Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources
Issue 4 - Evidence
OTTAWA, Thursday, February 24, 2000
The Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources met this day at 8:45 a.m. to examine issues relating to energy, the environment and natural resources generally in Canada (nuclear reactors safety).
Senator Mira Spivak (Chairman) in the Chair.
[English]
The Chairman: This morning we have with us members of the AECB. Welcome.
Please proceed. I would ask you to keep your presentation short in order that we may ask questions.
Mr. Jim Harvie, Director General, Directorate of Reactor Regulation, Atomic Energy Control Board: Thank you for inviting the Atomic Energy Control Board to appear before you. As the Director General of Reactor Regulation, I appreciate this opportunity to brief you and to respond to your questions on nuclear reactor safety issues.
The Atomic Energy Control Board is an independent federal agency that reports to Parliament through the Minister of Natural Resources. Our role is to regulate the nuclear industry in Canada in such a manner that the development and the use of nuclear energy do not pose an unreasonable risk to health, safety, the environment, and national security. To achieve this mandate, the Atomic Energy Control Board administers a comprehensive regulatory and licensing system that covers all aspects of the use of nuclear material, from the mining of uranium, milling of ores, and the multiple uses of radioisotopes, to nuclear reactors, facility decommissioning, and waste management.
In partnership with Transport Canada, we regulate the transportation of nuclear material in Canada. We also have responsibility for the implementation of certain international obligations relating to the safeguarding and non-proliferation of nuclear materials. In many cases, we have a joint regulatory process, to see that the concerns and responsibilities of federal and provincial government departments in such areas as health, the environment, transport, and labour are taken into account in our regulatory process.
The federal government has primary responsibility for nuclear matters in Canada. Therefore, the AECB has regulatory control over the safe operation of nuclear facilities. However, the AECB has no role in establishing energy or economic policy. Indeed, it is important to emphasize that the AECB is neither pro nor anti with respect to the use of nuclear energy. Policy decisions are the responsibility of other arms of government, both at the federal and provincial levels. However, when decisions to use nuclear energy or nuclear materials have been taken, it is the role of the AECB to ensure that usage is consistent with protection of health, safety, security, and the environment.
The Atomic Energy Control Board was established in 1946 under the authority of the Atomic Energy Control Act. This act was passed at a time when the primary focus of government was nuclear security and, for some time, has been seen as needing updating.
As I am sure you know, Parliament passed, in 1997, the Nuclear Safety and Control Act to provide Canadians with a more modern and effective regulatory framework for the nuclear industry. Under this act, the AECB will become the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, a name that will better reflect our mandate and/or modern role. Among other things, the act enables the commission to require financial guarantees to cover decommissioning and waste disposal as a condition of receiving a licence. This is an important change. The new act is expected to come into force in the middle of this year, after the necessary regulations are finalized.
For the benefit of newer members of the committee, I would like to briefly outline the distribution of power reactors in Canada. There are 22 Canadian power reactors licensed by the Atomic Energy Control Board. Twenty of these reactors are in Ontario and are operated by Ontario Power Generation Incorporated. These include: four at Bruce "A" and four at Bruce "B", on Lake Huron near Kincardine, Ontario; four at Pickering "A" and four at Pickering "B"; and four at Darlington on Lake Ontario. Hydro-Québec operates a single unit stationed at Gentilly near Trois- Rivières, and New Brunswick Power operates a similar facility at Point Lepreau near Saint John on the Bay of Fundy.
As a result of an internal review conducted in 1997, Ontario Hydro, as Ontario Power Generation was called before April 1999, decided to shut down its four Bruce "A" and four Pickering "A" reactors. This was done around the end of 1997 in order to concentrate its staff on improvement activities at the 12 remaining operating stations under Ontario Hydro's integrated improvement program.
There are currently seven operating research reactors in Canadian universities: three in Ontario, two in Québec, and one each in Nova Scotia and Alberta. There is also an operating research reactor at the Saskatchewan Research Council in Saskatoon. Atomic Energy of Canada Limited -- AECL, not to be confused with the AECB -- has research facilities at Chalk River, Ontario and Pinawa, Manitoba that are also licensed by the AECB. The Chalk River facilities include the NRU reactor, which has been operated since 1957 and is expected to shut down by the end of 2005. The MDS Nordion Medical Isotope Reactor (MMIR) project, also located at Chalk River, consists of two MAPLE reactors and a new radioisotopes processing facility. It is being built and will be operated by AECL but owned by MDS Nordion. Its purpose is to produce radioisotopes for medical use.
One MAPLE reactor started up for the first time on February 19, 2000. It is expected to be in service, supplying medical isotopes, within a few months. The second reactor should follow later this year.
Under Canadian law, the operator of any nuclear facility must be in possession of a current licence issued by the Atomic Energy Control Board. The facility must be operated in compliance with the Atomic Energy Control Act and the regulations under that act, and with the conditions of the operating licence. The essential nature of the licensing regime is described in the Nuclear Safety and Control Act, which specifically states, and I quote:
No licence may be issued, renewed, amended or replaced unless, in the opinion the commission, the applicant:
(a) is qualified to carry on the activity that the licence will authorize the licensee to carry on; and
(b) will, in carrying on the activity, make adequate provision for the protection of the environment, the health and safety of persons and the maintenance of national security and measures required to implement international obligations to which Canada has agreed.
Unlike many nuclear regulatory agencies in the world, the AECB does not issue lifetime operating licences. For power reactors, licences are generally issued for a two-year period. Granting of these licences is done by our five-member board, after public hearings. Members of the board are appointed by the Governor-in-Council. Before the end of each licence period, the licensee must apply for a licence renewal and be subject to a formal public review of past performance and future programs. In addition to making detailed licensing recommendations to the board, our staff present a mid-term report on each licensee's performance and an annual report of their overall assessment of the safety state of the industry. All of these reports are public.
The AECB sets stringent safety standards for the design and operation of nuclear facilities, both during normal operations and under possible accident conditions. Plant owners must demonstrate, through a range of safety analyses, that the safety equipment is capable of preventing a release of radioactive materials in excess of specified limits.
We have a staff of some 420 people, of whom approximately half are involved in the inspection and licensing of reactors. We maintain permanent offices at the five power reactor locations. A total of 31 professional inspectors, experienced in reactor safety, are distributed throughout these sites. These inspectors are supported by technical and other experts from our head office in Ottawa. For smaller reactors, a separate group of inspectors is based in Ottawa and they travel regularly to the sites to carry out inspections.
We enforce our safety requirements in a variety of ways. First, our site inspectors play a major role in dealing with licensing issues and they are responsible for carrying out various types of routine inspections of reactor operation and maintenance. The staff are supported by specialist staff in Ottawa, who have the expertise to review in detail all aspects of reactor safety, such as reactor physics, instrumentation and control, as well as human factors.
In addition to these routine inspections by our on-site staff, we conduct a variety of detailed inspections and evaluations using our Ottawa staff. These include appraisals of radiation protection, security, emergency preparedness, as well as quality assurance audits. We also conduct evaluations of training programs and we set both written and simulator-based examinations of key operations staff to verify the competence of the people who are responsible for operating the reactors. Furthermore, we study events that occurred at nuclear facilities, both in Canada and elsewhere, to look for lessons that could improve the safety of the reactors.
The Atomic Energy Control Board participates in a variety of international activities, primarily through the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna and the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD in Paris, in order to learn from our colleagues in other countries and to ensure that our standards of safety are consistent with international standards. Our president, Dr. Agnes J. Bishop, was the first person to sign, on behalf of Canada, the international Convention on Nuclear Safety. The Canadian team played a major role last April at the first meeting of the parties of this important convention.
Current safety issues are addressed in some detail in our publicly available licensing reports. I do not propose to discuss these individually. I will say that the Atomic Energy Control Board is on record as being not fully satisfied with the present standard of operation and maintenance at Canadian power reactors. While we remain satisfied that the provisions for public safety, security, and the environment are sufficient to allow operations in the short term, we are determined that the Canadian safety philosophy of "defence-in-depth" not be eroded. Our five-member board is monitoring the improvement programs at both Ontario Power and New Brunswick Power, as well as requiring regular progress reports from both of these licensees on their improvements.
With respect to potential safety issues, I would like to discuss three areas of concern, not only to the Atomic Energy Control Board but to many other national regulators, that are being discussed in increasing depth at international meetings of nuclear regulators. The first one is deregulation of the marketing sector of electrical power.
The main concern of regulators in Canada and elsewhere is that the increased competition created by deregulation has the potential to lead to decreased resources for safety-related issues in nuclear power plant operations, or that the need to meet power supply commitments could lead to less conservative safety-related decisions by the operators. In other words, we are concerned that the drive to remain fiscally competitive in a deregulated market will overshadow some of the fundamental needs for safety in nuclear installations.
Canada, as well as other countries, has witnessed a decrease in resources available for research to support continued safe operation of nuclear facilities. Another trend that has been noted is the decreasing attention paid by operators to appropriate planning and, therefore, fiscal commitment to issues of importance to safety in the intermediate or long term. It is not sufficient for nuclear plant management to concentrate only on immediate safety issues.
Partially related to market deregulation, but also related to the privatization of public utilities, is the increasing change in ownership and operating companies of nuclear facilities. Such changes almost always lead to changes in management processes or culture changes within the facilities. Ownership and operation changes do not necessarily lead to decreased safety performances; they also have the potential to lead to improved safety performances, but these changes must be well managed.
In Canada, with the potential privatization of facilities in Ontario, we may also be seeing changes in ownership. I should make it clear that a licence cannot be transferred by one operating company to another, but rather a new application for a licence must be made to the Atomic Energy Control Board. This application must follow our board procedures and be completely open to intervention by interested stakeholders.
Let me now turn to issues of management. Regulators do not manage nuclear facilities; however, over the past decade it has become increasingly clear that organizational infrastructure, human factors, and management processes can and do play a key role in safety performance. I believe it has been well demonstrated that absence of good practice in these areas has played a major role in these facilities experiencing incidents, accidents, and deteriorating safety performance; therefore, regulators cannot ignore these factors in the assessment of nuclear facilities.
Over the past few years, the board has been developing a predictable, transparent, and fair means to assess whether organizational and management processes and structures are capable of maintaining safe operation in order that this information can be used to support both the licensing process and compliance monitoring. The assessment methodology has already been tested at a Canadian nuclear power station and used within a regulatory framework at Atomic Energy of Canada Limited's Chalk River lab and at the Darlington nuclear generating station.
Finally, I should like to speak very briefly about the challenge of succession planning, which is of importance to both the industry and its regulators. As a regulator, we must ensure that we continue to have a knowledgeable workforce with the required technical expertise and experience to fulfil our mandate. This will not be easy to do. The nuclear industry, as it relates to nuclear power plants, has an uncertain long-term future in Canada and in most other western countries. This, combined with other factors, has resulted in the industry no longer being the attractive and exciting career choice for young people that it once was. As a consequence, many of our university programs in nuclear engineering have closed and other essential applied science professionals are opting for careers elsewhere.
This challenge is not unique to Canada. At a meeting of the International Nuclear Regulators Association a few weeks ago, attended by our president, Dr. Bishop, it was a topic discussed at some length. The AECB itself is looking at various options to address this challenge, including enhancement of our own training programs, cooperative programs with universities, and international cooperation with other regulators.
The nuclear industry has similar challenges in maintaining the required expertise for safe operations in the future. The practice of increasing contracting out by the licensees may further erode the operator's ability to maintain the level of expertise required for certain operational areas. Just like the regulator, the licensee can delegate activities to others, but it may not delegate its responsibilities. It must remain responsible for the quality of work performed by the contractors. Therefore, the level of expertise required to do so must be maintained. We recognize that many sectors of the industry are taking succession planning seriously and are developing programs to address this issue.
Senator Kenny: Welcome. In your opening remarks you made what is, I think, a reassuring comment to the committee that AECB is neither for nor against the use of nuclear energy. That implies that you have no interest one way or the other as to whether they continue as economic entities.
Mr. Harvie: That is correct.
Senator Kenny: I wish to test that a bit, because on the surface that sounds very positive. Where do the members of the Atomic Energy Control Board come from? Do they come from the industry? Where are they trained? What is their background? What sort of culture makes up the board?
Mr. Harvie: We have staff from a variety of backgrounds. Some have worked in the industry in the past; some have not. Some have come straight from university. Basically, we employ whatever experts we can find with expertise in nuclear safety. However, once people are working for the Atomic Energy Control Board, we try to instil in them that our job is to ensure that if nuclear reactors are built and operated in Canada it is done with due attention to safety, security, and the environment.
Does that answer your question?
Senator Kenny: It is a start, sir. I am giving you every opportunity to elaborate, if you care to. If that is all you have to say, I will go on.
Mr. Harvie: I do not think I have anything to add. We are responsible for ensuring that, if nuclear power is used in this country, it is done safely. We have no role in deciding whether nuclear power is used.
Senator Kenny: I understand your responsibilities. My question had more to do with the culture of the people carrying out those responsibilities. It is of interest to know their background and what biases they might have before they arrive there. The question is a very subjective one. Obviously, it is difficult to answer "yes" or "no". However, our committee is trying to get an assessment of the quality and nature of your board. I am interested in whatever you have to say on the subject.
Mr. Michael Taylor, Deputy Director General, Reactor Regulation, Atomic Energy Control Board: There are a number of aspects to consider, senator. I take the point that you are trying to make.
Senator Kenny: I am not trying to make a point. I am simply asking a question.
Mr. Taylor: For example, if you were to look at the background of my colleagues you would see that we all come from varied backgrounds. We are a multicultural organization in terms of our ethnic background. We have people from all over the world because it is often difficult to recruit people from Canada who have the necessary expertise. However, that gives us a significant mix of cultures, which I think provides a balance in the view that we have. It would be foolish to deny that any individual does not have some sort of bias.
We operate as a team. Our licensing is done by teams, not by individuals. We are clear about our philosophy. That is the best sort of assurance we can provide.
Senator Kenny: Eventually, I will work around to the question of how safe is safe. Before I do that, I would like to ask you about the situation that you raised toward the end of your comments, Mr. Harvie. You commented on not being fully satisfied with certain situations. My question relates to the pressure on you to continue the operation of a facility. I have no doubt that, if you felt that there was imminent danger, you would take action. Having said that, you seem to have indicated to us that there are some areas about which you are a little uncomfortable and where you would like to see a little more action taken in the future.
One of the principles that I believe is part of your philosophy of safety is "defence in depth." You talk about certain redundancies within the system. Could you comment on total redundancy? In other words, in discovering that a plant is not operating satisfactorily, one of the big problems you will face if you shut that plant down is the source of energy to take care of that part of the community. Is that something you take into account? Is it a potential pressure on your organization? For example, if you close reactor "X" or "Y", there may not be sufficient capacity to keep the lights burning in a community.
Mr. Harvie: Yes, it is consideration, obviously. However, if the Atomic Energy Control Board considers that a nuclear reactor is not being operated safely, then we would have no hesitation, despite whatever pressures are on us, to shut the nuclear reactor down. We have on occasion done that.
Senator Kenny: That is the black and white case. Let us move into the grey area.
Mr. Harvie: As I said, the Atomic Energy Control Board is not fully satisfied with the standards of operation and maintenance of the nuclear reactors in this country at this time. We are clearly on record as saying so. Our five-member board has required the operators of many of these reactors to report at six-month intervals what they are doing to improve the standard of operation and maintenance. Clearly, we are not satisfied with the quality of operation at this time.
On the other hand, we do a great deal of evaluation of these stations. We are satisfied, as is our board, that the quality of operation at this time meets acceptable standards for the protection of the safety of the public. Therefore, they are continuing to operate.
We are not satisfied that, in the longer term, the quality of maintenance will be satisfactory. Therefore, we are requiring improvements. At this time, we are satisfied that public safety is not jeopardized by continued operation. Therefore, we are licensing continued operations.
Senator Kenny: Mr. Harvie, you have brought me to how safe is safe faster than I was approaching it. However, it is probably just as well because I am taking up more time than I am entitled.
When you say that you are not fully satisfied but that you feel the situation is adequate to allow things to continue, what is adequate? How do you decide what is adequate?
Mr. Harvie: Over many years, we have established standards of safety in the design and operation of nuclear power stations. We recognize that errors will be made in the operation of nuclear power stations. We do not expect that no one will ever make a mistake. We require that there be safety systems installed in these reactors to prevent accidents that lead to releases to the public. We require that these safety systems be tested regularly to show that they have a high degree of reliability. We require safety analyses to show that if there is an accident in the plant the releases from the plant will be limited. We also require analyses when and if there is an accident and one of the safety systems does not work so that the releases will still be limited to within allowed limits. Generally, we require an analysis of the probabilities for all kinds of failures within the plants. We require that sufficient analysis be done to demonstrate that the plants are tolerant to things going wrong.
What is adequate is a little bit like saying, "How long is a piece of string?" We have professional experts in reactor safety who use their expert judgment as to what is an adequate level of safety. We believe that levels of safety that we require and enforce on the nuclear reactors in this country are very high, especially in comparison with other hazards that people in this country face.
Senator Kenny: Mr. Harvie, in many respects, you are probably the most important person that we will meet in this study.
Mr. Harvie: You flatter me.
Senator Kenny: No, I do not flatter people. I am serious about this. The operators will come to us and they will say, "We are meeting all of the standards. We are meeting all the national standards and international standards and country standards, so we are okay. Someone has set the hurdle at a certain level, and we are getting over the bar; in fact, we are exceeding the bar in most cases." You are the people who are setting the bar. Therefore, we are interested in knowing how you set the bar and how much is enough; how long that piece of string is and how you go about figuring out that the piece of string is strong enough and long enough and good enough.
Perhaps one hearing is not enough to do this, but, frankly, if you are going to be the touchstone for everyone in the industry in Canada, then it behooves us to pay a lot of attention to how you are establishing things, what your values are, and how you determine when enough is enough.
Mr. Harvie: I do not think the operators would come here and say they are satisfied that they are meeting adequate standards of operation and maintenance. It is a matter of public record that, in 1997, Ontario Hydro, as it was then, brought in a group of people from another country to manage their nuclear reactors. If they have to bring in people from another country to manage their reactors, that shows that their chief executive officer was not satisfied with the way the reactors were being managed. I do not think anyone is claiming that the quality of operation and maintenance at nuclear reactors in this country is fully satisfactory.
As to the second part of your question, Senator Kenny, as I said, we have experts who are very knowledgeable in reactor safety. We deal internationally with people who regulate nuclear reactors in other countries. We deal with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Energy Agency in Paris. We are members of the Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities of that agency. We participated very actively in the meeting of the parties of the convention on nuclear safety last April. We therefore have the opportunity to compare what standards we are setting with the standards that are being set internationally by experts in other countries and by international organizations.
Based on the expertise of our own staff, looking at what other countries do, and participating in international activities, we believe we are setting standards that are stringent and that protect the safety of the Canadian public.
Senator Cochrane: I have a few specific questions to ask you in regard to some of the happenings over the past few years. I understand that, last month, the Atomic Energy Control Board and Health Canada announced a new national surveillance program that will look for higher rates of cancer among people who live near nuclear power plants and research facilities, such as Pickering and Chalk River. I think this is very positive. It is important to inquire into health impacts; otherwise, their existence may go unnoticed. I have several questions about this program.
Our committee has heard that Canada has been producing nuclear energy for 50 years, which means that people in some communities have been exposed for a very long time. What kind of monitoring has been done until now? How is the new program going to differ from what has been done in the past? When do you expect to see some results? Finally, what exactly prompted you to do this?
Mr. Harvie: Before asking my colleague Mr. Utting to address that question, I would first like to say that, over the many years that we have regulated these reactors, we have regulated them to very stringent standards, such that any releases of radioactive material by them are very small in comparison to the natural background radiation that we are all exposed to. In fact, they are small within the variation of that natural background radiation. Therefore, we would not expect to see any difference in the health of people living in the vicinity of nuclear reactors from that of the rest of the population. Nevertheless, we are doing this study just to confirm that that is, in fact, the case.
Mr. Rod Utting, Head, Radiation and Environmental Protection Division, Atomic Energy Control Board: As Mr. Harvie has said, there have been studies in the past. One of the difficulties with these types of studies is that it is almost impossible to prove a negative. In other words, it is impossible to prove that there are no effects <#0107> either health effects or any other kinds of effects. All we can do is prove that the probability is extremely low. Studies in the past have not shown that there has been any health impact on the population surrounding nuclear facilities. Nevertheless, further studies are being done; as you mentioned, a new study is being commenced shortly to look at even a greater sample of the population.
Senator Cochrane: Let us go back to Chalk River. The AECB has charged AECL for allegedly exposing workers last May to radiation while they were cleaning vents in a building that had been empty since 1957. In 1952, as I understand it, Chalk River was the site of the first nuclear accident in history. The reactor core was destroyed, fuel melted, and there was a series of explosions. Former president Jimmy Carter, at the time a U.S. Navy engineer -- I am sure you remember that story -- was part of the cleanup crew. In 1958, there was another serious accident. It was a fuel rods fire. We saw the rods yesterday. More than 600 people were involved in that cleanup.
I have been reading some horror stories in the papers, and they are horror stories. I know it is very hard, as you said, for you to determine whether this is as a result of what happened, but what medical follow-up was done on the 1,000 or so men who cleaned up Chalk River? I know it has been a long time, but someone has to monitor these people. They cannot just go on and be neglected, with no one looking after them. They volunteered to do this work; they were good citizens. Do we know whether there was any unusual cancer rate after those accidents?
I have been reading that some of the AECL reports stress that very few of the men involved in the cleanup operations were overexposed to radiation levels allowed at that time. But regulations change. Monitoring has to be done. Are the radiation levels applicable then the same today? Can you tell me whether the permissible levels for radiation have declined since the 1950s? Would we let cleanup crews today go in and be exposed to the same levels of radiation?
Mr. Harvie: The accident at NRX in 1952 was unquestionably one of Canada's learning experiences in nuclear power. Many of today's safety requirements are derived from the lessons we learned in those days. The accident at NRU in 1958 was less serious but, again, we learned lessons from that.
With respect to whatever doses the people involved in the clean up received, I will have to look for help from some of my colleagues. I do not think there were any serious overexposures, but I will ask Ms Maloney to help me.
Ms Cait Maloney, Director, External Relations and Documents Division, Atomic Energy Control Board: We did not come here with details of that study. However, we certainly are prepared to have a look at some of those.
A 1980s study to look at the health of AECL workers and ex-workers showed that those people were actually healthier than the random population. That is something that one must consider. You must look at the healthy worker syndrome.
However, I will get that study and make it available to you.
With respect to your point about regulatory limits, you are correct. At that stage, the limits were not as stringent as they are now. They have been tightened several times since that time. Our new act and regulations will tighten them even more.
Senator Cochrane: Has there been any follow up on these people?
Ms Maloney: A study was done in the 1980s. I do not believe we are aware of anything else. We will check and get bank to you on that.
Senator Cochrane: I would like you to check whether there is anything even up to this point in time.
Ms Maloney: Yes; we will do that.
Senator Kelleher: Mr. Harvie, I wish to refer you to page 4 of your brief, the first paragraph under "Current and Potential Safety Issues." You state:
While we remain satisfied that the provisions for public safety, security and the environment are sufficient to allow operation in the short term...
What do you mean by "the short term"? Can you put a time frame on that? Is it one, two or three years, or is it six months?
Mr. Harvie: We are currently issuing licensing for all the nuclear power stations in Canada for two-year periods. "Short-term" means up to the next couple of years. Every two years, each licensee is required to come back to our board to justify continued operation of its reactors. We are not satisfied that the quality of operation and maintenance is adequate for the longer term, which would be 5 to 10 years.
Senator Kelleher: I think I know the answer to this, but I want to be absolutely certain. We heard evidence the other day that Canada -- that is, AECL -- has sold plants abroad, particularly in Korea and in Romania. Once these plants move offshore, do you people retain any sort of jurisdiction or authority over these plants?
Mr. Harvie: We have no legal authority to regulate nuclear reactors in other countries, just as people in other countries do not have any legal authority to regulate reactors in Canada. When Canada sells a reactor to another country, however, invariably we are asked for help in training and advising the people who are to regulate it. For example, in Romania and in Korea, we have sent nuclear safety experts from the Atomic Energy Control Board for a period of years to these plants, where they have been commissioned to advise the people who are regulating them. We have no legal authority in other countries but we are invariably asked to help the regulators who have the legal authority to regulate these reactors.
Senator Kelleher: I wanted to check with you on the restarting of Pickering A. As I understand it, AECB has set the scope for an environmental assessment of restarting the four reactors there. You are in the midst of it now I understand. Is that correct?
Mr. Utting: Yes, that is correct.
Senator Kelleher: I wanted to make sure. If my premise is wrong, then the question is of no value. I understand that it is called a screening, not a full environmental assessment with public hearings. Is that correct?
Mr. Utting: It is called a screening, yes.
Senator Kelleher: According to the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, if this assessment goes to the next stage, which is called a comprehensive assessment, then Ontario Power Generation, formerly known as Ontario Hydro, will also have to present the facts on alternatives to restarting the reactors.
Mr. Utting: I am not sure about that part of it.
Ms Maloney: The Environmental Assessment Act has several categories of work that can be done, one of which is the comprehensive study. Those are for a specific list of projects. It is not a case of a screening with them becoming a comprehensive study. You either do a screening or a comprehensive study. The screenings can require almost as much information, but you are correct in that, legally, the one part that differentiates it is that there is no requirement for alternatives.
Senator Kelleher: As I understand it, the Ontario Power Generation Corporation has already done some of the work on studying these alternatives to restarting these reactors. Without destroying confidentiality, if some exists, have you looked at any of the alternatives that they have done and have you made any preliminary assessment as to whether or not there is a need for a start up?
Mr. Harvie: We are not in the business of looking at alternatives to nuclear power reactors. Our job is to ensure that, if nuclear power reactors are operated in this country, they are safe, and to protect health, safety, security and the environment. The question of whether there are alternatives that would be better from other points of view, or whatever, is not our business. Our business is to ensure that if they are operated they are operated safely.
Senator Kelleher: If, under the act, Ontario Power Generation Incorporated must present alternatives -- that is, assuming it proceeds to that next step -- obviously someone has to look at those alternatives. Who would that be?
Mr. Harvie: Someone has to do so, but it is not the Atomic Energy Control Board.
Ms Maloney: These requirements are under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, which is administered by the Minister of Environment. Those decisions would be made by that department. However, because of the way this thing has been set up, considerations of alternatives will actually not be put on the table because it is going as a screening.
The Chairman: Would you please explain how the act works? If you had allowed for a comprehensive assessment, it would automatically have resulted in the canvassing of alternatives. However, the AECB did not allow that; am I correct?
Ms Maloney: No. With all due respect, the comprehensive study list is a very prescribed list. If you were to go through it, you would see that there are certain triggers that are on there. The renewal or the restart of Pickering is not something that is on that list. If we had said to the licensee, "You are expected to perform a comprehensive study," they could have challenged us on a legal basis because that is not the way the law is set up.
The Chairman: It would be helpful to us, since this is an important issue, if you could provide us with a written document on the subject of the requirements in the act. What you have said is not my information.
Ms Maloney: I shall do so.
Senator Wilson: My first question is to Mr. Ferch. With respect to decommissioning and waste management, is there money in place for that yet? In Dr. Bishop's speech, which was circulated to us, she noted that that would be established at appropriate intervals.
Is there a dedicated fund, or will it be like the last time, where then Ontario Hydro was just paper transfer and there was no money?
Mr. Richard Ferch, Director, Wastes and Decommissioning Division, Atomic Energy Control Board: At the present time, under the current act, we do not have the legislative authority to require licensees to set aside such a fund. We will have that authority under the new act.
At present, I am not able to speak to the situation in regard to exactly how Ontario Power has set up its funding for future decommissioning, other than to note that it is owned by the Government of Ontario. My understanding is that, as a corporation, it is still backed by the Government of Ontario.
Under the new act, we will be requiring decommissioning plans with cost estimates, followed by some form of financial assurance arrangement, which may be a segregated fund or in other forms, which we will require to be sufficient to cover the entire cost. At this time, I do not have that data. I cannot speak with certainty.
Senator Wilson: When the new legislation is passed, would you be available if we called you back to probe that?
Mr. Ferch: Yes.
Senator Wilson: My second question concerns the involvement of the public. I am pleased that the AECB has opened up some opportunities for public access to the commission meetings. Is there any intervenor funding, to provide for concerned members of the public to travel to your meetings?
Mr. Harvie: We have for several years had public participation at our board meetings. The board meetings are fully open to the public and intervenors. At present, there is no funding of that sort.
Senator Wilson: Do you have any plans to make it possible for people to get there? It is one thing to say that your board meetings are open; but if a one cannot get there, what is the point?
Mr. Harvie: We hold board meetings in the vicinity of the facilities we are licensing. Our board regularly holds meetings in Ottawa. When the board is making decisions with respect to the licensing of the Bruce facility, for instance, the board will try to have one of the meetings within a few miles of the Bruce plant so that members of the public might attend these meetings.
Senator Wilson: Do you have any plans to look at any intervenor funding?
Mr. Harvie: Our current regulations do not provide for that. The draft regulations under the new legislation do not provide for intervenor funding.
Senator Wilson: The answer is "no".
Senator Kenny raised the question of how safe is safe. You said that the standards for safety performance indicators would be understandable to the public, which I think is very important. With which public have you tested those standards, to find out if they understand them?
Mr. Harvie: We have done several studies of public views on the Atomic Energy Control Board and what we are doing. I do not have the answer to your question at my fingertips.
Ms Maloney: If I might add, over the last few years we have started using focus groups, to determine whether these subjects are understandable to the public. I cannot speak specifically about this instance, but I would assume that our communications division would be working with the reactor people to do that.
Senator Wilson: I ask this question because it is very important that the public know what is happening. I was encouraged when you said that it would be understandable. I wondered how you are able to make that statement.
Ms Maloney: The type of work we have done is testing with standard groups, who are just people off the street.
Senator Wilson: I met many of you in the preparation for the Seaborn report three years ago. Many participants in that report expressed their concerns about the acceptability of the risk estimates made by the International Commission on Radiological Protection, which some have described a self-perpetuating oligarchy. They have set these standards.
I noticed in Dr. Bishop's presentation that there was quite a variation. Some thought the radiation doses were fine, some thought they were too low, and so on. I know there is a time lag before the AECB incorporates the recommendations into their regulations. Do you have a comment on radiation risks and public perception in regard to the time it takes for AECB to incorporate the recommendations into your regulations, even if they were acceptable, which they are not.
Mr. Utting: I am confused. Members of the public feel that the standards set are too low?
Senator Wilson: Many do feel that way in regard to the international body.
Mr. Utting: Our standards are based on the recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection, as you said. We do have confidence in that organization. Almost all countries in the world base their radiation standards on recommendations of the ICRP. We have no reason to believe that those recommendations are anything but the best.
Senator Wilson: I raise this issue because many members of the public disagree with you on that subject.
What is the time lag in incorporating those standards into your regulations? There seemed to be a big time lag before you caught up with what was done five years ago.
Mr. Utting: We have drafted and proposed new regulations based on ICRP recommendations, regulations that we hope and anticipate will be in effect later this year.
Senator Wilson: When was that? Their regulations cover the last five years, or what?
Mr. Utting: Are you inquiring about ICRP's recommendations?
Senator Wilson: Yes, I am.
Mr. Utting: The current recommendations upon which these new regulations are based were published in or around 1992.
Senator Wilson: That is quite a time lag.
Senator Taylor: I have a number of questions. Stop me when I run out of time.
On page 3 of your brief, it reads:
Unlike many nuclear regulatory agencies world-wide, the AECB does not issue lifetime operating licences. For power reactors, licenses are generally issued for a two year period. Granting of these licences is done by the five-member Board itself, after public hearings.
I should like to know if those hearings are on safety and safety only? Do they take in pricing or pricing of alternatives, for instance? I gather from your answers that these hearings would be conducted on safety only.
Mr. Harvie: That is correct. Our board considers the re-licensing of a reactor at two meetings over a three-month period. The board considers the input from our staff and any members of the public or interest groups who wish to make representations. Our board is responsible for making sure that if nuclear reactors operate, they are operated safely. It is not our business to look at whether nuclear power is better or worse than alternatives.
Senator Taylor: Did anyone in the public, when they go after you for your safety arguments, argue that one large coal plant or natural gas plant would be better than two nuclear plants?
Mr. Harvie: I cannot recall any occasion where arguments like that have been made to our board.
Senator Taylor: Strictly safety.
Mr. Harvie: We look at whether reactors are safe. Decisions about the appropriateness of nuclear power are not part of the mandate of the Atomic Energy Control Board.
Senator Taylor: The last paragraph on page 5 of your brief reads:
Over the past few years, the Board has been developing a predictable, transparent and fair means to assess whether organizational and management processes and structures are capable of maintaining safe operation, so that this information can be used to support both the licensing process and compliance monitoring.
Compliance monitoring is very interesting because, in general, nuclear accidents have never happened in the construction process; rather, nuclear accidents relate more to the operation side.
What does this mean? Are you in an ivory tower, or do you actually put on a hard hat and tour the plant, without telling anyone, to determine whether compliance is taking place?
Mr. Taylor: Yes, we do put on hard hats and walk around the plant unexpectedly. At any rate, our people are at the stations full-time. As Mr. Harvie pointed out, we have 31 people distributed throughout the power stations. It is their job to be at those stations.
The question of management has been a challenge for regulators around the world. Traditionally, regulators focused on design and what the operators were doing. However, it is very clear, if you look at Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, whatever, that the impact of management policy has a very serious and significant impact on safety.
It has been difficult to regulate how a facility is managed. The U.S. NRC has had various attempts in the past, but they have definitely withdrawn from this idea because it is not for a regulator to say how to manage or what sort of organization should be in place.
In Canada, we have developed a model of what are said to be the ideal characteristics of effective management of a complex machine such as a nuclear power reactor. Characteristics such as clarity of objectives and whether management understands the issues are examples.
We have developed a methodology for measuring those things reasonably impartially, and we have been employing that methodology. We have found that it does give useful indications for our board of how well the station is actually managed and how well communication, for example, occurs between the senior management and the people who are doing the job.
We are out in the field finding out about that sort of thing.
Senator Taylor: Standards of construction, standards of operation and standards of operators were referenced. Standards of construction and standards of operation are fairly easy to lay out, but standards of operators are not. That is where accidents occur.
Allow me to draw an analogy with the automobile industry. It is not the nuts and bolts that hold a car together that causes accidents; it is the nuts behind the wheel that cause accidents. In reading back through your report, you say there is a shortage of training. We saw pictures yesterday of people pulling levers and flicking switches. Do they know what they are doing? What about things as simple as drug and alcohol tests? What is your role with respect to the operators inside the plant?
Mr. Harvie: The answer is very clear. We do evaluate the training programs of the people who are going to operate the plant to ensure that they have good training programs. The key people, who are the shift supervisors and the control room operators, are required to sit examinations. They undergo both written examinations and examinations on a simulator to demonstrate that they are competent to operate the plants. The Atomic Energy Control Board sets and manages those examinations. Therefore, there is no question that we take this area very seriously. We have a whole division dedicated to evaluating the training and qualifications of the people who operate the plan.
With respect to drug and alcohol testing, we do not in this country, as do some other countries, have random testing for drugs and alcohol. We do require that the management of the plant have processes in place to assist supervisors in their awareness of whether their employees are showing problems. However, we do not have random drug and alcohol testing.
Senator Taylor: Are there standards such as for those who are in charge of airliners? They are subject to random tests on any sort of abuse. Could you borrow that from the airline industry? Someone operating a nuclear plant is potentially more dangerous than someone sitting at the wheel of an aircraft.
Mr. Taylor: We have looked at this very seriously. Our major licensees, particularly Ontario Hydro, have also looked at it very seriously. They would like to introduce random drug and alcohol tests. However, their legal advice, and our legal advice, is that it will not fly in Canada.
Therefore, we have had to do our best. We have, as Mr. Harvie has said, required that our licensees do put in place the best surveillance arrangements that they can within the law.
Senator Taylor: I will move to another area entirely. We put this committee together because we felt that not only did we have a responsibility because we are a large-scale manufacturer of atomic energy creators, but also because atomic energy is being used increasingly around the world. When there is a nuclear accident, it is not just a neighbourhood that is affected; something is put into the air that could affect generations to come, not only across close borders but across continents as well. Hence, we will be looking at international control. You mentioned the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) in Vienna.
Are we making any progress in Canada or are we taking a leadership role in trying to put together an international standard with respect to raising the level of inspection? It bothered me to hear you say that you have no more influence on another country than another country has here. We put this committee study together to try to get around that problem. Free enterprise in the manufacturing power is one thing; free enterprise in safety regulations is quite another.
Is there anything in the United Nations that would give the IAEA teeth? We do that militarily, in that we fly people into areas and create peace zones. Is anyone looking at atomic power in order to put it under an international regulatory system that would be up to the standards that you are saying we have in Canada?
Mr. Harvie: We participate very actively in activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency in developing international standards for the safety of nuclear power stations. Canada was also the leader in developing the international Convention on Nuclear Safety. My predecessor chaired the organization that developed that convention. The first meeting of the parties was held last April. At that meeting, each country that signed the convention was required to produce a report stating what it is doing to ensure that nuclear reactors are safe at the national level. These reports are scrutinized by peers in other countries. People are given the opportunity to ask questions to other countries about what they are doing to address the safety of nuclear reactors. Therefore, there is a very good process internationally for scrutinizing and reporting on what safety standards are being enforced in each country.
Most countries do not want to have an international authority to regulate the nuclear industry. Thus, the Convention on Nuclear Safety is such that it requires a country to tell other countries what it is doing about safety, requires it to answer questions about nuclear safety. However, there is not an international regulatory authority. There are inspection organizations. The International Atomic Energy Agency has systems to inspect the operations of a nuclear facility at the request of countries. An organization called the World Association of Nuclear Operators carries out the inspections of nuclear plants at the request of various countries. Thus, there are international mechanisms in place to look at the safety of nuclear reactors.
Senator Taylor: Do you feel that cross-pollination is working well enough?
Mr. Harvie: Yes.
Senator Taylor: Would you except Russia or India from that? Are Russian and Indian plants up to that standard?
Mr. Harvie: Both Russia and India are members of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Russia has signed and ratified the Convention on Nuclear Safety; India, as of last April, had not.
Senator Taylor: I have a question related to the use of spent fuels versus the use of original fuels. There is quite a debate now on this issue. Does this fall under the safety committee's jurisdiction?
The Chairman: MOX fuel.
Ms Maloney: Reprocessing.
Senator Taylor: Yes. Is that a safety issue in your opinion, or is the fuel an economic, social, or military issue?
Mr. Harvie: It is a condition of every operating licence that the design of the fuel be approved by the Atomic Energy Control Board. Until now, no one has made an application to use any fuel other than natural uranium fuel in CANDU reactors. No one has applied to use reprocessed fuel.
Senator Taylor: I would ask the same question about the waste disposal. Does that come under your jurisdiction?
Mr. Harvie: Yes, it does. Dr. Ferch is the director of our wastes and decommissioning division. He can address any questions you have about waste.
Senator Taylor: I saw the waste report yesterday, and I am happy with it. However, it seems to be something that is focussed on by the opponents of atomic energy. They seem to be quite spooked by it.
Is our method of handling waste any better than elsewhere in the world, or is it worse? Could improvements be made?
Mr. Ferch: We would not consider MOX fuel to be waste. The production of it does produce waste as a by-product, but that is done outside this country. I believe the proposal at this time, as I understand it, involves production of the mixed oxide fuel outside this country. In terms of our waste-management capabilities, I believe our capabilities are comparable to those elsewhere.
I do not know if you were raising the possibility of transboundary shipments of waste, but the convention on waste safety does not permit the transboundary shipment of waste; waste will be returned to the country of origin. Thus, to the best of my knowledge, Canada is not proposing to accept someone else's waste nor to send its waste to someone else. Each country deals with its own waste. We are dealing with that in ways that are comparable to those in other countries.
Senator Christensen: Safety, of course, is your job. You have expressed concerns on long-term issues. You feel that short term is okay.
You do look at long-term needs and the use of nuclear power long term. You do projections about what those needs might be, so that you can meet those in developing the expertise. Is that a correct assumption about what you would be doing, as well as existing monitoring of plants?
Mr. Harvie: Yes. We look at the long-term needs for the safety of these plants.
Senator Christensen: The public certainly does not embrace nuclear power as its favourite source of energy, but that is just because there is not a huge demand at this time for a lot more power. Could that in fact turn around, with global warming, reduced water levels, hydro being less accessible or unable to meet demands, volatility of fossil fuels, the pollution problems related to those things, costs? Given that, and the fact that solar and wind power cannot meet those needs, suddenly it could become necessary for nuclear power to meet the ever increasing demand for power.
At the same time, we know that you and others have said that young people are not going into this field. As such, we do not have a body of expertise being developed to meet perhaps these needs. Have you addressed that issue? What are your thoughts related to that?
Mr. Harvie: Whether more nuclear power is built in this country is not the business of the Atomic Energy Control Board. We are here to ensure that, if there is more nuclear power, it is designed and operated safely.
I addressed your question about young people not having the expertise in my opening remarks. We recognize that there is a problem in maintaining sufficient expertise, both in the industry and in the regulator, in nuclear safety, power design and operation. We are trying to address that as best we can. We recognize that it is a challenge to maintain the expertise to do our job well.
Senator Christensen: In your recommendations to government, will you be addressing these issues and highlighting possible concerns you might have with respect to safe operation in the long term?
Mr. Harvie: I believe that our annual report to Parliament last year addressed that specific issue. We are working with universities and others to try to develop the training, to try to attract people to our business.
Senator Christensen: Do you have confidence that that will be effective?
Mr. Harvie: I am an optimist. Yes, I am reasonably confident.
Senator Cochrane: As you said, in your address and in your response to Senator Christensen, nuclear power plants have an uncertain long-term future in Canada. We saw yesterday some of the positive things that are being, such as medical advances and so on. What do you think the alternatives are, if the nuclear power plant has an uncertain long-term future?
Mr. Harvie: I can tell you my personal opinions, but they do not really matter here. From the point of view of the Atomic Energy Control Board, the future of nuclear power or what alternatives to nuclear power are used in the future are not part of our business.
Senator Cochrane: Do you report your findings and recommendations to government only once a year?
Mr. Harvie: We make a formal annual report to government once a year. We submit various other reports to Treasury Board and other government departments.
Every time we renew a licence for a reactor, our staff makes a report to our board, and those reports are fully public. Each board meeting has a three-ring binder full of documents, which are all fully public. Our business is very open to the public and to the government, as much as the government is interested.
Senator Cochrane: Are you satisfied with the government's responses to your recommendations, to your about safety hazards and so on? Are you satisfied that things are being done?
Mr. Harvie: We do not make recommendations to government about the safety of nuclear power plants. Our board reviews the safety of nuclear power plants and decides whether to issue a licence for continued operation.
As my colleague has pointed out, if you have questions about the future of power supplies in this country, they should be addressed Natural Resources Canada, not the Atomic Energy Control Board. They will be able to answer those questions.
The Chairman: I want to thank you for clarifying one particular issue that I found rather difficult with the testimony of the AECL, and that is the issue of whether safety also includes operational issues. They were reluctant to agree with that. The AECL wanted to separate out the technical operation of the reactor from the operating maintenance and job control. You have done a good job on that. AECL also said that the CANDU reactor had never had a serious accident, which seems to me to fly in the face of the facts. In your publications, you talk about generic action items. Also, from what I understand, there are at least 14 known design flaws in the CANDU reactor. You may wish to comment on that briefly.
I do want to get into what is a very pressing issue to a lot of the public, which is the environmental assessment at Pickering.
We have already settled the issue of the operation as being part of safety, which, I think, is only common sense.
Mr. Harvie: There is no question that operational safety is extremely important to the safety of nuclear reactors. We are fully aware of that.
I would not agree that the 14 generic action items are design flaws. They are issues where further work has to be done to confirm that certain aspects of safety are satisfactory.
The Chairman: Very good.
Mr. Harvie: What was the question on environmental assessment?
The Chairman: Perhaps you could submit to us some written material respecting your responses to the Ontario legislature study, in which they were rather critical of some of your functions, let us say, or the way in which you exercised them. If we could get some written material on that, that would be very good.
Pickering is the oldest commercial nuclear reactor in Canada. It is situated in a heavily urbanized area.
You are probably much more familiar with the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act than I am because it has been a few years since I have dealt with it. If there is no legal requirement for a comprehensive assessment, if is not on the list, then it certainly should be. If you were looking at risk factors, you would agree that Pickering was shut down for a reason.
I understand that, under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, if there is a warranted level of public concern, the responsible authority forwards a request to the Minister of Environment for referral of the assessment to a panel for review. That is not being done. You are not having a full panel review, but rather a screening. How do you track the level of concern? What precise factors did you use to decide whether the level of public concern warrants a panel review or not?
Mr. Harvie: I should clarify that the Pickering "A" reactors were not shut down because they were unsafe. They were shut down because Ontario Hydro, as it was then, saw the need to move the resources from Pickering "A" and Bruce "A" to the other reactors in order to achieve an improved performance of other reactors.
The Chairman: Would you agree, considering your standards, that they were fully adequate? Could you make that statement?
Mr. Harvie: We have made the statement that the standards of operation need to be improved for all reactors.
The Chairman: We will not argue about that. I will take your word for it. We are now looking at the restart and the assessment.
Perhaps I should relay to you all the factors that concern me or that have been made known to us so that you can fully respond. There is some criticism about the scoping document and the timing of the assessment. Already, Ontario Power Generation has 600 people dedicated to the start-up, is training scores of new operators, and will have 85 per cent of the re-engineering work completed. The assessment is happening in a reversed fashion. Why is that happening?
Also, why are you content with a screening-level assessment? What do you say to critics who believe the scoping is too narrow in its geographic limitations and the type of accident assessment not wide-ranging enough, including many of the deficiencies and problems identified at the time of shut-down, such as the lack of a second fast shut-down system? There is a general range of concerns.
Mr. Harvie: I will ask one of my colleagues to address the environmental assessment and the range of that assessment. If Ontario Power Generation chooses to spend money on resources related to the re-start of Pickering "A", that is their business, not ours. They do not yet have a licence from the Atomic Energy Control Board to restart Pickering "A". They cannot legally restart the reactor until the Atomic Energy Control Board issues a licence. We will not do that until we are satisfied that it is safe.
The Chairman: Are they the responsible authority, or are you?
Mr. Harvie: We are the regulator.
The Chairman: I refer to the terms of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act.
Mr. Harvie: We will come to the Environmental Assessment Act in a moment.
I want to address your concern about the second fast-acting shut-down system. Pickering "A" was built before there was a requirement for two fully independent fast-acting shut-down systems. In 1993, the Atomic Energy Control Board put a condition in the Pickering "A" licence that required an enhanced shut-down system, not two fully independent shut-down systems. Completion was required by the end of 1997. That was not completed by that time, thus the Pickering "A" reactors were shut down. They will not be permitted to restart unless there is an enhanced shut-down capability. We have agreed on the meaning of that, and Ontario Power Generation is fully aware that they will not get a licence to restart unless that enhanced shut-down capability is put in place.
Ms Maloney: We are aware that the Atomic Energy Control Board has sent the proposed scope of the study out for public comments. That is in addition to the requirements of the CEAA. We wished to seek public comment on that. We have not finalized the reaction to that as yet. I understand that a presentation will be made to the Pickering town council within the next week or so on that issue.
The Chairman: That is not the same as a full panel review with public hearings as under the CEAA.
Ms Maloney: That is right. We are moving on in the process. The scoping will be done; then there will be an environmental screening done, for which we are the responsible authority.
I will attempt to clarify the difference between a screening and a study. The names are somewhat unfortunate, in that it sounds as if a comprehensive study requires a lot more of the proponent than a screening does. In fact, if you look at what we require or have required for many screenings, it is virtually the same amount of work; only the title is different. However, as Senator Kelleher indicated earlier, the one part that is not required is the evaluation of alternatives. That is the main difference.
In terms of our decision in respect of public concern and whether we would recommend to the Minister of Environment that a panel be proposed, you are right, we could do that. We have made no decision in that area yet because the process is ongoing.
The Chairman: Are you saying there may indeed be a full public panel?
Ms Maloney: I am saying that the process has not been finished.
The Chairman: In your opinion, and given the level of public concern, the geographic location, and the fact that this is the oldest reactor in Canada, do you think it would be wise to have not only a full panel hearing but also a tracking system under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act? Thus, the responsible authority would be enabled or permitted to look at alternatives. That is the method used for the most serious kinds of decisions under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, which is quite progressive and enlightened in its look, despite its deficiencies. That is what was anticipated.
Ms Maloney: I would prefer not to anticipate our decision on this particular project. Your arguments are ones that have been presented to us. We will evaluate those along with the other ones that have come forward.
The Chairman: Thank you. We will, perhaps, get back to that question.
Mr. Harvie, I have one short question regarding your presentation. On page 6, it reads:
Like the regulator, the licensee can delegate activities to others but it may not delegate its responsibilities.
I do not quite understand that. What do you delegate to whom? Are you including provincial operators in that statement?
Mr. Harvie: I will ask Mr. Taylor to answer that question.
Mr. Taylor: In respect of the regulator's delegation, we generally are talking about provincial delegation to provincial responsibilities. A case in point is our responsibility for the integrity of pressure boundaries in these plants.
Provincial authorities generally do pressure boundary control. A recent Supreme Court decision led us to find out that, despite the fact that it is done by the province for nuclear facilities, it remains a federal responsibility. Thus, we are responsible but they do it.
We are taking steps to incorporate their regulations under federal law, and the provincial authorities still carry it out, primarily in Ontario. However, we are still responsible to be satisfied that what they do is adequate. We may delegate this responsibility for carrying out this function to another expert group, but ultimately we still hold the responsibility to see that it is done properly.
The Chairman: Is this because of industry complaints of duplication and overlap?
Mr. Taylor: No.
The Chairman: It has nothing to do with the harmonization?
Mr. Taylor: We are trying to avoid overlap, and this is a way of doing it. It is a particular highly specialized area where we do not have either the resources or the expertise. These people carry out this activity everywhere -- it is not only nuclear pressure vessels; they look at central heating boilers, or whatever it is. They have a lot of expertise in carrying that out. We delegate that.
Licensees are also -- and increasingly as we get into a competitive situation -- are looking for expertise outside their own resources because sometimes they consider it uneconomic to carry the expertise when they do not need it all the time. Therefore, internationally we are seeing an increase in the use of contractors. When there is a problem, a contractor is hired to come in and resolve the problem.
The challenge with that is maintaining responsibility. We require that our licensees maintain sufficient competence in order that they can tell whether or not their contractor is doing a proper job. We are very clear that, regardless of whether or not they contract out, they retain responsibility for whatever actions are taken.
The Chairman: There are a few areas we were not able to cover. One was the response to the legislative report; the other was Chalk River and the use of enriched uranium fuel.
We intend to visit the facilities. It was very kind of you all to attend before the committee. I would hope that, once we have seen these facilities, if we ask you to come back you would come back.
Mr. Harvie: It is been a pleasure. We would be very pleased to return if we can be of any further help to you.
The Chairman: Thank you.
The committee adjourned.