Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Fisheries and Oceans
Issue 3 - Evidence, February 25, 2003
OTTAWA, Tuesday, February 25, 2003
The Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans met this day at 7:04 p.m. to examine and report from time to time upon the matters relating to straddling stocks and to fish habitat.
Senator Gerald J. Comeau (Chairman) in the Chair.
[English]
The Chairman: Honourable senators, first, this evening, I should like to ask permission of committee members to televise a visit of the Honourable John Fraser to our meeting on March 18. Are honourable senators agreed?
Hon. Senators: Agreed.
The Chairman: I welcome our two witnesses this evening. Dr. Art May needs no introduction to this group because he has held many national and international appointments. He was the first Chairman of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization. Dr. May is a research scientist who worked a number of years with the Department of Fisheries and Oceans until he became the Deputy Minister of Fisheries and Oceans. In more recent times, he was appointed President and Vice Chancellor of Memorial University in 1990, where he served until 1999. He has had a distinguished career that we have all had a chance to follow and admire.
Mr. Alastair O'Rielly is President of the Fisheries Association of Newfoundland and Labrador, FANL, which represents many seafood processors. In terms of sales, FANL's membership ranges from companies with a few million in sales to Canada's largest seafood processor, Fisheries Products International. FANL is involved in price negotiations with the Fishermen, Food and Allied Workers/Canadian Auto Workers Union; advises government on international trade, fisheries management and conservation matters; and evaluates regulations, policies and legislation that affect the fisheries industry in Newfoundland and Labrador.
We have two gentlemen with a great deal of experience and expertise before us this evening.
Mr. O'Rielly, please proceed.
Mr. Alastair O'Rielly, Member, Newfoundland Provincial Advisory Council on Foreign Overfishing: Honourable senators, I am pleased to have the opportunity to speak to you this evening and to discuss one of the greatest challenges that we face in the Atlantic fishery. As honourable senators are no doubt aware, the purpose of that discussion is to talk about foreign overfishing and Canada's response to this problem over the past 25 years. I have put my information and my presentation together in a Power Point format. A friend of mine calls it an electronic crutch, to which I confess. With your permission, I will proceed through the presentation and outline to you the key points. Then, perhaps, Dr. May would elaborate on the other elements of this problem.
Our association represents seafood processors. As you indicated in your comments, Mr. Chairman, the association has been in operation since 1944. My involvement in this, through FANL, has been as a representative of part of Canada's delegation to the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization, NAFO, for the past six years. I am also a member of the province's Advisory Committee on Foreign Overfishing.
The map will be of limited benefit and I am sure honourable senators are all familiar with the terrain and the challenge that we face. The portion of the map in yellow is the area that is in question, in terms of the intensive level of fishing effort. I have another graph that depicts that in more detail.
The issue of the background, from our point of view, is that despite at least 25 years of NAFO involvement, we have truly failed to develop and to implement an adequate conservation resource management regime for waters outside the 200-mile limit. NAFO has a rather lax regime in and of itself. The regime that is in place is not well enforced. One good thing about NAFO — and there are a limited number — is observer coverage. We have 100-per-cent observer coverage largely arising from the events of 1995 and the incidents with the Spanish and the trawler, Estai. Observer coverage, however, really only gives you an opportunity to detect what is happening; it does not give you an opportunity to deter inappropriate activity and behaviour.
After ten years of moratoria on key groundfish stocks, there is little evidence of any recovery. The decline in Greenland halibut turbot stocks, which had been recovering, is disappointing. NAFO is guilty in this instance of failing to nurture the recovery of that stock and to continue to overexploit it.
The current problems include an increase in violations in the regulatory area, such as directed fishing on moratoria species; misreporting of catches; exceeding allocations; mesh size; and non-submission, or late submission, of observer reports.
The quotas that NAFO sets are also inconsistent with the scientific advice that is provided by NAFO's scientific council. That is especially true of Greenland halibut and turbot stocks. A number of members of NAFO are actively pushing to reduce 100-per-cent observer coverage, as is currently in place.
This graphic from DFO depicts the Grand Banks. Honourable senators can see that the depicted activity is supposedly a series of docks that show at least one fishing week of activity by a foreign fishing vessel during 1993. Honourable senators will see from this graphic the intensive level of fishing along the nose of the bank, throughout the entire tail of the bank and of course around the Flemish Cap. That gives you a graphic impression of the level of activity that we are dealing with.
What are the consequences of this lax regime? Clearly, it has a negative impact on resource conservation. Prior to 1995, we saw a very intensive level of fishing effort, up to 26,000 fishing days by foreign vessels outside the 200-mile limit. After 1995, the level of fishing effort dropped to 6,000 days. However, by 2001, it is back up to 10,000 days and growing. In 2000 and 2001, foreign vessels harvested roughly 10,000 metric tons and 8,000 metric tons respectively of species that are supposedly under moratoria.
In addition, the European Union, primarily, overfished its turbot or Greenland halibut quota by 6,500 tons. There are some detailed depictions of all these problems contained in submissions and presentations Canada made at the NAFO meetings in Denmark in January 2002 and Spain in September 2002. I would encourage honourable senators to obtain those documents and to view them for more detail as to what actually transpired, vis-à-vis non-compliance.
Another way to look at the cost of this lax regime is lost economic opportunities. For Canada alone, if we were able to bring back cod stocks, flatfish resources, yellowtail, plaice and redfish to mid-1980s levels, which are not historic highs, but rather average levels throughout the 1980s, that would generate up to 60,000 tons of added resources for Canada. That amount is enough to sustain six offshore plants, operating year-round. A phenomenal benefit is being forfeited by the failure to effect a recovery.
Canada has been part of this process for 25 years now. A major intervention in 1995, as I referenced, had the effect of significantly reducing fishing violations for a while, through the adoption of observer coverage. It cost us, though. Following 1995, to make peace and find accommodation with the European Union and other NAFO members, Canada achieved a significant reduction in our share of Greenland halibut. Canada used to haul 60 per cent of the allocations and that went down to 37 per cent, largely as a result of the appeasement process of dealing with the fallout of the Estai incident.
What we want, as an industry, is a comprehensive conservation regime that works outside the 200-mile limit; a regime that provides at least the same level of standard that we experience within Canada's 200-mile limit.
If we did have a proper conservation regime outside the 200-mile limit, it would help us considerably in having a better regime within it. Far too often, Canadian industry cites the foreign fishing problem as an excuse for not dealing with our own problems. There are benefits both ways here.
We have some choices. One is to try to fix NAFO and to develop a proper regulatory regime within NAFO, within a reasonable time-frame. Another option is to proceed with a custodial management regime, where Canada would take responsibility for enforcement of regulations outside th 200-mile limit, or we could continue to pursue, as we have in the past, a unilateral extension of jurisdiction so that Canada moves its economic zone all the way to the edge of the continental shelf, or perhaps even further, to take in the Flemish Cap.
Looking at the issue of fixing NAFO, the approach here would likely require that we first inform other NAFO contracting parties of what we require, vis-à-vis a proper regulatory regime, and the time-frame within which we see implementation of this regime. To some extent, Canada started that in 2002, in terms of the meeting in Denmark and the meeting at Santiago de Compostela in Spain, with submissions on non-compliance.
In September 2002, I had the opportunity of presenting our industry's views on this foreign fishing problem to the EU fisheries commission. I will come back to some of the points I made in that presentation. However, in terms of fixing it, if we cannot find a way to resolve this challenge, then our requirement is to leave NAFO.
I relayed to the EU Fisheries Committee officials and participants the key element of the key consideration, which is NAFO is not working. That is something that they were not aware of, according to them. Some of the presentation themes were that, within NAFO, most of the allocations are held either by Canada or the EU. We dominate access, between us. Yet we are adversaries, primarily over resource access issues. When resource access comes first, conservation is usually compromised. It is a long way behind. I think both Canada and the EU have been guilty of that, in terms of our approach to NAFO.
My suggestion to the EU was that we should recognize common interests in managing stocks and promoting recovery of those stocks.
I also reminded them that they made strong conservation commitments at the Earth Summit in Rio, in Spain, in Johannesburg and in their common fisheries policy. Both Canada and the EU have compatible policies with respect to consultation, yet neither one of us are manifesting that within NAFO.
Another theme was that if we do not find a solution to the problem, others would find it for us. Particularly, the world's environmental movement is seriously questioning what we are doing and our right to manage these resources, given our track record. The world is becoming less tolerant of those who do not provide proper conservation and resource management regimes. If we cannot or will not demonstrate the requisite will to do this properly, we may find that we no longer enjoy this access.
The option of custodial management is one that has grown considerably in the last year. It is one that the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador has strongly promoted. Custodial management effectively means that Canada, as the adjacent coastal state, would take the responsibility of designating fish stocks that straddle the 200-mile limit, as part of the exclusive economic zone for the purposes of applying consistent and conservation-based measures.
Key principles in custodial management would be, first of all, to respect historic access in allocations. Effectively, this is already done. NAFO has an allocation key, so there is an understanding of how much access each country ought to have to resources outside the 200-mile limit.
The other key principle is that, if Canada took responsibility for management, Canada would impose no greater burden on countries that are operating outside the limit than on harvesters operating within Canada's 200-mile limit. In effect, it would put in place a comparable resource management regime for all straddling stocks.
Canada, as a coastal state, would take responsibility for management, enforce consistent application of measures and be responsible for all monitoring and surveillance activity. NAFO would continue to operate the scientific council, carry out stock assessments, conduct the necessary research and provide recommendations on TAC levels. NAFO would also provide decisions with respect to resource access and allocations and also manage discrete stocks within the regulatory area. Primarily, these stocks are in the area of the Flemish Cap.
Finally, NAFO, through the fisheries commission, would develop and levy sanctions against non-compliant members of the organization.
With extended jurisdiction in which we bring Canada's 200-mile limit to the edge of the shelf or beyond, effectively we would be taking ownership of the resource and removing foreign fishing activity entirely from the nose and tail of the bank.
At present, under international law and convention, Canada would find virtually no support anywhere else on the planet at this point, if it were to contemplate that unilateral action. However, there is potential to pursue this option to build upon the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea regarding sedentary species and to help build an argument as to how and why we should have right of access to manage resources and access resources outside the 200- mile limit.
A realistic approach is likely to explore, in our view as a panel, the question of is there an opportunity to work with NAFO members to fix NAFO in the first instance, especially working with the European Union, given their predominant influence?
Our suggestion would be to set a reasonable time-frame to find solutions to the NAFO challenge. A reasonable time-frame may be three to five years. I would like to think it could be done more quickly, but again, being realistic, it is likely in that neighbourhood. We would have to demonstrate to NAFO members and others that we have given NAFO a full and fair opportunity to function properly and to deal with problems.
Concurrent with this approach is the suggestion that we should continue to consider our options under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and under the United Nations fisheries agreement, straddling stocks agreement, and through the international courts. Concurrently, we would explore what other choices we had. If we cannot achieve progress within the time-frame set, then we either move toward custodial management or other measures that we may determine at that point. To do this, we would have to engage in an intensive campaign to solidify support both nationally and internationally from what would be seen largely as unilateral action by Canada.
What can your committee do? Collectively and individually, we would like to encourage you to provide support for the industry's cause and for Canada's cause in finding a solution to this problem outside the 200-mile limit. We believe there is a requirement and a need to support a public relations campaign, not just domestically, but internationally. There is also a need to support action by Canada to take a stand at NAFO, and to become more forceful and aggressive than they have in the past in dealing with the problems that NAFO manifests.
Finally, strengthen the resolve and the resources both by Department of Fisheries and Oceans and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in dealing with this matter. That is largely a function of making representations to them.
That concludes my comments. Dr. May will continue and provide further elaboration.
Dr. Art May, Member, Newfoundland Provincial Advisory Council on Foreign Overfishing: I provided the clerk yesterday with a few pages of commentary, in one official language. With the permission of the committee, that might be circulated.
Let me begin by saying that as a much younger person, about 30 years ago, I was the scientific adviser to the Canadian delegation to the preparatory committee for the Law of the Sea. Ten years later in 1982, I was privileged to accompany Ambassador Beasley and Minister De Bané to Jamaica to sign the Convention on the Law of the Sea. As the chairman noted, I was the first chairman of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization.
I should be looking back over 30 years with a sense of great pride in the accomplishments that have arisen from all of that. Instead, I look back with a sense of frustration because the situation outside the 200-mile limit is worse than it was 30 years ago in spite of all the progress around the world.
The problem, basically, is that a 200-mile limit in terms of jurisdiction over fisheries is perfectly adequate for most of the world. It is not adequate for the Grand Bank of Newfoundland where the 200-mile line bisects the distribution of ground fish stock that live close to the bottom of the continental shelf.
Few other countries have problems with the 200-mile limit. The big problem is one that we have on the Grand Bank.
As Mr. O'Rielly has mentioned, the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization was created at the time we extended fisheries jurisdiction to deal with the problem outside the 200-mile limit, since we had an imperfect solution through the Law of the Sea. NAFO has existed for 24, 25 years, and the stocks outside the 200-mile limit have been decimated. There can be no argument about that. They are worse off now than when NAFO started. It has not worked.
The basic reason why it has not worked is that the convention is written in a way that anyone who does not like a conclusion from an annual meeting is entitled to object to the conclusion, and can extricate themselves legally from any obligations that the majority have. That objection procedure has been used frequently over the years.
The other problem is that enforcement can only be done by the flag state. That is the country that licenses the vessels. Canada can board and inspect a Spanish vessel, but it is not entitled to arrest the vessel if a flagrant violation is discovered.
Over the past quarter century, it has been discovered that these arrangements do not provide for an appropriate conservation regime.
The idea of custodial management that has been advanced particularly by the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador could work very well. It would mean that one entity would manage on behalf of everyone else. That could be Canada. There is an alternative that I think has not been thought of but could be debated, and that is using NAFO, itself, as the custodian should a country be unwilling to put its vessels at risk of being arrested by another country.
I doubt that the people who are resisting NAFO regulation or custodial management would accept that any more than they have accepted any other propositions up to now.
Unfortunately, custodial management can only work if the various entities collectively agree to allow themselves to be managed by a custodian on behalf of everyone. If they do not agree to do that, and Canada wishes to exercise custodial management, then it becomes a unilateral action. One cannot escape that logic. Then it would be hotly contested not only by the people to whom the action is directed, but also by many people who would not have any interest in the issue otherwise, but who would suddenly come out of the woodwork to protest.
There are various ways handle this problem. Mr. O'Rielly has mentioned some of them. Let me elaborate for a few minutes on one that has not received any attention, and yet in many ways, is the most logical way to proceed.
I return again to the Law of the Sea, and in particular, the convention of 1982 that drew a 200-mile limit across the middle of the Grand Bank. The fish ignored the limit, and continued to move freely back and forth across that line. That tells us that the law is inadequate. The law is deficient. The law does not work in a situation where the distribution of fish stocks is not encompassed by the 200-mile line. When law is deficient or when law has big loopholes, the usual response is to amend the law.
The Law of the Sea, I would suggest, some 21 years after the last convention was signed, is ready to be amended. It could be amended in various ways to solve this problem. To my mind, the most logical one would be to extend the definition of living resources now contained in one of the articles of the Law of the Sea. It is Article 77.
Article 77 of the Law of the Sea is concerned with the continental shelf and the definition of resources of the continental shelf, living and non-living. Article 77 provides that the coastal state shall have jurisdiction and ownership of the resources of the continental shelf as defined in article 77. The non-living resources are the oil, gas and minerals. There are no questions about that. The living resources are defined as resources that are immobile on the seabed or are unable to move, except in constant physical contact with the seabed or the subsoil. That means that crabs are resources of the shelf and, therefore, the property of the coastal state. It means that scallops are resources of the shelf and, therefore, the property of the coastal state, along with the scarfish, sea urchins, corrals, and things that are not quite as valuable as some of the others. However, groundfish, which are species of fish that live in close association with the ground, are not defined as resources of the shelf. Therein lies the problem. This would be a simple, logical and elegant solution to the problem. Would anyone agree? We will not know until we pick up the file and try to do something with it. The initial response would be, ``No, this could never happen because this would be seen as something that Canada wanted for itself and then other nations of the world would not be interested and might object.''
Back in 1947, Peru or Ecuador declared a 200-mile limit. By 1982, everyone had a 200-mile limit. It takes time, and unless we get started, we will never get it finished.
This is one avenue to be explored, among others. This issue is at a point where it now needs leadership at the national level. The kind of effort by several departments of government that brought us to the 200-mile limit in the first place now needs to be mounted to fix what I have called the loophole.
The Chairman: Thank you, Dr. May, for your excellent suggestion, which I am sure members will want to follow up on.
Senator Rompkey: First, what was the fallout from the Estai? You said we had to cope with the fallout from the Estai incident. The Estai incident has been refreshed in our minds after reading about it in Brian Tobin's recent book. All the details are in there, some of which we knew and some of which we did not know. We clearly gained a temporary advantage there, but whatever advantage we gained quickly dissipated. What accommodations did we have to make and why?
Mr. O'Rielly: There were a number of elements to what happened following the dramatic action that occurred with the Estai incident in 1995. This was unprecedented. It was an extreme action by Canada. Having carried out that action and having been pushed to that point, Canada then found it necessary to try to find the accommodation with the international community, particularly with the European Union. Within NAFO, the resolution of who had access to turbot is as I indicated. We went from having virtually 60 per cent of the identified quotas to then holding 37 per cent as part of the process. In some ways, that was a concession to try to find accommodation. The measures that we did achieve, for example, the 100-per-cent observer coverage, we had been struggling for the past number of years to maintain that advantage. That is slipping. As a colleague says, the reverberations from that bullet have long since been spent. It no longer has any great value to us. It served a purpose at the time. It definitely caused a reduction in the number of violations and in the fishing effort, but events in the past two or three years have dramatically reverted to what they were for the most part prior to 1995.
Senator Rompkey: The next question is, what time do we have? The answer to that question is probably little or none. There is absolutely no recovery in the cod stocks as well, and you have mentioned turbot. There is also pressure on species like crab, although that may be for different reasons. On the question of time and considering these options, some of them will take time, as both you and Dr. May have said. You must go through a process of negotiation. You have to run up the flag and see if anyone salutes it. Do we have that time? I am of the impression we do not have a lot of time.
Mr. O'Rielly: That is a good question. It is a speculative matter to talk about how long it would take to effect recovery. Part of the challenge is that the level of fishing effort taking place on the nose and tail is not sustainable on the basis of economics. The catch rates do not support it. The fish being harvested are small and, to a large extent, the challenge is compounded by the level to which the European Union subsidizes the operations of its vessels. That is a complicating factor. How long can they continue to fish and operate with low catch rates and small size fish? I suppose the answer is until such time as the European Union stops the subsidy. They are having their own domestic problems, as you know. The North Sea is in serious trouble. There is a tendency on their part, in our view at least, to continue to export some of their problem to the nose and tail of the banks. In the past couple of months, there were announcements of construction programs on vessels for Portugal that were being paid for by the European Union as distant water vessels. It is possible they may be fishing elsewhere, off Africa or other regions of the world, but it is also entirely possible that they will be fishing off the nose and tail of the banks. In that environment, time is questionable. It is not foreseeable that we will see a recovery, given the level of harvest.
Senator Rompkey: Why would NAFO pay attention to us now when they have not in the past, particularly given the strength of the European Union? Some were thumbing their noses at the United States. As a continent, Europe is probably as powerful now in one way or another as the U.S. They are showing that in a number of different ways, but they have shown it consistently. You have just said that since the Estai it has all gone downhill. Dr. May has indicated that within NAFO itself, the rules are such that there is a veto. You can describe it how you want, but a state does not have to go along with the conclusion. Given that, given the experience since Estai, given the way that NAFO is organized, given the power of the European Union, why would we expect they would pay any attention to what we say now when they have not in the past? If we acted unilaterally, what would it cost us?
Mr. O'Rielly: Maybe Dr. May should comment on this as well. The European Union is largely exporting its problem. Look at the dynamic within the European Union. For Spain and Portugal this issue is important. For the rest of the European Union, this is a relatively insignificant matter until such time as the other countries become seized of this by whatever motivation. That may happen at the behest of environmental groups, or there may be other forces that will induce the European Union to become serious about this.
At the moment, there is a relatively easy political solution for the people in Brussels who are dealing with their own domestic problems and facing challenges with Spain and Portugal.
It is also important to note that a number of NAFO members are currently seeking access to the EU as part of their enlargement program, particularly the Baltic States. In the last couple of years, we have seen those other NAFO countries that are seeking accession vote with the EU just because they want to find accommodation with the EU and improve their prospects for positive relationships. NAFO is essentially an EU-dominated regime for the most part. Our challenge is to deal with that.
Mr. May: The last part of Senator Rompkey's question was, if we acted unilaterally, what would be the consequences. The consequences are two. One, the EU would gain allies from other parts of the world who support them because we are acting against international law, as it now exists. In the second and worst consequence, the possibility of armed confrontation would raise its ugly head. We came close to that in 1995 during the Estai incident.
The EU will never pay much attention to what is happening in the Northwest Atlantic unless they feel pressured internally from within the European Union. It is possible to stimulate such pressure through the green movement and the green parties in various countries and through environmental organizations.
I do not know if anyone saw an advertisement in the National Geographic magazine in November-December. It was a full-page ad with a great big dinner plate and a little tiny fish in the middle. The ad simply said, ``The plates aren't getting any bigger.'' It was a meant as a condemnation of the European Union fisheries policy. That kind of pressure could ultimately pay off in terms of the European Union becoming more conscious of what it is doing. For the moment, there is a benefit to them from their activity on the eastern edge of the Grand Bank. Fishing efforts that otherwise might be turned toward the North Sea or other European Union waters is out of sight and out of mind on the other side of the Atlantic.
For 25 years, the EU has adopted a crass, uncaring, environmentally devastating policy in respect of the area outside the 200-mile limit in the Canadian Atlantic. They have been able to get away with it most of the time because no one has confronted them. The confrontation will probably have to come from inside the European Union in to be effective.
Senator Rompkey: Senator Spivak is a noted environmentalist and has excellent ties with the environmental community across Canada. Perhaps we can enlist her help in the cause.
Of course, we saw that during the seal — I do not know whether we would call it a war or a debate or a confrontation or a disaster. It was a disaster, but we certainly saw the environmental movement become powerful. They have not really taken up the cause of fish as they took up the cause of seals.
The Newfoundland government has set out custodial management as a preferred option. Is that your preferred option, Mr. O'Rielly?
Mr. O'Rielly: We have to pursue a number of options concurrently. Custodial management is a plausible course of action to present to NAFO members, including the EU. It can be presented to the world at large as something that is warranted if NAFO continues to fail to act responsibly. There are measures we can take and that we need to take under the straddling-stocks agreement which has recently been ratified and put in place although not yet by the EU. We may be able to avail ourselves of concurrent measures, options, there.
Canada needs to move forward with ratifying the Law of the Sea Convention and to seek measures through that option as well. Mostly, we need to sensitize the world to the nature of the problem. We need to build alliances where we can with environmental movements and others to strengthen the opportunities for action.
As Dr. May explained, we are trying to create new law. To create new law, there must be receptivity, a sense that it is necessary, warranted and justified. Right now, that element is missing. In terms of our current legal recourse, NAFO seems to be entirely within its power and authority to continue to act as it does. Canada's opportunities for taking unilateral action are limited. All these measures can be taken concurrently, be it custodial management or the pursuit of the option that Dr. May outlined of trying to build a case on the issue of sedentary species. However, we must act in a much more strategic fashion than we have done thus far, with greater conviction and with a greater level of resources.
Mr. May: To emphasize, there are four or five potentially productive lines of approach. We should be pursuing them all but that means the Government of Canada must take the view that this problem must be solved. The government must instruct its various departments to get on with it. Somewhere down the road then, it will be solved. That is how we got the 200-mile limit in the first place and that is how we must proceed now.
I do not suggest for a moment that it is solvable in two years or even in five, but at the moment, we are just spinning wheels. The only approach we are taking now is watching NAFO going around in circles and getting nowhere.
Senator Cook: Welcome to my two fellow Newfoundlanders. Dr. May has answered my first question. I heard you say that NAFO is a lax regime; that it is your despair 30-odd years later. Do the other member-countries know that NAFO is broken or do they see it as a means to an end for them? If we cannot fix NAFO and if Canada leaves, where does that leave Canada?
Mr. May: If Canada leaves NAFO, then the area outside the 200-mile limit would be unregulated. The short answer, after weighing all options, is that it is marginally better to be in NAFO than to have nothing at all. Outside NAFO, Canada would have no input into what is happening outside the 200-mile limit. At least now we can board and inspect vessels and gather information. We can argue within the NAFO annual meeting about what quotas should or should not be. No matter how bad things are, it is probably better to be in than to have nothing.
Senator Cook: Around this table and in other areas, I am on information overload from all the learned and experienced people. I have listened and tried to understand. What are we waiting for?
Who will we push in the pond or the bay first? Everyone has identified the problem. Everyone has some kind of a solution. Who should we push first?
Mr. May: If we knew the answer to that we would have solved the problem by now. Let me try to approach the answer.
The major players in NAFO are Canada and the European Community. Most of the allocations are held by countries of the European Community and by Canada.
One answer to your question is that we should be pressing at the highest levels of diplomacy and the highest levels of government of our counterparts in the European Community because what is happening is irrational and unconscionable. For some of the most developed countries of the world, it should be embarrassing. In fact, there are non-governmental organizations that are taking ads in National Geographic to create that embarrassment.
It needs a diplomatic «démarche» to try to get attention and persuade the highest levels of other governments that this is pretty poor behaviour. It is about time it stopped.
The reality is that it is hard to get people's attention when the other side of the coin is that the cod stocks in the North Sea are decimated, and the British fishers do not want to see any Spanish fishers in the North Sea. The Spanish have to go somewhere. It is easier to send them to the Grand Banks than to keep them in European waters. These are the realities of the situation.
The bottom line is that there are two major players in NAFO — Canada and the European Community. If we cannot come to grips with it in that context, then we are suggesting some other ways such as amending the Law of the Sea, which is a much broader and longer-term initiative.
If we have three or four approaches, the world would begin to accept that we are serious, and the problem must be solved.
Senator Cook: You are saying that the Government of Canada must take the leadership and make the first step. We have all this information at our fingertips, and we have all this knowledge. Surely the Government of Canada has the responsibility, either through DFO, Foreign Affairs or other agencies, to take that first step.
I want to talk about northern cod stocks. Are they part of the 200-mile limit? Is that part of the problem that we are having at home when we see the Northeast K3JL, or whatever, closing?
Someone must begin. I guess the lead would have to be the Government of Canada?
Mr. May: Yes. Foreign Affairs, DFO, Environment Canada, Natural Resources Canada, and perhaps other departments should organize themselves at the highest levels to say to the European Union, ``This problem must be solved because if it is not solved, it will hurt our relationship in other areas.''
Senator Cook: If a number of government departments were to build a strategic five-year plan, it would have more weight and bring more pressure to bear than if it were only DFO. Would mustering all the departments be a possible first step to take?
Mr. May: Yes, that is what I am suggesting.
Senator Cochrane: It seems as if Newfoundlanders are on the hot seat tonight.
Before Christmas, Gus Etchegary appeared before our committee. He cited Iceland and Norway as the two countries that have been successful in managing their fisheries. Would you agree with that, Dr. May?
Mr. May: Yes. The fisheries are so important to Iceland and Norway. The countries would be in pretty bad shape, although Norway has some soil if it did not manage its fisheries properly. Necessity is the mother of invention. They have done a good job.
Senator Cochrane: If the fisheries were the main resource in Canada the problem probably would be solved?
Mr. May: Neither Iceland nor Norway has significant resources outside the 200-mile limit. The first reason that they have been successful is that, necessity is the mother of invention. The fishery is so important. The second reason is that it is all theirs within their 200-mile limit.
Senator Cochrane: Even though we have that situation, can we still learn from what they are doing?
Mr. May: Yes, of course.
Senator Cochrane: Have we learned?
Mr. May: We could get into a whole other line of discussion. The Icelanders have experimented with moving the fisheries away from common property and more toward private property. I should not raise that because it is a totally different issue. It has already been before parliamentary committees.
The Chairman: It has been touched.
Mr. May: I think that it is one of the reasons for the current success in Iceland.
Senator Cochrane: I would like to ask your views on Canada's commitment to fisheries research.
Mr. May: I have to rely on hearsay because it has been some time since I was close to the department and its research agenda. I have been told that the resources are being reduced, and those recourses have not been restored. We are not spending as much on marine research and fisheries research as we should be.
Mr. O'Rielly is probably more knowledgeable than me on that.
Mr. O'Rielly: There have been dramatic reductions in the level of resources that DFO applies to fisheries research. DFO went through all the downsizing of government several years ago. It experienced dramatic cuts in its budgets. At the same time the department took on a much broader, more expansive mandate for oceans activities beyond fish that consumed a lot of their resources.
If you look at the aggregate numbers, it does not look that much different. However, consider the additional mandate and the inclusion of the Coast Guard in DFO's budget. It is evident that they are operating at a relative skeleton in terms of resources vis-à-vis vessel time and scientists. Much less work is being done.
That is not necessarily to say that the solution is to do more science. The problem we are facing outside the 200-mile limit is not really a stock assessment issue, in and of itself. It is primarily an enforcement issue and having the regulatory and jurisdictional authority to deal with it.
That issue returns us to having to find the solution in NAFO. That will come about only when we change the attitudes of rest of the world, particularly the European Union.
We are back into that kind of a loop as being the solution that we have to work towards. If we do not do that, all the stock assessment in the world will not solve the problem of unbridled and unregulated fishing activity.
Senator Cochrane: I agree with you to an extent. However, we do need the research to determine the state of the stocks and what to do about our certain regions. Should we close down certain regions of our province if the stocks are in a deplorable condition? Perhaps we can have a winter fishery or whatever. We need research to do that. Would you not agree with that?
Mr. O'Rielly: Yes, of course, we do. We need to do more research. I do not want to convey the impression that I am not supportive of that.
I was referring, of course, to the issues outside the 200-mile limit. However, domestically there is not really much question about the status of the stocks, it is a question of degree as to what level of decimation has been experienced. In regard to the northern cod stocks, Senator Cook made reference earlier in her comments to the 2J3KL cod fishery. There are only remnants of that stock left. It is virtually eliminated. It is commercially extinct for sure and it may not be all that far from being biologically extinct.
We know that. We really do not fully understand what the factors are that are preventing a recovery. There is a whole range of issues. Seal predation is a huge issue. Overfishing is probably a contributing factor, domestically or internationally. There are a raft of other theories about environmental change and the impact of that. The sad reality, in the context of the question you are asking, is that not only have we not experienced the recovery of key stocks like northern cod, we really and truly cannot say we know for sure what happened to northern cod, other than it is gone. We do not know what the contributing factors are. We do not know what the factors are, or the balance of factors that are preventing a recovery. We have no idea whatsoever when or if we can ever expect to see a resurgence of that stock. In large measure, I think you are correct in saying that we need more research.
Senator Cochrane: What factors do the nose and tail of the Grand Banks have on 2J3KL?
Mr. O'Rielly: I can say flippantly that I do not know, but DFO science, to the extent that they feel that they have done sufficient research on delineation of stocks, would suggest that the activity on the nose and tail of the bank has little or no impact on northern cod, for instance. It is a discrete stock on the nose and tail in terms of 3 and 0 cod. The interaction is limited. The activity outside the 200-mile limit is not really a contributing factor primarily to the recovery of that stock. It may have been a more significant factor and in all likelihood was a very significant factor in the demise of the stock. That is because that stock was migrating in and out over the line and there was virtually unregulated fishing outside. It certainly was a major contributor to decimating the stock. However, it probably is not contributing to the failure to recover.
Senator Cochrane: It is my understanding that you had a meeting in Brussels about five or six months ago. Is that correct?
Mr. O'Rielly: That is correct.
Senator Cochrane: What was the reaction from the European Community, from Spain and others, regarding our problem?
Mr. O'Rielly: It was an interesting experience. Perhaps in hindsight I may even have been able to predict the response. The members of parliament from the United Kingdom were supportive, were appreciative of the presentation, were appreciative of the criticisms and were supportive in their comments. A couple of interventions from other representatives, particularly one Member of Parliament from Germany, were more analytical and clinical. There was no real bias shown in terms of whether or not they agreed or disagreed. The Spanish were absolutely vehemently opposed to just about everything I said. That was predicable and understandable. I did not expect anything different from them.
What really was shocking for me, however, were the officials of the EU Commission who were asked to speak afterwards and to make comment on what I had said. They describe NAFO as the best regional fisheries organization in the world. They said that the EU was absolutely exemplary in their performance within NAFO. They cited the fact that the EU operates its own surveillance vessel, which it does, on the nose and tail of the bank. They said that the EU was fully compliant with all the rules and regulations of NAFO. Then they attacked Canada on two issues.
First, they attacked Canada's decision not to ratify the Convention on the Law of the Sea. Second, they attacked Canada's continued fishing of the northern cod stock when it is under moratorium. That response from the EU Commission was more than shocking because it also showed that EU parliamentarians were not getting the same information we are getting. Their own officials have told them that the EU's performance here is quite noble.
One of the good things that came from that meeting was the chair of the committee, a Scotsman named Struant Stevenson, was interested in what I had to say. I got to go to this thing as a result of his visiting St. John's and my speaking to him in St. John's. He invited me to come and give a presentation to their committee. He then decided to attend a NAFO meeting, which was being held the following week in Spain. He saw firsthand what was happening and he went away with an entirely different understanding and a different view of the world than had been communicated to him by his own officials.
Regrettably, to my knowledge, because I tried to monitor this since, he went away with some significant arguments and evidence of wrongdoing by the EU. I helped him because, through some contacts in DFO, I helped furnish him with some additional information. Our officials with DFAIT in Brussels have been monitoring the activities of that committee, and since the end of September they have not had a meeting to review this particular issue, and to have it exposed. I had anticipated a fairly intensive battle between Mr. Stevenson and his predecessor, Daniel Varella, from Spain.
Senator Cochrane: Dr. May, I know about your experience and the various committees with which you have been involved. With this review at the Law of the Sea Conference, and article 77 that you think should be revised, have you spoken with any of your predecessors, your colleagues from way back, and discussed with them this idea and their reaction?
Mr. May: No, I have not, simply because I have not been around these issues very much at all in the last 10 years or so. When I was invited to appear before this committee, I had to dust off some old knowledge and see what I could do to update that knowledge. That item stood out for me. There is a big loophole in the law, as it exists. The law is deficient. When you look at that particular article and say, ``If only a few words were changed we would not have the problem.'' That would be a great benefit for Canada if that could be done. Others would not see it as a benefit to them. Obviously, the initial view from our side would be, ``what a nice idea,'' and the initial view from the other side would be ``what a terrible idea.'' At least if we could get them talking, we can enter a discussion, followed by a negotiation, and followed by a conclusion some day. That is one approach. There are others and we should be pursuing them all.
Senator Cochrane: That is something we should note, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Johnson: Following on the last question of Senator Cochrane, has our government gone to bat on that issue at all yet?
Mr. May: Our government has not yet ratified the original Convention on the Law of the Sea from 1982. There were reasons earlier on why that was not done, having to do with doubts about the international seabed authority and how it might work and various other things.
My understanding from recent conversations with senior officials is that there is probably no compelling reason now why the Government of Canada should not ratify the 1982 convention. That being so, I further understand that having ratified it, within a fairly short period of time the convention will be open for amendment. That is why I see that route as one that we should be pursuing. We should ratify it and then put ourselves in a position to suggest an amendment.
Senator Johnson: Of course that seems so logical. How do we do that? What will does it take? You also say we have to get started. Would that not be a good starting point? You say in your paper that will take five to ten years. I have been sitting on this committee for years. I have heard this story over and over. I have lived in Newfoundland.
My family comes from Iceland, where there is such a great respect for the fishery. Everything depends on it. It is unfathomable that we have allowed the situation to get the way it is. Every time someone comes before us, we never hear that it is any better. Our government says it is doing things, but it is not. Should we start there? Should we be pushing for that? We have to start somewhere.
Mr. May: That is one approach that might or might not be productive, but it has the benefit of having some logic in its background.
There is the convention on straddling stocks that Canada has ratified but the EU has not. That is another item we should be picking up to see how we might advance the issue there.
We should always be pressing within NAFO to make that arrangement better. Since the two major players are now Canada and the European Union, one could hope that if those two could manage to reach some kind of accommodation, the others would come along.
I do not think we should hang our hats on one approach. We should be pursuing whatever lines of attack need to be pursued. However, we must get the attention of the government of the country, which could say to the governments of other countries: ``Twenty-five years is long enough to wait. We want this problem fixed.'' It is not beyond the bounds of human understanding as to what needs to be done to fix it. Let us get on with it.
Senator Johnson: I will conclude by asking how it feels to be in Newfoundland now with the situation the way it is.
Mr. May: There is the story about how you know the Newfoundlanders in heaven: They are the ones who want to go home. Newfoundland is always a wonderful place to be, no matter what the situation.
This is frustrating. The man in the street, the person in the street, everyone in every community in Newfoundland knows that we have a problem outside the 200-mile limit. NAFO is not working. It must be fixed. There is a Royal Commission at work in Newfoundland. I would be surprised if it does not have something to say about this issue. What will be said over and over again is that this is not a problem that can be fixed by the province; it can only be fixed by the country. The country has to pick it up and deal with it.
The Chairman: Senator Cochrane's question in regard to research led me to think that Canada has not been upfront in expending dollars on research, over the last number of years. We still have no clue what caused the collapse of the northern cod stocks. As a matter of fact, when the stocks were getting to their lowest, we actually cut funding to find out what happened. We have not done better elsewhere. We have cut into research almost everywhere. We have cut into enforcement. We have cut into various areas.
We have not been making a case, as a country, to then turn around and say to other countries, ``Look how great we are at management of the fish stocks.'' In fact, our domestic stocks keep going down. It would be difficult for us to make a case to our European colleagues to say what great custodians we are. We may want to look in our own backyard before we go pounding our chests elsewhere.
Having said that, what is your comment if they do come back and throw it in our face when we try to explain that we should be taking custody?
Mr. May: I would like to echo something that Mr. O'Rielly said earlier. The problem outside the 200-mile limit is well defined and does not need more science to be defined more precisely. That problem is well defined.
The Chairman: From our point of view, from a Canadian point of view, is that correct?
Mr. May: That is correct.
The Chairman: Let me play the devil's advocate for a moment. If I am a European, and Canada arrives in Europe to make the case for custodial management, saying how great they are as custodians, am I not, as a European, going to throw it back in Canada's face? We cannot simply say, ``Our problem is indefinable,'' where the nose and tail is definable.
Mr. May: Let me emphasize that I think we know what the problem is on the nose and tail. We will just leave it at that.
As Mr. O'Rielly said earlier, when he was speaking to people in the European Union, they did what you just did, Mr. Chairman. They played the devil's advocate or worse and said, ``Well, what are you doing about the northern cod, which is under moratorium? Of course, you have a recreational fishery that allows anyone who wants, to catch so many, et cetera.'' This is a really hot potato within Newfoundland. If you ask the question, ``Will you give up the recreational fishery for northern cod if it helps to convince the Europeans that they should be behaving outside the 200-mile limit?'' I am not sure what the answer would be.
To some extent, a criticism that we are trying to have our cake and eat it, too, has some justification.
The Chairman: I am referring more to the fact that we have absolutely no clue as to what caused the collapse of the northern cod. I have heard almost every excuse under the sun given, from seals to cold waters, to water temperatures, to the former federal government. God knows everyone else has been throwing excuses around. However, we still do not know the reason. That boils down to research, and we have been cutting research funds.
Mr. May: What we do not know now, we will never know in the sense that we are trying to explain something that happened historically.
We could give you a good outline of what we think happened with the northern cod. If you will allow me two minutes, I will do it.
In the late 1960s, the foreign fleets bumped the catch of northern cod from about 300,000 tons up to 800,000 tons. That was an enormous catch.
We extended jurisdiction in 1977 partly because of that massive increase in foreign fishing, which had an impact. At the time in the mid-1970s, the number of fishermen in Newfoundland was at its lowest level in the 20th century. That was a direct consequence of the big increase in foreign fishing in the late 1960s. We extended jurisdiction in the late 1970s and thought we had things under control. We did not.
What we did not realize was that an 800,000-ton catch sustained for several years had brought that stock down to a very low level — lower than we thought.
I am not giving you proven scientific fact. I am giving you a theory, a hypothesis. At a time when that stock was low, having suffered that big catch in the late 1960s, we did get into four or five years of excessively cold water in the late 1980s. As a consequence, there was no significant survival of young cod for about five years in a row — 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, those sorts of years. The young cod were born but they did not survive. The stock was getting lower and lower. One does not discover that scientifically until the fish get to be four or five years old, when the results begin to show up in the commercial catches.
At one point about three years before the moratorium, about 1989, the scientists were saying that there were fewer northern cod than they thought there were. There had not been any new fish born for four or five years, so it looked bad. That advice was given to the Government of Canada in 1989.
There were several high profile panels appointed, with the question always being, ``Is it really this bad?'' The answer was, ``Yes, it is this bad and it is getting worse.'' Three years went by and, in 1992, the moratorium was declared.
There was a combination of an already reduced stock and several years of adverse environmental conditions. However, I am missing an important point. When the water got cold, the fish moved south — not just the cod, but also many other species. They moved south and then they moved east. When they moved east, they went outside the 200- mile limit; and when they went outside the 200-mile limit, Spain, Portugal and some other countries were there and that was the end. I am 90-per-cent sure that is the broad outline of the story.
The Chairman: I believe you are right. There were some problems. It is interesting to have 20/20 hindsight.
One point you raised tonight is that we have to have many fronts. There are many fronts. You exposed one of them, and Mr. O'Rielly another one. All of these have to be done at the same time. In combination with committees like this one, other members of parliament and senators and so on all have to contribute to the effort.
One thing is that we have many allies. Canada has many allies in Europe. I am thinking of countries like Iceland, Norway, the U.K. and many countries that would be sympathetic, not necessarily to custodial management but to the problems we face. They are facing similar problems in some of these countries, except possibly Iceland.
If provincial and federal parliamentarians would tap into these contacts, and use environmentally conscious people like Senator Johnson and Senator Spivak to spearhead and help out in trying to protect these dwindling stocks, perhaps that is a way to go. Use many fronts.
Mr. May: I would certainly agree. The only other point that might be added is that, if it can be solved within the existing international arrangements, the beneficiaries are not just Canada, but the other people who have historical association with the area.
The Chairman: We have had a former federal fisheries minister who said, referring to the United Nations Fishing Agreement, UNFA, that permanent, practical enforcement was the best means to end high-seas overfishing. Would you agree with that statement?
Mr. May: It is too early to tell. The European Union has not ratified that particular agreement yet. That is a new baby on the block, as it were. One can hope that it will be effective, but it has not been tried yet.
The Chairman: I have one last question. Is 2J3K3L northern cod considered a straddling fish stock? I have never seen it on any of the lists presented to us by anyone in NAFO.
Mr. May: Yes, 2J3K3L is the distribution — 3L extends beyond 200 miles, that is the nose of the Bank.
The Chairman: It is a straddling stock.
Mr. May: Yes, and this goes back to the story I just told you. Normally, it does not straddle much; maybe 5 or 10 per cent of the stock is outside. However, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the water got cold and the fish moved south and east, they were largely outside the 200-mile limit.
Senator Rompkey: If we were to invite environmentalists before the committee, can you suggest any that we might invite? A name that comes to my mind, for example, is Elizabeth May of the Sierra Club. Would someone like that be useful to have in front of the committee, or do you have any other suggestions?
Mr. May: I will make one. First, let me sound a note of caution, because the first approach might be that, with the situation so bad, everyone should stop fishing. No fishing country would like that because of the impact on its communities. However, having gotten past that, I know that the World Wildlife Fund is taking a major interest in all of this. It is taking advertisements castigating the EU fisheries policy. It has recently been in St. John's to organize a workshop to educate itself about the issues and to try to find solutions. The World Wildlife Fund is one entity that is already engaged.
Mr. O'Rielly: I agree with Dr. May that organizations such as the World Wildlife Fund have a certain measure of credibility. The challenge we face in terms of seeking recourse and support from the environmental movement is that it may lead to restrictions on fishing that we may find not acceptable. The cure may be somewhat worse than the disease.
Senator Rompkey: Would you say, leave them alone?
Mr. O'Rielly: It is not our choice to leave them alone. The environmentalists are aware of the problem. They are concerned. They are going to be involved and they will have a role to play. It is incumbent upon us to acknowledge that and to find ways to work with them so that we can maintain our fishing activity, and seek and enlist their support in pushing towards a strategy of recovery. Certainly, again, within the EU, that will never happen. Apparently, that is not going to happen with fishing interests. We have dealt with fishing interests, between Canadian fishing interests and the European fishing interests. Our challenge and our interests are seizing access to the resource.
Our industries on both sides of the Atlantic have not demonstrated any great resolve in terms of conservation. In the absence of that, the environmental movement is going to have much more influence in the future than in the past.
Senator Rompkey: To clarify my own thinking, Dr. May said to Senator Cook that we would be marginally better off inside NAFO than outside NAFO. You made some suggestions. We have talked about various measures that can be pursued. Obviously, getting the government to begin is the first one. Then there are a number of options.
Mr. O'Rielly, you said at one point in your presentation that we should unilaterally extend jurisdiction and move Canada's economic zone to the edge of the continental shelf. You also said if the prescribed regime is not implemented within a reasonable time-frame, we should leave NAFO. I assume your preferred option is to stay within NAFO and pursue the various options within NAFO. Is that what you would recommend?
Mr. O'Rielly: Essentially, this comes down to plausibility. The only choice we have is to demonstrate to the rest of NAFO members, and to the world at large, that we have exhausted all avenues of making NAFO work. Structurally, NAFO is an ideal tool. It can serve a number of useful purposes. It can contain, for instance, fishing activity to member countries of NAFO. That is significant. Right now, nose and tail is only really open to NAFO countries. If we were to adopt responsible measures within NAFO, and protect the resource for all countries that are participating — if that message could be conveyed and if that action could be taken — NAFO could be an extremely beneficial organization.
The impetus for making that change, for creating almost a metamorphosis, is not there. That is what we are seeking. In the absence of that, it goes back to the points we made about concurrent actions. After two to five years — we could debate the time-frame — that you work within NAFO to fix the problem, at some point you must say, enough already. You will have to move, to take unilateral action and hopefully, through the process, demonstrate to the rest of the world that such action is warranted. If there is a consensus that unilateral action or more demonstrative action by the coastal state is needed, then it would be acceptable. Right now, that is not the case.
Senator Johnson: It was a comment arising from when Senator Rompkey was asking about environmentalists and promoting the cause. It ends up having to really stir the public concern. Outside of Newfoundland, the people of Canada, for example, where I come from on Lake Winnipeg, do not know anything about the situation except that there are not as many cod. It is awareness and how we do more of that. We have to do it in our own freshwater lakes as well as both oceans. The World Wildlife Fund, as Senator Spivak said, is one of the best — even those ads you were talking about, with the plate. Promotion is important, too. We will never get any activity on the environmental level until people's lives are affected by the quality of their water or food, until it hits them on their doorstep. That is where we have to get proactive in public life.
Senator Spivak: Is it not the fact that all of the 17 fishing areas in the world are either overfished or at capacity at the moment? This is a looming crisis. I would suggest, and I know that this will not be met kindly, the people who get the most attention are from Greenpeace.
Senator Johnson: I love Greenpeace in some things.
Senator Spivak: The point is not all environmental groups are animal rights people, in fact, quite the contrary. Many environmental groups understand that if you do not have animals, you do not have habitat and you do not have livelihood for people. Many environmentalists understand that. In fact, I would say most do. The seal issue is one in particular that has to do mostly with the way in which the seals are killed. It is not an area I am familiar with, but I would not think people with sensible ideas about what to do in this world would be so much against the seal hunt as some of the groups.
However, Greenpeace is the most effective organization in drawing public attention because they do outrageous things. They have been successful with huge oil companies. They have been successful in many ways. It would be interesting to see what they have to say.
Senator Johnson: I think we know.
Mr. May: The environmental movement is capable of delivering a message to a broad audience, and the time is here to try to use that lever, especially to educate the member states of the European Union and the people who live in those countries about the damage they have done in this part of the world over the last 25 years. Since the subject of seals comes up, I cannot resist saying that there are far too many of them out there.
Senator Spivak: Yes. Not all environmental organizations speak with one voice, just as all other organizations do not speak with one voice. Many are more sensible than others.
The Chairman: I might note that one of the best communicators we ever had on this subject was in fact a previous fisheries minister. I will never forget the day he went to New York and held up that poor little turbot that was hanging on for dear life to that net with the last little fins that it had. It was one of the most powerful scenes I have ever seen, and what a great communicator he was at that time. We cannot forget those kinds of communicators. I think they called him ``Tobinator.''
Senator Cook: Dr. May, I agree it is better to work within the tent than outside of it, and Newfoundlanders have a vocabulary that speaks to that very well.
A month or so ago, we had Dr. David Bevan from Dalhousie, the chair of the Standing Committee International Control, STACTIC, within NAFO. Do you see that as one of the options for tightening NAFO and giving it some discipline and wherewithal?
Mr. May: Mr. O'Reilly is more familiar with the current workings of NAFO, but I suspect we have taken the issue of international control as far as it can be taken without establishing some kind of custodianship, either by Canada or by NAFO.
Senator Cook: Do you see that as a vehicle for taking that extra step?
Mr. O'Rielly: It is actually part of NAFO, and Dr. Bevan is a senior official with DFO. He fulfils that responsibility to chair the STACTIC committee of NAFO as part of his responsibilities, so it is integral to the entire function.
Canada does a good job of documenting the problems, presenting the evidence and the requirements for better enforcement measures, but the receptivity and the willingness is not there. That is the fundamental issue. The short answer is, no, I do not see that as being part of the solution to the problem of fixing NAFO.
Senator Cook: I hoped it would have been an option.
The Chairman: Did you attend the round table that was held a few days ago, organized by the minister, to look at foreign overfishing?
Mr. May: We were both there.
The Chairman: Did anything earth-shattering or wildly imaginative come out of the meeting?
Mr. O'Rielly: No, this was a gathering of renowned international legal experts on marine law, who debated these issues at a high academic level. It was interesting and useful background, but it was largely an articulate explanation of why we do not have the legal authority to take unilateral action. It was not prescriptive. It did not give us much in the way of avenues or courses of action that we could pursue, other than some kinds of references to things already talked about, such as seeking some of the measures under UNFA that were elaborated.
Douglas Johnson outlined in part of his presentation the opportunity that exists to work again with the environmental movement and try to cause the world to become more seized of this as an issue of food security for the world rather than the self-serving issue of protecting the Canadian fishing industry, for instance, as another ploy to try to garner support. Many suggestions were put forth, but few were original. They were a collage of recipes that might be pursued, and many had merit and are subject to the kind of concurrent action.
However, this was not an event that caused one to go away and think that we are on a course, have a choice and should get on with it. That did not come from that round table, in my view.
The Chairman: They stayed within the box.
Mr. O'Rielly: Very much.
The Chairman: I will wrap this up by thanking our witnesses for a most interesting session this evening.
The committee adjourned.