Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Fisheries
Issue 25 - Evidence
OTTAWA, Tuesday, June 15, 1999
The Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries met this day at 8:30 a.m. to examine the expenditures set out in Fisheries and Oceans Votes 1, 5 and 10 of the Estimates for the fiscal year ending March 31, 2000.
Senator Gerald J. Comeau (Chairman) in the Chair.
[English]
The Chairman: The Honourable David Anderson, Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, is with us this morning. He has just returned from Norway and has recently finished negotiating the Pacific Salmon Treaty with the United States. That will be the subject of the discussion this morning, which is the mandate we have before us.
Just before I ask the minister to make his opening comments, I should like to advise the minister that the committee members may be somewhat at a disadvantage. The committee has not travelled to the West Coast since 1986. There has been a great change in committee members since that time. There may be only one or two committee members left who were serving in 1986.
Senator Stewart: I certainly did not go to the West Coast, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Robertson: I did.
The Chairman: We had planned to go to the West Coast this spring to learn more about the fishing issues but, unfortunately, our budget request was not even considered. We will have to make do with a limited manner of learning about the West Coast.
Senator Stewart: We were, in effect, told how unimportant the fisheries are.
The Chairman: We take great exception to the view that fisheries are unimportant. We consider this matter to be extremely important and we will of course be coming back to this issue in the future.
Having said that, we will ask the minister if he has any opening comments.
The Hon. David Anderson, Minister of Fisheries and Oceans: Mr. Chairman, I trust this heresy about fisheries not being important will be quickly put to rest, as Sister Peggy can tell us how many of the apostles were in fact fishermen and how many references to fishing there are in the Bible. There is the miracle of the loaves and the fishes. And fish are important not only in the Christian religion. The Buddhist religion has fish as a symbol of abundance. We could carry on, but in the presence of Sister Peggy I will be very careful about my comments on theology. I might exceed my knowledge very quickly.
I do appreciate the opportunity to be with you again. It would be very helpful if you did travel to the West Coast. Certainly, if my frail voice can add to the chorus of those who oppose the decision, I would be happy to say that I think it is important. I have certainly appreciated the opportunity to be with you on previous occasions and I have appreciated the perceptive questioning that I have received from committee members.
I will be talking today about the agreement that we reached recently with the United States, some two weeks ago now. It is quite timely.
I would preface my remarks by saying that these arrangements are under the umbrella of the Pacific Salmon Treaty which was signed in 1985 by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Canada, Mr. Reagan and Mr. Mulroney, at the so-called Irish Summit. That agreement had annexes that covered the fishery for a number of years. Those annexes lapsed and the assumption was that there would be renegotiated annexes under the umbrella of the treaty. I want to make that point clear because we have not negotiated a new treaty. We have in fact technically negotiated agreements under Annex IV of the treaty. There has been some misconception on this point in the press.
This is the first time in seven years that we have achieved an agreement with the United States and it is very much a milestone. In the previous years when we had no arrangements with the United States, Canada, which is down water of Alaska, simply got what they were willing to let through. Similarly, in the south, if the fish went outside Vancouver Island, they would come into the Fraser River and be intercepted by the state of Washington. We then got what they did not catch. In the south, at one point in history, the Americans took 60 per cent of the southern fish destined for the Fraser River. In the north, the Americans have frequently taken fish so that we are left with the choice of relatively few fish coming through. We know that they are needed for spawning purposes on the river, therefore we can have no fishing opportunity for Canadian fishermen. The Americans did not cut back at all, while we would have to cut back fishing opportunities because of the conservation requirement.
I mention those two things because we will have to keep our eye on the importance of the agreement, which is first in conservation, to share that conservation burden equally and, second, to give fishing opportunities for Canadian fishermen. They obviously come together, but occasionally they should be considered separately so that those two objectives are borne in mind.
I believe, Mr. Chairman, that with these arrangements we are beginning a new area of effective conservation and a more equitable sharing of the precious salmon resource. When the treaty was signed in 1985, salmon stocks were in relative abundance and naturally both nations were focussed on interception of fisheries of the other. The main issue was simply maximizing catch share.
However, the world, particularly the Pacific Ocean, has changed over those intervening years. In the last few years, West Coast salmon have experienced volatile environmental conditions, poor ocean survival and habitat degradation, both in the ocean and in their spawning streams, and they have suffered overfishing, all of which has led to serious and uneven decline in stocks.
What we have attempted to do -- and I believe have succeeded in doing -- with our American counterparts is to modernize the treaty, bringing it in line with that changed environment that I mentioned a moment ago. With the arrangements, we can be certain, or as close to certain as possible, that conservation requirements are met and that both countries will share in the burden of conservation as well as the benefits, and that sharing will be more equitable on both sides of the border.
New conservation-based fishing arrangements will certainly bring greater stability and greater certainty. Not only will the stocks benefit, but fishing communities and fishermen themselves will also benefit from that certainty.
It is important to note that the agreement that we arrived at also includes several measures that improve our institutional arrangements for cooperation on habitat, stock management and science. Responsible resource stewardship is obviously built on sound science and, as the salmon do not recognize borders, that science should not recognize borders either. Strengthening the institutional underpinnings of cooperation will ensure, we hope and expect, that the goodwill that is evident in these agreements will live on in the years ahead.
In broad terms, this new arrangement recognizes that the governments of both countries -- and I say "governments" because we are talking about state governments and tribal government as well as the U.S. federal government -- must do more than simply manage the harvest. We must protect and restore habitat, we must deepen the knowledge of salmon, and we must improve cooperation between our two nations for the good of the resource and of the fishermen of both nations.
I believe the agreement recognizes those responsibilities and launches a number of concrete measures to meet them. We will be saying more about the endowment funds, which is an example of that.
History tells us that the accomplishment of the agreement with the United States is no small matter. Again, the experience of members of this committee, I am sure, could be called upon to point out the long history of difficulty in this area. Sharing of the migratory salmon stocks has been a vexing issue between Canada and the United States since the turn of the century -- for a century, in fact. It took 15 years to negotiate the agreement of 1985 that I referred to earlier between the Prime Minister and the President.
Throughout that period and indeed since and certainly in the last two years of my phase as minister, voices on both sides of the border have called for confrontation. There may be times when less conventional tactics are useful. However, we made progress because we talked to the Americans directly and we did not talk for the television cameras or the morning headlines of the following day. The negotiation process was difficult. There are critics of the process, but we had to recognize that due to past failures we had to adopt different tactics.
We now have an agreement that puts fish first, and it is much more than a simple compromise. I remind you, Mr. Chairman, that this is in fact a turning point for the fish as well as a turning point in our relations with our American neighbours. We are beginning to reverse the mistakes of the past. We are now trying not to argue bitterly over a shrinking pie, but to grow a larger one for all of us. I recognize that the path ahead will not be easy, but if we stay on that path, if we work in a cooperative spirit, the rewards of responsible stewardship await us and also await future generations.
Mr. Chairman, those are very general words. I have with me Mr. Pat Chamut, who was a member of the negotiating team along with Dr. McCrae and Mr. Paul Sprout. Mr. Chamut is here to provide the technical details of the whole series of arrangements. They are quite technical. We are dealing with 14 different stocks of salmon. Each particular agreement contains a myriad of facets. I have asked Mr. Chamut to give a brief 12 to 15 minute overview of the whole treaty. If you feel that there are questions that should be asked at any particular point, I am sure that that could be arranged.
I should like to thank you for this opportunity because I must say that this arrangement with the Americans is, in my view, an important turning point from literally decades -- in fact a century -- of controversy and confrontation.
The Chairman: It would be useful if Mr. Chamut would go through the technical details. If members have any questions while Mr. Chamut is giving his presentation, please direct them to me. I imagine that for most of us, this is going to be more complicated than regular meetings.
Mr. Pat Chamut, Assistant Deputy Minister, Fisheries Management, Department of Fisheries and Oceans: Mr. Chairman, like the minister, I appreciate the opportunity to be here this morning to explain what we have negotiated with the United States. I should like to provide an overview of the actual arrangements that have recently been concluded.
By way of background, the minister has explained that the treaty itself provides the bilateral framework for how Canada and the United States can manage salmon together. Because salmon do not migrate separately -- that is, because the salmon from the United States and the salmon from Canada migrate together -- cooperation between Canada and the U.S. is necessary if we are going to be able to meet our objectives for Pacific salmon. The treaty that was ratified in 1985 does a number of things, but essentially it lays out the process or the framework for how Canada and the U.S. will work together. One of the important points is that the treaty itself contains something called Annex IV, which is the specific arrangements for managing the fisheries between Canada and the United States.
The difficulty that we have had is that there have been disputes since 1992 over what the harvest shares should be. We have been unable to review the specific arrangements that are necessary to govern the conduct of fisheries. This dispute has indeed been difficult and bitter over the last number of years, resulting in great conflict and a considerable effect on the resource itself.
Canada went into these negotiations with three objectives. The first and foremost objective was to ensure that the negotiated arrangements would ensure that we had effective bilateral conservation. We wanted to have regimes that put fish first. Second, we wanted to restrict U.S. interceptions and move more fish to Canada. Third, we wanted to try to secure improved working arrangements with the United States so that we would be working cooperatively on science and cooperatively on salmon stewardship.
As the minister indicated, these objectives reflect the current circumstances in the fishery. Abundance has declined. We have stocks that are at risk. We have undertaken fleet restructuring in Canada and, clearly, the world has changed considerably since 1985 when the treaty was first implemented.
Our objectives reflect the current circumstances and they were designed to try to reflect more properly our primary domestic interests. Consistent with recommendations that were made in a report submitted to the Prime Minister and the President in January of 1998, the negotiations this time were conducted in a government-to-government format involving people from the respective governments of the United States and Canada, as well as the state governments of Washington, Oregon and Alaska.
The agreement itself has four main elements. One is what we are calling improved institutional arrangements. These are means to try to improve our ability to work together. Second, there is an element that deals with habitat protection. Third, two Pacific salmon endowment funds have been created. Finally, the longest part of this agreement is the long-term fishing arrangements that have been renegotiated under Annex IV of the treaty. I should like to walk through each one of those arrangements quickly so that you will understand what we have agreed to.
Under improved institutional arrangements, we have adopted some new means by which we are going to be able to work together cooperatively with the United States. In the past, the Pacific Salmon Commission, which is the body that oversees the implementation of the treaty, has been dysfunctional. It has not been able to work as an institution. Therefore, we have agreed on a new committee on scientific cooperation, which will improve or help overcome some of the areas where we have had technical disputes. If we can come to technical agreement, we will be able to resolve some of the more difficult issues that have plagued us over the last number of years. This committee will also be responsible for peer review and technical reports and will have a new responsibility to prepare advice to governments on habitat protection activities in each jurisdiction.
We have also agreed that there will be rules and procedures that will be elaborated on for a component of the treaty dealing with technical dispute resolution. Again, that should help us overcome some of the problems that we have seen in the past. We see these arrangements as an important augmentation of our ability to work together in our shared responsibilities for protecting salmon.
The second element deals with habitat protection. The protection of the fresh water habitat of salmon is a key component of our ability to sustain and maintain the salmon populations. This provision is something new. It is based on the recognition that simply dealing with the harvest of salmon will not in itself rebuild stocks to optimum production. As part of the agreement, we have agreed to bilateral objectives to protect and restore habitat. An annual report will be provided to the parties in Canada and in the United States that will deal with particular problems associated with protecting habitat. We believe that, in concert with the two endowment funds that have been established, this new commitment to bilateral objectives and to work together to protect and restore habitat will significantly give us a more favourable long-term outlook for the future of Pacific salmon.
The third element I should like to refer to is the creation of two new endowment funds. One is to deal with issues in the north along our boundary with Alaska and the other is to deal with issues to the south along our boundary with Washington. Those two funds are being funded by the United States. The total amount of money that will go into these funds is about Can. $209 million. The funds are being provided in recognition of the past imbalance in interceptions that occurred between Canada and the U.S.; therefore, the U.S. is providing that money. The funds will be used in both Canada and the United States to enhance salmon production and to give us a better understanding of the science of salmon. The money will be provided by the U.S. Congress after October 1, which is the start of their fiscal year. The money will be phased in so that at the end of four years the full amount of money, the $209 million, will have been provided.
The most complex elements of the negotiations dealt with the topic of agreeing on long-term fishing arrangements under Annex IV of the treaty. There are six specific chapters under Annex IV and they cover what we call "intercepting fisheries." An example of an intercepting fishery is where Alaska would be harvesting its own stocks but at the same time would be harvesting stocks destined for B.C. We have had to come up with new arrangements that would govern the conduct of those intercepting fisheries in both Canada and the United States.
The new arrangements are indeed different from what we have had in the past. In the past we have had fixed ceilings. In other words, the party would fish to a fixed number independent of the health of the stock. In some years, that would create significant problems most often for Canada because the conservation burden was shifted to Canadian fishermen. If you fish to a fixed number and that number is too high, given the relative abundance of the stocks, then what you end up with is the full burden of conservation being borne by Canada.
We have adopted new arrangements based on abundance. These arrangements provide for improved sharing of the conservation burden. They will limit the interceptions. They will be responsive to the health of the stocks. They will address what we call "total fishing mortality." In other words, we are not just looking at the number of fish that are caught. We are trying to regulate the number of fish that are killed. That is what is important in terms of returning fish to spawn in the rivers of Canada.
The arrangements that have been agreed to will have a duration of ten years, with the exception of the one for the Fraser sockeye fishery, which will be for a period of 12 years. These arrangements are for a long period of time. They will provide us with certainty and stability and will avoid much of the annual conflict over harvest shares that we have seen in the past number of years.
The first chapter in Annex IV deals with the northern boundary sockeye and pink salmon fisheries. Those are fisheries in Alaska. District 104 and District 101 are fisheries that intercept Canadian sockeye in Alaska. The Area 3 Net and the Area 1 Troll intercept Alaskan pink salmon along the northern boundary. I will not go through all of the details here other than to say that we have agreed to abundance-based management. These limitations will restrict the opportunity of Alaska to intercept Canadian stocks and they also give us protection to assist in the conservation of our own stocks in the northern boundary.
These arrangements will, for example, limit the Alaskan interception of sockeye and will provide protection for Canada when the abundance is low, as is the case in 1999. Just to illustrate, in 1999, the Alaskans harvest of sockeye in their Noyes Island fishery will be about 20,000 fish under this new arrangement. In 1997, in the absence of any agreement, the Alaskans harvested 571,000 Canadian sockeye. So this does provide increased benefit. It will mean more fish returning to Canadian rivers in the future. In addition, the Canadian harvest of pink salmon can increase over what we have seen in past years.
Northern coho is a particular conservation problem for Canada. We have very low returns of coho in our Skeena River. In the past, there were no restrictions on the Alaskan harvest of coho. We have now adopted a new provision that will restrict Alaskan harvest during periods of low overall abundance.
The arrangements, as you can see, are somewhat tied to catch indices in the Alaskan fishery, which I will not go through. I can explain if people would like some additional clarification, but overall in this area, the closures will improve protection for Skeena coho during times when the abundance is low. I want to be clear that the Alaskan fishery will not close every year under these arrangements. They will close when the abundance is low, and that will indeed provide us with additional support for our conservation efforts during those years when those conditions are met. But those conditions will not be met every year.
Transboundary rivers are covered by another chapter of the treaty. Those are rivers where the main amount of flow is in Canada but they discharge into the sea through the Alaskan panhandle. Canadians fish in those rivers in the inland portion, and the harvest arrangements are very important to Canada's First Nations and to other people who have commercial fishing opportunities in that area.
The Taku, the Stikine and the Alsek Rivers are the main rivers in which these fisheries occur. We have improved harvest arrangements that will give Canadians additional harvest opportunity and, at the same time, we have agreed with the United States to continue with enhancement efforts that will provide benefits to Canadian fishermen.
The other important element is that we have established a new panel to deal with transboundary rivers. This panel will be responsible for overseeing the management in these areas and will report to the Pacific Salmon Commission. That will provide a voice for many of the First Nations who previously have not been able to participate in deliberations of the commission because of the absence of any forum or institutional arrangement for them to contribute.
The fourth subject is southern chum salmon. We have a new arrangement that will allow for Canada's catch levels to increase. Under this new arrangement, a Canadian catch of up to 280,000 fish triggers a U.S. catch of 20,000 fish. In the past, that Canadian catch level was 225,000 fish, so that trigger has increased. Canadian catches between 280,000 and 745,000 fish will trigger a U.S. catch of 120,000 fish. Canadian catches above 745,000 fish will trigger a U.S. catch of 140,000 fish. Essentially, that provides Canadians with an opportunity to catch more fish before a U.S. harvest is triggered. The U.S. catch, of course, is largely a harvest of Canadian stocks.
Southern coho is a particular priority of Canada because we have very serious conservation concerns with coho salmon. We have adopted a new abundance-based management regime that will replace previously set fixed catch ceilings. It is a very sophisticated, modern management approach that is currently being developed by our technical staff. When it is put in place, it will provide us with very effective bilateral controls to ensure that conservation of coho is achieved. These stocks are in very poor condition in both Canada and the southern U.S. It is extremely important that we work together to rebuild them. This arrangement, when it is implemented in the year 2000, will provide us with the opportunity to control harvests in such a manner that coho stocks will rebuild to former levels of abundance.
Fraser sockeye and pink salmon represent Canada's largest commercial fishing opportunity. We have agreed with the United States to a fixed percentage share of 16.5 per cent. The U.S. harvest -- and this goes back to the turn of the century -- has been in excess of 60 per cent of the Fraser sockeye. We have progressively reduced their harvest share, and they have now agreed to a share of 16.5 per cent, which is a significant reduction. The benefits from that reduction will accrue directly to Canadian fishermen, both commercial and First Nations. The U.S. share is significantly below their historic levels of harvest, and it will provide very significant benefits. By way of illustrating the value of this, each percentage point in Fraser sockeye represents almost 300,000 sockeye over a four-year cycle. In other words, the reduction from last year's level of 24.9 per cent represents 2 million or 2.5 million sockeye that will come to Canada as a result of this agreement.
A very complicated agreement has been reached with respect to chinook salmon. It is a new arrangement where we have harvests based on abundance. It replaces fixed ceilings. It regulates total mortality, and we have agreed to goals that are essentially to ensure that we meet maximum sustainable yield in our escapement, which is the number of adults that return to spawn.
This annex in particular is extremely complex. These slides go into much greater detail than I need to do here, but I should like to reinforce that we have agreed to specific percentage harvest shares for fisheries in Alaska, in northern B.C. and on the West Coast of Vancouver Island. As part of the arrangements, we have agreed to reduce our troll and outside sport fishery on the West Coast of Vancouver Island by 40 per cent to ensure that our conservation and stock rebuilding objectives are met. That will result in a harvest of around 150,000 to 200,000 chinook, which is roughly equivalent to recent levels of harvest. Although it looks onerous, a 40 per cent reduction in fact does not affect our fisheries because we have introduced restrictions in the last number of years that have already exceeded that level of reduction. This provides us with the assurance that we will be rebuilding stocks in Canada and the southern United States.
Similarly, we have reduced other fisheries in southern B.C. by 36.5 per cent and by 40 per cent in the southern U.S. As you can see, these are essential components of a very complicated agreement that will, over the next number of years, ensure that the future of chinook salmon, which have indeed been at risk because of overharvesting, will be assured.
I thought it would be useful to give some assessment of these new arrangements. We think it is appropriate to judge them in terms of how they would perform relative to having no agreement or to assess them against how they perform relative to past agreements and in terms of how they meet Canada's objectives for the negotiations that I laid out at the outset.
These arrangements provide significant restrictions on the ability of the U.S. to intercept our stocks. In the absence of an agreement, there are no limitations on what the Alaskans can intercept in the north and there would be no restrictions on what the United States could harvest in the southern range where Fraser sockeye can be intercepted by the United States. The new arrangements provide significant benefits and they are superior to the past treaty arrangements. They do address the three objectives that were laid out at the outset.
First and most important, conservation is secured. We are indeed putting the fish first in both our domestic and now our bilateral relationships. A number of different elements in these arrangements will ensure that conservation is achieved. We have the abundance-based management regimes. We have reduced harvest rates. We have measures that will ensure that weak stocks are protected. We are addressing total mortality rather than just catch. We have restrictions introduced for the first time in the Alaskan troll fishery. We have a mutual commitment to have habitat protection be an important element of our programs. Finally, the funding under the endowment funds will ensure that habitat protection and resource enhancement will be there to contribute for the long-term well-being of the stocks.
The second objective we had was to restrict interception to the U.S. and move fish to Canada, and we think we have done that. Notably, in the Fraser River we have significant reduction in U.S. interceptions, and we have more fish for Canada in the north as well as in the south. The arrangements that have been concluded, While not meeting the specific interest of every individual engaged in the fishery, the arrangements that have been concluded do, nonetheless, provide a very significant benefit to Canada with respect to the future in terms of both conservation and catch.
Our final objective was to try to secure improved bilateral cooperation. A number of provisions that have been adopted will provide improved cooperation and better circumstances of working together with the U.S. We think that these arrangements represent a significant improvement over the past. We have now agreed to bilateral rules for how fisheries will be conducted.
In the past we have had competitive overfishing and we know that that serves the interest of no one. We now have agreed upon arrangements that provide certainty and stability for the fleets. They provide restrictions on the ability of the U.S. to intercept our stock and they provide fish for Canadians. Most important, these arrangements represent a modernization of an arrangement that was antiquated and no longer serving the interests of our fish nor the interests of our fleets. These arrangements will provide improved conservation and the bilateral cooperation that we think is necessary if we are to be able to secure the future of our salmon resource on the West Coast. It is indeed a landmark agreement that will provide us with significant benefits in the future.
[Translation]
The Chairman: Thank you for providing us with the documents in both official languages. Committee members appreciated it very much.
[English]
Senator Robertson: Thank you for that presentation, sir. Can you tell me, please, which catch is considered to be the most important salmon on the West Coast?
Mr. Anderson: I will let Mr. Chamut answer that. It depends on your vantage point. If you were a sports fisherman you would say chinook; if you were a commercial fisherman you would say sockeye. But I may be wrong on both counts. I will defer to the expert.
Mr. Chamut: Minister, your answer is exactly right. Clearly, it is a question of where you are on the coast and what your specific interests are. A commercial fisherman in the north would probably say that Skeena sockeye is one of the most important fish or fisheries to be protected. If you were in the south, then you would certainly indicate that Fraser sockeye salmon is the key priority. But your perspective changes dramatically if you are a sports fisherman interested, for example, in fishing in Georgia Strait. Then your priorities would be coho and chinook, which are the primary species caught in the recreational fishery.
I could make it more complicated by throwing in the other dynamic, which is the importance of fish for aboriginal people. Getting enough fish back to sustain their cultural needs and their food needs becomes a very important priority for them.
Essentially, the importance is a function of where you are and what your particular interests are. I think everyone would agree that all salmon are important, particularly in B.C. where they are such a symbol of the culture and the lifestyle and provide such an important economic opportunity to so many communities.
Senator Robertson: You may not have this with you, but I should like to have it. What is the dollar value of the various salmon fisheries? What is the financial impact to British Columbia? How many fisheries will be removed from the various fleets and from the fishing industry because of this agreement?
Mr. Chamut: In the past, the commercial fishery has been worth between $200 million and $300 million annually. That was during times when the resource was much more abundant than it is now. Last year the value of the commercial fishery was in the order of $50 million. That reflects the decreased abundance and it also reflects the declining value of salmon in the markets.
Although there are restrictions of Canadian fisheries in some areas as part of this agreement, those will not require an immediate reduction in harvest over what has been practised in the last couple of years, because we have already taken significant reductions in our fisheries in order to achieve domestic conservation objectives. Therefore, the 40 per cent reduction in harvest that I referred to for chinook salmon on the West Coast of Vancouver Island does not mean any immediate reduction in harvest because we have already had to restrict that fishery in order to achieve our own conservation objectives. In fact, no new restrictions are added anywhere as a result of this agreement. On the contrary, there are new opportunities.
Senator Robertson: Are those opportunities anywhere?
Mr. Chamut: There will be new opportunities in specific areas.
Mr. Anderson: We are talking specifically about salmon when we refer to the $50 million.
Senator Stewart: I have a series of questions that seem unrelated, but I want to say right off that I thought the minister's opening statement and the statement by Mr. Chamut were models of clarity and most helpful to the members of the committee and to those who will read the record of this meeting.
I am sure that some of our readers and perhaps some of our members will want to know very briefly why it is that Alaska and Washington state and Oregon state got into the negotiation since they do not have personality at international law.
Mr. Anderson: I will attempt to answer that without constitutional law, but you do have to refer to the United States Constitution which grants authority over the fishery out to the three-mile limit to the states themselves. When you have an interception fishery near a river or where you have a fishery such as salmon where the fish come to the shore after their migration and turn down the shore, quite often you are within the three-mile limit. In fact, some of those Canadian fish in Alaska are taken by nets that are on the shore at one end and out on the boat at the other end. So hey are very close to shore.
Beyond the three-mile limit, the United States federal government has jurisdiction, but normally the U.S. federal government simply follows the same fishing plan as an adjacent state. That is the situation with respect to those constitutional provisions under the American Constitution.
The extra joker in the pack -- or perhaps I should not use that term because it is a very important consideration -- is the tribes both of the Columbia River and of Washington state. Constitutionally by law and by treaty, the Washington tribes are entitled to 50 per cent of the fishery in the state of Washington. They have a very different constitutional position. Mr. Chamut and Mr. McCrae had the interesting and indeed the extremely challenging task of negotiating with an uncoordinated American group comprising five different groups of people with differing objectives. Most of the time, sir, we found ourselves allied with Oregon and Washington and with the tribes. Sometimes we found ourselves allied with the tribes. Sometimes we found ourselves allied with Alaska. And sometimes we found ourselves isolated. It was very much a multilateral negotiating situation.
The American government provided in the person of Mr. Cutler an absolutely superb coordinator of the American team. I point out that he is 81 years old and those of you who think that the 75-year retirement level is probably inappropriate could judge by a man of that competence. He was remarkable. Nevertheless, he also was limited by the differing interests of the states and the tribes. That meant that it was particularly important for me over the last two years to spend a great deal of my time in Juneau, Alaska, and in Olympia, Washington. Mr. Chamut and Mr. McCrae similarly had to work an extremely complex negotiating situation where the Americans' positions often conflicted and where we were sometimes called in to negotiate between competing American interests to try to develop the necessary consensus.
When I say that Dr. McCrae and Mr. Chamut did a remarkable job in negotiations, I mean that all in sincerity. This was not a simple task at all, quite apart from the biological complications that you saw in Mr. Chamut's presentation. The constitutional complications were simply extraordinary.
Senator Stewart: Reference was made to Alaskan stocks, B.C. stocks and southern American stocks. I assume that "south American" is shorthand for Washington and Oregon. This is a very superficial question because it does not take into account the different types of salmon. Roughly, what percentage of the total overall salmon stock is what you would call Alaskan stock, what proportion is B.C. stock or Canadian and what proportion is southern American?
Mr. Anderson: I will turn that question over to Mr. Chamut.
Mr. Chamut: When we talk about a stock, we are talking about an individual population of salmon that spawns in a particular river. To give some idea of the complexity of what we are talking about, there are about 14,000 separate stocks of salmon throughout the Pacific Northwest, which includes Alaska, B.C., Washington and Oregon. Some stocks are very large, such as the Fraser River sockeye which can be 20 million fish, and some stocks are very small, where perhaps fewer than 100 fish belong to that particular stock. They are all mixed together and management is very complex.
In Alaska -- and here I mean just the southeastern part of Alaska, the area of the panhandle down to the boundary with Canada -- generally their harvest is roughly 50 million to 60 million salmon. That is largely pink salmon. In B.C., in the past the harvest has been 20 million to 30 million pieces or individual salmon that are caught. In the southern states of Washington and Oregon, the harvest is generally around 3 million pieces. As you can see, there is a diminishing abundance in terms of total numbers as you move from north to south.
Senator Stewart: This question may seem out of area, as they say in NATO. You talked earlier about habitat protection being one of the achievements of this agreement. As you know, I come from Nova Scotia. I read in our local newspapers that there is speculation that the reason some of our Atlantic rivers have had a declining stock of salmon has had to do with pesticides and spraying. Do you have that problem in Alaska, British Columbia or the southern states?
Mr. Anderson: Certainly there is no problem to speak of in Alaska. There is a certain amount of runoff but it is mostly natural turpentine from the pine trees and it does not necessarily affect the rivers.
We certainly have a problem with agricultural practices in British Columbia, in particular grazing in the higher country, where the upper river fish go. We certainly have a problem with logging degradation. We certainly have a problem with straight pollution runoff in the coastal streams, which are now so heavily urbanized. I am referring to streams around the Lower Mainland, for example.
In Washington they have all those problems in even greater abundance. The habitat with respect to the Columbia River is related closely to dams. They have created one of the largest hydroelectric systems in the world -- Bonneville Power Authority -- and they spend an enormous amount of money achieving extraordinarily little in trying to truck or barge fish up the river.
There is a variety of different habitat problems, but the pesticide problem that Atlantic Canada experiences is not present because we do not spray for budworms in the same way.
The issue you have raised, though, I have to say, is one of enormous interest to me. Less than a week ago I got an agreement from the Greenland Minister of Fisheries on interception of Atlantic salmon at sea. It really does little to get these agreements to reduce the fishing pressure if in fact the actual cause is habitat.
Senator, you probably put your finger on the importance of a coordinated approach. People who fix themselves only on one issue sometimes miss the wider issue. It would be very unwise to think that restrictions on fishing can solve our problems of Atlantic salmon. We are going to have to work the whole spectrum. I am told that there are very few -- 80,000 to 100,000 -- adult fish. That is a trivial number of fish in comparison with past history. If we are unable to reverse that trend, we are in fact looking at a disastrous situation.
Senator Robertson: In reading the West Coast papers and from talking to friends out there at the time of your treaty, minister, I gathered that there seemed to be some considerable concerns. I should like to ask you about some of those concerns.
The critics of your treaty say that the worst part of that treaty was perhaps the lack of a public process. As I understand it from reading and listening, the lack of a public process is in contravention of international fisheries agreements and the Oceans Act. You may have been following a recommendation not to start up the shareholder process, but my information, which may be incorrect, is that the stakeholders were not consulted, were kept completely in the dark. That is quite a dig difference. Could you respond to that, please?
Mr. Anderson: Certainly, I am happy for the opportunity. You are correct, senator, in pointing out that these negotiations were not done with the previous stakeholder process, which involved everybody. I remember that only two years ago 140 people met in seven different rooms in Portland as we tried to negotiate an agreement. It was chaotic. If you, for example, or I represent a specific, small group of fishermen, we have very little manoeuvering room. To come up with an overall agreement is next to impossible if small groups have a veto over the process. We had that problem.
The second problem we had was that we had involved the provincial government heavily. We had troubles with the provincial government two years ago when I first became minister. Enough said about provincial government support of a blockade of the Alaskan ferry.
Last year I thought I was being relatively magnanimous when I said that the province could play as big a role or as small a role as they wished. We had eight negotiators last year, two of whom were provincial government people. At delicate negotiations -- again, by coincidence, in Portland -- the provincial premier pulled the two members of the Canadian delegation from the meeting room, had them return to Victoria, denounced the chief negotiator and released papers that were internal to the Canadian delegation.
This year I was faced with the choice: Do I again repeat this, after two years of experience? I am not the swiftest person in the world, but twice bitten, thrice shy was my approach on this one. As minister, I had twice given the province the opportunity, never mind the experience previous to that. This agreement is important for the conservation of fish. I realized that it would become more difficult if we had people who were playing to tomorrow's headlines or tonight's television news. I made the conscious decision that I would exclude the province by reason of their behaviour in the past year.
I regretted that decision but I felt compelled to make it. Unfortunately, however, it forced me to make another decision that I regret having had to make. I felt that in order to exclude the province, I had to exclude everybody else because I could not pick and choose. I could not prevent the province from taking part, then allow another, friendlier group to take part. You can see the type of dilemma I would be in. It had to be a rule for all or a rule for none. So we changed the process. I might add that it was in accordance with the instructions of Dr. Strangway and Mr. Ruckelshaus, whose first recommendation was that the stakeholder process should not -- and "not" was underlined -- be reconvened.
We were following the recommendations of the two wise men appointed by the President and the Prime Minister to guide us in our negotiations and we took decisions based upon past experience with the provincial government. Nevertheless, may I say, senator, it was a tough decision and it was one that I would have preferred not to have had to make, but I believe it was necessary.
I feel it was unfortunate that I did not have an opportunity to consult widely with native leaders. Although they were not physically in the negotiating room or there as part of the negotiating process, the position put forward by the Canadian negotiators was their position. After all these many years we know their views. We had consulted with them this year and their views had not changed. The objectives remained the same. We took their objectives, and that was our negotiating position. For example, the fund of Can. $209 million came directly from the northern stakeholders' recommendations of two years ago. It was ironic that some of the northern stakeholders quickly denounced the fund until I pointed out that in fact we got the fund, we argued for the fund, we fought for the fund because they wanted the fund two years before. While they were excluded from the negotiations in the same manner that a labour negotiating team excludes other members of the union from taking part, we nevertheless based our approach on their views.
I have taken some time, and I apologize, Mr. Chairman, but it was a decision I regretted having to make. In retrospect, given the agreement, given the importance of this to our fishermen as well as of course to the fish, I still feel it was absolutely necessary to take that step.
Senator Robertson: Then do you also, minister, contemplate that it will be necessary at some time to have amendments to some of those international fisheries agreements and to the Oceans Act?
Mr. Anderson: No, because we have negotiations with them. The essential difference becomes a trifle technical. Do they have the right to be a part of the negotiating team? That is really the issue. It is not a question of are they involved in preparing the information. It is not a question of them being excluded from discussion or not having their views heard. The question is whether they are allowed to be in court sitting at the bench with the lawyer, if I could use that analogy. Of course, that is what we rejected.
I have asked my department to check very carefully and they have been unable to find any example where this violates the agreement. The only exception to that is a reference to the provincial government in the Strangway-Ruckelshaus report that, by necessity because of my experience, I had to ignore.
Senator Robertson: In the June 3 news release you described the treaty as a conservation-based approach, which is excellent, and a more equitable sharing of salmon catches between Canada and the United States. Those sound very good and we appreciate the hard work that you and your officials have put into this treaty.
Let me ask first about this more equitable sharing of salmon catches. Maybe I am being too picky here, but the words "more equitable" pose a bit of a concern for me. I am not sure how something can be more equitable or more fair. It is either equitable or fair or it is not.
I go to the B.C. coho salmon issue, which I am sure you are tired of hearing about. Last year, in order to ensure their optimum survival, no B.C. coho were caught by British Columbians, and that ties in with the conservation issue. At the same time, the Alaskans caught about 800,000 of the B.C. coho. This year, if I understand it correctly, British Columbia will not catch any endangered coho. However, the Alaskans will catch the endangered coho for the next ten years. What is going to happen to the coho? How can we conserve if one catches 800,000 and the other catches zero? And where is equity in that arrangement?
Mr. Anderson: On the issue of a more equitable sharing, of course none of us knows what the future will bring with respect to abundance levels. Because the abundance level will alter the harvest share, as Mr. Chamut explained, we cannot really determine the future. What we can do with precision is look at past history and say that had these arrangements been in place since 1985, when the treaty was first signed by Prime Minister Mulroney, how much more would Canada get in the way of fish for our fishermen? The number that we have worked out is totally undisputed by anyone because we were very conservative -- and I use that term in a positive sense -- in our estimates. The number is 8 million more fish to Canada, of which at least half are Fraser River sockeye, the value fish for the commercial fishery. It is simply incontrovertible that these arrangements do shift fish to Canada.
With respect to the comment you made about whether something can be more equitable, I agree that your knowledge of language is very precise. Maybe better words could have been chosen, but the concept is there that this is an improvement over the past.
With respect to coho in the north, which is one of the 14 different chapters that Mr. Chamut led us through earlier today, there is no question that the amount of reduction in Alaskan catch for coho will not equal what I had the misfortune of having the responsibility, I guess, of putting in place last year to protect coho stocks. But that is exactly why this agreement is so important. This is the first time ever in history that the Alaskans have recognized the importance of limiting under any circumstances the catch of coho coming to Canadian rivers. They have never before agreed to limit their catch. Now they have said that there could be a conservation problem and under circumstances such as this, this and this, they would be prepared to close down perhaps the entire southern half of the panhandle fisheries possibly for up to three weeks.
It is certainly true that a British Columbia fisherman or I, as minister, could say, "I wish they had been willing to do more." But there is a big gulf between doing absolutely nothing saying, "That is your problem. Tough. We are on our side of the line. International law says we can take fish in our waters" and saying, "Yes, we agree we have to adopt joint approaches and we agree that under certain circumstances to protect the stocks in Canadian rivers we should cut back and limit our catch."
I believe there has been a bit of a chasm bridged. There is no question we want to improve it. Then the comment comes, "It is a ten-year agreement. How can you improve it?" This can always be improved by agreement between Alaska and Canada or Washington and Canada in special circumstances that may occur. But at least we bridge this gap of them saying, "When fish are in our waters they are our fish." Sister Peggy and I might disagree on this -- they are God's fish -- but when they are rendered into possession, they are Alaskan fish or Canadian fish.
The fact is that these fish were not protected at all previously. We had literally to beg to get Alaskan fisheries to make any changes at all because we had no legal basis or agreed-upon basis upon which to do it. It is true that it would be nice had more been able to be done.
The other aspect that sometimes we forget in Canada is that in none of these arrangements did the Alaskans improve their catch, with the possible exception of chinook at very high levels of abundance. At high levels of abundance, where we have no problem with chinook, they would catch more. So they would have caught more than under previous arrangements. We do not envisage that happening for many years. In every other area they gave up something or things stayed the same.
I am not here to argue an Alaskan case. We argued with them bitterly. I should like more, but I should like to suggest that, as in all cases, there is another side to the story and we were not negotiating with people who had absolutely no basis for the position they took. They felt they had international law on their side and they felt that they did make concessions. To understand their position, we have to recognize that it was not simply a question of us achieving those arrangements.
Do not compare any one of those 14 arrangements against perfection. Compare them against the alternative. The alternative is nothing. Once again, as we say in elected politics, as I am sure you are well aware, do not compare me to perfection. Do not compare me to all those experts. Just compare me to the opposition. This is the situation here. The alternative was nothing. The alternative was continuing a six-year slide where more and more it got ingrained in the psyche of Alaskan fishermen, who are some tough people, that they are entitled to take whatever they want. We had allowed that slide to continue. This goes back to the original arrangements and why it was important for Mr. Mulroney to have that treaty in the first place.
We are down water and if we do not work our way into a system intelligently by being active and competent and persuasive, we are left out. Again, I do not want to argue the Alaskan case. I simply want to say that this is so much better than the alternative. It is not perfection. In any negotiations, you must decide whether the glass is half full or half empty or, in the case of getting nothing, you have to recognize the glass would be completely empty. This may be a half full/half empty situation for those who would like more, but all I ask them to do, in fairness, is to compare the alternative.
Senator Butts: I want to get back to basics. I do not even do recreational fishing. The 1985 arrangement did not have a closure on it. It was meant to go on. What specifically was wrong with that and what specifically did you cure? Was it outdated rules or was it folks who would not keep the rules?
Mr. Anderson: Senator, the 1985 arrangements had, under Annex IV, seven years of fishing plans. So under the actual signed document, you had your fishing plan. The treaty recognized that circumstances would change and that at the end of that period Canada and the United States were meant to negotiate year by year. We had failed totally for seven years. Therefore, this time we put in place ten-year provisions, which reverts much to the thinking of the original treaty that there should be some long-term stability.
For the specific changes, I will turn to Mr. Chamut, but I do want to stress that the original treaty had the annex on the fishing plan in place for seven years. What we now have in place after this seven-year gap is a fishing plan for ten years in every fishery except sockeye in the south which is 12 years.
Mr. Chamut: Senator, a number of things were adopted in 1985 that needed to be modernized and that is what we have done with the new arrangements. For example, when the treaty was adopted in 1985, it managed many of these fisheries by stipulating fixed harvest ceilings in certain fisheries. In other words, Canada was entitled under the first treaty to catch 1.8 million coho salmon. That was a fixed number. However, fish abundance goes up and down, depending on productivity in the ocean and other factors. We found that establishing a fixed ceiling was highly inappropriate during times when the ocean productivity was very low, because there was an incentive on the part of fishermen to want to catch what they saw as their guaranteed catch.
In my view, many of the problems that we currently have with coho are a consequence of fishing to a fixed number, which inevitably has been translated as a harvest guarantee. People want to take what they believe has been set for their use. Clearly, it was inconsistent with the changed circumstances that we have seen in the fishery, particularly since 1995. That was a key provision that had to be fixed.
One of the key arrangements that we have put in place is an arrangement whereby each party will get a percentage of the abundance that is there. In some years, when stocks are low, that abundance or that number might be 20,000. In times of greater abundance it might be 80,000. But the point is that it is responsive to some of the changes that occur naturally in a fish population. It is much more responsive to abundance and it reflects current management practice in our own fisheries. It is a far more sensible and conservation-based way to manage. I am personally extremely pleased that we have managed to avoid some of the very difficult problems that we foisted on ourselves given the level of knowledge and the ability to be able to come to agreement in 1985.
In the old treaty, we often times had nothing in place that would have penalized a person if they did not comply with the arrangements under the treaty. There are a couple of examples I could give you but, in effect, if a person fished above a particular amount, there was often no arrangement to cause that transgression to be compensated.
Under the new arrangement, we have agreed to what we call "overage and underage provisions," whereby if in any one year a party does not abide by their responsibilities, then the next year they are obliged to compensate for any excess catch that they have taken. Those are two key arrangements. There are a number of other more technical things that I could refer to, but those are important ones.
Senator Butts: Is it safe to say that you have put much more onus on the scientists who are going to tell you how many they think are out there?
Mr. Anderson: That is absolutely true, Sister Peggy. The scientists and the scientific work will become much more important and it will also be important to have joint arrangements so that we do not find scientific differences, which may be perfectly legitimate, depending on different bases on which they do their work, becoming political problems at the top. That is a very perceptive comment. This only works if we are willing to do the speed work.
Senator Butts: You mentioned the Pacific Salmon Commission. Who is on that commission?
Mr. Anderson: We have joint Canadian and U.S. panels. We also have the northern and southern people. It is quite technical.
Senator Butts: Are they stakeholders or are they citizens?
Mr. Anderson: They are stakeholders. I tried to expand it somewhat to include not just the fish harvesters but also some others who have interest. I should say we also have aboriginal representatives. I am trying to get representatives who are more generally interested in fish who do not necessarily kill them as part of their profession.
Mr. Chamut: The Pacific Salmon Commission is a body consisting of eight Canadians and eight United States representatives. On the U.S. side there are two appointees made by the President from Alaska, one from Washington state, one from Oregon, two from the tribal organizations in Washington and Oregon and two U.S. federal representatives.
On the Canadian side, it consists of eight people appointed by the minister. There are two federal representatives, of which I am one. There is also a fisheries manager from Vancouver. In addition, we have two aboriginal representatives, one from the north and one from the south. We have a representative of the Fisheries Council of B.C. We have a representative of the commercial fishing fleet. We have a representative of the environmental community. Finally, we have a representative of the sports community. Of the eight Canadians, six are what you would regard as stakeholders involved in various elements of the fishery in B.C.
Senator Butts: Are they still going to function in the new arrangement?
Mr. Chamut: Yes.
Senator Butts: If I am reading this correctly, you are putting another committee under them to tell them what to do because it did not function properly. Is that true?
Mr. Chamut: Not entirely.
Senator Butts: I think the slide says to advise them.
Mr. Chamut: The commission itself will be responsible for implementing the agreement over its life. As part of the new arrangements that we have agreed to, we have established a committee that will deal specifically with some of the science issues. In your previous intervention you said that science would be the compass that would guide the commission's activities. We are trying to find a way to make sure that science advice is provided to the commission in a more effective way. We are also trying to find a way to avoid some of the disputes that we had in the past where we essentially had scientists on various sides of an issue arguing the case more from the point of view of the national position than necessarily from the perspective of science. This committee will avoid some of those circumstances.
Senator Butts: Who is on this committee?
Mr. Chamut: We have agreed in the new arrangements that that committee would consist of six Canadians and six Americans. The committee would include experts from within the department. We have many very capable people who provide scientific expertise on Pacific salmon management. They will be joined by outside experts. We have not yet appointed anyone because this is very new, but my expectation is that we would probably have three departmental scientists who are recognized experts, as well as three outside independent people who can come in and provide us with a somewhat broader perspective.
Senator Butts: I am curious to know how you could get the Americans to fund two foundations completely by themselves. They are giving money to this arrangement while they are losing millions of fish. It is a miracle.
Mr. Anderson: Senator, the United States federal government certainly recognizes -- and I should say that this includes the people in the House of Representatives, the senators and the administrators that we have spoken to -- that there previously was an imbalance in their favour.
As to how we were successful in negotiating, I once more refer to the fact that we had an excellent team. But if you are willing to put it down to divine intervention, I would not disagree, either. There was an extraordinarily successful element to our negotiations.
Finally, I should also point out that the money is not yet in the bank, that there is a Byzantine process in the United States for getting appropriations. We thought that some of these appropriations would be tacked on to the money bill with respect to the Kosovo operations. To us, that was a stretch, but apparently in the United States that is not a stretch. Unfortunately, so many other people had similar ideas of tacking things on to that appropriations bill that everything was severed from it.
The President cancelled $60 million worth of other expenditures to put up the first $60 million contribution to this, which is a very clear indication of his determination.
Senator Stevens of Alaska is chair of the Appropriations Committee of the United States Senate and is the third-ranking Republican in Washington. I am sure that I need not tell senators here that United States senators are powers in the land. The fact that he has committed himself to assist is a very good sign. That is the best I can say with my limited knowledge of American politics.
Senator Mahovlich: I was going to ask about representation by Canadian aboriginals, but you have answered that you are representing them and you know their problems.
Apparently we have more whales now than we had five or six years ago. I read in the paper about a month ago that a group slaughtered a whale, maybe because of their beliefs or their traditions, and that created a lot of static. If there is an abundance of whales, are they not allowed to go back to their traditions?
Mr. Anderson: Senator, you are speaking about the Makah hunt that takes place directly opposite Vancouver Island in Washington State. You are perfectly correct that in terms of their numbers, there is an abundance. The number of grey whales was down to 3,000 to 4,000 some decades ago and is now at approximately 23,000. This number is considered to be at a historic level of abundance. We can get a very good count on the grey whale because it has its calves in lagoons in Mexico and it goes up and down the coast.
Senator Mahovlich: Does it go down to the Baja?
Mr. Anderson: That is correct. The Makah revived a tradition and, you are quite correct, it created considerable grief among people who simply believe that it is inappropriate to kill such an enormous, magnificent animal.
Senator Mahovlich: Killing seals inspires the same grief.
Mr. Anderson: The situation is not dissimilar in that much of the objection to sealing is based on the principle that it is inappropriate for mankind to kill these animals.
Senator Mahovlich: But do the whales not have an effect on our salmon?
Mr. Anderson: No, they do not. They are generally bottom feeders, crustacean feeders. A grey whale used to live off a particular inlet. He would just dig up the bottom and then he would roll and spout. If you think that whales are clean, neat and tidy creatures, think again. The bad breath of a whale after it spouted near you is something to experience. He would do this deliberately. He would spray you in the boat, so you knew you had to wash the vessel down when you got home. You had to get the hose out, as well as wash all your clothes. That whale did it just for fun. They are very attractive creatures and this is why this enormous emotional attachment has developed.
In Canada, we allow a bow whale to be killed in the Eastern Arctic every alternate year and one in the Western Arctic every other alternate year. Thus, one whale may be killed in Canadian waters by the aboriginal people of the Arctic every year. We do not have whaling on the West Coast.
To be candid, I cannot give you the correct legal opinion, if the Nuu-Chah-Nulth people decided to resume whaling after a 73-year absence from it, whether or not they would require a permit, because, as you point out, the whales are now abundant and they have the right to a subsistence fishery.
Senator Cook: Thank you very much for this overabundance of information this morning. Given my limited knowledge of the West Coast fishery, two thoughts are going through my mind. I do not see how the treaty will be enforced. The treaty is for 10 years, so is there a review and an evaluation process in the treaty?
Mr. Anderson: The enforcement will be done by the respective national governments. There is no penalty mechanism, but Mr. Chamut did mention the issue of overages and underages, which happens quite often with no mala fides. Sometimes you catch more fish because the boats are out there and you do not realize how many you have caught until they come back. We can compensate in the subsequent year or years. We do not have a mechanism for appeal. There is a dispute mechanism within the treaty itself, but we did not renegotiate anything on that line.
Mr. Chamut can give you further details of that.
The second point you mentioned was renewal. We did not put in specific renewal triggers. Given our experience and the close working relationship that we want to develop with the states of Alaska, Washington and Oregon and with the native peoples, we expect that all of us will have a pretty good idea when the time has come to start talking about what will happen at the end of 10 years. We did not work it out informally, but I have full confidence that it will work effectively.
Mr. Chamut: Senator, the treaty is negotiated on the basis of good faith. There is an expectation on the part of both parties that they will adhere to the responsibilities that they accepted under the treaty.
In the United States, if there is non-compliance, if, for example, one of the states is not adhering to its responsibilities, there is specific U.S. federal legislation that would allow the U.S. government to intervene to ensure compliance with the terms of the agreement. In my experience, that was implemented once on the U.S. side when one of the tribal organizations was initiating a fishery that was not authorized under the treaty. In that instance, the U.S. government used its authority to essentially get an executive order that prohibited the conduct of that fishery. On the U.S. side, there is reasonable authority to ensure compliance, and on the Canadian side there is a commitment to ensure that we abide by those arrangements and that we have the necessary authority to ensure that they are adhered to.
Article 12 deals with technical disputes. If there is a dispute between Canada and the U.S. over a technical interpretation, then there is a specific provision whereby a dispute resolution board can be convened. That board would consist of one person nominated by Canada, one person nominated by the United States, and a third party deemed acceptable to both parties, who would serve as chair. They would then receive submissions and render a decision that would be essentially binding on the commission that is implementing the treaty.
In my experience, we are trying to create an arrangement that is based on good faith and a commitment on the part of both parties to live within their obligations. I am satisfied that we have an arrangement that will work and that will probably work much more effectively than what we had in 1985.
Senator Cook: The backgrounder contains information that shows that annual expenditures will not exceed the annual earnings from the invested principal of the fund.
Mr. Anderson: That is correct. It is a perpetual fund. Like all funds of this type, the investment strategy will determine how much comes. We expect it to be a commercially managed fund and we expect it to generate reasonable amounts of money. It will vary, though.
The fund managers, who are three Canadians and three Americans, will actually decide on how the money is spent. Their revenues will vary, as they will for all people whose fixed incomes come from investment.
Senator Cook: Do you have any idea how much you will receive from that annually?
Mr. Anderson: I am trespassing on the domain of the Minister of Finance, but if current interest rates are 6 per cent, $209 million would give us approximately $12 million. That is a reasonably conservative approach, but nothing would stop us from topping up the fund if there is some sort of windfall. Governments sometimes do this -- the Canada Council is an example. Or, in fact, because of low income in any particular year, governments may say that this is unfortunate with regard to the continuous nature of our expenditures and they will give them some operating money this year. We could do that.
That investment income will be in addition to other expenditures made by the various states and by Canada. I will again ask Mr. Chamut to give the exact figure, but I think I am correct in saying that we put out $33 million in habitat and enhancement on the West Coast.
Mr. Chamut: In our combined program, we expend approximately $27 million annually on enhancement and habitat improvement, plus some additional funds in the amount of $7 million to $8 million, but it depends on the year. We are spending about $35 million in this area. These moneys themselves will be a very important supplement, which we would see being used to try to leverage other moneys that may be available from other sources. The value would be probably in excess of the actual amount that will be generated by interest.
It is important to say that this will continue. In our view, it will continue beyond the 10-year life of this arrangement. It will not only help to ensure that conservation needs are being funded, but it will help us to work far more cooperatively with the United States over the long term. We have agreed to a number of important provisions here.
Mr. Anderson: At the risk of excessive detail, we also have the $400 billion restructuring fund, which I have discussed with you previously. Of that, $100 million is for habitat, of which $30 million is a separate fund. In addition, before we arranged for this particular fund that we are talking about, the $209 million fund, the U.S. President set up a $100 million fund for the four states of California, Washington, Oregon and Alaska, which is split more or less equally. Washington and Alaska are getting two slices of extra money of about U.S. $25 million each. A number of different funds are involved. This, however, is a joint fund, which will be jointly managed by three Canadians and three Americans. Expenditures will be managed by a joint Canadian and American panel.
Senator Cook: Thank you for that. I just needed to get that endowment fund into perspective.
Senator Stewart: Am I correct in thinking that the 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty is indeed a treaty and, therefore, a part of the law of the land in the United States and prevailing in Oregon, Washington and Alaska? You have now made this new agreement. Will this agreement have all the legal consequences that it would have had if it were part of the 1985 treaty?
Mr. Anderson: Yes, sir. To the best of my knowledge, that is so. It is an annex to the treaty and, therefore, it has the full power of that treaty annex.
Senator Stewart: Reference was made in testimony and, indeed, on page 8 of the slides, to "fish killed not caught." Again, reference was made to total fishing mortality. What percentage of the fish that disappear, the total mortality, are fish that were killed but not caught?
Mr. Anderson: That will vary. I will ask Mr. Chamut to give examples. The problem with the conservation measure that prevents you from fishing coho or whatever other fish it may be is that in the type of fishery that we are facing on the West Coast, you have incidental catch and mixed stocks. If a fish cannot be fished, the fishers will throw it overboard. It never comes to shore and it is never recorded. There may be quite a substantial number of such fish. That is why we often make the difficult choice of letting them come to shore and sell the fish so that at least we will know how many they are killing. But when you say waste the fish completely by throwing it over the side, you lose your statistics on what may be a very large number of fish being killed. The numbers will vary according to the various fisheries, of which Mr. Chamut can give you examples.
Mr. Chamut: Senator, the best example I can give is the Alaskan troll fishery for chinook salmon. In the conduct of that fishery, the Alaskans normally would fish for between 10 to 12 days to catch their entitlement of chinook.
During that period they will obviously catch and retain chinook salmon until they meet their quota. Then they will continue fishing for other species, and while they are doing that, they will also hook some chinook salmon, which would have to be thrown back. Many of those fish would survive. They would be hooked, they would be released and they would not be harmed. But about 30 per cent of the ones that are hooked and released would actually die. Thus, there would be a high mortality rate of other chinook stocks associated with what we called the CNR, the chinook non-retention, fisheries.
We have agreed that we are going to count all of those fish against a total mortality limit. It is another example of what we think is a much more responsive and modernized approach to dealing with chinook conservation. In the past, when you just focus on catch, you lose a lot of fish to other types of mortality. This provides some restrictions and some incentives for people to reduce the total number of fish killed because, at the end of the day, that determines how many come back to the streams and how many come back to Canada for a catch.
Senator Stewart: Who is going to make sure that you get correct statistics from these boats and who is going to make sure that there is not high-grading?
Mr. Anderson: That will depend on the enforcement agencies of each jurisdiction. The high-grading can be a problem, but with a certain amount of self-discipline within the fleet, which we think will occur as people recognize the importance to everyone of this, we believe that we will fairly quickly discover those who are cheating because their catches will be anomalous. They will not be like the other fishers of the fleet.
Senator Stewart: Reference has been made to the declining value of salmon in the market. Could you explain?
Mr. Anderson: In 1988, the price of fish was at a peak. The price was three times higher in dollar terms than the price last year. You put your finger on one of the least mentioned and most important issues of our West Coast fishery. We have had this very big increase in aquaculture. The result has been a decline in price as the volume of fish on the market has increased. Also, there are issues with respect to quality, among others. Nevertheless, the price has gone down. This is perhaps the most important single reason why we have had such bitter competition and animosity between the various fleets. The number of fish they are catching has not improved -- in fact it has gone down -- and the price has dropped to one-third of what it was three years before. Their expenses have gone up. The number of boats have been reduced but not by enough to take into account their decline in income.
Fishers are a generous group. When they can afford to be generous they are generous and they share. But when they are wondering about the mortgage, when they know they have not met the expenses of their boat, they become just like the rest of us, defensive about their positions. This has been one of the reasons we have had such animosity on the coast in the last few years. The price of fish has gone down. The money that goes into the pockets of the fishers, the ability to give their children what they need, has declined. This is no different from the problem of declining income on the East Coast.
Senator Robertson: Tell us a bit more about the social impact of the reduced prices, of the reduced catch in many areas on these coastal communities. We see some of this in news reports, but we hear much more about the East Coast. How comparable is it, or is it comparable?
Mr. Anderson: Senator, there is no doubt that declining price, declining catches and a reduced number of people have altered some of the social structures of the community. While the income may be shared with fewer people, if you do not have a certain number of kids, you do not have a high school. You do not have this; you do not have that. It has had a social impact.
The difference between the East Coast and the West Coast is that in large parts of the East Coast, fishing is literally all there is. On the coastal communities of British Columbia, generally, forestry is twice as important as the fishery. Many of the same people are in both industries. The exceptions are the aboriginal communities on the West Coast, where fishing is far more likely to be the only major industry in that community.
There are parallels, but there are distinctions. It really shows the importance of taking a more holistic approach to the coastal community, of not simply referring only to fishery. Given the price of fish, fisheries cannot rescue the communities. If we work with the province, if we work with the forest industry, if we try to introduce new industry or some new economic activity, we can do more for the community than simply saying, "It used to be that the fisheries were the king. Why can you not make it that way again?" We cannot do that because of the price.
Senator Robertson: Mr. Chamut mentioned the hook and release of the chinook and the fact that 30 per cent die. What is the death rate related to hook and release in the sport fishery?
Mr. Anderson: It is approximately 10 to 12 per cent. But in what is called "motor mooching," which is a very slow troll with a strip of herring or a cut plug of herring where you cut the head off on a bias and the herring rotates very slowly, you could have a higher mortality rate because the fish then tends to swallow the entire bait rather than take it in its mouth. You might have a 20, 22 or 23 per cent mortality rate. But that is a matter of hot debate and people pick the figures that suit their particular position. All I can really say is that it varies anywhere from about 10 per cent up. By changing the type of lure you use, you can alter the mortality rate of released fish.
Senator Robertson: I have had interesting discussions with my friends down East who hook and release salmon, and I have always wondered about the mortality rate.
Mr. Anderson: It depends on the fisher. If a fisher wants to play with the fish, exhaust a fish, the lactic acid build-up will be such that there will be a much higher mortality rate.
When I fish steelhead, which I have not done for a very long time unfortunately, I use a very light leader. Once the fish has taken the fly, quite generally I will break off before the fish comes to shore so I do not release it. The hooks are just regular steel and not stainless steel, and they will rust out in a very short time. The thing to do is not to get the fish exhausted. Fish that are caught commercially by a fleet, which may pull the fish through the water a lot longer before the fish comes aboard and is released, have a higher mortality rate than fish caught by sports fishers, who, generally speaking, use lighter tackle and who are quicker to bring the fish in and release it. The fun is in fooling the fish, not in bringing it to the boat.
Senator Robertson: Thank you. I have better ammunition for my salmon fishers in hook and release.
Mr. Anderson: Senator, you have to do it yourself. You need personal experience.
The Chairman: I learned a new term this morning, "motor mooching." I thought we did that as teenagers but now I am learning that adults also do it.
I should like to thank the minister for again taking time out of his busy schedule to brief us on this very important agreement that has just been reached.
The document entitled "Technical Overview: Pacific Salmon Treaty: The Negotiated Agreement" presented by Pat Chamut this morning will be filed as an exhibit with the clerk of the committee. Would members be agreeable?
Some Hon. Senators: Agreed.
The Chairman: I should like to thank Mr. Chamut, who made special arrangements and changed his schedule so that he could appear before us this morning.
There will be no more meetings before the summer recess. I should like to say goodbye to one of our members who will be leaving over the summer months. Minister, you were not here at the previous meeting when we presented Sister Peggy with a little fish to remember the committee by. Sister Peggy is going to be leaving us, so this will be her last meeting. You might wish to have her as a negotiator in future negotiations. She might bring divine inspiration.
Mr. Anderson: It has been a pleasure to have Sister Peggy on the committee during my three recent appearances and previous to that. I did mention that Lloyd Cutler, the chief American coordinator, was 81 and I did make a reference to the rather arbitrary nature of the rule that insists that Canadian senators retire at 75. I am sure that Sister Peggy could have given us many more years had it not been for that rather foolish rule. Thank you, senator, for your work.
The Chairman: Senator Butts, we will miss you in the committee. Do you have any passing comments before we go?
Senator Butts: Keep up the good work.
The committee adjourned.