Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Foreign Affairs
Issue 19 - Evidence - Meeting of June 29, 2005
OTTAWA, Wednesday, June 29, 2005
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs met this day at 4:09 p.m. to examine the documents Overview, Diplomacy, Development and Commerce of Canada's International Policy Statement.
Senator Peter A. Stollery (Chairman) in the chair.
[English]
The Chairman: Honourable senators, welcome to this first meeting of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs on Canada's International Policy Statement.
[Translation]
Canada's International Policy Statement was released on April 19. At that time, the Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that this statement sets out an "integrated approach that will guide the next generation of Canadian global engagement." It brings together our diplomatic, defence, development, trade and investment strategies.
We shall attempt to see how these strategies will be put into effect.
[English]
For the benefit of our audience, I point out that the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence is currently studying the defence portion of this policy.
We have today the pleasure of welcoming Robert McRae, Director General, Policy Planning Secretariat, who is here for the diplomacy portion of the IPS; Robert Greenhill, the newly-minted president of the Canadian International Development Agency for the development section of the policy; and Randle Wilson, Acting Assistant Deputy Minister for Communications, Strategic Policy and Corporate Planning for the commerce segment of the IPS. Welcome to the Senate of Canada.
Mr. McRae, you have the floor.
Mr. Robert McRae, Director General, Policy Planning Secretariat, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Foreign Affairs): It is a pleasure to be here today to talk about the International Policy Statement. The IPS, as you are aware, was released on April 19 and provides, really for the first time, a strategic international policy framework to set out and to orient Canada's global engagement. Backed by almost $17 billion over five years, allocated by the budget 2005, the statement sets out five priorities.
[Translation]
Overall this entails: revitalizing our North American partnership; building a more secure world by countering terrorism, stabilizing failed and failing states, and combatting weapons of mass destruction proliferation; increasing global prosperity, by strengthening Canadian competitiveness, enhancing commercial engagement, and targeting support for Canadian business; taking responsibility by strengthening respect for human rights and building genuine developments; and crafting a new multilateralism and shaping a new and more flexible diplomacy.
[English]
The IPS reflects as well new approaches and new realities for international policy. First, it takes an integrated approach to international relations. Let me explain what we mean by that. There is a clear recognition woven throughout the IPS that the issues we face are ever more complex and increasingly interrelated, and that the distinction between domestic and international policies is irrevocably blurred. The ISP, therefore, puts forward a "whole-of-government," as we may say, and "whole-of-Canada" plan of action to respond to the international challenges facing Canada today.
Second, the IPS recognizes that we live in a changing geopolitical landscape, the principle aspects of which are the following. With respect to North America, which remains key in importance in our document, the government seeks to strike the right balance, combining progress in security, economic and people-to-people relations. The IPS also recognizes the need for new approaches to our continental relations and the growing importance of a more open and engaged Mexico.
Next, on failed and failing states: Among the greatest contemporary security threats are those resulting from fragile states. This is a theme that we see throughout all of the documents of the IPS. The document acknowledges that long-term commitment to help build institutions, civil society and a political culture conducive to security and prosperity is needed in order to make a difference.
Next, global issues: There is strong recognition in the IPS, broadly speaking, of the need for Canada to be more active in the world to adequately tackle global issues such as health, sustainable development and terrorism.
Finally, emerging giants: The IPS clearly factors in the global importance of emerging giants such as China, India, Brazil and the EU as well, while at the same time also recognizing that we need to develop stronger ties with the south in general.
[Translation]
Third, the IPS recommends that there be a serious reinvestment in Canada's role in the world.
The federal budget of 2005 provides for a considerable increase in the level of funding of our international instruments to enable the government to implement the IPS. As mentioned, some $17 billion in additional funding over a 5-year period has been earmarked to help us meet our global responsibilities and raise Canada's global profile. This increased funding will be directed towards strengthening the effectiveness and agility of our diplomatic presence abroad, bolstering our national defence, doubling our international assistance, and building stronger international economic relationships.
[English]
Let me quickly outline some of the key priorities of the diplomacy paper in the IPS and Foreign Affairs' IPS implementation. Since the 1995 foreign policy review, clearly failed and failing states and the rise of conflict within nations have posed a growing threat to international security. The new Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force — we call it START — will provide rapid reaction to international crises at Foreign Affairs. It will be funded by a $100 million per annum global peace and security fund, a first for the department. On this, we are moving ahead rapidly with implementation through the processes involved with cabinet and Treasury Board, and we will be proceeding to put into operation the START initiatives in the months ahead.
We are focussing more strongly on results-oriented multilateralism, using the best tools for each job based on the respective strengths of the various international institutions. Here, Canada's support for these efforts will be put into play this fall when reform issues are taken up at the UN leaders' summit in September.
Another key diplomatic priority will be to build new networks of influence through the development of what we are calling whole-of-government strategies to broaden and deepen ties with rising global powers such as China, India and Brazil.
The IPS commits us to greater transparency through a regular update on international priorities and achievements, in order to give Canadians a stronger sense of how and why international engagement matters to them. The IPS is, as the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs have said, a living document, and the views of this and other parliamentary committees will be taken into account in the first annual update on the IPS which will be delivered by the minister.
Finally, the diplomacy section highlights a renewed Department of Foreign Affairs, focussed on rebuilding our field presence, rebuilding our policy capacity, mainstreaming public diplomacy and modernizing consular and passport operations to provide the best possible assistance to Canadians abroad. Our work in terms of strengthening our overseas presence is well on track. We hope to have some additional officers already overseas this summer, to be followed with further numbers in subsequent summers.
Policy capacity will be enhanced by working more closely with other parts of government. This will provide better forecasting and policy leadership across government and more in-depth foreign policy options for the consideration of the government.
As noted in the IPS, public diplomacy is about projecting a coherent voice to all those who have influence overseas, not just to those within government. The IPS makes it a priority to mainstreaming public diplomacy in our work to ensure that public diplomacy considerations are incorporated into the full range of Canada's international policies.
The government is committed to providing better consular and passport services to Canadians by continuing to enhance security features of Canadian passports, revising travel information on an ongoing basis using state-of-the-art communications systems, and by creating a consular consultative board to discuss key issues that have an impact on consular services.
The foreign policy dialogue, which preceded the publication of the review, showed us that Canadians want their government to play a strong role internationally. The public interest shown in the IPS has reinforced this impression that we had during the foreign policy dialogue. The IPS website has received roughly 90,000 hits since April. Over 32,000 copies of the overview and 13,000 copies of the diplomacy paper, in particular, have been downloaded from the department's website.
I would like now to turn the floor over to my colleagues, who will speak about their specific sections of the review.
Mr. Robert Greenhill, President, Canadian International Development Agency: It is a pleasure for me to be here with you today. I see it as an opportunity to answer some of your questions, but also as an opportunity for me to hear your comments and suggestions as I start my role as the president of CIDA.
I would like to talk a bit about the development elements of the International Policy Statement. Specifically, I want to talk about the role of coherence, a point that Mr. McRae introduced a moment ago.
[Translation]
As you know, the International Policy Statement reaffirms our commitment to the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals. And it reinforces our work the strengthen the effectiveness of Canada's aid.
[English]
While improved aid is needed in order to get health care and education in the private sector up and running in many of these countries of concentration and to promote good governance and protect the environment, clearly it is not enough. Debt relief is no less important, trade is essential, and science and technology is key to solving many of the issues that these countries face.
Well beyond what CIDA would do, coherence on three dimensions is essential. The first dimension is what we are doing to provide coherence within CIDA and coherence with our fellow departments within the Government of Canada and other organizations, including civil society in Canada. Equally important is coherence of our approach and our strategies with the real, expressed needs of the recipient countries. The third dimension is to ensure that our approach is coherent with the actions being taken by other members of the donor community.
Over the next five minutes I would like to talk about some of the initial work we have been doing to ensure improved coherence across these three dimensions as we look at implementing the IPS and making it real. In terms of coherence at home, one of our goals is to ensure a more effective approach to international cooperation and development by ensuring that we have a focussed approach on bilateral assistance by focussing on 25 countries, which will represent two-thirds of our bilateral support by 2009-10, and choosing those countries based on their ability, among other things, to actually use this aid effectively.
We are trying to build better coherence internally by ensuring that we have a sectoral focus across the five sectors of health — education, governance, private sector and, across all these different initiatives, gender equity.
We are also trying to ensure coherence in terms of our approach with our fellow departments, including Foreign Affairs and International Trade, represented here today, as well as Defence — which, as you mentioned, is on a parallel track in terms of discussions with Senate committees — and also, increasingly, with line departments such as Justice, Agriculture, Canada Mortgage and Housing, and other departments which have an important role to play to ensure that Canada is making a real difference.
On the implementation side, we are joining forces to ensure that we coordinate as to where we are involved, and also where we are not involved. Let me give you an example of both. In terms of where we are involved at a strategic level, we have set up a global affairs committee at the deputy level to foster forward-looking discussions of emerging international policy challenges. In terms of where we work closely together, Defence, Foreign Affairs and CIDA regularly consult on specific challenging issues, particularly with states such as Sudan, Haiti and Afghanistan. We also work together on trade issues where, for example, we have a representative from CIDA embedded with International Trade as part of the WTO negotiating team in Geneva. That is part of the coherence whereby we work together. Another element of that coherence is where we decide who should do what, so that we do not overlap unnecessarily.
As we look toward graduating a number of middle-income countries, it is important for us to be working with those countries to build their technical capacity to engage in international trade discussions; to increase their technical capacity to ensure that their export sectors, particularly in food — as we have just done with an MOU with Vietnam — are able to meet international technical requirements; and then to actually look to international trade through the trade negotiation and other elements to shift the centre of gravity in terms of Canada's engagement from the provision of development assistance through the provision of other types of economic engagement, as these countries become better off. That requires us not only to do more but also, in some cases, to be doing less than we have before, and covering both those aspects correctly is challenging.
[Translation]
Domestically, also, we are getting our act together. And to maximize the effectiveness of our aid, we are also coordinating and harmonizing our policies and practices with other donors. This means that everyone knows what everyone else is doing so that we can move in the same direction and give consistent advice.
[English]
That is an important change of approach. If we look back 20 or 30 years, we were engaged in projects, not programs. In many cases, these projects at best overlapped with those of other donor countries, and in many cases competed. By shifting, for example in Tanzania, from a series of uncoordinated, competing projects 20 or 30 years ago to a well-integrated approach across donors so that we can all contribute to key development programs — such as their primary education development program or what they are doing on health — we ensure a coherence not just in terms of what we are doing vis-à-vis our other departments here but also what we are doing in collaboration with other donors.
The third element of coherence — in a sense, the first in terms of what we have to look at strategically — is the idea of coherence with what the real, expressed needs of the recipient countries are. Several years into their being — the poverty reduction strategy papers originally put forward by the World Bank and still overseen by it, but increasingly with the ownership being taken on by the developing countries themselves — we now have a process whereby the developing countries, with the input of society and other actors within that domain, can interact effective with Canada and other donor countries to come up with an integrated set of programs to ensure that the funds we provide have the biggest impact in the areas that are most important for the poverty reduction of those particular countries.
There is clearly a great deal of work to do. I would not claim, after four weeks on the job, to even know what all the list of challenges are, let alone have the answers to all those challenges. However, adopting a coherent approach at home and abroad is a prerequisite for success. The advantage we have today is that now with the IPS we have a clear document that we can use to ensure that we have a coherent and consistent approach. It is something to which we can refer back in terms of the annual updates we will be providing to ensure that there is a consistency of approach. In that way, the IPS implementation is a step forward toward making this greater coherence possible.
I would be delighted to answer your questions and also look forward to any comments or suggestions you may have.
Mr. Randle Wilson, Acting Assistant Deputy Minister for Communications, Strategic Policy and Corporate Planning, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (International Trade): The commerce strategy within the International Policy Statement is the government's first update of its trade policy and, more generally, of Canada's international commercial interest since 1983. You can imagine that this played a fairly important role in our thinking, and that the world has changed enormously since then. Canada has changed enormously as well.
The commerce strategy is situated at the junction of the international policies of Canada because it is fundamentally about how Canada and Canadians succeed in a globalized economy, and in Canadian economic strategy overall, with an exposure to international competition that can be hinted at but not fully conveyed by the numbers — for example, the roughly $20 million worth of trade that we have done in the United States since we started speaking, or the close to 40 per cent of the GDP that is directly tied to exports alone, without mentioning other forms of international commercial engagement. It was time to take stock and to assess the implications of these fundamental changes and of the directions that Canadian business and Canadian governmental actors at all levels should be taking collectively to anchor our prosperity in the future. There is no future prosperity if we do not succeed in the global economy.
[Translation]
Thus, the statement charts to course to be followed. We want to create in Canada a competitive climate for trade in order to ensure the future prosperity of Canadians in a globalized economy. To do so, our actions will rest on the three pillars set out in the IPS. Firstly, in a context where the line between domestic and international competitiveness is blurred in an increasingly globalized and interconnected world, we must ensure a domestic environment conducive to attracting talent and investment to Canada. The first pillar of our international commerce strategy focuses on making Canada a highly attractive location for economic activity.
The second pillar consists of building and maintaining sustainable relationships with key partners at all levels.
The third, more traditional pillar which calls into to play the Department of Trade, consists of offering Canadian businesses the services they need to strategically position themselves in the new global economy.
I am going to speak briefly on these three themes, while referring to the updated diagnosis.
[English]
First, the nature of the world economy does not include just the elements of classic commodities-based trade that we know out of nationally-based production. The strength of, and the demand for, Canada's commodities, from energy through to forest products, attracts a lot of attention in world markets these days.
More significantly, we are seeing an emergence of regional and global value chains that go beyond the evolution of manufacturing that we have not seen since the 1970s and 1980s, where different components in the manufacturing process could be disassociated from headquarters and sent down the road and eventually across the border into the United States, and now anywhere in the world. It is not necessarily just the manufacturing, design, testing and marketing; it could also be payroll, personnel, and after-sales service. It could be within the company, outsourced to an arm's length company, or completed by a reciprocal investment or other strategic partnership. International business is far more complex than exports and imports. That is why we deliberately chose the term "commerce" and not "trade."
Therefore, to succeed, we must be successful on both of these levels. That is to say, we cannot neglect our traditional strengths but we also cannot neglect anything that might position Canada advantageously. An advantageous position in this global interdependent economy is one built on mutually profitable relationships.
Moving away from the basics, Canadian economy must be competitive, and there is no "international" or "domestic: in that definition; it is the Canadian economy. Our commercial strategy aims, on one level, to ensure the right kinds of relationships with the right partners, the ones that will anchor Canadian prosperity in this century. These relationships start at the highest level by way of political and diplomatic relationships, nurtured by the Prime Minister and by Foreign Affairs. They go through trade agreements, investment agreements and the panoply of rules and commitments. They go increasingly into the kinds of agreements that matter to business here and now.
For example, there are air agreements that assure you can get to your target markets and assure you have the right kind of air or sea transport. There are double taxation agreements and science and technology cooperation agreements. All of these bring back opportunity and facilitate international business. Governments have a key role in driving those relationships, especially the ones based on agreements.
[Translation]
However, businesses must in their overall strategy ensure that they are attempting to maintain an advantageous position in light of the integration of the North American economy. It is increasingly clear that the economy must not only be approached from a Canadian perspective but from a North American one, as the success of Canadian businesses necessarily depends on that specific context. Businesses must also ensure that they deploy all the necessary efforts to secure choice positions for themselves and create durable and dependable relations with partners throughout the world.
[English]
From there, it is a short step to the third area of activity of the government's commerce strategy. Again, I use the term "government" because it is undertaken by well over a dozen government departments and agencies, and it is in partnership with provinces, territories, municipalities, business groups, NGOs and universities. That is, to give specific services that will help companies find themselves that particular position or advantage, the reliable partner, the distributor, and locate the technology that will give them a competitive edge and that will always keep them at the forefront of innovation and competitiveness.
Those are examples of high value-added services that are rooted in a reinvention of classic trade commissioner work by providing contacts and local knowledge. This is the world of the knowledge economy, and the government aims to be where it is needed across Canada and around the world, providing the knowledge that our business needs to succeed.
As we move forward, building on our partnerships, we are treating the International Policy Statement as a starting point, not an ending point. It is now our responsibility to take this high-level diagnostic and to turn it into concrete strategies that aim to ensure our success in three primary areas. For example, there is North America and the emerging markets that we tend to call "the new economic powers" because that is a more accurate description of the weight of China and India in the world. However, the list does not stop with them. One could include Brazil, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Russia and, depending on the sector you are in, many other countries. These are countries that will be key aspects to the success of the Canadian economy or to individual sectors and industries within it.
Third, along with the United States, the bulk of world trade, investment and innovation are driven by Japan and the European Union. We must ensure that the Canadian economy is properly positioned there. We are developing strategies for these three areas that will be subject to further consultation and working up with our partners.
[Translation]
These strategies will be designed to give us the means to ensure that the Canadian economy will be in an advantageous position in the long term, by making the necessary investments today to reach that position within five years and ensure the prosperity of Canadians. Without that prosperity, we will no longer have the choices we now enjoy, nor will we have the means to pursue the domestic and international policies that characterize us.
So this is a fundamental point for us. In the global economy, Canada, as a small economy, has no choice: success is the only way forward.
Senator Corbin: First of all, on behalf of the committee, I would like to thank our speakers for these excellent opening statements. It goes without saying that this is a very broad topic.
I now have in hand the very interesting document which was given me by our analyst and researcher, Mr. Peter Berg.
Mr. Greenhill, my question is addressed to you. You made a presentation on January 27, 2005, if I am not mistaken, on an interim report, entitled The External Voices Project. In your presentation, and I am asking you this question deliberately because this is a concern I have often voiced to the committee, it was apparent that certain countries seem to perform much better than Canada. I have on occasion referred to the Netherlands and certain other Nordic countries, but you have discovered, it seems, that the country with the best international aid record is the United Kingdom. Can you tell us more and give us some ideas as to how Canada could excel in this area in the future?
Mr. Greenhill: To put all of this in perspective, when I decided to get involved in issues of international public policy, I took a year to do research at the International Development Research Centre. In that context, I did research on The External Voices Project, which asked people throughout the world to make some projective forecasts on Canada's impact and what we should do to improve our performance in the future.
I believe there were two reports. The first was Making a Difference? The second was probably Making it Happen. Following the call I received, rather than writing that chapter, I am going to try, with my colleagues, to put it into effect.
[English]
The element of DFAIT that people found powerful was a consistency and an intensity of vision and focus. When the government arrived with Clare Short as minister, they actually put in place a clear approach which they have articulated publicly and have shown through their facts. As a result, that allowed a certain alignment in the coherence I was talking about.
Two aspects are interesting. One is that while, actually, around the world there was a strong sense that DFAIT had done some extraordinary work, in this new world, having had a chance to speak to them directly, one area where they would actually claim Canada has perhaps an advantage is the rigour of some of our project implementation and oversight. It is perhaps an interesting indication of their strength that they are always prepared to acknowledge where we are perhaps even stronger.
The second element that is important, particularly in light of the conversation today, is that the IPS gives us the chance to show that same focus and discipline and coherence. In a sense, it is now incumbent upon us. There is the same clarity of vision. It may not be exactly the same as Great Britain's, but it is our Canadian vision and clarity as laid out in the IPS, and we now have the opportunity to pursue it with the same discipline and focus that they have.
In fact, one of the goals with my team would be to ensure that we actually show that persistence and focus. If we meet on a regular basis over time, you will see that kind of progress. My desire would be that when that survey is done 10 years from now, there is a different rating.
Senator Downe: My question is for the new president of CIDA as well. Are you concerned that Canada does not have an independent foreign assistance policy? I ask that because we heard testimony on our study on Africa that after the United States invaded Afghanistan, CIDA moved in with assistance, and it is now at a level that is higher than in any African country. If the situation in Iraq stabilizes, I assume we will assist there more. We heard that our policies are dictated by American actions as opposed to Canadian priorities.
Mr. Greenhill: In my new role, I probably would not be able to give a sense to some elements of that in terms of historical analysis. I could, though, underline the clear intention, which I believe we can reach, of having two-thirds of our total bilateral funding being focussed on 25 countries that we ourselves have determined, through a very clear process, are the right places on which to focus in terms of not only their ability to absorb development aid effectively, not only because of our historical engagement but also because they are the places that need it the most. The countries you mentioned would be amongst the countries that would be, in that context, one-third of our total assistance.
Senator Downe: Could you say that again?
Mr. Greenhill: We take the bilateral envelope, not the multi-lateral, but the bilateral envelope, and the IPS sets a target by 2009-10 to have two-thirds of our aid to be focussed on these 25 development partners.
Senator Downe: I understand your point now. However, situations always change, and I am concerned that a policy somewhere else impacts on CIDA's priorities. I am looking for some type of assurance that, 10 years from now, we will look back and actually have that distribution of funds to the countries we have identified, as opposed to an activity somewhere else in the world by the Americans or the British or someone forcing a realignment of our priorities and resources. Is there any way to protect against that and ensure that we have an independent policy? I am concerned that we do not have that any more.
Mr. Greenhill: There are two elements to look at. One is that we have a clear target. If by 2009-10 we do not have two-thirds of our aid focused, one can draw a certain conclusion. If, as it is our intention, we do, that would be another conclusion.
The second element I would note in terms of the whole-of-government approach is with the envelope structure being set up, there is a peace and security envelope of $100 million a year. It is explicitly designed to ensure that we can be focussing primarily on the long-term development programs, and the funds are available for Canada to engage in an active response to emerging situations in fragile and failed states. I do not know if I am permitted to ask for a comment from my colleague who would be involved in administering that?
The Chairman: Certainly.
Mr. McRae: Thank you for the question. This is really a perennial question for Canadian foreign policy. Clearly, one of the issues in the past has been the fact that often CIDA, when it comes to financial commitments, has been on the hook, in a sense, for some foreign policy priorities and issues that have arisen, often unplanned for and unexpected. Some steps have been taken in the IPS and in the budget as well to begin to address the issue that you have raised.
One of the steps that has been taken has been what we described as "good fences make good neighbours." For civilian assistance with a security dimension, the kind of security assistance we might provide to a failing state in the area of justice or in other areas, that kind of activity and funding for that activity really properly belongs with Foreign Affairs. We have created now in Foreign Affairs this global peace and security fund of $100 million a year, which will be put into operation through this standing task force that we have set up, START, the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force, and it will be responsible for civilian assistance in the security areas to address crises, as opposed to development issues. The idea is that we let CIDA get on with the development side of the agenda. There may well be development issues that need to be addressed, including in countries like Afghanistan, which falls within the ODA category.
What we have also done, as Mr. Greenhill mentioned, through the budget is restructure the international assistance envelope. Not only do we now have a pool for this global peace and security fund at Foreign Affairs, there is also now a crisis reserve within this envelope so that large crises on the scale of an Afghanistan can be accessed when our $100 million is not enough — and it will not be enough in the Afghanistan example. In the future, the logic would be that Foreign Affairs, in the first instance in a crisis mode, would respond to the demands on the civilian side for security assistance; and when those demands really are significant, the reserve would be accessed. However, the policy objective here is to protect the development budget from being sourced for this kind of activity, which had been done in the past.
I think we have taken steps in the direction that you have asked.
Senator Downe: I am pleased to hear that. In light of a strong military, Canada has been using CIDA to show our international contribution, which is fine — what they are doing is good. However, the government cannot be distorting their priorities, and I am glad that the additional funding has been identified.
The Chairman: I have a supplementary to that.
Senator Downe: I have a different topic.
The Chairman: I want to be clear, so I understand this. As I understood Senator Downe's question, this is a big policy review; it involves a great many aspects of our foreign policy and I guess my own mind is still in Africa, because the committee has been looking into Africa. As I understood the question, CIDA, which to me is a development agency, is really in Afghanistan. I suspect, before the Americans invaded Afghanistan, our role in Afghanistan in CIDA was miniscule. They go into Afghanistan, and then all of a sudden our development agency gets involved in what some may call development projects in Afghanistan, but others might call security projects. As you cannot go out into the countryside without armed guards, it is hard to imagine a development policy taking place in the atmosphere of Afghanistan. Therefore, CIDA is then distorted into a branch of our assistance to the Americans on their problems in Afghanistan. Is that right, Senator Downe?
Senator Downe: Yes.
The Chairman: Is that what has happened?
Mr. McRae: Can I offer a response? On the issue of why Afghanistan, all of the commitments we make to address international crises of this kind are highly political. We cannot be everywhere dealing with every crisis. In each case, I would say there is not a set of criteria necessarily that helps us here. It really is a question of political guidance from the government of the day.
With regard specifically to Afghanistan — and to some extent I would say it was a parallel question with regard to the Balkans in the 1990s — here we have situations that are highly complex and require, in the way of international response when we decide to participate, a 3-D response — development, diplomacy and defence. Indeed, we often say 3-D plus T, because occasionally our trade colleagues are also an important factor in providing these integrated solutions to very complex problems.
With regard to Canada's interests in both the Balkans and in Afghanistan — of course, there were very important security issues at stake in the case of Afghanistan — failed and failing states are a concern to many countries in the world, and the kind of threat they can pose is a factor for Canada as well. Second, we are now in a situation where we are participating in the NATO operation in Afghanistan, and our role in NATO and our commitment to NATO and NATO's role in the transatlantic world is important. Therefore, Canadian interests are also engaged when NATO is operating in —
The Chairman: I understand that. I just have difficulty seeing CIDA as sort of a part of NATO, which is basically where it seems to have gone in Afghanistan.
Anyway, I would go back to Senator Downe. I get the picture, I think.
Senator Downe: For the record, I want to be clear: I think CIDA did good work, and is doing good work, in Afghanistan, and in particular what they have done to assist women and children and other projects. My concern is that a crisis arises and funds are reallocated from somewhere else for that priority. We have been assured by Mr. McRae that that is being addressed in the new policy. They have a pot of money and they will go for additional monies and leave CIDA to its priorities, which is the point I am trying to stress.
My second and last question has two parts. I am interested in the principle in the policy — and this is to Mr. McRae, I assume — of advancing and improving relations with Canada's partners in North America.
We have heard testimony at this committee over the last number of months about the large presence that the Mexican government has in the United States. I would assume, as our largest trading partner, that that would be our priority, and I wanted to confirm that that is where we are putting most of our resources as we expand the Canadian diplomatic community around the world. Is that correct?
Mr. McRae: We are addressing this particular question in a number of ways. It is something that is highlighted in the review. If I may add in an introductory way, what distinguishes this review from many that have preceded it is the fact that we begin by emphasizing our North American home as something which is really key to our global role. In addition, our global role does reinforce our presence within North America.
In terms of additional resources, as the review makes clear, we are expanding the number of consulates we have in the U.S. I can give you the exact number but my recollection is about 10 beyond our existing number of consulates. In addition to that, in terms of staffing, we also provided additional support in Washington itself — there is a parliamentary secretariat there that deals with the role of provinces, and so on. The recognition that we need to do more in terms of providing a whole-of-Canada presence in the U.S. in particular is highlighted by the review.
The final aspect is that when it comes to public diplomacy, we realize there is a particular challenge in terms of ensuring that Canada is seen and understood, and that our priorities in the world are appreciated, not only in Washington but more broadly. Therefore, in the area of public diplomacy we are also making an increased effort.
Both in terms of personnel and resources, you are correct to assume that the U.S. remains an important priority for us.
Senator Downe: Your document talks about diplomatic efforts in key countries, but the key country for Canada for trade purposes is the United States. Our other North American partner, Mexico, has a much larger presence there. Are we putting the majority of our resources into getting to the same level as the Mexicans, or are we doing a bit more in the United States and in a host of other key countries around the world? Are we spreading ourselves too thin? I would argue that we should increase the American presence first and then look at other key countries.
Mr. McRae: My colleague from International Trade may wish to add something to the trade dimension of your question.
With regard to Mexico, they have a large number of consulates in the United States. You may be aware of that. In recent talks with the Mexicans over the past few months, my recollection is that they have somewhere in the range of 40. I asked them why they have such an extensive network of consulates, clearly outnumbering Canada's consular network, and the answer they provided is that they are dealing with, as they said to me, roughly the movement of 400,000 Mexican citizens across the border into the U.S. every year.
The Chairman: These are illegal citizens?
Mr. McRae: That is right. By and large, their consulates are dealing with one issue, which is the presence of these 400,000 illegal Mexicans in the U.S. and the way in which they are dealing with U.S. authorities. The significance of their consular problem in the U.S. is huge compared with our own.
Perhaps on the trade side of your question, I would ask my colleague from International Trade to respond to that.
The Chairman: I just wanted to add that those are 400,000 known Mexican illegal citizens in the United States every year.
Mr. Wilson: Briefly, the importance of wrapping up our efforts on the commercial front for local market intelligence, as well as for the public diplomacy that is related to advancing our trade agenda as much as the other agenda, softwood lumber advocacy for example, did lead to the expanded representation initiative, which is being rolled out and was launched a couple of years ago. The Government of Canada is now represented in 31 cities in the United States, eight of which are through "honorary" representations. We make them work hard.
This is only a part of the way in which our commercial interests are addressed. We have a succession of missions, some of which are based on regional interests. There is Team Atlantic Canada, for example. We are actually very much in the Americans' face in advancing both our strategic long-term and our specific business-oriented interests.
Senator Downe: There is a volume of trade that we do daily with the United States. I do not have the figure off the top of my head. The chairman may have it. I think it is close to $1.8 billion a day. I would request that the witnesses provide to the members of this committee information regarding where Foreign Affairs intends to invest this funding over the next year on increasing a diplomatic presence so that we can compare the efforts in the rest of the world with the efforts in the United States.
Senator Mahovlich: Could one of you explain to me why Mexico has a consulate in Strasbourg and Canada does not? Is there an explanation for that? We have the Council of Europe there as well as the European Parliament. Everybody is in Strasbourg.
Mr. McRae: That is a tough question, admittedly. I know that our presence abroad is under review right now and, indeed, this relates to the previous question regarding where we will be placing some of the additional resources in terms of people abroad over the next few years.
As you know, through the budget there is some rather modest funding provided to increase our presence abroad. It does not involve the creation of new positions. They are existing positions from headquarters that are to be transferred abroad. The issue as to where those resources will go is under consideration right now.
I might ask the permission of Senator Mahovlich to come back with a written answer to that very specific question so that I can provide him with the most detailed answer possible.
The Chairman: We would be very interested in that information.
On behalf of the members of the committee, I would like to remind everyone that in our review of the Free Trade Agreement, we recommended more consulates in the U.S. This committee reviewed the Free Trade Agreement two years ago, and we made quite a number of recommendations, some of which we are talking about here this afternoon.
Senator Andreychuk: The international foreign policy statement is a very broad and large document, so we obviously cannot touch the many elements we would like to. Most people have said that the words are fine. We could have said it differently or we could have put it in a different order but, by and large, it is a good document on the face of the words. The dilemma is how it will be put into practice.
One of the areas that has been of great concern — and I know that Senator Prud'homme has raised it many times as have I — is the role of Parliament in setting priorities both for CIDA and for the government. The House of Commons spoke rather strongly that the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade should not be split.
Hon. Senators: Hear, hear!
Senator Andreychuk: There are a whole host of reasons why they suggested that that was not a wise move. However, despite the fact that we want to do some valuable things in the policy statement, there must be a singular place where all the policies are brought together. I speak with some personal knowledge of that.
When trade is an issue, when human rights are an issue, and when CIDA is an issue, when a crisis occurs and involves our defence, there has to be someone who draws it together in the foreign policy perspective. In a very short and curtailed way, I have said that it should be the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Then you would conduct your business under that regime.
We know that there has been a disconnect many times between immigration now and foreign policy and the department, and that has led to many problems that we know about.
I do not want to ask you questions about the policy, since it is not in your purview to set the policy. I want to know whether all of the departments are working as if you are still Foreign Affairs and International Trade, or are you going about your business as two separate departments?
Mr. Wilson: I will, of course, respectfully duck any second-guessing of government policy. However, the reality that we have analyzed and outlined in the International Policy Statement is one that does not lend itself to being controlled or shaped by any one department anymore. We found that we are, in fact, just four departments that are leading but far more actively contributing to Canada's international presence.
The issues such as those that cross the boundaries of trade and human rights or trade and development, or whatever, are and have been — and will continue to be — handled interdepartmentally, which is why this effort led us to articulate government policies, abstracted from mention of specific departments, by and large. For example, in the commerce strategy, there is no mention of the department because it is no longer specific to any one department.
I come back to my point about trade sitting at the intersect of the international policies and could be integrated there under one minister, or the intersect of all economic policies and could be under another minister there. It is not, from a practitioner's perspective, as significant that we have one or the other form of organization so much as that we ensure that Canadians are positioned for prosperity and success.
The Chairman: Mr. McRae, you are the Director General, Policy Planning Secretariat. Would you like to take a crack at that question?
Mr. McRae: Thank you. I would reinforce what Mr. Wilson has said about the importance of coherence in government and the fact that this really must become now a way of life for all of the international departments. You might recall that in the IPS there is a commitment on the part of the government to establish an advisory and consultative process to consider the appropriate means of achieving our policy objectives, including the relationship between Foreign Affairs and International Trade.
The role of Parliament is quite important, and there is something quite new on this in the review itself. The Minister of Foreign Affairs has committed to come to Parliament on an annual basis to provide an update on the implementation of the IPS and, indeed, to look ahead in terms of what is scheduled for the coming year. This is a new step or a new direction that recognizes the importance of Parliament's role in this regard.
As well, there is also an emphasis in the paper which responds to the essence of the question, which is how do we really arrive at that coherence that is so easy to talk about? The paper proposes that whole-of-government strategies be developed for our main priorities. For instance, on the country side, we are looking at developing whole-of-government strategies on China, or on India, or Russia, or Brazil, as a way of ensuring that, here in Ottawa, all departments, not only those on the international side, are able to participate in the development of these strategies but also that the strategies themselves would provide some coherence to all of the work.
These whole-of-government strategies will be reflected in the role of heads of mission. Clearly, heads of mission need to be able to speak with one voice and need to represent all of the government and all government interests in a particular country overseas. Naturally, coming out of the review, the role of our heads of mission, if anything, will be and really must be enhanced in terms of speaking with one voice overseas. This very issue, which is a very important one, has been taken up in the IPS in a number of ways, and these are some of the ways in which we are seeking to address this concern.
Senator Andreychuk: I have a follow-up question in that area. I appreciate what you will be attempting to do, and it sounds logical to have coordination and involvement of the heads of mission. That will probably work in most cases. However, in the singular cases that may be of concern most to Canadians, there will be conflict.
I recall when I first came into the Senate that there was a great, compelling reason for wanting to be part of the push into China for trade, to get in, to establish ourselves and to get our fair market share, to be able to trade, invest, et cetera. Those were laudable goals. On the other hand there was, and continues to be, overwhelming concern about their human rights record and how that has been handled.
Some of the answers in one area impact on another. Somebody has to make a decision. I would not want Mr. Wilson to be making the decision on the human rights issues. I am not sure, Mr. McRae, that you could do it for trade. I am not sure that you can do it on a whole host of others areas. Security is another reason for opening up and having confidence-building in the Asia-Pacific area. Where does the buck stop when there is a conflict or a change of emphasis? Is it the minister? You talked about a coordinating committee. That is all well and good, but if the committee cannot do it, then a political decision must be made. Where are the political decisions made? Are we now waiting for a cabinet decision? Is that the issue now?
Mr. McRae: This is a very good question. Clearly, at the end of the day, the balance that needs to be struck between these often competing priorities must be a political decision by the government of the day. Certainly, the intention is that we can prepare, at the level of officials, integrated strategies, whole-of-government strategies, say, for China, that seek to provide a coherent vision of our role, but there will be areas which require consideration by cabinet and where decisions must be made at the political level. The intention at the moment is to first provide these whole-of-government strategies so that we can better understand the kinds of tensions that might well be present in our approaches to countries as important as China, and to enable, at the political level, cabinet to make the decisions that are required to fine-tune the balance between these sometimes-competing priorities.
Senator, you have put your finger on a difficult issue. We do have a process coming out of the IPS which we hope will provide a better and more informed process to deal with these difficult and sensitive issues.
Mr. Wilson: I agree with everything Dr. McRae has said. The reality is that you are talking about the limit cases, and they are limit cases. As professionals, we work very hard to find a way to make things move in tandem and not in opposition — how to use, for example, China's accession to the WTO to reinforce the rule of law and economic rights, a Trojan horse in the perspective of some, but certainly the establishment of rights. However, there are points where clearly there are fundamental conflicts, either between opposing values or, in the kind of case you might mention, between one interest and another: India nuclear tests and trade, for example, or China and Tiananmen and investment and trade.
Ultimately, I have to agree with Dr. McRae. If it comes down to choosing one set of Canadian interests or values over another set of interests or values, we can but advise. That is a political decision. Our ministers are well aware of it and are always prepared to take the responsibility.
Senator Mahovlich: Just recently, we heard about a corporation investing $80 million or $90 million in China. It was brought to their attention about the problems that China is having with Taiwan, and their relationship with Taiwan and our relationship. They just pushed it aside and said "That is a political problem." Unless the politicians do not say anything, our corporations can invest whatever they want. Is that correct?
Mr. Wilson: Unless there is a specific constraint under, for example, the Special Economic Measures Act, the bottom-line answer is yes. It does not mean, however, that we advise them to engage in certain lines of action. In fact, we engage on a number of levels. For example, we are, with Industry Canada, champions of voluntary codes of corporate social responsibility. That is one level.
In the case of the Chinas, as it were, and the trouble that they might get themselves into, we certainly advise any corporation going into China — Senator Andreychuk has mentioned the enthusiasm, the headlong rush to participate in China's economic growth, both for its own right and as a platform for production for the rest of the world — that you had better do it with your eyes open about a number of factors, including the rights situation of your workforce, the respect or lack of respect for intellectual property and the political risk factors. The instruments of the Government of Canada —such as Export Development Canada, such as us — try to draw these to the attention of the Canadian business community. The bottom line is that it is their money and their call.
Senator Mahovlich: How would the United States look upon us investing there? Are they in competition with us going into China?
Mr. Wilson: There are two parts to that answer. To the integrated companies, for example, in the automotive sector, it is all one big corporation. However, in other areas they are definitely our competitors, as are the Australians, the French and the Germans.
Senator Andreychuk: We have picked 25 countries and we will be there in 2010, giving our aid. How much of that country-specific aid of the 25 countries will be aid in the form of money and investment in multilateral institutions? The difficulty that I have when I look at it is that I cannot find out what we are actually doing when it comes to NGOs and the governments because I am not tracking it all in the right way. We give a lot of money to the World Bank, but there is a whole list of these multilateral institutions. Then when I see a figure, I say to myself "I did not think we gave that much to that country," but it is that figure because we are factoring in all of the UN, the IFIs, et cetera. In these 25 countries, how much of that money will be going country-specific, as opposed to via multilateral?
Mr. Greenhill: That is a very important question as we are looking at how we are implementing the IPS. We look at our funding being through the bilaterals, which is us working on a direct basis with a recipient country, and then the multilateral system. and also through other partners such as NGOs and others. The focus on the 25 countries and the two-thirds of funding that I made reference to was for that bilateral portion. Within the amounts of money that we spend, the approximately one-third of our total funding that goes through the bilateral system, by 2009-10 we would have 25 countries comprise two-thirds of that total funding.
As you quite rightly noted, there is a whole other tranche of funding that goes through the multilateral system. There we have two counter-posing elements: How can we use our involvement through multilaterals, through UNICEF with bed nets or through the UNDP, where they are helping to provide a more coherent, coordinated donor approach to Tanzania? How can we use that to reinforce what we are doing with our focus development partners, on the one hand; on the other hand, how can we use the multilateral engagement as a way to ensure that we are also doing our part with respect to those other worthy developing countries that are not covered within our 25?
In terms of our implementation of the program, what we need to do on the bilateral side, there is a lot of work to do but it is fairly clear. That issue of how the multilateral fits in we will continue to push on. One way in which we can determine, regardless of the channel of delivery, whether we are having an impact is for us to increase the use of lending development goals themselves as the right measures when looking at the countries. Right now, we tend to look at whether a specific program or project in Tanzania meets its criteria. Fair enough. Those are the direct ones, but there are also the indirect ones.
At the end of the day, what matters is that literacy, at a primary level, in Tanzania has gone from 68 per cent seven or eight years ago to 93 per cent; that we have been able to reduce child mortality rates on a consistent basis; that we have seen other key metrics from lending development goals being reached. For our partner countries, we will increasingly be looking at these critical output measures and saying: Are we making progress against them? And whether we are using a bilateral or multilateral channel, are we seeing an impact?
[Translation]
Senator Prud'homme: Senator Andreychuk touched on one of my deep concerns. To be clear, I have a great deal of admiration for our senior officials, who are dedicated to serving our country. For instance, I said tribute to Mr. Théodore Arcand at the cathedral, and I saw how political masters could be absent when the time comes to honour one of our dedicated servants of the state. There were absolutely no representatives of the Government of Canada. I admire you a great deal because your task is to decipher the wishes of your political masters. This requires a great deal of skill, but you are managing.
I was quite close to CIDA for 30 years, and I want to congratulate you for your role. I have a specific question with regard to that.
The government was not under any obligation to divide up the department into two sections. It could have done so without consulting Parliament. It decided to consult Parliament.
[English]
Contrary to what was said on television last night that Parliament has adjourned, and members are away, in fact the Senate continues. That is a misunderstanding totally. Only the House of Commons has adjourned.
The political masters of the day have decided to consult Parliament, starting with the House of Commons. That bill was debated and rejected, so we do not even need to talk about it in the Senate. It did not reach us. It is already defeated and dead. Why did the government decide to go ahead, after having consulted Parliament? It is not your problem; it is a political decision with which I disagree and will continue to disagree.
We are multiplying the sources of decision-making. As an example — this is a cheap one but I will make it — it is like having a minister looking over the shoulder of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, scrutinizing every word that is taking place and every decision that is taking place concerning the Middle East. We all know Mr. Cotler is vetting everything that has to do with the Middle East and the Palestinian question. I resent that.
We have to live in the real world. It is only adding to your problem.
[Translation]
My question is directed to you particularly, as president of CIDA. When you arrive in Africa, you have decisions to make that have trade implications and implications at the level of foreign policy. And then your political master says: do not forget that there is now a minister responsible for all trade issues.
My question is a kind of monologue which you will not be able to answer, as this is a political question.
I listened carefully to your predecessors and the CIDA representatives who came to testify, and I felt a certain malaise. When you want to decide, you have to choose to go one way or the other. However, if there is a lot of consultation, there are too many imponderables that come along to complicate your life.
How can you agree on immediate decisions when there are two ministers responsible and in some sectors two and a half ministers, who have to conciliate Canada's foreign policy. You have all of my admiration.
[English]
The Chairman: I do not see how the witness can answer that question.
Senator Prud'homme: He could tell me how this new outfit manages things now.
[Translation]
Mr. Greenhill: My answer will be twofold. As for the structural aspect, as my colleague just pointed out, there have been three ministers' positions for at least 15 years. We have the Minister of Development, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of International Trade. This coordination challenge thus goes back a long way.
However, there are certain fundamental questions on which political decisions must be made. I have just returned from Africa and I can tell you that in the field, for instance in Tanzania, we work in close cooperation. People work in the same facility and can see each other on a daily basis. The advantage of the IPS is that we now have a consistent approach which ensures that energies are channelled in the right direction at the same time.
Over the past four weeks I was able to observe the situation on location, and found that people worked well together. There is the political aspect, and daily life. The coordination among our representatives is appreciated by the people in Tanzania and in other African countries.
[English]
Senator Prud'homme: You touched on a point, Mr. Greenhill.
[Translation]
You said that we should not worry about things in the field. Of course, my problem involves the upper echelons, and not the work that is actually done on location.
The Chairman: We are going to let Mr. McRae answer the question. Our witnesses, however, cannot answer questions that are addressed to ministers, since they are not ministers.
Mr. McRae: Mr. Greenhill described things well when he spoke of what transpires at the ministerial level. We now have several forums to promote coordination and consistency. Among others, we have the new committee on global affairs that allows the minister to have discussions on integration and coordination. The government took certain decisions in that regard to bolster the importance of consistency.
The international policy review is an important step that aims to put in place a framework for all of Canada's international policies. That framework involves not only the policy of our four departments but also of the other departments that deal with important international issues. This was but a first step to broach that problem. The political framework in Ottawa will add to this important consistency.
As Mr. Greenhill indicated, cooperation in the field is always excellent. The role of our mission chiefs is key to that success. That coherence remains a very important challenge for us. However, in the context of the international policy review, certain efforts were deployed to attain a greater consistency in general.
Mr. Wilson: The trade portfolio has existed since 1890. The first one to hold the minister's position was indeed Senator Bull. The portfolio thus existed long before the creation of the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Indeed, the politicians are well aware of this change and have been for a long time. I in fact had the pleasure and the honour of working in close cooperation with Minister Pettigrew for a five-year period before he went to Foreign Affairs and International Trade. We can thus be certain that the Minister of Foreign Affairs is well acquainted with the world of trade.
The problem is that the world is no longer contained in tidy little compartments. There are several opposing schools of thought when it comes to principles. Our work consists in ensuring that in practice, conflicts are defused or at least do not become more serious. As a matter of principle, no one wants to choose prosperity in all circumstances rather than security or some other general goal. This is not a choice we can ask Canadians or the government to make.
We public servants always have a passion for details. Tiny details make up the fabric of daily life.
[English]
Senator Prud'homme: My agony comes from my 41 years in Parliament. I have seen many changes. I will give you an example. It is a very dangerous one, of course. I immensely opposed the creation of CSIS in 1984. I had a long discussion with Mr. Trudeau, and I felt we should modernize and bring the RCMP up to date. I am supposed to be a fan of the RCMP. That is another story.
I felt that by diluting authority, you create conflict. I look at the example in the United States, where they have discovered that there were too many directions taken in security matters. Now they are coming back under one umbrella where everyone must work, but there is still someone who gives direction.
That is why I am so involved in this issue. I will not solve anything and I have never exercised power, but I follow this issue very closely. I am a fan of foreign affairs and of having good trade with the United States. Without your sensitivity in CIDA, it would not be worth calling ourselves Canadians. I try to be positive, even if I look negative. I want to have a boss who forces people to work together. I know you cannot say it, but I know there is friction. My job, as an old man on his way out, will be try to smooth things out as much as possible so that there is no friction. As soon as you have authority, you have power and you have division. Let us hope that what is going on, even though part of Parliament says no, will be successful and you can work the three together.
[Translation]
Senator Robichaud: You talked quite a bit about consistency with regard to our approach. This new consistency you are talking about, could it have an influence or an effect on our representations before the World Trade Organization? It is said that the next round of negotiations in Doha will be very important for developing African countries.
Could it also have an influence on our representations at the World Bank? We want to reduce poverty, and the World Bank, through the policies it has put in place, as well as the International Monetary Fund, do not always sing from the same hymnbook, or may have had commendable objectives which did not produce the expected results in poor countries; and we want to reduce that poverty.
Will that consistency give us more influence over these international institutions, which in some cases are in fact blocking the fight against poverty in Africa?
Mr. Greenhill: This is a fundamental question. I will begin answering you and I will ask Mr. Wilson to add his own comments.
Clearly, if you take the negotiations in Doha, we must take into account the importance of developing countries. As I mentioned earlier, we have a CIDA representative, who with the international trade team in Geneva ensures in a structural and ongoing way that we adopt a consistent approach which takes into account the needs of developing countries.
As for the World Bank, the Minister of Finance represents Canada, but CIDA is very involved in that organization. If I remember correctly, I am the alternative; I am there to ensure that in practice, in that case as well, development perspectives are indeed integrated into the whole picture.
I must say that our executive director over there is now Marcel Massé, who was president of CIDA twice in the past. I can thus assure you that the progressive points of view on development are well communicated at the World Bank.
I would invite Mr. Wilson to add his comments.
Mr. Wilson: Indeed, consistency is the watchword at the WTO and in several UN organizations involved in international development. There is not a single organization, however, that has all of the tools that are needed to bring everything together.
Internationally speaking, the spearhead for this consistency objective is the program which deals with the needs of the poorest countries, the less developed countries. The integrated framework which groups the WTO and other institutions is a Canadian initiative which goes back to the 1990s.
I would point to trade and development as an area where internal consistency was already the hallmark of Canadian government activity. This means that we are already influential in a practical way and have been from the beginning, that is to say the 1990s, and continue to be in the various forums involving the negotiations in the Doha round. This is done through an interdepartmental process; without going into detail, I can say that there are at least six major players, and that CIDA is one of them; there is Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, Foreign Affairs, the Department of Finance and the Department of Industry. All of this helps to harmonize our approaches, both domestically and internationally.
This coherence translates not only into a consistency in international access but also results in a consistent follow-up domestically. This is how we have been able to achieve concrete gains with regard to exportation rights for less developed countries and, for instance, to gain access to essential medications for poorer countries.
For the rest, negotiations are ongoing. But I can say that this type of consistency ensures that Canada is well respected and is indeed the leader in these negotiations.
[English]
Mr. Greenhill: I want to note how important the point you made was in terms of the coherent approach, and I want to bring your attention to an analysis done every year by the Centre for Global Development. Together with a magazine called International Policy Options, they do a study once a year on development effectiveness. They take into account not only the ODA, or official development assistance, that each country provides but also their trade policies, their immigration policies and their contribution to international peacekeeping to provide a secure environment for people to carry out their lives. They try to, in a very structured way, come up with a composite rating.
On the issues of both immigration and trade, Canada scores very high. In the recent publication that you may have seen on Canada's contribution to the G8 action plan, one of the points noted is the progress made not only on the debt relief but also in the virtual elimination of tariff barriers and the significant reduction of non-tariff barriers for the poorest countries to have access to Canadian markets. That was a development that occurred over the last few years, where International Trade made a great contribution to developing countries in some ways at least as important as the role we would be doing regularly.
The Chairman: I read much of the international policy review, and I thought, given the difficulties of coming up with this kind of thing, that it was pretty good. Who would have thought in the year 2000 that someone would blow up the World Trade Center the following year? It is very difficult to predict international events.
I am looking at the commerce section, and I am curious about this free trade area of the Americas, which seems to be like that famous bad penny. It just keeps turning up. Having spent many years of my life in the Spanish-speaking countries, and I still go there frequently, I keep wondering just what is this free trade agreement of the Americas. I go back to 1961 when they had the Alliance for Progress. I still recall the fading signs for that. Then there was the Caribbean Basin Initiative, and this, that and the other thing. Is this really a live animal?
Mr. Wilson: The recent history of this agreement is that it is the single most important initiative under the Summit of the Americas process, or at least that was the conception in Santiago where it was launched. It comes down to the kinds of problems you get into when something really is real, and it will affect interests.
The co-chairs, the United States and Brazil, are still trying to sort out their difficulties or, to put it more bluntly, their conflicting visions of what the free trade area of the Americas should be.
We have moved from the highly ambitious, economic integrationist model whose underlying objective was, above all, political stability, reinforcement of democracy, and the provision of economic viable alternatives to the drug trade, for example. That model has been beaten back, not by the United States or Canada as much as it has by Brazil and some other countries.
It is not for me to judge whether they were right in guessing that they would never be able to get the kinds of concessions out of the United States and Canada in areas such as sugar or poultry that they thought would make this exercise worthwhile. Until we get over that hurdle, the process is certainly stalled.
At this stage, however, the Doha development agenda may, in fact, unblock it. If that relaunches the impetus and allows governments in all parts of the Americas to find the political support to take the calculated risk that is a commitment to trade liberalization, as opposed to unilateral trade liberalization, then I would not be surprised if the FTAA process did not relaunch.
In some respects, this process has gone on so long that the real word has moved ahead and it is not waiting. The investment flows, the trade flows, and exchanges of people are already happening. I suppose there may come a point where we all declare success and go home.
The Chairman: Thank you very much. What you just stated conforms with some of my own impressions.
Honourable senators, I want to thank our witnesses on your behalf. They have made a very interesting presentation to us. This is the first meeting on the policy review. It is pretty hot outside, so I want to thank everyone, including the senators, for coming. We have consistently had a good turnout at the committee, and I think everyone should be complimented.
The committee adjourned.