Transcripts & Minutes - Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs (37th Parliament, 2nd Session)

Past Session:

Canada's Coastlines:

The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World

CHAPTER THREE:

The Need to Improve Security

INTELLIGENCE

“Intelligence, in this world of security, is like the blood of our bodies. It is the essential nutrient that keeps the whole body impact moving. Information is like that blood. Intelligence is like that blood. We need a system of collection that continues to pump that intelligence and to put it forward before decision makers where it should be known.” Dr. Thomas Axworthy, Chairman, Centre for the Study of Democracy, Queen's University

“The real key is knowing that there is something abnormal in one of those ships.” Vice-Adm. Ronald Buck, Chief of Maritime Staff, Department of National Defence

Indeed, the key to coastal defence is having some knowledge that a vessel approaching Canada may have abnormal intent. Such knowledge is primarily based on good intelligence.

Intelligence has always been essential to national security. But it becomes vital when the threat is asymmetrical, meaning unpredictable. Canada is never likely to be a country of more than modest military capability, but if there is one area in which Canada could better contribute to the defence of North America and global stability, it is in the area of military intelligence.

To date, the federal government’s focus has been on improved surveillance and communications between departments and agencies, rather than on improved intelligence and interdiction.

“I believe that security on the coasts and the Great Lakes has been close to non-existent. There were, and still are, large voids. The efforts have been moving toward improving communications in intelligence gathering. However, I do not think we have focused on what we would do with that intelligence.” John F. Thomas, Partner, BMB Consulting Services, Former Coast Guard Commissioner

Gathering information, analyzing it, and putting it to quick and effective use depends on people, resources and systems. Canada’s intelligence community needs:

· Skilled line officers with an understanding of other cultures, good language abilities and training in the fine art of making connections to sources in the field;

· Sophisticated technical equipment;

· Intelligent leadership;

· Smooth coordination with police and military interdiction units;

· Clear pipelines to a broad range of intelligence sources in other countries.

Getting the Right Thinkers

One witness who is most critical of the federal government’s failure to recruit the right people to analyze intelligence particularly outside government is Professor Wesley K. Wark, Associate Professor, Dept. of History, at the Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto. His point: “Until you get the analytical picture straight, all the money and time you spend on collection (of information) can be for nothing. You will not have anything of value to pass on to senior decision-makers.”

Dr. Wark told the Committee that part of the government’s problem in building a good intelligence capacity is that it does not cultivate potential recruits from Canada’s universities: “Even in the aftermath of September 11, and with new money available to it, it does not really have a process in place for recruiting from outside the government.” Over the past two years, he points out, even those intelligence officers recruited from inside the government have been extremely overworked.

Historically, said Dr. Wark, Canada has not devoted adequate resources to intelligence. A vicious cycle has emerged in which decision-makers – inadequately, served by intelligence advisors – lose respect for the value of intelligence. It is particularly unfortunate, he said, that decision-makers undervalue the need for intelligence at a time when asymmetrical warfare has lessened the value of countries’ fighting capacity and increased the value of its intelligence capacity.

“ . . . We have an analytical system that is too diffused and dispersed, it exists in silos, it is too small, too uncoordinated and too haphazardly constructed in terms of the talent that is distributed throughout. I do not think it has really had the opportunity, or perhaps even the will, to stop and think about what the new requirements for intelligence analysis really are post September 11 . . . I believe that small analytical community was probably one of the most over-stretched and over-stressed resources in government . . . It is time to give it the tools it needs and to rethink its function from the bottom up.”

Dr. Wark states that government decision-makers lack confidence in their intelligence advisors. Canada’s intelligence personnel are too often perceived by decision-makers to be guessing, rather than knowing. This should not come as a surprise . Recent Canadian governments have not treated intelligence with the priority it deserves, have not done thorough searches for talented people outside government to upgrade the quality of analysis, and have not dedicated sufficient resources to keep personnel fresh and well-informed.

Getting the Right Thinkers Working in Unison

“Intelligence must be collected, analyzed and disseminated; good intelligence informs emergency planning which improves, in turn, performance in crisis management. At present we have gaps in every phase of this intelligence-preparedness security continuum. ” Dr. Thomas Axworthy, Chairman, Centre for the Study of Democracy, Queen’s University

Under the current attempts to better share information that needs to be analyzed by intelligence personnel, the government has deemed it adequate that 17 departments and agencies are being encouraged to share maritime security information through the Interdepartmental Maritime Security Working Group using a simple system for alerting one another known as CANMARNET.

According to the Department of National Defence, CANMARNET is an unclassified website which it manages. CANMARNET provides a geo-spatial depiction of the Canada’s unclassified Recognized Maritime Picture by showing where all known vessels could be found at a recent point in time. The website also includes windows that display information posted by other governments departments (Canadian Customs and Revenue Agency, the RCMP, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, and Citizenship and Immigration Canada) that might be useful for security purposes. There is no integrated email nor chat capacity. Information for the CANMARNET site is sent from departments voluntarily and separately, and must be compiled by DND.

The Interdepartmental Maritime Security Working Group (IMSWG) has recognized the inadequacy of this methodology, and commissioned a study to analyze the information requirements and holdings of the various government security partners in order to develop a better system.

This study, entitled Maritime Information Management and Data Exchange Study (MIMDEX), was conducted by Montage DMC, a division of ATT Canada. It found “the various departments and agencies concerned with maritime security lack the requisite information infrastructure and procedures required to bring together relevant security information, so that this information can be collectively analyzed.”

As a result of the study, IMSWG submitted a proposal to the Treasury Board in the fall of 2003 recommending a new information management model with new IT architecture to support it. MIMDEX would provide a “common repository of data that is strictly controlled through authentication and access control.” MIMDEX is superior to CANMARNET because it is a stand-alone web-based network with dedicated operators who can pass information, communicate in real time, and maintain awareness of other departments' concerns.

In its first iteration, says DND, the MIMDEX system will operate at the "PROTECTED" level of security and it will have the capability to emigrate into a "SECRET level" government network sometime in the future. This system will have many advantages including: displaying geo-spatial information in close to "real time," allowing updates by members on-line, and email and chat. Reference material in a shared on-line database will be available for participating government departments and a system will be put in place to allow each member to "flag" or alert others about particular concerns. This is a novel system that allows interdepartmental collaboration while remaining within Canadian Privacy and Charter Laws.

In short, MIMDEX is superior to CANMARNET because it is a two way (or multi-way) system that allows the marine community to interact in real time to better share information and alert each other to possible challenges or threats to marine security.

MIMDEX was "approved in principle" by the Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group in July, 2003. The selected contractors ("All Stream" Company) briefed the IMSWG on the Implementation Plan at the end of August and received direction to move ahead with the project. The funding for MIMDEX will be in place if the Treasury Board submission for the IMSWG Coordination Fund (from which MIMDEX funds will be drawn) is approved.

There is no doubt in anyone’s mind that MIMDEX offers a much more sophisticated system of sharing intelligence than CANMARNET and that a new system is badly needed. Two years after September 11, 2001 IMSWG described by Transport Minister David Collenette as the “the centrepiece” of improved Canadian maritime security, is still communicating through a clumsy, outdated system.

Thinking in Unison –Beyond the Technology

But the problem with assembling information for analysis goes far beyond second rate technology. The problem lies with multiple jurisdictions – any one of which might be assigned the “lead” during any crisis – trying to create a cohesive security structure when nearly all of the components of that loose “structure” are mandated with other priorities. This is ad hockery at its Canadian best.

In fact, this multi-headed Hydra is still wrestling with the question of whether it is constitutionally permissible to share vital intelligence across jurisdictional boundaries:

“Several [IMSWG] subcommittees have been put in place. With the diverse departments and their mandates, they have an ability to collect various amounts of information on vessels and on people in those vessels coming into Canada or within Canada. We are looking at the ability to share that information between departments. The Department of Justice is helping us extensively with that activity. We must ensure that the information gathered was gathered for an appropriate reason, and, if it is shared, that it is permissible to be shared.” Capt. Peter Avis, Director, Maritime Policy, Operations and Readiness, Department of National Defence

Not only has this assembly of various mandates and interests not yet overcome the hurdle of whether or not it can always share sensitive information, there are components of this network who are not always sure they want to share information, or are confined by statute not to share information:

“There is a downside to sharing information unless you know what you are sharing. The intelligence system can quickly feed upon itself. Before you start sharing something, the first thing you must do is ensure that your data is accurate, that it has been independently confirmed, and that it is not confirmed independently by someone else feeding information into the loop. That is very important. Then, depending on the scenario, it is a question of whom you share the information with so that you can respect the integrity of the ongoing investigation. In the area of national security, the technique and the sharing and the persons involved will be somewhat different than in the case of an organized crime investigation, because the interests of Canada are at stake.” Assistant Commissionner W. A. Lenton, Federal Services Directorate, RCMP

Even if the diverse group of interests represented by the Interdepartmental Maritime Security Working Group does some day manage to overcome the difficulties of sharing information, there will always be a time lag as the various parties decide which of its many components should take the lead during a given crisis. Perhaps that lag time will only be measured in minutes, but perhaps it will be measured in hours that should not be wasted during a crisis.

It is the Committee’s belief that the federal government’s general methodology for attempting to assemble intelligence through committees like IMSWG resembles the use of voluntary fire brigades. Voluntary fire brigades are made up of people who generally have other priorities in their lives - people who may, or may not, be available when the alarm goes off. They are useful in small communities where no full time emergency resources are available. Canada is not a small community. Canada must be able to assemble and coordinate the full time resources needed to focus on threats to the security of its people in minutes. It must be able to act quickly in times of crisis.

Canada has or should have access to sophisticated thinkers capable of acting quickly and intelligently, in harmony, under strong leadership, when crises arise.

The Committee believes that the Government of Canada should listen to the words of some wise observers who testified before us on this issue:

“The key things are centralized command and control, and centralized intelligence analysis. Those things are fundamental . . . Somehow you have to transform that interdepartmental committee, which does not sit at a terribly high bureaucratic level, into something with teeth, so that someone can say “This is bad.” There has to be an avenue by which such urgent matters can be taken into cabinet, decisions made and directives given.” Peter T. Haydon, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University

“Given that intelligence is the most important aspect of security, we cannot afford to nickel and dime the infrastructure that will process the information.” (Retired) Vice-Adm. Gary L. Garnett, National Vice-President for Maritime Affairs, Navy League of Canada

“Until we can break down that sense that Canadian government operations consist of separate compartments that link, for better or worse, with others, and [adopt] a coherent system of cooperation, clearly defined roles and a broadly spread sense of the value of intelligence, I do not think we will get very far.” Prof. Wesley K. Wark, Assoc. Prof., Dept. of History, Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto

The Committee’s recommendations in Defence of North America: a Canadian Responsibility, included the following:

· The Coordination of all Canadian resources including Navy, Coast Guard, Air Force, Army, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, police forces and agencies responsible for intelligence and satellite surveillance to improve defence of Canada’s coastlines. (Recommendation #2 page 13)

· Effective coordination and utilization of the numerous monitoring resources such as: Shipping position reporting system, Canadian Navy assets to include the Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels and Canadian Patrol Frigates, satellite tracking resources, routine Aurora flights, Department of Fisheries and Oceans patrols and intelligence, the Canadian Coast Guard patrols and intelligence and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police patrols and intelligence. (Recommendation #2 page 14)

· Establishment of multi-departmental operations centres at Halifax and Esquimalt capable of collecting and analyzing shipping intelligence to provide a combined operational picture for all government agencies that deal with incoming vessels; to address coastal threats to North America, while designing procedures to deal with all anticipated threats. (Recommendation #3 page 14)

The emphasis in these recommendations is on:

· fusing Canada’s surveillance and intelligence resources

· centralizing command and control for quick action during times of crisis

These two imperatives - consolidation and centralization - are particularly crucial in the field of intelligence. It is essential that our decision makers, during crises, have as complete a picture as possible of the threat they face, and that this picture is transmitted to them from one command and control centre in a timely fashion.

The RCMP and the Canadian Navy both maintain operations centres on Canada’s East and West Coasts. In terms of intelligence gathering, this makes no sense. The Committee believes that

There is a need for one Canadian security operations centre on each coast that fuses information gained from surveillance and by other means and funnels it to a command centre in Ottawa, where intelligence experts can analyze this information and correlate it with information gained elsewhere from CSIS, from our international allies, from every credible source.

This testimony epitomized Canada’s fragmented approach to security operations:

Chairman:

“Has the Navy been entrusted with operational coordination at Esquimalt and Halifax?”

Gerry Frappier, Director General, Security and Emergency Preparedness, and Chair of Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group, Transport Canada:

“With respect to information and understanding of the current state of play of vessels and vessels in the system, yes. However, with respect to operational aspects, the answer would be ‘not completely.’ For instance, customs would be doing their own

set of things and the RCMP would be doing their own

activities … ”

This testimony supported the Committee’s belief that reform is badly needed:

Vice-Admiral (Ret’d) Gary L. Garnett, National Vice-President for Maritimes Affairs, Navy League of Canada:

“It is our view that the picture should be completed locally on each coast and then provided to a national centre, which will have many additional roles, such as commanding deployed Canadian Forces, operations beyond that of pure domestic security.

A maritime security centre or operations centre or whatever we want to call it must have intelligence, fusion and decision-making components, giving it the ability to identify and evaluate threats and implement an appropriate response. These centres would most logically be managed by the navy but must include permanent officers or officials from other government departments, such as DFO, RCMP,CCRA, Environment, Customs, etc. Those officers would coordinate intelligence efforts and advise the command structure as subject-matter experts for their field of expertise.

When important responses or threats or crises are being considered, higher level officials from their respective departments would move into this maritime operation centre, and these officers would then act as their staff officers. We see great benefit in integrating maritime security centres with the existing naval operational centres and command structure. Technology enables the real time sharing of information, and it is certainly possible to add additional strategic level intelligence nationally without hampering the operational effectiveness obtained by close coordination at the coastal level.”

Dr. James A. Boutilier, Special Advisor (Policy), Maritime Forces, Pacific Headquarters, Department of National Defence:

“Earlier testimony embraced a debate as to whether there should be bicoastal operations centres collecting data or one inter agency centre in Ottawa. My own feeling is that there should be both. The two environments are different, but complementary. Halifax and Esquimalt have a feel for regional maritime conditions that a centre like Ottawa is unlikely to have. Conversely, an operations centre in Ottawa will operate in a “political” environment, able to bring together information from both coasts, assemble it, analyze it and disseminate it at the highest levels.”

Recommendations

In addition to repeating the three recommendations listed above, from our report Defence of North America: a Canadian Responsibility, the Committee recommends that:

3.1 The government expand its cadre of intelligence analysts in the wake of reports that too few people have been assigned to do too much critical work.

3.2 The government move immediately to upgrade its recruitment of intelligence officers from Canadian universities and other institutions outside the public service and that those universities and institutions make wider use of instructors from outside Canada with insights into other cultures.

3.3 The government increase funding for the training of people with the kinds of language and cultural skills that the Canadian intelligence community needs to draw from.

3.4 The government treat the quick introduction of the Maritime Information Management & Data Exchange Study (MIMDEX) information-sharing system as a priority.

3.5 The government expand information-sharing among departments, agencies, police forces and the military, recognizing some potential limitations required by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms as well as confidentiality guarantees sometimes required by foreign intelligence sources.

CHAPTER FOUR:

The Need to Improve Canada’s

INTERDICTION CAPABILITY in its Coastal Waters

Who defends our coasts?

The Committee concluded that it isn’t the Canadian Navy. The Navy appears to be primarily a “blue water” fleet, mandated to fight Canada’s battles away from Canada’s shores.

The Navy does own a fleet of what are known as maritime coastal defence vessels (MCDVs), but their primary use is training naval reserves. As Vice-Admiral Ronald Buck, Chief of Maritime Staff pointed out, the navy sees its role in coastal defence as largely one of surveillance.

Does the Canadian Coast Guard defend our coasts? Not really. Neither our Coast Guard vessels nor the personnel on board are armed. Most Canadians probably assume that their Coast Guard is out there protecting our coasts in the manner of the U.S. Coast Guard (often called the third-largest Navy in the world). Not so.

The Canadian Coast Guard, like the Canadian Navy, sees its security role as supportive – an extra chore thrown on top of its more clearly defined roles of search and rescue, ice-breaking, charting navigable waters, setting out buoys, checking for fisheries and pollution violations, checking for vessel safety, etc.

The Canadian Coast Guard comes under the jurisdiction of Fisheries and Oceans Canada. Coast Guard vessels do, upon request, conduct security surveillance and will carry officers from Customs, Immigration, the RCMP, Fisheries and Transport Canada on possible interdiction missions, but this is a tertiary responsibility. The Coast Guard is not funded to perform this role in a regular way.

During the so called Turbot War of 1995, 50 calibre guns were mounted on two Coast Guard vessels and Coast Guard personnel were given some basic training and sent out to the 200 mile limit to interdict a Spanish fishing vessel. Did Coast Guard personnel enjoy playing a constabulary role in this confrontation? Not according to the testimony of John Adams, Coast Guard Commissioner: “It scared the living daylights out of the Coast Guard. I think they fired on them once over the bow, but I am not sure. They could not get the guns off the boats fast enough.”

The Committee was told by more than one witness that it might take decades to change the Canadian Coast Guard’s culture from one of ship hands going about their various observatory and regulatory functions to a Coast Guard with a more constabulary role.

The Committee stated earlier in this report that we believe it is essential that Canada, a country of limited military capacity, find ways of squeezing the maximum out of the resources it does possess in the interest of countering all types of illicit behaviour on our coasts, particularly terrorism-oriented.

This isn’t happening. Canada has a number of agencies playing a variety of supportive roles such as surveillance and ferrying, for the most part but it is largely left to the RCMP to provide the teeth in times of emergency.

The RCMP, of course, has a multitude of other duties, most of them on land. RCMP officers play a useful role on our coastal waters, as they do on land, but coastal patrol is not the focus of the RCMP. The agency’s capacity to interdict on the Great Lakes, is almost non-existent, for example, in terms of armed boarding of ships: “We do not have the resources, equipment or training in the central region as opposed to either coast,” acknowledges Supt. Ken Hansen of the RCMP’s federal services directorate.

The RCMP’s capacity to interdict vessels on Canada’s east coast is not what anyone would describe as muscular. In Nova Scotia, for example, Chief Superintendent Ian Atkins, of the Criminal Operations Branch, Province of Nova Scotia, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, told the Committee that the RCMP has exactly 13 officers dedicated specifically to the coast of Nova Scotia, backed up as required by 32 other officers who are emergency response trained for armed boarding of ships. Chief Supt. Atkins described the RCMP’s watch over the coasts that it is mandated to police as essentially volunteer-based, with RCMP officers sent out to encourage the public to recognize and report unusual behaviour. In his words:

“The RCMP has 13 resources dedicated to marine security. This is leveraged by additional resources from partner agencies, Halifax Regional Police, Canada Customs and National Defence. The coastal policing by the RCMP is essentially a volunteer-based coastal watch program. The RCMP has two full-time coordinators and utilize local RCMP detachment personnel to educate the public and help them to recognize and report unusual coastal occurrences.”

Asked whether the RCMP might be somewhat short-staffed to act as the “teeth” of Canada’s coastal security, Chief Supt. Atkins had to agree:

“We identified the impediments to marine security. One of the most significant is the lack of perhaps dedicated resources, as I said, 13 RCMP resources for a 7,400 kilometre coastline. We rely on the consent of the public to assist in the identification of unusual activities.”

Pretending to Defend

When Canadian Navy witnesses tell us that their role in defending our coasts is supportive, when Canadian Coast Guard witnesses tell us their role in defending our coasts is supportive, and when an RCMP witness tells us that he has 13 officers to police 7,400 kilometers of the Nova Scotia Coastline and no dedicated resources to board a vessel in the Great Lakes and in the St. Lawrence Seaway, it is not difficult for the Committee to come to this conclusion:

Canada’s coasts are virtually undefended.

What to do? The need for additional resources and personnel is obvious.

But the Committee does not believe that Canada is using the resources it does have – most notably the Canadian Coast Guard – in a way that would better secure Canada’s coastal waters. Nor does it accept the two explanations we heard most often as to why it cannot play a more muscular role:

· that current Coast Guard personnel and their union would rebel against the requirement that officers or ships bear arms

· that it would take decades to transform the Canadian Coast Guard into a constabulary force

Those are the messages we heard most often from Canadian Coast Guard officials, who, not surprisingly, defended their institution’s current role and its performance in the face of obvious under-funding. While Coast Guard officials made no complaints about funding in their statements to the Committee, when questioned, they did not deny the existence of a serious problem:

Sen. Forrestall: “As I understand it, your organization is in need of funds.”

Mr. John Adams, CCG Commissioner: “The Coast Guard is hurting right now.”

When Committee members probed other witnesses as to whether the Canadian Coast Guard currently has the resources to play a constabulary role on Canada’s coasts, the replies were uniform “no”. There has been a severe depletion of vessels and personnel in recent years. More than half of CCG vessels are past their half life, and it would cost an estimated $350 million just to bring them up to strength to perform the roles that they are mandated to play now.

In the words of Dr. James A. Boutilier, Special Advisor (Policy), Maritime Forces, Pacific Headquarters, Department of National Defence: “It strikes me that, for the moment, the Canadian Coast Guard is unable to fulfill even its existing mandate, let alone take on additional roles.”

And yet Dr. Boutilier, an expert on what other countries around the world are doing, believes that the possibility of expanding the CCG’s capacity in order to give it a constabulary role could be the best route to go:

“That is certainly the way in which more and more governments in the Asia-Pacific region are heading. In the Australian context, there was mounting concern about the utilization of the Navy, in the words of one observer, to ‘punch holes’ in the ocean in search of illegal migrants . . .”

The Australians are currently pumping $500 million into a stand alone Coast Guard, distinct from the Australian Navy. Which brings us to consideration of the Canadian Navy’s responsibilities. Requiring and funding the Canadian Navy to fulfill its primary mandate of defending Canada’s borders, would, of course, be an alternative to bolstering the role of the Canadian Coast Guard. But several witnesses have argued that the Navy’s ships are generally too big, too slow and too expensive to efficiently deal with threats in our littoral waters.

Navy officials and advisors have certainly made it clear that they believe their primary responsibilities lie far from Canadian shores. In the words of Dr. Boutilier:

“. . . increasingly, our Navy’s strength lies in long-term deployments . . . we can no longer denominate our national security in purely parochial terms. More and more we will be obliged to utilize such highly sophisticated vessels in such a way. It is probably inappropriate to utilize such highly sophisticated vessels [for coastal security].”

The Navy’s coastal defence vessels could be used to patrol, rather than train, reserves. But then training would suffer, and the training capacity of Canada’s armed forces is already inadequate because personnel who should be training have been pushed to the limit serving overseas. Furthermore, as Vice Admiral Ron Buck pointed out:

“The Navy’s maritime coastal defence vessels are not optimal to do interdiction: their top speed is 16 knots. They are beamy. They were designed for patrol and mine warfare.”

The truth is that even if funding for the Canadian Navy were to be increased dramatically – an unlikely eventuality – the Navy would resist taking on a new coastal role simply because it has so many other priorities to fill after years of under-funding, to the point that Navy officials have announced that the Navy is essentially taking a pause for a year off in an attempt to regenerate the institution.

With respect to mandating the Canadian Coast Guard to take on constabulary responsibilities to fill the clear gap in Canada’s coastal defence, the Committee was particularly impressed with the testimony of John F. Thomas, now a partner in a company known as BMB Consulting Services, but formerly commissioner of the Canadian Coast Guard. Mr. Thomas told us that earlier testimony suggesting that Coast Guard personnel were uncomfortable with their role in the Turbot War intervention in 1995 were untrue “there was a great deal of pride about what was happening” and that Coast Guard personnel that he had spoken with before testifying told him they would not be opposed to operating as armed peace officers:

“Each of those five agreed wholeheartedly with me that the resistance would not occur. If it were a question of trying to do it with the existing funding, then resistance would occur.”

As Mr. Thomas pointed out, carrying a side arm is high risk venture, but so is search and rescue, which is repeatedly conducted by the Canadian Coast Guard. He called on the Canadian government to set up the Coast Guard as an independent agency, rather than as an adjunct of Fisheries and Oceans Canada, and saw it operating somewhat like this:

“It is likely that all of the watch-keeping officers would be peace officers, and that a cadre of maybe ten people would be trained for each of the larger vessels . . . at the other end of the scale, currently these SAR vessels are manned with three people, a very small crew who would deal with smaller “target” vessels. You are not talking about an armed commercial vehicle. As they [the Coast Guard vessels] are usually close to the coast, I do not know that targeting a large commercial ship would happen very often, but if a suspicious situation arises, you need to be able to stop the vessel and conduct an investigation. If there is a requirement to call in a larger vessel, they can do that within the Coast Guard or, depending on what they find, within the Navy.”

The Truth About the Coast Guard’s Potential

During the summer of 2003, the Chair and officials of the Committee met informally with a number of Coast Guard union officials representing officers and other ranks and discovered that the overwhelming reaction was just what John Thomas had described: a willingness even an eagerness to operate as peace officers along Canada’s coasts and on the Great Lakes, as long as they were provided with adequate personnel and resources to perform that role, on top of their multitude of other roles, and as long as they were trained and compensated in accordance with their new responsibilities.

In late September the Committee heard testimony from CCG union officials in Halifax. Considerable bitterness was voiced concerning the Coast Guard’s treatment under the jurisdiction of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans:

“When we were with Transport, we were part of the air-surface-marine transportation safety and security network. I remember that. I joined the Coast Guard when we were with Transport. The Treasury Board study on fleets in 1990 really was pointing in the right direction for many of the Coast Guard services.

We took that hard left turn in 1995, and we have been paying for it ever since. We were nothing but a cash cow to DFO. Major monies, $200-million I believe in 1997 or 1998, diverted to DFO programs. That is what happens today. We are merely a trucking service. “ John Fox, Regional Representative, Nova Scotia, Union of Canadian Transport Employees

“The Canadian Coast Guard is stretched, stressed and insolvent. That is the good news. The bad news is the DFO is mortgaging Coast Guard's future to pay for its present. We should ask that this Committee have the courage to stand up and confront the deluded senior managers of DFO who continue to claim that all is well, while those in the front lines know this not to be true. Chronic under-funding, over-commitment, and government neglect is causing irreversible damage to the Coast Guard. The service is poised on the brink of a downward slope towards irrelevancy, if someone does not step in and say, enough is enough. We ask you to give serious consideration to re-building the Canadian Coast Guard to its once proud level, and that it be given a major position in ensuring maritime security in Canada.” Michael Wing, National President, Union of Canadian Transportation Employees

The union representatives generally agreed that it would be a formidable endeavour to transform the Canadian Coast Guard from an unarmed civilian agency to a constabulary agency. But they acknowledged that it could be done, provided that personnel were adequately compensated for carrying arms and provided that adequate resources were provided for them to expand their duties:

Sen. Smith: Do you believe that the Coast Guard should be changed so as to have some degree of armed vessels and armed staff?

Mr. Wing: Senator, we do not have any problem with the mandate of Coast Guard changing to take on those additional responsibilities and that includes the arming of those vessels.

Sen. Smith: We understand there would be cost ramifications.

Mr. Wing: Right.

Sen. Smith: I do not know that they are prohibitive, so you are okay with that.

Mr. Wing: Yes.

The Committee believes that the Canadian Coast Guard should take on constabulary responsibilities.

Since the Coast Guard will need new vessels in the near future at any rate, there should not be a problem in providing it with cutters capable of carrying adequate personnel and equipment, and of pursuing at a speed of 20+ knots, to carry out this additional mandate. Another option, recommended by Mr. John Dewar, was for a new cutter. Mr. Dewar testified to the Committee on June 2, 2003 that an adequate replacement cutter could cost $55 – 100 million each (see appendix X, Volume 2). The final cost would depend on the sophistication and density of the sensor and communications technology selected for installation. Mr. Dewar argued that the vessel should be about 75 meters long and have a minimum speed of 25 knots. It should also be able to accommodate a maritime helicopter (cost of the helicopter is not included in the cost for the vessel mentioned above), deploy boarding parties in high sea states, and stay out to sea for 30 days at a time.

The Canadian Coast Guard is a valuable Canadian resource, with more than 4,400 employees, supported by 5,100 auxiliary volunteers, operating 107 vessels, 27 helicopters and two fixed wing aircraft. It operates out of 11 bases, with 1,000 personnel on the Pacific Coast, 550 in Central and Arctic Canada, 780 in the Quebec region, 860 in Newfoundland and about 960 in the Maritimes (see appendix IX, Volume 2). No institution is more familiar with Canada’s coastal waters.

The Canadian Coast Guard could become an even more valuable Canadian resource. The Committee faced no shortage of witnesses who agreed with the Committee’s consensus that the CCG is an underutilized resource:

“An armed Coast Guard is a much more cost efficient means of interdicting vessels of interest close to our shores than the more costly destroyer or frigate . . . We heard in your previous testimony that if a Coast Guard cutter happened to come across an illegal act, it would be impotent to do anything about it, and that is a shame. I do not think Canadians are aware of that. There must be a policy, a policy that in part provides our Coast Guard a new mandate, a mandate worthy of the name “Coast Guard.” Commodore (Ret’d) Hans Hendel, Consultant, Canadian Forces Staff College

“ . . . Granting the Canadian Coast Guard policing powers on the sea would allow, I humbly submit, the RCMP to concentrate its resources more on the terrestrial domain . . . Many coast guards around the world possess a policing role. As matter of fact, the majority of coast guards throughout the world have a policing role. They are most often defined in this respect and thus have the necessary equipment and trained personnel to do that kind of work. What would it take to equip our own Canadian Coast Guard with a law enforcement role? I am thinking specifically of drug interdiction, illegal immigration and anti smuggling. Not only could such a determination reduce the degree of the politicization that I mentioned a moment ago that is often associated with defence operations, but it could also spell some economic advantages in the deployment of smaller, more cost effective platforms such as fast rescue craft and patrol boats with smaller crews. It could also lessen the already heavy workload of our federal police force and our Navy.” James C. Kelly, Research Fellow, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University

“In the military, when we conduct operations involving more than one area of expertise let us say with Army and Air Force and Navy we create a command and control system that respects the individual capabilities and expertise of those various components. We call those who control the operation ‘component commanders.’ Conceptually, there is nothing wrong with the Coast Guard being an additional component commander within a command system that is mandated by a policy that says, yes, under certain circumstances, the Coast Guard component commander will respond to the needs of the particular mission. In fact, when you think about it today with the search and rescue mission." Commodore (Retired) Hans Hendel, Consultant, Canadian Forces Staff College

To repeat, it is the view of the Committee that the Canadian Coast Guard should play a constabulary role on Canada’s coasts. Not every Coast Guard officer would have to be a peace officer, but all watch officers certainly would be. Rather than thinking of a new Canadian Coast Guard as “paramilitary” a description that fits the U.S. Coast guard the Canadian Coast Guard would perform its traditional roles, but have the weaponry to intervene when criminal behaviour is transpiring, or appears that it will transpire. The role would be constabulary.

While the Canadian Coast Guard would continue to perform duties for various departments and agencies, it would be an independent agency, reporting to Parliament through its own Minister. However, national security would take precedence over the Coast Guard’s other duties. Coast Guard assets would be on call, and responsible to, coastal operations centres at Trinity and Athena in situations threatening national security.

Other countries around the world are beefing up their coast guards to defend against the new realities of an increasing unstable world. So should Canada.

Reinventing the Coast Guard

Here is the Committee’s proposed structure for the Canadian Coast Guard:

1. The Canadian Coast Guard would have an independent headquarters.

2. Finance the organization as follows:

National Security Tasks	Directly by Appropriation
Search and Rescue
Boat Safety Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary
General Administration

Fish	Charge backs to Fisheries and Oceans
Environment	Charge backs to Environment
Navigation Aids	Charge backs to Transport
Ice Breaking	Charge backs to Transport or contract out as required
Customs	Charge back to CCRA
Immigration	Charge back to Immigration

3. Coast Guard assets would be on call and responsible to coastal operations centres (Trinity and Athena)

4. It would have constabulary powers, all watch keeping officers and an appropriate number of crew members to have peace officer status.

5. Coast Guard vessels would be provided with appropriate armament, including:

a) Side arms and protective equipment in all vessels

b) 50 calibre machine guns or similar equipment on mid-sized vessels

c) Bofors or similar guns on larger vessels

d) Necessary boarding equipment e) Equipment necessary for self-defense and personal protection.

6. Training and Pay

· All officers and crew who have police powers and those who may conduct boarding should receive training at Coast Guard College in Sydney (this type of training has been provided at RCMP Training Academy, Regina).

· Personnel would also receive training in specialized fields such as enforcement of federal laws relating to environment, fisheries, customs and immigration.

· Remuneration for Coast Guard personnel undertaking new responsibilities would be increased accordingly.

7. Vessel Renewal Program

· Older vessels should be replaced

· New fleet design should take into account new responsibilities

· Initially two new cutters would be required for each coast

· According to DND (see appendix XIII, Volume 2), the most critical maritime surveillance areas are the high-traffic ‘choke points’ on each coast. Essentially, these areas comprise 200-nautical mile square zones (102,400 square kilometers) around the entrance to the Straits of Juan de Fuca (west coast), the entrance to Halifax Harbour (east coast), and the Cabot Strait entrance to the Gulf of St. Lawrence.

8. Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary

· The Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliaries (CCGA) is made up of almost 5,000 dedicated volunteers and 1,600 enrolled vessels. The six Auxiliaries that have been federally incorporated as non-profit associations are: CCGA National, CCGA Pacific, CCGA Central & Arctic, CCGA Quebec, CCGA Maritimes, and CCGA Newfoundland.

· The CCGA contributes significantly to search and rescue and the promotion of safe boating activities. This work should be continued encouraged and continued.

Canada also needs a more robust interdiction capability on the Great Lakes and other inland waterways. The Canadian Coast Guard will take some time to reorganize, and even when it is, it should not be the sole agency responsible for policing Canada’s coastal waters.

Resurrecting the RCMP Marine Division

No One in Charge

The Members of the Committee have been struck that no one federal government department or agency appears to be responsible for marine security in the St. Lawrence Seaway, the St. Lawrence River, the Great Lakes, and the Fraser and Skeena Rivers. Rear-Admiral (retired) Bruce Johnston, a former Commander of Canada’s Pacific fleet, touched on the need for a lead marine security organization when he appeared before the Committee on April 28, 2003. During a discussion on surveillance, Admiral Johnston testified that the real challenge is to use existing resources as effectively as possible. “Short of that,” he commented, “there is not a lot that we can do. Without the change in mandate to actually put someone in charge, there is not a lot we can do”

John F. Thomas, a former Commissioner of the Canadian Coast Guard, also noted that no organization was dedicated to the policing and surveillance of the Great Lakes, inland waterways, and coasts. He told the Committee on June 9, 2003, that “in the Great Lakes, the navy would not do that work.” The Coast Guard, on the other hand, does not have the training or mandate for law enforcement. Mr. Thomas said that the issue is “what do we need from the point of view of our own policing security. It is a matter of making the best use of the capacity that you have. There is a fairly extensive capacity within the Coast Guard that needs training, and that would need a mandate.”

To Mr. Thomas, there is an obvious need for an institution that is focussed on marine security and policing. “I believe,” he argued, “that security on the coasts and the Great Lakes areas has been close to non-existent. There were, and still are, large voids.”

The Committee is of the same view. Significant vulnerabilities currently exist along Canada’s maritime approaches and major inland waterways that are undermining national security. It is regrettable that these areas are being overlooked. The situation at the southern Canada-United States border, in contrast, is more encouraging. The RCMP is involved in the multi-agency Integrated Border Enforcement Teams that are doing excellent work targeting cross-border crime and enhancing border integrity.

The Threat

The Committee believes that the St. Lawrence Seaway, St. Lawrence River, Great Lakes, and the major inland waterways such as the Fraser and Skeena Rivers are insecure. A wide variety of threats could come from these high-traffic areas. For example, a vessel carrying a bomb could travel up the Seaway, or disembark terrorists somewhere along the St. Lawrence River, or bring a weapon of mass destruction into Canada while travelling up a major river. The Committee is also aware that smuggling is a problem in the Cornwall / Akwesasne Reserve area.

The Committee has long been concerned about the prevalence of organized crime at Canada’s ports and the inadequate level of policing. This, it has noted, can lead to insecurity and heighten the country’s vulnerability to terrorism. The Committee’s first report, Canadian Security and Military Preparedness (February, 2002), stated that the RCMP lacked the funding to deal with crime and terrorism at the ports. The report determined that the problem of port crime, because of its implications for national security, needed to be addressed publicly and immediately.

The Committee therefore recommended, in February, 2002,

that a public inquiry, under the Inquiries Act, into significant ports be established as soon as possible, with a mandate that would include:

a. a major review of overall security at the ports and the development of a national approach to recruiting, training, and the retention of security personnel;

b. examination of the degree of control that organized crime has over Canadian sea port operations, as well as the relationship between such control and threats to national security; [and]

c. an assessment of the potential for the use of Canadian ports to further terrorism. (Recommendation #8 page 129)

Unfortunately, the Government has not implemented this important recommendation by calling a public inquiry.

The Committee therefore reiterates its recommendation that a public inquiry be struck under the Inquiries Act to look into the vulnerabilities to crime and terrorism at Canada’s ports.

The Committee also saw that the RCMP needed a bigger role not only at ports, but also airports. Canadian Security and Military Preparedness recommended that

a federal agency be created that will be responsible for selection, training, and supervision of persons and systems responsible for passenger and baggage screening at airports and that this agency report to the RCMP. (Recommendation #13 page 130)

This RCMP-managed agency still does not exist. Captain Don Johnson, the President of the Air Canada Pilots Association, recently commented on this. In a letter that was copied to the Committee, he said that “our Association has been consistent in highlighting the requirement for one federal government agency, subject to public oversight, to oversee all aspects of the aviation security network.”[1]

The Committee was disappointed to learn that, when the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority began operations in 2002, it was as a crown corporation that reported to the Minister of Transport, rather than to the Solicitor General through the RCMP.

Changes to Transport Canada’s Role

The Committee is of the view that Transport Canada has the capacity to be a regulatory body, but does not have the resources for an operational role.

Transport Canada should continue to monitor and provide regulatory oversight of air traffic control, vessel registration, air and sea worthiness, and other similar matters.

Security, however, should fall under the Solicitor General’s mandate. The Committee believes that the necessary amendments should be made to legislation to make this so.

The RCMP performs a valuable policing and security function along the Canada-US land border, and the Committee is therefore convinced that its role should be expanded to the St. Lawrence Seaway, St. Lawrence River, Great Lakes, and the Fraser and Skeena Rivers.

The Committee pointed to the Solicitor General because it believes that responsibility for airport and port security belongs with the RCMP. In this report, the Committee once again urges the Government to allow the RCMP to become more heavily involved policing Canada’s major inland waterways and ports. The Members are struck by the need for a unified marine policing system, and for an expansion to the RCMP’s mandate so that it can better provide Canadian security.

RCMP Marine Division

To enable the RCMP to do so, the Committee believes that a recognized marine picture of the Great Lakes must be created and maintained. A multi-departmental information fusion centre should be established somewhere in the region, to be operated by a re-established RCMP Marine Division. This centre should be linked with the Canadian Forces intelligence fusion centres on the east and west coasts (Trinity and Athena). The RCMP centre should be focussed on the St. Lawrence Seaway, the St. Lawrence River, the Great Lakes and the Fraser and Skeena Rivers because the Committee is seized of the fact that this area requires a higher level of scrutiny, and this capability is currently absent. The Committee’s call for a RCMP centre reflects its earlier report, Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility (September, 2002), which recommended the

Establishment of multi-departmental operations centres at Halifax and Esquimalt capable of collecting and analyzing shipping intelligence to provide a combined operational picture for all government agencies that deal with incoming vessels; to address coastal threats to North America, while designing procedures to deal with all anticipated threats. (Recommendation #3 page 14)

The Committee said that then, and is even more convinced of the need for such centres today. The present report expands on this recommendation by noting that a centre is needed not only for each coast, but also the Great Lakes region and the coastal rivers.

In order for the RCMP to create and maintain the recognised marine picture, extensive patrolling will be required. In particular, light fixed-wing aircraft are required to do surveillance work. Aerial policing is quick and cost-efficient. Regular monitoring of the St. Lawrence Seaway and River, from the Great Lakes to Tadoussac / Trois Pistoles, could strengthen Canadian maritime security. And yet, the routes – the most obvious ones are from Thunder Bay to Sault Saint Marie, Sault Saint Marie to Sarnia, Sarnia to Windsor, Windsor to Niagara, Niagara to Kingston, Kingston to Montreal, and Montreal to Rimouski – are not being flown.

The Committee believes that this is because the RCMP does not have the resources. Some of the RCMP’s needs are obvious. Fixed wing aircraft should be purchased or leased for the RCMP. Helicopters are part of the RCMP maritime policing picture. The recently announced cuts to the RCMP helicopters in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland & Labrador should therefore be reversed, and the RCMP should receive funding to expand its aircraft fleet. The RCMP should have vessels that are appropriate to its different tasks and operational locations. In short, the RCMP’s material requirements must be determined, and met.

In order to undertake these tasks, the RCMP needs to be restructured and receive additional personnel. The first step in addressing this is to re-establish the RCMP Marine Division, which was shut down in 1970 because it was deemed to be an inefficient use of resources. The Committee is convinced that times have changed. The Division should be recreated, have responsibilities that go beyond its former mandate of enforcing federal statutes, to also include physical security of all major ports. This, however, will not include duties currently held by local police services but will include maritime policing on the east and west coasts, St. Lawrence Seaway, Great Lakes and inland waterways identified as high risk. Each geographic area should have control of the RCMP officers stationed in its various ports. These members would replace the former Ports Canada Police, a service that numbered 324 at its peak in 1972. The Committee believes that the new Marine Division should be equivalent in size. Indeed, it is clear this number should be exceeded. The Netherlands has roughly 350 police in the port of Rotterdam alone!

RCMP Funding

The Committee is convinced that the RCMP needs more funding. Its view is that the Government can either pay now, or though a costly post-disaster recovery phase and then pay later. This should be a straightforward decision.

Some of the testimony heard from the RCMP is therefore disturbing:

The RCMP asked the Treasury Board for 24 full-time equivalent positions for the ports of Halifax, Montréal, and Vancouver.

The RCMP received 8 total. It redeployed 16 persons internally to make up the 24 investigators, so that there is a team of eight for each of the three ports.

There are 3 additional personnel dedicated to conduct record checks on port employees on behalf of Ports Canada.[2]

Recommendations

The Committee recommends that:

4.1. The federal government take immediate steps to transform the Canadian Coast Guard from an agency that reports to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans to an independent agency responsible to Parliament and carrying out its duties – search and rescue, ice-breaking, navigational aids, buoy tending, boat safety, fisheries and environment protection – plus new responsibilities for national security. For national security matters, Coast Guard assets would be temporarily directed by coastal operations centres (Trinity and Athena).

4.2. The Committee reiterates its recommendation that a public inquiry be struck under the Inquiries Act to look into the vulnerabilities to crime and terrorism at Canada’s ports.

4.3. The Committee recommends that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) conduct a risk / threat assessment to determine what personnel, equipment, and financial resources it needs to re-establish the Marine Division and to police the St. Lawrence Seaway, St. Lawrence River, Great Lakes, the Fraser and Skeena Rivers, and inland waterways identified as high risk.

4.4. The Committee recommends that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) report its findings to the public by March 31, 2004 and have an operational plan ready for March 31, 2005, and that the Government be prepared to fund the stated requirements.

In addition to the recommendations in the above text, the Committee recommended in Canadian Security and Military Preparedness (February, 2002) that:

· a federal agency be created that will be responsible for selection, training, and supervision of persons and systems responsible for passenger and baggage screening at airports, and that this agency report to the RCMP. (Recommendation #13 page 130)

On top of the recommendation cited in the text above, the Committee recommended in Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility (September, 2002) that:

· The Coordination of all Canadian resources – including Navy, Coast Guard, Air Force, Army, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, police forces and agencies responsible for intelligence and satellite surveillance – to improve defence of Canada’s coastlines. (Recommendation #2 page 14)

· New security measures on the Great Lakes including:

i. Mandatory reporting for all vessels (of a displacement to be determined by Canadian regulators) to Canadian authorities 24 hours prior to anticipated entry into Canadian Great Lakes ports;

ii. All vessels (of a displacement to be determined by Canadian regulators) intending to operate in the Great Lakes region be equipped with transponders to permit electronic tracking by Canadian authorities. This requirement would have the added benefit of greatly improving the precision of search and rescue;

iii. Mandatory daily reporting to Canadian authorities for all vessels (of a displacement to be determined by Canadian regulators) operating in Canadian national waters;

iv. Canada’s Great Lakes reporting stations will be responsible for receipt and coordination of these reports and for communication with policing agencies. (Recommendation #8 page 15)

In The Myth of Security at Canada’s Airports (January, 2003) the Committee recommended:

· All airport policing directly related to air travel security be removed from the airport authorities and assigned exclusively to the RCMP under contract to CATSA. [The Committee’s intention was to state that the contracts may be with CATSA, but the RCMP is the sole authority to which it reports.] (Recommendation #VII.1 page 147)

· Local police forces and security guards contracted by airport authorities be responsible for criminal offences that are not related to air travel security. (Recommendation #VII.2 page 147)

· CATSA should be given the authority to contract the RCMP to supervise all policing at airports as it relates to passenger, cargo, aircraft and airside security. [The Committee’s intention was that the RCMP, through CATSA, should supervise policing at airports.] (Recommendation #VIII.2 page 148)

[1] Don Johnson, “Letter to David Collenette,” (25 September 2003): 1. For the complete text, see Appendix XIV, Volume 2 to this report.

[2] Source: Assistant Commissioner W.A. (Bill) Lenton, Federal Services Directorate, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, “Testimony”, Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Issue 19, (June 9, 2003)