Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Transport and Communications
Issue 5 - Evidence - March 30, 2004
OTTAWA, Tuesday, March 30, 2004
The Standing Senate Committee on Transport and Communications, to which was referred Bill C-7, to amend certain Acts of Canada, and to enact measures for implementing the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, in order to enhance public safety, met this day at 9:33 a.m. to give consideration to the bill.
Senator Joan Fraser (Chairman) in the Chair.
[English]
The Chairman: Honourable senators, we are meeting today to resume our consideration of Bill C-7, an act to amend certain acts of Canada, and to enact measures for implementing the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in order to enhance public safety.
[Translation]
We are very pleased to welcome today two important ministers, the Honourable Anne McLellan, P.C., Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, as well as the Honourable Tony Valeri, P.C., Minister of Transport.
[English]
We also have deputy ministers. It is an impressive delegation. We have Ms. McLellan's Deputy Minister, Ms. Margaret Bloodworth, and Mr. Valeri's Deputy Minister, Mr. Louis Ranger. We are delighted to have you all here.
You are familiar with the way we proceed. We will begin with your introductory remarks and then have a question period.
The Honourable Tony Valeri, Minister of Transport: Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you on Bill C- 7.
[Translation]
I am very pleased to be making my first appearance before your committee as Minister of Transport.
[English]
I would like to start by sharing with you why I think Canada needs this proposed legislation. First, Bill C-7 the proposed public safety act, will improve security for all Canadians. It consists of a number of vital public safety initiatives that have been debated over the last two years. As a result of the proposals and arguments made during that time, the government has made improvements to the bill.
Bill C-7 will increase the capacity of the Government of Canada to prevent terrorist attacks, to protect Canadians and to respond swiftly, should a significant threat arise.
Consider air travel: Today, authorities can open your bags, check your hand luggage and even ensure that your shoes are not dangerous, but despite all of this, the person whose possessions are being screened remains unknown.
A flight from Toronto to Vancouver involves a large aircraft with a large fuel load. It will fly over several Canadian cities and close to several American cities.
I can buy a ticket on the Internet. I check in using an electronic kiosk. I have only my possessions screened at the security checkpoint. At the time of boarding, I show any document with both my picture and the name I used to buy my ticket. With that, I can board the aircraft.
Under Canadian law at the moment, no one can examine who I am from a security point of view. Clearly, the situation cannot continue. The proposed amendments to the Aeronautics Act will correct this.
These amendments will provide access to a restricted portion of the information that airlines collect on their customers in the course of their commercial activities. The data elements that could be accessed are listed in the schedule to the bill. I am sure you are quite familiar with them.
Transport Canada's interest is with respect to aircraft under an immediate threat, such as a hijacking, or persons whose presence on a flight would pose an immediate threat. The Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness would have the task of assessing people boarding flights to ensure a higher level of security for Canadian aviation. My colleague, the Deputy Prime Minister, will speak to you on this shortly.
This bill gives the Government of Canada the ability to make air travel more secure. It is as straightforward as that. The public safety act also deals with a number of other measures, all designed to improve and enhance the safety of air travellers. As you know, 23 acts are being amended and a new act is being created.
The bill will establish tighter control over explosives and hazardous substances, activities related to other dangerous substances such as pathogens and the export and transfer of technology.
Security is always a delicate balance between privacy and safety. This bill strikes that appropriate balance.
I should like to comment on two proposals in this bill that are important for the security of our country and our citizens.
The first of these deals with interim orders. I would emphasize that the concept of interim orders is not new. They are already included in the Aeronautics Act and the Canadian Environmental Protection Act. Under Bill C-7, the authority to issue interim orders would be extended to nine other acts within the mandates of the Minister of Health, Minister of Fisheries and Oceans and Minister of Transport. Interim orders would only be invoked where immediate action is required to deal with serious threat or significant risk to health, safety, security or the environment.
As an example of a scenario that would require immediate action, consider the case of a credible threat against the nuclear power station at Gentilly, Quebec. To be more specific, suppose the information indicated that a missile attack from a ship was the most likely scenario, although there was some concern over an air attack.
In this situation, I would put in place two interim orders, which is equivalent to establishing two regulations immediately. One would close the air space for an appropriate distance. The other would close the water space for at least two miles. Two miles, in this instance, turns out to be quite significant, as it includes the St. Lawrence Seaway.
In my interim order, I would thus establish an inspection protocol so that ships could continue to pass through the newly established area of control.
Although I have identified the possibility of such an event, I would not establish regulations today to create a St. Lawrence Seaway control zone near Gentilly. As other witnesses have said, security is not on or off. It is a series of levels that are invoked according to the appropriate threat analysis. In this case, I would have used the interim order authorities proposed under the Aeronautics Act and the Canada Shipping Act.
There is another aspect to interim orders upon which I want to spend a few moments. As a safeguard, constraints are proposed on the authority to issue these interim orders. For example, there must be a requirement for immediate action to deal with a significant threat to public safety. An interim order can only be made if the enabling act contains the authority to make the interim order as a regulation. The interim order must be approved by the Governor in Council within 14 days or it expires. The interim order must be referred to Parliament within 15 days.
It must also be published in the Canada Gazette within 23 days and expires in one year. However, it could be transformed into a regulation during that time.
One last point on the interim order is that it immediately stands referred to the Standing Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons for the Scrutiny of Regulations as a result of a change made in March of 2003.
In responding to terrorist acts, there has been the suggestion that the Emergencies Act should suffice, and, in particular, there should be no need for interim orders. Well, unfortunately, that is it not correct. A document comparing interim orders with actions under the Emergencies Act has been tabled with this committee and has been studied. That comparison clarifies that the Emergencies Act would be unsuitable to deal with the type of security emergency to be covered by the interim order.
Also, that document shows that the controls that exist on interim orders provide a level of parliamentary supervision equivalent to that exercised over the use of the Emergencies Act.
A second aspect of security I will discuss with you briefly is the part of the bill that deals with marine security. Specifically, I am referring to Part 12 of the bill that would allow the Government of Canada to permit the Minister of Transport to enter into agreement with marine facilities to provide contributions or grants that would enhance security at facilities, or even on vessels. This part has a sunset provision of three years following its proclamation. The part is necessary because the existing Canada Marine Act constrains the government from providing funds to port authorities, for instance, to support their capital plans.
As you know, senators, security circumstances have changed considerably since that provision was put in the Canada Marine Act in 1998. Last week's budget made reference to marine security as part of the government's commitment to address security priorities over the next five years. In the budget, the government committed a further $605 million to address security issues, and we must ensure that these funds can be spent in the most appropriate manner.
In closing, this bill we are considering today is extremely significant to the security of Canadians. It is an important piece of proposed legislation. We have had a lot of debate. It is time to ensure that the public interest is served, and I believe it will be by approving Bill C-7.
I would now like to turn it over to my colleague, the Deputy Prime Minister, Ms. McLellan.
[Translation]
The Honourable Anne McLellan, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness: I am pleased to be appearing before you to explain how Bill C-7 could contribute to increased safety for all Canadians while safeguarding individual privacy rights.
[English]
As many of you are aware, the international threat environment is much more fluid today than it was even at the height of the Cold War. Earlier testimony has portrayed the more unpredictable and more difficult reality of today. The terrorist bombs that ripped through commuter trains in Madrid two weeks ago, killing 190 innocent people and injuring many more, were yet another tragic reminder of the danger that exists in our world. If we needed any more evidence of this, we saw the President of the Philippines indicate that their security services were able to disrupt a planned terrorist attack that, on their best information, would have injured or killed as many people as were involved in the Madrid situation. We saw yesterday the United Kingdom breaking up a probable planned terrorist activity. Not many details have been made public at this point, but we cannot live in this world without understanding the unpredictable nature of the real threats that exist everywhere in relation to those who would commit acts of terror.
For Canada and our allies throughout the world, heightened and sustained vigilance is the new reality. While Canada may not be a primary target for a terrorist attack, we are named as a target. We have lived through the Air India disaster and the knowledge of the intentions of Ahmed Ressam as he crossed from Canada into the United States. Therefore, we must be prepared. We must refuse to be a weak link or a haven from which terrorists can attack others.
[Translation]
We have to understand that the core responsibility of any government is to ensure the safety of its citizens, which forms the basis for all of the other rights and freedoms citizens enjoy.
[English]
Our response in the wake of 9/11 included measures designed to strengthen some identified weaknesses. It is the responsibility of government to continuously improve our abilities to foresee and prevent threats to our national security.
For this reason, Bill C-7 is an extremely important piece of proposed legislation. It will better enable our law enforcement, security intelligence and border agencies to assess the threats we are facing, to share threat information with our partners and, where possible, to prevent an incident from happening. While we are better coordinated now to meet vital emergency preparedness, border integrity and national security obligations under my new portfolio, we need to operate more strategically to protect Canadians. We also need to ensure that the tools we use to prevent crimes and serious incidents remain appropriately balanced with fundamental interests, such as privacy and human rights, and promote transparency and accountability. That is why Bill C-7 has been drafted to provide a made-in-Canada approach that safeguards our liberties and respects constitutional and sovereignty requirements.
I will speak about the proposals in the bill that will strengthen the risk assessment capacity of the CBSA, RCMP and CSIS. In doing so, I will respond to some of the concerns that have been raised.
Part 11 of the bill affects the Canada Border Services Agency and introduces a new provision to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. This provision would authorize the making of regulations pertaining to the collection, retention, disposal and disclosure of information for the purposes of the IRPA. Under clause 72, the bill addresses the disclosure of information for the purposes of national security, the defence of Canada and the conduct of international affairs. Any regulation being proposed under this clause would be tabled before both Houses of Parliament and their standing committees for review.
Some questions have been raised about the meaning of information sharing ``for the conduct of international affairs.'' One of the most effective ways to secure our borders is to identify and intercept persons posing security risks as early as possible, long before they get to Canada.
The CBSA works closely with domestic agencies and international partners, such as the United States and other allies, to assist in the fight against terrorism. We recognize that we cannot do it alone. We must be able to exchange information with our partners to keep our borders secure.
I point out that the CBSA would only exchange information through agreements or arrangements established in conformity with the Privacy Act and for the purposes outlined in the acts that the CBSA administers. These conditions would safeguard the treatment of personal information by the CBSA.
Under proposed section 4.82 of Bill C-7, airlines and operators of airline reservation systems would be required to share passenger information for the purposes of transportation and national security, upon request, with a small group of specially designated RCMP and CSIS officials.
To ensure that privacy rights are respected, these designated officials would match passenger information against restricted information for the purposes of identifying transportation or national security risks.
I emphasize that the proposed data-sharing regime would not be used to track the travel patterns of law-abiding citizens. Only when a match occurs against the RCMP and CSIS restricted databases would a designated official verify the identity of a passenger and the threat posed by him or her. The vast majority of travellers would therefore never come to the attention of the RCMP and CSIS.
When a match occurs, given that several persons can have the same name, the RCMP and CSIS must have adequate time to do all the necessary verification checks to ensure that they have the right person.
I can assure you that the seven-day retention period was carefully chosen as the minimal time required by the RCMP and CSIS to reliably assess which persons pose a real threat.
Bill C-7 also gives RCMP-designated officials the authority to notify local police if, while analyzing passenger information, they identify a fugitive wanted for a serious crime. The RCMP would only be able to disclose passenger information to assist with the execution of a warrant if the passenger is wanted for an offence that carries a penalty of five years or more and is set out in the regulations.
I believe that you have the current draft regulations. They were shared with you last week, and they set out the serious offences that could place the public at risk.
These offences are linked directly to terrorism, transportation security, violent offences, organized crime and serious drug offences. They are reflected in the regulations because they relate specifically to the RCMP's mandate under clause 4.82 to assess threats to transportation security. From a police perspective, a fugitive with a court-ordered arrest warrant for a serious offence such as murder, kidnapping, child abduction or drug trafficking could very well pose a threat to the safety of passengers on an aircraft.
As the RCMP commissioner indicated to the committee, if we were to restrict the offences to terrorism-specific crimes, the regulations would have limited effectiveness. That is because most terrorists do not have a criminal record, and when they do, as we know only too well, their crimes are often related to forgery, fraud or organized crime.
I believe that the regulations must support the RCMP's mandate under the bill to identity any person who could threaten transportation security in the context of its broader public safety mandate.
There would also be strict limitations on the disclosure of passenger data. To help ensure the protection of privacy and ensure accountability, there would be strict limitations on any disclosure of passenger information. Designated officials would be able to disclose passenger information to a third party only if certain thresholds of reasonable belief were met, for example, if they had reason to believe that the information would assist an aircraft protective officer with his or her duties.
Under clause 4.82, disclosure to a person in a foreign state could only be made on a narrow and case-specific basis in accordance with the proposed strict disclosure regime. In addition, CSIS is already required under the CSIS Act to obtain my approval before entering into an arrangement with an agency for the purpose of information sharing. Given my authority under the RCMP Act to issue directions to the RCMP commissioner, I will commit to issuing a directive that will also require the RCMP to have an arrangement with a foreign agency prior to making any disclosure. This arrangement would also require safeguards to protect privacy.
Under clause 4.82, every time a disclosure is made, a record would have to be kept on the information that was disclosed, to whom it was disclosed and the reason for the disclosure. To ensure accountability, those records would be available for review by the Privacy Commissioner and the review bodies for the RCMP and CSIS.
In addition, the RCMP and CSIS would be required to conduct an annual review of information retained by designated officials and maintain records of these reviews. If retention were no longer reasonably required for the purposes of transportation or national security, the information would have to be destroyed.
An essential element of any legislation is to ensure that appropriate accountability and review mechanisms are in place. These mechanisms ensure the right balance between the exercise of state powers and individual rights and freedoms. A number of existing tools will ensure that the RCMP and CSIS are held accountable for their conduct. For example, the Privacy Commissioner can initiate an investigation into how the RCMP and CSIS collect, use, disclose, retain and dispose of personal information under section 37 of the Privacy Act. In addition, the Office of the Auditor General can audit RCMP and CSIS operations and report on the results to Parliament. We will see the Auditor General doing just that in relation to aspects of national security later today.
All of the activities of CSIS are subject to independent review by the Inspector General of CSIS and the Security Intelligence Review Committee, SIRC. SIRC publishes an annual report, which is tabled in Parliament. Once Bill C-7 is enacted, those bodies will also be able to review the activities of CSIS under this bill.
The RCMP also has a review mechanism, the Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP. As with SIRC, the CPC submits an annual report, which is tabled in both Houses of Parliament. On December 12, 2003, the government announced its intention to create an independent review mechanism for the RCMP's national security activities. In addition, as part of his inquiry into the case of Maher Arar, Mr. Justice O'Connor has been asked to conduct a policy review and make recommendations on this new review body.
I am very mindful of concerns regarding oversight and, obviously, am looking forward to receiving Justice O'Connor's recommendations. It is my intention to use this new review mechanism, in whatever form it may take, to provide review of the RCMP's activities under clause 4.82.
A related commitment of the government, which was also announced on December 12, 2003, was the creation of a new national security committee of parliamentarians — members of Parliament and senators — to review national security matters. It will be a joint committee. In the upcoming days, I will be providing more details on this additional related proposal.
[Translation]
In conclusion, Canada must continue to face up to the new threat hanging over the 21st century.
[English]
We cannot allow ourselves to become complacent. Rather, we must remain vigilant to guard against new threats. We must always be looking for ways to improve our strategies and emergency response capabilities. We must ensure that we do this in a way that reflects Canadian values, safeguards our liberties and respects our laws, our Constitution and our sovereignty.
Bill C-7 is an essential tool to help us achieve those goals. The proposals in this bill come at a time when it is imperative that Canada close the legislative gaps that currently exist with respect to national and transportation security. Otherwise, we put at risk the safety and security of Canadians.
The proposals also contain key measures to enhance our ability to protect against terrorist attacks and to respond quickly should a threat be identified. Furthermore, Bill C-7 reflects the commitment of the federal government to do all that it can to ensure the safety of Canadians while protecting their privacy rights and other freedoms.
As my colleague, Minister Valeri, has indicated, the Government of Canada views Bill C-7 as an important bill, providing new tools, with appropriate protections on their use, to further ensure the safety and security of Canadians.
I would simply conclude by saying that we have to understand the domestic and global reality. Tragically, if you look at what is happening around this world, there are more global threats and more threats of terrorism, and we have an obligation to be able to tell Canadians that we are doing everything we can, within reason, to protect their safety and security. We have an obligation to do our part, in conjunction with our allies, to help protect the people who live in this entire world. If we do less, we will have failed.
The Chairman: Thank you both very much. The list of senators who want to ask you questions is already quite long.
Senator Andreychuk: There are so many questions that I am not sure where to start and to which minister I should address my comments.
The question before us is not one of security and safety. Obviously, that is one of the fundamental responsibilities of any government.
The question before us is whether the tools that you are asking for and the price that we pay in terms of our freedoms create the appropriate balance.
Mr. Valeri, you say that you need this power and authority to get from airlines the names and addresses of passengers to match with those of known terrorists to ensure that we are not at risk in the air. My dilemma is, first, that we are trying to match our system to a North American safety system. I understand that there is great resistance in the United States to such a system of data collection. Will we put our system in place before they put theirs in place? If so, we will give up our rights while they may not?
Second, how does it help to collect information that is not verifiable? When a person gives a name, presents a visa and answers some questions, that information is not reliable. A terrorist will not say he is a terrorist and provide his name. He will use means to get on the aircraft while avoiding identification.
The information obtained is held for seven days. That information may have evidentiary value for a future flight, but the information obtained on every passenger is kept for seven days on these other bases.
How do you justify taking such a sweeping approach when the airlines say they think the value is minimal? They have said that they would like to be part of threat assessments and to be informed when something happens. Currently, there is no assurance that credible knowledge of a threat obtained by CSIS, the RCMP or the minister will be passed on to the airlines to enable them to take the necessary actions. They hope to be included in the loop, but there is nothing in the bill to ensure that the people in whom I put my trust when I travel will be part of the decision making.
Ms. McLellan: It is clear that the U.S. already has more powers than we have, and they will have further powers. In fact, they are working on CAPPS I and CAPPS II. If you would like more details on that, we would be happy to provide you with a comparative chart indicating the current powers of the United States and the additional CAPPS II initiatives on which they are working.
There is no question that the U.S., like us, has to ensure that the balance is right. Congress has identified some of those concerns, as have the House of Commons and the Senate here. That is why we are constantly working on ensuring that the balance is right.
There is no 100-per-cent guarantee that we can identify everyone who is a potential risk to the well-being of Canada and Canadians and that of our allies. We have to collect the best information possible and analyze and share it so that we can potentially disrupt and prevent acts that would kill innocent Canadians or citizens of allied countries. I wish I could say that we can develop a regime that will prevent a September 11, a Madrid or a Bali.
We can only collect the best information possible, analyze it in real time, and get it back to the front lines to disrupt the activities of people who would do harm. That is what this proposed legislation is about. We must strike the right balance in doing that, but the best way to prevent terrorist acts is through the collection of intelligence. That is our obligation to the people of this country. We must do that in a way that respects their reasonable expectations for freedoms and liberties. That is why we have worked so hard to develop this regime that we believe has built-in protections. It is a made-in-Canada approach that strikes the right balance between our fundamental obligation to protect the security of Canadians and acknowledging their reasonable and legitimate privacy interests.
Mr. Valeri: The Deputy Prime Minister has underlined that this system, like systems in all countries, operates on the best information available. You have asked whether the information that we get from reservation systems is reliable. It is the best information available. It is the information that countries around the world are using to assess a threat that may exist with respect to a particular individual flying on an airplane.
My main point is that under current Canadian law, no one can examine passengers on a plane from a security point of view. Bill C-7 enables us to do that. With regard to balancing security, safety and privacy, we need the ability to assess people using the best possible information. Inability to access that information is not helpful in preventing terrorist attacks.
Senator Andreychuk: Minister McLellan, every bill that comes before us dealing with security asks for power to identify terrorists. I look at Bill C-7 and see the terrorist threats there. Bill C-7 includes many powers for ministers that do not have much to do with terrorism but a lot to do with criminal behaviour. We cannot characterize everything as a possible terror threat. If I gave away all my rights, I suppose that I would be in a more secure position, but it is a question of balance.
Do the tools that you have already been given work?
Before more tools are given, can you tell me how effective Bill C-36, the anti-terrorism legislation, is, in which a phenomenal amount of freedom was given up in relation to terrorism. Has that tool been effective? Is that one that has been useful in fighting terrorism?
I understood the first premise was good intelligence officers doing their jobs — well trained, well funded. That would be our best tool, not screening all Canadians, but targeting terrorist activity.
Ms. McLellan: We have to get intelligence to target high-risk individuals; that is what we need this proposed legislation for. I know everybody here understands this. People think of airplanes as a convenient way of moving back and forth — we take it for granted. It is a key mode of transportation in the world in which we live.
Unfortunately, what we saw on September 11 is that some of those who choose to get on an airplane can use it as a weapon. An airplane is no longer simply a means of transportation. For those who will do evil, it is potentially a weapon. Therefore, we have to try to identify high-risk individuals who may be on those planes, and who would turn a mode of transportation into a lethal weapon. There is no guarantee that we will catch every one, but we have to do the best we can to identify those travellers who are known to be of high risk.
As I said in my comments, the vast majority — 99.99 per cent — of those people who travel are of no interest to the RCMP or CSIS. There will be no match. However, I would not want to be the person who has to explain to the Canadian public, if we had tools available and chose not to put them in place, if a tragedy like September 11 happened.
Therefore, we must look at the known risks and put in place the tools to help us deal with them. We now know that planes can be used as weapons, and that terrorists will board planes, take control of them and kill innocent people. What we need are the tools to help us identify high-risk individuals who may do harm.
Senator LaPierre: I am concerned, Madam, about the phrase you have used, ``reasonable freedom.'' Could you give me an example of an unreasonable freedom that I have as a Canadian? Obviously, you must think there is such a thing. I need to have that, Madam Chair, in order to pursue the matter.
Ms. McLellan: What we are talking about, Madam Chair, is a balance. Obviously, we strike a balance all the time in our society. Section 1 of the Charter strikes a balance — it speaks to reasonable limits on fundamental rights and freedoms.
There is not a democracy in the world that does not speak of the balance in relation to rights and freedoms. No right or freedom is absolute. Section 1 of our Charter makes that absolutely plain, as do the courts and government.
Every day, we attempt to strike the right balance between the protection of rights and freedoms, and the interests, for example, of the collectivity in terms of ensuring its safety and security. There is nothing unusual in speaking about reasonable limits on rights and freedoms.
Senator Jaffer: Thank you both, ministers, for being here. I will put all my questions and then you can answer them.
Minister Valeri, I wanted to thank you for the excellent briefing that Mr. Read has given, not only privately, but also his explanation of what happens once you receive the information.
My preoccupation — and I may be wrong — is that there is a lot of protection for airlines under Bill C-7, but what happens in a Madrid-like situation, on the trains? There seems to be an emphasis on planes — if you look at the U.S., they are also spending $4.5 billion on airlines — but what are we doing about trains?
Also, Minister McLellan, you were talking about known risks. What I understood from Mr. Read was that, for example, health risks or other types of risks are predictable. There is a way to assess them. One of the challenges that we face with terrorism is that we are not able to predict the risks. I would like you to clarify what you mean by ``known risks.''
My last question is, when you spoke last week at the public forum — and I was very pleased that you spoke about it — you said that our national security policy must reflect Canadian values, safeguard our liberties and respect legal, constitutional and sovereignty considerations. You set out three things — physical, threats and contributing to an international security system. I would have liked a fourth point, which is that to protect Canadian values is also our diversity and our strength.
When Commissioner Zaccardelli was here, he said he has not used any provisions of Bill C-36 to date. When Senator Bacon questioned him at those hearings, he said Bill C-36 would give him all the tools that he needed to protect us, yet he has not had to use them. Now you come and ask us for more. I am confused. What is happening?
Mr. Valeri: Thank you, senator, for your question. In terms of the emphasis on air travel, which there has certainly been, 9/11 dictated that. However, in terms of the incident in Spain, there are railway security provisions included in the existing Railway Safety Act.
We do have the ability, for instance, to restrict areas in railway stations and to apply different types of security measures to different modes. It would be quite difficult to deal with passenger information on commuter trains, where people are getting on and off often. Perhaps that approach to security would not function effectively with respect to rail travel.
Therefore, we would focus on the aspects of security that we can best pursue when looking at different modes. We are constantly looking at security measures for the different modes. We look at rail, and marine is also important. We will take a different approach to marine than to air.
I agree that the emphasis has been on air, but by no means should senators believe that we are not pursuing security measures to enhance the security and safety of Canadians regardless of the mode of transportation. For example, road transportation focuses on the transportation of dangerous goods, and we look at that in a very different way. We are looking at different modes. There are ways of achieving excellence in the different modes, and we are pursuing that as a department and as a government.
Ms. McLellan: Senator Jaffer, in relation to your questions, there is nothing in Bill C-36 that allows us to identify high-risk air travellers. That is why we need the tools that deal with the airline industry and its unique and potentially lethal nature. I understand that Commissioner Zaccardelli will be sending a letter to the committee clarifying comments he made before the committee in relation to Bill C-36.
You are absolutely right, and this is why I emphasized in my speech last Thursday before the Canadian Club that we have worked very hard, whether with our Smart Border Initiative or Bill C-36 — where the Senate and the House of Commons worked very hard and did good work, hearing a multitude of witnesses — to strike the right balance. We need a made-in-Canada approach that reflects that fact. Last evening, I was in Montreal speaking on this subject again with various members of ethnic communities.
We must draw upon the strength of our multiculturalism and diversity. Those things can make us more secure if we do this right by not marginalizing any group and ensuring that we do our utmost to avoid creating a sense of alienation.
I believe in our made-in-Canada approach. When I was Minister of Justice, I put in place an advisory group that represented the diversity of ethnic groups to talk about Bill C-36, the anti-terrorism legislation, and to discuss, on an ongoing basis, how that legislation was evolving and how it was being implemented.
Senator Jaffer: Minister, I absolutely believed you when you said that you would create an advisory group. You went on to another ministry. I have to tell you that that advisory group has never come about. I have written more than 15 letters. That advisory group does not exist.
I want to know why there is such a rush. We will have a review of Bill C-36 this year. We will have the Arar inquiry. I am not talking about the entire act or getting everything about which Minister Valeri spoke.
Deputy Prime Minister, why not wait before we enact clause 4.8? Why share information with foreign countries when we have had a challenge?
Ms. McLellan: Somebody could get on a plane today and choose to use that plane as a weapon to kill innocent Canadians. Bill C-36 does not speak to identifying high-risk air passengers. There is a gap in our existing legislative scheme. We have to fill it.
It has nothing to do with Bill C-36 because there is no power in that bill that permits us to do what we are asking to do in Bill C-7.
Senator Jaffer: I am not talking about getting the information. I am not suggesting that we delay enacting the entire bill. I agree that we need it.
I am talking about specific sections that deal with sharing information. What is the point of having the Arar inquiry, if we pass the law before the inquiry?
Ms. McLellan: If we cannot share the information, the information is useless. The point of prevention is to share the information with those who can then prevent an incident like September 11 or a hijacking. That is the point. There is no point in having information in data banks if, in fact, we do not share it and can share it in real time. My guess is that we will hear from the Auditor General on this today. The concerns are not around the collection of information but what we do with it.
The information is useless, unless you can analyze it in real time and get it back to the front lines. That may mean stopping someone getting on a plane. It may mean informing one of our protection officers on a plane that a match has been made, and they need to heighten their vigilance on that flight.
That is what this is about. There is nothing in Bill C-36 that presently permits us to identify high-risk travellers, and therefore, potentially prevent a tragedy like September 11.
The Chairman: For clarification, Senator Jaffer, was your concern about sharing information with non-Canadian bodies?
Senator Jaffer: That is right.
The Chairman: The minister's answer related to immediate on-the-ground Canadian passenger agents.
Senator Jaffer: Sorry, I did not make that question clear. I was concerned about disclosure to foreign governments.
My preoccupation is why conduct the Arar inquiry and then pass a law to share information with foreign governments. I have no issue domestically. Share everything with Canadian agencies. Otherwise, why have it? However, sharing information with foreign governments is a problem for me.
I realize I am not in your position, Deputy Prime Minister. However, I feel that the Arar community will look at sharing information with foreign governments and yet the Senate is being asked to pass a law that will give permission to share information with foreign governments. Those two things do not sit right.
Ms. McLellan: We share information now under protocols. The sharing of information takes place on the basis of agreements with foreign countries. There are protections inherent in those information-sharing agreements.
In fact, I would suggest it would be terrible if we were not able to share information and receive information because that is how we protect Canadians and how we do our share in terms of creating a network that attempts to disrupt global terrorist activities. The lifeblood of intelligence is the sharing of the information, not only at home, but also with allies under agreements that are entered into that indicate restrictions on the use of that information.
If we were not able to do that, we would be endangering Canadians. We would also not be doing our share, as a civilized member of the global community.
Senator Andreychuk: As a clarification, there is evidence that the information is being shared.
The Chairman: That is what the minister said.
Senator Andreychuk: What does the act do? We are sharing information already. What does the act do except formalize what is already happening?
Senator Jaffer: What I understood from other witnesses is that the act gives them explicit permission to share the information.
Senator LaPierre: Were they sharing it illegally before?
Ms. McLellan: No, absolutely not.
Senator Andreychuk: They were doing it legally before.
Margaret Bloodworth, Deputy Minister, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada: Honourable senators, people can, and do, share information now. Proposed section 4.82, for example, does not address subsequent disclosure to other countries. It allows access to other information that they do not have now. It also puts restrictions on what can be shared.
The difficulty question is, if they do identify a match on somebody on a plane going to Europe, for example, how do we defend not telling the European country that there is somebody who is a risk on that plane, given that they may identify them after they are on the plane. It is very difficult to say that there is no sharing.
The bill puts constraints on the sharing and indicates that there will be restrictions. In other words, we will only share information with people in the conditions that provide the same kind of privacy that we do. However, not to share would be very difficult to explain when we are talking about high-risk people.
The bill specifically addresses getting the information, as opposed to the sharing, per proposed section 4.82. There is a section relating to CBSA that talks about putting regulations governing the sharing of information on the customs side.
Senator Phalen: I have questions regarding the 34 elements on the back two pages of the bill. I will address some concerns that were expressed by witnesses in this committee.
In testimony before this committee, Privacy Commissioner Jennifer Stoddart stated that one of the reasons that she strongly objected to this bill was because it ``co-opts private-sector organizations by pressing them into service in support of law enforcement activities.'' Do you have any comments to make on that statement?
Ms. Bloodworth: The bill, as I understand it, does not force airlines to collect information, but it allows the security organizations to get the information from them.
Senator Phalen: Madam Chair, second, to what extent does the continued operation of transport or air service between Canada and the U.S. as it exists today depend on the data-sharing provisions in Bill C-7?
Mr. Valeri: They already provide that information. Air Canada is providing that information to the United States to facilitate landing in U.S. cities.
Senator Phalen: How complete is the information?
Mr. Valeri: They are providing information that they are already collecting. It is as complete as —
Senator Phalen: How complete is it? If someone buys a ticket at a travel agency, does Air Canada have the information that the Americans get?
Mr. Valeri: It is, senator, based on the same 34 points that you see in the back of this bill in the schedule. That is the information that Air Canada has the ability to provide. That information is being provided to the U.S. for transborder flights.
Senator Phalen: I understand that. My question is whether the information is complete. My understanding is that if someone purchases a ticket with a travel agency, Air Canada would not have all the information on all the passengers on that airline.
Mr. Valeri: This system works on the best available information. That is the same basis on which systems work in every country around the world. The information that is being provided allows us to make the intelligence decisions that are required in order to protect Canadians in the event of a potential terrorist attack.
Ms. Bloodworth: In respect of flights that are leaving the country, you may recall that when you check in, you must show identification — either a passport or a birth certificate going to the United States. When you are leaving the country, the airlines do have more information than they do on domestic flights.
Senator Phalen: In testimony before this committee, Ms. Renée Smith-Valade of Air Canada said, ``We have systems that perform the function for which they were designed to perform, and at this point, if we are asked to add information or to provide synergies with government data systems, the cost implications would be significant.''
Does the government have any plans to assist airlines with the significant cost implications of providing data to government departments?
Mr. Valeri: We would certainly work with airlines at finding the most efficient and effective way of providing information to government. With respect to cost, it is an issue that has been raised in the context of the consultation that is taking place with the department.
Senator LaPierre: I am totally confused. I arrive at the airport and I get my ticket and I show my passport. The attendant takes the passport and shoves it under a machine. Where does the information go? Are you saying that the information that goes to the Americans is the information we have provided in the process of booking a ticket or do they have secret files? They say Laurier LaPierre always likes to sit in an aisle seat.
Mr. John Read, Director General, Transport Dangerous Goods Directorate, Transport Canada: The information requested by the United States is their right to so request. What they do request is as much of the information as is present in those 34 data elements.
Under CAPPS II, we understand they intend to request all airlines flying into or taking off in the United States, domestic and foreign airlines, will ask for what they call ``name plus three.'' They would be asking for the name, date of birth, address and phone number for all people flying. Under the CAPPS II program, that data would be transferred to data providers — those kinds of groups that know information about people for the purpose of credits cards and so forth who would authenticate that the person exists. They then match the data against their internal data banks and conclude that the person is flagged red, orange or green. If it is red, the person is not allowed on an aircraft. If it is orange they receive extra attention. If it is green, they are treated as normal.
This is the information we are talking about. The information being shared under section 4.82, which the RCMP can do, relates to the fact that you were on the aircraft sitting in the aisle. There is no other information captured under section 4.82. We are only talking about the information the airline has and it is restricted to those elements within those 34 elements that they have. They are not required to gather all those. Essentially we look over the shoulder of the airlines while they do their commercial business. They provide any information that falls under those 34 elements to us. That is the information that can be provided under this bill to the United States if there were some reason for doing this.
Senator Gustafson: My next question pertains to ministerial responsibility. This morning we read in the newspapers that there has been a problem in Ottawa. There has been surveillance going on for a number of hours. What has happened there now that would be different if the bill were already in place?
Ms. McLellan: Nothing would be different. Obviously this bill deals with a number of different issues but speaking for myself — I am here this morning to speak on proposed section 4.82 — that would make nothing different in relation to what happened if you are referring to what happened in Ottawa yesterday. I cannot comment on that; that is an ongoing RCMP criminal investigation and they will be speaking about that when they are ready to do so. However, nothing as it relates to that part of this legislation for which I am directly responsible would implicate in anyway what happened yesterday.
Senator Gustafson: According to the news media yesterday there is a possibility that there may be 22 terrorist activity groups organized in Canada. Is there anything in this bill that relates to that situation?
Ms. McLellan: I suppose if, in fact, we know that there are high-risk individuals in this country and if one of them got on a plane, this would provide us with the information that we would make a match. We have watch lists of high- risk individuals and with information we could make a match between our watch lists and this person being on a certain flight. Obviously, all we want to do is try to make sure that we are identifying high-risk individuals who may cause harm to Canadians or others.
Mr. Valeri: I think you are hitting on an important point here — as in all other countries, we are attempting to prevent terrorists from coming into our country. All countries also accept the fact that there may be individuals with terrorist tendencies in your country. Bill C-7 is the answer to preventing terrorist activity in the country. This particular bill speaks to the protection on airlines, pipelines, and also the response to a potential terrorist act. The flow of information and the kind of approach we can take with that information could prevent a terrorist attack. It is the other half, I believe, of the Bill C-36, which dealt with anti-terrorism legislation in the first session of this Parliament.
Senator Graham: I have many questions but I will restrict myself to two at the moment.
I want to go back to the parliamentary oversight. We have gone round and round the mulberry bush on this. The anti-terrorism act, formerly Bill C-36, does contains provisions for a review within three years and a report within four years after the act receives Royal Assent. We do not have such a provision in Bill C-7. Would you consider that such a clause could be feasible and could be a workable addition to the bill?
Next, I should like to discuss the Privacy Commissioner, who expressed many concerns. Is there any way of satisfying the Privacy Commissioner, who still contends that scanning airline passenger information in search of persons wanted on warrants or offences not directly related to terrorism, transportation security or national security sets a dangerous precedent vis-à-vis government collection of information for one purpose and using it for another. How do you respond to the Privacy Commissioner and is there any way of satisfying the Privacy Commissioner?
Ms. McLellan: I will speak to that question and maybe my colleague Mr. Valeri will answer your first question.
We were very sensitive to this issue and worked hard to ensure that we had struck the right balance. However, if a name came up of a person being on a plane and it was apparent that there was a warrant for that individual for murder, rape, child molestation, or child pornography, it would be very hard to justify to Canadians that you could not share that information with local law enforcement authorities where that person got off the plane. That question would be: ``what in God's name are you doing in terms of the safety and security of Canadians?''
However, you must ensure that you are using the information only for serious crimes. That is why we have the draft regulations. There must be a minimum sentence of five years, for example. Obviously, we do not want this information shared in relation to lesser forms of criminal activity. We do believe that there is a profound safety and security interest in relation to being able to share information with, for example, local law enforcement authorities where it has come to your attention there is an extant warrant in relation to a serious crime that involves violence, threats to the security or safety of an individual, or a range of other offences. Canadians would say all of these say are pretty serious. If we knew where that person was and there was an extant warrant and we simply let them walk off the tarmac — I would not want to be in a position to have to explain that to Canadians.
Ms. Bloodworth: There was one important change made from the earliest version of the bill. The wording — although it was not the intent — of the earlier version would have allowed police to run warrants against a broader list. We recognized that it was too wide. The wording now allows access for transportation security purposes. The question now is, if incidentally, in the course of doing that they were to come across someone with a serious criminal warrant against them, what is the responsibility of the police?
That is a judgment and that is the balance. That is what the draft regulations attempt to do. Certainly that is still in draft form but that is what those are intended to address.
Senator Graham: That was a reasonable and beneficial change.
The Chairman: The first question, Mr. Valeri.
Mr. Valeri: In respect of parliamentary oversight, the committee can call us back next year and use many opportunities assess how we have performed and how we are doing with this particular piece of legislation. I would certainly welcome that opportunity. The parliamentary oversight is there. It is in the hands of the committee and certainly we are willing and able to come before the committee to respond to how this piece of legislation has performed.
Senator Graham: Was the parliamentary oversight considered in the drafting of the bill?
Mr. Valeri: Every time you draft a bill you would consider parliamentary oversight. Ultimately, Parliament and both Houses have a responsibility to provide that oversight. We were certainly very much prepared to come back whenever the committee would want us to come back to review this particular piece of legislation.
Senator Graham: I am surprised that it was in the anti-terrorism act and it is not in this particular bill. I was wondering if there was any reason.
Ms. McLellan: In addition to what my colleague has said, the Privacy Commissioner can initiate of her own volition an investigation on how the RCMP collects, uses, discloses, retains and disposes of the personal information. She can do that under section 37 of the Privacy Act now. That will not change.
The RCMP activities are documented in various annual reports, submitted to me and tabled in both Houses of Parliament. In the case of CSIS, there is SIRC. In the case of the RCMP, as I outlined, there is the existing complaints commission. We will create an additional civilian oversight mechanism. Their reports are, to a certain degree, made public. We have tried to accommodate the quite reasonable desire for oversight by both independent agencies and by parliamentarians.
As my colleague has indicated, it is always the right of this committee or any committee of the Senate or House of Commons to request that ministers to come back or that, for example, the commissioner of the RCMP or the director of CSIS to come back and answer questions in relation to the implementation and administration of any piece of legislation within their jurisdiction.
I want to reassure senators that we are sensitive to the fact that oversight is important and that there are a number of mechanisms, including the fact that we will be creating a new parliamentary committee. This committee will be unique in the culture of the Canadian Parliament. It will be peopled by both senators and members of the House of Commons. They will be sworn in as Privy Councillors and they will have access to information that will not be normally available to others. We want to swear them in so that they can have access to a wide range of secret and confidential information.
That committee will be able to exercise oversight as it sees fit in relation to the anti-terrorism legislation, Bill C-7, and a wide range of other bills, and even Criminal Code provisions as they relate to the national security of the country. This committee of parliamentarians is going to reflect a major departure in that it will be unique by being a joint committee, people are sworn in as Privy Councillors and, to discharge their obligation on behalf of Canadians, it will have to be a non-partisan venue where everyone is focused on the safety and security of Canadians.
Senator Graham: My concern was whether I would be more comforted if there were a kind of parliamentary oversight built into the bill. I understand that ministers and officials might be called before any committee at any time. I am concerned about what will happen, three or four years from now.
The Chairman: That was your wind up, Senator Graham, was it? Minister, do you want to add anything further to your answers on this?
Ms. McLellan: No, other than the fact that parliamentary oversight is, in a sense, implicit and built into this proposed legislation. In part, it is because of this new parliamentary committee, which will have the ability to review, in relation to the national security of the country, how this legislation will operate and any concerns that they would have.
The review must be ongoing, senator. The fight against terrorism will not end tomorrow. We all wish it would. The fight against terrorism is a long-term war and there is no end in sight. The provisions and the tools that we need to protect Canadians, much as we wish otherwise, will not disappear; they cannot disappear. Therefore, I would hope that there would be ongoing parliamentary oversight as we work together to deal with the war against terrorism.
Senator LaPierre: I do believe that vigilance is the price of liberty and I have no problem with that. However, I have some problems with the act because it may go too far, yet that is another matter that we could discuss at another time.
I am concerned about one aspect of the bill. Astonishing powers have been given to you, as the minister. You may delegate some of those powers to your deputy minister — who is not elected — especially for that purpose. Delegation of some of your powers, if not all of them, would be to your deputy. I would prefer if such a provision did not exist. I am referring to the provision that the Minister of Transport can delegate his authority to the deputy minister. Is that correct?
Mr. Valeri: Yes. The Minister of Transport, the ministers of environment, health, and fisheries and oceans have the ability and the authority to delegate to the deputy ministers with respect to interim orders. The question would be: Why is that the case?
Senator LaPierre: Yes.
Mr. Valeri: It is a matter of practicality. If there were a need to bring forward an interim order and the minister were unable to do so, then we would require someone with knowledge of the file, and the act under which that interim order was put. It truly is a matter of practicality.
The oversight — or the checks and balances — to that are such that the interim order requires the approval of cabinet within 14 days. If the minister, for instance, were temporarily out of contact because of travel, for example, we would require a safety valve that would be delegated to the deputy minister.
Senator LaPierre: Could another minister not be delegated? I am concerned that some of these matters might be very important and far-reaching for Canadians. It seems to me that someone who is accountable to the public should assume the responsibility; the deputy minister is not accountable. Consequently, Minister Valeri could you not delegate to an acting minister such as the Deputy Prime Minister?
Ms. McLellan: I will clarify part of the problem. On September 11, the decision to land the planes was made within 20 to 25 minutes. Ms. Bloodworth made that decision as a deputy minister.
In such a situation, if for some reason then Minister Collenette had not been available, it would not have made much sense to delegate that to me, then Minister of Health, or to Mr. Valeri, then Minister of Finance, and so on. In a critical and emergency situation such as that, you need to make an interim order. It does not make much sense to have a minister who knows nothing about that file; the intricacies of the airports; where best to land the planes; and the requirements for emergency response at airports to land those planes. It makes more sense to delegate, in such a situation, to the deputy Minister of the department, who understands the issues and the crisis.
It is fair to say that while deputy ministers are not accountable politically in the same way that we are, as public servants they are most certainly accountable to the public for the discharge of their obligations.
Senator LaPierre: I am concerned about the length of time — 14 days. It appears to be a prolonged period of time.
Mr. Valeri: In a situation where a decision needs to be made immediately in response to a pending emergency and that delegation of authority is provided to the deputy minister, the minister, once contacted, may review any of the action and may, in fact, change what the deputy minister has agreed to do immediately upon becoming available. You would not have to wait 14 days.
Senator LaPierre: I see.
Mr. Valeri: If there is concern that we would find ourselves with an interim order put by a deputy minister, a requirement to wait 14 days before cabinet could provide approval for it, and the deputy minister's interim order is out there, that would be incorrect. It would simply be for a specific time period, whether one or two hours or the next day. The minister would then come into that equation and would agree with or amend the actions of the deputy minister, as needed.
Senator LaPierre: The interim order by the deputy minister could live 14 days without any oversight.
Mr. Valeri: No, it would be for 14 days in the case of it being put forward by the deputy minister on approval or acceptance by the minister. The scenario is that the minister might not be available for the specific time that the interim order were required to be put. It could be one, two or three hours.
Senator LaPierre: Why is the 14-day period in there, then?
Mr. Valeri: Perhaps Mr. Read wants to speak to technically why it is there.
Mr. Read: When the interim order is made, it immediately stands referred to the Standing Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons for the Scrutiny of Regulations. By that amendment last March, that committee can recommend it be abolished.
The time frames that we have are based, I suppose, on the fact that we recognized during the events of September 11 that the people who are the experts on the emergency are fully immersed in the emergency. I was one of those people. One of the best things that happened to us was our deputy said we did not have to answer all of these questions we normally get by hand, and that was a good five-day period — we were fully occupied.
If you have seen the poor fellow who is working on mad cow disease, and some of those other people who are terribly overworked, they do not have time to withdraw to write out this careful reasoning and so forth. We had to have a period of time before we had to go the Governor in Council with all the argumentation written down and all the proper formats, et cetera.
Therefore, 14 days was the period chosen. Fifteen days to Parliament was the next period chosen. We could give you the interim order instantly. However, the concept here is that when we go to Parliament to report the content of the interim order, we would want to explain the rationale and all the rest, which is why 15 calendar days was chosen. Twenty-three was chosen for publication in the Canada Gazette, because that is the shortest time that we know we can always get. It is published every 23 days.
Ms. Bloodworth: It is clear that ministers are accountable in any event. Just because a deputy minister issues it does not mean the minister is not fully accountable for it. By the very fact that a minister does not change it, he or she is accepting it. I accept your point about an accountability elected-wise, but I would say, with due respect to the ministers, they would be accountable anyway under our system.
Senator Merchant: Minister McLellan, you seem to be very concerned as to how you would answer to Canadians if something were to happen. Do you think that Canadians understand what you are trying to do? How do they feel about divulging all this information to you? Do you think they feel safer by doing this? Do you hear from them?
I know that the industry says that all these measures are killing them. I know at the airport, the Air Canada people were telling me this week that there are more security people in Regina now than there are Air Canada and WestJet people.
How will people accept this? Do they understand the cost? A life is a life, and we have to make decisions all the time about what life is worth. We can save lives in many different ways. We can change a two-lane highway to a four-lane highway, or we cure people in our hospitals all the time. What is the interaction between you and the public? Of course, if a disaster would happen, the public would feel differently about what you are doing. You are in a difficult position. How aware are Canadians about what you are doing and what the costs are financially and personally?
Ms. McLellan: When you ask Canadians about increased security measures, even though they may find them inconvenient, as we all do — I may be the Minister of Public Safety and Security, but when I go through the airport in Calgary, I am asked to take off my shoes like everybody else, and I may miss a flight and I may not — the reality is that they accept that as part of the price of enhanced safety and security.
In fact, some of the recent polling work — and that is all it is — would indicate that a significant number of Canadians do not believe we have gone far enough in protecting their security. Therefore, Canadians, like others around the world, may find certain kinds of provisions inconvenient. However, they are generally willing to accept those measures as long as they believe there is a connection between their enhanced safety and security, as individuals or globally. They are willing to accept that.
During the Code Orange at Christmas, the CBC and CNN showed coverage of people lined up at the borders and in airports — both in Canada and the U.S. Canadians and Americans alike agreed that it was aggravating and inconvenient to have to go through security, but the also agreed that it has to be done. It is part of the cost of making sure we are doing everything we can to prevent another terrorist attack. Canadians, as long as they see the measures as reasonable, are very much committed. In fact, they would be very critical of government if they thought that we were not doing things that could reasonably and fairly easily be done to help enhance their safety.
Mr. Valeri: We all stand in line at airports as we go through security, and I hear the comments as well. I think they very much reflect what the Deputy Prime Minister has said. Inconvenient? — yes. Necessary? — absolutely. Am I willing to inconvenience myself for the sake of safety and security? Yes, I am. In fact, I would say that prior to coming into this position, some comments were made that we did not have as much of a presence at some airports that gave Canadians the sense that we were there, doing the job and looking to protect Canadians.
Recent surveys have shown that Canadians do feel a sense of safety and security, and they are willing to deal with sometimes having to wait in line for longer than they might have to. Generally, I think the response has been very good in terms of our presence at the airports; and I do believe that Canadians have a better sense that we are on the ground and doing what we need to do. Overall, I would agree with the Deputy Prime Minister that one-third of Canadians are, in fact, thinking that we need to go further with respect to our security measures.
Senator Merchant: I understand that fingerprinting and retina scanning are the way to really identify people. Will we implement those kinds of measures? That is the latest in technology.
The Chairman: At the border?
Senator Jaffer: With the U.S.?
Senator Merchant: Do we have that now?
Ms. McLellan: As it relates to fingerprinting, as you may be aware, we fingerprint all refugee claimants. Beyond that, does it extend to all those seeking entry to Canada as immigrants?
Ms. Bloodworth: No, it does not.
Ms. McLellan: It is simply as it relates to refugee claimants. Again, we run that information against various watch lists to ensure that there are not people entering this country who would do Canadians harm. There are high risks. We do it always to identify high-risk individuals. That is why we scan goods at the border, too — to identify high-risk goods and people and try to keep them out of this country.
Mr. Valeri: We have, in fact, tested some of the technology that you have described. I will have John Read speak to it specifically.
Mr. Read: Very briefly, we have tested some of this, but only for the purposes of restricted area passes for airport workers, and only with their consent. We did tests, and they are not good as some people think they are.
Senator Eyton: I have less concern about privacy issues in that realm. Bill C-7 is about making travel safer and making Canadians more secure. No one can argue with that. However, I do have some questions about process the process to obtain the information.
What information is collected and how is it collected? How should it be used by cooperating agencies, in particular? All of that must be part of a coherent whole, or it does not make any sense at all. The evidence that I have heard thus far suggests that we are not at the coherent whole at the moment. This kind of system, as complicated as it is, will not work unless it is something that is packaged, intelligent, and functioning as a complete system.
In brief, we need the right information consistently applied. For the moment, I will accept that your 34 elements are the right stuff. I have some questions about that. In particular, I would like to focus on the cooperating agencies that are part of that coherent package. They are, of course, national and international agencies.
We have heard evidence of fundamental questions on where this is going. We have heard that from Air Canada, for example. We have heard fundamental questions from regional and smaller airlines that say that they simply have no systems in place and, therefore, cannot provide any significant number of the 34 elements specified. We have heard questions about the travel agents and their ongoing association and rivalry with the airlines. They do not like to share information. In effect, that part may well break down.
I am one that is perhaps too preoccupied with process and detail. To what extent have the necessary players in this — both national and international — been consulted and co-opted? I suspect that you are far short of being there. Where are you now? How will you get there so that the system will work?
You can have the best rules, regulations and requirements, but unless the parties come together, it will not work. I acknowledge that it is a complicated task. However, if you do not come together in a coherent and intelligent way, you have nothing.
Where are you now? How will you bring in the necessary players so that you have a coherent system?
Mr. Valeri: From an international standpoint, we are working with the International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO, which is the international body that deals with these types of things. We are viewing what other countries have been doing.
You are absolutely right that we need to take a coordinated and coherent approach at the end of the day. We are asking the airlines to provide the information that they have. I would think that, over time, we would be looking at continuous improvement to the quality of the information. We want to move on the best information that we have today in order to build the kind of intelligence that we need.
Perhaps John Read can speak to what the department has done specifically to bring together the partners to date and how we would approach the continuous improvement of the collection of information and how Transport Canada would use that information.
Mr. Read: I should like to clarify something I said earlier. I hope that I did not mislead you when I said that we would not go further with the testing of equipment for airport workers. I meant to say that we will not continue on with other groups — the public, for example. However, we will continue the work with airport workers.
It is true that some travel agents gather information when making a reservation. At the bottom of every reservation there is a computer reservation system, a CRS — also called DRS, distributed reservation systems. In the proposed act, we could go to either an airline that holds information or to the operators of airline reservation systems. We had in mind the five centralized computer systems that hold reservations for airlines. Therefore, we do, today, have the ability to access reservations — even those made through a travel agent or casually in the fashion discussed. There is always the computer at the bottom that actually has the record.
We are heavily involved with ICAO and all countries are feeling their way in defining the ultimate list that we should have. Canada has settled on the 34 elements, the same ones used for pre-clearance in 1990, which formed the basis for the list in Bill C-44 and has continued into this bill. The 32-, 34- or 36-element lists that the European Economic Union provides to the United States currently for customs and immigration are similar, but not identical.
The United States has determined from their research that they need only the four elements that I named earlier — name, date of birth, permanent address and telephone number. If they have that information, they say that they will never twice stop a person accidentally. Once you have those four elements of information, you have uniquely identified a person. They may force the standard on the world that a reservation would contain those four elements. Other information would not be significant.
At the beginning, there was the concept that surely we could use much information. People now realize that all this information is not that good. What is significant is if we want to identify somebody, we must compare them against the databases of those with whom we would have difficulty and all we really need are those four elements. I think that we will see that happening more and more.
ICAO is the solution internationally. We are working with ICAO, and everybody wants harmonization.
Senator Eyton: I said that I was not so concerned about privacy, but the last comment scares the heck out of me. Those four elements give access to a universal brain that will spit out all sorts of other information about me. Is that correct?
Mr. Read: For our system, you would have to look at our act to see to whom we can we provide that information. The CAPPS II system in the U.S. will not provide that data to other people. They can only provide the result of a match that identifies a person as red outside of that system. They do not take those names and search other data banks.
Proposed sections 4.81 and 4.82 specify to whom the information can be passed. It is a very restricted group.
Senator Eyton: The four elements kick into a grander information system?
Mr. Read: I am not sure who would be running these against a grander system.
Ms. Bloodworth: If you are referring to RCMP and CSIS, they intend to create subsets of databases that will deal with people of concern from a terrorist point of view. I am not sure of your question. If it is whether there is an intention to create an international system, I have not heard anyone suggest that we will put information into a common database. Most countries would have clear statutory provisions against doing that. There are no plans to change that. Frankly, we would not want to change that. There is no great benefit to doing that. We are interested in protecting Canadians.
Mr. Read: Currently, you pick up date of birth, which is the one element not available. If you go on Canada 411 today, you can find my full name, address and phone number. Those three elements can be obtained easily. You can get those three elements for almost everyone in Canada by going to Canada 411.
Date of birth is the element that we do not get. We are not asking for that. We are asking airlines to give us those elements that they collect in the course of business. We are not requiring them to collect anything extra on our behalf.
Senator Eyton: I worry that the four elements may lead to something else.
We tended to concentrate on airline travel. There are many other modes of transcription — buses, ships and cars. The information-gathering process for those modes of transportation is different. Can you comment on that relative to the answers you just gave me?
Mr. Valeri: We need to look at modes in different ways. For example, if you look at trying to protect the integrity of commuter trains, collecting passenger information would be very difficult, given the volume and people getting off and on. The approach to security would be different for rail than it would be for air. The approach to road or surface transportation will be different where the focus will be more on the transportation of dangerous goods and being able to identify dangerous goods, knowing where they are and where they are going. The approach to marine will be different in terms of how we approach the safety and security.
We are looking at every mode however there may or may not be relevance to how we deal with other modes. It might not be about the passenger information on the people who use those particular modes. It might be about securing train stations in a different way, creating restricted areas in train stations and being able to identify the flow of people in those restricted areas because there is a security element in that station that heightens our vigilance. Therefore, based on intelligence, we need to do certain things.
I do not think we want to leave suggest that, from a transportation standpoint, one approach fits all. We need to look at the mode itself, and how people interact with those modes and find the best and most efficient way to build a security system in order to provide safety for Canadians.
Senator Adams: I think the Auditor General will report today on what has happened since September 11.
I heard on the news this morning that since 9/11, the government has spent close to $8 billion. I was wondering how much money has been approved so far, safety-wise, since 9/11?
Ms. McLellan: You are right, senator, that this afternoon, the Auditor General will release a report in which she reviews the expenditures since the budget of the fall of 2001 when some $7 billion put in place to help ensure Canadian safety and security and enhance existing facilities and agencies and institutions. I cannot comment on what she is going to say. That report will be released at two o'clock. For me to comment on anything that she will say will find me in contempt of Parliament and I really do not want to go there.
What I will say is that the entire amount has not been spent. It was a five-year initiative and there are dollars that remain to be spent. However, we have enhanced our intelligence-gathering capacity. We have enhanced the ability of the RCMP to work in an integrated fashion here at home in pursuit of interests of national security. I think it is fair to say that some of the dollars have gone to DND because, of course, you cannot talk about national security unless you talk about the Department of National Defence — your military — and how they are working, both at home and abroad in terms of in defence of Canadians' national security. All you have to do is look at Afghanistan and the mission there, and you know how directly that can speak to ensuring that you are breaking up terrorist elements that could harm Canadians abroad or in this country.
A big chunk of the money went to DND, CSIS, and the border. We have enhanced the border. We are working closely with our American neighbours on Smart Borders I to be sure we have the systems in place, as well as the physical infrastructure in some cases. We believe that $7.7 billion — not all of which has been spent — has been spent in identified areas, identified as part of a national security plan developed by the public security committee, then- chaired by my colleague, the former deputy prime minister, John Manley. Can we do better? Yes. We need to constantly review the risk and determine where our weaknesses are, such as identified with Bill C-7, and we hope to close a gap, a loophole. Constant vigilance is needed; review and then act, in terms of the changed risk assessment on the ground.
Senator Adams: The Minister of Transport was saying that Bill C-7 will mean spending another $600 million. Is that over five years or is that $600 million per year?
Ms. McLellan: In the budget that our colleague Mr. Ralph Goodale released last Tuesday, he indicated there are were an additional $605 million new dollars for aspects of national security. Part of that money will be important in Mr. Valeri's ability to enhance our marine security.
Let me congratulate Senator Kenny and his committee in terms of the work that has been done. He has report coming out tomorrow, in relation to emergency preparedness. Good work has been done in identifying some of the perceived weaknesses in terms of our maritime security, our airport security. I want to reassure the Senate that I and the committee I chair take seriously the work and it is often a reference point for our deliberations moving forward — the work that is done by the Senate, this committee, and Senator Kenny's committee.
Maritime security will be enhanced with that $605 million. Clearly there are other aspects. Somebody mentioned fingerprinting. We want to go to real-time identification. It is absolutely key in terms of being able to identify, in real time, those who may be high-risk individuals — be it for terrorist purposes, or for criminal activities such as organized crime, the profits thereof often fuel terrorist activities. The $605 million is over five years and it will be used for a number of identified priorities to enhance Canadian security and safety.
The Chairman: We told the ministers that we would free them at 11:30. However, if we could prevail upon you to stay another quarter of an hour, we could sneak in a few more legitimate questions.
Ms. McLellan: Unfortunately, both of us have a public security and safety committee that starts in half an hour. Minister Valeri and I have to meet to discuss aspects of the Auditor General's report. We put aside a half hour between 11:30 and noon to do that, and then we have to go immediately to the committee. We had agreed to be here for two hours and unfortunately, this is a very busy day because of the Auditor General's report.
The Chairman: We appreciate that.
Senator Adams, I will ask you to put your question in writing and we will undertake to get it to the ministers. The same is true of those questions that were to be put by Senator Beaudoin, and second rounds by Senators Andreychuk and Jaffer. If you can get me your questions in writing this afternoon, the ministers will have them.
Ms. McLellan: We will be delighted to do that.
The Chairman: We will get answers with the speed of light.
Ms. McLellan: The other thing we might do, if senators are interested, is a comparison between CAPPS II and CAPPS I. If people would find such comparative data useful, we would be pleased to provide it to you.
The Chairman: We do have some comparison now, but any more that you can give us will be very helpful.
Senators, at the next meeting, we will be meeting on Thursday, April 1 at 10:45 a.m. in room 160S in Centre Block. At that time, we will conduct a clause-by-clause consideration of this bill.
We will then have a very brief in camera session for consideration of a draft report on the study of the Canadian media industries. Senator Andreychuk, on a point of order.
Senator Andreychuk: A point of order. There was a list of witnesses and there was an assurance that if the bill came to this committee, we would be afforded the opportunity to hear witnesses to look at some of the legal aspects. A list was provided, yet other than the Canadian Bar the whole host of witnesses have not appeared and why are we rushing to judgement?
The Chairman: We are not exactly rushing to judgement. We have endeavoured to contact a long list of witnesses. As is sometimes the case in these matters, some witnesses believe they have already done their thing in front of the House of Commons Committee; others are just not interested in appearing and some have sent written material that is being circulated. We set aside large amounts time for the study this bill. We have done our very best to reach all the witnesses that the steering committee agreed we should try to reach that included the lists submitted by the official opposition. We cannot force these horses to come to water, let alone make them drink, Senator Andreychuk.
Senator Andreychuk: I would certainly like to have known that witnesses would not come because this is the first step. We need independent evidence on interim orders.
The Chairman: If we are considering future business of the committee, I will declare this to be an in camera session of the committee.
The committee continued in camera.