Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Defence and Security

Issue 5 - Evidence

OTTAWA, Monday, October 22, 2001

The Standing Senate Committee on Defence and Security met this day at 6:10 p.m. to conduct an introductory survey of the major security and defence issues facing Canada with a view to preparing a detailed work plan for future comprehensive studies.

Senator J. Michael Forrestall (Deputy Chairman) in the Chair.

[English]

The Deputy Chairman: It is my pleasure to sit in this evening for Senator Colin Kenny, the chair of this committee, and welcome you to the Standing Senate Committee on Defence and Security.

Our committee is the first permanent standing committee with a mandate to examine the subject of security and national defence. Today we continue our survey of major issues facing Canada, and we will be reporting back to the Senate before the end of February.

Recent events have focused attention on the importance of intelligence, particularly how it is gathered, utilized and analyzed. Three weeks ago, we heard from a panel of experts from outside of the government about their views on just how things should be done. This evening, we have before us a group of government officials directly involved in security and intelligence operations. They will tell us how intelligence is collected, the different ways it is analyzed, and how this information is then distributed to the people who need it - the end users. We shall hear opening comments this evening from officials of the Department of National Defence and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. We will then entertain questions.

Our first witness is Major-General Michel Maisonneuve, Assistant Deputy Chief of Defence Staff. From his biography, you will see that Major-General Maisonneuve has served in Canada, Cyprus, France, the United States, the former Yugoslavia and Kosovo. He is the deputy of Vice-Admiral Greg Madison, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, who is, in fact, Canadian Forces Chief of Operations.

Major-General Maisonneuve is accompanied by Brigadier-General Samson, Director General of Intelligence.

Our second witness, representing the RCMP, is Jerry Loeppky, Deputy Commissioner of Operations, who has held many positions in operational, administration and human resource areas of the RCMP. He was appointed to his current position exactly one year ago. He is accompanied by assistant commissioner Richard Proulx, head of the central intelligence directorate. Welcome, gentlemen. The floor is yours.

[Translation]

Major-general J.O. Michel Maisonneuve, Assistant Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, Department of National Defence:First of all, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak to the Committee.

As the events of September 11 have galvanized all Canadians, we, in the Canadian Forces, have been busy developing a response as directed by the government. You are aware of the Canadian Forces contribution, and this contribution provides a useful background to the discussion I know you wish to have today on specific intelligence issues.

Let me remind you of that contribution. Since the events of September 11, Canada and the Canadian Forces have been involved with the airplanes that were redirected to our airports. We have reinforced our intelligence efforts and our links with our allies. Recently, a Navy Operations Group started to be deployed in the Gulf area. One destroyer and three frigates will eventually be deployed there, as well as a supply ship. All these components have their own shipborne helicopters. We also have three Hercules, one AirBus and two Aurora Maritime Patrol airplanes, as well as components of Operational Force 2. The Operational Task Force is on its way and the Halifax frigate is also in the Red Sea at this time.

I would like to address three issues in my remarks, then, as it pleases the Chair, General Samson and I can respond to your questions. Of course, I should tell you upfront that it is a significant challenge to provide useful information on the subject of intelligence while remaining in the unclassified realm. First,I will tell you that I am not a professional intelligence officer; my background is from the combat arms, the Armoured Corps in particular. Therefore, throughout my 29 years in the military,I have not been as much a producer of intelligence and information as a consumer of the products produced by our intelligence services. As such, though, I can tell you of the usefulness of these products.

[English]

Throughout history, leaders have regarded information superiority as a key factor of victory. The need to provide analyzed information or intelligence to the military decision-maker in a timely, accurate way persists as much today as it has throughout time. Ultimately, the goal of the Canadian Forces military intelligence organizations is to provide this much-needed intelligence to our commanders before, during and after deployment, thereby ensuring the protection of our military force whether deployed internationally or domestically.

The defence intelligence program is guided by the intelligence priorities established annually by the meeting of ministers on security intelligence, chaired by the Prime Minister. The gathering of information to meet these requirements is done in a number of ways: through open and human sources, signals intelligence, imagery and geospatial information, and information received through our partnerships with other government departments and our allies. The analytical products resulting from the information acquired enable us to provide situational awareness to our commanders at all levels.

You might be interested at this point for me to expand on some of our collection capabilities. I cannot overemphasize here the need for us to partner with other government departments and with our allies. No intelligence organization in the world has the capability to collect by itself all the desired intelligence on every matter of national interest. No one can go it alone. All of our partners help us satisfy the Canadian Forces operational and intelligence requirements and, in return, we help them meet their requirements. It must be remembered that this is a two-way street for all partners and that this collaboration with them is key to our intelligence function.

With regard to signals intelligence, the Communications Security Establishment, or CSE, is mandated to collect, analyze, and report on foreign radio, radar and other electronic signals. CSE is supported in this role by the Canadian Forces Information Operations group.

The objective of supporting commanders in precision manoeuvre and delivery of weapons could not be achieved without geospatial and imagery information obtained from the mapping and charting establishment and the Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre respectively. The charts, maps, and imagery products merged together provide another tool in support of navigation and weapons systems.

The last category of intelligence is that of human intelligence, which is the information obtained either direct or indirectly from a human source. While deployed, every member of the Canadian Forces has the capability to be observant regarding the activities around him or her or to be in a situation where someone has said something unusual. Alone, the information is probably useless, but when added to other pieces of the puzzle, it becomes a priceless gem.

As an example, I can tell you of a piece of information that I received in Kosovo before the air campaign, during the Serb-Albanian negotiations in Rambouillet, France. While performing normal contact activities with members of the Kosovo Liberation Army, my international verifiers were made aware that one of the parties intended to restrict the movement of a regular patrol in their area. This "unforecasted" change in attitude on the ground at the tactical level had the potential to destabilize strategic level negotiations that were being overseen by the international community. Receiving the information early through human intelligence allowed us to defuse the situation.

Once the information is collected, a variety of intelligence organizations help to analyze it and to produce various intelligence assessments. Basically, military intelligence analysis is chiefly the responsibility of the Director General of Intelligence, BGen. Samson, here at National Defence Headquarters. It is also the responsibility of the intelligence elements of the navy, army, and air force, as well as the tactical intelligence units organic to the fighting forces. Together, these organizations provide a broad range of support and products with the principal consumer being the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence. Also, other government departments and ultimately our partners also benefit. This two-way sharing of data and intelligence products within the Canadian Forces with other government departments and with our allies is facilitated through a number of classified computer networks.

Information derived from intelligence also forms an important element of Canada's participation in international organizations, such as the United Nations, NATO and NORAD. Any bilateral cooperation in which Canada is involved almost always includes sharing of information and analysis of topics of mutual interest. An example of this is the cooperation we had with the Netherlands in our joint UN operation in Ethiopia and Eritrea a few months ago.

It is to be stressed here that the Canadian Forces in Canada in general derive great benefits from these cooperative relationships. The Canadian Forces intelligence community is very conscious of the need to "pull their share of the load" within the limits of our resources, and we know the allies are very appreciative of what we bring to the table.

That, in a nutshell, provides a strategic overview of intelligence gathering, analysis and sharing.

Before closing, it is important for me to discuss a third topic, which includes those areas that we are following closely. I intend to focus on three specific areas: human intelligence, analytical capability, and the fusion of information into one centre.

It is important that all of our collection assets not be all put in one basket. The use of technology to collect information has grown immensely in the last decade, but it cannot function alone. Although we have had considerable success, we feel we must be even more proactive in the area of human intelligence, and we are looking at enhancing our military human capability through the training of more military members in the collection of information from human sources and marrying these collectors up with our troops to provide a better view of the environment in which they are working, fighting or surviving. This basic need will continue to ensure the protection of our forces and provide support for our commanders.

Another area of enhancement centres on our analytical component. Although excellent, the analysis capacity we currently have may not meet tomorrow's requirements. Continuing changes in technology will enable more information to be collected and communicated in a quicker fashion. This glut of information will not be able to be handled by the analytical capability we currently possess, nor in the same way that we are doing it currently. We have to ensure that our analysts are more than good computer operators that can use the cut-and-paste method of analysis. They must become artists at putting together clues, facts, psychological and political traits of the enemy. Only then can the human process of synthesizing pieces of information into finished products be used for decision-making.

How do we enhance our capability to deal with the information and the demands put before us? We will have to hire some new analysts, but we will also have to partner more fully with external cultural, environmental and academic experts. Given that we do not have the capability to become experts or specialists in all the areas upon which information is collected, we will need the kind of information and skills that experts can bring to the table.

[Translation]

The final piece of the puzzle we are dealing with in the improvement of our intelligence capability is the creation of an overall information fusion centre that would receive collection assets and analyze the information to provide integrated support to commanders. At this stage, the vision is that of an enterprise system that would merge technical capabilities with doctrine and projects into an integrated whole. We feel this type of approach, and the final decision about the concept has not yet been made, would provide information superiority through enhanced situation awareness within the battlespace. Enhanced situational awareness means more effective decision-making from the tactical to the strategic level, especially within the vision articulated inStrategy 2020 of a highly capable and globally deployable force.

In closing, it is important to stress that intelligence is about understanding how people think, feel and react to certain situations. No matter how many assessments we produce or how we wish to engineer for tomorrow, there will always be an element of risk. The work of intelligence is to try to reduce the risk or potential for surprises; this will continue to be an ongoing challenge. Toward this end, it is vital that the intelligence community continue to provide analysis gathered from all sources and to provide assessments in a timely and useful way to decision and policy makers. However as I have learned from experience, the best intelligence in the world does not eliminate the burden of making difficult choices - that responsibility is one of leadership.

[English]

Mr. Gary Loeppky, Deputy Commissioner, Operations, Royal Canadian Mounted Police: Honourable senators, it is certainly a pleasure to be here and have the occasion to provide some comments with respect to the RCMP's role in terms of security and where we find ourselves today in an obviously ever-changing environment.

My presentation will cover a number of different areas, after which we would be delighted to respond to any questions. I am accompanied today by Assistant Commissioner Richard Proulx, who is responsible for the criminal intelligence program forthe RCMP.

My comments this afternoon will focus on three areas: the situation that existed prior to September , 2001; the immediate and ongoing response following that particular event; and of course, the longer-term objectives.

I think it is important to situate the RCMP's role in an historical context and then bring it up to today and where we go from here.

With the enactment of the CSIS Act and the Security Offences Act in 1984, the RCMP's role in investigating individuals who pose real or potential threats to national security was redefined. No new criminal offences were created as a result of the Security Offences Act, but it was decided that the RCMP would continue to investigate criminal offences relating to national security. However, for the first time, the RCMP was given that authority in legislation. CSIS was assigned the responsibility to investigate threats to the security of Canada by collecting security intelligence and to advise the government of those threats.

Specifically, under section 2(c) of the CSIS Act, the service would be responsible for investigating individuals or groups it had reasonable grounds to suspect of engaging in politically-motivated violence. In fulfilling its mandated responsibility, CSIS has publicly identified the number of individuals associated to terrorist groups it has reasonable grounds to suspect may engage in political-motivated violence and who are present and active in Canada. These individuals for the most part are engaging in various forms of non-criminal activity, which include the recruitment of new members, promoting ideology or cause, or fundraising on behalf of the organization.

At this stage, the majority of the activities of these individuals does not fall within the mandate of the RCMP. Consequently, in practical terms, we are dependent on CSIS to provide forewarning of when those individuals or groups plan to engage in criminal activity. The RCMP has dedicated national security investigation sections in major centres across Canada as well as at eight designated international airports to investigate and prosecute such criminal activity.

I will now turn to the new threat that September 11 clearly brought to the fore. The incidents of September 11 have clearly underscored the fact that terrorism has entered into a new phase. The criminal offence of conspiracy occurred long before September 11, but that day saw its deadly execution. Seemingly benign activity, such as acquiring a pilot's licence, we now realize was part of a criminal conspiracy. Subsequent investigation also revealed that many of these individuals had come to the attention of law enforcement previously. However, there were no linkages made between the information.

In light of the September 11 incident, the RCMP, as did all other federal enforcement and security agencies, took immediate steps in response to this incident, as well as conducted an assessment of its capacity to mitigate and investigate this new threat.

The RCMP response, because of its mandates and responsibilities, was multi-faceted. For example, in the area of physical security, we deployed forces members to handle rerouted aircraft. As you recall, over 40,000 people landed in Canada almost without notice, and we were very involved in that component. We responded to the increased security concerns of foreign embassies and its personnel in Canada. We increased our visibility at airports and international events given the threat level that was present, and we responded to security demands at vital points.

We also undertook a significant number of investigations. All divisions were immediately instructed that this incident was clearly an investigational priority, and approximately2,000 members were redeployed from other program areas into investigative teams. We also integrated representatives from other federal government departments into those teams in what was clearly an excellent use of an integrated federal approach.

We had international representation at the national level. One of the outcomes was that our TIPS line to date has handled over 6,000 calls. Many of those, of course, result in extensive investigations, which are ongoing.

We initiated a financial intelligence task force to investigate Canadian funding activity of identified organizations that were identified shortly thereafter. Of course, there was a significant increase in the number of racially-motivated crime complaints that we undertook to investigate throughout the country where we do provincial policing.

At the same time, we were requested to identify to government what we required to improve our capacity to respond to this new threat. Our requirements were grouped under five categories: intelligence, investigation, equipment, infrastructure, and training and administration.

Under intelligence and investigation, we recommended the formation of integrated national security enforcement teams, integrated border enforcement teams and a financial action task force. The national security enforcement and border enforcement teams are intended to be multi-disciplinary teams involving federal, provincial and municipal agencies targeting individuals identified as posing national security threats who are involved in criminal activity.

Our lessons from the Ressam investigation and this latest incident show clearly that many these individuals and their associates along the way are involved in various forms of what some might consider low-level criminal activity, such as credit card frauds and those types of criminal incidents. Often, offences that are minor in nature or different than the substantive offence being investigated or outside the jurisdiction of a police service are assessed to be of little danger to national security and therefore may not get the necessary attention. Under an integrated approach, these minor offences will be acted upon and could reveal vital links in identifying criminal conspiracies among groups operating in or outside of Canada. All information gathered as a result of these integrated efforts will be analyzed and shared among partner agencies.

The objective of these integrated teams is, through intelligence and enforcement, to prevent and disrupt or detect and prosecute any individuals conducting criminal activity that may support or contribute to a threat to the security of Canada or its citizens.

Funding, as often stated, it the lifeblood of terrorism. Much of the activity in Canada was previously conducted via legal means. This form of activity under current legislative proposals will be criminalized. Tracing the route of these proceeds of crime is fundamental to understanding the financing and maintenance of terrorist organizations. This understanding is central to prevention against extremist attack, intelligence gathering, and a successful disruption and dismantling of organizations.

With respect to equipment, infrastructure and training, we have identified a variety of requirements, such as real-time identification, live scan equipment, vital points update for contingency planning, improved capacity to identify counterfeit documents, counter-technical intrusion, and information technology upgrades which are required.

In the future, intelligence clearly remains a critical component to identifying the plans, activities and intentions of individuals planning to engage in terrorist activities. By being intelligence-led with the best available intelligence, we can determine how we can proactively, from a law enforcement perspective, mitigate the threat that many of these individuals pose.

New legislative proposals will move the activity of many of these individuals in Canada more clearly into the criminal realm. This signifies that the RCMP must be engaged at an earlier stage in investigating these individuals who pose a national security threat. We must ensure that all the information that is collected can be used to support an eventual criminal prosecution. Just as important, we must ensure that all forms of criminal activity of these individuals comes under the full scrutiny of the law enforcement community and is assessed in a broader context. This involvement in criminal activity by individuals who pose a threat to the security of Canada may very well be the point at which their vulnerabilities can thus best be exploited.

To achieve this objective, we must also ensure, however, that the proper structures are in place to eliminate any stovepipes and develop a framework by which all information that is available can be readily shared and subjected to a proper analysis. While information sharing has always been recognized as a key element in combating this form of criminal activity, the events of September 11 have caused us to examine our current working arrangements and determine how better integration can be achieved to eliminate any potential gaps. This is the concept underpinning the creation of integrated national security enforcement and border enforcement teams.

We recognize that all the various enforcement and security intelligence agencies have a significant role to play in mitigating this threat, and it is only when we work in true partnerships that the goal can be achieved.

I just wanted to pick up on the general's comments with respect to partnerships. Clearly, one of the underpinnings of the RCMP strategy is integrated policing. That is one of the focuses we have to ensure that we bring the very best information from all the partners - federal, provincial, or municipal - to the table so we get the complete picture.

Several years ago, the RCMP undertook a new model which focuses very much on intelligence-led policing, having all the intelligence before us before we make decisions. In that context, we have renewed our criminal intelligence program under Assistant Commissioner Proulx with extensive training with in-depth analysis to ensure that we can be at the leading forefront of intelligence in terms of the law enforcement community. We have a leadership role to play in that regard for the law enforcement community in Canada.

Commissioner Zaccardelli has undertaken significant initiatives with respect to the global community to bring law enforcement communities closer together to share information on a global basis. We realize that many of these situations we find ourselves in today are homeland issues that did not necessarily have their roots here in Canada. Partnerships, integrated policing, are clearly at the forefront of where we are going and where we must go.

Senator Meighen: Thank you for your presentations. They have been very helpful. You have given us quite a range of items to consider.

Major-General Maisonneuve, you raised a subject that has troubled me: How much can you say to people who are not beneficiaries of the highest level of security clearance, such as senators you see before you? My information is - and I may be wrong - that this is a problem in other jurisdictions as well. I am not sure whether parliamentarians in other jurisdictions have decided that it would be useful to receive security clearance and thereby have access to classified information. I suppose the difficulty is if you get classified information, what can you do with it? Once you tell me something that is classified, I cannot tell anyone else. I know that Senator LaPierre and I would have a terrible time with that. We would just be able to talk to each other and maybe not even that. Could you expand a bit on your comment? Which way would you come down? Are we missing an awful lot by not having the security clearance? If we did, what could we do with it?

MGen. Maisonneuve: You are right; this is a problem. It is not just faced by groups, bodies and committees, and so forth, but even in our own defence community. I am sure our partners would say the same thing. The way to protect information is by compartmentalizing it and ensuring that we make it as difficult as possible for organizations to pick it up and put it all together. Essentially they are doing the same thing we are doing - putting the information together and developing their own products. It is a difficult situation.

It becomes a matter of trust. When people such as ourselves appear in front of you and say that a situation is a certain way, I guess there is a sense that you have to accept the information at face value or you have to accept our word. When we tell you that our assets are there and are capable and that we are collecting, sharing and analysing information in the way I described it, that is in fact what happens. The information does get used in the best way possible. We are not perfect, obviously, but we are very effective.

Senator Meighen: Do you mean, therefore, that we should not ask you how you collect it?

MGen. Maisonneuve: You can always ask, senator.

Senator Meighen: That is the sort of thing you cannot tell us. Therefore, you are suggesting that we must accept the final report that you give us stating that you do get information that leads you to conclude such and such, rather than that you got information from so and so by doing such and such.

MGen. Maisonneuve: Exactly. Sometimes it is not just the information that is protected, but the means of collecting it. Given that much of this information is not just collected through our own means, there is the possibility letting some information come out that would be deleterious to our partners. It is a real difficult question to answer.

Senator Meighen: You both stressed in your presentations the necessity for integration. The real key seems to be that the left hand knows what the right hand is doing and that one piece of information gets married to another. It forms a picture. I get the sense that we have a lot of work to do in Canada in that area. I am not seeking to be critical or political or anything. I just want to know whether that is an area of integration. Do you see that as an important area, either the RCMP or the Canadian Forces?

MGen. Maisonneuve: You are right. As I said, this is probably the most important part of analysis and collection and sharing. That is how we derive usable products.

If we look at it as a puzzle, we get little bits of information from different sources that are then put together. You improve your analysis capability, enhance it or make sure you always stay up to date by ensuring that you have all the bits of information that to one analyst may not seem important. However, to another, he or she will say, "Ah, well, that is where it fits." Sharing not only within government departments, which we try to emphasize, but with allies as well is definitely an essential, vital part of the way we do our business.

Mr. Loeppky: Historically, we look at the agencies in Canada and in the U.S. that are tasked with a variety of mandates. Clearly, I think that there have been some gaps, and we have been working very hard to fill them.

A number of issues must be addressed and are being addressed, such as technology systems that were created for very good reasons but may not communicate as well as they can today because of enhanced technology. There is also the issue of having a common objective when sharing intelligence.

One of the outcomes of September 11 was that it reinforced the need for each one of us to look into our organizations and to put that piece of the puzzle on the table. We recognize that depending on which area of activity you are involved in, whether it is Immigration Canada or the RCMP, for example, you all bring different pieces of information to the table.

One of the objectives of putting together integrated teams is that in the absence of getting the technology to communicate instantly, because there will be a time frame to put this in place, we at least have that information at the table through the various organizations that will be represented there.

I can say that the level of integration is much greater today than it has been in the past, and it clearly brings together a lot of new talent. The talent of an analyst in the one department and our analysts see things from a different perspective.When all of that is put together, it makes for a more complete picture.

[Translation]

Mr. Richard Proulx, Assistant Commissioner, Criminal Intelligence Directorate, Royal Canadian Mounted Police: For several years, we have had partnerships based on projects about organized crime. During the past three years, we have established permanent teams, integrated groups of investigators, in Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto and Vancouver, where we have been very successful. This is what we want to set up against terrorists. We want to work in partnership with other agencies, through permanent teams and not on a case-by-case basis.

Senator Meighen: I don't really understand your notion of integrated teams. Would that be teams representing different agencies?

Mr. Proulx: A team might include municipal and provincial police officers, members of Immigration Canada, of Revenue Canada, of Customs, and even sometimes of the Armed Forces, depending on the aim of the project and of the tools needed for security.

Senator Meighen: Are you pursuing this idea?

Mr. Proulx: About terrorism, yes.

[English]

Mr. Loeppky: Just to add on to that, the best example of that is the recent operation in Quebec and Ontario, Operation Printemps, which involved 29 police departments working together, along with other federal government and provincial government agencies, to really focus on a common target.

Senator Meighen: If I could address my last question perhaps to you, deputy commissioner.

In one of the documents that you were good enough to give us, you itemize $59 million in additional funding that you have received. While no one ever gets as much money as they would like, it is $59 million more than you had the day before and is of some help. If the Armed Forces, for example, decide they need a new fighter aircraft or, take a wild example, a new helicopter, by the time the request for proposal is issued, evaluated, considered and then the order is given, many years have passed. How quick is the bang for this $59 million worth of additional funding?

Mr. Loeppky: The $59 million is broken into $50.5 million for essentially capital expenditures and $9 million for FTD costs. As we speak, the teams that are included in that $9 million are being staffed and will be on the ground within the next several weeks.There will be some redeployment of personnel in order to do that, but they will be in place.

With respect to the capital component of that money, a good percentage of the goods are on order now. We anticipate that the entire $50.5 million will have resulted in acquisition of capital items that will be in place and will be functioning before year end.

Senator Meighen: That is very encouraging.

Senator LaPierre: I want to pursue two issues. The first has to do with training. Brigadier-General Samson, what makes a good intelligence officer? How do you describe that creature? You were a school teacher. One would never have thought that you would become an intelligence officer, and yet there you are on top of the pile.

Brigadier-General P. M. Samson, Director General, Intelligence, Department of National Defence: Senator, I guess I can start answering your question by saying that I was lucky to become an intelligence officer after being a school teacher.I believe that a good intelligence analyst is someone who is curious, someone who likes putting pieces of puzzles together. Basically, that is what intelligence is, of course. It is taking information from various areas, taking clues and putting them together to come out with a picture of hopefully what may happen in the future.

Not everyone can become a good intelligence analyst, but that does not mean that they cannot perform in other areas in the intelligence world. They could research various things without having to analyze them. Maybe all they are looking for are facts and they bring the facts to the table. Other people take these facts and add other things to them and come up with an analysis of something that may happen.

I would suspect that most people, even in this room, would be quite good at collecting any kind of information and turning it into intelligence. When you walk down the road and see something out of the ordinary, you can turn that into a piece of intelligence. If you are driving down the road and a ball crosses your path, very quickly your mind comes to the conclusion that maybe there is a child behind that ball. Therefore, chances are, a child will step out to pick up the ball. It is a very simple thing, but basically that is the nature of intelligence. You take information, add some ideas, some clues and the cultural dimension to it, and you come up with an analysis.

Senator LaPierre: How useful are the qualities ofJames Bond? That is our image of a spy and intelligence gatherer. Is that good?

BGen. Samson: I would suspect that that is pretty well the idea that a lot of people have. It is interesting that most people would like to have met James Bond.

I really do not know if we have spies who do such things today, to tell you the truth, because we in the military collect information overtly, not covertly.

Senator LaPierre: Do young people who graduate from university become intelligence officers? Is that career genuinely pursued by young people in our country?

BGen. Samson: Absolutely, senator. Some of our best analysts have graduated from university with a masters degree in political science or in research analysis. They make fantastic analytical people.

Senator LaPierre: They are seeking this career?

BGen. Samson: Absolutely. Within the government, of course, there are many agencies that deal with intelligence. I brought along some books that give an overview of the Canadian security and intelligence community. Within the government, there is a great career, and it is a wonderful place for young people to go.I brought some books for all of you.

Senator LaPierre: I will take one.

MGen. Maisonneuve: Both military and civilian, by the way, senator. It is not just the military realm.

Senator LaPierre: The other area I want to explore is the "one basket" idea. You say it is important that all of our collection assets not all be put into one basket. I also have difficulties with the pronoun "we." When you speak of "we," you mean we, the military intelligence, the RCMP intelligence, the CSIS intelligence. I can understand that you do not want to put all your assets in one basket. However, should we not put all of our collective agencies in one basket so that we have only one agency gathering information? That information could then be analyzed by the various people who do so. In that way, the sharing of information will really take place.

In the brief submitted on behalf of the RCMP, I was struck by the following sentence:

Accordingly third party agencies who may have sensitive information to provide are at times reluctant to share this information for fear of placing the identity of its sources in jeopardy.

We know now that there is a battle of computers going on, and we also know that turf has to be protected, which is the natural human thing to do. Therefore, if it is not classified, how impossible would it be to arrive at one agency made up of all of the experts of our country who then distribute the information to the various parties. There would only be one gatherer of information. Is that possible?

MGen. Maisonneuve: That is a very good question. I believe that the work of this committee will be very helpful in deciding which way this question goes.

My sense is that the sharing, the gathering, the collecting and the connection of the information does not necessarily need to be done from an ownership point of view. There are virtual organizations, committees and groups that get together to exchange this information. I spoke about the computer networks that we possess and that are available to enable us to share this information. Information moves seamlessly between organizations and enables us to put the pieces of puzzle together.

Do we need to put all of the resources under one umbrella to do a better job? I am not convinced.

The other thing that I would say is we all use intelligence for different reasons. The military uses it primarily to support our commanders who are deployed in the field. Obviously, we provide advice to the Minister of National Defence and our senior officials. However, how does that fit if everyone is put under one organization? I cannot answer that question.

Mr. Loeppky: We still do face some challenges in that area.In some cases, information or intelligence is provided from one law enforcement agency to another and is subject to third party rules.

Going back to your comment with respect to the challenges that we face in receiving information and protecting that information, the reality is that when we use that information for criminal prosecution, the law requires that there be full disclosure. That can create some difficult situations. When organizations have very sensitive or highly placed sources, there are challenges with respect to sharing all of that information. If we base a criminal investigation on that information and a subsequent prosecution takes place, then we are required by law to disclose all of the relevant information. That has posed some issues.

Senator LaPierre: We are not talking about murders. We are talking about defence and security. You all play a significant role in the defence and security of my country. More and more, the word "defence" and the word "security" are becoming synonymous for the vast majority of Canadians. They see these words as meaning the same thing. The military defends us, CSIS gathers the information to defend us, and the RCMP sees to it that everyone does their work. Consequently, do we have to face a new parameter, a new understanding, a new reality?

Mr. Loeppky: Yes, sir, we do.

When we talk about collecting information from an RCMP perspective, it is related to the criminal activities of individuals, whereas the mandate of CSIS is to collect national security information and intelligence. There is a divide based on mandates. Clearly, however, there is a very close sharing where possible, based on mandates and based on disclosure.

Senator Atkins: You have obviously had a chance to read the terrorist bill that is now being dealt with in the House of Commons, Bill C-36. What is your view of that bill and how does it help you?

Mr. Loeppky: We have had an opportunity to examine the legislative proposals that are before the House now. Clearly, those tools are required to enhance the ability of the law enforcement community to undertake organized crime or criminal investigations related to terrorists or terrorist-funded activities. It must be recognized that while those are enhanced tools, in a democratic society we are still subject and we must be subject to the Charter obligations. Therefore, I would emphasize that these legislative amendments must be adhered to in compliance with the existing Charter. We respect and support that notion.

I believe the legislative proposals that have been tabled will enhance our ability to undertake investigations related to terrorist activity involving crime. Clearly, we are supportive.

I could certainly speak to various components of the bill, such as the greater opportunity to look at the fundraising aspects of terrorist groups. That is one of their clear activities in Canada. As well, additional protection will be provided by legislative amendments to statutes such as the Canada Evidence Act.

We are supportive of the proposals that have been tabled, and we also recognize the significant responsibility that befalls the law enforcement community in using those tools in a democratic way in our country.

MGen. Maisonneuve: I would back that up as well, senator. The amendments that are proposed for the National Defence Act will help us to get our own house in order, which brings up the new definition of terrorism and what a terrorist is and so forth. The bill gives more tools to the military justice system to deal with these offences. I would also say we support the amendments.

Senator Atkins: Was the military and the RCMP consulted in the preparation of the bill?

Mr. Loeppky: Yes, we were.

I want to emphasize that this legislation is focused on identifying, prosecuting, convicting and punishing terrorist groups or people involved in fundraising for terrorist-related activities. It has to be clear that the bill has a very focused agenda.

Senator Atkins: Is there anything in the bill that is a disappointment to you? If you had an opportunity, would you recommend things that should be included in the bill?

Mr. Loeppky: We were consulted in terms of some of the tools, as were a number of other organizations. We will await the outcomes of the processes that are in place now to see what is passed at the end. We are very happy with what has been put on the table, and we applaud the government for taking these decisions and putting this bill forward.

MGen. Maisonneuve: On our side, no, nothing we can think of right now would further add to the bill.

Senator Atkins: Do you want me to prod you?

MGen. Maisonneuve: Well, if you think there is something, sir, I guess so.

Senator Atkins: Do you have the financial resources - and I am asking both the military and the RCMP - the financial personnel and the equipment to fight the campaign against terrorism?

MGen. Maisonneuve: I would say that every organization could use more funding, more resources and more of everything. However, what I can tell you is that, at this time, we are extremely effective. The services that we provide and the products that we produce are highly thought of by our allies. Of course, this is through cooperation with all the other government departments. No doubt, everyone could use more funding and more resources, but right now, we are very effective in what we do.

I think you have heard the ambassador of the U.S. in Canada say many times that they have been extremely happy with the cooperation and with the sharing of information.

Naturally, even before the events of September 11, we were looking at what capabilities we could enhance. I will let General Samson give you an idea of what those might be, but I spoke about them in my remarks. In all of my discussions with our allies, they never cease to say how happy they have been with the products we have provided to them with the current means we have at our disposal. I think we make the best with what we have. We are very effective. I think you can be proud of that.

BGen. Samson: Senator, in the area of intelligence, we are always looking to improve ourselves because if we do not do that, we will fall behind very quickly.Whether it be in the analytical world or putting together a fusion centre where all the information comes in to be analyzed and put out to the rest of the military, we are always looking at projects. At the end of the day, it may mean that we need more money or more people to continue providing better service, especially with the glut of information that will be coming down the pipe very soon as a result of new technologies. However, at the moment, as a result of September 11, we are very proud and our allies are very pleased with what we bring to the table.

Mr. Loeppky: The reality is that every organization could always do with more resources, but the key lies in leveraging resources with other organizations, with the greater law enforcement community and with other federal government departments. We must leverage resources to work together, to share information, and to work in an interdependent way, which we have perhaps not done as well as we needed to in the past.

We also recognize that our environment changes daily, which can drive some of those needs that may come up in the future. For example, when we look at protective policing and the pressures that exist in that area, that must be addressed. That is a very important responsibility and we do that. However, given the changing environment and what we have today, will it be sufficient in a year from now? That will depend on threats and how our situation unfolds.

We do not really understand to the extent we want to yet or that we need to the impact of the legislative proposals and what that will actually mean, although we are obviously assessing that impact.

The answer to me is that we must carefully pick where we can best use our resources, where we get the maximum bang for the buck. Clearly, we have to leverage our opportunities with other departments.

When we look at the teams that we are putting together, we are bringing the municipal and the provincial police forces - where we are not the provincial police force, such as in Ontario and Quebec - into those teams so we can also leverage their resources and their information to provide a more efficient use of taxpayers' dollars.

Senator Atkins: I guess if you were offered a second helicopter in Atlantic Canada, you would take it.

Mr. Loeppky: We would look at the pressures, and if that is where the greatest need was, we would certainly put it there.

Senator Atkins: Previous witnesses have suggested that they are quite happy - the RCMP and I think CSIS - to not have a central coordinating agency. What is your view of that?

Mr. Loeppky: When one looks at the structure, they both do account to the Solicitor General of Canada, so there is, in a sense, a common touch point for accountability. Their mandates are complementary and work well in a complementary way in terms of security intelligence versus criminal prosecution.

I think the structure as it exists is satisfactory. It is important that we work very closely together and that, where possible, without encroaching on mandates, we work collaboratively to the largest extent possible.

We recognize and respect that CSIS has a separate mandate.I believe that the notion of the security service as it was prior to 1984 and the situation that exists today certainly meets the needs of Canadians. It provides that separation of function. It is dependent, though, on a close working relationship. which we do have.

Senator Atkins: It is interesting that the first thing the Americans reacted to after September the 11 was the fact that they needed a coordinating agency because a lot of the information was falling between the chairs.

Mr. Loeppky: I am very familiar with some of those situations, but I will let my expert in the intelligence community respond to that.

Mr. Proulx: All of our intelligence on security matters is shared with CSIS. As you know, our mandate is to investigate criminal activities and to gather intelligence on criminal activities, and CSIS focuses on security and intelligence. We do share everything with respect to security interactions.

Senator Meighen: Senator Atkins is really on to the point I wanted to make about integration and sharing. We all can say and we all can feel that, yes, we are going to do better and we are going to share, but we get busy and we protect our own turf, as Senator LaPierre said, which is natural human inclination.

Do you think it would be helpful if the Prime Minister, or whoever, named a coordinator who would invite the RCMP, the military and CSIS to meet his or her office on a regular basis to talk about the exchange of information? Would that advance this file, in your opinion?

Mr. Loeppky: As you probably know, senator, there is an intelligence policy group that really does bring together some components of the intelligence community.

Senator Meighen: Are you referring to a recently reactivated cabinet committee?

Mr. Loeppky: No, this is a committee that is part of the security and intelligence component of the PCO. That is an opportunity to bring together the various partners around the table in terms of the security and intelligence community.

There is a challenge in terms of having full and open sharing of all information. Information sharing is good in practice, and I am a strong supporter of that, but I also recognize that due to our law enforcement role, we are subject to the law and the full disclosure component that exists in criminal prosecutions. That is occasionally a problem with respect to the full sharing of information because it may be information that has been received from other countries, third parties, if they were all in one area. My sense would be that the law enforcement community, because of its unique criminal enforcement component, creates some barriers.

Senator LaPierre: I am a little lost here. Do you mean to tell me that if the RCMP receives information that affects the security of Canada but falls under the rubric of criminal intelligence gathering, you will not pass it on? Full disclosure will take place in a closed court. Judges have done that before in matters of this kind. Are you telling us that there is a loophole that may very well affect the security of Canada?

Mr. Loeppky: Not at all, senator. As Assistant Commissioner Proulx mentioned, when we receive information, we can certainly pass that on. The challenge is that when we receive information with respect to someone who may be involved in criminal activity and we initiate a prosecution as a result, that information may be subject to disclosure in court. That is where the challenge exists.

Senator Wiebe: My questions are similar to what Senator LaPierre and other senators mentioned in regard to the number of different intelligence gathering agencies in our country. We have CSIS, the RCMP and the various sections of our armed services. There is probably a very good reason and very logical reason for this. It is difficult for me to understand the reasoning, perhaps because it has not been clearly explained to me. In the back of my mind, my fear is that sometimes the right hand may not be aware of what the left hand is doing. Are there areas of intelligence where one group thinks that the other one is looking after things, only to find out that no one has been monitoring a particular issue?

Second, how quickly can someone out in the field get the intelligence information that he requires? Say, for example, the intelligence is held by the armed services. What kind of clearance does this poor guy out in the field need to get that kind of intelligence, and how long does it take for that to come back again? Do we run the risk of having so many different tentacles out there that the intelligence we need is not of any value by the time we receive it? Do you understand the direction in which I am going?

MGen. Maisonneuve: Yes, I do, senator. I will answer thefirst portion of your question, and then I will let General Samson answer the second, which looks at the manner and the use of the intelligence and how quickly we can get it.

In terms of coordination, you are right when you say it is vital and essential so that intelligence does not fall through the cracks, so that information is used properly and so that there is no assumption or speculation that someone else will handle something without actually putting it on the table and saying,"We must deal with this" or "We must go in this direction."

I was just looking at the little book that we will provide you. It explains exactly what my colleague from the RCMP mentioned. Reporting to the Clerk of the Privy Council is the Deputy Clerk, Counsel and Security Intelligence Coordinator. His mandate from the Prime Minister is to coordinate the security intelligence activities of all Canadian government departments and agencies and to promote effective international intelligence relationships. Right now, I would say that this is the primary means of coordinating all the different agencies, organizations and departments that are gathering intelligence. By the way, they are enumerated in this booklet in pretty good detail.

I would reinforce one fact: Do we need to own all the agencies, all the capabilities, to effectively coordinate, share and be connected?

You pointed out the different mandates of the different organizations. The Department of National Defence primarily looks at supporting our commanders in the field and providing information upwards for advice to the minister, which is a different mandate than that of the RCMP. In spite of that, however, we do coordinate and cooperate. We are tightly connected. We must continue to make efforts in this direction. We are not perfect, but we currently have this mechanism with PCO and we are well connected everywhere else.

BGen. Samson: Senator, every entity within Canada that collects information, analyzes it and comes up with an intelligence product uses it for their own purpose. Everyone has their own individual goals. In the military, of course, the intelligence is for military use, to preserve and to provide protection for our forces. CSIS collects their intelligence for the security of Canada, and the RCMP gathers criminal intelligence for their needs. I believe that if everything was under one roof, we would end up fighting over priorities. What is more important today? Where should the money go?

I believe in having different entities. For example, we focus on the needs of our particular department, of our particular area of expertise. That does not mean we do not share. I can assure you that we do.

In the military, any product that we write up goes on our classified network. When we deal with the soldiers, the sailors and the airmen, their computers are linked to ours and everything is available to them.

We have coordination and command centre that operates24 hours a day, seven days a week. When information comes to the centre, we have people who can analyze it and put it back out five, ten minutes, half an hour, an hour later depending on the urgency to get it back out. We are equipped to do that here. We are equipped to do that when our troops are deployed. General Maisonneuve can probably speak to that capability because he has been deployed more often than I have.

Mr. Loeppky: I want to touch on the aspect of whether we share information as well as we need to. Perhaps I can just share with you an example post-September 11.

We have a national operations centre in Ottawa, which has been activated since that time. The national operations centre is under the direction of the RCMP, but it contains representatives from other federal government departments, from CSIS from the FBI. We have a full sharing of information. These departments and organizations have access to our information and, in return, we obviously have access to any of their available databanks.

With respect to access of our information from the field,I would suggest that our members all have access to the information that Assistant Commissioner Proulx has in the databanks. We do not restrict that information at all in terms of where it is needed for investigational purposes of criminal activity.

The Deputy Chairman: For the purpose of excusing thetwo generals, I wish to express our warmest appreciation to them for appearing before the committee this evening. We thank them for having the fortitude to carry on under very difficult circumstances and to do such a splendid job. Many of us are not nearly as worried about our physical security as we are about our mental security.

Senator Wiebe: Mr. Loeppky, you will have to excuse my ignorance. "PCO" has been used a number of times. Can you tell me what PCO stands for?

Mr. Loeppky: The Privy Council Office.

There is a subcommittee within the PCO called the Intelligence Policy Group, which is primarily at the associate or assistant deputy minister level or the key representatives from the intelligence units of each agency. For example, Assistant Commissioner Proulx would represent the RCMP on that subcommittee. That subcommittee meets to share common issues and to discuss threats to the country. It has a fairly defined role. It reports to a committee of deputy ministers called the Interdepartmental Committee on Security and Intelligence. It studies and analyzes the work of the subgroup that is made up of the departmental intelligence people.

Senator Wiebe: Would the PCO, then, ensure that there is no duplication in ongoing investigative work?

Mr. Loeppky: That is correct. It provides government-wide security assessment, which various agencies feed into. I think it is important to differentiate between national security information, which is clearly the mandate of that committee, and criminal intelligence, which is not.

Senator Wiebe: We seem to have a scattered approach to not only intelligence but to providing security for this country. We have a border with the U.S. that one department and one agency looks after and which comes under one minister. We have our ports into which a lot of container material can be smuggled. Another agency looks after that. We have our airports. We have another agency looking after that. I understand the system now being used to gather intelligence. However, in terms of providing security at ports of entry, it would be much better to have one organization look after that. It would report to one minister rather than have shotgun approaches and the same standard being applied to A as it is to B and to C. In your work, do you find any difficulties with that scattered approach?

Mr. Loeppky: One of the initiatives that we are putting in place is integrated border enforcement teams, which would include not only borders but also ports of entry, which are, in effect, borders, as well as airports. These integrated border enforcement teams have not only representation from the RCMP but also representation from other federal government departments, such as immigration and customs. We have representation on some of the teams from municipal departments that have policing responsibility.

These teams are underpinned by a number of initiatives. They have a very focused mandate along the border and at points of entry such as ports. They are underpinned by the programs that we have between the ports and between the points of entry.

One of our initiatives is called Jetway, which focuses on airport security and illegal activity at airports. Project Convoy focuses on highways and vehicular traffic involved in criminal activity. There is an interconnectedness between points of entry along the borders and in between those points.

Senator Wiebe: Is there not a lot of overlap and duplication here? Would it not be better to have the RCMP, our national police force, do all of the policing in this country in regard to our airports, our ports and our highways? We have provincial police, municipal police, port police and airport security police; you name it. While there is some coordination, I do not feel comfortable in my own mind that the same level of security is there because it is not under one proven police force or organization within this country. I am not saying that just because both of you wear the RCMP uniform. I believe very strongly in that.

Mr. Loeppky: I certainly appreciate your kind comments.

We must ensure that we have a consistently high level of law enforcement in Canada, of training and of professionalism. We recognize that there may be different structures in different provinces and maybe different decisions made with respect to who does the policing. I believe that the RCMP has a very clear leadership role in bringing those various entities together so that we can benefit from all of the knowledge around the table and so that we can become interdependent in terms of how we provide the best service.

Mr. Proulx: You must also realize that we have a federal presence in all of these places that you mentioned. At the border, we are responsible to enforce the Customs Act as well as the Immigration Act in between the ports. We are also present in most of the airports, the international airports, be it for a federal presence or for national security. In the ports, because we are federal police, we have also a mandate on drugs, immigration, customs, and so on.

Senator Day: I wonder if I am being too simplistic when I think in terms of intelligence activity as being divisible into the gathering, exchanging and amassing of information and then another activity being the analysis of all that information. Is there a convergence in those activities, or can we think of them as two different activities within the global intelligence field?

Mr. Loeppky: Various organizations gather intelligence for quite different purposes. The military gathers intelligence for the protection and the security of their soldiers, their people, and has that type of an outlook. With respect to the RCMP, we gather criminal intelligence to ultimately undertake criminal prosecution. That is our role. We gather that component of intelligence. CSIS gathers national security intelligence. There are different needs for the type of intelligence one is looking for and how it is put to use.

With respect to the common analysis of intelligence once it has been gathered, there are opportunities and there are cases, I believe, where that type of analysis has taken place. PerhapsMr. Proulx can expand on that point.

Mr. Proulx: In the RCMP, all police officers are de facto intelligence officers because they are gathering information, willingly or not, which goes into the database. We also have trained intelligence officers who are only dedicated to that function. They are top-notch investigators who only want to collect information. They collect this information from investigators, from open sources, and so on, and this information is passed on to the analysts. A group of analysts analyze the information and transform it into intelligence. That information can be used for decision making by senior management at the strategic level and can be used on a technical level so that we can target the right suspects and set our priorities. We have a group of analysts who can be police officers, also civilian members, depending on who is doing what. The strategic level is composed mainly of civilian members, and the technical level is a mix of civilian members and police officers.

Mr. Loeppky: Criminal Intelligence Service Canada is within the RCMP. It is a national police service. Within that service, there is representation from other government departments in terms of the analytical component that actually feeds their interest into an overall analysis component.There is that integration within the Criminal Intelligence Service Canada component.

Senator Day: Is there the possibility for more global coordination in the gathering of information from the many different sources, whereas applying your specific mandate takes analysis by people who understand your specific mandate and what you are looking for? Rather than talking about a global basket organization for the overall activity, is it possible to divide the activities and achieve better coordination at the gathering stage?

Mr. Proulx: Actually, the activities are divided. We have a group that works mainly on organized crime, and we have also a group that works on national security investigation. Of course, that is done very closely with our colleagues from CSIS and sometimes with the Armed Forces, when it is necessary. In other words, we do work in close cooperation. Information is being shared.

As mentioned earlier, most of our information, if not all, is passed on to CSIS with respect to security intelligence. It is not the same with information coming from CSIS to us because of the legal requirements when we arrest individuals and we go to court. We are required to disclose the information.

We work in sync, but we have different mandates. I can assure you that we work very closely together, as we do with other provincial police forces. Large municipal police forces are also involved with us.

Senator Day: Could you explain how the sharing of information on an international basis functions? Am I right in thinking that policing operations in other countries would share policing information with you on criminal activities, whereas international political activities might be shared with CSIS and military activities would be shared with the RCMP? Is that the flow?

Mr. Proulx: You are absolutely right, senator. We deal with foreign police agencies. CSIS deals with their counterparts in security and intelligent services, and of course the military deals with the military from other countries.

Information sharing takes place mostly at RCMP headquarters - CSIS to the RCMP headquarters - or sometimes in the field, in the divisions, because we also have local detachments or divisions. CSIS also has regional offices, and we are in contact with those offices.

Mr. Loeppky: Perhaps I could respond to the question about international cooperation within the law enforcement community.

Canada and the RCMP are members of Interpol. We have an Interpol branch within our headquarters building, and it acts as a conduit for enquiries coming into Canada and for enquiries going out. It is closely connected to Interpol headquarters in Leon, France. One of our analysts is over there working in their analytical area for criminal intelligence. We do have that international liaison on a daily basis.

I referred earlier to the initiatives that the commissioner has undertaken and in which Assistant Commissioner Proulx has been involved - that is, bringing the law enforcement community together in countries with which we have a good working relationship, countries that have common criminal threats or activity, common criminal groups. They are looking at how to do a common threat assessment to ensure that, collectively, we are targeting the appropriate criminal organizations. We know that criminal organizations operate globally and transact money globally; therefore, that is the level at which we need to attack them. We need to bring together that international law enforcement intelligence community to look at common threats and threat levels, to develop a common measurement tool, and then to do the enforcement action collectively.

Senator Day: Is it conceivable that CSIS would be looking for information from the FBI in the United States in relation to a particular group's activities and that the RCMP would also be looking for information? Would you both go independently to the FBI asking for that information, or does the Privy Council Office get involved in coordinating requests for that flow of activity?

Mr. Loeppky: No, that is generally done agency to agency. In most cases, agencies would be in contact with their counterparts in another country.

In our case, because we have a multi-faceted mandate, we deal with a number of agencies in the USA: the Drug Enforcement Administration for drug matters; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms for explosives, for firearms and for alcohol smuggling; the FBI primarily for organized crime; as well as a host of local and state agencies that are in existence.

Clearly, then, there are challenges in terms of making sure that we get all of the partners to the table when we are dealing with our colleagues south of the border.

Mr. Proulx: To clarify a point you made, senator, if we were to investigate a terrorist group, CSIS would be aware of it, that is for sure.

Senator Meighen: And vice versa?

Mr. Proulx: Not necessarily. It depends if the group is involved in criminal activity.

Senator Meighen: Most of them are.

Mr. Proulx: Most of them are, but some are not at that stage yet.

Senator Day: In your submission, two points stood out in my mind. One was that the RCMP retained its responsibility for investigating criminal offences relating to national security, and you go on to say that CSIS has the responsibility for political activities that are threats to national security. In reality, can you really differentiate between those two, especially in light of international terrorism that in many instances is defined as a criminal activity and that we know in many cases is politically-motivated? How do you coordinate your activities in that modern context?

Mr. Loeppky: CSIS collects information concerning individuals or groups who pose a threat to the security of Canada, such as linkages, ideology, structure, and recruitment into the organization, while the RCMP is only interested in the criminal activities of individuals involved within that group. CSIS clearly is engaged in national security issues, such fundraising - which before this point in time was not necessarily a criminal activity - recruiting, and promoting a terrorist ideology in Canada to support initiatives in their homeland. These issues impact our national security. However, our role is to look at the criminal activity of those groups or individuals. There is a complementary mandate that we need to work at and we do work at to ensure that there are no gaps and that there is a common approach to our activities.

Mr. Proulx: We also have liaison officers in place. We have a program of liaison officers at headquarters and in most of the major cities.

Senator Day: Would it not be easier if you were together?

Mr. Proulx: We were together before 1984.

Senator Day: I understand that, and we experimented with dividing you in 1984.

Mr. Loeppky: We work closely together and we have a common objective, which is to keep Canada safe.

The Deputy Chairman: Do you have any knowledge of files on members of Parliament, including senators, that are being kept up to date and maintained?

Mr. Loeppky: No, we do not maintain files unless we are involved in a criminal investigation.

The Deputy Chairman: I will not ask you that question. I do not want to put members of parliament on the spot.

Can I turn back to the PCO? We are dealing here as much with the good health and secure feelings of Canadians as we are with the things that we cannot touch, cannot see and do not really understand. However, in this area, I think Canadians do understand. In that connection, how often do you meet with the PCO committee? How often did you meet with them, for example, prior to September 11?

Mr. Loeppky: I believe the meetings were twice a month, every two weeks, to assess issues and to look at a variety of projects that were underway. For example, we had input into publication of the booklet referred to earlier.

Since September 11, the meetings have obviously taken place much more frequently, depending on the state of not necessarily the threat but the state of activity in terms of what was going on. Post September 11, there were very frequent meetings to ensure that there were no gaps in the information. I do not have an exact agenda in terms of which meetings took place on which date, but they were much more frequent.

The Deputy Chairman: Would they meet as frequently as six or eight times a month?

Mr. Loeppky: I would believe so, yes. More than that.

The Deputy Chairman: Which government departments are present? For example, DND certainly would be there and the force would certainly be there and CSIS would certainly be there. Was Immigration Canada present?

Mr. Loeppky: Yes, immigration would be there. Customs would be there. Transport would be there. Justice would be there. There may be a few others. I do not have the list in front of me.

The Deputy Chairman: That is pretty broad participation.

Mr. Loeppky: Foreign affairs would be there. The various departments that have a role in terms of intelligence and security matters would be present.

The Deputy Chairman: How large is the PCO security section? If it is a problem to answer that question, do not answer it.

Are one or two people involved, or is it a secretariat?

Mr. Loeppky: It is a secretariat, but I am not sure about the actual staffing levels of PCO.

The Deputy Chairman: Are ministers present regularly? Do ministers attend?

Mr. Loeppky: No, they do not. It is an assistant deputy minister level. The heads of intelligence or the heads of intelligence coordinators from each of the agencies are there. That is who represents us.

The Deputy Chairman: Is that because of a need to know?

Mr. Loeppky: No. They are best placed to bring the issues to the table, I believe.

The Deputy Chairman: The other question I have has to do with pursuit. Are there any members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police who work in countries other than Canada?

Mr. Loeppky: Yes. We have a fairly extensive foreign liaison program. I believe that there are about 30 members in 22 different countries, if I am not mistaken.

The Deputy Chairman: Are any of those members engaged in intelligence work?

Mr. Loeppky: No.

The Deputy Chairman: What are they? Are they liaison people with the police forces of the various countries?

Mr. Loeppky: They have several roles, but their key role is to act in a liaison capacity to facility Canadian-based investigations and to provide an assessment to us in terms of the criminal environment within which they work. Their role is primarily one of liaison and interaction with the other police organizations in those countries.

The Deputy Chairman: Are members of the force doing intelligence work in countries beyond the 22 that you have identified?

Mr. Loeppky: No. Our role is strictly one of liaison with law enforcement communities to further criminal investigations and build those partnerships.

The Deputy Chairman: Does Immigration Canada have people doing investigative work on the ground in foreign countries other than the normal staffs at our embassies?

Mr. Loeppky: I believe their role is to vet visas and that type of thing. Mr. Proulx was involved in the immigration program for the RCMP, but to my knowledge, that is their role.

Mr. Proulx: They also have immigration control officers who deal with local authorities with respect to the criminal and security screening of potential immigrants.

The Deputy Chairman: To your knowledge, are any foreign intelligence gathering forces, such as American immigration personnel, currently pursuing investigations on Canadian soil?

Mr. Loeppky: No. Their role here is very similar to our role in the U.S., for example.

The Deputy Chairman: It is very similar, but the question is as precise as I can put it. Are there any, to your knowledge?

Mr. Loeppky: No, not conducting investigations; but acting in a liaison capacity, yes.

The Deputy Chairman: Then there are ongoing investigations.

My general question had to do with pursuit. How do you pursue? Under what authority and under what laws do you pursue? How do you protect the people we send off in pursuit, even if they are liaison personnel?

Mr. Loeppky: I am sorry. I did not understand the question correctly.

The U.S. has no police officer or peace officer status in Canada. They provide information to us on relevant investigations that are of interest to them in the U.S. and then we take the action pursuant to that liaison. Having somebody on the ground here simply provides a more direct avenue of discussion than having somebody in the U.S. In terms of having the ability to move inquiries forward, our experience is to have a liaison program. It really facilitates getting the responses and getting the work done.

The Deputy Chairman: Do you know if CSIS has personnel off-shore? I notice there is some money for that purpose.

The companion question to that, of course, is this: Is CSIS host to international forces pursuing intelligence activities in our country and with our goodwill and support?

Mr. Loeppky: CSIS has a important liaison program as well, but I am not sure how extensive it is. I am not aware of the presence of foreign intelligence agencies in Canada.

Senator Atkins: I gather we will host the G20 conference.

Mr. Loeppky: That is correct.

Senator Atkins: Who is responsible for coordinating the security for that event, which will be pretty high-profile.

Mr. Loeppky: Under the Security Offences Act, we have a mandate to provide protection to internationally protected persons. That is a responsibility of ours, and we will obviously have a lead role in providing protection. However, it is very much a joint effort in conjunction with the Ottawa-Carleton Police, the Ontario Provincial Police, in terms of bringing their various pieces to the table. CSIS will also bring their information to the table in terms of threat assessments. The mandate for the protection of individuals who are here and are designated "protectees" is the ultimate responsibility of the force.

Senator Atkins: Would this conference be a bigger challenge than, say, the NATO conference that we hosted a week or so ago?

Mr. Loeppky: I believe it has a different profile and, consequently, is the subject of different interest groups. We are sensitive to that and are preparing for it.

In preparation for this conference, which will take place in the very near future, we can certainly build on the planning that was done for the G8.

Senator Atkins: Will it include, say, the President of the United States?

Mr. Loeppky: It will be at the level the finance minister.

Senator Atkins: Not the heads of state?

Mr. Loeppky: No.

Senator Meighen: You gentlemen are both aware of the fact that some people in Canada believe that we should indeed have an off-shore intelligence-gathering capability. This is not, as I understand it, a function of CSIS at the present time. You are also well aware this would be a relatively expensive operation. According to assessments that I have read, even if we did set up such a thing, we would not get much information from it for approximately 10 years or some considerable period of time.

That being said, and leaving aside the small "p" political ramifications of the question, would it be useful to you if tomorrow I could snap my fingers and there were international off-shore Canadian intelligence-gathering operations?

Mr. Loeppky: There is no question that many of our terrorists threats arise from what I would call homeland issues from other parts of the country and from other parts of the world. Therefore, there is a need to know what is going on there, to know what is behind those types of issues so that we can address them in a more proactive way.

We work closely with foreign agencies to ensure that we understand the environment and the issues. When those issues are brought to Canadian soil, we need the capacity and the ability to address them.

Do we have all the information we need, as much as we would like? I guess it is always beneficial to have more.

Would we have more information if we had the ability to gather foreign intelligence, not necessarily ourselves, but a Canadian component? You might have information that has not been filtered and that is probably more reliable, but, clearly, that decision would have to be made beyond us.

Senator Meighen: Mr. Proulx had said at one point that all officers are intelligence gatherers because they have to keep their eyes open. Do I assume that liaison officers abroad do not just liaise but also keep their eyes open and, therefore, act as intelligence gatherers?

Mr. Loeppky: Intelligence is a very broad term. It involves the open intelligence on the Internet. It involves intelligence of what is seen and heard. Clearly, liaison officers are not out there actively gathering intelligence. I certainly would not want to send that message. However, if issues are brought to their attention by foreign law enforcement agencies that impact on us, if that is intelligence gathering, they would record that and provide it to us; but, they are not out there actively soliciting agents and recruiting agents.

The Deputy Chairman: I would express our sincerest thanks to both of you for appearing here and to our earlier witnesses as well.

The Senate committee has been meeting to survey the major security and defence matters facing Canada. This evening, we have focused on how intelligence is collected, the different ways it is analyzed, and how this information is then distributed to the people who need and use it. We have heard the views of a knowledgeable group of specialists about what should happen.

The committee's work will continue on October 29 when we will hear further from government officials, such as Mr. Richard Fadden, Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council. He is responsible for intelligence at the PCO.

To those of you at home following our work, please visit our Web site by going to www.senate-senat.ca/defence.asp. We post the testimony of witnesses, as well as confirmed hearing schedules. Otherwise, you may contact the clerk of the committee by calling 1-800-267-7362 for further information or assistance in contacting the members of the committee.

The committee adjourned.