Proceedings of the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs
Issue 4 - Evidence - April 18, 2007
OTTAWA, Wednesday, April 18, 2007
The Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met this day at 12 p.m. to study the services and benefits provided to members of the Canadian Forces, veterans of war and peacekeeping missions, and members of their families in recognition of their services to Canada.
Senator Joseph A. Day (Chairman) in the chair.
[English]
The Chairman: It is my pleasure to welcome you to the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs. This meeting will examine the text display entitled An Enduring Controversy at the Canadian War Museum.
Appearing before us today, on behalf of the Air Force Association of Canada, is the Executive Director, retired Lieutenant-Colonel Dean Black. Representing the Royal Canadian Legion is Dominion President, Mr. Jack Frost, and retired Brigadier-General Duane Daley, Dominion Secretary. From the Aircrew Association we have Mr. Donald Elliott, Chair of the Toronto Branch. Appearing as an individual is retired Lieutenant General William Carr.
I am Senator Day from New Brunswick and I am the chair of this subcommittee. With me today is Senator Kenny, chair of the parent committee, the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. Senator Kenny is from Ontario. Senator Atkins is also with us. He is both a senator from Ontario and New Brunswick.
Before we begin, I would briefly right to introduce the members of the committee who will arrive shortly. We expect Senator Dallaire, who has been delayed. Senator Downe, from Prince Edward Island, is very involved with the headquarters for Veterans Affairs Canada and he will try to be here later on.
Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Duane Daley, Dominion Secretary, The Royal Canadian Legion: I am honoured that Mr. Jack Frost, in support of the air veteran community, is here today. We are here to discuss the Bomber Command exhibit at the museum.
It is unfortunate, senators that a molehill issue has grown into that of a mountain, which has been further impacted by misunderstanding and intransigence. I hope your review will be able to cut to the heart of the matter and encourage a fair and acceptable compromise for all concerned.
Let me emphasize the Legion's commitment to the Canadian War Museum as a wonderful facility designed to tell the magnificent story of Canada's veterans, their sacrifice and the evolving history of our nation. War has shaped the development of democracy and in particular the establishment of our way of life as we know it today. This has been one with the blood and sacrifice of those who answered the call even from our early days as a colony of both France and Britain.
We take great pride in our new museum and the tremendous effort that has been taken in developing the outstanding exhibits that tell the veterans' story.
The air war gallery, in particular, is a fine piece of work; however, the same cannot be said of the Bomber Command exhibit, which stands as a component of the air war gallery. It pays tribute to the sacrifice and commitment to our aircrews in waging the bombing campaign against Germany, but for some reason the museum has decided to focus the exhibit on the issue of the controversy, which has consumed academics since the end of the war.
Let there be no mistake: There is no controversy as to the effectiveness of the bombing campaign among the aircrew who actually made the history in the cockpits and crew compartments of the bombers. I leave it to the air veterans here today to explain how effective their commitment was in helping shorten the war.
I wish to zero in on the issue of the placard entitled An Enduring Controversy. This is the issue that brings us here today. Why has the museum focused on the issue of controversy as the predominant feature of the Bomber Command exhibit?
By elevating a huge placard in headline font in a central position reading An Enduring Controversy and by accompanying it with wall size photos of dead civilians in the streets of bomb-ravaged cities, the museum has generated a biased, unbalanced message. The museum questions the aims of the campaign, its effectiveness and the sacrifice of the veterans in drawing the war to a close.
It is important to note that the veterans do not deny that there was and is controversy. That is the realm of academics and historians. As such, the veterans can readily accept the inclusion of a few lines of text into the general exhibit narrative indicating that there was controversy relating to the degree of effectiveness of the campaign in compromising Germany's war effort.
The aim of the Legion's request to Mr. Geurts the chief executive officer of the war museum was that he meet with me and members of the air veteran community on October 5, 2006, to develop an acceptable compromise concerning the placard. Regretfully, Mr. Geurts responded that there was no basis for a meeting and that he had no intention of amending the exhibit or of removing the offending placard and photos.
It was clear that the construction of a molehill into a mountain was well underway. Not only had the museum developed and insensitive and biased display, which offends air war veterans across the country, but the issue has evolved into one of insulting intransigence whereby museum officials refuse to meet with veterans in the face of legitimate concerns and growing consternation.
As a result, and as a member of the war museum committee, I took the issue to that committee on November 12, 2006. The committee chairman, General Paul Manson, fully supported the appeal for a compromise. He made the commitment that the appeal would be presented to the board of the Canadian Museum of Civilization Corporation, the Crown corporation with authorized oversight over the war museum. In response to the board's request that the matter be reviewed, the chief executive officer of the Canadian Museum of Civilization Corporation, Dr. Victor Rabinovitch, enlisted the support of four distinguished historians to review the exhibit and the placard in question. Historians were asked the two following questions. Does the war museum section on the strategic air bombing campaign provide a balanced presentation and does it explain the part that strategic bombing played in the wider European military campaign? Some people have criticized one panel, entitled An Enduring Controversy. Does this panel appropriately present current understanding of some of the impacts of the bombing campaign during the war?
The four historians were divided in their opinions, particularly concerning the placard. Considering the difference of opinion, whereby two of the historians questioned the value or significance of the panel, one would have appreciated the decision by Dr. Rabinovitch to direct the removal of the offending panel. Surprisingly, he took the opposite approach and stated that because the overall section presented a balanced display he was not going to direct any sort of a compromise concerning the panel. The molehill erupted into the mountain.
Most interestingly, even though the difference of opinion of the historians should have been sufficient to give any benefit of the doubt to the veterans, Dr. Rabinovitch misdirected the historians from the real issue.
The veterans do not dispute that there was and is controversy. They can accept the inclusion of that fact in the general narrative, but the correctness of the placard's statement is not the issue. At the core of the matter, the veterans expressed concern with the prominence with which museum officials afforded the fact of controversy as a feature item of display in the exhibit. The second concern was the suggestion by museum officials through their use of horrific photos that they support the negative side of the controversy, which proposes that the only real result of the bombing campaign, was the destruction of cities and the wanton death of thousands of civilians. What a biased and unjust accusation against those who sacrificed their lives during the air campaign.
The stress of the veterans today is fully understandable. They simply ask that this predominance of display be removed in favour of simply indicating the issue of controversy in their narrative of one of the panels. While some may accept the placard as factually correct, it does nothing to reinforce the message of remembrance or to emphasize the courage and commitment of the aircrew who faced each day with the fear that they would not see another sunrise. The message on the placard is irrelevant and distorts the whole theme of the exhibit. It presents an argumentative and biased or one-sided message which serves no useful purpose in educating our youth and the public at large to the aims of the bombing campaign and the sacrifice paid in blood by our veterans to achieve that end. The accompanying photos are unacceptable.
On behalf of the 400,000 members of the Royal Canadian Legion, and in support of the courageous war veterans of Bomber Command, the Legion requests that the Senate of Canada urge officials at the Canadian War Museum to remove both the placard entitled An Enduring Controversy and the associated photos of dead civilians. The Legion asks that the museum amend the Bomber Command exhibit to emphasize the tremendous sacrifice paid by the air veterans of Bomber Command to help shorten the war and to contribute to victory.
Finally, honourable senators, we request you to review the whole issue of governance related to the war museum. Is it appropriate to hold oversight of the war museum through the Canadian Museum of Civilization Corporation? We think not. The aims of each of these two museums are totally distinct, so much so that they should each be established with their own boards of governance. More specifically, we suggest that the Canadian War Museum should be governed by a separate board of directors composed of veterans, senior members of the Canadian Forces, historians and representatives of the public at large. This is a critical issue and should be addressed at the earliest opportunity.
I thank you for your indulgence in permitting us to submit this presentation today.
The Chairman: Thank you, Brigadier-General Daley. We appreciate the background that you have given us with respect to this particular Bomber Command display at the war museum. The second issue that you raise with respect to governance is not one that we had considered, but you do raise another interesting point that will be given consideration.
Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret'd) Dean C. Black, CD, Executive Director, Air Force Association of Canada: Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, the Air Force Association of Canada appreciates the opportunity to participate in these important discussions.
At the annual general meeting of the association held last October, a resolution was passed expressing the members' displeasure with the wording of the Canadian War Museum's plaque, An Enduring Controversy devoted to Bomber Command in the Second World War. This important issue captured the overwhelming support of the entire association. The plaque's depiction of the strategic bombing campaign is unjust and there are logical compelling reasons to address the situation.
Those of us who are not World War II veterans find it difficult to appreciate the depth of emotion surrounding this issue. We have not experienced the terrifying circumstances under which Canadian veterans served. We have no idea what it must have been like to awake in the morning not knowing if that day's mission would be our last. We should depend on those who lived through these ordeals to help provide us with the proper context. The crews who experienced these challenges were young men putting their lives at risk in the service of their country. They were doing what they were lawfully ordered to do and were proud of their ability to carry out their mission effectively and to survive doing so.
To have their motives questioned some 65 years later is repulsive to each and every one of them. They feel insulted, diminished and unjustly criticized. They insist on a change to the museum display and we agree with them. We feel that a change de-emphasizing An Enduring Controversy in favour of an argument that reflects the phenomenon of total war would address the veteran's concerns. Let me be clear, we are not advocating a revisionist account but an account that more fairly represents the circumstances under which the bombing campaign was conducted.
We have no wider argument with the Canadian War Museum. The museum is an outstanding venue and the staff deserves credit for work designed to teach, inform and commemorate. Sadly, for as long as the museum's strategic bombing display includes a certain plaque, to veterans the museum will fall short in all of these areas. The plaque is the issue because it suggests that these veterans fought in vain and in morally questionable ways. Today, historical evidence says otherwise.
The museum's display seems to ignore the implications of total war, suggesting instead that strategic bombing was an aspect of war lacking in purpose. This is simply untrue. When Stalin complained that the Allies would fight to the last Russian, the Allies employed strategic bombing as the most ready means by which a second front could be opened. Pressures on the Eastern front were relieved and German economic production was immediately threatened. While it is regrettable that 600,000 Germans perished, the phenomenon of total war suggests that many did not qualify as innocents or non-combatants. Recent research continues to support this claim. Richard Holmes, for example, makes it clear that forming behind those responsible in war is a lengthy queue of the culpable. Total war involves everyone and it is with this reality that critics seem to have difficulty.
No modern author appears to have grasped the true meaning of total war better than Hans J. Morgenthau. To him, the increasing percentage of the population completely identified in its emotions and convictions with war and the increasing percentage of the population participating in war were phenomena reflective of total war.
Similarly, Richard Overy detailed the human and economic resource commitments on both sides that defined total war. In contrast to the Canadian War Museum's display, Mr. Overy states that the rain of bombs on German cities eroded once-flourishing industries, reducing output of aircraft and tanks by 31per cent and 35 per cent respectively.
Combining Mr. Morgenthau's astute qualifications with Mr. Overy's facts, we learn why defeat of the enemy called for the complete destruction of Nazi war industries and disruption of the citizens who depended on and contributed to the sustaining of those industries, the culpable, to which I referred earlier. These were goals to which air power forces were committed. The Allies waged the war relying heavily on every military capability including strategic bombing. Our bomber crews did the best they could and they sought constant improvements to their trade.
As time passed, restrictions were lifted on Allied bombing, but the principles of distinction and proportionality were preserved. Our scientific advisers did their best, and their improvements shaped subsequent bombing efforts for generations to come. The Second World War ended, the enemy surrendered and a total war has not been waged on a similar scale since. For that we should be thanking our bomber veterans, not discrediting them.
Surprisingly, the panel in question does not commemorate the 10,000 Allied bomber aircrew who never came home to Canada. Instead, it suggests that allied aircrew acted on a dubious moral plane. Of the words found on the plaque, the following are the most erroneous. ``The raids resulted in only small reductions on German war production until late in the war.'' ``The value and morality of the offensive remains bitterly contested.''
Consider that in good measure it was precisely because the strategic bombing campaign was so effective that the author of these words is at all able to refer to a ``late stage of the war.'' The quote in its current form is not fact; it is fallacy designed to besmirch. In the absence of bombers, if it came at all, the late part of the war would most probably have been postponed well beyond 1945 at a cost of thousands of more casualties.
The use of the word ``raid'' is an inaccuracy best described as ``wordsmithing'' designed to belittle. These bombing missions were part of a long, well-planned strategic campaign purposefully designed to destroy the enemy's economic engine.
Thanks to thousands of bomber crew members in the Allied air forces, 10,000 of whom never returned home to Canada, the strategic air power campaign worked. It is unclear why the Canadian War Museum gave vent to what might qualify as nothing more than outdated, academic faddism centred on the alleged moral depravity of strategic bombing and outdated and uninformed disputes about its effectiveness. Albert Speer, Hitler's Minister of Armaments, claimed, almost 40 years ago, that German industry came to a halt on May 12, 1944, when 935 bombers hit their targets. Adam Tooze, author of the recent The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy argues that Speer himself believed the end came much earlier in the summer of 1943.
Finally, earlier this year a member of the museum staff claimed, ``The museum's respect for veterans remains profound and unqualified and so too does its respect for history.'' History is a study of the past; it is accumulated experience. A respect for history, therefore, should entail continuous reflection and acknowledgment of current research. The plaque, however, seems to disregard experience that has accumulated since strategic bombing was once considered a controversy 45 years ago. The offending plaque is a giant step backwards. It is difficult to find in the plaque evidence of a respect for history in this example. Because it is painful for surviving veterans, it is also difficult to find evidence of respect for our aging heroes. Respected historian Leopold von Ranke established professional standards for historical training in the mid-nineteenth century. He argued that historians should refrain from judging the past and simply write what happened. Each historical period should be understood on its own terms.
If one looks closely at the war museum's collection, I think with only one exception, can we qualify the museum's outstanding work as falling in step with von Ranke and his followers. The one exception has to be the plaque An Enduring Controversy, which falls short, because it invokes a message that judges the past. It uses words that promote the judging of the bomber crews involved in the bombings. It relies on the application of post-war technical standards to evoke a message of immorality and incompetence.
The director of research at the museum boasts that an adjacent panel includes several photographs including one on the ``relationship between imprecise equipment and the collateral damage visited upon civilian targets.'' These phrases seem to bear very little respect for history. Bombing equipment in use during the war was precise, in every meaning of the word, in that time. ``Collateral damage'' is a colloquialism more at home in the 1990s than the 1940s and the phenomenon of total war manifest in the Second World War discredits any notion that there was such a thing as a purely civilian target in Nazi Germany.
Thousands of years of history tell us that very little of what actually transpires in war is morally acceptable; rather, much of it is morally reprehensible. That is war. Why then, of all the Canadian War Museum displays featuring war in a Canadian context is the strategic bombing campaign the only one to come with a plaque claiming immorality and ineffectiveness? Is this what the Canadian War Museum refers to as balance? It is proposed therefore that the present wording on the plaque be replaced with more appropriate wording similar to that found in a book entitled, No Prouder Place: Canadians and the Bomber Command Experience, 1939-1945, written by David L. Bashow, adjunct professor of history at Royal Military College:
The Allied bombing of the Third Reich and its allies was part of Britain's overall war strategy to take the offensive to the enemy. It created a ``second front'' that bled off resources from the enemy's Soviet campaign involving massive amounts of manpower and material diverted from the primary war effort to address the threat and damage sustained. The bombing campaign dealt telling blows to Germany's economic and industrial infrastructure forcing the decentralization of its war industries. Finally, it paved the way, through destruction of the enemy's defence, oil resources and transportation networks, for successful invasion of Germany through northwest Europe in 1944.
This proposed action is just and appropriate. The Air Force Association of Canada implores the Canadian War Museum to rectify this situation immediately and seeks the support of this committee to make it so.
Donald Elliott, Chairman of the Toronto Branch, Aircrew Association: I am a veteran of World War II. I served as a navigator in 99 Squadron RAF. I served as an observer in the 99 Squadron, which meant I navigated aircraft to the target and then I went down into the nose of the aircraft where the bombing site was located. I am also 90 years old and sometimes my brain stops, so I will ask my young friend about what I should be saying.
My aircraft was shot down by German flack over Cologne on July 8, 1941. I am a retired lawyer and you will realize that from my presentation because I did a lot of contract work earlier in my career, which meant you had to concentrate on the words and that is what I have done here. I have a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Georgia, 1983.
The important paragraph of An Enduring Controversy states, ``Strategic bombing — mass bomber raids against Germany resulted in vast destruction and heavy loss of life.'' The following paragraph states, ``The value and morality of the strategic bomber offensive against Germany remains bitterly contested.''
Who are the people that are bitterly contesting the value and morality of the strategic bomber offensive? It goes on to say, ``Bomber Command's aim was to crush civilian morale and force Germany to surrender by destroying its cities and industrial installations.'' The plaque states ``Although Bomber Command and American attacks left 600,000 Germans dead . . . ,'' I want to point out to you, as I say, because I am a lawyer, that it does not say ``German civilians.'' It says ``Germans'' and so, to a lawyer, the question is does that include the sailors that were killed when the Tirpitz sank? Does it include the aircrew of the night and day fighters that were shot down and killed? If the museum is going to do presentations, the presentations should be accurate. I suggest to you that one is not accurate.
With respect to the statement, that even though 600,000 Germans died and more than 5 million were left homeless, the raids resulted in only small reductions in German war production until late in the war, I ask when is late in the war.
I suggest that the reductions in German warfare were small only because from April to September 1944 Bomber Command was under the control of General Eisenhower. It was used as a tactical weapon to strike at the German forces everywhere. I will develop that thought a little later. Again, if you are to have presentations, it is not sufficient to say ``until late in the war.'' It does not mean anything.
Appearing before this committee reminds me that 15 years ago I gave evidence before Senator Marshall's committee inquiring into the television production, The Valour and the Horror. I was a young Bomber Command veteran aged 75 at that time. The request of those remaining veterans is the same now as it was then. We want any production about Bomber Command to be accurate, fair and if a quotation is used, we want to know its source. When I saw The Valour and the Horror, I taped it and then I translated the tape word by word into a script. However, there was no way that I could find the source of the wording. I thought that, as it had the backing of the CBC and the National Film Board, everything would be correct; I was very naive. There were many mistakes in the wording and in the context. I suggest that we require the source of the quotes. The Canadian War Museum should put a number beside each quotation and keep a book where the number shows the source of the information. If one is interested enough, one can then go to that book and find out where the information came from and exactly what was said.
I understand that your committee will be taking evidence at a later date from the officials of the Canadian War Museum and we would appreciate it if you could obtain answers to the following questions.
I have been told by Terry Goodwin, a Bomber Command veteran, that when he spoke to Dean Oliver of the museum staff about the heading An Enduring Controversy, he was told that it was taken from Senator Marshall's report that referred to an ``enduring debate.'' Would not that word ``debate'' be a more appropriate heading than the word ``controversy,'' particularly as the photograph at the bottom right of the panel states, ``Images like this one fuelled the debate about the bomber offensive''?
I have provided you with photographs taken in July of last year. They were not taken by a professional photographer. That is why I have written what is at the bottom of each one of them.
Looking at this photograph, it is to be noted that there is no message indicating where, when, and under what circumstances this photograph was taken. It says ``Civilian casualties. Images like this one fuelled the debate about the bomber offensive.'' Was the photograph taken in London, Coventry, Rotterdam, Warsaw, or posed for some German propaganda purpose? Were these the employees of some German factory? If so, why were they not in a bomb shelter or evacuated to safer territory?
For Bomber Command veterans, this graphic photograph with no information about its production tells Canadian Bomber Command veterans that the Canadian War Museum officials are using this photograph to imply that we were war criminals.
The photograph beside it adds to that belief when it states, ``To hit only strategic targets such as factories and railway yards as at Münster, Allied bombers would wind up destroying entire cities through collateral damage.''
When was this photograph taken? It does not say. I suspect that it was the result of a raid by 160 Lancasters on Münster on March 21, 1945 when they could operate by day. The photograph shows two locomotives upturned and damaged railway sheds, yet the steeple of a church is still standing. Why was this photograph of a perfect strike on a war target entitled ``collateral damage''? It only serves to anger Bomber Command veterans.
If we go back to the heading of ``Strategic Bombing,'' what is the meaning of the word ``mass,'' as in mass bombing? Does it include aircraft from the 8th and 15th U.S. Army Air Forces? There is no definition of the American presence and the 8th and the 15th were there and doing a great job. Without this definition, the accent is wholly on Bomber Command.
What is the ``vast destruction and heavy loss of life''? How does the loss of life in Germany compare with the killing of six million Jews by the Nazis? How would the museum officials describe that situation? Why not say, ``Bomber raids against Germany resulted in much destruction and many lives lost''? Why do the museum officials hype this statement, except to reinforce the implication that bomber command aircrew were guilty of war crimes?
The Canadian airmen — and I include myself — who clamoured aboard Bomber Command aircraft and flew into the dangerous skies of Nazi-controlled Europe were buoyed by the belief that they were fighting a just war, which was true, and doing so acceptably to the Canadian people, which was also true. Now the panel and its accompanying photographs made after the war by people who never had to face the dangers that I faced and they faced imply that we had been party to the commission of a moral crime. Veterans see it as a bitter insult. Moreover, this feeling of insult is increased by the fact that there is no mention on the panel of the achievements carried out by Bomber Command as a tactical weapon of war.
From April until September 1944, all strategic forces, both RAF and American, were placed under the direction of the Allied Supreme Commander, General Eisenhower, when engaged on operations connected with the invasion of Europe. All commitments in preparation for or support of the invasion had absolute and overriding priority.
On March 25, 1944, the Allied commanders drew up a plan to bomb key railway centres in France and Belgium in order to restrict the reinforcement of German troops before and after the invasion. Thirty-seven railway yards were assigned and destroyed by Bomber Command. In addition, Allied bomber forces attacked airfields, munitions dumps and military encampments, as well as the coastal defences between Calais and the Normandy beaches, making sure to drop twice the weight of bombs near Calais in order to confirm in German minds that the invasion would take place there.
On the night of June 4-5, Bomber Command dropped paratroops and 5,000 tons of bombs, battering the coastal defences and, with the navy, knocking out nine out of 10 Normandy batteries. In the weeks after D-Day, Bomber Command flew over 3,500 operations in order to interdict German communications and attacked German naval units attempting to disrupt Allied supplies across the English Channel. Thereafter, Bomber Command gave close tactical support to Canadian troops during the battles of Caen and Falaise Gap. General Montgomery wrote a letter of praise to Air Marshal Harris, thanking the command for its assistance in those battles. Later, Bomber Command attacked five coastal ports, allowing Canadians to overrun them, taking thousands of POWs and suffering relatively few casualties. Thus, when in September 1944 Bomber Command was released from its obligations, Air Marshall Harris received fulsome thanks from General Eisenhower for what the command had done and Air Marshall Harris was awarded the Order of Merit by President Franklin Roosevelt.
Canadian aircrew took part in all of these battles, yet when I last visited the Canadian War Museum in August 2006 there was no mention of any of these achievements in Gallery 3. During the five-month period from April-September 1944, Bomber Command made relatively few attacks on Germany. They were made largely to prevent the Germans from moving their flak guns to France. All of this important period of the war has been condensed on the panel in 16 words, ``The raids resulted in only small reductions in German war production until later in the war.'' Is it any wonder that Bomber Command veterans feel deeply insulted by An Enduring Controversy panel and its accompanying photographs? Moreover, there is a sidebar in which Air Marshal Harris is said to have stated, ``The extent to which Bomber Command was able to contribute to the solution of the great problems of the war is indeed remarkable.'' Typically, there is no reference given to and no explanation of the problems that Bomber Command faced. However, Denis Richards, in his book entitled, The Hardest Victory, at page 302, lists the achievements of Bomber Command as follows:
Intervention at Dunkirk, the bombing of the invasion barges, the bolstering of British morale, the mining campaign, the substantial part in defeating the U-boats and in finishing off the German fleet, the share in knocking out Italy, the help in mastering the V-weapon menace, the assistance to the Allied armies at critical moments from Normandy landings onward, the tying down of vast German resources to anti-aircraft defence and the final deadly offensive against oil and communications. The list of achievements is impressive enough, whatever view is taken of the losses in production caused by area bombing.
Again, as of August 20, 2006, only the achievement of tying down vast German resources to anti-aircraft defence was mentioned on one of the smaller panels in Gallery 3.
I have one last point: If we ask ourselves who the parties are to the controversy, there are no answers in the panel. One wonders if the controversy is between Bomber Command veterans or perhaps between veterans and their commanders. It is only when you look at the war museum's original website that you can find the single line, ``Historians have hotly contested the morality and effectiveness of strategic bombing.'' In the panel, the word ``hotly'' has been altered to ``bitterly,'' and the reference to historians has been removed. We veterans ask why that is so? These are the kinds of matters that we veterans wanted to discuss with Canadian Bomber Command officials. We set a meeting for that purpose on October 5, 2006.
You have heard that this meeting did not take place because the officials at the war museum said that they would not appear because they would not change their arguments. The representatives of seven different RCAF associations that were ready to go to Ottawa were told that museum officials would not attend because such a meeting would be futile; they were unwilling to change anything. Thus, we appeal to your committee.
The Toronto Branch of the Aircrew Association joins with the Air Force Association of Canada in its request that the panel entitled An Enduring Controversy be replaced by a panel that sets out the passage from David Bashow's book, No Prouder Place: Canadians and the Bomber Command Experience 1939-1945. Senators have it before them today so I will not read it.
When I saw The Valour and the Horror for the first time, my stomach began to churn and I wondered why the CBC and Brian McKenna were doing this to veterans. When I first saw An Enduring Controversy, I experienced the same feeling. I have received all kinds of letters and emails about this panel and I am surprised by the depth of passion amongst the aircrew veterans of Bomber Command. They truly feel strongly about this, and we would appreciate any help that this committee can provide.
The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Elliott. We appreciate your comments. The David Bashow quotation that you referred to was in Lieutenant-Colonel Black's presentation earlier.
Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) William Carr, as an individual: Mr. Chairman, senators, I am here because I was asked to get involved when a number of people found out how emotional and excited I was about the display at the Canadian War Museum. Mr. Elliott is one of those people. I called on him the other day to congratulate him on his ninetieth birthday and asked him to what he owes his longevity. He said, ``Bad luck.''
Mr. Elliott: That is not true. When people ask me how I am, I say, ``Alive and grateful.''
LGen. Carr: During the Second World War, RAF Bomber Command dropped 1,059,656 tons of bombs on Europe. The U.S. 8th and 15th Air Force dropped a further 700,000 tons. The Allied cost was 82,000 aircrew dead and 34,000 wounded or prisoners of war. Bomber Command lost 12,330 aircraft, shot down or damaged beyond repair, and the United States Air Force lost 9,066 bombers in Europe. Of the 94,000 RCAF members who served overseas, 27,000 were combat aircrew. Two thirds were attached to RAF squadrons and one third served in RCAF squadrons. Nearly 15,000 of them were killed and, of that 15,000, 10,000 were in Bomber Command.
Bomber Command casualty rates were second only to the German U-boat casualty rate whereby 60 per cent of our airmen died, 3 per cent were seriously wounded, 12 per cent became POWs, 1 per cent evaded capture and only 24 per cent survived unharmed. Each bombing sortie they flew, in retrospect, seems close to voluntary suicide. The survival rate for two tours in Bomber Command was 5 per cent.
In this introduction, I am trying to set the stage as to why veterans are justified to be outraged at what they sense to be a cavalier and demeaning attitude by the author of the wording and the highlighting of the An Enduring Controversy panel at the Canadian War Museum.
I was not a member of Bomber Command, but I am a lucky World War II survivor who flew 142 photographic missions against enemy targets. There were not many of us in the photo recce business, but unarmed and alone we were supplied superb aircraft with first-class cameras and German lenses, I might add. I am one of the 45 per cent that survived the tour. My admiration and respect for what the unmatched airmen of Bomber Command did to help us become victorious in World War II is unbounded. It flows not just from things I know first-hand but also from the detailed knowledge I have made it my business to learn about their operations and why they unquestionably deserve our nation's deepest respect and gratitude. Canadians cannot permit their memory to be sullied.
I will not repeat what General Daley said about the dominance of the panel; you cannot avoid it as you enter Gallery 3. It is prominent on the left-hand wall. The bombing story in that gallery is well told. It is informative, but it is full of errors. In addition to the bad choice of words on the strategic bombing channel, the inference that the RCAF's 6th group was responsible for all of the RCAF's participation in Bomber Command is wrong. In fact, only 40 per cent of the Canadian aircrew in Bomber Command ever served in RCAF 6 Group squadrons, and the other 60 per cent were in RAF squadrons. While this information may not be pertinent to the debate about the offending panel, it may prove that even the historians at the museum can make mistakes.
The contention by veterans is that inherent in the statement, ``The value and morality of the strategic bomber offensive against Germany remains bitterly contested,'' is a judgment call, which suggests that those who were involved acted immorally and were nothing short of war criminals dropping bombs and killing innocent civilians.
``Bomber Harris,'' the commander, did not establish Bomber Command's objectives and policy. The British cabinet set the objectives, approved by Churchill and relayed through the Chief of the Air Staff to him. He did what he was told and indeed on occasion was given detailed instructions on certain targets; Dresden is a case in point.
The bomber crews, at such terrible costs, also did what they were told to do. They had no choice. The subject of precision bombing as we conceive it now has been well covered, so I will not talk about it again except to point out that, in recognition of the inability to hit targets precisely, a special group Pathfinder Force was created in order to assist, prevent and reduce the collateral damage problem.
The production point has already been made. Indeed, production was not cut back as badly as it might have been. The fact was that the bombing campaign cost so much in terms of manpower to operate the anti-aircraft guns, repair the damage done by the bombs that, had the campaign not occurred, the war would have lasted much longer and been much more costly. There is no question.
The appeals that have been made have been mentioned, but I would like to be a little more specific. Among those who had been appealed to are the Prime Minister's Office, the Heritage Minister, the CEO of the Canadian Museum of Civilization, the CEO of the Canadian War Museum and the director of research and displays at the museum. Despite requests made by the Royal Canadian Legion, the Army, Navy and Air Force Veterans, the Air Force Association of Canada, the Wartime Pilots and Observers, the War Amps and the Aircrew Association in the lead, no sign of support of any kind to the current appeals has been forthcoming.
I will not repeat again the decision by the CEO of the Canadian Museum of Civilization to overrule the recommendation of the historians which he appointed. We do not understand.
World War II aircrew veterans supported by many ordinary Canadians sense that in the wording on the panel, An Enduring Controversy, in Gallery 3 of the Canadian War Museum, they have been judged guilty of immoral acts by having been actively involved in the bombing campaign against Germany. They are outraged a public institution such as the Canadian War Museum would dare to call into question why they did their duty and where so many of their fellow airmen died.
The staff of the museum and the CEO of the Canadian Museum of Civilization deny that there is any cause to bow to what to everyone else are the reasonable and justifiable requests by air force veterans to amend the wording on the panel. These officials arrogantly support the retention of what, to the veterans, are clearly slurs against the exceptional and deadly service the Bomber Command aircrew gave to the winning of the war.
The image of our magnificent new war museum is being tarnished because some officials and staff members are intransigent in their views that the veterans are wrong to question their judgement call.
Finally, Sir Winston put it succinctly when in a letter to ``Bomber Harris'' at this end of the war he summarized Bomber Command's performance as ``duty nobly done.''
Obviously it was. Would this not be a more appropriate heading? The veterans see the present heading as not only grossly unfair and judgmental but also arrogant, morally biased and dishonest. The present panel in Gallery 3 of the museum is unacceptable and must be changed. I recommend that a new panel be prepared entitled Duty Nobly Done, and the text on the new panel to be exactly that already suggested by two other speakers from David Bashow's No Prouder Place: Canadians and the Bomber Command Experience, 1939-1945.
The Chairman: We appreciate your comments and presentations. We understand your position and you have put it forward nicely, succinctly and clearly on behalf of the members of your association. We would like to go to questions and points of clarification. The questioner would typically pose the question to one or all of you and, if others would like to comment on any point, please let me know and I will give you the floor.
Senator Kenny: I have to state a bias at the start. My father was a pilot in the RCAF. He flew at D-Day. He was shot down at Arnhem. He was a prisoner of war, and I can visualize him sitting beside you today if he were still alive.
General Carr, you talked about the statistics and the high level of casualties in Bomber Command. A tour typically was 30 sorties. What was the expectancy of an aircrew to survive 30 sorties?
Mr. Elliott: About 25 per cent.
Senator Kenny: You had one chance in four of making it through your tour?
Mr. Elliott: Yes, and then you did six months of instruction and came back for a second tour of 20 trips. You had a 5 per cent chance.
Senator Kenny: Is there any mention of that in the Canadian War Museum?
Mr. Elliott: No, not to my knowledge.
Senator Kenny: Is there any relativity in terms of the casualties that aircrew sustained, Bomber Command in particular, compared to other combatants? You discussed it, General Carr. Is there any reference?
LGen. Carr: No, there is not.
Senator Kenny: Is there any discussion in the museum of the blitz, of the bombing of Coventry, of what had happened prior to the Allies developing their capacity to attack Germany?
LGen. Carr: As I remember, it is vaguely passed over in one panel, but it is not significant and it does not attract attention. In fact, I dug out statistics as to how many were killed in Britain during the blitz and by the buzz bombs.
Senator Kenny: Is that reflected in the museum?
LGen. Carr: No, it is not. The numbers are not there at all.
Senator Kenny: Was there any further explanation from the museum officials about not being prepared to sit down and listen to you?
BGen. Daley: It amazes me to this day that they would not sit down and talk to us. In fairness to Mr. Geurts, the Chief Executive Officer of the Canadian War Museum, he answered every query from individual veterans. When it became apparent that there was agreement in the air veteran community that the placard was a misstatement, we asked if we could sit down to try to find the compromise with both Mr. Geurts and his chief historian. Unfortunately, a decision had already been taken and he said there was no point in meeting with us, as they were not prepared to amend the display.
Senator Kenny: Clearly, the issues that I have addressed so far regarding the extraordinary risks that Bomber Command took, the costs in terms of lives, the fact that the United Kingdom had already endured the blitz, all seemed to me to be remarkable in their absence. The proposal that you are putting to the committee is what Professor Bashow has written.
In our discussion earlier, you conceded the right of academics to interpret; you conceded that there are differing views about the way the bombing was conducted; and you focused a great deal on how offensive the wording is that is currently up on the wall. If your proposal were adopted by the museum, there would be no reference to the fact that there are differing views among historians about the bombing.
Professor Bashow does not seem to reflect that in the statement that you are putting to us. It seems a little incomplete. Do you feel it is comprehensive or do you feel it is a little incomplete?
Mr. Elliott: It is as comprehensive as you can get, but if the matter could be settled by them adopting their own thought. I am searching for the phrase.
LCol. Black: ``Bitterly contested.''
Mr. Elliott: No.
LGen. Carr: It is on the web page as ``Historians bitterly contest the validity . . .''
Mr. Elliott: No, they say, ``Historians hotly contested the morality and the relevance of the bombing strategy.'' If they want to put something like that in to satisfy you, I am sure that I can convince my group to accept that wording.
Senator Kenny: It is not to satisfy me, Mr. Elliott. It is to ensure that the museum does it right. That is the objective.
LCol. Black: This is an excellent point. There was a time the Air Force Association of Canada was prepared to make such a compromise. Very early on, the nuance that has been so professionally briefed by Dr. Elliott was part of our attempts. We wanted words such as ``some historians.'' Those important bits of nuance were part of our initial attempt, but the intransigence got in the way, to the point where we are now going for a wholesale change.
Mr. Elliott: I would agree completely. I was out in Calgary last week at a meeting of the Southern Alberta branch of the Aircrew Association. I was astonished at the passion. Their thought was to throw the thing out and not even start again.
BGen. Daley: I will emphasize the point that the proposal was made to the museum. Certainly, no one is denying there is controversy or even using the better word that Dr. Elliott presented, ``debate.'' There has been much debate. There was a proposal. Please go ahead. Put that in; it is a fact. The issue is the prominence of the controversy afforded by the museum.
LGen. Carr: I exchanged correspondence with Dr. Rabinovitch, and on behalf of many of our veterans, I suggested to him that he and his staff sit down with us, the Aircrew Association, and work out some compromising wording without continuing to sully the reputation of our beautiful, magnificent Canadian War Museum, but I received no positive response.
The Chairman: Is your opinion reflective of all of the veteran associations? Is there another point of view that we should be hearing? Can we assume that you have put forward their point of view?
Mr. Elliott: I am sure, because I have spoken to Bruce Allen, the President of the Bomber Command Association in Sarnia. I have spoken to the head of the POW association and the head of the Halifax association, because I had to get them together to go to Ottawa. They feel the same way I do.
Senator Atkins: Brigadier-General Daley, when you made the request to Mr. Geurts and he replied that there was not point in meeting because a decision had been made; whom was he representing in terms of that decision?
BGen. Daley: I guess that is part of the issue at hand today. Certainly, Mr. Geurts does not work in isolation because of the issue I commented on earlier. He works within the governance of the Canadian Museum of Civilization. I think this was an internal decision made by the museum officials. My interpretation is that Mr. Geurts was in the position of having to present that response.
Senator Atkins: If that was their decision, surely they recognized the fact that it would polarize the whole issue.
BGen. Daley: I think so, but at the same time they continued to proclaim the righteousness of their case, that we are wrong; that they have the right to interpret as well as document, and it would be inappropriate for members of the public to ask them to rewrite the way they have presented the historical facts.
Senator Atkins: The bottom line is, it is pride of authorship.
BGen. Daley: That must be it.
Senator Atkins: The Legion has suggested that it might boycott the Canadian War Museum. What do you think that action would achieve?
BGen. Daley: The Legion has never formally proclaimed a boycott of the Canadian War Museum. We are tremendous supporters of the war museum. We sit on the war museum committee and try to provide guidance through that medium.
The issue of a boycott was reported in the media. It reflected a feeling among the Mayday Committee. It was independently suggested in Legion Magazine, which is not an official spokesperson of the Dominion president and his executive, but an arm's length magazine, that the members of the veterans committee should support the Mayday committee in these objectives. It was ultimately interpreted in the media as meaning to completely avoid participation in the museum, to boycott.
Senator Atkins: What is the membership of the Legion?
BGen. Daley: The Legion's membership is 400,000 members, but I think what is important, and also in response to one of Senator Kenny's questions earlier on, the war museum's committee has members of the veteran's community. Because of the shape of the veteran's community, the Legion has one spokesman. There are also observers here from the Army, Navy and Air Force Veterans in Canada. They have a seat on the war museum committee, as does the National Council of Veteran Associations, Dr. Chadderton's organization. All three of these veterans' organizations were unanimous in their appeal to the museum to look at a compromise; it is more than the 400,000 members of the Royal Canadian Legion.
Senator Atkins: How many directors are there at the museum?
BGen. Daley: I cannot answer that question.
Mr. Elliott: There is a board of trustees and to the best of my knowledge, there were at least 10 members. When General Manson's term expired, there was no longer any member of the board with military experience. Fredrik Eaton and Jack Granatstein were appointed thereafter. We had written to Ms. Oda suggesting some of our members be made members of the committee so that we could put our point across, but she chose to look elsewhere.
Senator Atkins: How many members of the senior organization, the Canadian Museum of Civilization Corporation, have military experience?
BGen. Daley: The only member that had military experience on the board of directors of the Museum of Civilization Corporation was General Manson. As a member of that board, he was tasked to chair the war museum committee which consisted of the three major organizations, but all the other members, approximately another seven members, were all members of the that Museum of Civilization board.
I would not be out of line in saying that General Manson, as our chairman of the war museum committee, was fully supportive of the veteran community and spoke eloquently that the placard had to be changed. He was the one who made the presentation to the board.
What was surprising to us in the Legion and the veteran community was that when the decision was finally made after the investigation by the four historians, it was pronounced by the chief executive officer of the Museum of Civilization and not the Canadian War Museum. What sort of teeth does the chairman or the CEO of the Canadian War Museum have in resolving these issues? We are confused. What is the purpose of the war museum committee in trying to resolve these issues? We are also confused about that.
Senator Atkins: It raises the question of what debate was at the board.
The Chairman: To clarify the record Brigadier-General Daley, you said that General Manson is former chief of the air force in Canada. Did he have any role with respect to the building of the new war museum?
BGen. Daley: General Manson is also the former Chief of the Defence Staff and he led the fund raising effort on behalf of the war museum, a very successful project. I must say, of course, the funding for the new museum was also focused through the Museum of Civilization Corporation.
The Chairman: I was trying to bring out — and you have done it nicely — the role of the air force and retired air force personnel in having built the new war museum.
Senator Dallaire: I hope that does not mean that you have comments on how the building looks and whether it has anything to do with an air force hanger.
Do you have information on how the bombing campaign is presented in museums in the U.K. and the U.S.?
Mr. Elliott: I was on a radio program with Anna Maria Tremonti of the CBC. She interviewed an expert from the United States who said that when the Smithsonian Institute brought in the Enola Gay, the aircraft that dropped the atomic bomb, they had something like 500 placards around the aircraft. Most of the placards were unsympathetic to the bombing, so the government then ordered that only two of the placards remain. I think one of them says it is the Enola Gay and the other one says that this aircraft dropped the first atomic bomb. The man was pleased that the Canadian veterans had not gone to the government for help. He was wrong, of course. We had gone.
Senator Dallaire: On this specific campaign, not the Asian campaign but the northwest Europe campaign, do we specifically know what the British and Americans say in their museums?
Mr. Elliott: I have been to the British air museum and it is mostly aircraft. I cannot recall if there was anything like this. I only know that the American museum is at Dayton, Ohio and that they are laudatory about what they did.
Senator Dallaire: It is not a national museum as such; it is an air force base.
Mr. Elliott: Yes.
Senator Dallaire: You are a lawyer so you know that although things might happen, unless you can prove it in court, it will not wash. You need documentary proof, eyewitness proof and so on. In this case, to what extent have initiatives been taken to go to the source of the analysis, that is the academic world, seek from them the more rigorous peer review interpretations of that campaign and build from that in your arguments with both the museum and potentially the government?
As an example, could the Air Force Association of Canada do a three-day symposium on this, specifically inviting academics, and historians and so on, to take a crack at this and bring a new intellectual-based argument to the problem?
Mr. Elliott: I know they have done this in Britain, but we have not considered it here because we have not. That is all.
LCol. Black: It is still relatively early in the process, but I cannot help but wonder whether there would be any sympathy for or attention paid to such an effort knowing that four of Canada's most renowned historians were offered an opportunity to do exactly that only to be ignored by the museum.
Senator Dallaire: In a campaign to change something, you will not start by saying that maybe we can no longer use that venue. Although veterans have lived these experiences and have that background, civilian Canadians are looking for a third-party perspective on it. It would be more than appropriate to get everyone who knows how to write and has done analysis of this to hold symposia, debate and discussion. That would be a more appropriate counterbalance to the argument of this being an erroneous and misplaced demonstration of that campaign. You might set up an alternate stand with that data, and if they refuse to accept that, they are into an intellectually corrupted perspective of the campaign. If they are not able to debate it in an intellectually rigorous fashion rather than an emotional fashion, it is their error rather than the error of those who lived it. I am afraid that does not necessarily hold water in a courtroom when arguing the legal dimensions of this issue. I think you should proceed from the same perspective as they are and prove them to be intellectually erroneous.
The Chairman: For clarification, Mr. Elliott, in response to questioning by Senator Kenny you talked about the first tour of 30 sorties. You said that the chance of survival was 25 per cent. You said that those personnel then worked at a desk job for a while before participating in 20 sorties in the next tour with the chance of survival of the two tours being 5 per cent.
Mr. Elliott: Yes.
The Chairman: There was some discussion about London and Coventry. My recollection is that there is some mention of that at the front end of the display.
Mr. Elliott: I do not think there is in the display but, as I recall, there is a board that says that the Germans had strongly attacked London in a blitz. I am sure that there is no mention of British casualties, for example.
The Chairman: I suppose the argument there is that this is a display of Bomber Command. I am wondering how you would feel if that last plaque made reference to strategic bombing that took place both ways in the war, if rather than referring to the value and morality of the bombing by the allies and the Americans in Germany it just said that there was strategic bombing and that there are differing views on its effectiveness. Would that lessen the concerns?
Mr. Elliott: It is interesting you should say that because that is the way I started. I was asked to comment on it and that was my first thought. However, when we saw David Bashow's summation on the dust jacket of the book, it seemed so appropriate that I dropped the idea of doing what you suggest.
The Chairman: Mr. Bashow focuses on the Allied bombing of the Third Reich. He used different wording and a different approach, but only from one point of view, from the allies taking it to Germany.
Mr. Elliott: Yes.
The Chairman: The important point you have made is that we as a Senate committee are not, and you as presenters and representatives of various veterans' associations are not, trying to rewrite history here, which is the typical academic complaint.
We are concerned about, and you have told us your concern is, the interpretation particularly of the words ``The value and morality of the strategic bombing offensive against Germany remains bitterly contested.'' We have focused on that sentence today, and there is no question that there would have been, even during the war, some who were not in agreement with respect to the effectiveness of strategic bombing and perhaps the morality.
Mr. Elliott: That is true.
The Chairman: You are not telling us that you are objecting to that, but you are saying that the way this is presented suggests that the lack of morality goes to the individual air crew members and suggests that they might have been performing war crimes. Am I interpreting your comments correctly?
Mr. Elliott: Yes.
Senator Dallaire: I have the impression that the whole tone of the display is accusatory to the aircrew and even more so to the generals who took the decisions to go along with this campaign. The tone is that we implemented an immoral concept of operations and we have not been held accountable for it. That is the tone of the way it is written and that is the main objection, because it makes accusations of a war crime that is not proven.
The Chairman: As I understand it, they are going from the decision and the direction to have strategic bombing being immoral to the actual carrying out of the orders by the air crew being immoral.
Senator Dallaire: Yes, by extension.
Senator Atkins: How do you respond to the historians who think it is inappropriate for the Senate subcommittee to involve itself in this issue?
Mr. Elliott: Well, let us find out.
The Chairman: Thank you very much, gentlemen, for presenting the issue in a clear manner. We understand it and will look forward, as I am sure you will, to the reply from war museum personnel next week. We will ensure that you get a copy of the transcript.
The committee adjourned.