Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources

Issue 8 - Evidence

The Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources met this day at 6:10 p.m. to examine issues relating to energy, the environment and natural resources generally in Canada (Nuclear Reactor Safety).

Senator Mira Spivak (Chairman) in the Chair.

[English]

The Chairman: Ladies and gentlemen, I apologize for the delay, but we must adhere to the rules of the Senate.

We have before us witnesses from the Nuclear Awareness Project. Please proceed.

Ms Irene Kock, Executive Director, Nuclear Awareness Project: Honourable senators, thank you for this opportunity to appear before your committee. I represent the Nuclear Awareness Project. Our local chapter, Durham Nuclear Awareness, is a citizens' organization based in Durham region. Our group was formed shortly after the Chernobyl accident which occurred 14 years ago last week. Our mandate is to conduct research and promote public education on nuclear issues as well as on energy alternatives and energy policy matters.

On the broader issue of energy policy, a document was recently released which I co-wrote called "Canada's Green Energy Future." It deals with a synopsis of energy options for a sustainable energy policy. Another recently released document comes from the David Suzuki Foundation. It is called "Power Shift." It addresses climate change in the context of energy choices and the phase-out of fossil and nuclear fuels to deal with climate change issues and transportation policy.

We are concerned about the notion that climate change requires a return to heavier reliance on nuclear energy. We believe that nuclear power is part of the problem and not part of the solution to climate issues, partly because, in the short term, it is more expensive than more viable alternatives such as conservation measures.

Unreliability is also an issue. It is inappropriate, in our view, to replace one pollutant with another by allowing carcinogenic emissions from routine operations, especially considering the accident risks. There are ethical and environmental concerns around waste disposal, exports, and risk of proliferation. We are confident that nuclear and fossil fuels can be phased out with due consideration for security of the workers and for the host communities. These are important issues that we must address.

At your informal session in Pickering, we pointed out that past promises to undertake a national energy policy review have never come through. I urge this committee to reiterate the recommendation that there be a broad energy policy review.

I will speak specifically now to concerns about the Atomic Energy Control Board as the regulator of the industry. There are three cases where we see urgent need for reforms.

The Atomic Energy Control Board is about to operate under a new act and new regulations. Under the new Canadian Nuclear Safety Act, the board will now be referred to as a "commission." One flaw in the new regulations is the lack of a requirement for financial guarantees to pay for future liabilities such as waste disposal and decommissioning. Although there is a provision in the new act to allow the commission to require financial guarantees, it is not a mandatory requirement. Financial guarantees will be discretionary.

That is a serious flaw in the new rules. Taxpayers may potentially face multi-billion-dollar bills if the costs are not covered by the industry. One part of our package relates directly to this particular section of the new act.

There are other concerns with the new act but that issue has the largest potential impact on Canadians in terms of the bills we may face in future.

I would urge you to further review the environmental assessment on the Pickering A restart. I will leave with the clerk the correspondence I mentioned at your session in Pickering and in the course of our earlier submission to the AECB.

The environmental assessment is being conducted at the screening level. We have made a formal request that the Minister of the Environment refer this matter to a panel review. There are important reasons for that. One relates to the process itself and how it has been handled by the AECB so far. Another reason is the narrow scope selected for this review. One of the most glaring problems related to the scope is that Ontario Power Generation, OPG, the utility which hopes to restart Pickering A, will not be required to undertake a review of a serious accident scenario involving contamination in the surrounding areas. Our comments on scope contain more detail. We requested a review of the potential results of a severe accident, not only as it would relate to human health and the environmental impacts, but also the economic impacts. That type of review was clearly ruled out.

We heard from the Atomic Energy Control Board at a Pickering council meeting on March 20. The AECB representative clearly stated that OPG would not be required to look at any accident involving a loss of containment at the facility.

In our view, that is an indefensible situation. This is the oldest commercial station in the country. It has an acknowledged problem with its safety system. The upgrade being done is not up to the standard required in new nuclear facilities. There are outstanding concerns around fire protection upgrades and seismic upgrades at that station. If any station should be required to have a thorough and proper accident-risk review, it should be the Pickering A station.

We have raised some process concerns such as the rather severe problems with the administration of the public registry for the assessment, and the undertaking of private meetings between the responsible authority, the AECB, and Ontario Power Generation to negotiate the scope of the environmental assessment. Despite our written request to be allowed, minimally, to observe any sessions where the assessment was being discussed, we are still not satisfied with the correspondence received from the AECB on this.

We have concluded that the AECB is not managing the environmental assessment properly at this stage. We feel the independent panel review route is essential to get credible assessment results.

My final point involves a previous decision made by the AECB regarding one particular safety issue at Pickering A, that is, the question of upgrading the fast shutdown system. I will leave with you our 1994 report entitled "The Nuclear Hazard Report" which outlines in one section our concerns arising from 1992 when the AECB decided to allow an upgrade of the safety system. Of the four options that were put forward, the AECB approved the least costly option.

You will be interested to know that, by the end of 1997, that particular upgrade had not been completed. That was part of the reason for the closure of the Pickering A station at the end of December, 1997. They had not met the deadline for that upgrade.

The concerns we have around the choice to allow the least costly of these four upgrade options relate to some of the current safety upgrades being considered and reviewed at this stage. There is no public access to the debate and the negotiations around what kind of upgrades will be done, the costs of the various options, and whether there are, in fact, safety trade-offs being made to save money on the whole restart budget. I do not raise this issue lightly. We saw direct evidence of this in the case of fire safety upgrades in the 1997 integrated independent performance assessment documents released by Ontario Hydro at that time. There was a clear indication that the consultants hired to review safety and operative issues at the plant felt that the fire safety upgrades issue should not get out of hand and that the debate should be controlled so that the upgrades would not be overly costly, as had happened in the United States. They should work hard to convince the regulators that they should be allowed to make minimal upgrades in order to save money. We are very concerned that these issues are not part of the scope of the environmental assessment. There is no forum to review and discuss those kinds of trade-offs.

Finally, in the hazard report we raise the same concerns we raised previously about some of the other facilities in Ontario, including the other nuclear stations and the Chalk River nuclear labs. I understand you are also looking into some of the safety issues there. We have documented concerns up to the end of 1992; and we do have more current information. One of our main sources of information is the Atomic Energy Control Board staff reports themselves, as well as the nuclear industry and utility documentation, much of which, in the case of this report, was obtained through access to information and freedom of information legislation.

In conclusion, I urge you to consider recommending serious reforms in how the AECB operates to improve the regulation of the industry and to improve accountability.

Senator Christensen: What are your thoughts on the long-term storage of nuclear fuel waste on site?

Ms Kock: We are concerned about the proposal to bury nuclear fuel waste in the Canadian Shield, and we were involved in hearings in that regard. With the existing dry storage system, for example at Pickering, if the documentation is to be believed, the canisters are expected to last several decades. Therefore, it is quite likely that we do not need to rush into a decision about burial because those wastes are secure on site, are under guard, and are monitored. In our view, an important aspect of waste management is that we have the ability to monitor it and replace the containers if one leaks.

Senator Christensen: Are you presently comfortable with the system we have in place for the short term?

Ms Kock: As a short-term issue, that part of the waste stream is under control.

Senator Christensen: It was announced in January that a health study was to be conducted to monitor the incidence of cancer in the general area. Is your group involved in that in any way?

Ms Kock: I assume you are referring to the Atomic Energy Control Board cancer surveillance program. We corresponded with the AECB and asked to be involved in the consideration of the study design. We were hoping there would be some public involvement in the design of the program prior to launching. However, it is not clear to me that there will be a public involvement component in this.

We see this as an important development, but it is in fact not sufficient to address some of the concerns which have been raised in other studies, such as the leukaemia study, where it is quite clear that we need a detailed case-controlled study to examine actual cases and determine whether there is a cause and effect. The AECB will be using existing hospitalization records to simply track cancer incidence rates. That is an important step, but it is a comprehensive approach to the whole program that should be undertaken.

Senator Christensen: You feel it is not comprehensive enough.

Ms Kock: It does not look at the underlying cause and effect.

Senator Wilson: You tell us that this is not comprehensive enough, so I gather you would be in favour of a review of the national energy policy of Canada. We asked five different ministers of energy to consider the Seaborn Report. Promises were made, but nothing was forthcoming. Do you think we may see that kind of a national energy policy review in Canada at some future date? Would you be in favour of that?

Ms Kock: We would definitely be in favour of that kind of national energy policy review. We view it as essential. When the nuclear fuel waste review was launched in the late 1980s, our organization insisted that the ministers of the day conduct this energy policy review as a parallel process. That was never done.

I believe it is essential, particularly now that we are starting to make choices about the future of fossil and nuclear industries. We now understand that choices are to be made in the context of climate change issues and energy policy. We do not have policies to address this issue in a holistic manner.

Senator Wilson: Are you working with any other parties to get that done?

Ms Kock: In the context of climate change, the federal authority must take a more comprehensive approach in considering energy options. Many organizations in the energy sector are continuing to push for the kind of policy review that would pull the various issues into one package so that we can start making appropriate choices, for example, on how public money should be spent in the energy sector.

Senator Wilson: The Town of Pickering commissioned an independent review of the screening report but, so far, the Town of Pickering council has not acted on the study recommendation by pushing for an independent panel review. Do you know why they have not yet responded? Are they likely to respond?

Ms Kock: My impression is that the Town of Pickering councillors decided to ask their peer review team to consider the screening report to determine if any of the outstanding issues that were not in the scope were actually addressed in any way by OPG. I understand it was released yesterday. Once that peer review team has looked at the screening report -- and that may take a month or so -- there may be a revisitation of that by the Town of Pickering council.

Unfortunately, there is a very short 60-day comment on that screening report which places tremendous pressures on our group and the municipalities that chose to be involved with it. It is inadequate.

Senator Cochrane: Do you have any major safety related concerns about Pickering B? Are your concerns restricted to the restart of Pickering A?

Ms Kock: Pickering A and B are closely linked. They actually share some safety systems from all eight reactors, including the containment system. Some of the concerns around Pickering A apply to the whole site -- that is, all eight reactors as a whole. We have safety concerns about Pickering B. A recent Atomic Energy Control Board staff report -- they call it their "midterm" report -- looked at the first year of a two-year licence for that station and assessed how things went. In the midterm report, we see that many of the issues raised in the licensing hearing are yet unresolved. I am referring to issues such as backlogs in maintenance. At the last licensing hearing one year ago, we had suggested that, perhaps, Pickering B be closed until they caught up on that maintenance backlog. We saw no action on that by the AECB -- not even a licence condition that things be sorted out in that part of the operation. The problems there continue to exist.

Senator Finnerty: Are you still concerned about the fast shutdown system?

Ms Kock: I will give you some background concerning the trade-off that was made around the decision of how to upgrade. Pickering A was the first commercial station to be built. It was built with a single fast shutdown and it has another feature, a moderator dump, which you probably heard about during your tour. The moderator dump takes up to 10 seconds to begin to have the effect required for safety, whereas the fast shutdown system is required to operate within the order of two seconds. After Chernobyl, the Atomic Energy Control Board decided that Pickering A should be retrofitted. They went to the utility and asked them to outline the options. Four options were put forward, and one was approved. The option they selected does not give us full, independent, double-fast shutdown. It is just not up to the standard of the other plants that have been built since then. It is still a major concern.

In 1992, we went on the record on this issue with the AECB. That is an example of the kind of back-and-forth negotiations that occur between the AECB and the utilities where a problem is identified and they are given an indefinite amount of time to come to some kind of solution. It involves back-and-forth negotiations. The industry and the regulator argue that that is the best and most effective way to operate, but we feel that the AECB should be laying down the law and providing deadlines for things to be fixed and not allowing a back-and-forth exchange wherein they are told, "We will get our experts to review it for one year and get back to you." The AECB then hires consultants to review what the OPG experts have produced.

There is the generic, action items list which deals with the whole range of serious safety problems that apply to most CANDUs, where both the negotiations and the back-and-forth exchange continues. The resolution could happen quickly. It could happen after all the stations have been closed. It would be a moot point then.

Senator Adams: Since Pickering was built have safety standards improved? What further safety measures would you like to see taken? The Pickering operation seems to be successful. It has been operating for 30 years and safety measures have been increased during that time.

Ms Kock: There has been a learning curve in terms of design issues and operations. As problems arise and accidents are analyzed, changes are made in operations to compensate or prevent that kind of accident from happening. However, we also see reports which demonstrate that lessons are not being learned in terms of both operations and station design. As new stations were built, designs were altered and improved. However, it is not clear that the changes were appropriate. Each station has a set of safety issues that are specific to its design because of the design changes that were made along the way.

I would tend to agree that lessons have been learned, and that is an improvement in safety, but there is no foolproof situation. Unanticipated problems will continue to arise.

Senator Adams: I am concerned about the risks that may arise during long-term operation of these facilities. I recognize that, in the long term, nuclear power is cleaner than burning coal or natural gas, but how much damage would be caused if there were an accident in that size of power plant?

Ms Kock: There is a trade-off in the choice between fossil fuel or nuclear powered facilities. We believe that question should be considered in a different framework. We must also consider the trade-off between fossil fuel and nuclear power on the one hand, and non-renewable resources and a range of alternatives in the renewable sector and conservation on the other. Those energy choices are to be made. In that regard, the energy policy must be considered.

Accident risks are defined in a couple of different ways. One of the reports I am giving you has a chart in it which describes what is called the "International Nuclear Events Scale," which rates the severity of nuclear accidents. What we see in the review for the Pickering station is related to an accident that would fall midway on the scale. We specifically asked that a worst-case accident, which is described as one having widespread health and environmental effects, be reviewed. That is not on the table.

In the case of either the Pickering or Darlington stations, it is clear that a severe accident has the potential to affect not only the GTA but also our neighbours across the lake and, perhaps, a large part of southern Ontario in a way that would be quite likely unacceptable. By "unacceptable consequences" we mean the long-term relocation of the population to a new areas and economic disruption beyond what could be anticipated. That is the worst-case scenario. It is a low-probability event or accident but the consequences are so high that when you multiply probability times consequences, it still comes out high-risk.

The Chairman: When Mr. Andognini was here, I asked him about the difference between the retrofitting that is being done at Pickering A and the latest CANDU technology. He told us that, although Pickering A does not have two independent fast shutdown systems, it has the equivalent. He also said that he would send the committee a more detailed technical explanation of what that meant. He either could not answer our question or he needed technical information to answer it. I thought you should know that or, perhaps, you read that in our transcripts of these proceedings.

Have you had an opportunity to consider the technical difference, and what the term "equivalent" means.

Ms Kock: When we looked at this issue as the decision was being made by the board in the early 1990s, it was clear from the AECB staff reports on this topic that this was not equivalent to two separate, fast shutdowns. That was acknowledged in the AECB board member document.

I would refer you to that and to AECB staff for that explanation, because there are important distinctions around what we are getting at Pickering A, in terms of a retrofit, versus what we have at the other stations built since then. My understanding is they are not equivalent.

The Chairman: This is an area where experts do disagree. I have read some literature where they say the light water reactor is far safer than the CANDU reactor, but I have also heard testimony to the effect that the CANDU reactor is much safer. We will have to look into that.

What is your reading of the public feeling about the Pickering situation? Is there a great deal of public anxiety? I understand there may be different views within the Town of Pickering since the station employs so many people.

I also want to ask you a question that arises from our visit to the OPG. Why are they so opposed to a complete panel review? What is the downside for them, if they are so convinced that this is a "fail safe" kind of operation? It seems to me that the credibility and the weight of that position would be enhanced by the full, independent panel review. I did not quite get an answer to that from them.

Now that the screening report has been released, could you lead us through the next steps in order? It appears to me, but I am not certain of this, that for there to be a full panel review, the minister must decide, but does the atomic energy board need to request that? What are the steps and the time frame now that the screening report has been released?

Ms Kock: The public feelings about concerns around Pickering station within the area are difficult to define. There was a poll conducted by an environmental research company, and it was a very limited poll so the results had a huge margin of error, 10 per cent either way, but one thing that was clear from the poll is that, if people had the choice, they would choose to purchase renewable energy supplies, that they are more comfortable with that, and they recognize a risk. OPG conducted a poll on public concerns around Pickering A, but they have not agreed to release the questions and results. You might be able to get more information about their poll from OPG.

In terms of employment and the concerns about the economic impacts on the town, another important document you might wish to review is an economic implications report prepared by OPG. As well, the Town of Pickering had a peer review of that economic assessment. We have not seen the OPG report, it has not been released yet, but the peer review report by the Town of Pickering is available, and a few issues arise from that. The labour force is dispersed quite far and wide from the Pickering and Darlington sites, so we see no particular detriment to the labour force of Pickering. It is dispersed beyond Durham region. You may be interested in looking into that as well.

As for your second question, my impression is that there is opposition by OPG to what is perceived to be a lengthier review because of their interest in restarting the plant as soon as possible. Their schedule has already slipped by more than a year from what they intended when they originally announced the shutdown. I suspect there are a number of factors. The income they hope to generate once the reactor is reopened is one factor. Time is a factor. There is perhaps also a reluctance to have the level of scrutiny that a panel review might offer, in terms of the ability of intervenors such as ourselves to hire independent experts through intervenor funding. That is just my own guess about what might be reluctance on their part to have that level of scrutiny.

In terms of the screening report and where we go now, apparently the 60-day limit on comments that was announced earlier has not been adjusted or lengthened, even though we asked for a minimum of 90 days. It is my impression now that the comments on the screening report are to be sent back to the AECB by the end of June, and at that stage the AECB staff will produce a report for their board, which then goes back out to the public. We will have the opportunity to review the staff report and appear before the AECB with a 10-minute submission to the AECB board itself or what will likely be the commission at that point. That meeting will likely be in August or October. They have two pre-scheduled meetings in that time frame. Then a second meeting will be conducted by the new commission before making a decision, and that could be potentially in November or December of this year.

The Chairman: All this time, of course, the shutdown systems are being installed, or at least practically everything has been ordered.

Ms Kock: It is not clear to me how much work is going on in advance of the approval by the AECB. However, we know that money was allocated to the restart program even as early as a year ago, so some work is proceeding.

The Chairman: The point is that, once that AECB process is through, three things can happen. AECB could say that is fine, and then that would be the end of it, or they could ask the minister for a panel review, or the minister could intervene and suggest a panel review. Is that the process?

Ms Kock: That can happen at any time. We need not wait for the end of that process. We are arguing that the sooner the panel review begins, the sooner it will all be over for everyone, and the sooner they can proceed or not proceed and know where they are going with their business plan.

The Chairman: Just recently, I came across the Pembina Institute of Appropriate Development study on energy policy. Have you seen that?

Ms Kock: Yes.

The Chairman: We appreciate your appearance.

Our next witnesses are representatives of the Power Workers' Union.

Welcome, and please proceed.

Mr. John Murphy, President, Power Workers' Union: Madam Chair, if there are any questions that you do not wish to ask us specifically, we brought with us the representatives from each of the nuclear generating locations.

The Chairman: They are welcome to sit at the table.

Mr. Murphy: The nuclear industry is one of the few in which there is a clear convergence of safety interests between the industry employees and the general public. Whatever we can do to improve worker health and safety will almost certainly improve public safety. This is why we feel it is appropriate in our presentation to approach nuclear safety from a workers' perspective. It is what we know best, and it is where we can add the most value to your deliberations. This is also why believe investments in the future, in improving worker health and safety, must be seen as public health investments, not as corporate expenditures.

I will stop here for a moment to provide some personal comments, as someone who is a resident of Pickering.

I am sure honourable senators have received many different perspectives on the issues you are currently evaluating. I wish to be clear in terms of our motivation in regard to this issue. We all like to have jobs, and certainly as a union representing members who work in the nuclear industry, we obviously have an interest in looking after the interests of those jobs. However, let me be candid. None of us, neither myself, nor my colleagues here or a single member we represent, thinks that their job is so valuable that they would put their own health or safety in jeopardy or the health and safety of co-workers, friends or children.

We live and work in those communities. I wish to be absolutely clear, this is not a new technology, it has been around for decades. The thousands of members who we represent in that industry operate, build, commission and know those plants inside and out. They know the inherent risks and, from a safety perspective, they are absolutely convinced, as we are, that the risks associated with the technology with which they work is being managed in a safe and clear manner. We are not suggesting the maintenance of an industry that is inherently unsafe and which would put us in jeopardy.

We have an active history as a union in terms of improving safety. In any industry, it is clear that there are opportunities for improvement. Over the decades that we have been involved as a union, there is nothing that is more important to us than the health and safety of our members. There is no point having a great wage and benefit plan or a great pension plan if you cannot live to enjoy it in a healthy and productive way.

Health and safety has always been our top priority. Getting out there and trying to continuously monitor and look for ways of improving health and safety in our workplace has been one of our top priorities. I would be happy to share any historical data that senators might find useful.

One of specific areas that we found particularly important in terms of improving health and safety was that having competent and trained workers in any work environment is essential.

I should like to review with you some of the initiatives at OPG in the area of training.

The training required to work at a nuclear facility is extensive and the programs are proceduralized. All procedures are prepared and independently reviewed before they are put into operation. All of the work processes, such as requalification programs, are controlled to ensure the upgrading of skills to meet changing conditions.

We have a stringent and regulated work environment. These are not work environments where someone can simply go in and start working on a piece of equipment. There are strict approval processes and requirements in place to determine who does what work and what training is required and what requalification processes must be gone through.

All workers are required to learn and to demonstrate knowledge of the hazards of radiation exposure as an integral part of employment initiation and subsequent training. Workers are taught to monitor and minimize their own exposure and that of their fellow workers before being allowed on the job or to supervise others. That is unique about the Canadian nuclear experience. For example, in many of the U.S. plants only certain people are trained in radiation protection, but the general workforce is not. Thus, the trained personnel are expected to look after the workers in the plants.

In our situation, the much more progressive approach has been taken of training all personnel and ensuring that everyone understands the hazards in the workplace so that they may make decisions about their own radiological protection as well as that of their co-workers.

It takes between 8 to 12 years of training and experience to become an authorized nuclear operator in charge of running a reactor. In addition to the 8 to 12 years, qualification must be maintained constantly. There is continuous testing throughout the employee's work life to ensure that he or she can maintain the authorization status.

There are typically several reviews underway at any one time that measure performance, procedures and personnel. Our industry is probably one of the most scrutinized of any, and rightfully so. As noted by the Atomic Energy Control Board staff in their appearance before the committee, the regulator carries out audits of training programs and sets examinations of all key operating staff.

In summary, nuclear workers' training programs in Ontario are extensive and proceduralized, and workers' performance is frequently monitored and tested, not only by OPG -- nuclear management -- but by the Atomic Energy Control Board.

Nevertheless, the PWU is always searching in conjunction with the employer for ways to improve our safety training. On the job training is a starting point of nuclear safety.

The next question is: What can individual workers do with their training and experience when potential safety issues arise in the workplace? There are five ways for nuclear station workers to use their training and experience and identify and deal with operational safety concerns.

The first is an obvious one, but worth restating -- direct communication with supervisors. We encourage continuous opportunities for workers to raise concerns through daily discussion and work-planning sessions with supervisors. For example, pre-job briefings are regular events at which supervisors and workers discuss all aspects of the job before it is undertaken. All safety concerns are discussed in detail. As well, beyond these formal discussions, workers are instructed and encouraged to bring any safety concern to their supervisor immediately.

We then have a process called "significant condition reports." Any worker can call up a significant condition report form at their station computer terminal and submit a report of their concerns. SCRs are typically submitted if a concern has not been satisfactorily resolved in a worker's discussion with supervision, but they could be submitted even before such a discussion. The employee has a choice. If the worker does not feel comfortable in raising the concern with the supervisor, they can complete the SCR process.

If the SCRs are not resolved to the worker's satisfaction, the matter will ultimately end up on the agenda of the local joint health and safety committee which is the third level of area that we have in place.

OPGs health and safety structure is the most expansive and inclusive framework to be found in any industry of which I am aware. It includes a joint health and safety committee at each site, and currently we have 48 joint health and safety committees across the whole of OPG. Certainly, at each of the nuclear facilities, we have a joint health and safety committee.

We have a joint health and safety committee forum involving all joint health and safety committees in OPG nuclear. That is where we bring all of the groups together and share issues and discuss how they have dealt with those issues.

We have a joint health and safety advisory committee at the nuclear and corporate levels at OPG. These are tripartite committees consisting of ourselves, the other union at OPG, which is Society of Energy Professionals, and the senior level of management within the company.

Our purpose in those corporate types of committees is to develop joint policies and agreements on health and safety issues, to establish working committees and task groups to address priority issues, and identify, evaluate and make recommendations on existing and emerging key health and safety problems and issues.

In addition, we have had a fairly active history in terms of making sure that workers are really empowered to deal with issues of safety in their workplace. We have contained within our collective agreements the right of employees to refuse to do work that they feel is unsafe. It is a guaranteed right in their collective agreements, and they have refused and have not been afraid to do so. Most such refusals are resolved at the first stage. When someone says, "I really feel that this is unsafe," 99.99 per cent of the issues get resolved right at that level. The supervisor looks at it and says, "Yes, you are right. This is what we need to do to fix the problem."

Failure to resolve the worker's concern at the first stage triggers a formal inspection and complete documentation of the event. We are informed and the whole process is triggered as to why the refusal occurred and what were the issues and actions taken.

In addition to this process, we have in our agreements the right to stop unsafe work. We have had that right since 1991. In fact, I think we were one of the first unions to get that provision into our collective agreement. It provides each of our members of the Joint Health And Safety Committee the right to stop any work taking place that they believe is unsafe. Again, it is a rarely used right but it is, nevertheless, an important one. It empowers the members of the Joint Health And Safety Committee to take any actions required to make sure unsafe work is stopped.

In summary, the Power Workers' Union feels that the essential safety infrastructure is in place and works well. Our training is good. We have the tools we need to deal with concerns and we are using them. We can never be satisfied, however. This is not a process with a beginning, middle and end. It is an ongoing, evolving process.

Improving safety performance is my next topic. Before explaining what we, as a union, are doing to further improve nuclear safety performance, we wish to establish that we do not see this as a goal that is incompatible with improving operational and financial performance. There is often a suggestion that improving safety in a nuclear plant has a cost factor that has a tendency to make that plant less financially viable or less competitive. That is increasingly becoming an issue in Ontario as we prepare for open competition in the electricity market beginning in November of this year.

I wish to share two examples with the senators that dispel the myth that a safe nuclear power plant cannot be a competitive, cost-effective and efficient power plant. The first example is California's Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant. The second is Pennsylvania's PECO nuclear operations.

California's Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant is owned and operated by Pacific Gas & Electric. It has earned the number one rating in safety and performance from the U.S. Institute of Nuclear Power Operations for several consecutive years, up to the present. Recent organizational changes and significant cost reductions have not interrupted this record. INPO gave the plant high marks in operations, engineering, radiation protection, and chemistry. It also noted strengths in the plant's training program, which includes a strong partnership between the line and training organizations on steering committees. That is an example of a success story in which the company is quite successful, from a business perspective, and at the same time has achieved and retained the number one ranking in the U.S.

It is interesting to look at what others are doing to see if there are lessons we can learn from them as well. That is why I raised the second example as well. Pennsylvania's PECO nuclear operations, Limerick and Peach Bottom Generation Stations, set new production records in 1999. Their output has grown by 40 per cent over the last 10 years. Limerick's 1999 capacity factor was 91.6 per cent and Peach Bottom's was 93.5 per cent. Capacity factor increased by one-third during the decade and forced outage rate decreased by nearly 75 per cent. These remarkable numbers were accompanied by an outstanding safety performance; so it is obvious that we do not have to compromise the economic aspect in order to achieve the goal of excellence in safety.

One of the approaches our union has taken, which I think is a healthy one as well, is to figure out how we can work better and more cooperatively together. The preferred approach that the union has historically taken, and continues to take, is to say that we have interests as a union that are different from those of the employer, yet we have many common interests and shared values; certainly, the safety of our plants, workers and communities is a common, shared goal.

Our joint health and safety committee structures have embarked on a process of revitalizing those structures, getting people recharged and refocused on how they can be even more effective in improving safety in those power plants. We are, on May 8 and 9, co-sponsoring with OPG a two-day conference with the joint health and safety committees at OPG. Our hope is to get everyone together to share their perspectives and explain what they feel is working in their locations, share that information with representatives from other locations, and get everyone renewed, refreshed and refocused on the whole objective of improving health and safety.

The PWU independently conducts health and safety training for worker committee members and other health and safety activists. In fact, our union is committing large amounts of funds to train our activists out there and encourage new activists to become trained in the whole area of health and safety.

The third area is a partnership agreement that we recently signed along with the Society of Energy Professionals and Ontario Power Generation management. This was a partnership agreement designed to put in writing principles that would establish the new relationship going forward between the Power Workers' Union, the Society of Energy Professionals and the company.

I wish to share some aspects of that partnership agreement. It is contained in the submission that we made to the Senate members.

As you will note, the first two objectives of this partnership are improved union-management relationships, at all levels, and improved mutual trust and respect. This is common sense, but still it is something that we felt was important to come to a common mindset around and commit to writing.

The next four objectives followed the first two, and they were: productive operations, customer responsiveness, committed and motivated employees, and a skilled and flexible workforce. Again, we believe in terms of the partnership agreement that our future is really linked to the success of the company and that working together to address these issues is the key to that success.

Contained within the agreement is the recognition of the right of employees to participate in decisions that affect their lives -- a fundamental principle, but nonetheless an important one that all three parties agreed to. This is followed by the right of all to be treated with respect and dignity; and the rest are equally compelling in that document. The PWU signed this agreement because it had confidence that all parties felt equally strong about achieving the objectives and wanted to seize the opportunity presented by the restructuring of the electricity industry in Ontario to shape a culture and a new company based on those values.

We would not have signed it unless we had felt empowered to equitably enforce the intent and spirit of the agreement. We mention this partnership agreement because it is the key to achieving our dual objective of high safety and operational performance. In several places, this document stresses the primacy of human values. Personal safety is implicitly the most important of these.

It is natural that people have concerns about the safety of nuclear operations in Ontario, particularly those who live near nuclear sites. These concerns must always be addressed, never dismissed, even if they are repetitively expressed and just as repetitively answered. We feel that way even about the views and conclusions of those with whom we may disagree. The importance of nuclear safety transcends all other considerations.

It is nonetheless a fact that Ontario's nuclear safety record is outstanding. I will use one example. Of the thousands of nuclear workers whom we have represented -- and we have been around as a union for 54 years and around the nuclear industry since its inception in Ontario -- we have not had a single member of our union killed as the result of a nuclear accident. There are not too many industries who can make that kind of claim. No member of the public has ever been harmed during the entire 30 years of Ontario's nuclear operations.

However, even though we have an outstanding safety record for which our members can take a substantial portion of the credit, we in the PWU will not become complacent, because we cannot afford to be. We are not allowed to be. Our training, our control mechanisms and our very culture as a union all ensure that safety is now and always will be our paramount concern. We are on the front lines.

By protecting ourselves, we protect everyone else. That is why we can say without fear of being contradicted that no one cares more about nuclear safety than the PWU. As long as we have the tools to do so, we will promote and enforce the very highest standards of safety in our workplaces. Anything less is unacceptable. We will look to the public, which benefits as well, for its wholehearted support of our efforts to continuously improve nuclear safety.

Senator Kenny: Mr. Murphy, we are pleased to have you with us this evening. We value the testimony that you have given us.

I was particularly impressed with your brief's focus on safety. I understand, as I believe all senators do, that if you are working in a nuclear plant and if your family lives within commuting distance, then you have a greater stake than most people in ensuring that safety takes place. With that in mind, I want to raise with you a couple of issues that appear to relate to safety. The first is the question of a fitness-for-duty program, which, as I understand it, would allow for tests on a regular basis -- perhaps even on a random basis -- of people working in critical parts of the facility to determine whether they are using any substance that might be mind altering. My understanding is that that is not a policy that your union embraces. Is that correct?

Mr. Murphy: The position we have taken on that issue is that there is no one who wants someone who is abusing drugs or alcohol -- in other words, being unfit for work -- in a nuclear power plant. That is something upon which we are all agreed.

Our union is on record as stating that we are in favour of having a process consistent with current legislation. The one area of which we have to be respectful has to do with the privacy rights of individuals. Consistent with current legislation, we are in favour of a process that preserves the privacy rights of individuals and at the same time achieves the objective of satisfying ourselves that people are in fact fit for work.

We are quite confident that there is not a problem in the nuclear plants. Our people are screened during the hiring process and there is regular monitoring of people in the workplace. We have not had any incidents that have been attributed to the abuse of alcohol or drugs.

Having said that, we have a large population. We are on record as stating that we are supportive of some form of test -- one that does not identify individuals -- to find out whether or not there is a problem. If there were a random sampling done within the plants that did not tie in specifically with individuals, then we could analyze that data and determine whether or not there is a problem. If there is a problem, we may need to consider doing something different. That is the position that we have taken up to this point in time.

Mr. Terry Pigeau, Vice President, Power Workers' Union: Madam Chairman, we have had discussions with the AECB about this particular concern. As Mr. Murphy said, we are interested in dealing with the problem, if there is a problem. Thus, we would have to perform random testing to identify whether or not there is a problem and then deal with the issue. The one thing we do not want to do is violate people's rights under the human rights code with relation to drug testing because of some of the Supreme Court rulings. Therefore, we must be careful as to how we do it. We are certainly not against doing it under the proper circumstances.

Senator Finnerty: What are your views with regard to the environmental assessment of the restart plan and how it is handled? Are you satisfied with having the screening rather than an independent review?

Mr. Murphy: First, my colleagues and I are absolutely satisfied with the screening level of environmental assessment into the Pickering A restart. The initiative to lay up the Pickering A reactors was not initiated by a regulator saying, "Look, you are running these plants unsafely and they must be laid up." This was an action that was taken by the company itself, that is, Ontario Hydro. It was taken because they were looking at the overall performance within their plants decreasing. They laid up not only the Pickering reactors but the Bruce reactors and took virtually all the staff associated with them and applied them to their other plants. They then spent billions of dollars to import power from the U.S. to make up for the lost production from those generators. They did all of that voluntarily without someone requiring them to do it because they believed it was the right thing to do to improve the performance of the other reactors. Once we got those up, we could look at restarting the other reactors.

They did not anticipate at the time that the result of that would be a requirement for an environmental assessment hearing. I like the idea of there being no interference or second-guessing of regulators. They are sort of independent bodies. They have people with lots of scientific resources available to them to make informed decisions. Sometimes I like their decisions and sometimes I do not. However, they are independent and at arm's length.

The regulator came back and said, "We think in this instance, because the reactors have been laid up for a lengthy period of time, that an environmental assessment process should take place." OPG agreed that such a process should take place.

The terminology is what gets us into difficulty in this area. I am referring to the terminology around a screening level and full panel. "Screening level" sounds at first pass as being something that is second class to a full panel, or a half-baked kind of thing. However, as I understand it, if you had a Greenfield situation in Pickering and you were considering building a nuclear plant or putting in a mine, then a full panel review would be more comprehensive in terms of looking at the socio-economic impacts in the community and everything else that gets looked at in such an instance. The screening review has more to do with when you already have a mine or a plant, and it is something that the Atomic Energy Control Board suggests.

As I understand it, there is no compromise in terms of quantity or quality of review when it comes to what we are all concerned about: that is, whether this plant is safe to start up. That is the bottom line for the people of Pickering. There is no compromise on the detailed level of review in terms of safety.

On that side of the equation, I am happy that there was an environmental assessment review. I am pleased with the decision of the Atomic Energy Control Board that the screening level was the appropriate level. The plant already exists. Providing intervenor funding and going through a lengthy panel review might be good for intervenors, but it would not necessarily improve the quality of safety.

It was a good initiative for OPG to give money to the community to fund evaluations if they were not happy. Overall, I am quite pleased and happy with the decisions made by the Atomic Energy Control Board. I believe they are right ones.

Senator Finnerty: You do not agree with an independent panel review?

Mr. Murphy: If I thought that the panel review would give us more information on whether the plant was safe to start up, I would be in favour of it. However, I do not think it will do that. In very simple terms, I think that it would add to the length of the review, which would add to the cost of the project, which would make it less economical to bring back. One of the reasons we have been supportive of the government's initiative to create competition in electricity in Ontario is that we want competition in order to bring rates down, because that affects not only us and our jobs, but the economy and competitiveness of Ontario.

I am opposed to anything that increases cost to ratepayers in Ontario, which a panel review would do without adding to quality and safety. I would prefer to spend that money on improving equipment in the plant rather than spending it on intervenor funding that will not improve the quality of the plant.

Senator Kenny: Mr. Murphy, I asked why you are not in favour of a program that would provide for fitness-for-duty tests; in other words, tests to see if members working in critical locations have been using mind-altering substances, those being drugs or alcohol. If I understood the answer correctly, you are in favour of it in a general sense, but you are not in favour of it if it identifies individuals. Have I interpreted your answer correctly?

Mr. Murphy: Almost. To clarify, we are on record as being in favour of a fitness-for-duty program. We want to ensure that employees are fit for work. We are in complete agreement there. The one area of concern that must be considered is the legislation. We cannot simply put a drug testing program in place only to have it challenged next week and find out that we are in violation of the legislation and therefore the program is shut down.

The first step in the process is to be confident that no one in those plants is unfit for work. We want to have a testing program in place to ensure that no one is unfit for work. We are supportive of that.

If you do not link the results with individuals, you do not end up with legal challenges, and everything is fine so long as the tests come back negative. If the results suggest that people in the plants are unfit, then we need to go to the next step, which is to put in place a testing program that would identify individuals without violating the legislation -- in other words, one that would withstand a challenge. However, before going to that second stage, we should not try to fix a problem that does not exist.

Senator Kenny: I should like to spend some time on this area, because I want to be very clear on it. Am I correct that you would be in favour of having everyone tested on a regular basis to find out whether anyone has a drug or alcohol problem and then, if some tests come back positive, you would proceed to the next stage where you would identify those people?

Mr. Murphy: Yes. One step at a time is the approach that we think makes sense. We do not think that it makes sense to go to the thousands of workers in the nuclear plants, with no evidence of a problem, and say that we must embark upon massive, individualized drug testing of everyone. We are suggesting that we take it one step at a time.

We have, with the employer, put in place a fitness-for-duty procedure that does not include testing. However, we are not opposed to testing so long as it does not identify individuals at the moment.

Senator Kenny: Why would you not want to identify someone who is not capable of working? I cannot image you wanting to be at work with someone who is under the influence of drugs or alcohol.

Mr. Murphy: I agree, senator; none of us do. However, there are laws that would have to be changed in order to successfully put such a program in place.

Senator Kenny: What are these laws?

Mr. Murphy: The Ontario Human Rights Code, as an example, says that you cannot discriminate against an individual that has an addiction.

Senator Kenny: I watch the testing of athletes on a regular basis. We all know that athletes are tested on a random basis, including Ontario athletes. I do not see a human rights issue coming up there. I have worked in the oil and gas industry and no one gets onto a rig without being tested. On an oil rig the danger is that a co-worker will be injured. The danger in your type of operation could affect many more than just the workers.

Mr. Pigeau: It is my understanding that, under the Human Rights Code, you can test new hires but not existing employees. We have a fitness-for-duty policy in the nuclear industry through which supervisors are trained to watch out for things that could be considered unfitness for duty. We do have a random drug testing program for our truck drivers who enter into the United States, but that is the only instance of it.

It is my understanding that under the Human Rights Code you can test people before you hire them but not once they are working for you. That would be a violation of their human rights unless you can prove that there is a problem.

Senator Kenny: Why is it okay to test truck drivers going into the United States and not an operator who could cause a meltdown?

Mr. Pigeau: That is because the law in the United States is that drivers entering the country must be tested.

Senator Kenny: Would you be in favour of the law being changed to ensure that you could be tested on a regular basis?

Mr. Pigeau: I understand that there have been a couple of court cases that have disallowed that.

Senator Kenny: As vice president of a union, is this not something that you would push for to ensure the safety of your fellow workers and the families that live next door?

Mr. Murphy: The answer to your question would be absolutely yes, if we do the first stage. I am a firm believer that we need to ensure that we have a problem before we try to fix it. Let us assume that we are trying to ensure that no one in a nuclear power plant is unfit for work, which is a legitimate concern.

To accomplish that, we propose a screening program, a testing program that does not identify the individual but provides results to show that there are no problems. If everyone is okay, then the program can continue and you need not change the legislation to require personal-identity testing. If at some stage in the future, negative results appear, you can do the more complicated task and consider changing the legislation to require personal testing based on rational and logical reasons.

Senator Kenny: Who are you kidding? Are nuclear industry workers the only people in society with no drug or alcohol problems? You know as well as I that a certain percentage of your union members, as in any population, will have these problems. Why do you not want to identify them?

Mr. Murphy: I do, senator, but I am suggesting the two approaches that I think make sense. We do not have control over changing the legislation. If we did not have the restrictions under the legislation, perhaps this would be less of a problem.

Senator Kenny: Would you suggest a change in the legislation to fix the problem?

Mr. Murphy: We want to be sure that we are fixing a problem. That is our only point. Within our power plants, as Mr. Pigeau explained, we have rigorous training of our supervisory staff to monitor signs and symptoms that can be picked up within the workplace. That exists right now.

We have an active employee-family assistance program within the workplace for the union members. If anyone starts to develop a problem that could impact on their work, there is a process whereby these representatives can take them out of the work location and get them the help they need.

It will be much easier to explain to our members that we support a change in the legislation towards individualized testing, if it is being done because our random testing across the organization has shown that some people are unfit for work, requiring us to fix the problem. There will be more of a buy-in and it makes more logical sense to proceed on that basis.

Senator Kenny: What seems to make more logical sense is to have someone independent of the union conducting the tests. There is a great danger that people who are part of the union, who are taking care of their own, may overlook something. It is irresponsible to suggest that the union can handle this as a part of the family.

Mr. Murphy: I would be quite supportive, as I am sure my colleagues would, to have the testers be completely independent from the company and the union. A specialized company can do the testing.

Senator Kenny: My other question involves searching people who are coming in and going out. I understand your union is not in favour of searching. Is that correct?

Mr. Murphy: Certainly, we would be in favour of searching people entering or leaving, if there was a reason or a suspicion, or if it was being done on a random basis, but we do not want institutionalized searches of individuals.

I have been doing this work for many years, representing people's issues. We have about 30 work locations. I have learned that any workforce will eventually act the way they are treated. If you treat people like criminals, then they will likely end up acting like criminals. If you treat people like children, they will act that way. We say it makes more sense to treat people with dignity and respect.

Most people who go to work are respectable, hard-working, decent people. That is how they should be treated. If you treat them like criminals or drug-abusers, you will not create the constructive, positive work environment that you want. There must be a balance between ensuring security and safety in a nuclear plant and being progressive. This is Canada, not some third-world country. We have different standards and ethics for how we treat our citizens. That is our approach as a union.

Senator Kenny: Mr. Murphy, your union works in a very special industry, not in a run-of-the-mill industry. It is a unique industry. You talk about people being treated in a degrading way if they are searched. I am searched every time I get on an airplane. I do not feel degraded or treated as a criminal. I understand that there is a special risk involved if people are taking things onto airplanes that they should not. I do not feel bad about that. I understand the reason for that.

You and your colleagues work in a facility that, frankly, makes some people nervous. It is a vulnerable facility where someone may want to do damage. Why is it such a difficult problem to search people who are taking things in or taking things out?

Mr. Murphy: There are strict security procedures for getting into a nuclear power plant. You cannot simply walk in. You must go through a gate. You must have a pass identifying your car. If not, you are stopped by security and you need approval to get past the gate.

When you get beyond the gate and you get to the plant, there are additional security procedures. You must have a badge. There are monitors. There are rules and procedures for going from point A to point B. All of those security checks and balances are in place and they are quite rigorous in terms of approach.

If security has any reason to be suspicious, they can and they do act. We represent those people. Their job is to take whatever action is required. If they see a suspicious vehicle, it is their job to stop and search that vehicle. We encourage them to do that, to make sure that there is no danger to the plant or to the workers or to the community as a whole. We have a common shared interest in that.

Senator Kenny: So you have no objection to searching people entering or leaving?

Mr. Murphy: I have no objection to searching people entering or leaving a nuclear plant when, in the judgment of the security people, there is a reason to do so.

Senator Cochrane: You seem to have quite a relationship with this company as a union. I have never seen a union to be so warm and compatible with their company. You do not seem to have any problems whatsoever. May I ask first what your own employment background is? How long have you been president of the union? What are your credentials?

Mr. Murphy: I started out my working life back in Ireland. I served as an apprentice electrician starting in 1969. When I finished my apprenticeship, I worked in a shipbuilding yard. I worked in the merchant navy, travelling around for about five years, and that gave me my first exposure to Canada. I fell in love with Vancouver and decided to emigrate there.

When I stopped in Toronto on the way to Vancouver, I was offered a job with a company called Alfa Laval as an electrical technologist in Peterborough. After six months, Ontario Hydro were hiring control technicians in their nuclear branch and I joined them.

About three years after joining OHN as a control technician, I got involved in the union. In 1987, I began working full-time for the union, first as a vice-president representing our members in the fossil, nuclear and construction branch of our union. In 1993, I became president of the union.

In terms of the relationship with the employer, what looks as a pretty cosy, warm relationship I would say is a healthy relationship, but we have been through all of the extremes -- from the very militant, aggressive approach to dealing with the employer right to the relationship that we currently have with the employer. As I said, we have over 30 bargaining units at the moment.

The approach we take is that we can achieve much better objectives of representing our members' interests, whether their interests are health and safety or having an influence on things important to them in their daily work life, by working cooperatively with the employer. You get more success by trying to understand the employer's concerns and addressing them and, at the same time, trying to get them to understand our members' issues, rather than the traditional adversarial tug-of-war that seems to go on too often.

Senator Cochrane: You say the nuclear industry has been around now for 54 years, and there have not been any fatal accidents. Would you tell us about some of the minor accidents or what you would classify as minor accidents? There must be some incidents that one would not approve of or recall favourably.

Mr. Murphy: When I referred to there being no fatalities of our members during that whole period, I meant as a result of a nuclear accident. We certainly have had members killed on the job associated with the conventional side of the industry. An example is power line maintainers and electrocution accidents or falling accidents or automobile accidents.

Senator Cochrane: What about within the nuclear plants?

Mr. Murphy: In the nuclear plants, associated with the radioactive side of the plants, we have never had a fatality on that side.

Senator Cochrane: What about just an accident that is not a fatality?

Mr. Murphy: As in any industry, we do have day-to-day incidents, but, as I said in the presentation, there is such a centralized, controlled, proceduralized approach to how you do work in the nuclear side of the business that it really minimizes the frequency of those events occurring. Even highly skilled tradespeople have to go through a rigid process. This is one of the people challenges that we constantly have: someone who is highly skilled and trained say in the electrical field cannot just go out and use that knowledge to fix a piece of equipment. They must, and for solid, good reasons, follow an itemized, procedural process, step by step, each time to minimize the risk of any kind of accident.

We had one fatality recently at Pickering, which was not somebody from our bargaining unit. It was a security guard supervisor who had made a trip to the police station and was coming back to the plant in his vehicle and heading back toward the Pickering plant.

Senator Cochrane: It had nothing to do with the plant?

Mr. Murphy: No, but it was still regarded as an accident.

Senator Cochrane: How many times would you say work has stopped because of unsafe working conditions?

Mr. Murphy: Over the years, it has stopped many times, but in recent years it has been less and less. Originally, when we were back in the phase of the relationship being very traditional and adversarial, then that sort of adversarial relationship contaminates the whole environment. It is hard to be in an environment where there are traditional, adversarial labour and management relations and not have it pollute the environment. When an environment gets polluted, you find, not in every case but in general, that if a worker goes to the supervisor with a concern, the supervisor, because it is an "us and them" syndrome, will take the position of, "Go away with your concern." When we had more traditional, adversarial, labour-management relations, we tended to have more work refusals, because everything got bumped up a notch before it was addressed.

Today I would say that we have far fewer, and very infrequent, formal types of work refusals. There are hundreds of incidents of members identifying concerns for supervision or for the joint health and safety committee, saying, "Here is the issue, and here is the concern." The general emphasis now is in terms of everyone recognizing that we need to work together; so if concerns are being brought forward, that is a good thing, not a bad thing. It is not a matter of challenging management's authority. We want people on the front lines identifying concerns and telling us when they see problems.

Senator Cochrane: How would you describe the current status of labour and management relations?

Mr. Murphy: As in any organization, it is not perfect. We certainly have opportunities for improvement in terms of our labour-management relations. However, overall, I would say that our relationships are quite healthy in terms of labour-management relations within the plants.

Senator Wilson: You said the right to stop unsafe work is rarely used. Can you tell me the instances in which it was used?

Mr. Murphy: I will refer that to my colleagues for specific examples.

Mr. Peter Falconer, Health and Safety Chair for Sector 1, Chief Steward, Pickering Plant, Power Workers' Union: I need to clarify whether you are talking about the health and safety members' right to shut down or an individual member's right to refuse unsafe work.

Senator Wilson: The latter.

Mr. Falconer: We have had incidents at the facility at Bruce of work refusals. The last work refusal that I can recall would be possibly back some years ago with the carbon 14 issue. That was quite a number of years ago. In the mid-1980s that was one of the big issues.

I do not want to take away from what Mr. Murphy is saying. Workers do have concerns. Workers bring those concerns forward. They do not always have to go to the point of saying, "I am refusing to do that work." I would say there is an opportunity for those workers to discuss the issue with the supervisor and have the issue dealt with immediately. It is seldom that we have to go that far.

Senator Wilson: However, it has happened?

Mr. Falconer:Yes. I would guarantee to the senators that the members have no issue with taking that forward if they believe there is a problem and they are being asked to do unsafe work. They will bring that up and deal with that with management immediately. They also have the reinforcement of our joint health and safety committee members who are trained to address those kinds of concerns, and they would be immediately involved in any formal work refusal process.

Senator Wilson: At what point do labour-management problems threaten to compromise safety, in your experience, or have they done this? If so, how have they done this?

Mr. Murphy: If my colleagues have different viewpoints, I encourage them to jump in. We have never reached that point, I don't believe. As I said, like any organization, we have highs and lows in terms of labour-management relations, but I do not think we have ever reached a point, even on the lows of our labour-management relations, where health and safety was threatened. In any of the practical examples of health and safety issues within the plants, if they are unresolved through workers identifying them to the supervisors or talking with the health and safety representatives, we have a process that is built in for dealing with them. The Ministry of Labour gets called in, and they trigger the investigation and figure out the issue and what needs to be done to resolve the matter.

We are not in an industry where someone has the right to say, "Keep working and keep going down that path and, therefore, compromise safety." A number of safeguards are automatically built in. If someone has concerns, they are brought up and must be dealt with, and ultimately a third party is brought in to resolve those issues, if the parties cannot agree to resolve them themselves.

Senator Wilson: You were asked about a panel review, and your response was that a panel review would not add any new information but would take extra time. How do you know that? I am astonished that you have made the assumption that public input would not add to the level of safety in the form of public review.

Mr. Murphy: The process that the Atomic Energy Control Board set up allows for complete and total public involvement and input, especially community leadership input. That was an important part of our process in terms of supporting the screening level. The Atomic Energy Control Board allowed any groups or members or organizations that wanted to hand in their submissions or offer suggestions or have their concerns addressed before the Pickering A restarts to do so. The process allows that to happen.

Senator Wilson: The question concerned screening and public review. Your answer was that public review would take more time and would not add anything -- at least, to your knowledge.

Mr. Murphy: No, not the public review. Public input is very important in this process. The difference is that the panel review was designed more for green-field starting. That is to say, if you have never had a power plant, the panel review looks at the whole, broader, socio-economic impact on the community as a whole of building a nuclear plant. That begs the question: If you already have a nuclear plant, do you need that level of detail? If so, does it add any level of safety?

Senator Wilson: Your assumption was that it would not.

Mr. Murphy: Right.

Senator Wilson: Why would it not?

Mr. Murphy: The plant was already there. Evaluating whether or not we should have a nuclear plant in Pickering does not add value in terms of safety. The plant is already there. The issue is whether or not the plant is safe to start up.

I am all in favour of spending whatever money it takes and allowing as much opportunity as possible for input, technical analysis and evaluations to ensure a comfort level to start up that plant. However, I am not in support of a review about whether or not we should have a power plant there in the first place, because it is already there. That is the difference between the panel review and the screening level review.

Senator Christensen: You have touched on a number of things that have been touched on for clarification. I thank you for being here and taking the time to answer our questions. We seem to have a quite a few.

To follow up both Senator Finnerty's questions and previous questions on the screening level review as opposed to the public panel, I take it that you are quite comfortable with that, but is there not a great importance there for the public to have a better public level of comfort? Surely it is important to the industry, if it is to survive, to have a public that is not only comfortable with what is going on but also feels that it is part of the process. Is there not great value in that? Whether it is a safety concern or something else for which you do not feel anything would be gained by having a public panel, would there not be great value in having public input because of the confidence that the public would gain from having some input and knowing they were part of the process?

Mr. Murphy: As someone who lives in Pickering, I think I have a fairly good understanding of the community there. The average person in Pickering is not spending time worrying about whether it is a screening level review or a panel level review. In fact, I am not sure they fully understand the difference. They really want to know whether or not the plant is safe to start up. The screening level review, as our legal and technical experts tell us, deals with the full scope of issues associated with that question: Is that plant safe to start up? The panel review would look at that component and add the element that we think is a waste of money and time, namely, should there be a nuclear power plant built in the community or not?

Senator Finnerty: Is the screening review an independent review outside the company?

Mr. Murphy: Yes. More important, the whole process about the screening level review is being driven by the Atomic Energy Control Board, which is the regulator or the watchdog for the nuclear industry in Canada.

If we want to talk about public confidence, it is important that there is a confidence level in supporting the decisions that their board and their staff make with respect to regulating the nuclear industry. The community wants to believe that the body that regulates the nuclear industry -- and, they look at the B plants, the Darlington plants, the Bruce plants and the rest of the nuclear industry -- is competent and capable in its decisions and in what it does.

Senator Christensen: You are saying that the screening review is done independently?

Mr. Murphy: Independent of OPG, yes.

Senator Christensen: Who is doing the screening review?

Mr. Murphy: The Atomic Energy Control Board -- the regulator <#0107> is doing it.

Senator Christensen: Just to touch on the testing for substance abuse, other than the training of the supervisors and workers in the plant to recognize when substance abuse may be a problem, is there any other anonymous testing occurring? You said if that kind of abuse was identified, the next step could be taken. Currently, is there any testing of persons anonymously so that, while you cannot identify them, nevertheless that testing is taking place?

Mr. Murphy: The only case I am aware of is for the drivers we represent, who are going into the U.S. Testing is being done there.

Senator Christensen: It seems that that is not taking place and that we are depending on families and co-workers. I worked as an executive director in a drug and alcohol centre for a number of years dealing with clients, family and co-workers, and I can say that both the denial and the ability of people to mask these things is very real, until they get to the point where no one can handle it anymore, and at that point, it has gone beyond what you would want to be working around in this kind of plant.

We have heard evidence about the concern regarding the fire suppression upgrading and the fact that it is being done at a lower cost so that the cheapest system is being installed. Do you have concerns in that area?

Mr. Murphy: On fire safety?

Senator Christensen: Yes, the upgrading of the suppressants for fire in the plant itself.

Mr. Murphy: I will defer to one of my colleagues who might know more of the specifics concerning fire safety upgrading.

Mr. Pigeau: They have put in place full-time firefighters in stations as part the upgrade of the fire system. For the Pickering A restart, they are looking at changing all of the cabling in the station to meet the new fire standards. They are also looking at putting sprinkler systems in all of the other stations. It is an ongoing process. In the last year or so, they have put full-time firefighters in each of the stations. It is part of an ongoing process.

Senator Christensen: You are comfortable with the level at which that is happening?

Mr. Pigeau: Yes.

Mr. Murphy: I did not want to finish our presentation without having an opportunity, in terms of Senator Kenny's comments, to suggest something that might be useful.

The concern that you raised about fitness for duty is one that we share. It is only in how we get to the issue that there is some disagreement. Our kind of approach was, "Let us be sure there is a problem that needs to be fixed before we go out and fix it." You feel that within a large workforce, given the nature of the industry that we are in, there probably is a problem. I think that is your concern. You also asked: "Why would people be concerned about being tested if there was not a problem?" I detected the perception that we are out there blocking this from happening. We are absolutely committed to ensuring that people are fit for work. That is why we have been working with the employer on the fitness-for-duty program, and all the other procedures and safeguards that are found in the workplace.

That is why we have been on record as saying that, if the employer wanted to do that sort of testing to see if there was a problem, without identifying the individuals, we would be supportive. We never went beyond that step because our legal people were saying, "You have the right to represent and you must respect that right to represent, and if the law says that it would be illegal for the company to do that, then your job, in terms of representing those people, would be to say, `No, employer, you cannot do that because the law prohibits it.'"

Having listened to the concerns voiced by Senator Kenny, let me undertake to go back and review this whole matter with our legal and elected people and decide whether or not there is a different approach that we should be taking to the issue, in light of his comments. We will review that with our legal people, and if we can come up with a different approach, we will certainly talk with the employer about that.

Senator Kenny: I appreciate that, Mr. Murphy. Could you advise the committee how long it might take to undertake such a review? Could you also undertake to advise this committee of the results of the review?

Mr. Murphy: Absolutely. We could probably do it in two to four weeks.

The Chairman: That is a very interesting outcome of this meeting.

I must say for the record that, because this meeting was extended and we have some private business to do, there are some questions that we could not get to. If we send you those questions, would you be good enough to answer them for us?

Mr. Murphy: We would be happy to respond to any concerns of the committee.

The Chairman: Thank you. We appreciate your patience. We look forward to hearing the results of your review.

The committee adjourned.