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SECD - Standing Committee

National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs

 

Canada's Coastlines:

The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World

Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence

VOLUME 1

October 2003


MEMBERSHIP

37th Parliament - 2nd Session

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE

The Honourable Colin Kenny, Chair
The Honourable J. Michael Forrestall, Deputy Chair

And

The Honourable Senators:

The Honourable Norman Atkins
The Honourable Tommy Banks
The Honourable Jane Cordy
The Honourable Joseph A. Day
The Honourable Michael A. Meighen
The Honourable David P. Smith, P.C.
The Honourable John (Jack) Wiebe

*Carstairs, P.C. (or Robichaud, P.C.)
*Lynch-Staunton (or Kinsella)
*Ex Officio Members


TABLE OF CONTENTS

NIGHTMARES FOR A NEW MILLENNIUM

TERRORISM TAKES CENTRE STAGE

THE END OF COLD WAR CERTAINTY

CANADA'S COASTLINES:
    THE LONGEST UNDER-DEFENDED BORDERS IN THE WORLD

BATTLING THE UNKNOWN

AWAKENING CANADIANS

FOCUS ON MARITIME SECURITY

THE ISSUES WE ADDRESS

CHAPTER ONE:
   
LACK OF RESOURCES
    INADEQUACY OF FUNDING: THE CANADIAN COAST GUARD
    INADEQUACY OF FUNDING: THE CANADIAN NAVY
    SUNKEN FORTUNES
    NAVAL SURVEILLANCE
    INADEQUATE FUNDING: RCMP

CHAPTER TWO:
   
BETTER SURVEILLANCE
    DOMAIN AWARENESS
    PROGRESS REPORT
    IMPROVEMENTS AT PORTS
    BUT CANADA COULD DO MUCH BETTER
    RECOMMENDATIONS

CHAPTER THREE:
   
INTELLIGENCE
    GETTING THE RIGHT THINKERS
    GETTING THE RIGHT THINKERS - WORKING IN UNISON
    THINKING IN UNISON - BEYOND THE TECHNOLOGY
    RECOMMENDATIONS

CHAPTER FOUR:
   
INTERDICTION CAPABILITY
    PRETENDING TO DEFEND
    THE TRUTH ABOUT THE COAST GUARD'S POTENTIAL
    REINVENTING THE COAST GUARD
    RESURRECTING THE RCMP MARINE DIVISION
    RECOMMENDATIONS

CHAPTER FIVE:
   
NEW STRUCTURE
    THE NEGLECT OF OUR COASTS
    RESPONSE AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL TO MARITIME SECURITY
    FROM COASTAL SECURITY TO THE BIG NATIONAL PICTURE
    PROPOSAL FOR A NEW NATIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE
    PROPOSED NEW CENTRAL ARCHITECTURE FOR GOVERNMENT PRIORITIES
    RECOMMENDATIONS

CHAPTER SIX:
   
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
    RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSION

RECOMMENDATIONS

(There are two volumes to the report)


Nightmares for a New Millennium

Suppose ten people, acting in common ideological cause, spread out into dry woods across Canada on a hot summer day. How much damage could they do, armed with nothing more than penny matches?

How much damage could five people do - using explosives with components available at any garden centre - if they decided to cripple North America's common electricity grid by knocking out five high transmission lines?

It is common knowledge that only a small percentage of containers entering North American ports currently are searched. Consider the immense potential for devastation if just one of the unsearched contained a dirty bomb.

Many modern terrorists do not mind killing themselves if they can do enough damage in the process. Suppose someone inoculated a group of people with smallpox in some far off land just before they flew to North America. Their symptoms would be unlikely to appear until hours after they - and their vulnerable and unknowing fellow passengers - deplaned. Might epidemics be this century's main weapons of war?

All those scenarios sound bizarre. Some would call them alarmist. But who expected the waves of suicide bombings that the world has witnessed in recent years? How many Canadians thought they would ever see passenger planes being plunged into skyscrapers on North American soil?

September 11, 2001 will not go down in history because 3,000 unarmed and innocent people were killed in an unprovoked attack. History is littered with massacres. September 11, 2001 will go down in history as the day that the most powerful nation in history learned a devastating lesson: it was vulnerable to extreme assault inside its impregnable fortress. How easy it was for trickery to outflank power, right on power's own turf!

For most North Americans, the horror has dissipated over the past two years. People tend to get on with their lives. But only the naïve among us assume that this was a one-off disaster; that there aren't plans for more. Which leaves decision-makers in the world's wealthiest and most powerful nations to ponder: How do we defend against the unfamiliar and the unforeseen? 

The answer is, we cannot defend against the unforeseen. We simply must foresee. And we simply must defend. The alternative does not befit any society worth saving.


Terrorism Takes Centre Stage

The past decade and a half has seen one of the most dramatic shifts in the long history of human conflict. The symmetry and predictability of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, which ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, has given way to the asymmetry and unpredictability of international terrorists active on every continent.

Terrorism itself is by no means a new phenomenon. Codes of honour for waging war have been more the exception than the rule throughout history. The mythical chivalry of the Middle Ages and international conventions of war of the twentieth century have never seemed particularly noble to underdog warriors with passionate causes. The side with fewer resources often comes to the conclusion that there are more successful ways to engage in mortal combat than head-to-head confrontation with more powerful forces.

The American Revolution succeeded partially because the revolutionaries realized that when troops are facing superior firepower, they have a better chance fighting from ragged positions behind trees than from straight lines in open fields. The Viet Cong were later to succeed against the Americans using the same tactics: hide and surprise, hide and surprise. Three decades later, suicide bombers have pushed the element of surprise to a grisly new level with their focus on civilian victims.
It is obviously more difficult for a combatant to defend against an assailant employing unfamiliar tactics than it is to defend against what one has been trained to respond to.

Asymmetrical warfare is simply warfare that lacks the “predictability” of traditional military thinking. It is the greatest man-made physical threat to industrialized societies. How seriously do U.S. decision-makers take this threat since September 11, 2001, In The Right Man: The Surprise Presidency of George W. Bush, David Frum (who served briefly on President Bush’s speech-writing team), describes the atmosphere at the office of Tom Ridge, Assistant to the President and Homeland Security Advisor: 

"Occasionally, I would do some writing for Ridge and his team. I'd arrive with my notepad, and they would detail the appalling list of ways that America was vulnerable to terror and mass murder. . .”  

"I don't know why they sent the anthrax through the mail," one of them said to me. "It would have been much more effective if they had just doused themselves with penicillin, put the anthrax in a salt shaker, and emptied it out the back of a New York subway train…”   

“Just hijack a dozen trucks and fill 'em with explosives."  

"Or a ship and then sail it into the middle of Seattle."   

"I still think the shopping mall suicide bombers would work best." 


The End of Cold War Certainty

If asymmetrical warfare tactics have been around for a long time used with painful regularity over the twentieth century in places like Cuba, Ireland, Sri Lanka and Peru what makes the past decade and a half so dramatically different? 

It is that international terrorism has now become the primary threat to world stability, supplanting the danger that someone would finally push the button in the long standing U.S.-Soviet nuclear standoff.  

The motives for terrorists to wreck the lives of comfortable people living in prosperous societies include xenophobia, religious fanaticism, embittering poverty and revenge for past humiliations. These phenomena are increasing, not decreasing. 

Add a mindset advantage to terrorists’ destructive motivations: comfort with the prospect of death. By contrast, death has become an increasingly terrifying prospect in well-to-do societies. Cosmetic surgery, anti-aging creams and personal fitness instructors have become mainstream in the western world. Families of military enlistees have come to dread — and even protest — situations in which their sons and daughters are put in harm’s way. 

The United States now possesses weaponry unfathomed even a few decades ago. Even the military capabilities of its most well armed traditional allies seem outmoded in comparison. But breathtaking military capacity cannot negate one truism. In any battle of irrationally unafraid underdogs versus rationally fearful overdogs – with the underdogs aided by the Internet and other inexpensive modern communication technologies – the most powerful side is not always going to win. It may win every time on the battlefield, but unconventional attacks have changed the nature of warfare.  North America needs a new security focus:  defending against what was once the unthinkable. 

What can the countries on the terrorists’ target list — including Canada — do to lessen the possibility of catastrophes on their own turf? We can do more to mitigate some of the causes of terrorism through diplomacy and foreign aid, but nobody should pretend that generosity and understanding alone will win the day. Canadians must also defend ourselves.  In this relatively narrow examination of one of our greatest vulnerabilities — our long, rugged coastlines — the Senate Committee on National Security and Defence argues that, to optimize our chances of survival, the Government of Canada must focus on three imperatives: 

1.     An increased emphasis on intelligence as the key to Canada’s security; 

2.     A rationalization of Canada’s national security resources, making optimal use of resources through better command and control structures, coordination and mandating of personnel; 

3.     The expansion of military resources to a level commensurate with Canada’s Gross National Product and the country’s international responsibilities (in conjunction with a more credible foreign aid program and upgraded diplomatic representation abroad). 

In this report, the Committee will focus on expanding and rationalizing Canada’s military and other national resources with respect to maritime security.

 

Canada’s Coastlines:

The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World 

Canada’s southern border with the United States is affectionately known as “the longest undefended border in the world.” But Canadians have even longer borders: our coastlines with the Pacific, Arctic and Atlantic Oceans. These stretch nearly a quarter of a million kilometers, looking out on more than ten million square kilometers of ocean territory. No country has longer seacoasts than Canada.  

After considerable study over the past year, the Committee believes it is fair to define these coastlines on the Atlantic, on the Pacific, and in the Arctic as the longest under-defended borders in the world. They are vast, they are vulnerable, and, unfortunately, they are largely unattended. 

Committee members understand that the enormity of the territory demands risk assessment. Triage is essential because Canada cannot defend every spot on every coast all the time. But it can be more intelligent about assembling its resources to offer a less penetrable defence. 

Lack of appropriate coastal security and defence is a problem for Canadians, and for our American allies. The United States remains very much a target for international terrorists; it is clearly the bull’s eye. Canada, it is fair to say, is on the next ring out. We are so positioned because of our military bonds with America, our similar lifestyles, and our integrated markets.  

Furthermore, as the U.S. government is very aware, Canada is a potential conduit for those wishing to strike at the heart of America. The fact that Canada and the United States have the largest trading partnership in the world, with more than 85 per cent of Canadian exports going to the United States, makes attempts to trans-ship terrorist personnel and weaponry through Canada to the United States more a question of “when” than “if.” The likelihood of a direct attack on Canada itself falls within the same realm of probability. 

By definition, surprise attack is essential to the type of asymmetrical warfare practiced by terrorists. The use of commercial aircraft as weapons in the attacks of September 11, 2001, was a stunning surprise. As a result of that shock, security at world airports has been tightened (although not, in Canada, to the degree that the Committee has recommended). 

 

Battling the Unknown 

Where will the next shock come from? It may again descend from the air, but it is just as likely to come from the sea. Perhaps from a container given that only a small percentage of containers are searched at U.S. or Canadian ports. Or, through the hijacking of a commercial vessel. Or, loaded onto small vessels the kind that smugglers have used successfully for centuries to unload in remote coves and the neglected smaller ports that dot Canada’s coastlines. 

Again, the Committee is not so naïve as to believe it possible to put up an impenetrable “Maginot Line” along Canada’s coastlines that would seal them off from unwanted visitors. The cost would be unfathomable.  The Committee believes, however, that the Government of Canada could make much more effective use of its resources in offering Canadians and our American neighbours a more reasonable and effective system of coastal security and defence.  

 

Awakening Canadians 

This report represents a continuation of the Committee’s long-term evaluation of Canada’s ability to contribute to North American security and defence. It comes in the wake of four other reports published by the Committee over the past two years related to Canada’s capacity to defend itself and contribute to continental security.  

If it seems strange for a Senate committee to continue to expend so much time and energy pursuing this issue, we offer two very good explanations: 

·        We hold that the first priority of any national government should be the security of the nation and the physical protection of its citizens – that is why nations were invented. 

·        We are convinced that Canadians’ peace-loving nature is a double edged sword: Canadians’ distaste for violence too often makes us turn our backs on the threat of violence, rather than seeking remedies to lessen its probability. 

In the words of Dr. Danford W. Middlemiss, Professor of Political Science at Dalhousie University, in a recent appearance before the Committee: 

“Canadians and their governments do not take national defence or national security seriously, in part because, first, they have historically been blessed with good luck, and, second, because of their fortuitous geostrategic position alongside our friendly superpower to the south.” 

Canada’s geostrategic position, however, is not completely fortuitous  (especially considering that a key terrorist objective is to wreak destruction on our next-door neighbour). Furthermore, living right next to the world’s only superpower entails responsibilities. All of North America must be defended if people anywhere in North America are to be defended.  That means that Canada has a serious role to play. We Canadians do not have to join the United States on every security initiative that country decides to take. But helping to secure the perimeter of North America makes extremely good sense in terms of our own survival. It is not just the American way of life that is at stake, but also the Canadian way of life. 

For both moral and practical reasons, Canada cannot afford to be the weak link in the security of North America.

Focus on Maritime Security 

This report focuses on Canada’s ability to defend its territorial waters and help police the continental coastline. In some respects it takes up where Defence of North America; a Canadian Responsibility (September, 2002) left off. It will be followed by future Committee reports on emergency preparedness, intelligence and other aspects of Canada’s security capabilities. These reports are designed as interlocking building blocks in the construction of a national security policy founded on the optimal use of Canada’s resources. 

The report occasionally takes note of the federal government’s responses to the recommendations of earlier reports. But its main thrust is to address maritime security issues that the Committee has not specifically addressed before. The focus will be on Canada’s littoral – our coastal waters.  We need to determine how Canada can best plug the gaps in the surveillance, policing and defence of these waters.

 

The Issues We Address

The main issues addressed by the Committee in this report are: 

1.      CANADA’S LACK OF SECURITY RESOURCES ON ITS COASTS 

2.     THE NEED TO IMPROVE SURVEILLANCE 

3.     THE NEED TO IMPROVE INTELLIGENCE 

4.     THE NEED TO IMPROVE CANADA’S INTERDICTION CAPABILITY  

5.     THE NEED FOR A NEW STRUCTURE AT THE TOP 

6.     THE NEED FOR ENHANCED INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

The general concern of the report was well expressed by one of our many insightful witnesses: 

“I am glad I do not have to sit down with my former colleagues, the United States Navy, and have them say to me, “Our Coast Guard looks over the first 200 miles and then the Navy takes over. How does it work in Canada?” I would say “I can tell you about outside 200 miles, but you do not want to hear about it inside 200 miles.” Rear Adm. (Retired) Bruce Johnston, Former Commander, Canadian Maritime Forces Pacific

 


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