroCanada, Imperial, Shell, down through, on the retail side, ICG propane, Superior propane, and the small one- and two-man operations located from coast to coast in Canada. Although the railroad which preceded us is not a member of the Propane Gas Association, CN Rail is. We also have a fairly close working relationship with a number of the trucking companies which transport the product.
This afternoon I will spend some time putting everything into context -- that is, to review the number of LPG incidents that have occurred and that have been handled by the LPG Assistance Corp. Emergency Response program -- and then describe the industry's prevention, preparedness and response plans which will take us into the 21st century.
The LPG Assistance Corp. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Propane Gas Association and offers to the member companies of the association emergency response capability. That emergency response capability is required by law under the transportation of dangerous goods and is required for movement of product. We have also established an emergency response program for stationary tanks as well as those that move on road.
Our premise in crafting this presentation this afternoon consisted of two points: As governments at all levels re-invent themselves, they start to outsource a broad number of things. We have seen outsourcing, whether it is at the municipal, provincial, or federal level. Not only today but as we move into the 21st century, industry has a responsibility and the association itself and its members have a responsibility and in fact an opportunity to accept the challenges that are forthcoming as a result of this outsourcing and thereby take greater control over their own destiny.
Looking at the activations of the LPG Assistance Corp. gives you some sort of an idea over the last ten years since it was formed in 1987 as to the number of planned activations. To put that into context, on average over the last ten years we have received slightly in excess of 3,000 calls on our emergency response line. Of those 3,000 calls, the breakdown of the number of incidents and the actual plan activations that have occurred are in front of you.
On an ongoing basis, we have looked for trend lines to determine whether things are increasing or decreasing. Quite frankly, we have not been able to find any trend lines. We have not seen any trend lines upward or downward as a result of any deregulation or outsourcing that has occurred.
We have included two sets of statistics which may not be under the jurisdiction of this group, but nonetheless they are of interest -- that is, so-called public and stationary tanks. Those are unregulated situations where the we have responded to incidents involving the public, various vehicles, RVs, barbecues, or whatever the situation may be. As well, our stationary tank plan responds to tanks generally at residential, commercial, or industrial sites. When you are considering the overall emergency response of the LP gas business in Canada, obviously the road and the rail lines are the lines that you look at; however, that is only part of the story as far as the LP gas situation is concerned.
We have had in existence since 1987 an emergency response plan. As we have evolved, we have seen the need for a new response plan. We are in the process of finalizing new response plan, and I will present that to you this afternoon.
To this point in time, the LPG Assistance Corp. has represented a smaller segment of the industry which included some of the producers, all of the retail marketers, and some of the transporters. We are now seeing an evolution into a larger plan, a more comprehensive plan that will allow the LP gas business to move into the 21st century. However, if I were to look into my crystal ball to see where are going, I would see that this is just one step in a series of steps that could well involve a number of the scheduled 12 dangerous goods being involved in one overall emergency response plan.
Senators, I will now describe the new response organization for LP gas.
In crafting that new organization, we looked approximately 15 principles, which are as follows:
First, to meet or exceed regulatory requirements;
Second, to provide a single focus for LP gas emergency response in Canada for both transportation and stationary tanks;
Third, to maintain or reduce the liability of any individual involved in providing response capability;
Fourth, and this relates to part of the preparedness portion of the PPR with which we are all so familiar, to ensure that there is a minimum insurance requirement so if something does happen, the smaller organizations can respond and live up to their legal and liability expectations.
Fifth, to provide a risk-based response capability and to provide a long-term solution. What has been in position to this point evolved from a ten-year effort, but we need to look longer term and broader term.
Sixth, to develop response program which meets the public's expectations and, from an industry standpoint, is cost-effective for the overall services provided.
Seventh, to look at some of the cost associated with providing that response. We have established an equitable funding formula and an organization which builds on existing strengths. The major companies in Canada had and still have an extremely strong capability to respond to rail instances. The LPG Assistance Corp. as it is right now has a strong capability to respond to both the road and to the stationary tank. A combination of the two provides each of us with a stronger capability to respond.
Eighth, to standardize the response capability. It is important to ensure that the level of training of the individuals and the emergency response team and the equipment they take to the scene of the incident is standardized across the country.
Ninth, to facilitate companies meeting the need for full life-cycle stewardship. There is a clear trend, not only within the LP gas business but across all industries, to look more at this full life-cycle stewardship. In our view, we are trying to establish that safety is not a department but rather a management philosophy.
Tenth, to establish a strong management system so that the plant continues to function. Part of that management system relates to audits and the ability to audit equipment and personnel to ensure they keep current with existing and new response techniques.
Eleventh, to establish an organization which is simple to administer so that it can look at its effectiveness overall.
The plan itself will respond to propanes and butanes and mixtures of propanes and butanes. We are not in a position with this plan, nor is it the intention at this juncture, to respond to liquids. That is an important point to remember.
It also must recognize that it is never in charge. As per the emergency response plan, there is always an on-scene commander at or on his way to the scene of the incident. The emergency response teams we send out are never in charge. The person in charge is always the on-scene commander -- generally police and/or fire, and sometimes federal or provincial government officials.
The response plan will respond to rail, truck, and stationary tanks, particularly large tanks.
As it is a private industry plan, we must wrestle with how you respond to incidents involving non-plan participants. The way we have done it in the past and will continue to do it is to link very closely with government and to have the plan activated by government. By "government," I do not necessarily mean the federal government or Transport Canada. We do mean municipal and fire services. Our vast experience tells us that these are the individuals who want the assistance and are on scene.
We wish to establish certain criteria in terms of response capability so that we can give individuals tangible evidence. We have tried to raise the bar and improve the response time firstly in terms of providing initial information to the scene of the incident which we do within minutes, and secondly, to have an advisor -- the RMA is known as a remedial measures advisor -- on scene within six hours and to have the response team, if it is required, on scene in no more than 12 hours.
We have established and continue to upgrade the necessary equipment requirements for going on scene. We have set the criteria so that they must have sufficient capability to off-load a jumbo rail car within eight hours and a tank truck within four hours. To ensure that there is continued company participation, we have said that the ownership and maintenance of equipment is the responsibility of the remedial measures advisors and the response teams.
Incidentally, to ensure no misunderstanding, the remedial measures advisors come from industry companies themselves. We have strategically located a number of them across the country, and they come from the member companies of the association. It is a member-sponsored, member-driven emergency response plan.
The plan itself has an organization structure which consists of a board of directors, a manager, an overall administrator and, the real heart of it, the remedial measures advisors and emergency response teams.
We have tried to ensure a national presence and involvement. We have set up the board of directors so that eight of the seats on that board come from PGAC, the Propane Gas Association of Canada, and LP-Map. LP-Map is the mutual aid plan that many of the major oil and gas companies have used. We did, however, decide to leave some seats open, as there are organizations in addition to the Propane Gas Association which represent the propane industry in Canada. We wanted to ensure they too were represented at the table, particularly the Ontario Propane Association and the AQP, which is the Quebec association.
We have structured an operating committee to provide input to the board of directors and to the management of the corporation so that they, being field-level personnel, could keep people advised as to the appropriate technical reaction to various response requirements.
The heart of the plan consists of the remedial measures advisors, the response teams, and the response management function.
The response management function is currently located in Sarnia. There is a 1-800 number which offers bilingual, 365-day-a-year emergency response and a source to report an incident. To the extent that the incident requires an individual be sent to the scene, an RMA is sent. There are 35 located across Canada who have the capability of chartering aircraft or driving to the scene so that they can arrive within the six-hour time frame.
There are 11 response teams located at strategic locations: Vancouver, northeast B.C., Calgary, Edmonton, Regina, Winnipeg, Thunder Bay, Toronto, Montreal, and Saint John, New Brunswick. Of those 11 teams, we currently have verbal agreements with 10 of the 11, and we are trying to finalize formal agreements. From the response we are receiving, I do not think there will be a problem. Quite the converse, we are in the politically enviable position of having to turn some companies down for the simple reason that we do not believe they are as well qualified as others. There is, from an industry standpoint, not only a willingness but a desire to participate in the program. The overall technical competence of the individuals is important. If the individuals do not have the capability, the training, and the expertise, they are of no use.
We have established criteria generally based on NFPA, National Fire Prevention Association out of the States, requirements for response team members. We are developing training curriculum and scheduling individuals to be trained to that level. We believe at this point in time that the 35 RMAs in existence do have that capability. We are still developing some of the team members.
Looking into my crystal ball, on the preparedness side of PPR, we would like to see our own industry -- those people who are not response teams or not remedial measures advisors -- have a greater capability to handle their own incidents and also to look at the training of non-members. When you consider the fire services particularly, and the police services to a lesser level, we see a real need to provide those first responders with greater skills in assessing the scenes of LP gas incidents and conceivably taking remedial measures until the response teams arrive.
Whether it is at the scene of the incident or prior to an incident occurring, there is a strong need for communications. Looking again at the preparedness, prevention and response trio, prevention involves a heavy level of communication. Not dissimilar to some of the other emergency response capability that exists in Canada, we wish to ensure that we are able to start developing programs for use at the community level so that we can talk to them about LP gas, the dangers of LP gas, the emergency response capability that the industry has, and to allay some of their overall concerns and fears.
My summary goes to the response, preparedness and prevention and our overall evolution in thinking. If we have one goal, it is to make safety not a department but rather a management philosophy.
When considering prevention, preparedness and response, everyone starts at response, and that is normally where governments act and try to put in various regulations and legislation that are necessary to ensure that the public's interest is protected. I think we have the response and the preparedness. We have the equipment, the manpower, and the skills to be able to respond. Our real task now is in the area of prevention.
The CCPA, Canadian Chemical Producers Association, was here earlier and made mention of some of the work that they have done in establishing codes of conduct for industry and the members of their organization. The work they have done has been good work, and they have been a leader in establishing a number of those.
As part of the two-year project so that we can go into the next millennium with a series of programs which ensure that our members are committed to an appropriate philosophy associated with emergency response, we are developing codes of conduct. We have already started this two-year project, and we have received a positive response not only from those companies involved in the similar exercise with CCPA but also from member companies who are at the retail and transportation end.
In summary, senators, we are at a stage of evolution. Our evolution will take us to an emergency response plan and a PPR philosophy relating to codes of conduct. If I were to look to the year 2010 or 2020, federal and industry discussions have already started on the establishment of a national emergency response system involving a broad number of schedule 12 goods which will ultimately put all industries in a position so that they will be able to maintain an appropriate stance on public interest and safety.
I would be more than pleased to answer any questions you may have.
The Chairman: Thank you very much. It was quite interesting. I did not realize that you were that well advanced with this.
Senator St. Germain: I do not know how advanced you are, but you certainly put on a good presentation, sir.
Mr. Kurtze: Coming from you, senator, that is a compliment.
Senator St. Germain: My question relates to how closely you are associated with the Canadian Chemical Producers Association. Is there a reason why you should not be like two fleas on a dog's tail? You are both dealing with a dangerous good that is transported in a similar manner. I do not know if yours is more hazardous than theirs, but it is hazardous if mismanaged.
Mr. Kurtze: Unquestionably it is hazardous if mismanaged. I am not sure I would have chosen the analogy of two fleas on a dog. There would be many people who would call us worse things, so I will not be insulted.
There is no question that a closer relationship will evolve. We have already started that process.
I would not leave government out of the picture either. Transportation of dangerous goods and the directorate associated therewith has been and will continue to be an integral part of this exercise.
I am not ashamed to admit that CCPA is ahead of us. However, having said that, we are in a position where we are speeding up our evolution. I would see a time, from the emergency response side, where those organizations and other organizations which also ship dangerous goods will function under a national emergency response system.
Senator St. Germain: Are there problems in the field between the provincial jurisdiction and the federal jurisdiction in these areas? Can you see a federal responsibility being to coordinate and establish a system utilizing the technologies that are available? I am thinking of something similar -- I do not know if you were here when Ms. Ackermans spoke -- to the program that is being tested in Texas and this type of thing.
Mr. Kurtze: Are you referring to a national data system?
Senator St. Germain: Yes.
Mr. Kurtze: On that issue, I agree with the railroads. The information data base they are building is the type of data base that is necessary. The consist is the key document, and the ability to phone one number and access that data is the appropriate way to go. I see the railroads as having that capability and seeing no reason why they should not continue to have that capability.
While I can understand a centralist attitude saying that we should establish one major data base in one particular location for all movement of goods and services, whether they are dangerous goods or not, I do not believe that is the most cost-effective way to go. Each transporter is moving in a direction where you will see the necessary information available, particularly the railroads. I am not sure I would recommend that system.
I will go back to the first part of your question relating to federal/provincial interactions. The most important section relative to emergency responses is at the scene of the incident. One of the things that you see at the scene of the incident is quite clear disagreement as to the best and most effective way to proceed. This is particularly so when there is a derailment and a broad number of dangerous goods involved. You quite frequently hear heated debate and dialogue between the various jurisdictions as to who has authority and who has the power to make the appropriate decision. I am not sure that can ever be resolved to the satisfaction of all the parties. In that kind of situation, people want to be able to make the decisions that are necessary to protect themselves and the people that they feel they represent.
I am not sure I could recommend a way which this group could write a piece of regulation or legislation that would say this is always under the jurisdiction of the province versus the federal government. That debate and dialogue are healthy, because frequently the best emergency response solution is arrived at.
There are pros and cons. There is mix of opinion as to whether the on-scene people, and they are the heart of the whole thing, should be taken out of the debate. At the scene of an incident, you will quite frequently see the establishment of a command centre. That command centre will have representatives from the federal government, the provincial government, municipal governments, municipal services, police services, and, in the case of the LP gas situation --
The Chairman: They will show up because of the event.
Mr. Kurtze: You bet.
The Chairman: Not because of any planned organization.
Mr. Kurtze: No. They are representing their political self-interest, if I can term it in that fashion -- the legislation or regulations which say they are responsible for are adhered to.
Federal/provincial disagreements are the only place in an emergency response context that I see those types of problems. In some cases, those problems are healthy.
Senator St. Germain: What do you provide to fire departments? What do you give to the national fire association, the police associations and what have you for support in dealing with incidents that relate to your products?
Mr. Kurtze: As a trade association, the Propane Gas Association of Canada's role is to provide information and to craft an emergency response plan. We would provide the on-scene commander, fire or police, with physical assistance in people who know the product and can provide them with the appropriate advice as to how the handle the incident. We provide them with a response team or teams to be able to physically mitigate that incident in terms of the softer information. One of our ongoing directions is to try to provide them with information and training programs to assist them and the fire fighter at the field level, the guy that is actually in there, with the understanding of what LP gas is, how it reacts in certain circumstances, and what he should or should not do until such time as professional assistance arrives.
Senator St. Germain: How immediate is that? If a call comes through 911 that a propane truck has rolled into the ditch north of Red Deer, who is sent there? Is there some way they can phone and be in contact with you right away?
Mr. Kurtze: You bet.
Senator St. Germain: Is that 24 hours a day?
Mr. Kurtze: You bet. The number is 1-800-265-0212, senator.
Senator St. Germain: I hope I never have to call that.
The Chairman: So do I.
What were the criteria for the location of the response centres, and would you walk us through an incident from start to finish? What happens?
Mr. Kurtze: We looked at the major rail and road transportation corridors, and we established specific locations. Quite frankly, we then drew circles on a map to ensure that a point could be covered within 12 hours. Recognizing transportation times and distances, we set our teams along the major transportation corridors so that they would be able to arrive within the 12-hour time limit that we set for ourselves. The government has no time limit, offers or guidance, nor should they in our view.
In terms of an incident, normally a call would come in to the 1-800 number that I mentioned. We have individuals on shift 12 hours day, 365 days of the year, who would respond to that call. If the call happened to be in French, we have made an arrangement with Canutec, with which I am sure you are familiar, to provide us with that bilingual capability. We immediately patch the call into Canutec, and they provide the response management function of determining the incident and whether that incident requires a response team. We receive many calls, and probably the most humorous have been wrong numbers that order pizzas and a top for a 1965 Chevrolet Corvette.
In normal circumstances, when they have the right number, we would dispatch one or more emergency responders to the scene of the incident. That individual or individuals would go out to the scene of the incident by the fastest route possible to assess the scene of the incident. Usually by that time an on-scene commander -- fire services predominantly -- are already at the scene of the incident.
The individual RMA, or remedial measures advisor, would identify himself, assess the scene of the incident, and determine with the on-scene commander what is required. Normally, the individual would make the recommendation that an emergency response team be activated. If that is his recommendation, the emergency response team would be activated through our response management function. In other words, the call would come back to 1-800 number, the 1-800 number operator would phone the response team, and the response team would be sent out to the scene of the incident.
From there, advisor turns over control to the response team. That response team is debriefed by the advisor saying, "This is how I view the situation, this is what I believe is necessary, and you can verify it for yourself." The team leader of the response team would verify that and then proceed to handle the incident.
Mother nature somewhat helps LPG, as opposed to a liquid spill where mother nature would cause a problem. If the product is leaking, many times it dissipates into the air and there is no problem. More frequently what happens is the vehicle or vehicles are off-loaded righted up, whether rail or road, and then moved by various means to a scene where we can deal with the vehicle itself.
Approximately ten days ago, there was a vehicle going near one of the lakes in the Okanagan, and it rolled down a 30-foot embankment. A tractor trailer loaded with propane was in the lake. The process I just described was followed. By the time the response team arrived, it was 7:00 in the evening. The police had cordoned off the area and said, "We will wait until morning to allow you to go down and look at the scene of the incident and make your evaluation." Since the tank was punctured, by the next morning the product had leaked out and dissipated. The only thing left to do was to use divers and cranes to bring the trailer and tractor back up to the surface again, put it on a flat bed, and bring it to Calgary.
If there is no leakage, the problem becomes more difficult in that you must off-load and have the equipment necessary to be able to off-load. The worst possible situation would be having to off-load a large tank car or a large tank truck. Our equipment requirements are such that an individual or a response team can off-load a super tanker in 12 hours and a tank truck in eight hours, so we can ensure that commerce continues. A transporter wants to get back on the road as quickly as possible. Everyone does, whether it is road or rail. You need equipment which has the capability to respond to the needs of the shipper and, at the same time, ensure you maintain some level of public safety.
The Chairman: It is fire containment, police control, and evacuation if necessary, that usual type of thing. Would it be your preference that nothing be touched at the scene until there is competent expertise on hand?
Mr. Kurtze: That is correct, senator. Quite frankly, that is what the man at the scene of the incident wants. In other words, the on-scene commander is not anxious to risk his men in an incident. He has a tendency to ensure that the area is cordoned off, that people were moved away, and that he and his manpower stay away from the scene of the incident. One situation comes to mind of a stationary tank in Quebec where some fire fighters were killed. That happens too often. Quite clearly, that would be our preference, and I know from speaking with the fire services that that is the preference of the fire services.
The Chairman: Would you have the approval or acquiescence of the local fire authorities? If something happened on the water front In Halifax, would the Halifax regional fire chief or the duty officer be fully aware of it?
Mr. Kurtze: In normal circumstances, I would say "yes". Canutec is the most well-known amongst the fire services. Normally the fire services, either directly or through their dispatcher, would talk to Canutec. Where it involves LP gas, Canutec immediately phones us.
The Chairman: It is not comforting to know that Halifax must rely on Saint John, New Brunswick. I find that personally quite offensive. I am being absolutely facetious.
Mr. Kurtze: I know. I apologize if you are offended, senator, but we looked at the 12-hour corridor so that we could ensure equal coverage to all citizens.
The Chairman: If Halifax had been selected and Saint John was in that 12-hour corridor, I would have been a very happy senator.
Senator Perrault: I am not totally familiar with the propane industry terminology. I made some notes during your excellent presentation. We heard about the remedial measures response team. We heard about the new emergency response organization for LP gas. We heard frequent reference to the unseen commander, who is almost an unseen presence.
I would appreciate hearing about one, two or three other specific instances where this plan has been put in operation. You mentioned that you had plan activation in areas involving the public, stationary, road, and rail. You have given us one example, and that is interesting. However, specific examples would be helpful: Precisely this happened, and this is what the activation means.
Mr. Kurtze: To deal with the first part of your question on our thought process, senator, each industry unfortunately has its own buzz words and its own jargon. Perhaps it is because I tend to talk a little quickly.
Senator Perrault: You presented it very well.
Mr. Kurtze: It is "on-scene commander," rather than "unseen." He is seen. I do not articulate very well.
In terms of rail, over the last year there have been six derailments. Some of those derailments involved LP gas; some involved other products. There was one in January or February of 1996 near Brandon where a number of rail cars were derailed and some of them involved LP gas.
Incidentally, propane and butane is also called LP gas, again industry jargon.
Senator Perrault: They have different characteristics, do they not? Natural gas dissipates out into the air, and propane stays on the ground.
Mr. Kurtze: Yes. LP gas is liquified petroleum gas. That is what "LP gas" stands for. It includes propane and butane and mixes of propane and butane. Natural gas is lighter than air, so it goes up. Propane is heavier than air, so it goes down.
That particular incident was a multi-day incident. It involved several commodities. It involved several government levels -- municipal, provincial, and federal. It involved a prioritization of dangerous goods that had been loaded in vehicles that were derailed. It followed much the same process as I described before. The call comes in. In that case, the call obviously went to a number of emergency response programs. In our case, the call came in, and an RMA, a remedial measures advisor, was sent out to assess the LP gas portion of it.
Senator Perrault: Did he leave for the scene immediately?
Mr. Kurtze: Yes, sir. He assessed the on-scene incident as it related to LP gas.
Senator Perrault: Do you mean the on-scene severity?
Mr. Kurtze: Yes, sir. He was then responsible for having Petro-Canada's response team from Winnipeg sent out to the scene of the incident, as far as the LP gas portion of it was concerned. It took several days. The weather conditions were atrocious. That particular incident involved the evacuation of a number of people out of the area to ensure that their safety was preserved.
Once there was a meeting of the individuals -- the governments, industry and railroad personnel at the scene of the incident -- to decide on the sequence of events and how the particular products were to be off-loaded from their respective vehicles and so on, the process took its normal course, and fortunately without incident. There was no damage or injuries.
Senator Perrault: I t is good to hear these examples, Mr. Chairman. Obviously, it is much better than it was 20 years ago. There was a public concern about the safety of propane in the 1950s and 1960s, was there not?
Mr. Kurtze: To be honest and candid with you, there still is. With dangerous goods, there is that level of concern, and our goal as an industry and as an association and emergency response program is to better educate the public.
As I say, I am not ashamed to say that the CCPA on the chemical side is ahead of us on this one.
Senator Perrault:Are you heading in the same direction?
Mr. Kurtze: We are quite clearly heading in the same direction.
Senator Perrault: It seems to be quite a systematic plan, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman: Supplementary to that, you were talking about the heavier and the lighter gases. At the risk of being facetious, there are other debilitating gases being transported. Does this concept envision gases other than the ones you speak of? In other words, the hazardous material might be nerve affecting or in other ways quite toxic. Would the same procedure apply there?
Mr. Kurtze: I am getting a little out of my area here, senator. I think the same procedure would apply. Clearly the equipment that is necessary, in particular the personnel protection that is necessary, is totally and completely different, including the use of encapsulated suits and self-containing breathing apparatuses.
LP gas is not toxic in that context, so you do not need the encapsulated suits. A self-contained breathing apparatus is used because, when you go in to the scene of an incident, you never know what is there. You know what you have been told was there, you know what the placard says, and you know what the consist says, but you cannot take the chance, so you use the self-contained breathing apparatus.
The types of things that you mentioned require special training and equipment.
In terms of an evolution when looking at an emergency response system in Canada, if you want to dream awhile, I can see the day when that type of emergency response system exists. The capability exists today. I believe that a fully coordinated and integrated approach will exist, and we will all live to see that day.
Senator Perrault: The Chairman raised a good question. We were testing nerve gases at Suffield, Alberta. Can you tell us how those substances were transported safely?
The Chairman: We can get the answer to that. We are very future oriented. We can shape the systems in place today when we have a small and manageable transportation environment to meet some of the needs of the 21st century. Now is the time to be thinking about this, not when we have 70 or 80 million people and another crossing in the Lower Mainland with some kind of hazardous product. It is a good question, and perhaps the research staff might determine how we transported that material. Thank you for planting the seed.
It is important that we have a fully qualified and competent response team. Whether it comes out of the chemical refinery base industry or whether it comes out of the military or a coast guard type function, we must put it in place now.
Mr. Kurtze: There has been a lot of work and effort put into that by a broad number of industries, CCPA included, to ensure that that type of response capability exists. The next step is to coordinate that so you have a fully integrated emergency response system.
I welcome your collective wisdom in focusing on the future because it is important to ensure that the appropriate regulatory and legislative environment to facilitate that kind of a process exists. I was pleased and honoured to participate in some of the initial meetings on that integrated system. I was also delighted to see that Transport Canada was one of the instigators in bringing all of the emergency response plans together. There are a number of good minds out there, and they seem to be all working in the same direction.
The Chairman: Thank you very much. I wish we had another hour. You present things articulately and clearly, and we appreciate it.
We now call on the Director of Internal Operations at the Calgary airport and ask Mr. Terpstra to begin his presentation.
Mr. John Terpstra, Director of Operations, Calgary Airport Authority: I know you have been here for most of day, so I will not keep you for a great length of time.
Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. My name is John Terpstra, and I am the Director, Terminal Operations for the Calgary Airport Authority. I thank the Chairman for giving us the opportunity to make a presentation to this committee on such an important topic as transportation safety and, in particular, airport safety. As a Calgarian, it is always a pleasure to be able to come to Edmonton and talk about airport operations.
I have worked at a number of airports from Prince Rupert, British Columbia to Kingston, Ontario, and from Lethbridge, Alberta to Cambridge Bay, Northwest Territories. Needless to say, to me, the world of airport management and operation continues to be a challenging, demanding and exciting environment, particularly in this day and age.
While we may live in a world of rapidly changing technology and increasing competition, it is imperative that our passengers, suppliers, regulators and the government believe that air transportation is a safe mode of travel. Our industry is particularly sensitive to incidents or events that bring into question the safety and security of our customers, our employees, and the general public.
I am sure we are all familiar with such high profile events as Air India, Pan Am Flight 103, TWA Flight 800 in New York, the ValuJet DC9 incident in Florida, the more recent mid-air collision in India, and the recent highjacking of the Ethiopian Boeing 767 aircraft that subsequently ran out of fuel and crashed. These high-profile tragedies that claimed so many innocent lives underscore the absolute importance of safety, both on the ground and in the air. They also cast long shadows over the air transportation industry around the world.
A number of years ago, the Federal Government announced a National Airports Policy which would see all major domestic and international airports in Canada transferred either to Local Airport Authorities or to Canadian Airport Authorities.
Calgary International Airport was the first major Canadian international airport transferred from the federal Department of Transport to a local airport authority on July 1, 1992. Vancouver International Airport was transferred later that day, while Edmonton International and the two airports in Montreal, Dorval and Mirabel, were transferred approximately one month later. A number of other Canadian international and major domestic airports are well on their way to becoming locally controlled and managed airport authorities. I saw on the news last night that Toronto was handed over yesterday.
As an aerodrome operator, I believe that our airport today is as safe, if not safer, than when we transferred from Transport Canada to a local airport authority. Leaving the federal government has allowed us to develop our own vision, values, mission, strategic direction, long-term goals, business plans, capital and O & M budgets based on close consultation and cooperation with both our industry and government partners.
Gone are the days of government cutbacks, spending freezes, and downsizing. Gone are the days also of government inaction and foot-dragging on facility expansion. Gone are the days when there were insufficient funds to adequately operate and maintain our airport, never mind trying to expand the facilities to meet the increased demand.
In the last two years, Calgary has seen the number of passengers using our facility increase by approximately 44 per cent, which is significant growth -- from approximately 4.8 million in 1994 to an estimated 6.9 million by the end of the year. Today, Calgary International stands on the threshold of becoming the third busiest airport in Canada, after Toronto and Vancouver.
Today we can and do listen attentively to what our customers tell us. This includes not only the passengers through our surveys, but also our tenants, the airlines, the fixed business operators, the taxi operators, the bus operators, the various tour companies, the parking operators, and many others.
We estimate that there will be approximately 7 million passengers who pass through our single terminal building this year. Many of these people come from various countries around the world. We are being challenged to meet the needs of people whose mother tongue is neither English or French.
In addition to the travelling passengers, we estimate another 7 million customers use our facilities as meeters, greeters, well-wishers, and others who simply come to the airport because they enjoy the sights, the sounds, the entertainment in the building, the different shops, and the many food and beverage facilities available in our air terminal building today.
This large diverse group of people requires that we be able to communicate with them, especially with important safety or security information.
We have changed some of our key emergency signage in the air terminal building from a bilingual format to a multi-lingual format which we believe better meets the needs of our growing clientele from around the world. We will continue to proceed with the changeover from bilingual format to multi-lingual format, not because there is a law or regulation that says we must but because we know that this is what our customers want and need.
In many ways, we are a very large landlord, and we have all the responsibilities and accountabilities of a landlord. This includes the safety of our patrons from the time they leave their car in our parking facility to the time they exit the terminal bridge into their aircraft.
The safety and security of our airport employees and our customers remain our top priority. In fact, safety is one of our key values; the others being customer service, respect, accountability, fairness, and teamwork, and in our organization we use the acronym CRAFTS.
Raised crosswalks; increased lighting levels; closed-circuit television camera systems; strategically-placed emergency phones in the parking lots; increased inspections for hazardous conditions, airside and groundside and throughout the terminal building; increased employee awareness; and increased man and mobile patrols are just a few examples of improvements that we have made over the last several years to promote safety in our own operations.
In addition, we continue to work closely with our community-based, barrier-free advisory committee to identify and implement new technologies and changes that meet the needs of our employees and customers.
A new area that is becoming increasingly important to us is the security of vital telecommunication systems which, if breached or destroyed, would be devastating to the companies that rely so heavily on the rapid exchange of data and information from the airport.
Sometime in early 1997 -- we think it will be April 1, 1997 -- the Calgary Airport Authority, along with all the other Canadian international airports, will assume the responsibility and the costs associated with the withdrawal of the RMCP policing and security services that we enjoy today. While some may view this development as further evidence of a continuing federal government strategy to download programs and costs on other parties, I see this change as an opportunity to streamline the delivery of police and security services at our airport -- an opportunity to significantly improve levels of customer service and, at the same time, substantially reduce overall costs.
I am fully confident that Transport Canada will be there and they will continue to play an effective role as regulator, monitor, and enforcer to ensure that Canadians from coast to coast receive adequate levels of security services from airport operators.
Prior to the devolution of our airport from Transport Canada, it was my experience that most people who had an accident in our airport would simply let it go. It appeared that most people had neither the taste, the time, nor the money to take on both Transport Canada and the Department of Justice. However, in the last few years, that seems to be changing, whether because the Calgary Airport Authority is a much smaller corporate entity or because people are simply becoming more willing to pursue legal action against us. Not only is our airport much more vulnerable to damaging lawsuits and costly settlements, we are also much more sensitive to our responsibilities of being a good corporate citizen in the city of Calgary.
We believe the Calgary Airport Authority has one of the best emergency response service capabilities of any international airport in Canada. We believe the arrangement and the contract between the City of Calgary and the Calgary Airport Authority will serve as a model for other Canadian airports and communities. Our system ensures we have highly trained and experienced fire fighters on the airport premises at all times. We also receive a secondary benefit from our Calgary fire fighters in that many of them have specialized training and experience that most Transport Canada fire fighters probably never received. I refer specifically to structural and building fires, vehicle accidents, chemical spills, and emergency medical training.
We continue to be regulated by the Canada Labour Code and other federal regulations pertaining to occupational health and safety issues. Again, our employees and the management representatives on our occupational health and safety committee know and fully realize that the buck stops here. We are it. There is no regional office or headquarters in Ottawa to rethink, ponder, agree, or disagree with our recommendations. I think, for example, of the recent drug and alcohol abuse policy arrived at by our company.
There has been a true sense of empowerment and personal responsibility for one's actions and also for the customer reactions to the services and facilities we provide.
In the area of environmental stewardship, the Calgary Airport Authority has shown leadership and innovation in meeting the increasing stringent demands placed on our operations.
Instead of cutbacks and shrinking budgets year after year, which was the norm for Transport Canada airports prior to devolution, we are now capable of developing reasonable O & M budgets and capital budgets based on actual demands and requirements. Increasing resources are spent on bird control, mammal control, and using new technologies like the Phoenix Whaler to assist in making the airport environment undesirable to birds and mammals which can present a real safety concern to aircraft.
While we try to ensure safe and secure environments both on the air side and the ground side of the airport, incidents and accidents do happen from time to time. Regrettably, last Sunday evening a young airport authority employee was killed just north of the terminal building on Barlow Trail while riding his bicycle to work. In November, our board approved the 1997 capital plan which, among other things, includes the design of a 20-kilometre bicycle path around the airport. Whether the existence of that bicycle path would have prevented this tragedy, I do not know. However, the design and the construction of the pathway will clearly demonstrate the commitment by the Calgary Airport Authority to being a good corporate citizen.
We are determined to show leadership, to be innovative, and to be concerned about the health, safety and security of all our employees, customers, tenants, and the general public who view Calgary International Airport as their airport.
Once against, Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank you and the committee members for the opportunity to speak to you.
Senator St. Germain: You are going in-house with your security. I am quite familiar with this. I do not know if it was you who visited me in Ottawa, but I happened to be the Minister of State for Transport when this initiative was being pushed.
In any case, why would you want to eliminate the RCMP and go to your own security? You would then be required to put on your own training programs. Willl you be doing this with other local authorities? To me, you cannot get better police training than what the RCMP provides. If you can, it is not very much better. I would say it is about the best there is in the world, and it has been so traditionally. Why would you want to go outside?
Mr. Terpstra: The Calgary Airport Authority falls completely within the City of Calgary. The Calgary police service today has criminal jurisdiction over the airport. We have always dealt with the Calgary police service and the RCMP.
In discussions with both the RCMP and the Calgary police service, everyone agrees that dealing with just one police service makes a lot of sense. They have always agreed with that position. That has never been a point of contention between the RCMP, ourselves, or the Calgary police service.
When you say it is inside, it is not really inside. Let me clarify that. It would be our intention to have a contractual arrangement with the Calgary police service to expand those functions which fall under the aerodrome security measures because they already have full criminal jurisdiction over the airport. When there is a bomb threat or any incident at the airport, whether that be a crash or something inside the terminal building, the Calgary police service come on board and take over as the on-scene commander. The RCMP have traditionally played the role of first responders at our airport.
Senator St. Germain: What kind of accidents are you referring to such that they were not reported because of the hassle involved in dealing with Transport and Justice?
Mr. Terpstra: Most of them were slips and falls. Recalling all of the incidents and accidents reported to us through of the operations people, the vast majority of the incidents and accidents that happen on our property are people slipping and falling, whether on ice or snow or, sometimes, dry pavement. People would be hurt. Sometimes they would knock their teeth out. They would sue for a variety of things or would claim expenses.
Now we treat people a differently than we used to, hopefully more humanely and in a more timely manner.
Senator Bacon: I find your brief very positive. Are there any problems?
Mr. Terpstra: There are many problems.
Senator Bacon: It all seems positive. Could you mention one problem?
Mr. Terpstra: I suppose that our biggest problem is that we are bursting at the seams. We were not prepared when we transferred. We did not have the facilities and the capacities to meet the demand that we have today.
If I have a problem, it is that things are really tight as far as bridges and counter space. We have a big operational problem in simply trying to meet the needs of the people who want to come in and do business with us.
Senator Bacon: Is that because of the increased volume of passengers?
Mr. Terpstra: There have been phenomenal volumes in the last two years. It is much higher than what we forecasted, far beyond what we predicted.
Senator Bacon: Does that mean that the devolution of airports to the local airport authorities is positive?
Mr. Terpstra: In my experience, it has been extremely positive. Do not get me wrong. I thoroughly enjoyed the time that I worked for Transport Canada. They were a wonderful department. I was able see a significant part of Canada with them, and I always enjoyed that time.
However, we have much more freedom as a local airport authority to respond to the needs and wishes of our customers. Many of the rules and regulations and procedures are gone.
Senator Bacon: Do you feel there is an immediate response to decisions that are made? When you take action, do you see the results right away? Is it faster?
Mr. Terpstra: It is faster by light years. My president and CEO are just down the hallway from me, so I cannot hide and duck very long.
Senator Bacon: What effect would the flight and duty-time regulations for pilots and crew have on safety?
Mr. Terpstra: Do you mean in restricting the time?
Senator Bacon: Yes.
Mr. Terpstra: I am not sure I know enough about what pilots and flight crews do to be able to answer that question, senator.
Senator Bacon: Would the increase in passengers also be due to open skies with the United States? We are ten years into airline deregulation.
Mr. Terpstra: The open skies has been a positive benefit for Calgary. We have seen a significant increase in the number of transborder flights. However, our largest area of increase has probably been on the international side, which is well in excess of 50-per-cent growth year over year. Certainly in total numbers transborder has been a positive experience for Calgary and Calgary International, and it largely can be attributed to the open skies. We certainly have benefited from it.
Senator Bacon: You mentioned that you have trained and experienced fire fighters on the airport premises at all times. Where do they get their special training? Is that in Calgary?
Mr. Terpstra: Yes. We have a contract with the Calgary Fire Department, and they provide the trained fire fighters. When they show up on site, all we have to do is train them on how to run the fire vehicles and the response vehicles. Other than that, they are highly trained.
We use a number of them as our first responders for medical emergencies in the terminal building because they are trained to an EMT or emergency medical technician level. They carry their own defibrillators. We get great value for our dollar.
Senator Bacon: Do you foresee another increase in passengers for the next few years, and you can cope with the increase in volume?
Mr. Terpstra: We have an ambitious capital program. To go back to one of your previous questions, yes, that is a problem. We are behind the eight ball, and we must build and build and build. We simply hope that, at the end of the day, after we have built everything, the traffic is still there.
We have an excellent relationship with the airlines, as far as they have agreed with our ten-year master plan and our capital program, which means they will also, in large part, pay for it.
Senator Perrault: Mr. Chairman, this was an excellent presentation, in my view.
Mr. Terpstra, you have an up-beat approach to the challenges out there. I was in Nanaimo yesterday when we turned the Nanaimo airport over to local authorities. The same feeling exists there. They say, "Look, we know our community better than Ottawa or any other part of the country, and we want to do imaginative things to make this a real revenue centre." I like that spirit in your presentation.
Mr. Terpstra: Thank you, sir.
Senator Perrault: I hope you get the World's Fair in Calgary so that you have a great deal of traffic at the airport.
Mr. Terpstra: We agree with you. We certainly have the police and fire fighters coming in June of this year. That will be a real challenge. There are certainly a number of them.
Thank you for your kind words. It is a challenge. The communities which are yet to go through this process should know that, yes, there are problems going through the transition.
Senator Perrault: It is all self-confidence. It is the same in Vancouver now. The local people are putting together a great act.
Mr. Terpstra: They are.
Senator Adams: Mr. Terpstra, you are familiar with and have been in the Territories. You talked about safety around the airport. In the Territories, we sometimes feel we are second-class citizens. Down south, every other airplane is sitting in a terminal. Last night, we came in from Yellowknife and landed at the International Airport, and we deplaned out in the field.
Why is it that NWT Air or Canadian Airlines, when coming from the north, do not have the facilities of a gate in the terminal?
At Rankin, sometimes the plane parks out in the field around the tank area. You walk quite a long way with a 30 or 40 kilometre an hour wind. The patients leaving the hospital are required to walk quite a long way out in the field. We also we pay a much higher price for air tickets when going to other airports across Canada -- for example, NWT Air and Canadian Airlines flying to any other community.
Why is there a difference in regulation between Calgary and the small communities? The weather is a colder, and we are required to walk out to the plane and get into the airplane with people in wheelchairs. Some of those have to be wheeled out in the field.
Mr. Terpstra: Senator, I share your concerns. I spent a number of years in Fort Simpson, the copper mine at Cambridge Bay. and smaller sites. I can understand the frustration with respect to the expensive flights in and out of the north.
As I understood your question, it dealt more with bridges and bridgeable aircraft and how passengers can move conveniently and safely from a terminal building to an aircraft.
Again, cost is a major factor. A bridge alone costs a quarter of a million dollars. Each airport must look at recapturing the capital costs for that facility as well as being able to operate it. Some airplanes cannot bridge, and we certainly have a number of our commuter flights at Calgary that are not bridgeable. We have built passenger walkways. We try to keep it as close as we can so as to keep the walking distances short. I am certainly familiar with the winds that howl in the high Arctic.
It is an individual airport decision. There is not a regulation which indicates you can or cannot do that. It is a function of cost and customers and how you treat your customers.
I know Whitehorse has the bridge. Perhaps people thought they should not have the bridge, but they do have a bridge, and people appreciate that better level of service.
I fully support your concerns from the smaller sites, but it becomes a function of cost. Can you afford to put it on? Is the building even designed to take that type of structure?
Senator Adams: We are still taxpayers.
My second question has to do with the organizations taking over part of the airports and NAV CANADA. How do you feel about that as far as safety and having more control in the future, taking over from Transport Canada and being more privatized at some of the airports?
Mr. Terpstra: I am in favour of devolution of airports and the ANS service with NAV CANADA. I think it is only positive to the industry and to the users of those services.
If I had any concern about NAV CANADA, it is simply that these people now would have the right to strike, where they may not have had that right, or at leastthey did not have that right before to the same extent. As an aerodrome operator, it would cause me some concern down the road if there is a withdrawal of services. That could have a significant impact on airport operations.
Senator Adams: In the meantime, everyone talks about cutbacks in the future. Transport Canada says now we have the contract with NAV CANADA, and they have to wait for the budget. Can you see a problem in the future, or would it have been better for Transport Canada to be operating the terminals and the airport?
Mr. Terpstra: NAV CANADA, just from my own perspective, would be in a much better position to deal with the airlines and their requirements, determine what their needs are, and then set in place a fee structure which would recover those costs. They would be in a better position to do that than the Department of Transport.
Senator Adams: You mentioned bicycle paths. I thought that most of the area around the airport was owned by Transport Canada. Does the municipality approve that, and are they able to have bicycle paths through there? You mentioned a person was killed. Was he killed by an airplane or some other means?
Mr. Terpstra: No, the individual that was killed on Sunday night was struck by a vehicle.
The Chairman: Would you tell us please what a Phoenix Whaler is?
Mr. Terpstra: It is a devise which emits very high frequency sounds that human beings cannot hear but birds can, and apparently it is supposed to annoy them to the extent they will either leave and they will not come around. That is the theory, and that is what we paid for.
The Chairman: Does it work?
Mr. Terpstra: They claim it works.
The Chairman: What about seaguls particularly?
Mr. Terpstra: I think it does work. Where we have installed the unit, we certainly have noticed far less birds than we had before.
Senator Perrault: What if the odd bird is tone deaf?
Mr. Terpstra: Then we have a problem. We have to use a different strategy.
The Chairman: We all welcome devolution. It is not quite as simple the nice cup of tea it has been for Calgary. Sydney and Halifax and St. John's have lost benefit of the revolving fund. It is becoming more and more difficult, and the gap between one level of air services and your level will continue to widen. We have not come to grips with that yet, but we hope that you will do it yourselves. It will create a diversity of service between one airport and another. It is not without problems, even though it looks rosy and great. I mention that because it is something which has concerned me for some considerable time.
How comfortable do you feel now, four or five years into the scenario, about personnel security checks? Have you seen any difference in them? Are you able to carry them out with confidence? How do you carry out a security check on a Cara operator, for example? How do you keep track of all of these people who have access to the plane?
In the old days, we built fences around airports to protect people from planes. Now, we build those same fences to protect planes from people. I am serious. It is a sign, and you can take whatever you want from it.
How well are we doing with other forms of out-source with on-site work -- maintenance work, specialty work, and technology, particularly where sophisticated people are coming into your mix? You are large, sophisticated workshop. Someone going in with an apparently correct badge can go wherever he or she may want to go. Can we still have a good feeling or a sense of comfort about that? Is there something that you would like to see done as the complexity grows?
You are going in now with another major influx of people. If you have a problem, who will handle it? Will you use the military? Will the Calgary police draw on the RCMP to assist them? We are either light years ahead of the new airport in Tokyo or light years behind it, and only events will answer that question.
How do you feel personally about security? We get a little edgy about safety and airplanes.
Finally, to throw all my questions onto the table at the same time, we have the technology, so can you foresee the day at your airport where you can offer a clean airplane?
Mr. Terpstra: Mr. Chairman, you have mentioned a number of issues, and I will try to address them all.
The first point dealt with the passes or the clearances both for people who go air side and the people who work in restricted areas in the terminal building. We still abide by Transport Canada's airport restricted access clearance program, which of course drives the airport restricted access pass. There has been no change in our relationship with Transport Canada.
The Chairman: Is that still carried out by the Federal Government, not by you?
Mr. Terpstra: That is correct. We collect the information, like we always have, and fill out the forms. They are then shipped on, and people at CSIS and other people do the background checks on these folks. They let us know that yes, you can give them the pass, or no, you cannot. That has not changed at all since the devolution of airports.
What has changed is that the level of service has improved between the time we ship the documents to Ottawa and the time we receive the response. That has improved so that we do not have people waiting on the hook as long as we they were, and I thank Transport Canada for that. That is good.
An issue came up between the four local airport authorities several years ago, and that was whether they would recognize my pass in Vancouver if I recognized theirs. That is true for Toronto as well as for Montreal. Just so we did not get too bureaucratic about it, we all agreed that we would. If you are not a threat in Vancouver, you should not be a threat in Calgary, and if you are not a threat in Montreal, you should not be a threat in Edmonton. That was the theory of our decision.
However, a lawyer in Vancouver thought there was legal liability with respect to that. So that was put on the back burner for a while. We are back to the old way of a Calgary pass is good in Calgary. If you want to go to Vancouver, you must trade in your Calgary pass and obtain a Vancouver pass. I personally have a problem with that, but that is where we are.
The Chairman: How far down the line would that go in terms of you being at the top? Would your department heads have that same courtesy that would you envision?
Mr. Terpstra: It is for anyone who has a restricted airport pass in Calgary. The idea was that as long as you have a need and a right, you could use it at another airport, no questions asked. You would have to have a need and a right. If someone challenged you, you would have to be there. If I wanted to visit people in Montreal or Edmonton, I could simply use this pass and it would get me through the security systems because, according to this document, I am not a threat to civil aviation in Calgary. It stands to reason.
Senator Perrault: Is there an electronic chip in those?
Mr. Terpstra: No, there is not.
The Chairman: I thought there was.
Mr. Terpstra: No, there is nothing on this. It is simply a laminated document.
Senator Perrault: That would boost security.
The Chairman: Would you view that as something lacking? I had assumed that we had done that two or three years ago.
Mr. Terpstra: We do not have the type of electronic pass system where you swipe a card or could read it from a distance. It is just a laminated card that you visually inspect.
Senator Perrault: Is that another measure of protection?
Mr. Terpstra: We see them more as a convenience for airport authority employees from coast to coast -- to be able to work and move freely from airport to airport, knowing full well that you still need to have a need and a right to be in a restricted area.
The other issue I would raise is pre-board screening.In the last two years, I have been down in the States with my family and my four young children, and I personally find it a great pleasure to be able to take my family past the pre-board screening points and into the various concourses and sit down and have a meal or look around. My four small children certainly seem to enjoy that. I see no reason why Canadian people, children, et cetera, should not have at least that same opportunity.
The last point you mentioned was about the police. In addition to the Calgary police service, we will be contracting with the Canadian Corps of Commissionaires to provide the basic security functions. We will boost up that number significantly. There may be a lower level of actual policemen on site, but it will be done in a more reasonable and cost-effective manner. Most of the duties are security-related, and the Canadian Corps of Commissionaires are more than capable of carrying out many of those functions.
The Chairman: What are your three most pressing security and safety concerns?
Mr. Terpstra: I would think, for myself, the big challenge is always our own employees. We have become used to systems. We know how to go around them, if you will. We must ensure the employees are always cognizant and always aware, that they do not let their guard down. It is easy to become complacent in our business. We need employee awareness to keep their enthusiasm. When you do the same thing day after day after day, you may get complacent. That is a big challenge for any airport operator.
There is also the whole field of explosive detection. I also serve on the National Steering Committee with Transport Canada. We are looking now at setting standards and looking at new equipment which would be purchased in the coming years and installed in airports to detect explosives.
Those are probably the two big ones. I am not sure if I have a third.
The Chairman: A clean plane would be quite an ideal, would it not?
Mr. Terpstra: I am comfortable when I fly now; however, yes, it would be nice to have someone check something off before we leave. We guarantee this thing is absolutely clean. We may be a way from that yet.
The Chairman: You also know how easy it is to put a gun on a food tray, and you know what happens after that. Everyone is still up in the air over the flight out of New York recently.
Senator Bacon: Is chemical testing included in company policy for jobs which are identified as risk sensitive?
Mr. Terpstra: When you speak of "chemicals," are you referring to drugs and alcohol?
Senator Bacon: Yes, both.
Mr. Terpstra: Yes. Three or four months ago, after spending a great deal of time with our union, we developed our own internal company drug and alcohol abuse policy. That deals with all new hires, and it deals also with cause when there are accidents and incidents. Both the management side and the union side were unanimous in supporting this policy. It took us a while to get there.
We did not do it because of regulation; we did it because of due diligence. We thought we had to do that. It made sense to do that in case there was an accident or an event, and that is why we got on with it.
Senator Perrault: Mr. Chairman, he ValuJet that went down recently had the oxygen cylinders on board. Would the company itself have been responsible to check that?
Mr. Terpstra: I would think.
Senator Perrault: If we loaded cylinders in Calgary, for example, who would do the check to ensure that there was no oxygen left in them?
Mr. Terpstra: I would think probably both the airplane and the company they contract with, the ground handling company that actually loads them, to ensure (a) they are empty, and (b) they do not load more than required by regulation or law. Nonetheless, it would be the ground handling company as well as the airline which monitors to ensure things are done in accordance with regulations.
Senator Perrault: Are we are properly covered with that service by the Calgary airlines?
Mr. Terpstra: I do not wish to speak for any of the airlines or how their contracts work.
Senator Perrault: Are there any new theories about the New York crash? It is a mystery, is it not?
Mr. Terpstra: It is indeed. That is a real tough one. At the end of the day, when you have no evidence to point to anything, that is the worst. Sometimes you wish there was some evidence so you could get on with the theory and get on with your life.
The Chairman: We would appreciate it if you did not let that question arise on anything going out of Calgary, and we will do the same in Halifax.
I appreciate your patience and kindness. It has been a pleasure to talk with you and to see what the first years were like. I am pleased, and I am sure we all are, that you are still enthusiastic about it and gung-ho. Thank you very much.
I should also like to thank the Department of Transport for their presence today. It has been rather comforting to watch their close attention.
The committee adjourned.