EUROPE REVISITED:
CONSEQUENCES OF INCREASED EUROPEAN INTEGRATION FOR CANADA
FORGING STRONGER TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC LINKS
After World War II, political leaders on both sides of the Atlantic recognized the need to achieve strong interregional links as well as integration within Europe itself. These transatlantic links were to be forged in terms of both national security and economic prosperity; certainly that was the intention of Lester B. Pearson when Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty was made.
The reality, however, is that while substantial progress has been made on the transatlantic security side, a common transatlantic economic framework paralleling NATO has not been attained. As Professor Donald Barry (University of Calgary) told the Committee, Article 2 did not take the form of a binding commitment and an extensive formalized economic link between Europe and Canada was not achieved. The vision of a vibrant Transatlantic relationship has been largely replaced by a series of lengthy bilateral trade conflicts and less than optimal economic ties.
The Committee is of the view that even if the natural forces of economic integration are pulling Canada ever southward, it is worthwhile to strive for closer economic ties between Canada and Europe. As one Committee member put the critical question: how does Canada balance its close relationship with the U.S.? in trade, investment, and cultural and social aspects ? with that of Europe, where many of our historical roots are. However, before one can make an informed judgement on what needs to be done to strengthen Transatlantic ties, one must understand the relationship that now prevails.
A. The Existing Trade and Investment Relationship
It may come as a surprise to some that the EU is the world’s largest single market. This regional economy, valued at $8.6 trillion U.S., should grow as it fulfils its expansion plans and accomplishes its economic reforms.
Europe continues to be Canada’s second most important economic and trade partner, next to the United States. Two-way trade in goods and services between Canada and the EU exceeded $59 billion in 1998, with our merchandise exports amounting to $17.8 billion and our merchandise imports registering $25.4 billion. Services exports equalled $7.1 billion, while services imports totalled $9.2 billion.
But when the EU’s market potential is taken into account, one can make a strong case that Canada’s trade relationship with the EU needs to be given a boost. While Canada now exports almost $18 billion in goods to the EU annually, its exports to the 15 EU member countries have not kept pace with Europe’s economic growth. According to the May 1998 Statistics Canada analysis as provided to the Committee (Canada’s Trade With The EU), the value of Canada’s exports to Europe is minuscule when compared to the value of total EU imports (2% in 1997). Both Canada and the United States have lost market share in European markets as intra-EU trade has grown to the point where as of 1996, a full 63% of EU exports was destined for other EU countries. And while Canada now exports over $23 billion in goods and services to the EU annually, as a proportion of our total merchandise exports the EU share has been on the decline: from 12.6% to 5.1% over the 1980-97 period.
Granted, there are sound explanations for the slippage in Canada’s penetration of the European market. Part of the decline in the share of Canadian exports destined for European markets can be attributed to the appreciation of the value of the Canadian dollar, in tandem with that of the U.S. currency. Also, one could point to the sluggish economic conditions that were experienced in Europe during most of the 1990s. Arguably the dramatic growth of regional trade, both in the Americas and in Europe, has been of more importance. For instance, increasing integration of the North American economy, derived from free trade agreements, geography, and other factors, has caused our exports to the U.S. to have risen dramatically. Sales to the U.S. now account for over 85% of our total exports, as opposed to 63% in 1980.
What is disconcerting, however, is that Canada’s relative trade presence in Europe is shrinking at the very time when the EU market is expected to grow as a result of expansion in membership and its new single currency. As a recent Conference Board report on the Canada-EU business relationship (Strengthening Canada-Europe Business Relations) has concluded, Canada must strive to seize the opportunities that the EU market presents.
Also of concern is the fact that the merchandise trade deficit with the EU continues to grow, with services trade also recording a deficit. In contrast to the shifting trend in exports, the share of total imports (about 10%) sourced from the EU has not budged materially throughout much of the 1980s and 1990s. As a result, a growing merchandise trade deficit has developed, amounting to $7.6 billion in 1998. Services trade is also in a deficit position, standing at approximately $1.5 billion in 1996.
It is to be noted that the Canada-EU bilateral relationship has been plagued by a series of lingering trade irritants. As DFAIT officials noted, bilateral disputes are entirely normal within a bilateral trade relationship of almost $60 billion (goods and services). While this may be true, given the scale of the economic relationship, there is also no denying the fact that in recent years Canada-EU trade relations have been dominated by a long list of trade disputes.
There remains a range of barriers to trade in the EU of concern to Canada, especially in the agriculture and natural resource sectors and pharmaceuticals. Current bilateral "hotspots" include asbestos, organically modified products such as canola, and the EU’s ban on imports of beef produced with growth-promoting hormones. Regarding the latter, Canada imposed WTO-approved retaliatory duties (of 100%) against the EU in July, 1999, affecting EU exports of beef, pork, cucumbers, and gherkins to this country.
What is especially troublesome is the fact that some of these disputes have gone on and on. Removing or reducing trade irritants can be a time-consuming process, one that can distract government officials from the loftier pursuit of enhancing the overall trade relationship. In fact, these irritants, although relatively minor, can be seen as having obstructed the achievement of truly smooth bilateral relations.
On the bright side of the economic relationship, the composition of Canada’s exports to Europe has shifted to include greater quantities of manufactured (higher value-added) products. The share of such products in total exports has grown from 28% in 1980 to approximately 50% now. According to the May, 1998 Statistics Canada report, almost one-half of our leading exports consist of manufactured goods. All told, forest products, industrial goods, and machinery and equipment make up about 80% of total merchandise exports to the EU.
Turning to investment, there is no question that foreign direct investment has been the most dynamic element of the economic relationship. Whereas trade flows have been disappointing ? a situation which is not improving ? and increasingly directed southwards, growth in Canadian investment in Europe far exceeded that in the U.S. in the 1983-97 period (a seven-fold increase versus one that was four-fold).
The EU is both the second-largest source and destination of foreign direct investment (FDI) for Canada. Cumulative Canadian foreign direct investment in the EU was valued at more than $43.7 billion in 1997, with incoming FDI amounting to $42.8 billion. In contrast to our above-noted export performance, Canada’s firms have become increasingly active investors in Europe. Indeed, the EU is the destination of over 42% of our stock of non-U.S. foreign direct investment. If one includes the U.S., the figure drops to a still respectable 20% (up from 12% in 1983). Outward Canadian investment in Europe has been concentrated in four broad sectors: finance and insurance (23% of the total); metallic minerals and metal products (16%); communications industries (16%); and food, beverage, and tobacco holdings (13%). Combined, the United Kingdom and Ireland account for two-thirds of total Canadian FDI in the EU. Increasingly, we have tended to invest in those two countries so as to be able to service the European market.
Similarly, over 20% of foreign investment in Canada comes from the EU. The United Kingdom, with 41% of the total EU direct investment in Canada in 1997, is the largest EU investor in Canada. EU direct investment in Canada has been concentrated in the finance and insurance; food, beverage and tobacco; energy; and the chemical products and textiles sectors.
While it is generally accepted that trade follows investment, this causal relationship has not been borne out if one considers the poor growth of exports to Europe in the 1990s. The Conference Board report raises the possibility that Canadian investment in Europe may be displacing, rather than creating trade. The question put forward by the Board is the following: in the absence of a formal NAFTA-EU trade link, have Canadian firms established in Europe so as to conduct primarily inter-European trade? As witnesses from Statistics Canada told the Committee, it is quite conceivable that Canadian companies have been investing overseas so as to operate behind the tariff wall and/or to produce in a location close to the customer base. These officials argued that probably it is easier to construct a plant overseas than to export the physical product from Canada.
B. Improving Transatlantic Trade Ties
Although our trade with Europe has recorded modest growth, it has been said that Canada is "barely on the radar screen" as far as Europe is concerned. More than likely, this is because Canada is too small to be attractive in Europe. According to the Conference Board’s report on Canada-EU relations, there is also an urgent need for businesses on both sides of the Atlantic to overcome what appears to be an "information deficit" about each other’s markets. For example, a 1998 survey of European business executives, conducted privately for the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, revealed that these business leaders had little knowledge of either Canada or its economy. Mostly, this country was perceived to have remained as a strictly resource-based economy, whereas in actual fact some 70% of our exports are now industrial products. Without accurate information, business strategies to capture market share will not be effective.
However, it well may be that within the Canadian large business community there is a distinct lack of interest in furthering the Transatlantic trade agenda. As Professor Barry informed the Committee, the Canada-EU relationship has been largely a government-to-government affair, with an effective Transatlantic business dialogue noticeably absent. In many cases, Canadian firms have already established themselves physically on the European continent or have closely aligned themselves in a North-South direction. There are few signs that large Canadian companies have firm plans for the gaining of an expanded share of Europe’s new single-currency market. Not having an aggressive promoter of closer Transatlantic ties in place within large companies may have left smaller companies without an effective voice on this issue. Canada needs to move vigorously to identify the private sector champions who will undertake this dialogue and represent Canada’s interests effectively.
In this regard, two recent developments should be viewed as somewhat positive. First, the EU and Canada are exploring means by which trade and investment between small- and medium-sized enterprises (SME) can be promoted. A first meeting of European and Canadian small businesses took place in June, 1998, and the federal government is working with the Canadian Advanced Technologies Association (CATA) to advance common trade and investment interests between information, technology, and medical device companies. After all, Canada considers itself to be a world leader in advanced industries such as telecommunications, aerospace, electronics, and information technology. Second, business communities on both sides of the Atlantic have launched a Canada-Europe Round Table designed to provide advice to the EU and Canada on trade and investment issues. Professor Barry pointed out that the jury was still out on the effectiveness of this new institution.
Canada must do even more. It must attempt to foster a more active transatlantic business relationship, or risk losing out on opportunities in Europe. The Conference Board report found the consistent relative decline of Canadian export activity in Europe troubling. In its trade activity, the Canadian business sector focus seems stuck on the U.S. If Canadian firms and governments continue to concentrate their attention on the United States, while neglecting Europe, it noted, valuable commercial opportunities will be missed. This view tended to be supported by Ms. Smadja, who claimed that Canada was too strongly U.S.–oriented and that Canadian business need to exert a significantly greater effort in seeking out European markets.
In terms of efforts to liberalize trade, Europe continues to be wedded to the idea of separate transatlantic trade ties with each of the three NAFTA members. The bilateral discussions that have occurred to achieve freer trade between the EU and Mexico, and more importantly between the EU and the United States, have become a cause for some concern in Canada. Predicting where the future course of trade relations with the EU will lead is, at the best of times, a difficult exercise. However, whatever the scenario that emerges, Canada will want to ensure that its interests are not sidelined in any separate trade arrangements that may be reached between Europe and our NAFTA trading partners.
Mexico and the EU, with the most ambitious agenda, are targeting the end of this year for the completion of negotiations on a sectoral free-trade agreement, an agreement which would provide the EU with NAFTA-equivalent access to the Mexican market. However, three points are worth noting. First, as senior DFAIT officials informed the Committee, the urgency of strengthened EU-Mexican links may be directly attributed to the fact that EU access to the Mexican market had been reduced as a result of that country’s entry into NAFTA. Moreover, as Ms. Smadja stressed before the Committee, relations with South American countries are starting from a very small base, whereas the EU-Canada relationship is much deeper. A final consideration is that notwithstanding the apparent urgency of the Mexican link to the Europeans, it is not apparent that the negotiating timetable will be met, given that serious differences in crucial negotiating areas have not been overcome.
Turning to the American perspective, what was to have become an important EU-US Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) has been scaled back significantly, owing to opposition on both sides of the Atlantic ? in Europe, strong opposition emanated from France ? and to sharp differences in opinion in the two areas of culture and agriculture (e.g., disputes over beef hormones, bananas, and farm subsidies). In March, 1998, the EU stated its intention to explore a bold new initiative with the U.S., an initiative encompassing the creation of free trade in commercial services by the year 2000; removal of tariffs on industrial goods by 2010; the reduction of standards barriers to trade; as well as measures in the areas of investment, intellectual property, and procurement. Since that time, however, the proposal has not attracted the necessary political backing, either in the U.S. Congress or in the EU. The TEP’s current primary area of concentration involves standards and regulatory cooperation.
Canada has entered into its own bilateral agreement, the EU-Canada Trade Initiative (ECTI), which is similar in nature to the TEP. The ECTI, launched in December, 1998, builds on the joint Canada-EU Action Plan (December, 1996), which was designed (a) to resolve bilateral trade disputes and to examine ways to improve the trade environment by removing existing barriers to trade and (b) to enhance trade facilitation. A number of high level meetings with EU officials have been held since December, 1998.
Work under the ECTI agreement has been designed to improve cooperation in several areas: mutual recognition of standards, equivalence and regulatory cooperation; services; government procurement; intellectual property rights; competition issues; cultural cooperation; and business-to-business contacts, especially in the SME sector. As in the case of TEP, this Canada-EU agreement entails discussion on multilateral trade negotiation issues in the period leading up to the Seattle WTO meeting.
It has been argued that the removal of discriminatory, non-tariff barriers would improve Canada-EU relations more effectively than would a free trade agreement involving tariff elimination. According to Ms. Smadja, since relatively few problems exist on the tariff side of trade relations, the two entities are working on issues such as mutual recognition of standards and regulatory cooperation. As tariff levels have come down in response to successive rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, non-tariff barriers have arisen to take their place as impediments to trade. Incompatible standards and technical regulations have been identified by many exporters as being major barriers to trade. Ms. Smadja observed that in these areas, the Canada-EU relationship seemed to be further advanced than the U.S. – EU relationship.
Nevertheless, your Committee continues to have questions about the relevance of the existing bilateral link, with one member believing that we are trailing the other two NAFTA partners. We also note the tendency for Canada-EU declarations of intent to result in little action. The Committee therefore recommends:
Recommendation 5: That the Government of Canada accelerate the work underway under the EU-Canada Trade Initiative in order to foster early progress in enhancing Transatlantic trade. |
For their part, DFAIT officials expressed to the Committee a willingness to seek closer trade ties with Europe, but not at the expense of the existing prosperous relationship with the U.S. For them, eroding an over 85% share to improve upon an 8-9% share, even though the EU remains the world’s largest market, does not appear to be worthwhile. The federal government’s own trade focus appears to be shifting away from Europe, at the same time as the natural forces of economic integration are pulling commercial activity southward.
However, even if the federal government were keener on expanding Canada-EU ties, would achievement of a comprehensive free trade agreement with the EU represent a realistic objective? While perhaps it is true that a Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement (TAFTA) would lessen the fears of those concerned about a "Fortress Europe," witnesses have told us that a TAFTA does not appear to be a realistic possibility. According to Mr. Jacquet, the TAFTA concept is unrealistic: first, the concept produces a nervous reaction in Europe; second, an attempt to realize it would detract from the trade liberalization efforts now underway at the multilateral WTO level. He also questioned the benefits that would be derived from such a bilateral arrangement. It was his view that even if a TAFTA were to be achieved, no gains from liberalized agricultural trade would have been made, since agriculture, and by extension CAP reform, would be excluded from any such deal.
John Beck (Director, Directorate-General I, External Relations/Directorate B, European Commission, Brussels) concurred with the view that Canada was not important enough economically in the eyes of the Europeans, accounting as it does for a mere 1.7% of Europe’s trade in contrast to the U.S.’s share ? over 20% ? and also with the view that a TAFTA deal before the next WTO round held no likely real prospect, especially with a protectionist Congress in place in Washington. It is also not clear that either the EU or the Americans would want Canadians "at the table" for any free-trade discussions upon which they might embark.
While the Committee recognizes these roadblocks, it is concerned about Canada’s near-invisibility in Europe and the existence of an inaccurate perception in Europe of Canada’s industrial structure, its increasing irrelevance in the eyes of both the U.S. and the EU, and its rising dependence on the U.S. We are concerned that the federal government does not seem to be fully committed to upgrading trade relations with the EU, at a time when closer economic integration with the U.S. is occurring. Compounding the problem is the erosion of security ties between Canada and Europe since the end of the Cold War, the lessening of traditional demographic ties, and the increasingly inward-looking nature of both Canadian and EU policies. The Committee is of the view that this perception/strategic error needs to be corrected and that a revitalized Transatlantic link needs to be developed. The Committee recommends:
Recommendation 6: That to ensure greater diversity of Canada’s global economic activity, the federal government rededicate itself to enhancing Canada’s international trade and investment ties with Europe. In doing so, the government should adopt a more aggressive approach and target its trade and information promotion efforts more effectively on individual sectors and countries showing strong potential. Whenever possible, the image of Canada as a modern knowledge-based economy should be promoted. |
Recommendation 7: That, while the Committee recognizes that a Transatlantic free trade initiative may not be propitious at this time, given the expected launch of a new multilateral round of trade negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO) at Seattle in November, the idea of a Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement (TAFTA) be resurrected if the WTO negotiations are unfruitful. In the interim, the Government of Canada should develop a thorough analysis of the benefits and costs of a potential TAFTA. |
C. Canada-EU Fisheries Relations
The turbot war of the mid-1990s still casts a shadow over Canada-European Union links even if, according to Professor Barry, it is not serving as a major impediment to the development of further relations. As revealed by Ms. Smadja, the EU has some concern about the statute (Bill C-27) enacted earlier this year to enable Canada to implement the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea relating to straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks. The EU’s concern relates to the extraterritorial aspect of this measure, as well as to some of the language in the statute.
Dealing with these concerns, Mr. Earl Wiseman (Director General, International Affairs Directorate, Fisheries and Oceans Canada), told the Committee that the Government of Canada had let the EU know that it was Canada’s intention to ratify the UN Convention in a way fully consistent with this country’s rights and obligations under the UN agreement. Moreover, he said that EU objections to Canada’s interpretation of the agreement, should they arise, could be dealt with by the existing dispute settlement mechanism. Even with these assurances, the EU concerns remain, driven by lingering worries on the part of fisheries officials in Spain, a country which accounts for a full one-half of EU fisheries activity. According to Mr. Wiseman, the Spanish government wants assurances from Canada that no action will ever be taken against Spanish fishing vessels; however, according to him, this type of iron-clad guarantee could not be given.
Committee members were told by Ms. Smadja, Mr. Wiseman, and Professor Barry that fortunately both parties are in the process of taking steps to build up a more positive and constructive overall fishing industry relationship. Since 1997, high-level bilateral fisheries consultations have been held on an annual basis. Undoubtedly, achieving such a link will take time and minor skirmishes or disagreements (such as that expressed over Bill C-27) can be expected to reoccur occasionally.
As this report has outlined, Europe is undergoing a number of important economic and political changes designed to advance its long-standing agenda of integration and to achieve greater prosperity for its citizens. The launching of the EMU and the EU’s Agenda 2000, along with a hoped-for set of economic reforms undertaken at the individual-country level, are initiatives that, if successful, will be considered by future historians to have been landmark achievements.
In our report, we have also noted that the EU, even before its anticipated enlargement, had already become the world’s largest single market. Obviously, the entry of new members, combined with successful achievement of economic reforms, will make the EU’s economic strength that much greater.
Set against these exciting new developments on the European stage, we are uneasy at the lack of interest displayed in Europe by Canadian policy-makers and by the domestic business community. Europe is far too important and prosperous a region for it to be given a half-hearted and sporadic emphasis. We ignore it at our own peril.
By concentrating its trade on the United States, Canada also runs the risk of "having all its eggs in one basket." It is the opinion of this Committee that we need to diversify our trade and adopt a more global approach. To that end, Europe offers an attractive alternative to our increasingly dominant economic relationship with our southern neighbour. Now is the time for Canada to rededicate itself to energizing our Transatlantic links and for the Government of Canada to propose new and creative initiatives designed to foster a more effective relationship.
- That no common currency arrangement with the United States be entered into by the
federal government without it having concrete evidence that the required pre-conditions of
an "optimum currency area" are in place.
- That Canada continuously strive to maintain its current standing and level of influence
as a member of various international organizations such as the G-7 group of countries. Any
lessening of Canada’s influence on international monetary and broader economic
issues, owing to a potential movement to a tri-polar (or any other) global currency
environment, should be actively resisted.
- That the federal government formulate an aggressive political strategy in advance of the
World Trade Organization’s new round of multilateral trade negotiations, aimed at
highlighting the serious adverse impacts of existing agricultural subsidies on the world
economy and rallying international support for a full-scale assault on the continued
provision of trade-distorting subsidies, especially export subsidies. Strengthened
strategic alliances with like-minded countries should be vigorously pursued so that
increased pressure can be placed on major subsidy providers to remove the inequities
between countries in the provision of farm subsidies.
- That the Government of Canada endeavour, through the use of a detailed impact analysis,
to anticipate the effect of EU enlargement on Canada’s specific trade and investment
ties with Europe. Moreover, the government should strive to ensure that Canada’s
economic interests are not adversely affected through any future enlargement but if they
are, appropriate compensation should be requested from the European Union.
- That the Government of Canada accelerate the work underway under the EU-Canada Trade
Initiative in order to foster early progress in enhancing Transatlantic trade.
- That to ensure greater diversity of Canada’s global economic activity, the federal
government rededicate itself to enhancing Canada’s international trade and investment
ties with Europe. In doing so, the government should adopt a more aggressive approach and
target its trade and information promotion efforts more effectively on individual sectors
and countries showing strong potential. Whenever possible, the image of Canada as a modern
knowledge-based economy should be promoted.
- That, while the Committee recognizes that a Transatlantic free trade initiative may not be propitious at this time, given the expected launch of a new multilateral round of trade negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO) at Seattle in November, the idea of a Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement (TAFTA) be resurrected if the WTO negotiations are unfruitful. In the interim, the Government of Canada should develop a thorough analysis of the benefits and costs of a potential TAFTA.
CHRONOLOGY OF CANADA-EU ECONOMIC RELATIONS
DATE |
EVENT |
June 1999 |
Competition Agreement signed |
December 1998 |
Launching of the EU-Canada Trade Initiative, similar in nature to the Transatlantic Economic Partnership signed between the EU and the United States earlier that year |
December 1998 |
Veterinary Agreement and Agreements on Nuclear Research Cooperation signed |
May 1998 |
Mutual Recognition and EC-Canada Leghold Trap Agreements signed |
December 1997 |
Agreement on Customs Cooperation and Mutual Administrative Assistance signed |
October 1997 |
Transatlantic free trade zone concept proposed again by Prime Minister Chrétien, in London, England |
December 1996 |
EU-Canada Political Declaration and Joint Action Plan, similar in nature to the EU-U.S. Action Plan signed in December 1995, launched |
June 1995 |
Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement signed |
April 1995 |
EU-Canada Agreement on Fisheries Enforcement and Conservation signed |
December 1994 |
NAFTA-EU Free Trade Agreement advocated by Prime Minister Chrétien before the French Senate |
Fall 1994 |
Canada-EU free trade agreement proposed by Trade Minister MacLaren |
1991 |
First EC-Canada Summit meeting held |
November 1990 |
Transatlantic Declaration by the EC and Canada issued |
1983 |
Agreement on Research of Radioactive Wastes signed |
1980 |
Agreement on the Management of Radioactive Wastes signed |
1979 |
EC-Canada Fisheries Agreement signed |
July 1976 |
EC-Canada Framework Agreement for Commercial and Economic Cooperation signed |
Source: Evidence provided to the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs by Professor Donald Barry, University of Calgary, 2 November 1999; Delegation of the European Commission to Canada, European Union – Canada Relations, June 1999.
| ISSUE NO. | DATE | WITNESSES |
| Second Session, Thirty-sixth Parliament | ||
| 3 | November 2, 1999 | From the University of Calgary:
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| First Session, Thirty-sixth Parliament | ||
| 38 | May 26, 1999 | From the Delegation of the European Commission in Canada:
From Fisheries and Oceans Canada:
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| 34 | April 27, 1999 | From the Bank of Canada : Mr. John B. Murray, |
| 24 | September 29, 1998 | A Delegation of European Parliamentarians: |
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| 22 | June 2, 1998 | From the Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade:
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| 19 | May 13, 1998 | From the Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade:
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| 18 | May 12, 1998 | From the Bank of Canada : Mr. John B. Murray, Chief, International Department. |
| 16 | May 5, 1998 | From Statistics Canada:
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| 9 | February 25, 1998 | From the Council of Europe:
From the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade:
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| 5 | November 27, 1997 | From the Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade:
From Industry Canada:
From the Department of Finance:
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FACT-FINDING MISSION TO LONDON, UK; PARIS, FRANCE; BONN, GERMANY; AND BRUSSELS, BELIGUM (JUNE 21-JULY 2, 1999)
LONDON, UK
The Right Honourable Lord Owen.
From Solomon, Smith, and Barney:
Mr. Michael Saunders, Head of European Economic Research.
PARIS, FRANCE
From the Bank of France:
Mr. Jean-Claude Trichet, Governor.
From the Economic Observation Centre, Paris Chamber of Commerce and
Industry:
Mr. Christian de Boissieu, Scientific Director.
From the Embassy of Canada to France:
His Excellency Ambassador Jacques Roy;
Mr. Ian McLean, Minister Plenipotentiary.
From the "Centre d'études prospectives et d'informations
internationales:
Ms. Stéphanie Guichard.
From the French Institute of International Relations:
Mr. Pierre Jacquet, Deputy Director (Economics).
BONN, GERMANY
From the German Council for Industry and Trade:
Dr. Günther Albrecht.
From the "Deutscher Sparkassen und Giroverband e. V."
Professor Dr. Manfred Neumann.
From the Embassy of Canada to Germany:
His Excellency Ambassador Gaëtan Lavertu.
From the External Relations Division of the European Central Bank:
Dr. Heinz-Jurgen Scheid.
From the Institute for International Economic Policy, University of
Bonn:
Dr. Wolfgang Neumann,
BRUSSELS, GERMANY
From the Embassy of Canada to the European Community:
His Excellency Ambassador Jean-Pierre Juneau
From the European Commission:
Mr. John Beck, Director, Directorate General I, External Relations/Directorate B.
Mr. Gunter Grosche, Secretary of the Monetary and Economic Policy Committee.
Mr. Jan Host Schmidt, Director, Directorate General II/B, Economic and Financial Affairs.
From the European Parliament:
Mr. Julien Priestley, Secretary General.