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SOCI - Standing Committee

Social Affairs, Science and Technology

 

Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Social Affairs, Science and Technology

Issue 20 - Evidence for September 18, 2003


OTTAWA, Thursday, September 18, 2003

The Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology met this day at 11:03 a.m. to study on the infrastructure and governance of the public health system in Canada, as well as on Canada's ability to respond to public health emergencies arising from outbreaks of infectious disease.

Senator Marjory LeBreton (Deputy Chairman) in the Chair.

[English]

The Deputy Chairman: We are continuing our study on the infrastructure of governance of the public health system in Canada, as well as Canada's ability to respond to public health emergencies. The recent example of SARS focused our mind on this.

Our witnesses this morning, from Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, are Andrew Marsland, Gilles Lavoie, Judith Bossé and Dr. Karen Dodds. Welcome to our committee.

Dr. Dodds, I understand you will present first. Please proceed.

Dr. Karen Dodds, Director General, Food Directorate, Health Products and Food Branch, Health Canada: So I am sharing this presentation with my colleagues from the Canadian Food Inspection Agency and from Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada. It is a pleasure to be with you here this morning to talk about food safety and public health with a specific reference to governance infrastructure and the response to Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, BSE, that we have lived through since the announcement May 20 of a case of BSE in the domestic herd in Canada.

The remit of this committee is looking at public health. It is appropriate that you asked for examination of BSE, because internationally food safety is considered a fundamental part of public health. It is dealt with in other countries often in agencies apart from disease surveillance and control agency. However, food safety and water safety are considered to be important parts of public health.

You can see this when the World Health Organization was established in 1948. Part of their mandate was food safety, considered part of the public health mandate. That was reaffirmed in May 2000, when the World Health Assembly adopted a resolution calling on the World Health Organization to recognize food safety as an essential public health function. It can be taken for granted in countries that have a well-developed food safety system, but it needs to be cared and nurtured and tended to in countries developing a food safety system.

There are a number of different depictions that relate food safety, animal and plant health, and the whole environment to the impact on human health. This is one example. Obviously, human food tends to be our largest exposure to any environmental contaminant, be it an infectious contaminant or a chemical contaminant.

Plants, but more especially, animals, are a way of conveying some of those contaminants to us. Animals are similar physiological beings to humans, so micro-organisms that cause disease in animals can often cause disease in humans. There must be close links between animal health and human health. Food is often the vehicle — but not always. What the animals are exposed to in the environment and through inputs such as feed can affect their health, which affects human health.

The food safety system in Canada is complex and there are a number of different levels and different players in the system. It is important that each level and each player also pay attention. We speak to the federal government, the provincial and territorial governments, municipal governments, the food industry, the agricultural sector itself, consumers who obviously play an important role through the foods they choose and how they handle food, and civil society in participating in decision making and policy development.

At the federal level in Canada, the mandate for food safety is divided. Health Canada has the responsibility for establishing standards and policies relating to food safety and food nutrition. That is, for tolerances for chemical contaminants, microbiological contaminants and for certain processes such as pasturization. We are responsible for setting those aspects of food safety for reviewing submissions from industry for new food additives for genetically modified foods.

We also have a responsibility to evaluate the effectiveness of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency's activities that relate to food safety and, as you heard yesterday, another important part of our mandate is outbreak control and disease surveillance and the public health response. It is important that those two parts have close links because they need to work together. We do research, surveillance, epidemiology, risk assessment, policy development, standard setting and regulation.

Ms. Judith Bossé, Vice-President, Science, Canadian Food Inspection Agency: The Canadian Food Inspection Agency has a role to play in the area of public health, related to food and disease that can be transmitted directly from the animal or the plant to humans. We are developing policy in the inspection program for the enforcement and compliance with federal food standards and policies and we are also developing standards and policy for animal and plant health, which are leading to programs that will enforce and ensure compliance with the standards and policies.

For example, we do regulate inputs such as animal feed to ensure that this will not go into the food chain. We do regulate veterinary biologics, which are vaccines used in animals but could represent a risk to humans depending on how they are produced. We have numerous animal disease control programs, some of which pertain to tuberculosis, anthrax or BSE. We conduct surveillance monitoring, intelligence function, research and test development similar to what Health Canada is doing, but looking at the animal diseases as a whole and not just the ones giving concern to public health, knowing that public health issues are at the top of the pyramid.

Mr. Andrew Marsland, Acting Assistant Deputy Minister, Market and Industry Services Branch, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada: Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada's principle role in relation to food safety is to lead the development of policies and programs to support the agriculture and agri-food industry in succeeding in the marketplace and responding to the demands of consumers. Most pertinent in this respect is development of the Agricultural Policy Framework, which responds to an increasingly complex marketplace where consumers are much more concerned about the foods that they eat and the manner in which they are prepared.

The Agricultural Policy Framework is federal-provincial/territorial initiative. All provinces have signed on to the framework agreement and we are currently negotiating implementation agreements with particular provinces.

There are five pillars to the framework: business risk management, science and innovation, environment, renewal, and food safety and quality. We are helping farmers and producers gain the management skills and technical skills they need to succeed in a complex environment.

For this committee, safety and quality is the most pertinent. In that context, the Agricultural Policy Framework aims at establishing targets and programs in four key areas. The first one is food safety. We are developing food safety systems along the food production chain, including on-farm Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point, HACCP, based systems, on a national basis. We also provide surveillance information to the industry and governance of those systems.

Second, the objective under the topic of quality is to provide a framework whereby industry can develop quality standards to help them succeed in the market place. Third, we are developing tracing and tracking systems in all major commodity groups to facilitate the trace back of particular products to the farm gate. Finally, we are undertaking research to identify risks and support industry-led systems.

An important part of the agreements is the development of targets and public reporting to Canadians on how governance and industry have done in meeting those targets.

[Translation]

Ms. Dodds: I will now describe the provincial and territorial responsibilities. Each province is responsible for the development of standards and policies for agriculture and food destined for trade or consumption within its borders. The department responsible varies from province to province. The responsibility sometimes rests with the Department of Agriculture and sometimes with the Department of Health.

[English]

You cannot predict from province to province if it will be the minister of health or the minister of agriculture. There are also responsibilities at the municipal level. They are responsible primarily for regulation and inspection of food premises, which include food service establishments such as cafeterias and restaurants. In some provinces — British Columbia and Ontario, for example — they have delegated some responsibility for food safety from provincial ministries of health to regional public health units.

Ms. Bossé: It is understood among the three departments that we need close collaboration on food safety matters given that measures to protect animal and plant health are an important and complimentary part of public health protection actions. An MOU has been developed between Health Canada and CFIA. Some MOUs are being developed between AFC and CFIA, as well as between AFC and Health Canada under the APF.

[Translation]

We now have various committees coordinating the activities of Health Canada and the agency or Agriculture Canada. These committees are made up of deputy ministers as well as members from all levels down to the working level: there also working groups who discuss more specific issues.

[English]

The Deputy Chairman: I would remind the witness that when you use an acronym, please explain what it is.

Dr. Dodds: There is also a well-developed system for coordination between the federal and provincial/territorial levels. I will bring to your attention specifically three committees. The Canadian Food Inspection System Implementation Group is perhaps the broadest of the three committees. It involves participants from the federal level — the three departments represented here — and a representative from health and from agriculture from each province. Its focus is looking at national standards and coordination amongst the different agencies.

There is also a federal/provincial/territorial committee on food safety policy. This group discusses the development of policies and standards but again has both participation from health and from agriculture and it is led by Health Canada.

There is also the Federal/Provincial/Territorial Agri-Food Inspection Committee, which is led by the Canadian Food Inspection Agency with participation of Agriculture Canada and provincial ministries of agriculture. There are also new committees in discussion of governance considering the Agriculture Policy Framework.

We also have explicit federal/provincial/territorial agreements and protocols. One that is germane to the issue is Food-Borne Illness Outbreak Response Protocol, which is across all parts of Health Canada and includes the Canadian Food Inspection Agency. The provinces have agreed to the protocol. It clearly sets leads and other responsibilities in the situation of a food borne illness.

If the illness is detected first, the public health-medical side takes the lead. My colleagues who were here yesterday from the population and public health branch have the lead at the federal level for investigating the outbreak. Whereas the responsibility for working at the food level — which may include analysis of food — but more important, investigations of food premises rests with the Canadian Food Inspection Agency and/or the province depending on the way in which the food is in commerce within Canada.

The Canadian Food Inspection Agency also has bilateral agreements with many provinces with respect to the inspection responsibilities within a province.

[Translation]

Ms. Bossé: If I may, I would like to describe our response to the detection of a case of BSE.

The infected cow was diagnosed by one of the veterinary laboratories in the network that was put in place in early 2002 for BSE surveillance. BSE was confirmed in tissue samples from the cow, samples that had undergone routine testing. The case was refered to CFIA and the sample was immediately sent to the reference laboratory in Winnipeg, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency laboratory.

Since this was the first case detected in Canada, the agency proceeded normally. The sample was sent to the World Reference Laboratory and testing there confirmed on June 20 that the cow was infected with BSE.

The agency immediately launched an investigation to determine the origin of the cow and how the carcass has been disposed of. This investigation led the agency to conclude that no meat from that animal had entered the human food chain. It was also established that according to the way the cow has been slaughtered, the meat had been sent to a feed mill, but it had not entered the ruminant food chain.

It is most likely that this animal was contaminated through animal feed, specifically through proteins commonly used to feed animals. We concluded at the end of our investigation over the summer that no other animal had been infected with BSE.

[English]

Dr. Dodds: It was clear after the confirmation of an animal with Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, BSE, that a response, which included a public health response, was necessary. Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, vCJD, is the human disease that is associated with BSE. It is a neurodegenerative disease and is incurable. It has a long incubation period and is always fatal. There have been 145 cases worldwide against a background of an animal epidemic that in the U.K. alone affected approximately 200,000 animals but it may have been a total of 2 million animals infected with BSE. A number of international cases, such as the one identified in Canada one year ago, have been associated with residence and consumption of beef in the U.K.

There are considerations for human health and public health that go beyond food safety. Health Canada has had a blood donor deferral policy that relates to the BSE status of a country and the length of residence in a country. There are a number of other therapeutic products that include pharmaceuticals, medical devices, biologics and vaccines, natural health products and cosmetics that may contain an active or other ingredient that may be a derivation of a bovine source. For example, gelatin and gelatin capsules may be from a bovine source.

All other countries that have identified a case of domestic BSE have implemented additional controls, typically at both the public health/human health level and also at the animal health level. Before May 20, Canada and other countries had considered that we were provisionally free of BSE. We had implemented controls on imports; we had the surveillance system; and we had a feed ban, even though we had never detected BSE in Canada. The finding of one positive cow changed our understanding of what the prevalence level of the disease may be in Canada. Officials from Health Canada, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, the industry and public health have considered revision of the policies relating to human and animal health.

Mr. Marsland: I think we are all well aware of the reaction of the world to the discovery of a case of BSE in Alberta. In context, the beef industry has been successful at growing export markets. It exports about $4.4 billion in live cattle, beef and beef products. That represents approximately 60 per cent of total production and 50 per cent of production is exported to the U.S. The response of our trading partners was quite immediate: They closed the borders. A total of some 34 countries imposed restrictions on exports of beef and cattle from Canada immediately. That was a typical response to a case of BSE.

In terms of the investigation, an official from the Canadian Food Inspection Agency immediately recognized the need for a review of its investigation and so a team of exports was engaged to perform that review. Their report strongly endorsed the strength and thoroughness of the investigation and contained a number of recommendations in terms of actions that Canada should consider in response to this expression of a single case. In effect, the recommendations included a review of our surveillance policies for BSE, feed policies for BSE, public education, tracking and tracing, et cetera.

The Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food immediately met with the Beef Industry Value Chain Roundtable on May 28, just over one week after the discovery of the case. After discussions with that roundtable, a five-point plan was proposed in response to the case. Those five points included surveillance, review of the feed policy, strengthening the existing tracking and tracing system in the beef industry, looking at on-farm food safety plans and reviewing a national approach to food safety systems.

In July, the ministers of health and agriculture announced a policy for the removal of specified risk materials from cattle aged more than 30 months at slaughter — the key measure to protect human health in this case.

In response to the economic consequences of the discovery of BSE, federal, provincial and territorial governments announced a BSE recovery program with a total value of $460 million, which was subsequently supplemented by an additional $60 million. The program provided a price deficiency payment when the market fell below a reference level. That program ended at the end of August with the partial reopening of the U.S. border to Canadian beef.

As this issue developed over the summer, a key point was how the risks were communicated to the public and that the risks were kept in the appropriate context. That is born out by the growth in the consumption of beef over July and August, when we saw significant increases in what is known as ``beef disappearance,'' which is a measure of beef consumption.

Ms. Bossé: I will talk about the significant progress made since the summer. The implementation of the specified risk material removal policy has helped us to keep the confidence of Canadians and it has also facilitated the reopening of the border with the U.S. and Mexico. We have also seen a limited reopening of some of our international markets. That has not occurred before in other countries that had BSE on a short-term basis such as we had here. We have been able to maintain an effective slaughter program to keep the supply chain operational.

That being said, there is still much work to do. We have to enhance our animal feed restrictions and standards; we must strengthen the tracking and tracing system; we have to enhance surveillance; we have to make an effort to improve disease awareness; we have to rebuild a weakened industry; we have to reopen closed borders, including access to the U.S, for live animals, which is not done now; and we have to develop a test method and validation and expand our national testing capacity.

Mr. Marsland: In terms of the specific role of Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada in managing the parallel concerns of food safety and the economic consequences of the discovery of BSE, a key role of the ministry was the coordination of the Beef Industry Value Chain Roundtable. This was established prior to the discovery of BSE and, indeed, is one of a series of round tables covering all of the major commodity groups. The objective of the round table was to bring together key stakeholders from across the value chain, from primary producers to processors to exporters, et cetera, with key contacts in the provincial and federal governments.

The beef industry roundtable met on May 28 and has had three subsequent meetings. It immediately went to work on developing an industry-government action plan to deal with the consequences of this issue. Working groups were established on reopening markets, on specified risk materials, on farm food safety systems, on bolstering the existing tracking and tracing system and on feed policy. Those working groups have continued to meet and work throughout the summer.

Dr. Dodds: There are certainly some longer term public health and animal health public policy challenges that relate to the finding of BSE. As my colleagues have said, we need to continue to develop our policies on some issues. Feed and surveillance are just two of the more complex ones. We need to do this in a manner that is national that can meet domestic and international expectations to the extent possible and that supports industry.

Much to our advantage, there has been considerable scientific progress since the animal disease was first identified in the U.K. in about 1986, and the human disease a decade later. We have benefited from their science, but it remains an area in which a lot more research would be of benefit to us. Obviously, we would like to maintain public confidence, both in the government systems and in the beef industry, both within Canada and internationally.

In looking at these different policy issues, the team of experts said that it was very important to ensure that the measures were national in scope — not taken only at the federal level but taken at all levels within the country. This is important for us in terms of being adopted, implemented and enforced comparably in all of the different jurisdictions within Canada.

It also means that we need a shared commitment and action from both federal and provincial governments, from producers, consumers, industry and veterinary professionals.

We have learned some lessons from this issue over the last number of months. All parties learned that close collaborations and communications were absolutely critical in positioning the federal government to manage the BSE issue rather than be swallowed up by it. There were almost daily interactions — either face-to-face or by telephone — at a number of different levels, including the deputies, over the summer, as well as communication between the different stakeholders within the provinces and the industry.

Our external risk communication on BSE, which included the routine technical briefings to the media, was instrumental in creating what we would call a reasoned public consideration of BSE that was not fuelled by panic. Our colleague, Dr. Brian Evans, Canada's chief veterinary officer with the Canadian Food Inspection Agency is not with us today, but his was the face that day after day was there. Other countries and colleagues have commented that the reaction in Canada also sets a precedent, as does the trade reaction. No other country has had this ability to handle the consequences of a finding of BSE. Certainly, this helped to maintain the public confidence in the Canadian food safety system and in Canadian agriculture.

We also learned that early and transparent dialogue with the affected non-governmental partners greatly facilitated our examination of real and potential implementation challenges that we faced in this issue.

The Deputy Chairman: Mr. Marsland, I would like to ask you about the tracking and tracing system. Am I correct to assume that when cattle are born they are tagged or tattooed and, in that way, they can be traced literally from birth to the marketplace? If that is the case, then, how many years of cattle are in this tracking and tracing system?

Mr. Gilles Lavoie, Senior Director General, Market and Industry Services Branch, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada: The current system allows us to trace cattle from birth to slaughter. They have a tag attached to the ear. There are still some weaknesses in the system that the industry has tried to correct. For example, it may happen that an animal will lose the tag, for some reason. We must ensure that it is replaced.

For some of the industry, the tracing from the slaughterhouse to retail is not complete. From an animal health perspective, however, tracing it to a slaughterhouse is enough. That is because there is then a veterinarian and a pre- mortem inspection, et cetera. In terms of animal health, it fulfils its role. It also fulfils its role in terms of tracing the information that was then made immediately available by the Canadian Cattle Identification Agency to the CFIA. It was used to trace the affected animal.

The Deputy Chairman: How long has this tracking and tracing system been in place?

Mr. Lavoie: It has been regulated and mandatory in the cattle industry since January 2001. At the moment, another system is being developed for other species in the system. Sheep and pork are active. In fact, various livestock producers are meeting in Calgary today to try to harmonize the various systems so that they can communicate with one another. Thus, if there is a disease that can be spread to more than one species the information would be readily available.

The Deputy Chairman: As a matter of curiosity, did they ever figure out where that one cow came from? It was an older cow.

Ms. Bossé: We are almost sure of is that is came from depopulated herds. It remains to be confirmed exactly which herd. However, we are very confident that it was from the animals that were being depopulated.

The Deputy Chairman: Where did that farmer obtain this cow?

Ms. Bossé: It was born on his farm.

Senator Morin: My first question deals with the outbreak of enteric illnesses. A few years ago, there was an outbreak of salmonellosis in sandwich meat. If I understand it correctly, the health products branch within Health Canada deals with standards. However, if a real outbreak crosses provincial borders, the population and public health branch would take the lead.

I am sure you have read in the newspaper that the minister, the Canadian Medical Association, CMA, and the Naylor commission are strongly recommending an agency along the lines of the Centers for Disease Control, CDC, the health protection agency in the U.K. or the Australian system. Every country in Europe seems to be moving toward a type of agency that would integrate provincial resources, and so forth. This is a possibility. I am not saying that we are necessarily going this way, but we have to consider it.

If that were the case and there was a diseased food outbreak — such as hamburger disease — would the surveillance and response fall under this agency or would it remain outside the scope of the agency? For example, I hear in the U.S. that would fall under the responsibility of the FDA. Do you have any views on that?

I know this is a theoretical question. However, this is the only chance we have to talk about this issue and you are the Canadian experts. Could I have your views on that?

Dr. Dodds: It is not a theoretic question. It is a reality that happens, unfortunately, on a too regular basis in Canada, as it does in all developed countries, that there are food-borne outbreaks. The protocol that I mentioned earlier addresses that question. More often, an illness outbreak is first identified when people go to their family physicians or to the hospital emergency clinic presenting with symptoms. The doctor may report it into a system. Certainly, samples will go to a public health lab, typically at the provincial or local level. Some of my colleagues from the Population and Public Health Branch might have mentioned they have a web-based system that now starts collecting those kinds of reports, so that if they start seeing a number of cases of the same kind salmonella or E. coli, they will identify it as an outbreak rather than just background. They will report it to us on the food side, either the food directorate or directly to the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, depending on whether it is on the national or local level, who will then start working with them to determine if a food is the source of the problem; the source could also be water or a different mode of transmission.

Most often, food-borne outbreaks report through a family physician and up through a system to my colleagues.

Senator Morin: Who does the detective work? Who does the epidemiology? Who sees these patients and asks where and what they have eaten and where they bought the food and so forth. Who does that?

Dr. Dodds: That would be the responsibility of my colleagues in the Population and Public Health Branch, working with their provincial colleagues. At times, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency will receive directly consumer complaints. They may then send an inspector to do the first round of questions, and they would contact the health side.

The other part that the food safety system does is sometimes you detect the problem in the food and then look to see whether there has been an increase in disease. That is how the link is made. That occurs less frequently than knowing the human disease and linking the problematic food.

Senator Morin: My second question deals with conflict of interest. I would like to address this to Mr. Marsland and his colleagues.

CFIA is under the responsibility of Agriculture Canada. There are public health issues and there are market issues, and the same agency deals with both. There are good examples of this. Concerning BSE, we spent more time talking about economic issues this morning than we did about public health issues. Economic issues are extremely important — there is no doubt about that and I am sympathetic to that — but it is the wrong committee. Agriculture is doing that. I am sympathetic to the issue, but I think we should address BSE from a public health perspective, not an economic perspective.

I have a number of questions dealing with this — for example, what are the provincial and federal responsibilities? If I understood correctly, most of the work is done in provincial labs right now. For example, this poor old cow was first diagnosed in a provincial lab and then went up the chain. The first testing is done in a provincial lab. Who is responsible for making sure that animal feed is not given to cattle right now? Who has the responsibility of doing this?

Who has the responsibility of ensuring that no one is — to adapt a rather famous phrase —''shooting, shovelling and shutting up''? How do we know this is not going on? It has been going on before this very famous pronouncement — which has been denied, by the way, in the newspaper this morning.

This is a public health issue. If people now have sick cows with pneumonia, like this poor old cow, how do we know?

This leads me to my last question. Why did all the countries close their borders? Why are they still partially closed? Do they have a reason? If there is a scientific basis for this partial closing of the borders, we should know about it.

The only response we have had — and I agree with it — is that Canadian beef is safe. I believe it is, but at some point, we should distinguish between the economic and public health issues. At some point, we should have a clear statement of the public health risk.

Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease is a serious condition. You do not only die from it; you can remain sitting in a hospital for years — I would prefer dying anytime to having that happen. In this committee, and for Canadians, we should have a clear understanding — not just saying, we just had one case and everything is okay. All we talked about this morning was the economic aspects — the millions it cost, and the cattle and the ranches. I realize those are issues, but this is not the issue we are dealing with here today. We are dealing with public health; this is the health of Canadians.

We have the terrible example of the health minister in the U.K., at the start of the outbreak there, giving hamburger to his 7-year-old daughter, saying there was nothing wrong, when in fact there was. To me, putting out propaganda or a commercial type of campaign is not the answer. We should state clearly, why these borders are still closed.

Is it for public health? They do not close it for any other reason than for public health in their own country. That is the only official reason they have. Are they completely wrong? If so, we should prove that is what it is.

That whole issue worries me a bit. I am extremely sympathetic to the commercial aspect of it. I fully realize that for these farmers and ranchers, it represents a serious problem. In another room or another committee, I would be very vocal in support of them. However, this is not place to do it — this is public health.

Ms. Bossé: You mentioned something about the provincial lab finding the case. I will explain how the testing for BSE, or Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, is organized in Canada. It is done by a network of labs. We have two federal reference labs that ensure that all the testing is done with internationally validated tests and that they are performed with good quality assurance to ensure the quality of the results that get out.

In that BSE laboratory network, there are both provincial and federal labs. In 2001, before we had an extensive BSE network, we tested around 1,000 high-risk animals every year. In 2002, as a result of enhancing the capacity of the network, we tested more than 3,400 animals of high risk. We are targeting the animals most likely to show the disease. It is not just a provincial exercise; it is a collaboration between provincial and federal counterparts. Because of the multiple jurisdictions, these animals of a certain age do get in the federal system, but they also get in the provincial system. We are working through our channels of jurisdictions to access these animals with high risk.

In terms of the public health, it has always been our opinion that BSE is a high public health risk. Therefore, as a result of the announcement in 1996 that there was a link made to human disease, the CFIA has implemented a feed ban, which is a ruminant-to-ruminant feed ban. That feed ban has been enforced, and it has been complied with.

If you would like to have more detail on either surveillance or the feed ban, I could invite one of our scientists to talk about it.

Senator Morin: What about ``shoot, shovel and shut up''?

The Deputy Chairman: How do you deal with that? I watched the news last night. As a consumer, that sends chills down my spine.

Senator Morin: It is a public health issue.

The Deputy Chairman: Yes. A good job has been done in containing and giving information, but then you wonder if maybe there are farmers who do that. There was one farmer who admitted he would have done that. How do you deal with that? The farmer admitted that he wished he had done that. That simply destroys public confidence.

Dr. Sarah Kahn, Deputy Chief Veterinary Officer for Canada, Canadian Food Inspection Agency: I am the deputy to the Chief Veterinary Officer and the Director of the Animal Health and Production Division of CFIA. Thank you for the opportunity to speak to the committee. You raise an important issue.

Canada has a system of control that is considered by world standards to be very good. We have a federal mandate for controlling animal diseases. There is a very clear line of responsibility and accountability and authority for the control of animal diseases in Canada. Many countries do not have such a clear or well-established system.

We have a system for reportable diseases, which includes all the important ones such as foot and mouth disease and BSE, whereby there is an obligation on any person who suspects a case of such disease to report it to the federal authority, through local arrangements, local district veterinarians.

We maintain a close working relationship with the veterinary profession to highlight for them the diseases that are important, the science of diseases and the reasons why they are important. We address professional meetings. We put articles in professional journals, and we have information on the Internet site. We provide training sessions, and we are active with the profession. One of the most important lines of defence is the veterinary herd health adviser who attends the farm and has a professional relationship with the farmer and cares for the health of the herd.

We have the network of labs and the diagnostic facilities, as Ms. Bossé has mentioned. We also have an excellent system for awarding compensation to a farmer whose animal is ordered destroyed to control a disease. This could be for a disease such as bovine tuberculosis — which also has a human health implication — right through to BSE. They know that in reporting a disease, they will be paid fair compensation, the value of that animal, if it had gone to market as a healthy animal.

Communications also go directly to the industry through trade journals and farming weeklies. For example, in the months of April and May, before the detection of BSE, we had reissued a brochure about the importance of the feed ban. We get that out to farmers and farming families through their milk cheque and through other pieces of correspondence that we are sure they will open — as opposed to a circular from Canadian Tire, for example. We are very active in communicating with the industry and with the veterinary profession the importance of these diseases, how to recognize them and what their obligations are in reporting.

Having said that, we must recognize that there will always to be a tendency — perhaps for farmers who are not quite so good, not quite at the standard of excellence you would like to see — to want to hide or cover up disease. Certainly, for BSE, with these extraordinary consequences, I guess that temptation must be pretty high for some people.

As an agency, we have in our favour a line of authority and responsibility from the farm to the plate in terms of the inspection control, the regulatory programs at the farm and in the abattoir, in terms of labelling and even the responsibility for food recalls. We do as much as we can, through all of those avenues, to struggle against what you might call the tendency to shoot, shovel and shut up.

Senator Morin: Is there an obligation for a farmer to take every animal into account? Does the farmer have the liberty to shoot an animal and bury it and that is it? Let us say he has too many cows and wants to get rid of 50. Does he just kill them and bury them? Is there any obligation to keep account of the animals that he has in his herd? Is he at liberty to get rid of animals without any reporting?

Dr. Kahn: He is at liberty to dispose of animals subject to controls on environmental impact and so forth. However, if there is a case of disease suspected — and it is a disease that is reportable — then he has a legal obligation to report that suspicion of disease. The farmer does, the veterinarian does, and the laboratory that makes a diagnosis also does.

Senator Morin: A cow could disappear from a herd and no one would hear about it. There would be no inquiry or questions if a cow disappeared from the herd.

The Deputy Chairman: As was pointed out, there is fair compensation. I was raised on a farm. Most farmers would opt for the compensation rather than digging a hole and burying the animal.

Dr. Kahn: The other thing that is relevant, when the country is thought to be a BSE-free country, some people out there might not even consider that BSE is possible. For example, is a cow with a broken leg possibly a case of BSE? In the countries that have BSE, it is considered to be a risk. That one is a risk animal for BSE. In Canada 12 months ago, a cow with a broken leg would not have been considered as a risk for BSE. People would say it had a broken leg. The need to raise awareness and to ensure that people take into account this possible diagnostic area is very important.

Dr. Dodds: Senator Morin raised the issue about public health and BSE. Both Health Canada and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency have recognized that the relationship between public health and animal health is a very interconnected relationship from the get-go.

Canada has been very fortunate, and it is building on the good work that was done first by Agriculture Canada and then by the Canadian Food Inspection Agency. From early days of the outbreak in the U.K., we have had a policy — and again it was basically more of an animal health policy — to not import animals or animal products from countries that had BSE.

We have also had the surveillance system for animal disease in place since 1992, and the surveillance system that was in place exceeded international standards for surveillance in a country where BSE has not been detected. The feed ban has been in place since 1997.

After the detection of the positive case, Health Canada looked at the controls we had in place and the potential risks to human health — not just from food but through other products as well. Under federally registered plans, every animal that goes to slaughter has an ante-mortem inspection. A vet looks at the state of health of the animal before it is slaughtered. That is true for most provincial systems as well. That was the situation in Alberta. With regard to that case, the vet who examined it said, ``No, that animal is not fit for slaughter and entry into the food chain''. It was condemned and sent to the renderers. The animals are inspected by a vet.

We know from experience in scientific work that animals under three years of age are essentially free of the disease. The majority of animals that go to slaughter in Canada for beef production are less than three years of age. Again, we know from the scientific work that has been done that muscle meat is free of the infective tissue. Milk and dairy items are free of the infective material. We added the specified risk material ban as a precautionary measure because if there was the potential for an animal to get into the system without being detected, that one action eliminates more than 99 per cent of the potential infectivity of the animal. It is an effective way for blocking disease transmission from animal to humans.

Internationally, we are one of the few countries that implemented those controls before identifying a case of BSE within Canada. Looking at the international level, our minister, the Secretary of Agriculture in the United States and the Mexican minister for agriculture have asked the international standards-setting organization for animal health to review its standards and to look at the situation in Canada, where the information is that the prevalence is low. Controls have been in place in some cases for more than a decade. There must be changes to standards where previously, more or less, a country had the disease in significant numbers or it was free of the disease. That meeting will happen next week. Dr. Brian Evans will be participating in that meeting.

Senator Cook: We are talking about the movement of food. When I go grocery shopping, my oranges are probably from Africa; my grapes are from Chile; my kiwis are from down under; and it never occurred to me that they are not fit to eat.

I do want to move from meat to fish. There is a burgeoning industry on both our coasts — and, indeed, inland — called the aquaculture industry. Every now and then, we hear of a disease and the whole school, or whatever, is destroyed.

What kinds of processes are in place to ensure that that food — which is increasingly becoming part of Canadians' diets — is under surveillance? Right now, we have cod and trout in an aquaculture system, and in Newfoundland, cod. We are now growing fish that always swam in oceans, in pens. In Nova Scotia, halibut is being grown. Where does responsibility lie there and what kind of containment for good food processing is in place?

Dr. Dodds: In respect of the issue of veterinary drugs, Health Canada has the responsibility for approving and registering veterinary drugs, which would include any drugs used for fish and aquaculture. Looking at the safety of veterinary drugs, they are concerned about the use of those in animals, including fish, and in the human food chain afterwards. The safety for humans is built into a review of veterinary drugs. A colleague of mine in Health Canada has responsibility for that. My colleague from Canadian Food Inspection Agency can talk to the issue of surveillance.

Dr. Kahn: This is an area where there is a bit of shared jurisdiction, because the Department of Fisheries and Oceans is certainly one of the major players in terms of the disease status or the health status of fish populations. There are some discussions underway between CFIA and Fisheries and Oceans as to how best manage the particular challenges presented by aquaculture practice.

Certainly, the inspection of fish and seafood products comes under CFIA jurisdiction. A particular focus here is the public health protection. Fortunately, many of the diseases that are specific to aquatic species are not zoonotic diseases in the sense that they affect human beings. Some of the greatest areas of concern relate to shellfish because they are filtering substances from the water. You can have residues of public health concern, whether it is microbiological or of metals or toxic substances.

There is surveillance undertaken as to what you might call the quality and the safety of fish and seafood products that are produced for human consumption. That is done by CFIA.

Senator Cook: This is purely anecdotal, but I have seen smolt getting their needles, getting inoculated, running through the chute in an aquaculture facility. I am told the food has a level of medication in it. I hear that when we eat the fish, we are consuming a certain amount of it. Maybe that is why our medications are not as good as they used to be. This is purely anecdotal, but nevertheless of concern from a public health perspective.

Ms. Bossé: CFIA has a monitoring program for residues in the fish. It is also monitoring the shellfish industry for toxins. Zones are open based on the fact that they are safe and that the toxin levels are low. This is being monitored on a continuous level.

The water from which the shellfish are being harvested is monitored for the quality and the number of microbes that may be in it. There is a tight monitoring of the food coming from aquaculture as well as from the wild shellfish harvest.

Senator Cook: An aquaculture site will have a pen with probably 15,000 salmon. At maturity, they do not have a lot of room to move. There are probably a multiple number of nets. What I hear at the Fisheries Committee concerns me. Do you have any jurisdiction or is there any collaboration with Fisheries, public health or agri-foods? Do you talk to each other? Do you monitor the fish from its first injection until it comes to my plate?

Dr. Dodds: We do. Indeed, Health Canada hosted in March a national workshop to look at coordination of surveillance for chemical contaminants in food, which would include the residues from veterinary drugs, pesticides and that kind of thing. Health Canada sets the maximum residue levels against which the CFIA inspects. We recognize that the Canadian Food Inspection Agency will do some of the surveillance and monitoring. Fisheries and Oceans, and provincial departments of environment, do some surveillance and monitoring. Provincial ministries of agriculture may do some.

Last March, we hosted a workshop to talk about developing more of a nationally coordinated system rather than the separate bits that exist now. Again, there has always been good collaboration on these issues; therefore, there has been good information flow. We are looking to improve and formalize it.

Senator Cook: Are you confident or comfortable with an appropriate protocol at the moment across the jurisdiction for this industry?

Dr. Dodds: The aquaculture industry does have an industry association. We have had them in some stakeholder meetings. They are concerned about ensuring that their product is a safe quality product, just as farmers with land- based agriculture are.

Senator Roche: I am not sure to which witness to direct this question. I thank them all for their illuminating testimony.

I was taken by Dr. Dodd's phrase that we have to manage the BSE issue rather than being swallowed up in it. I think perhaps that is what has happened. The longer it goes on, the higher the frustration level — not only among politicians but also, as we saw here yesterday, among the beef ranchers and farmers. There is a deep level of frustration in trying to respond to the responsibilities to protect health and also to carry on business.

This brings me to our longer-term interests. We are here today, Madam Chair, to examine the infrastructure and governance of the public health system and Canada's ability to respond to emergencies — in other words, the system that is in place today to protect health.

We talked about BSE. It seems to me that the system worked; it caught this cow. The cow never entered the food chain. There was never a risk to health, as far as I can understand. Yet, we have been caught up in this seemingly never- ending flow of results and repercussions that suggest factors other than those related to health protection. There are political factors and trade factors, a full discussion of which would take us beyond the purview of this committee. We have to address ourselves to the questions before us in our study on the infrastructure and our ability to respond to emergencies.

Is there a way of getting a clear answer to this question: Is the system all right the way it is or do we have to change the system? Is there a short answer to that question that would help me to understand whether the beef ranchers and farmers are being taken unfair advantage of and that they are caught up in something that they cannot control? They have adhered to the system. How will the long-range effect play out on their livelihoods and on the Canadian economy?

Dr. Dodds: I will describe some public health challenges within the system in Canada and then I will look to a colleague to discuss some of the Office International des Epizooties, OIE, standards and their next evolution.

We would say that the system did work in Canada, but living this example illustrated some improvements that can be made to the system. There is responsibility at the federal level, at the provincial level, and at the municipal level. It is not true that the same level of oversight happens within every jurisdiction within Canada. From a public health perspective, we would like to improve that so that each Canadian has the same level of protection whether the animal in question went through a federal or provincial plant or a different kind of plant.

We have our federal/provincial/territorial committees that work to improve harmonization and to improve our communication, but we also look to further strengthening that. That presents a challenge. Newfoundland does not have a significant, if any, beef industry. What is the level of government investment there comparable to that in Ontario and Alberta, which have significant investments in the industry? Exposure is part of the risk to Canadians. We are more concerned about federal plants because federal plants produce most of the meat that we consume.

There are some public health challenges. There are some improvements that can be made in a system but I think it is one of the best systems in place internationally at the moment.

Ms. Bossé: Currently in Canada, approximately 95 per cent of slaughterhouses are federally inspected. That means, by those standards, that all the animals through the system are seen before they are slaughtered. The federal government is actually working to develop, with the stakeholder provinces, a national meat and poultry regulation code. They are working actively to have the provinces adhere to the code. That is work ongoing to ensure that there is a national standard. It has been compared, and is similar, to the federal standard. I would say we are making some progress and there is obviously always progress to be made.

Senator Roche: It seems clear that an integration of the federal and provincial systems of inspection is called for. I suppose that might be put under the category of improvements to which Dr. Dodds referred.

Do we need a structural change and not just a better integration of federal and provincial testing systems? For example, do we need, as the Japanese have argued, testing on every animal? Is it feasible to test every animal and, if so, would that end forever the challenge that we are not tough enough on BSE? Is universal comprehensive testing a viable option here?

Ms. Bossé: We know a great deal about BSE when it is actually happening. Animals are normally slaughtered for meat consumption long before they reach the age of 20 months. Therefore, testing all animals would mean increasing costs without bringing any more science to your surveillance. You are just building an extra measure that is not supported by the current science at all.

The Deputy Chairman: Are you saying that, before 24 months, the disease would not show up in a test even if the animal had it?

Ms. Bossé: The animals would not have it.

Senator Morin: Do we test every animal right now that is aged over three years?

Ms. Bossé: This is not the current surveillance program, but there are healthy animals above 30 months of age that are tested in a surveillance programs. We have to look at enhancement to the surveillance program. A task force is looking at options for enhancing surveillance but still basing it on sound science.

Senator Roche: I would like to pursue this. As a non-expert myself, I am trying to determine whether there is a simple answer to the request to test every animal. You are indicating that you would not support that.

If I understand correctly, the Japanese authorities said that we should test every animal in order to get access back into the Japanese market. Is that, in your view, a sincere or completely objective evaluation of the subject? In other words, if we tested, would we get back into Japan? Is it not possible that the Japanese closure of their market to Canadian beef was in retaliation for our closure from their market when they had a problem? Thus, we are into trade not to mention political issues?

I am asking these questions in the framework of the overall structure we have. Does this infrastructure that we have need to be changed or does it need to be, as Dr. Dodds said earlier, managed better?

Dr. Kahn: I have been involved in the discussions with Japan and with Europe. The countries that test all animals for BSE have done so to address a total crisis of public confidence in the safety of the food supply and in the competence of governments to manage the issue of BSE. For example, in Japan, they have done a lot of testing. They have not found a case in an animal younger than 65 months of age. They have tested everything — including calves — for no good reason other than that there was a crisis in public confidence.

Here, in Canada, through our good systems, we have not had that crisis. We should pursue what we are asking our trading partners to pursue, namely, science-based policies that address the risks from a proper scientific perspective to give us the best protection of public health.

As Dr. Bossé mentions, the groups of animals that present the highest risk are well defined. A very standard approach in population surveillance in both public and animal health is to look to the population where your testing will give the best bang for the buck. You have the best capacity to predict a problem if you look at the defined risk groups. That is the approach that the government and other agencies would take — namely, to base our enhanced surveillance on the science and on the best experience from we can gain from what other countries have done. It would not push us into the direction of testing all healthy cattle.

Senator Roche: Enhanced surveillance stops short of universal testing, is that correct?

Dr. Kahn: That is right. In other countries, a lot of the testing they do is worthless. Animals under two years of age have not had time to develop the disease.

The Deputy Chairman: If they have not had time to develop it, then the public consuming it would not be in any danger.

Senator Morin: Would that open up our borders if we did that?

Mr. Marsland: This past summer's response by the 34 countries who placed restrictions on Canadian beef and cattle does not reflect 15 years of understanding of scientific research on the disease. It is an on/off switch: One case of BSE and the border is closed. It does not reflect the international standards developed by the international organization that provides for the trade in products with countries that have exhibited cases of BSE and have a gradual classification of free, provisionally free, low and moderate risk and saturate categories.

We are beginning to see a change in that response in two respects. First, the United States and Mexico have partially reopened their borders to Canadian beef, recognizing that the science says that there is no or negligible risk associated with certain categories of product and beef cuts from cattle of certain ages and younger cattle, which is further mitigated by policies such as the removal of specified risk materials. That is the first change. It is really quite significant. It is an important first step that, for the first time, a country has opened up its borders to one that has exhibited a case of BSE.

Second, Minister Vanclief, together with Secretary Veneman from the U.S. and Secretary Usabiaga from Mexico have asked the OIE to develop a pragmatic approach based on the up-to-date science for international guidelines in response to cases of BSE. Those meetings will begin next week. There is a movement in the world to recognize that the science has given us a much better understanding of the risks associated with both the disease and the trade of animals and beef.

Senator Roche: Would you agree that there is no reason why Canada should impose standards with respect to BSE that are beyond the international standards? If we live up to the international standards ought that not to be sufficient scientific enhancement of surveillance methods?

Ms. Bossé: These are options that we are actually putting together for consideration by our minister. They are all being derived. There are combinations of various programs that are to be looked at and surveillance is one of them. Enhancing the feed ban is another one.

Senator Roche: When is this going forward?

Ms. Bossé: The work is underway now. I cannot tell you the exact date because the working group is working on this.

The Deputy Chairman: Once you have completed your work and the minister has it and it is available for release, perhaps you can provide the committee with it. That would be helpful.

Senator Morin: Before we had this case, what was Canada's position toward countries that had a single case of BSE?

Dr. Kahn: We did not accept imports.

Senator Morin: I know that, but on what basis?

Dr. Kahn: It was done on the basis of policies that had been worked through with the United States and Mexico for a number of years.

Senator Morin: What was the basis of these policies? Why did we not import cattle and meat from countries that had one single case of BSE? It was a result of public health concerns, of course. What else?

Dr. Kahn: It was really looking at the policies that countries that were similarly free around the world had adopted. Seeing that as some type of benchmark of international practice, North America took a similar approach.

Senator Morin: Yes, based on public health concerns.

Senator Callbeck: I wish to change the subject. Being from Prince Edward Island, I am sure you know what I am going to ask about: Potatoes. The inspection fees have gone up tremendously in the last five years. I would like to have an explanation as to why.

Ms. Bossé: I am really sorry, but I will not be able to answer your question. However, it will be my pleasure to try to find the information and get it back to you. I recently took this position and I have a science background and one as an administrator.

Senator Callbeck: I would really appreciate getting that information. There have been tremendous increases there.

I have another question in respect of potatoes. Since you are new in this position, perhaps you cannot answer this. However, you can get back to me. Years ago, every field used to be tested. The only fields tested are for seed potatoes. In other words, if I am a grower of seed potatoes, I have my fields tested. However, the fields around me are not, unless the farmer requests it. In the last two years, we have had a number of problems with viruses.

Have you thought of ways to help the seed potato growers with their quality improvement? I would like your comment on that.

Ms. Bossé: I will have to get the information back to you. I am not familiar with the seed plant and potato programs. I will try to get the answer for you.

Senator Callbeck: Thank you.

The Deputy Chairman: I was listening to you and all of the complexities of the areas you have to deal with. We had the SARS outbreak, which was animal to human that was offshore. That would not be something within your jurisdiction necessarily, although I am sure you are monitoring it. How do you deal with potential emerging illnesses? It seems there is something new every year. For instance, we now have the West Nile virus.

How do we know that West Nile does not somehow mutate into our food system when a mosquito bites an animal and we then eat the animal? It might be possible. People experience these new illnesses and a few years down the road it is realized that there was an impact on their health.

Dr. Dodds: Earlier, one of my colleagues made reference to what is referred to as ``zoonotic diseases''. These are, by definition, diseases that can be transmitted from animals to humans through different vectors — sometimes directly animal to human but more often, it is through a vector such as a mosquito, food or water. The disease organism originates in animals and also causes disease in humans.

This kind of knowledge has been in place for well over one century in the public health field. People who look after human safety, whether food safety or public health beyond food safety, have always known that they need to be aware of what is going on in the animal health world. More and more with the different surveillance systems, there have been efforts to link them.

To understand, at the scientific level, I will use an example that everyone will recognize — E.coli 0157, which is the agent that caused the water-borne disease from Walkerton. The reservoir for that is not the human population but it is the animal population. If we have a sense of what animals are infected, whether they are diseased or just carriers, it can help us to understand what controls we need to put in place to protect human health. Very often that is through food and food safety measures.

For emerging diseases, it is the same kind of issue. There is the scientific reality of past experience that micro- organisms can infect animals that can then infect humans. You are always on the lookout. It is primarily a concern with the warm-blooded animals. Our body temperature is 37-degrees Celsius. The cows are warm-blooded as well. Therefore, it is more likely that bacteria that cause a problem and infect a cow could cause a disease in a human rather than in a fish because a fish's body temperature is different and it has a different physiology. There are fewer fish pathogens that could cause a human health concern. The same fact applies to plants with a different biological system. The organisms that cause plant disease would seldom have any effect on human diseases. However, it often happens with warm-blooded animals such as cows and deer.

The Deputy Chairman: West Nile is an example of an emerging disease. Are the scientists keeping ahead of it?

Dr. Dodds: Next week, two of my colleagues from Health Canada will be here. They both have responsibility for labs that specialize in that area of zoonotics.

Ms. Bossé: Next week, Dr. Paul Kitching, who is in charge of the Winnipeg lab, will be here with Dr. Francis Plummer.

The Deputy Chairman: I will save the questions for them.

Ms. Bossé: Much work has been done on the West Nile virus. We know that it affects certain species, such as horses, which are highly susceptible to West Nile virus. For their protection, a vaccine has been developed.

However, SARS is an emerging disease that caught people off-guard because it evolved so rapidly. I would say that the response in Canada occurred as soon as the disease was identified and isolated. The Winnipeg lab — our side as well as the human and health side — organized an animal experiment to determine whether animals could play a role in the transmission of SARS. Just as Toronto was trying to deal with the issue, the labs were trying to determine the pathway of the transmission of the disease. People are aware that it may take a long time to fully understand the transmission of a disease.

The Deputy Chairman: I thank our witnesses for an enlightening presentation and for their detailed explanations.

The committee adjourned.


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