Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
National Security and Defence
Issue 12 - Evidence - Morning session
OTTAWA, Monday, March 17, 2003
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met this day at 9:30 a.m. to examine and report on the need for a national security policy for Canada.
Senator Colin Kenny (Chairman) in the Chair.
[English]
The Chairman: It is my pleasure to welcome you to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. Today, the committee concludes its briefings on Canada-United States relations, in preparation for its trip next week to Washington to meet with members of Congress and with U.S. administration officials.
I am a senator from Ontario and I serve as chair of this committee.
Our deputy chair is the distinguished Senator Michael Forrestall, who is from Nova Scotia. Senator Forrestall has served the constituents of Dartmouth for 37 years, first as their member in the House of Commons and later as their senator. Throughout his parliamentary career, he has followed defence matters and has served on defence-related parliamentary committees, including the 1993 Special Joint Committee on the future of the Canadian Forces.
Senator Tommy Banks was well-known to Canadians as an accomplished and versatile musician and entertainer before his appointment to the Senate in 2000. Senator Banks chairs the Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources. Currently, that committee is studying the Nuclear Safety and Control Act.
Senator Jane Cordy, from Nova Scotia, was an accomplished educator with an extensive record in community involvement before she came to the Senate in 2000. In addition to serving on this committee, Senator Cordy is a member of the Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, which recently released a landmark report on health care and that will now study mental health.
Senator Norman Atkins, from Ontario, came to the Senate in 1986 with a strong background in the field of communications and with experience as advisor to former Premier Davis of Ontario. Senator Atkins is a member of our Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs and of the Standing Committee on Internal Economy, Budgets and Administration. He serves as chair of the Senate Conservative caucus.
Senator David Smith, from Ontario, served as a councillor and deputy mayor of Toronto, as a member of the House of Commons and as a minister of state, prior to being appointed to the Senate in 2002. Senator Smith serves on the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee and on the Standing Committee on Rules, Procedures and the Rights of Parliament.
Our committee is the first permanent Senate committee with a mandate to examine the subjects of security and defence. Over the past 18 months, we have completed a number of studies, beginning with the report ``Canadian Security and Military Preparedness'' on a study of the major issues facing Canada. That report was tabled in February 2002.
The Senate then asked our committee to examine the need for a national security policy. To date, we have released three reports on various aspects of national security: ``Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility,'' September 2002; ``For an Extra 130 Bucks...Update On Canada's Military Financial Crisis: A VIEW FROM THE BOTTOM UP,'' November 2002; and ``The Myth of Security at Canada's Airports,'' January 2003.
The committee is in the process of evaluating the federal contribution to the work of the men and women across the country who first respond to emergencies or disasters. In recent meetings, the committee has been preparing for its trip to Washington next week with a series of briefings on Canada-U.S. relations. We began with a presentation by the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, CCRA, about their involvement with Canada-U.S. border relations and the implementation of the 30-point Smart Border Action Plan. This was followed by briefings on the role and capabilities of the Canadian Coast Guard and by a question-and-answer session on Canada-United States intelligence issues with the Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, CSIS.
Just before the recent parliamentary break, the committee heard evidence about how the Privy Council Office, PCO, coordinates intelligence and how the Communications Security Establishment cooperates with its United States counterparts. This was followed by a briefing from the Department of the Solicitor General of Canada on how Canada and the United States cooperate on border enforcement.
Today's hearings will begin with an update on the Canada-United States military relationship. Our presenters will be MGen. Pierre Daigle and Col. Rick Williams. I welcome both of you here today. I understand that you have a short opening statement to make. Please proceed.
Major-General Pierre Daigle, MSC, CD, Special Advisor to the Chief of Defence Staff (Homeland Security Issues), Department of National Defence: I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the committee today. I will keep my opening remarks brief to allow time for questions and answers.
There has been much discussion on homeland security over the past year and a half as the Government of Canada has sought to ensure national security in the face of new threats.
[Translation]
I will try to highlight the role of the Canadian armed forces in a national security context. The department and the Canadian armed forces are engaged in an era of change, and we keep improving our operational capacity. I gave a few examples in my submission. We should look into our obligations on the North American continent.
[English]
National security, in my view, has become continental security. The establishment of the Bi-national Planning Group for the purpose of enhancing Canada-U.S. military cooperation in this new security environment is a fundamental step within our obligations as part of North America. Defence is a subset of homeland security, which is the responsibility of the Government of Canada; however, the execution of homeland security missions rests with a number of federal government agencies. As you are aware, many Canadian government departments are engaged with their U.S. counterparts in enhancing North American security. Post-9/11, this requires a high degree of cooperation between departments and agencies, both domestically and with our American colleagues.
I will try to explain, to the best of my knowledge, any aspect that touches on homeland defence and security. Before doing so, I would ask Col. Williams to say a few words.
Colonel Rick Williams, Director, Western Hemisphere Policy, Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy Branch, Department of National Defence: Mr. Chairman, in the interests of time, I have no opening statement to add to MGen. Daigle's comments. However, I am fully prepared to review the background material that we provided, which outlines the context of the military relationships between Canada and the United States.
Senator Forrestall: Col. Williams, among the information you provided us earlier, you indicated that one of the missions of the planning group is to prevent or to mitigate wars or attacks by terrorists or others on Canada or the United States. Can you indicate to me how a planning group intends to prevent an attack by terrorists? Are you perhaps suggesting there will be an operational cell? How will this play out? Are we viewing Canada and the United States as one entity? MGen. Daigle said a moment ago that national security has become homeland security. Col. Williams, could you elaborate on that for us?
Col. Williams: The concept I should like to leave with you is that the planning group will serve to gather the best information available so that we are better prepared to deal with a situation that emerges. Clearly, no planning or preparation will deter a dedicated group of terrorists who wish to inflict harm on the country. However, if they know that Canada and the United States have taken all measures to ensure that they are aware of what is going on and that they are protected, I believe that will provide terrorists with a far bigger challenge to create a terrorist potential.
The planning group will be in place to establish the infrastructure, to gather the information, to monitor, and to train and prepare for a range of eventualities, from a terrorist attack to a natural disaster.
Senator Forrestall: Are you describing to us what the infrastructure will eventually look like? Will it have those components of preparation? Is that what you are describing to us? If that is the case, how fundamentally basic is this part of the infrastructure to where we go from here over the next several years?
Col. Williams: If I refer to the actual material that I provided, there was a listing of the tasks that the planning group would be expected to perform. I will just briefly summarize them in order to answer your question.
On page 4, slide 7 is titled ``Planning Group Specified Tasks.'' It takes the mission of the planning group one level below, so that we start to identify those tasks that they want to accomplish.
Briefly, I have described the concept of them maintaining awareness of emerging situations, in this case, primarily through the maritime surveillance activities they will organize. They will share intelligence and operational information in accordance with national laws, policies and directives. They will assess the threats that exist, design and participate in exercises that will ensure we are prepared for those threats, conduct joint training programs to ensure that the forces available are aware of the latest technology and activities that could be beneficial to their task, and they will validate these plans through national authorities to ensure both governments understand, are aware of and agree to the kind of structure that is in place. Lastly, because the military is not the agency of first response — which is fundamentally police and civil — they will ensure appropriate coordination with those civil agencies.
When you look at the type of tasks that the planning group will be involved in, I think you can see the coordination and the preparation that I was talking about.
Senator Forrestall: You touch on maritime surveillance but concentrate your thoughts on the other aspects of it. Does your indication that the planning group will maintain awareness of emerging situations through maritime surveillance imply the establishment of a separate planning group, given the early importance being attached to entry into the United States of items other than welcome material and goods via water, containers, et cetera?
Col. Williams: I would respond by saying that, as recently as Friday, Canada appointed a liaison officer to the United States, RAdm. Fraser, who was Commander, Maritime Forces Pacific. That, I believe, is an indication that the maritime situation is probably the task with which the planning group will first become charged.
We have a very comprehensive system in place for aerospace protection of the continent through NORAD. We have identified that the maritime piece is perhaps the next most important. Charged with these two activities, I believe they will make some extensive progress in the short term.
Senator Forrestall: I should say that the promotion of MGen. Findley to Lieutenant-General, and what that seems to have triggered along the line, would indicate serious action. I congratulate all of them on their new positions, appointments and promotions.
MGen. Daigle, you indicated that Armed Forces was conducting a total review of defence intelligence and creating an intelligence fusion centre. Can you tell us a little more about the centre? Will it involve DND only, or will other government departments be involved in this centre?
MGen. Daigle: Mr. Chairman, first, to address the defence intelligence review, the review is being done in collaboration with ADM Margaret Purdy and the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, VAdm. Greg Maddison. They will be co-leading this initiative, looking within DND to assess and streamline all of the defence functions that have been carried out, doing a full review in order to better discipline the intelligence within the department.
There is a misconception concerning the fusion centre to which you are alluding. It is not necessarily a centre that we are trying to put in place, but more a capability. Its purpose is to provide information intelligence to the command control of the Canadian Forces in a timely manner.
At this stage, this organization is designed to take in the ever-increasing flow of information from disparate sources, digest it, analyze it and present it in a manageable, comprehensive format in real time. It has been defined at this stage, and there is money and resources assigned to this project. We think the definition phase will be completed by 2004, and the joint fusion centre should be in place by 2006. The Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff has the lead in all this. To date, I think this is what has been worked on.
However, the defence intelligence review is definitely an important step in harmonizing and disciplining all the intelligence assets within the department. Some other departments in the government are also looking at this, since nine or 10 of them have security and intelligence roles to play.
Senator Forrestall: That is rather interesting. Let me move on to a final question for now.
We heard some very disturbing evidence in Windsor a short while ago. Someone was describing one of the 1,500 or 1,600 emergency packs we have around the country. We discovered that the one in Windsor has three or four blankets, a broken axe and a pail for fire, but not much else. If you have not, would you take a look at these emergency packs? It would seem that 1,600 would cover the communities of Canada quite well, particularly in critical areas.
How closely do you relate to first responders? Do you relate directly, or through the provincial authorities to which most of the local emergency groups report?
MGen. Daigle: As Col. Williams mentioned, the Canadian Forces is a force of last resort. In most cases, we are not the first responder; we come in to support any civil agencies and law enforcement organizations.
The army is organized into four land force areas across Canada. Each land force area liases with related provincial governments and, in some areas, with local municipalities. The reserve forces have a footprint across the country and are integrated within the communities. They maintain a liaison with local authorities through land force areas, in the event they are called to support first responders. That is at the provincial and municipal level, where there are relations between the military, law enforcement agencies and local authorities.
At the federal level, OCIPEP is involved and responsible for coordinating response and preparedness across the country. They are engaged regularly in coordinating meetings with provincial offices of critical infrastructure across the country. In fact, OCIPEP is doing some simulated exercises to ensure that their decision-making processes and the connection between provincial and the federal agencies are in place.
Senator Forrestall: I appreciate that. I gather, then, that, at your planning group level, ongoing contact with provincial authorities is not a function you will carry out.
MGen. Daigle: The planning group will be fully manned in Colorado Springs this summer. Their first task will be to review and enhance military plans, in cooperation with the Americans. On the American side, most of the members of the planning groups belong to NORTHCOM, which is the new U.S. command. Their staff officer will have the dual responsibility of NORTHCOM and the planning group. We will have access to what is happening on the American side, because NORTHCOM supports agencies and handles liaison.
Our planning group will primarily enhance military cooperation. We will have one representative from OCIPEP, and this planning group will report back to the DCDS, but through the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, VAdm. Maddison. He is the operations officer of the Canadian Forces and will be the main contact with the different departments in Canada. The planning group in Colorado Springs will have no coordinating role with the various Canadian departments. It will have to go through the DCDS, who, in fact, will not have a role to coordinate. This is the government's function. We will be linking to all those departments, to be aware of their planning process, in the event we have to come in to support the civilian agencies.
Senator Forrestall: How many people do we have in Colorado Springs?
Col. Williams: Through NORAD, we have 268. We will have 30 in place by the summer.
I should like to give an example of where the planning group could assist in a situation. We used the Windsor- Detroit situation as a scenario when we first put forward the concept of the planning group. Let me say that we respect the jurisdiction of municipal and provincial authorities within their mandate to protect their citizens. The military, as MGen. Daigle has said, is not called into a situation unless a municipal and/or provincial authority needs assistance. It is not our role to look into the baskets of the police and fire departments, or these emergency kits, and make a determination of whether they are sufficient. That is their mandate and jurisdiction. They can ask us for help and we would be willing to do so, but that is theirs.
Where we would gain from the establishment of the planning group is that we have a group of people who are good at preparing and running exercises and evaluation scenarios, so that all of the people can have an opportunity to practice and train for the eventuality. We have seen in the past, through an exercise called ``TOPOFF'' — short for ``top officials'' — where a group of officials were presented with the scenario of a biological hazard originating on the West Coast and spreading across North America, that many questions were spun off to lower levels officials to look into the issues. The point you raise, where a particular preparedness kit is low on materials, as we get into the evaluation and exercise program we will bring these things to light. The appropriate agency that is responsible for the function will then be in a position to take appropriate action.
There is fear on the military side in both countries that we cannot do the job for everyone. We have neither the budget nor the people — or the mandate. We are trying to set up a situation where we will all learn and cooperate and the appropriate action agent will be in a position to make the right decision. The planning group will go a long way to helping what you have just described.
The Chairman: The kits that Senator Forrestall was talking about were Health Canada kits.
Senator Forrestall: I did not say they were.
The Chairman: I know you did not, but this is to clarify the record. We were quite impressed with the testimony we received about the supplies and caches that existed across the country, until we took our first trip out and asked first responders what they thought about the federal kits. They asked, ``What federal kits?'' When they looked into them — it was not quite as bad as Senator Forrestall described; there were two blankets, not one. However, they essentially told us that the kids were of no use. We intend to close the loop on that, if you will, and get back to Health Canada to explain to us how these caches of supplies work.
While we are on the subject of caches of supplies, perhaps you could talk about the Disaster Assistance Response Team, DART. The last time we looked at it, its supplies were in Trenton, its planning took place in Kingston and its people were in Petawawa, which struck us as an interesting way to organize a group. The number of people that could be processed at a given time, at one time, was as high as 100. It has been reduced to a number significantly less than that.
The Disaster Assistance Response Team has domestic uses obviously. Can you be more specific for the committee as to how you are readjusting it?
You referred to improving its domestic capability. Our impression was that it did not have much capability, period, the last time we looked at it. A year has passed. If more work has been done, the committee would be very interested in learning about it.
MGen. Daigle: Mr. Chairman, I have given a few examples of some of the enhancements that we brought to our capabilities since 9/11. I am not very knowledgeable of the details. I know that the DART has been deployed in the past. In the past year, we tried to improve their ability to deploy within Canada, including the equipment for a winter scenario that they were probably lacking at some point.
That is all I can say. I do not have much information on the details of this subject, which is under the authority of the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff.
The Chairman: In fairness, I would not have asked you about it if you had not brought it up. Could you undertake to provide more information to the committee about DART? Specifically, is the team still located at three separate bases? If so, why? What is the capacity of the unit to deal with casualties? What capability does the Canadian Forces have to actually move the team from one location to another? How quickly could that be done? How many aircraft would it take to move the team? Do you have the aircraft available to move the team, if it were necessary to move it?
MGen. Daigle: We will collate that information, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman: Our impression from visiting Trenton was that, given the number of Hercules that are unserviceable, you could not take anyone anywhere, essentially. We are very interested in the lack of capability of a strategic and tactical lift. It worries us a great deal. I am sure it worries you on a daily basis.
If you could give us more information about what the Disaster Assistance Response Team could do in North America if we wanted to be of assistance in the event of a natural disaster, it would be very helpful.
You also have been commenting on the maritime component that is working with NORTHCOM. I got the impression during your response that the Americans being double-hatted is a good thing for us, that if they were not double-hatted they would simply be focusing on the Canada-U.S. relationship. However, since they are double-hatted, you get an insight into what NORTHCOM is thinking about as well. I would welcome your comments on that.
I would also draw to your attention that this committee issued a report in September entitled ``Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility,'' in which we commented on the value of having this organization in Colorado Springs. We made the point that before you could coordinate with the Americans, you would have to coordinate inside Canada. This committee was not of the view that our assets were very well coordinated inside Canada. We would like to know if you have taken any of our September report to heart and the sort of work that is being undertaken ahead in terms of coordinating assets inside Canada.
MGen. Daigle: Honourable senators, you are right. I will do my best as an infantry officer to speak as an expert on the navy. We are looking at the North American framework for maritime assets. We need, also, to ensure that we are well integrated in our national area.
In December of last year, cabinet approved what we have called an Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group. That group devised a marine security protection plan. It is in collaboration with the Coast Guard. Our navy is working closely with Transport Canada and the Coast Guard.
The Chairman: Is the navy or Transport Canada the lead?
MGen. Daigle: Transport Canada is the lead. Our navy worked in collaboration with them. There are efforts to harmonize and discipline this particular aspect within our government. Our navy is very much involved. This is evolving more and more.
Our navy is not only working with the Coast Guard and Transport Canada, but also with the United States Navy and Coast Guard. On each of our coasts, as honourable senators will be aware, there are the maritime surveillance operational intelligence centres. They are working in close cooperation with the Americans. There are links with American fleets on both coasts.
The Chairman: MGen. Daigle, there is some confusion in my mind when you speak about Transport Canada being the lead agency of this group. When you talk about the coordination on each of our coasts, you are talking about Esquimalt and Halifax, which are clearly navy functions and responsibilities. Therefore, I am confused about the roles of Transport Canada and the navy? Who is in charge here?
MGen. Daigle: The navy, through this Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group, is collaborating with the other government departments in this maritime domestic security plan. They are one player among other departments involved with maritime civilians and the Coast Guard as key players in controlling drug trafficking and so on. They are working in close cooperation with other government departments.
The Chairman: I do not understand. When you are talking about the Coast Guard, are you talking about the United States Coast Guard?
MGen. Daigle: No, the Canadian Coast Guard.
The Chairman: Are you telling me that the Canadian Coast Guard is greatly involved in interdicting drugs?
MGen. Daigle: I do not know about the Canadian Coast Guard, but we are in a supporting role in the main awareness into drug trafficking. The navy is involved in this, but I do not have all the details of that. I do know that they are in a supporting role with the RCMP and others and may be called to help in those particular scenarios.
The Chairman: Perhaps I did not put the question well. The planning group seems to be run by Transport Canada. Yet, the two centres, one in Esquimalt and one in Halifax, are run by the military, and the navy is in charge. What is the relationship between Transport Canada and the navy in terms of coordinating Canadian assets? We will then move from coordinating Canadian assets to how we relate to the Americans. If you could walk us through that, MGen. Daigle, it would be helpful.
MGen. Daigle: I will try, Mr. Chairman. Sometimes the relationship is not necessarily that clear in my mind. We have navy on both coasts, with a homeland defence role as navy of defending our coasts and providing patrol and surveillance. That role exists. They do that through their maritime operational surveillance intelligence centres, which are established on both coasts.
Particularly in the role in homeland defence, they are linking with their American counterpart fleets that are operating on both ends of the continent.
Per the memorandum to cabinet that was approved in December 2002, we are one of the players, with other government departments, that are looking at gaps in maritime security. Our navy is collaborating with those departments in order to help facilitate the closing of those gaps, so resources have been allocated to those departments to enable them to do their job.
Within this interdepartmental maritime security working group, I know that Transport Canada had the lead. They were the ones who did the memorandum to cabinet, with the input of all of the other departments, including the navy. There is ongoing coordination. That is all that I know about this particular aspect at this stage.
I could bring you the overall framework going through the northern continent. We are getting more and more involved with the Americans, for instance, on the navy. However, on the domestic side, I can say that something has been done inside to look at all those gaps and to get a better coordination framework among all of the key department players. Perhaps the colonel has more to add.
The Chairman: The colonel is making hand signals. Has there been an announcement about what has been done? Is it public? Can we know what has been done to improve the coordination of the navy, the Coast Guard, the air force, the RCMP, Transport Canada, Customs, the whole gang that float around the coasts?
Col. Williams: Let me do my best for the air force and army. We will not try to speak for the navy. I wish we had a third partner who could specifically speak to some of the navy issues.
Senator Forrestall: So do we.
Col. Williams: The situation, on the surface, as we have tried to paint it, may have many players. That does not necessarily mean that there is confusion or a lack of leadership. If you look at the specific roles that are being played out, honourable senators will see that there is no misinterpretation of who is in charge.
Looking at the mission of national defence for the country and establishing a boundary around the country is the sole responsibility of the navy. Whether you draw that line 200 miles off the coast, or whatever, the navy takes responsibility and protects the coasts, conducts regular surveillance, monitors the situation, and basically interdicts and does the high seas missions.
As you start getting in closer to the country, other players come to the table with other interests. As you get into regions like economic development, floating oil rigs, fisheries, protection of the environment around the coast line, other players come to the table and claim as their mission the protection of those waters, those resources or those elements. Therefore, at that stage, there is cooperation between that agency and the military to provide assets or equipment to best meet the need.
You get the situation where there is an agreement between Fisheries Canada and the Department of National Defence to conduct fisheries patrols on behalf of a federal department. That agreement is in place, it is organized, there is a resource bill that is associated with it, and that is dealt with.
As you get closer to the coast line and see domestic industry, container shipping, vessels that move cargo and so on, that starts to enter a different mission, which is the responsibility of Transport Canada. They look at registering vessels, licensing them and protecting them. The regulatory component is done by the Canadian Coast Guard.
It is most important to recognize that our Coast Guard and the United States Coast Guard have a very different role. Though their title is the same, their role and manifestations are very different. Port protection, control of shipping within the St. Lawrence Seaway and so forth fall as a mission to the Department of Transport.
MGen. Daigle spoke about the horizontal coordination of these issues within government. A good forum for that was the interdepartmental maritime security working group. Transport brings the players to the table, understanding that there are missions that each of these players are responsible for, and attempts to coordinate the overlapping aspects of it.
A case in point: Drug traffic on the coasts is a police responsibility. However, the military has the capacity to deliver interdiction teams to vessels of interest. We do not do the boarding, nor do we do the arrest, but we assist the RCMP in conducting that operation at sea, to the best of our ability and under a series of agreements and arrangements.
To return to your pertinent question of who is in charge, my first response would be, which mission are we talking about? If it is the mission of national defence off the coasts, it is the navy. If it is the mission of resource protection, it is various departments. If it is the mission of internal industry, commerce and transportation, then it is the Department of Transportation. That is how I would answer your question. What on the surface looks like many players, when you break it down, is quite logical, and the right coordination is happening through functions like the interdepartmental maritime surveillance working group.
When you go to the United States, you entire a different domain with different players. Their Coast Guard functions as an interdiction agent within 200 miles. There is a standing agreement in the United States where the navy basically looks out 200 miles and beyond and the Coast Guard looks 200 miles in. There are various arrangements of internal jurisdictions, police, FBI and so on. Their problem is perhaps more complicated than ours in coordinating how these things come together. The recent establishment of the Department of Homeland Security has brought to the surface the tremendous scope of change that is underway in the U.S. administration and the elements that deal with homeland security.
My point is that what appears on the surface to have many players is, in fact, an ordered structure. The establishment of these horizontal committees has been useful to ensure that the right thing is done at the right time. When you cast your eyes to the United States, they are in the process of establishing much of what we have already set up in Canada.
The Chairman: Your answer is helpful, colonel. It does beg the question, though, of whether we made any progress in terms of coordinating our assets on each coast. My understanding is that is a matter still being studied by the Transport Canada group. It also begs the question of if Transport Canada is, in fact, responsible for coordinating the assets, as you just described a moment ago, perhaps we should have 30 Transport Canada folks at Colorado Springs instead of people from the Canadian Forces.
Col. Williams: As part of our interdepartmental consultations, as we put the planning group proposal forward to cabinet, we did offer them the potential for the establishment of liaison positions in the planning group for those functions where the civil dimension is very important: Transport Canada, the Solicitor General for the RCMP, and other intelligence activities and so on. We said, ``If you feel that there is a bona fide value for having someone elbow to elbow in Colorado with the planning group, we are more than happy to entertain that and facilitate it.''
The Chairman: What did they say?
Col. Williams: They were interested. Their first question related to who would pay, which is the resource issue. We pointed out that if they wished to establish a liaison position they would have to provide the resources.
MGen. Daigle: This will evolve. The planning group will focus primarily on ensuring that the military planning is looked at closely in a binational way.
One part of your question had to do with a dual-hatted NORTHCOM. The navy is participating with the Americans in what they call the maritime surveillance working group. We are participating in that. We bring this maritime issue into the continental level.
We do not know what will happen in the future, but there are those in the United States who are saying that we need a North American surveillance plan that will encompass all those umbrellas, including aerospace and maritime.
NORTHCOM has a responsibility that extends to 500 nautical miles around the continent, so that is one thing that has been looked at in the coordination with the Americans.
The dual-hatted issue means that we will have 30 Canadian staff officers in Colorado Springs this summer, reinforced by some local contractors. On the American side, the commander of NORTHCOM is also commander of NORAD, Gen. Eberhardt. He has told us that the standing of NORTHCOM is a bit beyond schedule in terms of having all the people and personnel in place. They do not have all of the people that should be in place at this time of the year. They will not create additional organizations in the planning group, or PG.
Most of their staff officers are part of this binational planning group. From the American side, there will be dual- hatted people from NORTHCOM. Gen. Pennie is head of the planning group. Gen. Findley, I assume, will take that over for continuity. His deputy head is LCol. Anderson, who is, at the moment, the deputy commander of NORTHCOM. We have right there in the planning group, the two heads having some insight into NORAD and NORTHCOM.
Also, as Col. Williams mentioned, we will have in place this summer what we call a liaison officer to NORTHCOM, NORTHCOM being only a U.S. command. Two-star RAdm. Fraser will go there. He will also have some roles with the planning group.
We will have entry into this overall organization in Colorado Springs, where NORAD, NORTHCOM and this planning group will be located.
Senator Banks: I am having difficulty focusing the questions, let alone the answers. I want to take a moment to tell you why.
As the chairman said, our main interest is in being better informed today with respect to a trip that we plan to make next week to Washington. During our last trip to Washington, we found that some of our misgivings on the question of coordination are shared by some American politicians and senior public servants.
I have found that particularly frustrating, as I think we all have, with respect to questions that boil down to who is in charge. We all appreciate fully the necessity of clear planning, of coordination, of preparation and of all of those things. We also appreciate the difficulties that we know exist in answering questions about interoperability, the sharing of information and the capability of the various elements that come into play, both civilian and military, to actually function in a particular circumstance. The circumstance to which I wish to address your particular attention is the possibility that, within the fairly near future, there may be a war. One of the interests in that war may be attacked and may have the temerity to defend itself in one way or another. In that sense, North America is not in much danger of a conventional, symmetrical attack in the normal sense of the word.
For the last couple of years, we have been hearing about planning groups and working groups and about coordination task forces and interdepartmental study groups. Some committee members have genuine and well-placed misgivings. General, you gave us some assurances in those general terms about the capacity of the Pentagon and what the nature of the threat is and the capacity of the system to respond, if I can put it that way. Then it will be clear whose responsibility it is.
Narrowing down the question of who is in charge here to our visit next week to Washington, can you give us assurances that, in the event of some catastrophic event occurring in the next few weeks or months, the planning groups and the working groups and the coordination — I am sorry to be so unfocused here, but we keep hearing various entities and interests that say that their job is coordinating everyone else. I do not have much comfort from the answers to the question of who is in charge here, notwithstanding, Colonel, what you have said and, General, what you have said.
An unsymmetrical terrorist-based attack — I do not know if that is the appropriate term — becomes more likely in the event of a war. Are you confident right now, today, that we can go, for example, to Washington and nod our heads up and down and say to our counterparts there:, ``Everything is okay in respect of our capacity to respond''? Are you confident that the various elements of response can actually talk to each other, can actually understand what each other is doing and ensure that priorities are being looked after? Are you confident that the first responders, the second responders and the third responders are the right ones, and that they will know what else is going on?
I am sorry that that is such an unfocused question about such a specifically focused set of meetings into which we are about to go. I need to have, for myself, more assurance than we have been able to get so far. That is not because of what you have said but because some of the things you have said are the same kinds of things we have had said to us by half a dozen other people.
I am sorry that the question is so unfocused, but I am scared.
MGen. Daigle: I will say just a few words, and then I will let Col. Williams add to this.
First, the planning group is not yet in place in Colorado Springs. We have a few elements there. We will have the full complement of people there by this summer, by June or July. There will be 30 people, and the Americans will also have their own staff officers.
Senator Banks: Pardon my interrupting, General, but that is exactly what I am getting at. Maybe a little tyranny would be in order here. ``By this summer'' is very interesting, but today is March 17 and we are hearing that the President of the United States has said to someone, ``You have one day left.'' It is very nice that the planning group will be in place and begin to work in the summer time. How about Thursday?
MGen. Daigle: The planning group, sir, is not the solution to all of the problems. Yes, the planning group will enhance continental security. We have been looking at that following 9/11.
Since the event of 9/11, something else happened within our own country, within our own Armed Forces. We have put some money into resources to enhance our capability to face those asymmetric threats.
On the OCIPEP side and other government departments, there are many efforts put forward to manage the consequences if something were to happen. On the operational side, the DCDS and the chief are definitely looking at increasing or not increasing levels of protection in this particular scenario that we are talking about, as we did in 1991 with the Gulf War. We went to a higher alert.
NORAD is in place. They performed excellently in 9/11. From 20 aircraft, they moved up to 400 aircraft in the air within 24 hours. Their plans are very much in place. They are looking even deeper into internal threats. They still have a mandate for external threats.
NORTHCOM will coordinate the activity of forces. They will have their final capability in place by October of this year. Everyone would have liked to have the new enhancement in place now, but this is evolving as fast as is possible. The planning group was to be in place within two years; it will be in place in summer. We have people there already. The planning group will do planning and surveillance, as well as, it is hoped, provide a dimension of pre-warning in case of threat.
Senator Banks: The 30 people you are talking about from the Canadian Forces will be specifically NORTHCOM people or planning group people to coordinate with NORTHCOM. They are not NORAD people. Do the Americans have any people who are similarly dedicated to this planning process?
MGen. Daigle: As I said, NORAD remains as is. The planning group will be in place. Canada will provide 30 people to this planning group, and the Americans will provide the same number, but most of the people will have another job within NORTHCOM, not within NORAD. They will work together. This planning group will be in place. The Government of Canada approved this agreement in December 2002, and we will have this in place within the six months. People are doing their best, but this will not take care of all the problems. Within our own country, we will have resources to put toward those specific threats.
Col. Williams: In answer to your question, I would note the following, which maybe beneficial to you as you move to the United States.
First, I think September 11, as an event, fundamentally changed the perception that people have of security in North America in a way that we have not, perhaps, fully come to grips with. In January 2001, about 10 months prior to September 11, the third volume of a U.S. report was tabled; it is entitled ``The Presidential Commission on National Security for the 21st Century.'' They had worked non-stop for two and a half years to prepare the United States for a potential terrorist threat. The first page of the report says that within the next decade there will be a terrorist attack on the United States territory and thousands of people will die. They basically prophesied the kind of structure that would be necessary to prepare the United States for such an eventuality.
The report basically languished. People did not believe it was necessary to take such forceful actions as reorganizing departments, preparing contingency planning, and so on. Yet, following September 11, we have seen the United States establish the Department of Homeland Security, reorganize government departments on a scale heretofore not done, and, in terms of the military, establish a domestic commander and restructure the military to a degree not done since 1946.
In the Canadian context, we tend not to prefer structure and form. We have established over a period of time — and I am sure your study of national security policy in the country highlights the horizontality of the Canadian practice. This is demonstrated from a preference in the political system that this horizontal approach, this coordination, provides Canada with the flexibility to deal with circumstances as they arise.
The military stands in the middle. Because of our close relationship with the U.S., we tend to go more for a structured solution — one that is prepared, is trained, is prepared to react and is able to go for the speed. We tend to bridge the two extremes of the solution and work within the context of the political reality and the necessity for an immediate response capability.
When we refer to structures like the planning group, contingency planning exercises, and so on, we are trying to say that we think that those methods will actually achieve practical means to protect Canadians or Americans and protect the continent. We can demonstrate that by saying that NORAD was not prepared for the threat of civilian airliners crashing into buildings, but, when it happened, NORAD was able to take control of civil air space and put the airplanes on the ground in a reasoned manner in which no one was hurt, in order to establish order with stability.
The Chairman: You are suggesting that NORAD got on the phone and started talking to pilots and said, ``Land here.'' It did not happen that way. You are imputing that NORAD can do and did things that just did not happen.
Col. Williams: I am saying that, as the order to ground commercial aviation in Canada was given, there was close coordination between NORAD, NAV CANADA and the FAA; the decision of where to put airplanes is more of a civil thing.
The Chairman: Right, and NORAD watched it happen.
Col. Williams: At the same time, as you said, they had 400 fighters in the air ensuring that what was supposed to happen happened.
The Chairman: Was NORAD in command of those fighters?
Col. Williams: They were in the position of ensuring that the direction to those airplanes was followed.
The Chairman: Who commanded the fighters that were in the air?
Col. Williams: NORAD.
The Chairman: They were the commanding entity at the time?
Col. Williams: That is correct. They were ensuring that what was happening with the landing of the airplanes followed the pattern agreed to between the various civil agencies.
The structure in place reacted to the circumstances and, in an orderly manner, dealt with the situation, which was horrific. It was handled in such a way that the there was no further loss of life and that public confidence in the state of peace, order and good government was re-established. We are simply saying that the mechanisms we are talking about, namely, the establishments of planning relationships and the coordinative and consultative capabilities, give us the capacity to deal with some of these circumstances because we cannot predict what will happen.
Senator Banks: I have on last question relating specifically to our trip to Washington. I want to make sure that I understand correctly. You have said, I think, that the idea that the Americans are double-hatting the people in the planning group — that is, that they will be NORAD people who are —
MGen. Daigle: NORTHCOM, Senator Banks.
Senator Banks: They will be NORTHCOM people assigned to the planning group. We have no such double-hatting capability because we do not have NORTHCOM. Our people are there specifically for relating to the planning group from the U.S. side, who are also members of NORTHCOM but our guys are not. Am I correct?
MGen. Daigle: Correct. We have a few people who were already in NORAD and were assigned to the planning group. For administrative purposes, it was easy to have people already in place that knew about the environment.
Senator Banks: Will they continue their NORAD roles?
MGen. Daigle: No. The planning group will send 30 people from Canada into a new position in Colorado Springs. NORAD will remain as is. NORTHCOM is co-located there, and the U.S. command only will provide the binational planning part of the group from their officers into this planning group.
Senator Banks: Our planning group people will not be our NORAD people?
MGen. Daigle: No, sir.
Senator Banks: They will need to set up a liaison, will they?
MGen. Daigle: General Pennie is the deputy commander of NORAD. His deputy head of the planning group, General Henderson, is the deputy commander of NORTHCOM. The commander of NORAD and NORTHCOM is General Eberhart. The liaison officer we will put in place will be the CDS liaison officer with NORTHCOM, which is a U.S. command, and will have a role in the planning group because it is a binational thing. From the leadership over there, we will have interoperability, connectivity and visibility in terms of what is happening on both sides.
The American authorities that have met in the past few months are happy to see this binational planning group going into place because it increases the aerospace umbrella into a continent-wide umbrella as a contingency planning organization.
Senator Banks: Is the reason that we are not double-hatting people from NORAD into the planning group because we need to expand it beyond an air force fact, involving land and naval forces as well?
MGen. Daigle: NORAD, and people on the Canadian side, will tell you that since 9/11 they do not have enough people in NORAD. They would love to increase their number of personnel there. We are limited, as you know, in the places we are involved. The people will be assigned to the planning group only.
Col. Williams: I would add that the establishment of the planning group separate but with NORAD was a means of addressing concerns that had been raised about sensitivities in Canada on the involvement of Canadian and U.S. militaries in areas such as this. Over the course of the debate on the establishment of the planning group, various counter-arguments were raised in terms of how close the Canadian and American militaries should become on this issue.
Senator Banks: Is this the sovereignty question that Canadians are concerned about?
Col. Williams: That is correct. There is an element of that in the establishment, to let the planning group get its feet underneath it and show how capable it can be of integrating the various elements together. The sensitivity for those aspects will be disproved over time as the planning group establishes what it can do and how it can benefit and protect Canadians.
MGen. Daigle: In your visit to the United States, people might raise, first, that they are happy that the planning group will be in place. As you mentioned, the staff are assigned to NORAD. NORAD has assigned forces to it. The planning group has no assigned forces to it. There are people doing planning and so on. NORTHCOM is a U.S. command alone. Those three entities will eventually evolve into something else that our governments will be looking at in the near future. The planning group will come under review after two years of existence, around December 2004. We want this group to be on the ground early this year in order to have a full year ahead to look at all those coordination mechanisms and so forth. The head of the planning group reports directly to the President and the Prime Minister. Two years from now, they will have at least a year of work and people can decide what will come next in the defence of this continent with those entities in place at that time.
Senator Cordy: Thank you for appearing to help us gather information before we head off to Washington next week.
In your background materials, you have stated that one of the key issues is that Canada-U.S. relations are at the crossroads. Geographically, we have a huge border with the United States. They are our neighbours. Leaders in both countries have referred to us as family members. Whether one likes it or not, family members always have to have some type of a relationship. You have talked about the relationship also in your background material and said that the relationship deserves sustained attention and careful management. Is this the purpose of the planning group? Is this one of the main reasons that the planning group was set up, to cultivate this relationship in times that we are having such as these?
Col. Williams: When we went into the process of negotiation with the United States, we set out some strategic objectives, which we announced basically as, first and foremost, to establish a mechanism to protect Canadians and Americans, to protect the continent. The protection aspect was first and foremost.
The second objective was to protect the relationship we had with the United States, most notably NORAD, that in the process of the stand-up of NORTHCOM and the establishment of any mechanism for this coordination we had to preserve and protect the important relationship we had within NORAD.
The third objective was to carefully sustain and manage the relationship we have with the United States for the inherent benefits to both countries. The answer to your question is, yes, we did look at that as a key objective for the establishment of the planning group.
Senator Cordy: Are there other things we are doing to continue to develop this relationship?
Col. Williams: Fundamentally, the defence and security relationship between Canada and the United States is a very complex mosaic, almost like a tapestry of connections between the two nations. Almost universally across the spectrum of all of these relationships, post-9/11 security environment issues have taken centre stage.
We are about to leave for Washington tomorrow to conduct the next meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, PJBD, Canada-U.S, and the theme of that has been almost universally focused on ensuring and enhancing Canadian security and defence cooperation between the two countries.
I believe the biggest threat to the Canada-U.S. defence relationship is taking it for granted, because it is so important and so complex and so intimate across the spectrum of all the agencies and bodies that deal with these matters. We are focusing on making sure we keep it up to date.
MGen. Daigle: As Col. Williams mentioned, since 1940 and the creation of PJBD, of which the main function was the coordination of defence of the continent through NATO, through the Canada-U.S. Regional Planning Group, through NORAD, through NORTHCOM, and through the planning group now, the evolution of our binational defence cooperation is a normal extension of that relationship. It brings things to a continental level and covers all dimensions now, not just air but land and sea.
As I say, the common denominator, since 1940, is cooperation, defence and continent, and we have always worked closely with the Americans on those issues. You have been told this before, and the Americans are using the same numbers as we are; we are in sync here — we have 80 treaty-level defence agreements with the Americans. We have 250 memoranda of understanding between the Department of Defense and DND. We have 145 binational forums on defence matters. We hope and assume, through the binational planning group and everything we are doing, that eventually all the treaties and memoranda of understanding and so on will be looked after and will continue to be streamlined and revisited because the threat environment has changed over 50 years. Our relation with the Americans has been always very good on the DND side.
If I may make one last point: DFAIT — the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade — will also have in place in NORAD a political adviser this year, which we do not have. On the military side, we are reinforcing our cooperation. On the political side, the Americans have a political adviser in NORAD advising the commander of NORAD, Colonel Eberhart, and General Pennie, because it is binational, but we will have our political adviser in place sometime this summer provided by DFAIT.
Senator Cordy: One of the key elements of the agreement is that the planning group is comprised of military and civilian members. You said there will be 30 staff officers. What civilian members will be in the group?
MGen. Daigle: At the beginning, we will have one representative from OCIPEP, some contractors hired locally that will help the work in the planning group, and the others will be mainly military.
Senator Cordy: What do you mean by a contractor hired locally?
MGen. Daigle: Instead of having a military person sent over there in a permanent position, they can, as we do here, give a contract to retired military over there to help them working on planning and so on. It is a contract. It is civilian people they hire to help them do a job, and they are on a contract.
Now, the planning group may evolve. As Col. Williams mentioned, we offered government departments here to participate in the planning group, and thus far OCIPEP is the only one represented that will be part of this planning group as a civilian staff officers.
Senator Cordy: The Americans will be double-hatting, and you explained earlier that one of the pros of the double- hatting is that you can bring up-to-date information as to what is happening.
What about the consistency or the continuity? How can we ensure that the same people will be attending the meeting, for example, that somebody is not tied up with another job and sends somebody else? How do we ensure continuity and that it is the same situation? The double-hatting can work. It can have disadvantages if they do not take it quite as seriously as they should.
MGen. Daigle: On the Canadian side, that will not be a problem because our people are fully assigned to the planning group, so they will be there. On the American side, it is up to them and General Eberhart to decide who will be part of the planning group.
The planning group's functions are planning and surveillance, and it will look at exercises, training and so on. Hence, they will have to take people who are already involved in planning, training and so on. As to whether there is a guarantee that they will have the same people there all the time, I cannot say. I believe it will be to their advantage to have continuity, and they agreed to that. However, like anywhere else, people will be posted in and out, just as we do. I would suggest that they will make sure there is continuity, because it will not be logical to have people in and out. They are taking this seriously, so they will have people to bring continuity to the process.
Senator Atkins: General, you stated that the Canadian Forces were conducting a total review of defence intelligence and creating an intelligence fusion centre. Can you tell us more about that? Does it remain under the Department of National Defence, or are other departments involved?
MGen. Daigle: As I said, we are looking internally. It started a while ago. The Chief of Review Services has looked at all of the intelligence assets we have within the department, and it was agreed by the Chief of Defence Staff and the DM that we need to look internally at the department and streamline all the intelligence functions. This intelligence review is going on right now, and this is DND looking at our things first.
Since 9/11, other government departments are looking at how to best integrate intelligence sharing within the government departments. The other departments are doing that. With all of that eventually coming to a whole, organizations like the Public Security and Anti-Terrorism Committee will look at it. What we are doing now is looking at our house before seeing how we can better merge with the rest of the department, because all of those government departments together, plus DND, are the homeland security. The security framework is larger than the defence framework.
Senator Atkins: What departments are they?
MGen. Daigle: Right now, there are eight departments, ten if you are counting some agencies that have security and intelligence roles. CCRA, CSIS, Transport Canada, Justice and PCO have a security and intelligence role in their functions. We do not have the equivalent of the American organization. We have the Public Safety and Anti-Terrorist Committee headed by Minister Manley, and its role is to look at coordinating all the different departments.
Senator Atkins: If it turns out that the President makes a decision in the next while to go to war, the Americans have an alert system — the red, orange and yellow — about which I have two questions. How soon would we know that we should be on some form of special alert? Do we have any kind of system in place that would move our whole defence system into an alert situation?
MGen. Daigle: We are very much in coordination with the Americans.
Senator Atkins: We would not learn about it on CNN?
MGen. Daigle: We have intelligence sharing and information. We do and we did in the past have the capability to increase our state of readiness or level of protection. We did that during 9/11 and on bases across the country with the anthrax threat. With respect to how soon in this kind of scenario — I hate to speculate — as soon as there is an indication that something might happen, it has always been considered best to prepare rather than to react. We will know. The Americans obviously will be told in their own country, but we will know and we have plans within the department to ensure that our own defence assets are at the proper level of readiness and protection. Obviously, OCIPEP and other government departments who have responsibility in times of crisis will ensure that they provide the proper warning, on the health side and so forth, to our population.
Senator Atkins: We have not implemented an alert system similar to the Americans, have we?
Col. Williams: We are mixing apples and oranges here. With respect to the colours, you are speaking of the civil alert system in the United States. A military or defence condition system is in place, and has been for some time. DEFCON 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 is in place. If the civil alert system changes, the military does not necessarily change in lockstep. They are separate.
In the Canadian context, we have a military alert condition. We do not have a civil alert condition.
Senator Atkins: They would not be coordinated?
Col. Williams: As part of the relationship we have with the United States military, the defence condition on the United States side and the Canadian alert condition are linked because we are made aware of any change through the whole NORAD process.
I am not aware of the civil alert condition. You would have to pose that question to the Public Security and Anti- Terrorism Committee, to determine how the civil alert conditions are changed. As a benefit of being involved in the NORAD process and our close military relationship with the United States, we are thoroughly aware of any change to the military alert situation.
Senator Atkins: Col. Williams, you have stated that the strategic link between the CDS and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will remain. What functions remain with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs and what functions moved to the commander of NORTHCOM?
Col. Williams: That is a good question. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Chief of Defence Staff are chiefs of defence for their respective countries. As chiefs of defence, they have regular contact. In the Canadian situation, that contact is extended so that there is an annual meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the United States side and the Armed Forces council on the Canadian side. They meet to discuss things strategically.
The commander of NORTHCOM is established as a regional commander, with countries within his region of interest. His task is to establish security and defence relationships that are more or less at the tactical or operational level.
The short answer is that the strategic issues between Canada and the United States are dealt with by the chairmen in the CDS; and the operational and tactical issues concerning the set-up and establishment of relationships and agreements specifically at that level would fall under the responsibility of the commander of NORTHCOM as regional combatant commander.
Senator Atkins: Will the PJBD responsibilities on the U.S. side also shift from the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
Col. Williams: No. We posed this question to the chairman in the context of the establishment of the commander NORTHCOM: As chairman, how would you like to see the relationship with NORTHCOM? His answer was essentially what I have just described. The relationship with the PJBD remains intact. The membership of the PJBD is headed by an appointed civilian lead on both sides. There is representation from the joint staff, from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and from the services. Officially, there is no formal membership for commander NORTHCOM, although he or his staff participate regularly as observers. Strategically, the relationship between Canada and the United States remains unchanged.
The Chairman: Col. Williams, the first mission that you list in your document is to prevent or mitigate threats or attacks by terrorists or others on Canada or U.S. soil. Obviously, today is a day on which we are all expectant.
Can you tell us how the planning group would prevent or mitigate terrorist attacks on Canada?
Col. Williams: Mr. Chairman, in this forum, what I can say is that a number of planning processes are underway between Canada and the United States, coordinated through the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff along the lines of the relationship that is established within NORAD and also recently established under the planning group. As part of that process, consideration of potential threats to the continent and the types of reactions that are necessary are under discussion and consideration. I am sure the details of that would best be dealt with by the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff on a specific military case.
MGen. Daigle: Mr. Chairman, when we talk about prevention, deterrence, preparation and so on, the keyword is ``intelligence.'' One might say that we will never have a full guarantee that we will prevent any terrorist attack. However, the sharing of intelligence, surveillance and so on might provide us with the capability of preventing such an attack, if we were to have the right intelligence and the right time for the right threat; or we might do some deterrence if we are not sure from where the threat will come. The fact is that we are always out there listening, watching and sharing intelligence.
It is hard to say how we will prevent this. We cannot tell people we have in place a system that will prevent an attack. The planning group reinforces the sharing of intelligence and so on. If by coordinating and sharing all of this, then at one point this might very much help us to prevent something from happening.
The Chairman: MGen. Daigle, in your remarks you said that the Canadian Forces have established a high readiness capability for nuclear, biological and chemical defence. The last time this committee looked at the issue there were 12 people at Camp Borden with this responsibility. Can you tell us if the Canadian Forces have a better capability now? If so, what is it?
MGen. Daigle: I was in Borden last year. Mr. Chairman, you are right, the nuclear, biological and chemical response team was very small. We always use the term ``double-hatted'' or ``dual-hatted'' when referring to this team. Most of those people belong to the nuclear, biological and chemical school in Borden where we give courses on how to deal with such matters. This remains at Camp Borden. They also have the ability to be deployed to where their function and capability is needed.
Last year, the minister attended the inauguration of this company. I do not know exactly the number of people, perhaps someone can help me out. I believe the team will be located in Trenton. From there, they will be able to deploy faster using the air means that we have in place.
In Borden, the school remains. We will continue to give courses to members of the Canadian Forces to deal with NBC. We are separate from the NBC company. This falls under the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff. I know this capability has been put in place.
The Chairman: My understanding is that the company is about 100 people. Is that your understanding, MGen. Daigle?
MGen. Daigle: In the infantry it is. I am sorry, I do not have the exact number. We can provide you with the information on that.
The Chairman: If we needed these people tomorrow, how many of them are ready to go?
MGen. Daigle: I do not have all the details, and I hate to speculate on such a matter, Mr. Chairman. When I was in Borden, with the few people we had there, they are put on a different alert status. At one point, they could have deployed within 12 hours.
The Chairman: That was 12 people deploying in 12 hours assuming you could get an aircraft up to Borden. You are telling us you have moved it to Trenton because you have an airstrip there and you have aircraft that can move these people around. My question is: How many people are there today, or tomorrow, and are they ready to go?
MGen. Daigle: I do not know, Mr. Chairman. I could provide that information.
The Chairman: If you could provide us with that information, we would appreciate it.
MGen. Daigle, you sit on an interdepartmental committee that looks at homeland security; is that correct?
MGen. Daigle: Not really. Did I write that somewhere in the speech?
The Chairman: I thought I had read that.
MGen. Daigle: Associate Deputy Minister Purdy chairs the committee on behalf of the PCO, where many departments are represented around the table. Most of the departments are those that have some security and intelligence responsibility. Ms. Purdy is working to coordinate with all those departments to prepare the minister's committee on security and intelligence. I am sitting as an observer. As adviser on homeland security, I invite myself to those different committees, to get an understanding of the big picture.
Senator Forrestall: Did you say you invite yourself to these committees?
MGen. Daigle: When there is anything to do with homeland defence and security, I try to get as much information as I can. I invite myself in the sense that I try to stay abreast of what is going on in this particular field. Ms. Purdy has invited me to be an observer on this committee. The Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, who is mainly responsible for the operation, has a member attending those meetings.
Senator Forrestall: You may be interested to know that Mr. Robin Cook has resigned as the government's leader in the British House of Commons, which is a fairly significant act. We are talking about putting things in place six to ten months down the road, and yet we may be ready in the year 2004 or 2006. We are talking about going to war tonight, tomorrow or the day after that. The ultimatum will be laid out at eight o'clock this evening. Why has it taken so long for us to get a handle on this issue? Honestly, it has been two years now. Why has it taken so long? Are there just so many people who must involve themselves? If the Prime Minister wanted to make a decision this afternoon, whom would he call to issue an order to have something done? That is rhetorical. I do not know, I do not think the Canadian public know, and I think they are upset about it, period.
The Chairman: That is not quite the note I had in mind on which to end this portion of the meeting, MGen. Daigle and Col. Williams. You have helped us in our preparations for our upcoming meetings in Washington, and I am grateful to you both for attending here to address the questions that committee members realize are sometimes complicated and difficult to understand. It is fair to say that we are looking at a work in progress. The committee members are trying to obtain the most accurate picture of where the work stands before we talk to our American colleagues.
We have asked you for a number of pieces of information. If you would be good enough to convey them to the Clerk of the Committee, we would be grateful. Thank you for your assistance to the committee today.
Our next witness is Mr. Robert Fonberg. He is accompanied by Mr. Graham Flack.
Welcome to the committee. I understand you have an opening statement. The floor is yours.
Mr. Robert Fonberg, Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet, Operations, Privy Council Office: Honourable senators, following the events of September 11, 2001, I was tasked with creating and leading the Borders Task Force, a small team of five officers in the Privy Council Office that supported the Deputy Prime Minister in developing the Smart Border Declaration and its 30-point Action Plan.
Following the signature of that declaration by the Deputy Prime Minister and his U.S. counterpart at that time, Governor Tom Ridge, now Secretary, back in December 2001, I became responsible for leading the task force and driving forward the smart border discussions with the United States. With me today is Mr. Graham Flack, Director of Operations for that task force.
The Borders Task Force has had three basic objectives. The first, going back to just after September 11, was to establish a sustainable strategic approach to ensuring that the border would facilitate growth in trade, would be resilient to future events and would be based on principles of risk management. The second was to work with our American counterparts to lock in that strategic approach, which we did in December 2001, when the declaration was signed. The third has been to work, in an ongoing way, with responsible Canadian agencies as well as with our own U.S. counterparts — in the White House until recently, and moving over as well to the Department of Homeland Security — to ensure coherent, timely and methodical implementation of that approach.
I know you have heard much from previous witnesses about the smart borders process and the action plan. I will not go into much detail on the history, but we can answer whatever questions you may have.
I also understand that you have heard from individual departments like the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, CCRA, and you will hear later on today from Citizenship and Immigration Canada. These, along with other departments, are responsible for the day-to-day management of the border and the implementation of the 30-point action plan. The individual departments are accountable for the initiatives for which they have the lead.
Canada's overall strategic objective in the implementation of the Smart Border Declaration continues to be to enhance our security while facilitating the flow of low-risk people and goods across the border. Both countries recognize that the underpinnings of public and economic security are not competing objectives; rather, they are mutually reinforcing goals.
In an integrated global economy, it is neither possible nor desirable to conduct a full search of all goods or people transiting between countries. Instead, the two countries acknowledge that they need to make effective use of intelligence to better concentrate efforts on potentially higher-risk travellers and goods. This allows Canada and the U.S. to ensure that our border is both secure and trade-efficient. Our objective is to build a border that is open for business but closed to terrorists.
We have made significant progress on the delivery of the Smart Border Action Plan that is built on top of that risk management framework. As the Prime Minister and the President of the United States reported last September, substantive agreement has been reached on the 30 action items. The departments and agencies are now in the implementation phase.
Both Canada and the United States are strongly committed to the smart border process. Deputy Prime Minister Manley and Secretary Ridge are in regular contact to ensure that momentum is maintained and that full implementation of the action plan is achieved. Extensive contacts take place at all levels between Canadian departments and their American counterparts. My team, the Borders Task Force and Privy Council Office are in regular contact with our counterparts in the White House.
I will not go through each of the action items; however, I will quickly update you on progress on a couple of the initiatives. The first one is NEXUS. Prior to the Smart Border Declaration back in December, we and the Americans had implemented a joint pilot project called NEXUS, destined for pre-approved, low-risk travellers crossing the land border. The program is more secure since port-of-entry officials have much more information about the individuals crossing the border who are enrolled in the program. It facilitates travel since participants can quickly cross the border without the need to be interviewed by a border official. Since December 2001, the program has been expanded to six ports of entry, with another five ports scheduled for implementation by mid-2003.
We also are examining other land border ports to which NEXUS could be expanded later this year. There have been about 44,000 applications for the program, and about 33,000 participants have been enrolled. Given that most of those participants are commuters who regularly cross the border, it represents a significant number of crossings.
The second item is the FAST program. Prior to the smart borders process and the Smart Border Declaration, our customs agency faced challenges in convincing their U.S. counterparts of the merits of a program to facilitate the crossing of pre-approved, low-risk commercial traffic. The smart border process helped to convince them of the merits of the approach. We now have the FAST program, which stands for ``Free and Secure Trade,'' running at the six major commercial land border crossings. The program handles close to 70 per cent of trade, and facilitates the just-in-time delivery model critical to many industries. U.S. customs is touting FAST as a model through which trade can be made more secure and facilitated. A total of 3,000 FAST driver applications have been approved to date. It is anticipated there will be a rapid ramp-up, reaching 30,000 by the end of 2003.
The third aspect is the IBETs, or Integrated Border Enforcement Teams. Our countries have expanded these teams to 11 of the 14 geographical areas along the land border. As you heard from the Department of the Solicitor General, the IBETs have evolved into a major enforcement tool. They have effectively disrupted smuggling rings, confiscated illegal drugs, weapons, liquor, tobacco and vehicles, and they have made numerous arrests. They have also shut down criminal networks attempting to smuggle illegal migrants across the border. At their meeting last fall, U.S. President Bush and Prime Minister Chrétien agreed to deepen cooperation within the existing action plan. They tasked officials with developing new initiatives in the areas of biosecurity, science and technology.
Going forward, there are challenges that we face as we continue to try to implement the action plan and build a smart border. The United States is currently undergoing the most significant reorganization since the Second World War, in the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. You have shown an interest in that, and have had a number of discussions. The primary mission of the department is to protect the American homeland by securing U.S. borders, the transportation sector, ports and critical infrastructure. The department will also coordinate homeland security intelligence from multiple sources, to ensure this data is used efficiently. With regard to the organizational impact on the relationships between the agencies responsible for immigration, customs transportation and others within the two countries, we are watching the transformation closely to ensure agency-to-agency relationships remain strong, effective and cohesive.
We are working through the complex task of bilateral contingency plans to ensure that we are well prepared to respond to threats to our citizens. Officials in the two countries continue to improve a system of alerting each other to emerging threats and to improve response to threats.
We are facing the congressionally mandated plan to implement entry-exit tracking at all U.S. ports of entry by the end of 2005. Deputy Prime Minister Manley and Secretary Ridge discussed this issue when they met last December. Both agreed that border programs should not impact negatively on the tremendous progress made in expediting legitimate trade and travel across the Canada-U.S. land border.
It is clear that both countries are committed to the principles and actions of the Smart Borders Declaration, more generally, to continue to cooperate on border management issues to ensure the shared border remains both secure and trade-efficient.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to speak. We will take your questions.
The Chairman: You said that your team is in regular contact with counterparts in the White House. Is there a White House component now that the Department of Homeland Security has been set up?
Mr. Fonberg: There is indeed. They are moving from a less formal organization, the office of homeland security, to the Homeland Security Council. The council would be a counterpart to the National Security Council in the White House, and they are in the process of staffing that council. It will now move from the office of homeland security to a Homeland Security Council.
The Chairman: You commented at some length about FAST and NEXUS. The committee is impressed with the philosophy and approach taken. Having said that, we are going to Washington next week and we fully anticipate to bump into opposite numbers who have, one way or another, picked up a series of myths that seem to perpetuate themselves about the Canadian-U.S. border and problems that happen on the border.
With both NEXUS and FAST, all it will take is one mistake or problem person. You will then see the same politicians making a lot of hay about it. We do not quite understand why these myths exist, but would you comment on what level of confidence you have that the background checks that have been undertaken in relation to NEXUS and FAST will work? Will you also comment on whether you agree that all it will take is one mistake for the programs to go down?
Mr. Fonberg: I cannot comment on the specifics of the security checks that go in on the people side, drivers or NEXUS applicants, but those were arrangements that provided sufficient confidence to agencies on both sides of the border, in terms of detail and number of questions. There are actually face-to-face interviews with the applicants on the NEXUS side, as I understand it, and I assume on the FAST side. That is more than you need for a number of other kinds of travel documents. Therefore, there is a great deal of confidence among the agencies that the level of security checks is appropriate for the program. The whole intent of these programs is for them to be resilient enough to withstand a mistake. It is extremely difficult to predict how the Americans, or how we, would react if there were a mistake. This is an issue we continue to press on an agency-to-agency level, as well as with our White House and Department of Homeland Security counterparts. It is critical that these programs stay open, in the event of some kind of situation.
Mr. Graham Flack, Director of Operations, Borders Task Force, Privy Council Office: With close to 200-million crossings a year, the question becomes: How do you manage the risk? The alternative to programs like NEXUS and FAST is that individuals arrive at the border, where customs officials have their first interaction with them. The customs officials know nothing about the individual and have to make an assessment, based on a short contact with them, as to whether that individual poses a risk. We developed FAST and NEXUS jointly with the Americans, because both countries view it as an enhancement. There are two levels of background check, on both sides of the borders, for individuals that apply. There is also a face-to-face interview that the individual undergoes. The position that both governments have taken is that we have a higher level of security, in terms of our knowledge about individuals, than we would have if the program did not exist and we allowed these individuals to arrive at the border.
There is a low rate at which you intercept individuals under the programs. In the event that you move to higher alert levels, those checks can be increased as a way to enhance the security within the program itself.
In the risk-management planning, we have to compare the risk against the default. The default here is individuals arriving, where there is no information about them at the border.
The Chairman: I understand what you are saying, Mr. Flack. My point was that given the high volume that you are talking about and the extraordinary impact that this could have on the Canadian economy, a rational approach would say that there will be a screw-up at some point and, when that happens, here is the plan. My question is this: Do you have the plan?
Mr. Fonberg: Let me make sure I understand the question. If someone in the NEXUS or FAST program crosses the border, and it turns out they have a carload of explosives or something, someone figures that out and the Department of Homeland Security says, ``Shut it down.''
Your question is: What is the plan for that eventuality?
We would like to have an ironclad commitment that the programs will not be shut down, unless there is something else going on in threat assessment — for example, if the intelligence community suddenly learned that someone in one of these programs was co-opted by someone and will cross the border with something. I can see situations like that, where they will say, ``Let's throw up the net.''
I do not know the enforcement community well, but that is how it works. There is intelligence and enforcement. They become engaged and figure out the problem.
Again, we have spent the better part of a year trying to build trust and confidence in the security screening that goes into the programs for exactly this eventuality. You are talking about the low-probability event. These programs are built to withstand low-probability events down to a level. Can we determine whether they will close them down? No.
I should add that we have a high degree of confidence that these programs will be robust and resilient certainly to general threat level assessment changes on either side of the border. However, there are numerous scenarios in the low- probability, event-planning world, and it is impossible to know.
Senator Banks: When illnesses are treated by antibiotics, they try to find a way around it as a natural state of affairs. Bad guys do the same thing. As soon as we fix something, close a gap and find a way of enforcement, people will try, as a matter of course, to try to find a way around it.
If I wanted to smuggle something across the border in either direction, I would find a company that has a smart program in place with approved drivers because they will go across the border repeatedly without anyone looking in that truck. I would find a way to get something on that truck, would I not? Is there random inspection? How often is their random inspection?
Mr. Fonberg: Yes. I do not know how the inspection rates work, but any NEXUS traveler can be stopped at the border and inspected. This is not a free pass to proceed automatically. Any time there is an intelligence or information reason to stop on either side —
Senator Banks: Do the random stops actually happen?
Mr. Fonberg: You would have to ask CCRA, but my working assumption is that they are happening. They are there for exactly that purpose.
Senator Banks: It is more complicated now. We have the Borders Task Force, the Canada-U.S. Cross Border Crime Forum, IBETs, et cetera.
I do not think you heard us talking to our last witnesses, but we are continually asking, ``Who is in charge?'' in certain circumstances. Some of us have considerable misgivings as to the answer to that question. Is there someone actually in charge? Would you respond to us, perhaps later, with a chart showing the placement of IBETs, the Crime Forum and the Borders Task Force? Show us who reports to who, and how it relates. Tell us who is in charge of random stops of FAST trucks at the border.
We have asked several people these questions. They refer us to another person for an answer.
As the chairman mentioned, we are looking for your assistance in preparing us to go to Washington. The last time we were there, we found it useful in assuaging some of the myths held up by many United States citizens, including those in authority who we would hope would know better but sometimes do not.
You know better than we, with respect to border questions, some of the misconceptions that we will bump up against when we are in Washington. You must have run into them.
I gather that security of the border would be your area of expertise and greatest experience as you are running the Borders Task Force. What is the biggest problem? What is your worst nightmare? What is the most intransigent thing in terms of dealing with border questions that is outstanding? What do we need to watch?
Mr. Fonberg: I will ask my colleague to speak to this as well, senator. It depends on to whom you are talking.
The chairman raised the issue of some of the myths out there. The United States is a big place. Our work with the task force is generally restricted to the administration and the White House.
As you know, there are myths that are perpetrated and are picked up in Congress and in the media. These myths are often unfounded.
Senator Banks: They are. However, we will be meeting with people from the White House and from the U.S. administration. That is exactly what I am talking about.
Mr. Fonberg: I understand that. I think that you will find the concerns inside the administration to be within tolerance levels that are acceptable to us. The working relationships with the administration and right into the White House are generally very good working relationships.
Are there issues? There are absolutely issues. Did we deal last year with the question of the whether Americans would carry guns on Canadian soil? We did. It was a difficult issue. We found solutions that were appropriate work- arounds that all parties respected.
Are there difficult issues? Entry-exist will be a difficult issue. It is a difficult with the administration.
The Chairman: By that you mean us collecting their access forms?
Mr. Fonberg: This is their congressionally mandated obligation to track the entry and exit of all foreign nationals, which is to be in place by the year 2005.
Senator Banks: Is it also a congressional undertaking that there be no additional documents required that purpose.
Mr. Fonberg: They will use existing documents as determined appropriate for use at that time by the Americans. They will determine the documents required, including passports, visas or whatever. They have the right to change those requirements. That is our current understanding.
In terms of the White House and the administration, these are some of the difficult issues that are being addressed in very good faith. You will speak with congressional leaders and hear other concerns that they have. You will hear about a porous northern border and our refugee determination system. These are easy places to score points and develop headlines. As you peel that onion back, you will find that the existing concerns of the administration are far fewer than those in Congress.
The Deputy Prime Minister spoke to Senator Clinton a year ago about whether Canadians were involved in the terrorism attacks. A myth developed after September 11 that those people came through Canada. The answer was no.
Senator Banks: She seems unconvinced.
Mr. Fonberg: She does seem unconvinced. However, there is absolutely no evidence to suggest otherwise.
What are you up against? Can you convince people who do not want to be convinced on certain things? I do not know how to answer those questions.
There are other issues that you may well hear in the United States. In a sense, they are easy issues to roll off the tongue. They are much more complicated to deal with.
There is an issue related to perimeter security. When you look at how we try to protect Canada and how the Americans try to protect United States, we do certain things jointly that are beyond the perimeter, but effectively look like perimeter.
Many things occur at the land border, which is the best place to intercept certain things. There are things that occur at the seaports.
You may hear a lot about perimeter. We have heard quite a bit about it from the administration since September 11. Having said that, this is not an easy one-size-fits-all solution to the problem. The 30-point action plan reflects that.
It will be helpful for us for you to play out this question of risk management and how you drive and deepen a risk- management approach to border flows in the 21st century, given the threat environment.
The Chairman: Our impression, frankly, is that, administration to administration, there is a pretty good understanding. We have been trying to prepare ourselves as we go through these briefings to deal with concerns that come up in Congress. We expect to have meetings with eight different congressional committees. Each group that has come before us has been asked to help us with the comparisons and show us what they are doing and what we are doing so that we have answers to the myths. Can you assist us, perhaps after the meeting, by providing us with a list of the myths that you have been coming across and the responses that you have been giving?
Mr. Fonberg: Absolutely.
The Chairman: If we could make arrangements for this through our clerk, we would be grateful to have that. We anticipate, judging by the meetings we had with six of the eight committees last year, that these things will come up. It is helpful if you are not blind-sided or if you are expecting them to come forward with it. We do not mind duplicating the lists. We do not mind hearing from three or four departments about one problem. We would be better prepared when we go forward. We would be grateful for your help in that regard.
Mr. Fonberg: We would be happy to help. Could we have the list of the congressional committees that you are seeing so we can tailor our answers?
The Chairman: The clerk will make it available to you at the end of the meeting.
Senator Banks: Would you include in that the question of staffing at the border? That is a question we hear about from the members of the Congress who think we do not have anyone there doing anything. It will be helpful if we knew the facts, because I think we are doing pretty well.
How close are we to actually having in place the safe third-country operation? I know the agreement is signed, and I know we are talking about implementation, and I know we are meeting and saying we are going to do this. How close are we?
Mr. Fonberg: As you said, the agreement is signed. Both sides are now in the process of finalizing their regulations and promulgating them.
Mr. Flack: We pre-published our regulations in October. We expect or anticipate the U.S. will be pre-publishing their regulations shortly. We are hopeful that the agreement will be up and running this summer. Mr. Jean from the Department of Citizenship and Immigration has primary responsibility for this, and will be appearing this afternoon. He may be able to give you more details.
We can tell you that it was one of the more challenging aspects of the Smart Border Declaration. There are certainly constituencies in the United States that were deeply opposed to signing a safe third-country agreement with Canada, in part because the net flow of refugees is hugely in Canada's favour, with a trickle of people coming into Canada and transiting to the United States. To date this year, close to 40 per cent of our refugees are individuals transiting from the United States to Canada via the land border. To get the United States to sign the agreement was a challenging task. We are pressing and pushing as hard as we can to get implementation. The hope is this summer, but there may be more information this afternoon.
Senator Banks: Will you give our clerk the numbers you spoke about?
Mr. Flack: That is one of the things we will put in the myths document for you.
Mr. Fonberg: I think Mr. Bilodeau may have sent you a letter today following up on some information you asked of him when he was here. We will put them on another piece of paper, but we think that will have that information in it.
The Chairman: The clerk told me that Mr. Bilodeau called us and said it was coming today. On the assumption that you work on this file on a regular basis, perhaps you have heard more myths.
Mr. Fonberg: Myths generally, absolutely.
Mr. Flack: To give a sense of order of magnitude, in 2002, Canada received 10,855 refugee claims from individuals transiting via the land border. Our best information about the number of individuals going in the reverse direction is less than 220 transiting Canada to the United States. That is 10,855 south-to-north and less than 220 north-to-south refugee claims transiting via the land border.
To take the 2003 statistics to date, there are about 7,450 refugee claims to date, of which 2,804 transited via the land border with the United States. Of Canada's total refugee claims, close to 38 per cent are individuals transiting via the United States. We think the agreement is important, and we are pressing to have it brought into force.
Senator Banks: You mentioned the third-party agreement, but with respect to trade in particular, there is also a lot of misgiving by some aspects of the United States Congress with respect to trade. You said in your remarks that public security on the one hand and economic security on the other are not conflicting objectives.
It is very nice to say that, and it is very nice to have that in mind when you are operating toward the objective that you have and the aims at which you hope to arrive; however, would you please respond to my contention that public security and economic security are often conflicting objectives? We find that that is so. They rub off on each other. They are sources of friction. They are things that have elements that obtain each upon the other, and they are sometimes conflicting objectives. My argument is that it is a nice objective but not a fact today.
Mr. Fonberg: Going back to September 11 and the border being shut down, obviously, for national security and public security reasons, it took not a very long time before people realized that certainly our lifeblood on the economic side was getting choked off. There were long lineups of trucks at the Windsor-Detroit corridor and other border crossings. It quickly became apparent that auto plants would be at risk because of the just-in-time delivery model that they use on either side of the border. The economic security side of this got choked off quickly. It became apparent on the American side.
Yes, we are more dependent on the trading relationship than the Americans are, but certainly something like 38 American states say that Canada is their No. 1 trading partner. This rippled through the relationship quickly. It became apparent that if we got on to a model where we were trading one off against the other, it would be a lose-lose situation. The trading relationship has become hugely important to the economic well-being of both countries. In the risk-managed approach, we have to deal with public security in a way that not only gives confidence to both countries but also in a way that absolutely facilitates the free movement of people and goods.
Are there frictions at the margin? Yes. Did we have a hard time negotiating the FAST program or ramping NEXUS up so that it would be more than just a pilot? We did have a hard time. People had to be convinced about moving on the basis of intelligence and information to a model where you check either only randomly for those enrolled in the model or you focus resources on higher-risk goods and people and allow lower-risk goods and people to move through. People quickly came to the conclusion that it had to be the right model. It was the only model.
I would agree that there are always frictions at the margin, but at the highest level the President and the Prime Minister agreed early on and Deputy Prime Minister Manley and Governor Ridge agreed early on, at the implementation stage, that we had to build this way. There are frictions, yes, but they are frictions at the level of detail, in my view, as opposed to frictions at the level of a real grind between public security and economic security.
The Chairman: Is the third-party or third-country agreement contingent on any further congressional approvals?
Mr. Flack: Mr. Daniel Jean represents the department responsible for that. My understanding is that this is an administration-to-administration agreement not requiring congressional approval. Obviously, as you know, with the U.S. congressional system, Congress finds ways to have influence on decisions outside their strict legislative purview, but there is no congressional approval required per se, as compared to the required Senate approval of a treaty.
The Chairman: Is the funding in place? Has Congress provided the funding?
Mr. Flack: Daniel Jean may be aware of that information. You are right; there will be funding required in respect of the additional refugee claimants and asylum-seekers.
The Chairman: Would that be the traditional way that one would expect Congress to express its displeasure, if it was trying to do that?
Mr. Flack: There is an obligation to deal with refugees who arrive on your soil. As a result, the funding is not contingent. If there is a surge in the number of refugees arriving, say, at airports, the former USINS, now the Department of Homeland Security, will have to deal with those individuals. This is not a classic, budgeted item in that it responds to the demand as it emerges, which, as you recognize, can fluctuate.
Senator Forrestall: We were in the Windsor-Detroit area recently. We witnessed how these programs work. It was interesting. In watching the truckers going through, many obviously had their wives with them. There may have been some couple-operators or just simply spouses accompanying drivers on a short trip. In any event, the drivers had no problem because they had approved applications and appropriate papers. The border officer would ask questions of the passengers. In one case, we watched the questioning of the driver's wife go on for a couple of minutes. It was not a long time, but the trucks that came behind had to come to a complete stop and wait. Truckers travelling alone barely needed to stop. Information came up on the screen and off they would go after a 10- or 15-second pause.
One driver asked if his wife could get the same kind of clearance that he had. The answer was no; she had to be the driver or the co-driver of the truck. That driver's truck looked to me as if it had 32 wheels. That is fine; women can drive big trucks. This did not seem to be a couple operation, just a woman travelling with her husband, but it caused a slowdown in contradiction of the ends we are trying to achieve.
Is it possible to look at that and see if wives cannot go through the clearance process and procedure to obtain the same type of clearance that the driver has, to expedite the process?
Mr. Fonberg: We absolutely could look at that. I would assume that the other passenger, who was arm's length to the business, could certainly apply for a NEXUS card. How that would actually work at the pill box at the border, I do not know. The FAST card and the NEXUS card are the two expedited processes.
You have identified a more important problem: How do we optimize the infrastructure at the border? We do not want FAST-program trucks to end up sitting behind trucks that are not in the FAST program. We did implement the $600-million border infrastructure fund in the budget of December 2001, I believe. Honourable senators will be aware of the $300-million joint announcement between Ontario and Canada in the Windsor area. That will allow us to begin thinking about better infrastructure and better crossings there.
The CCRA and the customs folks will speak to this in spades; even with the expedited programs, the objective and the purpose of the programs are defeated without the infrastructure and without properly configured lanes.
Senator Atkins: As a supplementary comment, when the truck passenger asked whether she could get a pass, the response was that she needed the same type of licence as the driver of the truck.
When the truck came in, the agent asked the truck driver to turn off the engine. That is another step in slowing up the whole system.
Mr. Fonberg: We will certainly look into the question, senator.
Senator Atkins: That is just an observation.
Senator Cordy: You mentioned earlier the entry-exit tracking program that has been mandated by Congress. I agree it will be challenging to work out the logistics. How do you go about working out the logistics? The U.S. Congress has mandated the tracking, so how do you jiggle it and work with it to make it more workable and less cumbersome? I do not know much about it, but, at face value, the process seems to be very cumbersome.
Mr. Fonberg: That is a concern that many of us share, that this could be a very cumbersome process. As you noted, the tracking is congressionally mandated. The largest concern is the default position that Americans will actually build the exit infrastructure on their side of the border. That has potentially substantial and disruptive implications for border flows. It means, effectively, that an individual is checked twice. The person is stopped on the way out; his or her documents are picked up; and then the person is stopped on the way into Canada. Within a short geographical space, the person is stopped twice.
Our view is that that is the default view of the administration or at least of the program. There are other ideas on the table. The Deputy Prime Minister and Governor, now Secretary, Ridge asked the officials to begin talking together about options and models that would prevent exactly these kinds of disruptions. Both Manley and Ridge have stated publicly, I believe, that the objective must be to minimize any negative impacts or disruptions of border flows.
There is one model on the table from the — what is the DMIA?
Mr. Flack: Data Management Improvement Act.
Mr. Fonberg: Who are those folks? There is a model on the table done by a lot of people. Is the administration involved in that?
Mr. Flack: Yes.
Mr. Fonberg: Administration plus trucker associations plus exporter associations have looked at a model where the American exit information would actually be collected on the Canadian side of the border and would avoid the infrastructure build-up on the American side. That model is on the table for discussion. We are in the process of talking to our counterparts about minimizing disruptions associated with an entry-exit program.
Senator Cordy: It will still be a challenge.
Mr. Fonberg: It will be a challenge.
Senator Cordy: It was interesting reading the status report that you included in your briefing materials. Many good things have been happening since September 11. It would be good if Canadians were to realize some of the good things that are happening.
We just talked about an initiative that the U.S. Congress wants to implement. Are there policies or initiatives that we would like the Americans to implement? Is there any message that we can bring to Washington when we travel next week?
Mr. Fonberg: I will turn to Mr. Flack in a moment. We would absolutely like to see a complete rollout of some of these expedited movement programs like FAST and NEXUS, so that they become as ubiquitous as makes sense. We would absolutely like to see the regulations on the safe third agreement promulgated.
Mr. Flack: Mr. Fonberg has hit my wish list, particularly on the safe third agreement. This is one we have worked hard to get. Any additional pressure you could bring would be greatly appreciated. It is one that I think the Americans recognize themselves. They have a difficult story to tell in terms of why they would not do this from the perspective of equity, dealing with individuals who arrive within their borders.
Mr. Fonberg is right. On FAST and NEXUS, at the level of the administration, they do view these programs as enhanced confidence programs. The alternative to them would be an individual who you know nothing about arriving at the border. You will certainly not stop the person and do as much as you would under FAST and NEXUS, which is to subject the individual to a 30-minute interview and a full criminal record check. You will not be able to do that with every individual. That is an example of how we can truly speak to that principle of enhancing economic security at the same time as enhancing national security, as you have more information about the individuals.
There have been some challenges on the U.S. side in terms of funding, to roll these programs out as expeditiously as we would like. It is the type of thing where you could be of assistance with your legislative counterparts in terms of pushing these forward.
The Chairman: To return to Senator Cordy's point, Mr. Fonberg, is the best argument against the entry-exit legislation that has passed Congress the very infrastructure that the Americans would have to put in to put it in place?
When I heard you say that one possibility that is on the table is that Canadian customs would pick up the forms and return them back to the Americans, it seems to me to say, ``Fine, we will set aside X number of person years to collect these forms and to get them back and we will also deal with the problem of someone who arrives at our border and does not have an exit form and what we say to that person.''
From a negotiating point of view, is it not better to say, ``Look, if you are passing a law like this, have you guys figured out how much it will cost to have people there who will collect the forms, and what will you do with an American tourist who wants to come up for a weekend to Quebec City or whatever? Will you send them back to Ohio?''
Why are we offering to pick up the forms? My question is why that is on the table at this stage. Why would our first line of defence not be as follows: ``Have you costed this one out? It sounds like a terrific idea, but have you costed it out? Will it work, and what will you do with the 1 or 2 per cent failure rate that works out to be hundreds of thousands of people who are messed up at the border?''
What is your position on that?
Mr. Fonberg: The issues that you raise are actually the issues that put the Americans off this proposition the last time it was on the table, section 110, which was in the late 1990s, when they realized how cumbersome it would be. At the same time, they did not have the same kind of public security threats they are facing today. The border communities, governors and mayors all lined up against this. At the end of the day, they brought enough pressure to bear that it did not go forward.
This time, as I understand it, the funding will be in place. Public security, as we all know, trumps a lot of other things in Washington at this point in time. The deadlines for actually implementing this, and these are congressionally mandated deadlines, are extremely aggressive. Our view is that the Americans will have to start making decisions about how to put this in place very soon. As they start making those decisions, they will lock into models that may be the default models that really do not work in our interest. While there is nothing on the table at this point, there are models out there. This task force — and it is a public document, as I understand it — has the Canadian side collecting these papers. The real challenge at this point is understanding that the American administration now, again because of the congressional mandate, seems very intent on implementing an entry-exit tracking system.
Having said that, we have one of two choices. They have a pretty good idea at this point. I suspect they have done some costing. They know this will not be cheap. Again, Congress is prepared to vote them the money at the end of the day.
The Chairman: There is no question that security seems to trump everything in Washington post-9/11. In addition to cost, in addition to actual dollars, there is huge inconvenience that will be involved not just for Canadians but for Americans as well. That is a harder thing to cost. One of the things that is difficult for me to understand — and perhaps the committee as well — is the different level or response that we are seeing from border states.
Senator Clinton was mentioned earlier, but it is not just Senator Clinton. Governor Pataki has hired an additional 70 state troopers to be on the border. If Premier Eves hired an additional 70 OPP to be on the border, we would all think he is crazy. Clearly, there are a number of border state politicians who see a problem there. Why?
Mr. Fonberg: I want to ensure that I follow the flow of the question. This is from entry-exit. At this point in time, the northern border caucus, if you will, or the northern border governors, recognize that this is an issue.
The Chairman: These are people who trade a lot. Voters go back and forth on the Thousand Islands. These are people who know Canadians. Hockey teams at the junior league level play back and forth. There are 1,000 kids at Cornell.
Mr. Fonberg: I cannot comment specifically on Governor Pataki.
The Chairman: I use that as an illustration of the concern that exists in border states that normally should be our friends on these types of issues. Why are we not seeing the same response?
Mr. Flack: Much of what we hear from the traditional allies we had on the section 110 battle is not that they agree with the new approach. It is that in the current environment they are unwilling to give the same public opposition to the new approach, given the security environment that the United States is in.
Mr. Fonberg talked about the Data Management Improvement Act Task Force, set up with elements from industry and government, looking at how to implement entry-exit in an efficient way. Even Congress was mindful in the legislation that efforts should be made to implement entry-exit in a way that was trade-efficient and efficient in the flow of people.
The northern border segment of that task force recommended a system that had two pieces. Mr. Fonberg talked to you about one of them, which is the fact that Canadian customs officials could at the frontline collect the exit data. The other was that Canadian and American citizens would be exempt from entry-exit tracking. That is a model that is out there by U.S. stakeholders. That could be something around which individuals could rally. The legislation itself, as are you probably aware, Mr. Chairman, does not explicitly include Canadian citizens. It refers to visa-exempt countries and visa-required countries. Canadians are in a unique category in that we currently have no documentary requirements to go to the United States, as a result of a bilateral agreement between the two countries.
I agree with your statement up front that we have a sense that the United States was going to balk at the cost of implementing this system and recognize the risks, as you did, that even a 1 per cent failure rate is a huge number of people, measured in the hundreds of thousands. Our sense is, and veterans from the section 110 battle will tell us, that the mood has shifted dramatically. The funding will be there, even if it is immense, to the point where the U.S. administration or, now, the Department of Homeland Security has begun to scout for land that might be used to set up the exit booths.
The sense is that the default option is a real option and, worse, in order to put that option in place, although 2005 is the deadline for all ports, 2004 is the deadline for the 50 highest volume land ports, which include some Canadian ports. If they are to get that running in under two years, and they think that the default option is where they may end up, they will have to take steps now to effect that.
There is a question of how much time we would have. If the U.S. embarks on a default option at some point, we will have to. Those discussions we are having now are about trying to identify alternatives that would facilitate both trade and the flow of people, yet still assist the U.S. in meeting their security concerns.
The Chairman: When Ambassador Cellucci was speaking to the committee earlier last month, he favoured the exemption of Canadians and Americans from this. Presumably, he speaks for the administration.
Mr. Flack: We certainly hope so. The task force is a creature of Congress in the sense that it was mandated to undertake this activity. We think there is a basis on which we can build a position that is administration-wide and, potentially, even congressional-wide. We are still at early phases in terms of the discussions.
The Chairman: What is the Canadian position on entry-exit?
Mr. Fonberg: It is a model that provides minimal disruption and does not move backward on the Smart Border Action Plan.
The Chairman: Could you get specific on that, Mr. Fonberg? Does that mean exempting Canadians?
Mr. Fonberg: Our strong preference would be to exempt Canadians. You can work your way through to what we think is the current American default, which is the not-very-good scenario, and all the way back up to a model that exempts Canadians and Americans.
The Chairman: Should our going-in position be that one?
Mr. Fonberg: Absolutely.
Senator Atkins: Are forged documents the reason for the Americans arguing against it?
Mr. Fonberg: In terms of the exemption of Canadians and Americans?
Senator Atkins: That is correct.
Mr. Fonberg: I am not sure. He is nodding his head here.
The Chairman: Let the record show Mr. Flack nodding his head.
Mr. Flack: One of the things we point out to our U.S. counterparts is the legislation that began with the Patriot Act but, most recently, with the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act. American citizens are not subject to entry-exit tracking.
Individuals could equally forge documents about their American citizenship because they are not required to carry passports in order to arrive at the land border in the United States. The individual who might otherwise fraudulently pose as a Canadian and claim a Canadian birth certificate could also pose as an American with an American birth certificate. As long as American citizens are exempt from the program, there are challenges from a security perspective in terms of managing the documentary integrity of the individuals coming in. The largest category of individuals arriving are individuals for which you do not have a secure travel document in the form of a passport, let alone one with a biometric on it.
Were we to continue the current position whereby Canadian citizens also do not have additional documentary requirements, that would be no more security challenging than would be the position with respect to American citizens under the entry-exit program.
Senator Smith: I know you are sometimes asked whether you have anticipated every possible terrible thing that could happen. You cannot. It is impossible. How do you try to ensure that whatever governments are doing is being done in a cost-effective way?
The analogy that I would refer to would be the Y2K situation, where we now know that millions, if not billions, were virtually flushed down the toilet with all sorts of schemes for problems that never had any reality to them.
That is not to suggest that there are not real problems here, but, after a while, when things have been tried out, how do you assure yourselves that things are being done in a cost-effective way so that we do not get carried away with paranoia about a remote possibility that you may never be able to prevent in any event? How do you react to that challenge?
Mr. Fonberg: The underpinnings of the answer to that are really classic risk management. It is understanding the nature of the threat, the probability of the event actually happening and the costs, consequences and impacts of it actually happening. It is a model you can apply widely, in this particular case. Once you have decided the probability of an event and its impacts or consequences, then you have to ensure, in a fairly classic way, that every dollar you spend to solve that problem is spent in an efficient way. Many control mechanisms in the government-spending context do that. You could take it back to September 11 and ask yourself how much should have been paid to try to prevent September 11. You go back to a classic risk-management approach to that.
You are asking a few questions: How well do we understand the nature of the threat? How well do we understand the consequences associated with a non-zero probability that that event will actually happen? How do you actually pay, spend or develop programming to prevent that from happening?
Senator Banks: If I may follow up on that point, if you asked that question now, how much would you have paid to obviate September 11, the answer would be anything. There is no answer. Nobody would be able to come up with an answer to that question — at least, I do not think so. Risk management would require that someone would be able to quantify that and say, ``In order to stop this or that from happening, we are prepared to spend this many millions or billions of dollars.'' The answer to how much would the Americans gladly spend to turn back the clock and do something to obviate 9/11 is there is no amount of money that they would not spend to do that. Is that not so? Is there a risk-management answer that you can make come out of the end of the pipe that answers the question?
Mr. Fonberg: What I intended to say was, if you go back well before the events of September 11 and ask yourself in a risk-management context. You know that the Americans have gone back and done a lot of soul searching about how intelligence and information was shared. There have been many dialogues about whether intelligence was accurately and appropriately shared to prevent the event.
My real point is this: If you went back and looked at how you would plan to avoid those kinds of events, how would you have built programming and intelligence sharing as opposed to not what would you have paid to prevent the actual event?
Senator Smith: The large law firm that I ran for many years, before I came here, had five floors in First Canadian Place, which is the highest building in Canada, at 72 storeys. No matter how much they are spending — and we do have New York offices — if they were to rebuild the World Trade Center again, maybe for its symbolism, I would never even remotely consider taking space up around the 100th floor. I do not care how much was being spent, I would still not do it. I must admit when I look at this Libeskind thing that won it, there is a degree of ego and bravado, but who would want to be on the top floors? I would not want to be on the top floors.
The Chairman: I understand, Senator Smith, your law firm is moving out to single-storey buildings in Scarborough.
Senator Smith: Actually, we are in Rockefeller Center, but on a lower floor.
Senator Atkins: If someone is applying for a NEXUS pass, does it cost $80?
Mr. Flack: It is $80 and the pass is valid for five years.
Senator Atkins: Last night, I heard that students who are travelling to Buffalo are paying $3.50 to cross the border into the U.S. and $3.50 to come back. What is that?
Mr. Flack: Some of the bridge crossings are on a cost-recovery basis. There is a toll associated with individuals travelling.
Senator Atkins: Is it to that extent?
Mr. Flack: Trucks crossing the Ambassador Bridge pay close to $40 each direction.
Senator Atkins: I am talking about a student.
Mr. Flack: There is a toll for a passenger going across, but we can check on the amount.
The Chairman: Coming back to the question of the third safe country, how much is this issue being complicated by the Mexican situation and the negotiations that President Fox had and has now stopped vis-à-vis Mexican immigrants who are in the United States illegally?
Mr. Flack: We have not found any spillover.
The Chairman: How about symmetry on each border?
Mr. Flack: That is an enduring question on the Canada-U.S. file and the smart borders file. As you are probably aware, the Mexicans have signed a 22-point smart border declaration and action plan with Tom Ridge and his counterpart in Mexico.
The Canada-U.S. smart borders process has proceeded much like the relationships that currently exist between the Canadian and the American customs agencies or the Canadian and American citizenship and immigration departments — that is to say, they have dense, tight relationships. The Mexican and Canadian borders have always been treated differently. As a result, the 30-point action plan has proceeded at a very considerable pace. If you look at a program like FAST, which was a theoretical program in 2002, you will see that by the end of that year it was in place at all six major crossings.
You are right in talking about the fact that, historically, the borders have had different levels of security and facilitation associated with them. They have always been treated differently. The Smart Borders Declaration has not diverged from that.
Specifically, in terms of the safe third country agreement, you may want to ask this afternoon's witnesses about it. I am not aware of any discussions or challenges we have faced as a result of a perceived asymmetry with the Mexicans.
Mr. Fonberg: It is fair to say, Mr. Chairman, that in the year and half that we have been at this I cannot remember a time when the issue of Mexico has come up in our bilateral discussions around these issues, certainly in the context of the Smart Borders Action Plan. This has very much been bilateral around the northern border, the Canada-U.S. set of confidence issues.
The Chairman: We expect to hear it in Congress.
Mr. Fonberg: Are you referring to the Mexico dimension of all this?
The Chairman: Yes.
Mr. Fonberg: I am sure you will hear it. It would not surprise me at all. It is definitely a major issue in Washington. In the context of the Smart Borders Action Plan, it has been managed in a strictly bilateral way with virtually no push back or bringing in of the Mexican dimension to the Canada-U.S. Smart Borders Action Plan.
Mr. Flack: Where reference has been made to it, the American administration has talked about how some of these facilitation programs could be models on which, eventually, they could build a Mexican program that would be similar. In a sense, Canada and the U.S. will work out the details of the program. As Mexico is able to cooperate more fully, they could come on stream. Tangentially, it is raised in the form of a working model that could be used elsewhere. We have not found there has been a slowdown as a result of the perceived asymmetric treatment of the two borders.
The Chairman: Thank you. You have been helpful to the committee today. We appreciate your appearance before us. We appreciate the information you have brought to us.
I look forward to the additional documentation that you will provide us with. The clerk has advised me that she has provided your staff with a list of the eight committees with whom we will be meeting.
The committee adjourned.