Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
National Finance
Issue 31 - Evidence
OTTAWA, Tuesday, November 22, 2005
The Standing Senate Committee on National Finance met this day at 9:35 a.m. to examine the Main Estimates laid before Parliament for the fiscal year ending March 31, 2006.
Senator Donald H. Oliver (Chairman) in the chair.
[English]
The Chairman: I would like to call this forty-seventh meeting of the Standing Senate Committee on National Finance to order. I would like to remind honourable senators that this committee's field of interest is government spending, either directly through the estimates or indirectly through bills that provide borrowing authority or bear upon the spending proposals identified in the estimates.
[Translation]
On Monday March 7, 2005, our committee was authorized to examine and report on the Main Estimates for the fiscal year ending March 31, 2006. This is the 13th meeting of the committee since March 9, 2005 devoted to the examination of the Main Estimates.
[English]
We have been examining government spending in the context of greater accountability and transparency. At the core of Canada's parliamentary system is the constitutional convention and practice of ministerial accountability. Ministers of the Crown are responsible and accountable to Parliament collectively, as part of cabinet, and individually, as minister in charge of a particular department. This convention arises out of the democratic principle that only elected officials, and not public servants who assist them, should be held accountable for the functioning of the government.
In our examination of these issues, we have heard from a number of former senior public servants and academics including James Mitchell, Arthur Kroeger, as well as Ned Franks, Peter Aucoin, Sharon Sutherland, Jonathan Malloy, Paul Thomas and David Good.
To continue with this particular study we are pleased to welcome today officials from the Treasury Board: Mr. Charles-Antoine St-Jean, the Comptroller General of Canada; Mr. John Morgan, the acting assistant Comptroller General; and Mr. Roger Scott-Douglas, the Executive Director of Strategic Policy.
Charles-Antoine St-Jean, Comptroller General of Canada, Treasury Board of Canada: Honourable senators, thank you for inviting me here today. Before taking your questions, I would like to make some general remarks on the subject of deputy ministers' responsibility for financial management. This subject has been the focus of various studies, the most recent being a review of the responsibilities and accountabilities of ministries and senior officials. The recommendation from this report has been incorporated in the government's management improvement agenda.
I know that the President of the Treasury Board spoke to you about the agenda last week and I would like to recap a few of the highlights he touched upon.
[Translation]
The measures being taken to enhance Parliament's ability to hold the government to account and to provide better, more timely information to parliamentarians are an important part of the management improvement agenda. This will include, for example, more timely Public Accounts.
A range of measures will support ministers in providing leadership on the direction and overall management of their organization. These include receiving detailed assurances that management control systems are in place, and regular accountability sessions with their deputy ministers on significant management issues, such as internal audit reports, Management Accountability Framework assessments and Departmental Performance Reports. Ministers will be expected to attend more parliamentary committee meetings with their deputies present to explain and account for management performance.
To bolster oversight, Treasury Board will call upon ministers and their deputy ministers more frequently to report on strategic management and spending plans, performance and key management challenges in their departments. To reinforce the management responsibilities of deputy ministers, the Financial Administration Act will be amended to give them more explicit statutory authority for day-to-day management matters under the minister, including signing the accounts of the organization. This is a more robust process that will make clear who is responsible for what and mark a significant advance on current practices.
I would like to take the next few minutes to talk about three of my office's initiatives, and how they will support deputy ministers in fulfilling their responsibilities for financial management.
[English]
We have policies with renewal initiatives. I will speak first to our work to streamline and refocus Treasury Board's suite of management policies to bring increased clarity to the responsibilities of deputy ministers.
The management accountability framework will be used as a comprehensive means of assessing management capacity within departments and across government. The driver of management improvement is not more rules but it is the right rules backed up with better information about management performance and stronger governance. As part of this project my office is responsible for developing the financial management policy framework and revising the financial policy suite. We are looking at significant changes. For example, the new policy framework will provide an enhanced structure to the suite of financial policy instruments. It will not only clarify the responsibility of the key stakeholders including deputy ministers, the Comptroller General of Canada, Treasury Board Secretariat and the departmental chief financial officer but also the responsibility of managers and financial officers. We will reduce the number of policies. We do not want to create more rules but we do want better rules that are simple, clear and consistent.
It is expected that the framework will be based on five core financial management policies that will be supported by directives and standards. The framework will provide further guidance and direction in specific areas of financial management.
[Translation]
The five core financial management policies are the backbone of the Chief Financial Officer model which we have developed for the position of departmental comptroller. CFOs will have a vital role to play in strengthening financial management. They will act as objective, strategic advisors to deputy heads, providing them with strong assurance of due diligence, financial management integrity and effective financial controls.
They will be responsible for reviewing and signing off on new departmental spending proposals and initiatives with financial impacts. Sign-off is a written attestation by the CFO and recommendation to the deputy on all financial, risk and performance aspects of the proposal. The CFO will recommend to the deputy whether or not to proceed with the initiative in question. The deputy is then fully accountable for any subsequent decision with respect to the sign-off recommendation.
In summary, the CFO model will support the deputy in his or her financial responsibilities by ensuring the integrity, relevance and reliability of financial management information, controls, analysis and advice.
[English]
The third element is the policy on the internal audit, which involves strengthening financial management by the transformative new policy. The main objectives of this new policy include strengthening and professionalizing the function; adopting a comprehensive government-wide approach to the planning and conducting of internal audits; enhancing the oversight, monitoring and reporting role of internal audit; and increasing the independence of internal audits across government. For example, the chief audit executives will be independent from line operation. Once the policy is fully implemented, all audit committees will have a majority of members coming from outside the public service with the remainder coming from outside the department in question.
The policy sets a clear, integrated assignment of responsibility for internal audit activities between the heads of departments and agencies and the Comptroller General of Canada. With the implementation of the policy, we will be able to provide a greater level of assurance to ministers and deputy ministers.
[Translation]
That is a brief summary of three of our initiatives to strengthen financial management and support deputy ministers in their financial responsibilities.
I would be glad to discuss any of our other initiatives. However, at this time, I welcome your questions and comments.
[English]
The Chairman: Thank you for the excellent overview. Many professors, some who appeared before the committee, have said in numerous academic journals and magazines that the true test of whether it is possible to hold government accountable must rest on committees of Parliament. Today, the only thing you said about Parliament is that you want to have clearer and better information coming before the committees.
I would like to hear your recommendations to empower parliamentary committees of both Houses so that they can better hold government to account. You talked about the chief financial officers, audit committees and other internal elements that will take place. What about the legislative branch where there is a Commons Public Accounts Committee and a Senate National Finance Committee whose responsibility it is to look at estimates and government spending?
Mr. St-Jean: I spoke to how to reinforce financial management within government to ensure that deputy ministers and ministers are fully informed in respect of departmental controls and risks so that they are able to provide complete information to committees.
The constitutional model in terms of who should provide this information to parliamentary committees was proposed by the President of Treasury Board, Mr. Reg Alcock, when he appeared before this committee last week. The responsibility to provide full and complete information to committees would rest with the minister. We want to ensure that ministers and deputy ministers are fully knowledgeable and appropriately informed when they present to committees.
The Chairman: What do you recommend to strengthen the role of parliamentary committees to hold government to account?
Mr. St-Jean: Perhaps my colleague, Mr. Scott-Douglas, could respond to that question.
Roger Scott-Douglas, Executive Director, Strategic Policy, Treasury Board of Canada: In the recently tabled action plan for improving public sector management, the government set out a range of measures that would strengthen Parliament's capacity to hold the government to account. It begins by acknowledging that Parliament, both House committees and Senate committees, talked about the importance of strengthening their capacity to do that through enhanced research capabilities and professional support for the questions and volumes of material presented. The government has indicated that it would support parliamentary committees that wish to do that.
In addition, the government has made it clear that it has an obligation to improve the quality of information put before parliamentary committees. It has indicated a number of measures that it wishes to explore. In the first instance, there will be whole-of-government reporting on the state of management and, in particular, on the state of HR management beginning in 2006.
The government is seeking better ways to reflect in the Main Estimates the numbers that are included in the budget of that year. In that way, when documents are put before Parliament, they will be as up-to-date and current as possible. Committees will be examining figures that are in play at the time, as it were.
In the area of public accounts, there has been a commitment to try to bring before the House an accounting of government spending in a more timely fashion. Mr. St-Jean will be doing that. There will be an effort to bring the power of technology to many reports to ensure better access to the numbers. Statutorily, more than 1,000 reports come before Parliament each year. Developing better access to the data and the information included in it to identify trends and to sort through that material will be of great help.
As Mr. St-Jean mentioned, the appearance of ministers before parliamentary committees, including this committee, would allow Parliament better access. You can get at some of these key issues and ask ministers to account for the performance of their departments — management performance, in particular. They will be accompanied by their deputies more frequently before committees.
The Chairman: Deputies and chief financial officers, I would think.
Senator Stratton: To bring this to practical reality, let us look at a case that has bothered this committee for several years. Please tell this committee and the public how these new rules would control the government spending on the gun registry. Use that as a specific example. How would you prevent the cost overruns on the gun registry?
Remember, we had the minister here year after year. We had the Treasury Board officials here year after year; and every year, it was just a little bit more and a little bit more. It was not until it hit $1 billion and the media got hold of it that it hit the fan.
How are these new rules going to prevent that from reoccurring?
Mr. St-Jean: I took my position about a year and a half ago, so I do not know all the details of the genesis of that file. However, we have studied many cases to learn how we can improve the financial management program.
One of the aspects of it was more independence within the department for the challenge function of program design. I have had many discussions with deputy ministers, ministers and senior financial officers in terms of how we would see the role of the chief financial officers in departments. It would be to challenge not the policy itself but the design of the management framework around those programs to ensure that we do have the proper mechanisms and that we do not have programs that are leaking in their design. We are introducing a much more rigorous and vigorous challenge function within the department by the chief financial officer.
We are also introducing the independent audit executive. This person, independent from operations, will look into the internal controls over programs. We are also introducing the independent audit committee that will oversee the work of the chief financial officer. It will provide rigorous advice to deputy ministers to ensure that when design flaws cause leakages in programs or where the measurement or the strategy around some programs is not clear, they are brought to their attention and reported.
The chief audit executive and the chief financial officer report to the deputy minister but they also have a relationship with the audit committee, which is independent. They also have a reporting relationship with the Comptroller General. When there are issues, we know them early; we focus on them when we can still deal with them. These are some of the elements that will help to strengthen the management of those programs.
Senator Stratton: That is clear and understandable. When you have a program that is starting to get into trouble, you have these challenges and controls. The independent audit committee reports to the deputy minister, who then reports to the minister, saying that things are going astray, things are in trouble, and so on. However, the minister still has the right, as a minister over policy, to make the determination whether or not to proceed despite the reporting. What do you do then?
Mr. St-Jean: You must recognize the primacy of the policy decision. What concerns me is the reporting.
Senator Stratton: While in London we saw a process in which if there is a difference of opinion in the reporting of a problem in a technical, financial or legal way, the minister can still override your opinion in a policy way. How do you manage that? Do you write a letter to someone? Do you just let it go and the minister accepts the responsibility? What happens? That is not clear.
Mr. Scott-Douglas: You have identified a very important part of the accountability process. The government has identified a clearer way of determining who is responsible for which decision and has articulated that in the paper it put before Parliament. It says the minister is responsible for all that happens within the department and is accountable to Parliament for those matters.
In a matter of interpretation of the implication or application of a Treasury Board policy or directive under the Financial Administration Act, in a case where the minister chooses not to follow the advice of his or her deputy minister, in the first instance, that would be discussed with the secretary of the Treasury Board — that is, the secretary to the management board of government, the responsibility centre for determining management policy for the government. That is the first issue. They would try to resolve it at that level and clarify what is entailed and the consequences of those policies, and so on.
Should the minister nevertheless wish to proceed, he or she would then, in conformity with the principle of collective responsibility, go before his or her colleagues at the Treasury Board and explain why he or she wished to do something that was against the advice of the deputy minister. The Treasury Board would then have an opportunity to declare its interpretation of the appropriate policy. That decision would be tabled with the Auditor General.
Senator Stratton: It would then be public through the Auditor General.
Mr. Scott-Douglas: It would be shared with the Auditor General. It would be shared with the Auditor General but, because it is a matter of cabinet confidence, it would be shared with the Auditor General as a decision of Treasury Board.
Senator Stratton: If they decide to control things, this could continue. In other words, another gun registry potential is still there. That would appear to be the case.
Mr. Scott-Douglas: There would be a full discussion of the issue among ministers responsible for the Treasury Board policies.
Mr. St-Jean: A key factor is timely disclosure. When I referred earlier to the challenge functions, the audit function, and the audit committee, we also have the departmental public performance report. As we see in the private sector, audit committees review and see all external publications. One of the roles and responsibilities of the audit committee will be to review the DPR and RPP to ensure there are no errors or omissions. If there are some major deviations in a program, that should be disclosed in the DPR.
In one U.K. model, they disclose when they have problems. The DPR should also be a place where they would disclose any major issues. The audit committee's role will be to ensure there are no errors or omissions so the committee is provided with fair and full disclosure on the state of the controls on the various programs. That mechanism ensures that the committee and Parliament will have the full and fair disclosure on a timely basis.
Senator Stratton: So, it becomes public.
Mr. St-Jean: The DPR is very public.
Senator Stratton: My concern is retroactivity.
Senator Segal: It is disclosed after the fact.
Mr. St-Jean: It is disclosed once a year, not every three or four years. The audit company ensures that they are complete at that time.
Senator Segal: Further to the Comptroller General's statements this morning, I want to pursue the issue of apprehensive control. I do not view the Comptroller General of Canada as a retroactive officer of the Crown. The meeting at Runnymede between the King and the nobles was not about the right to comment after the fact; it was about the right to control expenditures and taxation by the King without regard to the views of others.
The basis of parliamentary control, through no fault of our guests this morning, was largely ceded by all political parties in the 1970s when they took the position that estimates not approved by a committee are deemed to be forwarded up to the House. That is when that measure was lost, and it is not the fault of anyone around this table.
I have three specific questions for you. I ask you to reflect not from the official roles you discharge on behalf of Her Majesty but also as fellow taxpayers and citizens.
You talk about the role of the audit committees, which are being envisaged as having a majority of outsiders, which strikes me as a very constructive reform. I understand that the present draft policy calls for an annual assessment.
Is it your view that everyone's ability, including your own and Parliament's, to understand the context and to act precipitously as necessary would be enhanced if those audit committees could report quarterly as in the private sector?
Often in the private sector, the amounts of money involved would pale by comparison to single line items in many budgetary operations.
Second, the Comptroller General used the expression “better information about management performance.” How timely can that be if it is, at best under the present plan, a year late? Of course, as things really work, it is usually 18 months late due to when the reports about the last fiscal year actually come out. That tends to force this committee, the Public Accounts Committee in the other place, and the entire mindset in this city to be about making retroactive judgments about what public servants and ministers thought might have been appropriate 18 months ago rather than the notion of acting precipitously and constructively based on good information to stop excess from happening.
I do not impute anything around excess other than that on occasion it transpires. The compassionate leave program, for very solid and understandable reasons, had an administrative cost overrun substantially higher than the actual output of cash to deserving recipients, through the fault of no one in particular.
It strikes me that the system did not seem to have the capacity to reach in and stop it before it got worse, as would be the case in any private sector operation. Your colleagues last week about whether they could act precipitously to stop an expenditure that clearly was not doing what it should, they said that they could call a meeting, do a report and gather people together, but that they did not have the ability to just turn the tap off because officials and taxpayers are troubled about the trend.
My final question relates to the internal audit function. In the private sector, which is not necessarily the standard we should follow here, internal audit structure post-Enron has to have an independent reporting relationship to the independent audit committee, all of whom now have to be independent and not in any way related to the day-to-day operation of the company.
They have the burden, which you correctly underline, to disclose materiality. An internal auditor will say that, having found an operation in one of our branches, which was inappropriate, or malfeasant or, most likely, without adequate controls and reporting, they have stopped that operation until a new mechanism is put into place.
It is my sense that that capacity to act before the jar is emptied is not as precise as many would like it to be, I am sure, within the public service itself.
Mr. St-Jean: Private sector audit committees meet up to 12 times a year, although they do not necessarily report at each meeting.
Quarterly financial statements are public and are reviewed by the audit committee for material errors and omissions during the year and at the end of the year, there is an audited statement. Undoubtedly, we will want to put that discipline in place in order to have much more frequent reporting. We are still trying to get audited financial statements for departments. I have a three-year plan to put that in place for the 23 largest departments, which account for 93 per cent of the spending of government.
Senator Segal: You have no real or theoretical opposition to those audit committees reporting publicly every quarter if there was a way for that to happen.
Mr. St-Jean: I do not have an objection, the sooner the better. We should have some type of Management Discussion and Analysis report on a quarterly basis. However, it will take a bit of time to get there.
In terms of better information on a timelier basis and not being retroactive, our proposed design for chief financial officers in departments is exactly what you have stated. It is to have a rigorous challenge at the time the operation comes in so that when we see problems, we can turn the tap on. There are some hard challenges that are independent from programs. We are slowly bringing this model into place to have much more independence of the financial management functions so that when a program goes astray or an unforeseen risk arises, it is the role of the CFO to challenge. If they cannot get the attention of the DM and the audit committee, then they have to come to the Comptroller General so that we can provide advice and support to that CFO on a timely basis.
The reporting is done many months later, but we want the inner workings of the department to be vigorous, rigorous, and independent from the program. That is what we are working toward at this time.
With regard to the internal audit, I appreciate that our model is at variance with what we see in public companies in the private sector. We do not have boards for departments; in the private sectors, public companies have boards. We are trying to find where these audit committees would be better positioned. We designed a system of people from the outside who will be eminent and reputable Canadians who know the business of the departments and can ask tough questions. They will provide hard advice to the deputy ministers.
One of the features of the management of those audit committees will be the terms of reference of those audit committee members and, as I have mentioned a number of times, those audit committee members will have a duty to consult and a duty to resign as part of their terms of reference.
When they see undue management risk, not policy risks but management risks, to the department, they will have a duty to make their best efforts to try to influence the deputy minister to change their course of action and reduce the level of risk and take a course of action that will address those risks. If for a different reason they cannot convince or influence the management to change course of action, then they will have a duty to consult with the Comptroller General or the secretary or the clerk to make sure the information is known so that we can change course of action.
After all this, if no one is moving, then they have a duty to resign publicly. External auditors now have a duty to resign publicly when they have a disagreement with their client. In this case, they will have to send a resignation letter to the deputy minister, to the Comptroller General and probably to the clerk so it will be known there were some disagreements. That does not mean to say there could not be legitimate differences of point of view. Those will happen. It does not mean to say that if somebody resigns, they are always right. However, it will not be done quietly.
That is the protocol that will strengthen the reporting and the control. It is not perfect, but it is better.
Senator Harb: Thank you for your excellent work. In your statement, talking about the CFO model, at the fifth paragraph, you talk about the responsibility of signing off attestation by the CFO that represents his or her professional judgment and recommendation to the deputy on all financial risk and performance aspects of the proposal.
You said earlier that we are dealing with management or with the merit of the proposal. For example, a department has brought forward a spending proposal through the channels. Perhaps you can give us an idea of a situation where you will say that there is a high risk here financially as well as with the performance aspect of the proposal. Give us an example.
Mr. St-Jean: The issue of the sign-off of the CFO has been controversial and debated within government. What should it be? Where do we draw the line between financial management and policy? There is a fine line to say that we have to be humble in that aspect. A good financial officer should not get us into a policy aspect.
A good chief financial officer has a duty to challenge the design of the program that will deliver a policy. We need to ensure all the risks are known. There are good risk mitigation strategies that are known and can be put in place. There is a good measurement strategy to say our design upfront can be implemented and we can measure the effectiveness. It is not for the chief financial officer to design the outcomes and the outputs of the program, but we need a measurement strategy that tells us we are doing what we are supposed to be doing.
The role of the chief financial officer is to do a good challenge of that spending so he or she can provide an informed opinion to the deputy minister as to whether the proposal is financially sound. When I say “financially sound,” it is not only that the left side of the equation has integrity; but also that outcome and the outputs show that the thing can fly. If we cannot give assurance that this can fly, then the CFO should probably state so.
Senator Harb: You become accountable and not the department that made the proposal. They already have it as an item line for spending.
Mr. St-Jean: The program officer is the foremost person responsible for that proposal. We do not want the chief financial officer to be responsible for everything in the department. The program officer must take ownership and responsibility for the design and operation of the program. When the program officer goes to the deputy minister with what he feels is the greatest program in the world the DM says to the chief financial officer, “Can you challenge this program design to ensure that everything that has been told to me is reasonable and is good and there is a good design and measurement?”
The CFO is responsible to provide a due diligence on it and provide advice to the DM. At the end of the day, it is the DM's responsibility to accept the advice or not. This is where the accountability lies. The CFO must ensure he has vigorous and rigorous challenges before providing his advice.
Senator Harb: My second question is a result of a number of years observing how government has moved from one system to another system that is mostly information-based, accessible and transparent to large extent. If we were to look internationally, Canada is probably ranked as a top country in terms of management systems.
Can you see any possibility in your role as a Comptroller General of Canada where at some point you put your foot down and say that every department has a financial statement issued on an annual basis or a quarterly basis?
The role that Treasury Board has taken over the years has been to prepare auditable financial statements, but not audited financial statements. It has become a question of credibility. When you have these internal auditors doing the auditing, if there is a problem, we will not be able to look at it with a balance. We will say, it is tilted, it is internal, and we do not know.
Rather, if it was to be done on a purely external basis, hiring a firm in order to do the actual independent auditing of financial statements, when these financial statements come to a parliamentary committee or the House of Commons from the department of whatever, it is a financial statement that is independently audited.
By doing so, I believe your role as a comptroller would be easier because then you have that independent eye that looks into what has taken place. Secondly, the Auditor General's job will become easier. Third, as a taxpayer looking from the outside in, you will feel more comfortable. Would you agree?
Mr. St-Jean: Yes, indeed. I would like to thank you for your preamble when you said that the Government of Canada is still recognized as number one. I really want to make that point. I try to make it internally and externally. Whenever I have discussions with my counterparts from the G7 countries, they are in awe of the quality of our financial management, to see our proactive disclosure. When I say we put contracts over $10,000 on the web, and the travelling of all the senior officials, some of them look at me with big eyes. In terms of transparency and disclosure, we are no doubt at the forefront.
Senator Segal: Not all of that was progress.
Mr. St-Jean: No, but I think we are on the same page.
In terms of quality of financial statements, we are still the only country with consolidated financial statements, which our auditor would say are unqualified and prepared on the accrual basis in the G7 countries. We should not forget that we are pretty much number one on many of those fronts.
That being said, Canadians still want additional assurances. We are asking it of the public companies and public organizations and not-for-profit organizations also. I agree with you that we should have audited financial statements of at least our major departments. We have a plan to put it in place within three years. It will take some time. There will be some additional costs to put them in place. The president and the minister of Finance are putting aside the funds to do it. We are determined to make it not only an auditable but an audited financial statement, so that by 2009, we will have audited financial statements.
Let us not kid ourselves. Our friends in the U.S. say that when you look at the DOD, they do not expect unqualified audited opinion for at least 10 years. Of the countries in Europe, the only one that has one is the U.K. It is not easy to do. We are trying to get unqualified audited financial statements within the next three years. We hope to be there, but it will be tough.
John Morgan, Acting Assistant Comptroller General, Treasury Board of Canada: Honourable senators, starting in fiscal 2005-06, departments will be required to produce their financial statements in their DPRs. Some of these are produced already and tabled in Parliament on an audited basis, so what we will have for 2005-06 is a mix; some will be audited and some will not be audited.
The Chairman: You are not asking that they all be audited until 2009; is that correct?
Mr. Morgan: We will be focusing on the major departments. We will then take stock in terms of the cost of the audit, their value, to see do we proceed with all the other financial statements of smaller organizations.
Senator Harb: I look at what you do and I say, “Wow, the Auditor General does that, too.” How do you two interact? At what point in time do you say, “This is not my field, this is the Auditor General's”? Value for money has been changed in the past few years, so the Auditor General looks at that. At what point do you say, “This my territory,” and the Auditor General will say, “This my territory”? In a situation like that, who resolves the impasse?
Mr. St-Jean: The role of the Auditor General is clear. They are the external auditors. They provide the opinion to Parliament. Our job is to ensure that our statements can be audited, that they can sustain an audit and obtain an unqualified audit opinion. Our job is to do everything we can to ensure that they can express an audit opinion. There is no contradiction. It is a continuum of work. We prepare them; we make sure they are auditable; there are audit trails and so on. They do their work and give their opinion. I hope that we will get an unqualified audit opinion. We have a good relationship with the Auditor General.
Senator Ringuette: I find that the Canadian government will be audited almost to death. It is incredible, but from my perspective as a country girl, I like things that are simple, practical and efficient. I have many concerns in regard to the role and model that you are proposing.
First, in practical terms, it goes back to Senator Harb's question; you are signing off on programs and making recommendations to the deputy minister. When is the information going to the minister who is ultimately responsible to Parliament?
Mr. St-Jean: My colleague could expand in regard to the accountability sessions which are expected to be held between deputy ministers and ministers.
Senator Ringuette: No, what I am asking is when you make a recommendation on a certain program, either for or against or with alternatives, you are making the recommendations to the deputy minister. When do you make this information about the recommendations available to the minister? Is it at the same time or six months afterwards or when?
I assume that when you look at a program you do the risk assessment and some kind of value for money outlook on the proposals. I assume you look for alternative options.
Mr. St-Jean: I would have great difficulty if suddenly the CFOs were reporting to both the deputy ministers and the minister. The link between the deputy minister and the minister must be clear. The deputy minister and the CFO challenge the management framework around the program.
Senator Ringuette: The minister must be informed because he or she is responsible and accountable to Parliament.
Mr. St-Jean: The minister receives the information in two ways: through the deputy ministers who will have those discussions, and through yearly discussions of the internal controls of the department. The minister sits down with the audit committee to review the health of internal control and to look at the risk profile of the department to ensure that the department has a good management framework.
The presumption is that the ministers and the deputy ministers will be talking frequently about the various programs. However, at least once a year, there will be an accountability session between the minister and the audit committee to ensure that the minister is fully informed of the health of the internal control.
The Chairman: Is once a year enough?
Mr. St-Jean: The policy states that it is at least once a year. Personally, I hope it would be more often. At least once a year, ministers will have a duty to sit down with the audit committee to review the health of the audit committee. If it is more often, I would be delighted.
Senator Ringuette: The Auditor General does forensic analysis, value for money and more than once a year reports to Parliament.
You say that within each department you have the departmental comptroller who reports to the deputy minister, who may or may not but should report to the minister, who on a daily basis is responsible to report to Parliament. Then you have this addition of an independent, internal audit for each department, with people coming from outside the public service. I guess this will be a once a year thing?
Mr. St-Jean: No.
Senator Ringuette: Is it a continuous thing?
Mr. St-Jean: As I mentioned to Senator Segal, the audit committees nowadays in large organizations, meet four, five, six or 10 times a year. Before that, it used to be four times a year, for short meetings. If you have a large organization, an audit committee can last half a day to a day.
Senator Ringuette: I am sorry, but I thought that the auditing job was supposed to be for the Auditor General. I thought your job was to look at control mechanisms and to ensure that the day-to-day operation and program delivery had benchmarks and objectives and you were looking constantly at ensuring that the comptroller that you had within reviewed those benchmarks.
Mr. St-Jean: In any large organization, you always have the external audit and the report to the owners or, in this case, Parliament.
Senator Ringuette: I find it difficult to see where you are convinced you can be the comptroller and the auditor at the same time.
Mr. St-Jean: In any large organization, you have the chief financial officers, internal auditors, and the external auditors who represent the owners, in this case Parliament. Parliament is asking the Auditor General, on their behalf, to audit the books of the various departments and report. That is the role of Parliament.
The deputy minister asks the chief financial officer to put in place a good control system on which to manage the department. He asks the chief audit executive to make sure the internal control system is well designed. The deputy minister can focus on the operation of the department. Like any other organization, he can have an external auditor audit his books and report to Parliament. This is a very simple model.
Mr. Scott-Douglas: I want to comment on two points because I think they are terribly important.
Your first point, by way of introduction, is that you are concerned about adding more rules to the situation. That same feeling was very much present in the development of this package and Minister Alcock was keen to try to reduce and streamline the number of rules. There will be much less reliance on rules and much enhanced reliance on up-to- date, timely and comprehensive performance management information and the appropriate oversight. What you have mentioned is very much a shared concern with the government.
The second point is that you rightly identified the daily accountability relationship ministers have on management issues in the House and before parliamentary committees such as this. A number of important measures have been taken to strengthen the assurance that ministers have when they stand before their colleagues. An accountability session with deputy ministers who have responsibility for daily management of the departments will provide them with information on a timely basis. They will receive information on their internal audit reports, the reports on plans and parties, department performance reports, the assessment of department performance against management accountability framework, et cetera. You will get ministers with a much greater degree of assurance that things are working within their departments and control systems are doing their jobs.
There will be a management agreement reached between the minister and his or her deputy minister on these matters. You will have many measures within this package that go right to the heart of some of your concerns.
Senator Ringuette: I have a complicated question so if you want to send us an answer in writing that would be fine. This question relates to you statement that says:
Once the policy is fully implemented, all audit committees will have a majority of members coming from outside the public service with the remainder coming from outside the department in question.
I would like to know about the cost and who will compose “outside the public service” and their relevance to the department. We are looking at many new costs for each department in order to make this happen.
Why have you chosen this model and not gone with the appropriate House of Commons' standing committees for each of those departments to participate in this audit performance?
Mr. St-Jean: The cost of maintaining competent audit committees throughout the Government of Canada has been estimated at about $7 million a year. We expect to see audit committee members sit approximately 20 days a year with the chair of the audit committee possibly sitting up to 30 days a year. It will depend on the complexity and the size of the department.
In terms of the sourcing of those audit committee members, we will be looking at a combination of two profiles for those audit committees. One-half of the members will need to demonstrate a deep knowledge of the business of the department or the management process of the department. As an example, DND is one of the largest logistics organizations in Canada and therefore it would be worthwhile to get someone who has managed a large logistic organization, especially an international logistic organization. We must have some Canadians who would come and provide advice to the deputy minister about managing the risk of logistics. They would provide real value-added advice on the management of risk.
The other half of the members of the audit committees would be people trained in how to deal with external auditors, internal audits and CFOs. They must know to ask questions if they are not satisfied with the answers they are getting from internal auditors or are not satisfied with the audit program. They will exercise a challenging function. These people will have experience on audit committees of large organizations, not-for-profit organizations, public companies or other government departments. These people will ask the hard questions.
We did not look at the parliamentary committee model to play that role because we are looking at two different roles. One role was to provide a good, strong management of the government so they could present themselves in front of audit committees with a solid framework, good answers, and so on. It is then for the committees to play their role.
I was a bit concerned that there is a division of responsibility — and I am not a constitutional expert — but I was advised that they might try mixing legislative with the executive, which might confuse some of the lines. We chose audit committees made up of experts who know audits and financial management. They can come before committees with proper answers.
The Chairman: How many audit committees do you envisage for $7 million?
Mr. St-Jean: There are 25 large departments with $1 billion plus as their expenditure. About 15 to 20 departments and agencies are medium size. I would expect that all those organizations should have an audit committee. We would also have an audit committee for all the small departments and agencies that would be a bit larger. I expect there would be about 30 to 40 audit committees for the Government of Canada, with 125 to 140 outsiders that would be needed for audit committee members.
The Chairman: With regard to the 140 outsiders, what would you envisage paying them on an annual basis?
Mr. St-Jean: We might want to adopt the approach taken by Justice Department in paying outside lawyers or legal advisors. I think they have a rate of pay in the range of $200-$225 dollars per hour. This is nothing compared to what the private sector pays for audit committees of large organizations and we are not trying to compete with it. Financial exposure is not the same but the risk to reputation is probably as high, if not higher. We want to find a good balance to have the undivided attention of the members of the audit committees. An audit committee's business is serious. We are examining it on that basis, although we have not made a final decision.
Senator Murray: Mr. St-Jean, I would like you to recall some concerns that I raised a year or two ago, in particular, the reporting relationship of these departmental comptrollers. I believe that the committee took the position that departmental comptrollers should owe their loyalty to a higher power than the deputy minister. It was suggested that they report directly to you, the Comptroller General of Canada. We lost that argument and they report directly to the deputy minister with a kind of “dotted line” to you.
As you described the new model today, it recommends, advises, and supports reporting to the deputy ministers. There is little in this about your role. I would like you to say a word about your authority in terms of appointing departmental comptrollers and removing them, if necessary.
We all laugh when Senator Stratton sits down at the piano to play the gun registry blues but he has a point. I ask myself whether it would have been possible to catch the problems surrounding the gun registry at an early stage if we had had this model in place. After reading this, I think yes and I think no. The problem was that the registry was put under the Department of Justice where they have little experience in running a large program of that kind. Not only did they not know how to run the program but also they did not know what they did not know. The minister of the day had been the prime mover of the program and he and the government had a great deal of political capital invested in it.
What would have been our first line of defence? Would it have been the departmental comptroller, recognizing that being human there is a tendency to close ranks in a department? Would it have been the audit committee, in terms of stopping this at an earlier stage before it became a truly horrendous problem?
Mr. St-Jean: There is no simple answer to this question because there is the role of the departmental comptrollers to consider. As you mentioned, with all due respect for colleagues in the Department of Justice, their experience in managing large programs was probably not optimum. In terms of the risk factor associated with the program, that is what I mean by the management framework. One of the risks is having competent people that are in the know because they have managed projects and have the scars to prove it. If there is a large risk, you want to have a mitigation strategy such that the CFO can call a time out and insist on rigorous and challenging discussions with the deputy minister on that large risk, which might be at an undue level. The audit committee would be informed and involved in this decision. You do not necessarily want to run to the Comptroller General for each issue; however, departmental comptrollers have a duty to consult with the Comptroller General. Then, it is up to the Comptroller General to pursue discussion with the clerk or the deputy clerk. The dotted line to the comptroller must be a solid line so that when major issues arise the Comptroller General is able to exercise his or her responsibility to ensure that the proper control framework is put in place.
The other aspect is better disclosure in the estimates in respect of the use of funds. Currently, we see more details in DPRs and RPPs that should alert the committee to some of those issues sooner.
Senator Murray: The Senate committee was on it at a relatively early stage. Treasury Board officials gave us their information and the committee moved on. However, it continued to worsen, and no one in government seemed to have a handle on it.
Mr. St-Jean: The proposed model will help such situations to surface sooner, although not in all cases perhaps because no system can do that. The duty to consult and the duty to report for the audit committee should bode well for a quicker, more visible exposure of such issues.
Senator Murray: It was not a question of impropriety.
Mr. St-Jean: No, it was a matter of the undue risk. It was not that people were not trying to do their best but whether they had the proper infrastructure to manage the program.
Senator Murray: Several times today Mr. St-Jean, you and your colleagues have insisted that the government is not piling new rules upon new rules but, rather, streamlining the rules. It is not clear to me whether the government is trying to anticipate Justice Gomery or get ahead of him.
What did you think of Harry Swain's speech last week?
Mr. St-Jean: I would simply allow the gentleman his opinion. I truly believe in strong governance. I have been in this job for about 18 months and I have seen many transactions sent to Treasury Board for decisions, some for small amounts and others for billions of dollars. At times, it is difficult to know whether TBS is managing the programs or the department is managing its programs.
Senator Murray: Sometimes the arguments are over the small amounts.
Mr. St-Jean: Currently, the 754 transfer payment programs have to be reviewed under the existing rules by the Office of the Comptroller General of Canada. I find it difficult to envision adding value in the review of each of those programs. That would be better done by departmental officials, who know the business and are empowered to challenge it. Rather than run to Treasury Board to have all transfer payment programs reviewed and approved, the précis prepared, and the analyses done in both languages, perhaps it would be better to have it done in the home department.
We are looking at pushing back the management of programs to the respective departments to determine where there is strong self-governance. Audit committees will look at the overall managing framework of the department and, if there are problems, will expect those people to speak up and advise their deputy ministers to do the right thing.
The objective is to push the management back into the departments and make them manage their departments and keep the strategic transactions at the centre. We know who is responsible for what jobs and this measure takes the enormous procedural machinery out of the department.
I have been trying to understand all the financial management policies of the Government of Canada for the last year and a half. It is pretty tough.
The Chairman: That is the point that Senator Murray is making. They are adding to it.
Mr. St-Jean: No. We are bringing the review of the policy suite down to five policies. The financial management policies will be found in five or six pages that deputy ministers will be able to read and understand easily. The DM will not have to read volumes of directives and guidelines, some that date back 10, 20 or 30 years.
Having said that, we have to put things into perspective. The public sector has also expanded the number of rules and guidelines. The private sector has been going through the same exercise. Sarbanes-Oxley has put an enormous burden on the private sector. We do not intend to go anywhere near the Sarbanes-Oxley type of reporting. That would cost the Government of Canada $100 million or $200 million if we were to put that type of regime in place. I do not think that Canadians would find value in that type of exercise; what they want is good governance — good, strong challenges within departments and good reporting relationships so that when there is a problem, it surfaces. We do not want a lot of rules and regulations.
Senator Murray: I hope the Gomery commission will focus on restoring parliamentary control of the public purse rather than suggesting or recommending volumes of new rules and procedures.
Mr. St-Jean: I am with you, senator.
Senator Murray: Mr. Justice Gomery has a number of advisers that we know and hold in high esteem. However, they are all on the record on these issues and they have been out around the country schmoozing with like-minded people. I think we know what to expect.
Senator Segal: We will see how that word is translated in the blues.
The Chairman: Those are interesting comments by Senator Murray. I hope they will be taken into account.
Senator Mitchell: Like most of the members of the committee and probably most observers of this process, I share the concern about paralysis of the public service. It seems we focus almost entirely on what is going wrong. It is not just the politicians who wear that; I am sure public servants feel that as well. It is not a very inspirational process for them. Second, my experience in business and elsewhere is that you cannot manage something that you cannot measure. Third, we are probably all aware of the power of business plans.
Is there something akin to business plans in the process of developing budgets and the like, which would be very clear in outlining the objectives for a department? Objectives are extremely important in focusing peoples' energies and effectiveness.
Is there a mechanism for identifying benchmarks? It is easy for a business to measure success — you either make money or you do not. It is less easy to do that in government, as we are all aware.
This may be a bad example, but let us say the health department establishes benchmarks with respect to waiting lists. Those become measurements for that department. At the end of each year, we see how that is progressing.
A properly structured business plan process harnesses the energy, resources and strengths of the people in a big organization. It gives a way of focusing people and inspiring them to achieve something big and important. When you measure it, it simply enhances that process.
I see business plans as a very positive process. It would meet Senator Segal's concern with doing something apprehensively, or before the fact. I am sure he is apprehensive about most of what the government does. Could you comment on that?
Mr. St-Jean: In your first comments, you are talking about the difficulty that the paralysis causes. There is no doubt that we have to deal with this issue. I have raised it with the newcomers to the civil service and also with students. We have to make the government an attractive employer. If we keep putting such burdens on our civil servants that they cannot act and are all tied up, this is not a productive environment for new people to join.
We are competing for talent and if we are not attractive, people will go elsewhere and everyone will suffer. We have to find a way to attract talented people. I had that discussion again last week with the newcomers that are taking the CMA/CIPFA program for financial management in the public sector. We imported this program from the United Kingdom and we are tailoring it to Canadian needs.
I agree with you that the business of public service is extremely difficult to measure. In the private sector, we have more immediate measurements such as profit, market shares or the position of the brands. There are some pretty objective measures that people recognize, which make it clearer in terms of whether or not you succeed. In the public sector, we have to define “good.”
The government, over the last few years, has introduced the Report on Plans and Priorities. It is not a perfect document by any stretch of the imagination, but it is not bad; it is moving in the right direction. I would like to make the RPPs a bit more like the measure, discussion and analysis — the MDA — where we have full disclosure and analysis to see the business of the department, the programs and how to measure the output and the outcomes. Outcome is always difficult to measure, but maybe we can have surrogates of the outcome, which will be the outputs, and we can measure it year by year to see if we are making progress.
When we are talking about the challenge role of the chief financial officers and the measurement strategy, it is not enough to have a good measurement framework around those programs. You must have a good measurement strategy. I do not care what “good” is, that is for the policy people; but define what “good” is for me so that I can measure our progress. We will be pushing to have more discipline in the RPPs. We will also have more discipline in the sign-off to ensure that we can measure the “good.” That is a culture that I would like to push forward in the system.
Senator Mitchell: I encourage you to do so.
Senator Cowan: My question deals with the recruitment of external members of the audit committee. It seems to me that there would be a pretty small pool of people who would have the deep knowledge of a department that you describe who would not quickly run afoul of conflict of interest guidelines. On paper this makes a lot of sense.
You used the Department of Defence as an example, so I am trying to think of people who would be familiar with defence procurement, who would not have some dealings with or be part of firms or organizations which have dealings with, if not that department, other departments that would quickly make them run afoul of the conflict of interest guidelines.
I am not arguing against this, but I would like to hear your views on how available these qualified, independent outside experts would be and how available they would be to take on the job that you describe and give it the kind of emphasis required to do the job effectively.
Mr. St-Jean: Independence is absolutely crucial. In no way, shape or form can the audit committee have any other dealings with the department. They cannot compromise their independence.
With regard to knowledge of the business of the department, for DND I was thinking of logistics. Companies such as Purolator and FedEx are pretty large organizations. We have large manufacturing companies that know about logistics although they are not defence companies per se. Procurement is a large part of it.
Senator Cowan: I would think that those organizations have dealings with the Government of Canada in some other way would prevent them from acting in this capacity. I agree with you that they would have the necessary talents, experience and expertise.
Mr. St-Jean: We would be looking at people who were previously but are no longer associated with those organizations, such as retirees and former members of boards of directors. Some of these people are in academia, some are professional board members and some are in not-for-profit organizations. We have to be careful about independence.
We have had a number of discussions with eminent Canadians on this subject. Some would be stepping down from boards to have the opportunity of being of service to Canada. It will not be easy to find them, but I will be asking the deputy ministers to help us find the very best Canadians to provide us with good management advice. There must be good chemistry between the deputy minister and the audit committee members so that they can provide good advice. We will work together to find the best Canadians for the job. We are not talking about thousands of people; we are talking about 100-150 people. It will not be easy but we should be able to find them.
Senator Day: Mr. St-Jean, I was interested in your comment that you have imported from the U.K. a financial program for the public sector and that you have made certain modifications to it to fit the Canadian situation. I am particularly interested in the issue of responsibility of deputy ministers. You said that to reinforce management responsibilities of deputy ministers the Financial Administration Act will be amended to give more explicit statutory authority for day-to-day management. I am sure you will ask Parliament to amend the act.
This committee handled the public service reorganization bill and we heard extensive testimony on why it was important to allow public servants and, in particular, deputy ministers, to manage. I think you used the term “let the managers manage.” We accepted that approach with respect to the fundamental change in public sector reorganization. We know that there are a number of different provisions for delegation of authority to deputy ministers and now we are talking about amending the Financial Administration Act to give explicit statutory authority to deputy ministers.
My question is with respect not to the authority but the responsibility and the accountability. Parliament is giving them direct statutory authority. They also have delegated authority. Surely, then, they have a responsibility to account to Parliament for that authority; otherwise, we are giving them all kinds of powers but they are not accountable to Parliament. I would like you to comment on that.
Mr. St-Jean: I will speak to the point on importing U.K. training, and then I will ask my colleague to comment more specifically on the last part of the question.
The U.K. training is for certified financial officers in the public sector. It is a pretty good program. My colleagues in the U.K. treasury department are very happy with the support of that organization which trains the public sector. We started this only two months ago. We have a pilot program with 25 students. We will be refining it and by September we hope to be able to offer this program more widely so that our financial officers are better trained, both those from the outside and those inside, to know better how to manage in the public sector environment. We will be doing that in the near future.
Senator Day: We play around with the words “responsibility” and “accountability.” I do not mean anything sinister by the word “accountability.” I just mean responsibility and reporting. Tell us what is going on and accept the consequences if you have not done what you said you were going to do.
Mr. Scott-Douglas: Senator Day, Parliament will be asked to amend the Financial Administration Act to make more explicit their management responsibilities “under the minister,” and that is a very important phrase in this context. It recognizes that departmental legislation provides ministers with the authority for the management and general direction of their portfolios and that under that you will see deputy ministers executing their authority. It is under the minister. It reinforces and maintains that important relationship that ministers have to the management responsibilities of the department.
Second, in those cases the deputy minister will be accountable to the minister for how he or she executes those authorities that are made clear in the Financial Administration Act. That will be an accountability issue. The minister, in turn, will be accountable to the Prime Minister and to Parliament for how that authority is used. They will, at the same time, be accountable to their colleagues on the Treasury Board who have the management responsibility internal to government, mirroring the responsibility of Parliament but within government. That is how that will play itself out in terms of accountability.
Mr. Morgan: In terms of powers vested with deputy heads or ministers within legislation, in Financial Administration Act or other acts, sometimes these are further constrained with reference to policies or directives of the Treasury Board. The Treasury Board powers in issuing policies then constrain deputy heads in terms of managing their affairs with due regard for legislation but also Treasury Board policies, so that complicates it in terms of that overall relationship. It is not complete authority to do what they want within the statute; it is also constrained by Treasury Board policies.
Senator Day: You recall when we had the public service reorganization bill a few years ago that there was direct delegation of responsibility to deputy ministers, not to the minister and then down to the deputy, but either from Treasury Board or Public Service Commission directly to the deputy minister. “Deputy Head” was the term used.
We have had witnesses, and Mr. Franks was one of them, that said that since they have been given either statutory or delegated authority directly, then they should be responsible in their own right and therefore accountable in their own right to Parliament.
This is one of the committees of Parliament, so we should be able to bring the deputy minister here and expect the deputy minister to be accountable directly and not, as so often happen, have them come and be very concerned about saying anything that might in any way step on the toes of their minister. We want direct information and direct thought.
Mr. Scott-Douglas: The deputy minister has at least two sources of authority. One, as you say, is delegated, so the authority is in the first instance assigned to or vested in the minister, and that minister in turn delegates it to the deputy minister. In that case, the deputy minister is accountable to the minister for that authority that has come from the minister.
In other cases, you are right that there are certain acts, and they tend to be quite narrow in scope and deal with specific issues, that do assign authority directly to deputy ministers. In those cases, the minister remains accountable to Parliament overall for the all actions within the department. There is an accountability relationship that continues to exist. The deputy minister is answerable to Parliament, comes before committee such as this, and provides explanations and information about what was done. The deputy minister for those responsibilities is accountable, for instance, to Treasury Board for the use of authorities that are assigned directly to the minister under the Financial Administration Act or, for instance, to the Public Service Commission for certain authorities assigned to the deputy minister in the area of staffing. There is an accountability relationship that continues to exist, but it is within government in those specific instances. The minister remains accountable to Parliament for the overall management direction of the department. Parliament goes to the minister for that accountability relationship.
Senator Day: That is helpful. I will wait to see what you will ask us to consider with respect to amendments to the Financial Administration Act. However, as I understand your point now, you are saying this statutory authority that will be going to the deputy minister will be really just a comment that the minister may delegate to the deputy minister. You are saying it is under the minister, and therefore the line is still minister to deputy minister.
Mr. Scott-Douglas: Correct. It will reinforce the minister's responsibility for his or her department and will make clear that the deputy minister, under the minister, has responsibility for the day-to-day management of the department and for the signing of the accounts of the organization.
Senator Day: So what is new?
Mr. Scott-Douglas: That does not exist currently in legislation.
Senator Day: Why do we need legislation to say that the deputy minister works for the minister?
Mr. Scott-Douglas: It will make it explicit. As Mr. Morgan made clear, it will also ensure that the Treasury Board has the required authorities to provide direction to deputy ministers on how they can use the authority vested in them and will put constraints where necessary to ensure that the sound principles of management are adhered to in the use of that authority.
Senator Day: Directly to the deputy minister.
Mr. Scott-Douglas: That is correct, yes.
Senator Day: This will be interesting, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman: Yes, it will. Honourable senators, our time is up, but there are two senators who are down for a second round. I propose they put their questions on the record, and perhaps, Mr. St-Jean, you can send a written response. You are the last witnesses that we will be hearing on the accountability paper that we are working on, so your comments will be incorporated in the report we intend to table soon. If you could respond quickly to the two questions that will be put, we would appreciate that.
Senator Ringuette: Briefly, when you sign off a written attestation to the deputy minister, is that before or after you receive the money from Treasury Board?
Under your organization budget, are the different department comptrollers under your budget, and what is your budget?
In regards to these new internal auditing committees, will they be under your budget or under the department budget? Who will appoint them?
Who has attested this number of $7 million? Have you verified this number of $7 million? If the $7 million is distributed to all the departments, how can we make sure that this is the right assessment?
Senator Segal: Very specifically, I would be appreciative, and I am sure colleagues on the committee would share that appreciation, if you and your officials could reflect on the answer to this question and provide it in a convenient time frame.
What are the barriers to having all federal departments report on their material financial activities quarterly in the public domain to Parliament so that ministers, the Comptroller General, the Auditor General and Parliament have the data and the information necessary to judge, on a proactive basis, in-year activities before a problem so worsens that it is beyond repair? Thank you.
The Chairman: Mr. St-Jean, Mr. Scott-Douglas, Mr. Morgan, thank you for coming and answering a series of difficult and complicated questions. You have discharged your duties and obligations very well, and we appreciate your input into this important study.
Honourable senators, we will now continue in camera.
The committee continued in camera.