Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Agriculture and Forestry
Issue 21 - Evidence - October 30 meeting
OTTAWA, Thursday, October 30, 2003
The Standing Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, authorized to hear from the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food and his officials, met this day at 8:30 a.m. in order to receive a briefing on incidences of bovine spongiform encephalopathy in Canada.
Senator Donald H. Oliver (Chairman) in the Chair.
[English]
The Chairman: Honourable senators, for several months now Canada has been faced with concerns involving BSE, and although there has been just one single case, the event has affected farming communities across the entire country. There are very few people in Canada who are unaware of the stressful and serious economic situation facing Canada's beef industry.
This morning we have invited officials from the Department of Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency to brief us on the BSE situation in Canada.
I invite Mr. Marsland to begin his presentation.
[Translation]
Mr. Andrew Marsland, Assistant Deputy Minister, Market and Industry Services Branch, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada: Mr. Chairman, we are pleased to be here and to have the opportunity to inform you of the most recent developments regarding this very important issue. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, we will make a presentation that is longer than usual in order to give the Committee members all the necessary information.
With me today are Dr. Brian Evans, Chief Veterinary Officer of Canada from the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, and Mr. Gilles Lavoie, Senior Director General, who is largely responsible for the participation of Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada in the BSE issue.
As you know, honourable senators, many things have happened since that sorry day in May when the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) confirmed the first case of BSE in Canada. Foreign markets quickly closed after that announcement, marking the beginning of serious economic and financial problems for our producers and many others involved in such sectors as transportation, cattle markets, packers, etc. Whole stakeholder communities have been affected.
[English]
Mr. Evans will discuss the CFIA investigation and follow-up work concerning the BSE incident.
[Translation]
Dr. Brian Evans, Chief Veterinary Officer of Canada, Canadian Food Inspection Agency: Thank you for inviting us, Mr. Chairman.
[English]
On May 20, 2003, we received confirmation that BSE had been detected in Alberta. We immediately began a thorough investigation that involved a trace back involving two primary lines of enquiry, a trace forward, and a feed investigation to find and test any cattle that may have been exposed to the same feeding practices associated with the infected cow.
[Translation]
We quarantined 18 cattle herds in Alberta, Saskatchewan and British Columbia. Thirty-six more herds were investigated because they had received one or several groups of animals that, in the past eight years, had come from herds included in the investigation.
[English]
In the end, over 2,700 animals were destroyed and more than 2000 samples were taken and submitted to our laboratories for BSE testing. All of the test results came back negative and all of the quarantines have been lifted. It is clear that there was no epidemic of BSE in Canada.
In September, as a result of further DNA analysis, a match was made between the positive cow with her sire, her dame — in other words, her father and mother — and her progeny, or offspring. This information, along with corroborating information obtained from the ear tag of her progeny, further confirmed and provided conclusive evidence to us of the herd of origin. It has been definitively determined that the animal was born in Saskatchewan on March 22, 1997.
Honourable senators may recall that following the conclusion of our investigation last summer, the government invited an international team of animal disease and human health experts to assess our approach and findings. The international team concluded that we had conducted an appropriate and exhaustive investigation. It also made several recommendations and endorsed measures under consideration to strengthen Canada's safeguards against BSE.
In terms of public health, the most important recommendation was the removal of specified risk materials at slaughter. On July 28, the government acted on this recommendation. We are now focusing our attention on other enhancements such as feed controls and animal disease surveillance.
[Translation]
Throughout our investigation, CFIA has endeavoured to provide information to the public, industry, the provinces and territories and foreign governments on a regular basis. We are determined to maintain this open approach as we continue to implement measures to respond to BSE.
[English]
We have provided scientific briefings to a number of countries in support of the Government of Canada's market access recovery efforts. Initially, these were focused on priority markets such as the United States, Mexico, Japan and Korea. In recent weeks, we have participated in technical missions to Russia, China and other Asian countries to promote better market access for products banned as a result of our BSE case.
Our primary focus remains the re-establishment of market access for live animals, animal products, and animal by- products based on the science described in international standards under the Office International des Epizooties, the world organization for animal health and scientific reference body under the SPS agreement of the World Trade Organization.
[Translation]
Mr. Chairman, as I mentioned earlier, we are now studying and revising our policies regarding BSE prevention, particularly those relating to monitoring animal diseases and animal feed restrictions. We will strengthen controls if necessary. We want to further strengthen the security of the system.
[English]
Some steps can be taken within our own jurisdiction. For example, we are looking at focusing our surveillance on animals with the potential highest risk of BSE. We are also considering an increase in the overall number of animals tested for BSE, which will provide additional assurance to Canadians and our trading partners that the prevalence of BSE is low, if it remains at all, and that our measures have indeed been effective.
However, there are other measures that require collaboration and cooperation from many parties. For example, we are looking at enhancing the ban on using ruminant protein as feed, but these policy changes must involve extensive consultation with the scientific community, industry, the province and territories as well as our trading partners. We want to make sure that BSE policy changes are appropriate, defensible, integrated and capable of being enforced. While this is a complex process that requires time to implement changes properly, we are making significant progress on these important measures.
Mr. Marsland: Once export markets were choked off on May 20 and the days following it became clear that a significant economic crisis lay ahead. In 2002 our beef exports totalled $2.2 billion and the export of live cattle was $1.8 billion.
It should be noted that the various import bans around the world affected all ruminants and their meat, including goat, sheep, cervids, et cetera, our world-class breeding animals and genetics, as well as a wide range of processed foods.
From the outset and for obvious reasons, the priority of the minister and the government was to regain access to the U.S. market. We were very fortunate to have a ready-made consultative forum available, the Beef Value Chain Round Table, which met within days of the discovery of the case of BSE in Alberta.
The round table was established as part of the agricultural policy framework in conjunction with a number of round tables in various sectors. This round table includes most participants in the beef industry. Initially, the round table brought together players along the value chain in the beef industry to develop future-oriented action to secure the success of the industry. It served as an essential element in bringing industry and government officials from both levels of government together to develop strategies to address BSE. The round table has been critical in developing strategies for advocacy with the U.S. and joint action plans to get our messages across to our key markets. It is co-chaired by the Canadian Cattlemen's Association and the federal government.
From the outset, we have based our representations to foreign veterinary authorities and market participants on a joint industry-provincial-federal government agreed-upon advocacy strategy. Its underpinnings remain straightforward: it simply asks that decisions be made on the basis of good science.
In support of this principle, Canada, through the considerable efforts of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, offers the results of a sound epidemiological investigation, backed up with the support of an international team of BSE experts' report that confirmed the thoroughness of the investigation.
In August, Minister Vanclief, USDA Secretary Veneman and Mexican Secretary Usabiaga approached the Office International des Epizooties and asked that it develop a more pragmatic, science-based approach in terms of the guidelines that countries must operate under when discovering BSE in a national herd, and how this impacts on international trade. It serves no country's interest to have the results of the discovery of serious diseases like BSE become a disincentive for reporting. I am sure Mr. Evans can provide more information on the work of the OIE should the committee wish to see it.
On August 8, the U.S. and Mexico announced a partial resumption of trade in boneless beef and other products, and by early September, the USDA agreed on the appropriate CFIA certification procedures, and product began moving over the border. As the minister has pointed out, this 100-day achievement is of singular importance as it represents the first time the U.S. has accepted product from a BSE country. To date, something approaching 100 million pounds of beef has crossed the Canadian border into the United States.
At the same time, Secretary Veneman announced that the live animals rule-making process would begin immediately. Rule-making, like our own regulatory process, is a serious business; it must take into account the many aspects relevant to a matter as serious as BSE. We are now at a point where the unfolding of this process has seen the completion of the internal debate with the USDA and how they wish to proceed. The Office of Management and Budget has completed its review of the proposed rule, and we are hopeful that rule will be published in the very near future.
This is a critical component, because we have now resumed trade in boneless beef. Trade in live animals will do a great deal to reduce the pressure on the industry.
In the meantime, considerable effort continues to be devoted to the reopening of our other traditional markets. I will not attempt to brief you on every country, but perhaps we can provide the clerk with copies of the ``Summary of Actions Taken by Trade Partners,'' prepared by the CFIA, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada.
Our messaging has been consistent. Trade concerns must be addressed on the basis of science. Our investigation has been open and transparent; our scientific scrutiny has been recognized and applauded by international experts; and North American beef is now safer than it ever has been.
In June the minister announced a $460-million federal-provincial assistance package to help the Canadian cattle and beef industry continue to operate while borders were closed. This package included measures that allowed producers to receive payments for cattle owned as of May 20, 2003. The assistance helped compensate producers when the price of cattle fell below reference price, based on market value in the U.S.
The package also offered incentives to processors to sell or otherwise move surplus meat cuts out of inventory that was produced after May 20. The purpose was to free up storage space, to allow processors to operate at increased capacity and serve the domestic market.
On August 12, the minister announced two new measures to further assist the Canadian livestock sector. The first measure was a $36-million extension of our commitment to the BSE recovery program. The initial funding had successfully doubled the slaughter capacity from late May; and moved about 725,000 cattle into the domestic market, while providing improved returns to feed lots and producers in light of severely depressed prices.
The second initiative provided for disaster assistance payments to be advanced to producers as a transition measure until a new national business risk management programming is implemented.
We continued to closely monitor the situation. We have been working with the provinces and industry to identify how we can best create a market for animals that are older than 30 months, that is those animals whose meat cannot be exported. For example, the Ad Hoc Beef Committee, a committee made up of producers, packers and processors, has recommended a more judicious use of supplementary beef imports that come into Canada, above our WTO quota obligations. This provides a further opportunity to domestic beef and veal producers to supply the domestic market for these products, while recognizing the needs of processors to have access to competitively priced inputs.
I think it is important to acknowledge that we are asking our export market countries that have implemented measures to either allow the continuation or reinstatement of market access for certain products exported from Canada. There have been several encouraging initial steps in this regard. While we applaud these actions, we also encourage others to open their borders to products that we know can continue to be safely traded.
We are asking our trading partners to base their measures on current scientific knowledge, consistent with the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement on rights and obligations. This includes the establishment of conditions that allow for the safe trade in the numerous meat and meat products, as well as lamb, goat, caribou and muskox.
We believe that it is possible, using OIE standards as a basis, to agree on conditions that would allow for the safe trade in certain categories of pet food and live animals. In addition, we continue to remind countries of the OIE recommendations regarding certain products that should be exempt from any BSE-related measures regardless of the country's BSE standards. There is no recognized scientific basis for banning the entry of these products, and we request all countries with bans on such products to immediately review their measures with a view to bringing them into conformity with their obligations.
Canada's investigation was thorough, transparent and conclusive. Objective analysis has demonstrated that Canada is a minimum-risk BSE country. Already safe Canadian beef has been made even safer with the requirement to remove specified risk materials at slaughter. Canada looks forward to working cooperatively with its trade partners to resume access for its exports under safe and practical conditions, and a further evolution of science-based, and consistently implemented OIE standards.
There is light at the end of tunnel as the U.S. rule-making process moves towards final requirements that will allow for resumed live animal exports to this key market. We continue to work closely with industry to seek ways to address the problem of older cattle and the surplus of those animals in the system.
We owe a huge debt of gratitude to Canadian consumers who have continued to support the Canadian beef industry throughout this crisis. It is important to note that it is probably the first time that the country has witnessed an increase in beef consumption subsequent to the identification of a case of BSE.
The Chairman: Mr. Evans, what is a high-risk animal?
If another cow was found to have BSE what would you do differently than you have since May?
Mr. Evans: Our investigation reinforced our previous knowledge of BSE. This was well portrayed publicly through various studies, including the Harvard University study in the U.S, and numerous risk assessments that were carried out.
We learned that if Canada and more broadly North America had been exposed to BSE, it, in all likelihood, took place prior to 1990 because Canada and the U.S. had imported small numbers of genetically enhanced cattle from the United Kingdom between 1982-89.
We put those animals under permanent monitoring and tracing programs that led to the discovery of BSE in an imported cow in Alberta in 1993. At that time, we took unprecedented action to remove all the remaining live U.K. cattle from our population. They were destroyed or, in the case of Nova Scotia, they were returned to the United Kingdom. This was done in advance of any human link with BSE and new variant CJD, which did not occur until 1996.
Our findings indicated that within that group of animals, some level of infectivity had possibly existed. In 1993 and 1994 when we took out the remaining 122 animals of the total of the 191 that had been imported, we knew that 68 animals had either entered into the food chain or died on farms. Because of the permanent monitoring program, we knew that 59 of those animals had gone into slaughter plants and had been clinically healthy and examined at the time of slaughter, and an additional nine animals had died on farms and had been buried, and thus had not entered the food chain.
Starting in 1989 we traced all of those animals back to their farms in the United Kingdom. We regularly updated our database to show whether any of the U.K. farms showed BSE after the animals had been shipped to Canada. In 1994, and this has been reconfirmed every six months thereafter, we knew that out of the group of 68 animals unavailable for removal and testing in 1994, 10 of those animals, at some time subsequent to 1990, did have at least one case of BSE in the United Kingdom.
We knew that there had been a low level of potential infectivity although the animals that entered the slaughter chain were clinically healthy. They can be clinically healthy but actually infected for up to six months before they show symptoms of BSE. We recognized that reality and much of our decision-making and collective measures for food bans have taken place since that time.
High-risk animals, in a Canadian context, were animals born prior to our 1997 feed ban. These animals came from specific geographic areas of the country. We have mapped and indicated where all of the U.K. animals entered into the feed system. We have tracked how feed has been produced in Canada over the last 15 years. We know the trade pattern that exists within Canada.
In terms of possible exposure, if it did happen, we know that the highest risk animals as demonstrated by the Harvard study, within North America is that last group of animals born in late 1996 and early 1997 that would have potentially been, if there were infected feed prior to the feed ban, exposed to that feed. They would have had the highest level of exposure of any circulating prion activity in feed.
Based on collective international experience, we know that BSE will not always express itself in the same way. We benefit in Canada, if one can call having other diseases a benefit, from a long history of dealing with neurological diseases such as rabies in animals. Our producers are sensitized to animals showing nervous signs because of the potential for rabies and other diseases. The reporting of neurological cases is high. We also recognize that high-risk animals could be those that show nervous signs similar to symptoms of other diseases that we see in Canada. We have good reporting in that area, and that helps us define high-risk animals that we are targeting in our surveillance program to determine if any residual BSE could exist.
Certainly, if we found a second case we would have to recognize that the most important issue in respect of public health has already been taken with the removal of specified risk materials at the point of slaughter. Based on Health Canada information, removal of that material provides a greater than 99 per cent assurance that no infectivity would get into the food chain.
In terms of investigation, we would not initiate as broad an investigation to find a second case. We would be limited to dealing primarily with the farm from which the animal was derived so the effort would be more focussed and localized.
The Chairman: Would out-of-Canada buyers accept that science?
Mr. Evans: It is fair to state, Mr. Chairman, that most countries in the world recognize the integrity and credibility of our animal health control and certification systems. As difficult as this has been, there are many factors beyond science that dictate what imports countries will choose. It is fair to state that international confidence in Canada's animal health and public health systems has been heightened by this event in terms of our transparency and the reviews that were carried out. I have every confidence that the international community would not overreact to the finding of a second case and would recognize that the measures we have in place are appropriate to protecting their interests and the interests of Canadians.
Senator Wiebe: First, I want to congratulate officials in the department for the excellent way in which they have handled BSE events since last spring. I think that Canada and the United States have not had a good track record. In fact, our track record has been terrible in respect of reopening borders after we have closed them.
You have been able to get the United States to move as quickly as possible. That deserves a compliment as well, however, that may be the end of the compliments.
During the last eight years, the agricultural sector has been in a very difficult situation with the exception of those farmers who are involved with marketing boards and those farmers who are in the beef industry. It is pretty difficult for a grain farmer to get into a marketing board in any meaningful way.
Our departments of agriculture, both provincial and federal, have done quite a job convincing farmers that they should move away from a dependency on the grain business and look for niche markets. Farmers are being convinced to enter some other field of expertise. As noted, it is difficult to become established in the marketing board system, and so, many farmers moved into the cattle business.
At the urging of both the federal and provincial governments many of our farmers diversified into the livestock industry, and long-term established cow/calf producer will probably survive. However, the farmers who were talked into it and had to invest money into breeding stock and equipment are having one hell of a time.
We brought in a program last spring that was designed to help the feeder operation. It was also designed to protect the jobs in the processing plants. One wonders whether that was the main reason for that assistance program.
A few weeks ago at the round table set up to look at current problems both the provincial and the federal ministers of agriculture rejected out of hand the proposal that the industry had made in regards to the culled cow situation. They sited the risk management program under the new Agricultural Policy Framework, and said that program would take care of the problem.
No one knows much about the Agricultural Policy Framework. It is based on operations from previous years. No one knows what the Business Risk Management Program is all about or how much money there will be to support the cattle producers.
We have many people who we have encouraged to get into the cattle business, and they feel that the government has abandoned them. As you say, while we congratulate the fact that we have moved more quickly than people expected with the U.S. opening their borders, it will not happen tomorrow or any time before the first quarter of next year.
What will cow/calf operators do in the meantime?
Mr. Marsland: It is important to point out that the objective of the original BSE recovery program introduced in June was really quite limited. At that point, we saw a totally dysfunctional market. It was a market where 60 per cent of its output was exported. When a situation occurs like the one that we experienced and the border is closed, the market freezes.
Farming is a machine that cannot be turned off. It continues to produce cattle that put on weight and at a certain point lose value. Our objective was to get that market moving, to get the slaughter rates up to closer to historic level, and avoid paralysis of the market. At the same time, we needed to increase the returns that producers would get from the marketplace given the depressed prices of a flooded market.
In that context, the program was successful in achieving that objective. It certainly did not resolve many of the issues on this incident, but we can provide data on how the market responded to that in terms of increasing slaughter rates. Most participants in the industry would agree that was the objective at the time, and the objective was achieved.
The immediate problem facing the industry is the problem of culled cows. There is a surplus of older cows, and their meat is not eligible for export. A large proportion of those animals used to be exported live or their meat was exported to the U.S. We have a problem with the surplus of many hundreds of thousands of older cows.
We have been working with the industry looking at options for the development of a domestic market for that meat. Part of that is the restriction of supplementary import quota permits to create a larger domestic market for that product. There will be other measures directed to that problem.
Senator Wiebe: How much longer will we have to wait?
Mr. Marsland: I believe the minister indicated that we would be looking at that in the immediate future.
Senator Wiebe: Will that fall under the Business Risk Management Program or will it be a separate program?
Mr. Marsland: The Business Risk Management Program once in place will partly address the longer-term income issue for producers, but the issue of culled animals and the market problems associated with that will not be addressed. The domestic market issue is a specific problem. We are examining whether specific measures are required to get that market moving and get the animals out the system.
Senator Wiebe: Up until now, we have had the luxury in this country of exporting our cows and letting someone else eat that beef.
Is the department looking at ways and means by which we could find a market for that meat here in Canada?
Would there be a market for a processed product that we may be able to export?
Mr. Marsland: There are two or three aspects to that question. We have exported a large proportion of these animals in the past so there are issues in terms of capacity to process those animals in the Canadian system. If we are to use that product in the domestic market, we will need to build the processing and packing capacity to deal with it.
As second aspect is that given that we have exported this product we have not used it in the domestic processing industry so a significant marketing developing effort needs to be made to develop the market in Canada. We are trying to assist the industry in doing that including increasing resources to the industry to develop that market campaign.
The Chairman: Are you referring to cows that are younger than 30 months?
Mr. Marsland: I was referring to animals that are more than 30 months and therefore not eligible for export.
Senator Fairbairn: I would like to take a moment to thank you for the work you have performed. I come from southwestern Alberta, and when that single cow became news everyone from producers, truckers, and people in packing plants, et cetera became involved. We are very close to the border and that was a large concern as well. It was pretty frightening stuff at the beginning, and had a great effect on the people from my area. In the beginning of the process the whole world very quickly came to see this as a science-based attack on the problem. There were an awful lot of cattle people who, because it had not been an issue before, did not know much about BSE.
You mentioned communications earlier and I must say that although we are often not very good at communications, there has been a remarkable change in that over the last several months.
In the beginning, the thing that kept this country and our area from going into a state of panic and despair was the fact that information was made available to all of the groups involved in the cattle industry. Parliamentarians made conference calls and the media was well briefed, and this effort did a lot to keep a lid on what could have been mass hysteria in the area. An awful lot of credit must go to the people who worked so hard to avoid a terrible situation.
Sometimes, in the kind of news industry we have now, it is the disasters that claim the headlines. That is what people want to write about, or put on television. On this issue, in the beginning at least, very seldom were people interested in saying anything about what was happening in Ottawa, and what the government agencies and the government itself were trying to do. For any of us out there on the hoof, as it were, there was only one way to deal with the problem, and that was to get out in the auction barns, in the farms, in the towns and at the rallies, doing everything from flipping beef to trying to answer questions.
I am not a BSE expert, but I wanted to get out there and pass on information concerning the efforts of the federal government. Our people were not just trying to get a grip on the issue, but were also working on this extraordinary scientific effort.
I telephoned the department and made it clear that I wanted to help. A gentleman from the Canadian Food Inspection Agency who is stationed in Manitoba but ended up with the emergency response team out of Calgary took the time to come down into my area and work with me. George Luterbach was enormously effective in giving people answers, desperate people who did not know if they would making a living the next day.
I do want to put that on the record. I thank everyone for the effort to try and make Canadians understand and, in that sense, take the fear out of this issue.
Would you please bring us up to date on how many of the recommendations have been met?
The international panel stated that we did a splendid job but that there are other things that we need to do in order to have the border re-opened. I am referring to the risk materials.
In the aftermath of this crisis we must ask the question: What about the next time? We must ask, what have we learned from this experience?
Are you able to tell us what we have to do to be able to better handle the day-to-day testing?
What resources and numbers do we have to put into facilities to avoid this problem rather than having to deal with it in a crisis situation?
Mr. Evans: I want to express our appreciation to Senator Fairbairn for her very kind words and her letter in support of Dr. Luterbach. It is difficult in the midst of these circumstances to make sure people are adequately recognized and that their work is appreciated. That means a lot to people who put their hearts and souls into what they do to protect both public and animal health in this country.
I know that Dr. Luterbach takes great solace in the fact that his hard work had a positive impact. He appreciates that he has been recognized, and continues his hard work on this and other matters.
With respect to other measures, we have moved significantly on the areas of feed practices and surveillance. Our surveillance numbers are up from where they were prior to the outbreak.
You have identified some of the impediments that we have had to work through. We are in the process of moving the rapid test out of the federal system into the provinces and into our veterinary colleges and other institutions across the country that can play an active role and provide a higher level of coverage in a more timely fashion.
Since June we have advanced and approved additional test methods. Provinces are now able to use existing equipment rather than purchase new equipment and do new training for new methods. We have tried to work with the provinces to allow the testing to continue to escalate based on the targeting of the population that we have discussed.
It must be fully recognized that the market forces are very important at this time. We must get the testing done on the animals that are six, seven, and eight years of age, as they are not the animals being pulled into the slaughter system, and as a result, their numbers are up. These programs, in terms of culled cows, are equally important to make sure we get access to those animals in an appropriate time.
It has taken time to integrate the pieces. Historically, 95 per cent of the meat that moves out of Canada originates in federal establishments, and 95 per cent of the animals slaughtered are between 18 and 24 months of age. Those animals have minimal test relevance to us because the tests are not validated to work in animals that are under 24 months and those animals would not have been exposed to the same feed sources.
The dynamics of where and how we get the testing done have progressed. Our numbers are moving up and we hope that, over the course of the next four to six months, the ramped-up program will get us back up to testing.
It is important to recognize that Canadian testing levels were in excess of the international standards prescribed. The OIE is undertaking a review of the standards and we are targeting our testing to ensure that we meet or exceed any new international standards. Over the coming weeks, we hope to make our work available to all Canadians.
There are impacts across in respect of feed, not only within the industry, but also because of tighter feed restrictions. We have looked at a number of options and have had extensive discussions with industry and the provinces. We have also looked at adjusting our feed measures, having expressed a case of BSE, and what we do domestically must be reflected in our import approach. Managing that integrated North American market with the United States is also a factor. We are trying to ensure that our measures, appropriate to Canada's circumstances, do not create barriers to re- establishing that integrated market that could restrict or slow it down.
We are close to achieving consensus on the feed issue. I hope that it is well understood that enforceable measures need to be implemented because we do not want to make the same mistakes that other countries made in terms of a legislative approach that cannot be achieved.
A large part of what happened in Europe was that they brought in legal restrictions that they could not enforce. The result was that it undermined public confidence when people realized that they were not being protected. We have tried to find that balance and we are close in those two areas.
We have collaborated with industry to enhance our animal identification system. It would have been nice had it been in effect sooner. The Canadian Cattle Identification Agency, CCIA, is looking at new methods of animal identification, while ensuring that their database allows us to track an animal when it leaves the farm to go to slaughter and when it is sold.
That system is coming along well and shows a good basis for an international standard.
Senator Day: I think I heard that 95 per cent of the beef slaughtered in Canada is at establishments supervised by the federal government. Is that correct?
Mr. Evans: That is correct.
Senator Day: Is 5 per cent unsupervised?
Mr. Evans: For meat to be exported or to move interprovincially, it must be slaughtered at a federally supervised establishment. Within the provincial system there are standards as well.
Senator Day: Any international trade would be within that 95 per cent?
Mr. Evans: That is correct. The remaining 5 per cent is inspected at the provincial level and not eligible for trade outside of Canada.
These issues on biological threats are more visible in today's environment and we are in focus because we are collectively responsible for the protection of the citizens and animals of Canada.
Our laboratory complex in Winnipeg is unique in the world and a model that others build upon. The Winnipeg Laboratory is operated with Health Canada and operates at human animal health level four capacity.
The lab infrastructure in Canada, although jeopardized because of inter-jurisdictional isolation, provincial debt management, and adjustment in investment measures, is undergoing a renewed vigour to bring the animal health infrastructure to the table for good food safety approach.
We have worked with the provinces so they have rapid testing capacity for BSE. We are collating that information and broadening it to other parts of the animal and public health community, such as veterinary schools, and academic institutions that are now full partners in the testing activity.
Senator Gustafson: I want to commend the department on its very excellent job.
I have one caveat. You did all this when the political climate was not useful in reopening the border. That is a fact.
I want to mention the young farmers who borrowed money and are now in debt in the aftermath of the BSE issue. As Senator Wiebe said, farmers were encouraged by the government to diversify. If something could be done to assist them in terms of bank interest payable, it would be a positive move.
It is surprising that the cattle market has held up quite well. Feeder cattle are moving at $1.20 per pound and fat cattle are moving at 98 cents to $1 per pound, which is remarkable.
When the American border reopens, you will see these prices escalate by 20 cents a pound. That will be the positive side. The down side has been the people hurt, the young farmers who borrowed money and now have to hold their calves longer than they anticipated.
The feed market, barley for instance, has gone to pieces. It is worth one-half today what it worth one year ago. The grain farmer has also taken a hit because of that and, of course, the truckers and all the others relevant to the industry. That, of course, has nothing to do with the fact that your department has done a good job in dealing with the situation.
Senator Hubley: There is overwhelming support for the thorough work. When you can garner the support of the farm community and the Senate of Canada, it is to your credit.
One of our handouts shows the standards that other countries have put in place for the import of material.
Will the Canadian experience make an international difference?
Is the way that you have handled this situation going to become an encouragement for other countries to not only look at their standards, but also put in place some of our practices and science behind their decisions?
Mr. Evans: Senator, I think you have captured a very key element. We hope that our work will lead to continuous learning and international improvement. We have tried to learn from other countries' experiences. The current international response is at odds with the science that has evolved since 1985. It is at odds with how the international standards have evolved.
I think the best that we can take from that is that governments around the world have not been effective in their risk communication with the public, and that is the standard that we in Canada tried to use as a basis for change. We made a great effort to engage the public in our work. We made sure to explain the situation and just what we were doing to overcome the problem. We made the public aware of what we did and did not know about BSE and where it had originated. We tried to bridge that gap and made available any bit of important information that helped to clear up the problem. The support of the Canadian public has been unparalleled compared to other countries that have had this disease.
Unfortunately, other countries were forced to focus on restoring the public confidence while they should have been focusing on the control of the disease. Precious time was spent trying to deal with government and regulatory approaches that took them into domains that went well beyond where science suggested they needed to go. As a result, there was hysteria in the international community.
Although we recognize the public health impacts are severe if anybody is unfortunate enough to encounter new variance CJD, we also recognize that there has been a huge retreat in Europe from the original projection of hundreds of thousands of people developing new variance CJD, to the current projection of 200 or 300 people developing it over 20 years.
In terms of relative risk, the message is starting to change. This is an important component that Canada has set a standard for communication and engagement with the public that allows the public to take informed decisions and to understand that risk can be managed and that they are part of the risk management process
For the record, Canada made an intervention yesterday at the World Trade Organization SPS meeting. The OIE supported Canada's statement that the international community must change its approach, stay current with the science, and engage with its population to continue to build confidence in public health and animal health risk management. To do otherwise sends the wrong message to the world. If a political institution invests in disease control and is transparent in its reports as the obligations state it should be, the current environment punishes you. That serves as a deterrent for countries to make those investments or to be transparent.
We have already started to see the shift in the thinking with the OIE approaching all 165-member countries at a political level to demonstrate that the Canadian model is the basis on which global trade and global protection can be founded.
We see a shift and Canada should take full credit for having brought the perspective to managing not just this disease, but diseases of this type that can affect trade. There is a shift in the understanding that trade interests and public and animal health interests are not seen as being at odds with each other, but in fact the integrity and infrastructure and the confidence in the systems merits that you should have legitimate access for trade.
Senator Day: Are you aware of the current status of British trade and production? Are they able to sell in Europe? Is the problem behind them?
Mr. Evans: Yes, in fact the U.K. as recently as six weeks ago received permission from the European commission to start trade in beef from animals over 30 months age.
Senator Day: They seem to have the problem behind them.
Mr. Evans: Well, again, it is never always behind you, but certainly their situation is starting to come in line with what science and the standards state.
Senator Day: We have heard that its trade with Japan is influencing the U.S. border situation. I wonder if you can comment on the situation from the point of view that when you look at world commerce there are factors other than science that are involved in the bigger picture.
You have spoken about managing communication and risk. Most of us who are not in the industry wonder how there could be such a profound impact with one diseased cow.
Are there other scientific demands that we are not meeting, or are other factors contributing to the continuation of the problem?
Mr. Evans: The reality is there is no road map that has ever been successful for countries that have been exposed to BSE. As a veterinary regulatory official I take equal blame with the government in not putting this particular disease into context for the Canadian public.
There were hundreds of thousands of cattle with BSE in Europe. Estimates are that there were probably over 2 million cattle that entered the food chain between 1985 and 1994-95 when they finally got their feed restrictions set up in a way that they became enforceable. That led to the epidemiological link with new variance CJD in human disease.
People saw this as mismanagement of the interface between animal health and public health, and the ineffectiveness of government to bring in measures to control the disease. As a result, an unfortunate international environment was created that put the emphasis on not what was safe but who in particular was affected. They were not sure the countries could implement effective measures in a way that was appropriate. That is the tide that is turning.
In the case of Japan, it is well known that in the early stages, we found ourselves in a triangulation with the U.S. interest to export to Japan, our interest to re-establish export to Japan, and our interest in exporting to the United States.
There has been progress. It has been slow but it comes back to the issue that there has not been a road map that has been used effectively in the past. We have been changing the world's approach. We have seen an opening to Canadian products by other countries that no other country has achieved following a case of BSE.
We have been to Japan three times in the last three months and they have been here. We have very high-level political intervention going on with Japan as well.
A week ago Friday when we were in Tokyo, there was a new receptivity. They are more interested in the methods that we used and seem to be coming around to our model. My sense is that the situation is not going to change this week or next, but the engagement has changed significantly.
The Chairman: Did you take any Canadian beef over with you?
Mr. Evans: The Canadian Beef Export Federation has run three promotions in Japan since BSE was found in Canada. This was based on stocks already in Japan. Canadian beef sold higher in Japan than it ever had.
Alberta did a tremendous job bringing in well-respected Japanese journalists to look at the circumstances first hand, and they in turn, reported fairly on the Canadian situation. I take my hat off to the province that did this in part of a leverage strategy to see that the Japanese public was well informed. As a result of this strategy the Japanese public trusts Canadian beef, and that trust is moving upwards to government officials who are beginning to understand what actually happened in Canada.
Senator LaPierre: Do they not have nine cows with this disease?
Mr. Evans: They have eight reported cases and they will find more.
Senator LaPierre: The Japanese should stop complaining.
[Translation]
Senator Day: Mr. Lavoie, I believe I saw you on television yesterday. There was a demonstration at Quebec's National Assembly; first of all, are you aware of that demonstration?
Mr. Gilles Lavoie, Senior Director General, Market and Industry Services Branch, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada: I saw it, as many others did, on television last evening, yes.
Senator Day: Can you comment? If I understood clearly, that demonstration took place because the farmers are asking for a subsidy, is that correct? Is that what they want?
Mr. Lavoie: Over three weeks ago, the Government of Quebec announced an additional subsidy to help producers of conditioned cattle, just as some other provinces have. They have not yet announced any special measures for animals over 30 months old, cull stock.
Ms. Gauthier said in her press release that such a measure would be implemented in conjunction with that of the federal government. Three weeks have passed and producers have expressed their impatience regarding the implementation of those additional measures. I believe Ms. Gauthier said yesterday on television that she expects to have such measures implemented soon and that it was not a question of months or weeks but rather of days.
Senator Day: Is this a problem between the federal and provincial governments?
Mr. Lavoie: No, I don't think so. The options that Mr. Marsland was referring to were initiated and continue to be studied and developed in cooperation with the provinces. There is no problem in that regard.
[English]
The Chairman: You have mentioned the problems concerning cows of 30 months and more. Could you tell us something about the current inventory of these animals? How many are there now compared to before the outbreak on May 20?
[Translation]
Mr. Lavoie: Approximately 200,000 unconditioned cows would have been slaughtered between May 1 and today at the normal rate of about 10,000 a week. This summer, however, the rate was only 2,000 to 4,000 head. We are therefore behind. Since the beginning of September, the slaughter rate has increased to about 6,000 unconditioned animals. On the other hand, we are slaughtering over 50,000 conditioned animals per week, which is nearly the same level as in 2002. In that regard, things are going well.
With regards to unconditioned animals, cull stock, a serious effort is still required.
[English]
Senator Gustafson: What kind of compensation was paid to the farmers who had to have their cows put under?
Mr. Evans: Are you talking about the compensation paid to the owners of the animals that were destroyed during the investigation?
Senator Gustafson: Is the figure 2,700 correct?
Mr. Evans: Under the Health of Animals Act, we do pay compensation to any animal that is ordered destroyed as part of our disease control activities. Unfortunately, we have maximum amounts that are paid for any one species. In the case of cattle, we currently have a cap that says the federal government cannot pay in excess of $2,500 for an animal.
In the case of the investigations, all cattle were evaluated before they were removed from the farm. The evaluation team involves a government representative, industry representative and a third party, either insurance or bank or someone that has knowledge of the value of the animals to ensure that there is a fair value paid for the animals up to the maximum allowed. Then in the case of our investigation, the longest delay from the removal of animals to the receipt of cheques from the government was under three weeks. We did not receive a single complaint from any of the producers who lost herds. There were certainly concerns about the values compared to the compensation eligible, but in terms of the turn-around time and evaluation process, virtually every one of the farmers who lost animals was satisfied they were treated fairly within the scope of what is allowed.
Senator Gustafson: If there was an exotic cow or specialized bull in the herd, you could not pay over $2,500.
Mr. Evans: That is correct, if there are animals of exceptional genetic value. Of course, farmers do have access to private insurance on animals of that kind. It is not always the norm to insure. Some insurance would not pay indemnities against reportable disease. They see that as beyond the scope of their programs.
With industry, we review our compensation levels every four years to establish new levels based on market forces, but it remains an issue of the scope of compensation and that area of capping, which was brought in during the early 1990s. At that time we were dealing with the TB removal of elk imported from the United States. In that situation some of the animals were valued at over $100,000 apiece because of their breeding and entrepreneurial value.
Senator LaPierre: I also want to join my voice to the symphony of compliments that have been bestowed upon you and also acknowledge the magnificent leadership of your minister in this entire affair.
I also want to say that you are bankrupt in the sense that you have used more acronyms than anyone else we have ever heard. You have actually used them three times in one sentence. That is costing you money because we have a rule about this in this committee. I would not put it on your expense account, if I were you, because Mr. Williams from the Alliance will confiscate them. Acronyms are astonishingly difficult for simple-minded peasants like myself.
I had not lived with a cow intimately since I was four years old and I am 73. Like 85 per cent of Canadians, I have never had a conversation with a cow. All of a sudden the cow has become the symbol of our unity and capacity to trade with the world and of our relationship with the United States. People have gone so far as to suggest that if Mr. Chrétien were to have had a scotch with Mr. Bush every hour on the hour, the cows would move more easily across the border.
Senator Gustafson: It would have helped.
Senator LaPierre: I know more about Alberta cows. Did cows in British Columbia and in the Maritimes, for example, need help, or only Alberta cows? Surely we must have some cows that are sold on the international market that do not come from Alberta.
I also must tell you that I have never consumed so much red meat in my life. I went to all kinds of ceremonies and parties in which Alberta beef was served. In carrying out my patriotic duty, I even went to McDonald's on two occasions. I had not been there since I was 15 years old. I discovered finally why it is that people like so much junk on their hamburger, because by itself it is inedible.
I am concerned with the increase of the consumption of red meat by 72 per cent in a single month. That is a health problem. No one has warned us of that problem, even though we are aware that we must eat a balanced diet. Does that frighten Agriculture Canada?
Who do you report to, Mr. Evans? Are you an agriculture person as well?
Mr. Evans: The Canadian Food Inspection Agency is part of Minister Vanclief's portfolio, but we have a separate reporting regime.
Senator LaPierre: Did you ever talk about that with Minister McLellan, who comes from Alberta and knows all about cows?
Mr. Evans: As you say, when we talk about public health, public health is much more than diseases that can spread between animals and humans from our perspective. It is much more than food safety in terms of ensuring that the meat being eaten is safe, either in terms of direct public health risk or, as you have indicated, a nutritional standpoint.
Health Canada is the lead government agency in dealing with the nutritional status of Canadians. I think what is being reported in terms of the increased sales of beef, I am not sure all of that was consumed. I am sure it is in freezers across the country as well. It may not have been consumed within that period of time.
At the retail level, this sale of beef displaced of sales of other products. It is not that Canadians ate more meat in the summer; they ate what they historically would have eaten. There have been impacts obviously on the pork and poultry sectors as well.
It is important that the message cover the full range of issues. The most recent studies by Health Canada firmly suggest that the size of any consumption of red meat in Canada, as it has the rest of the world, at any one sitting is not an issue. Normally four to six ounces of red meat from cholesterol and other standpoints does not create health issues; it can be metabolized by the body.
We have to differentiate between whether this increased volume was actually consumed in that short period of time or whether it has been put into freezers for longer-term consumption.
[Translation]
Mr. Lavoie: Mr. Chairman, to complete the information requested by the senator, there are approximately two million cows in Alberta, out of a total of six million in Canada. Therefore, they have around a third of the cow population.
Senator Lapierre: How many cows are there in Quebec?
Mr. Lavoie: There are around 222,000 butcher cows and 395,000 dairy cows, adding up to a little more than 600,000.
[English]
Senator Fairbairn: I guess people like myself ate an awful lot more beef day-in and day-out just to show the flag.
I will add to the witnesses' statements that I saw a lot of beef that was sold in boxes for the expressed purpose of being sold for later use.
I want to thank all of you for coming today. This is an issue that definitely should have a good workout in this committee. We hope that you will return on another occasion to bring us up to date on your progress.
The committee adjourned.