Proceedings of the Special Senate Committee on
Anti-terrorism
Issue 1 - Evidence - Meeting of May 31, 2010
OTTAWA, Monday, May 31, 2010
The Special Senate Committee on Anti-terrorism met this day at 1 p.m. to consider matters relating to anti- terrorism.
Senator Hugh Segal (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: Colleagues, it is one o'clock, and I would like to start on time today for everyone's benefit.
Welcome to the second meeting of the Special Senate Committee on Anti-terrorism. This committee was established by order of reference from the Senate of Canada both on May 4 and on May 27. We are waiting for two bills to study: Bill S-7, to deter terrorism and to amend the State Immunity Act, allowing victims of terrorism to sue perpetrators and designated state sponsors, and Bill C-17, to amend the Criminal Code with respect to investigative hearing and recognizance with conditions.
Today, we are beginning our hearings with an update from senior security police and anti-terrorism officials in Canada on the context of the terrorist threat as it exists. We will be hearing from Charles Bisson, Deputy Director, Operations, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, CSIS; Monik Beauregard, Director, Integrated Threat Assessment Centre, ITAC; Assistant Commissioner Gilles Michaud, National Security Criminal Investigations, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, RCMP; and Linda Goldthorp, Director General, Director General Intelligence Production, National Defence.
Our guests were asked to deal with a series of specific questions: how the terrorist threat in Canada and internationally has changed over the last five years, and what those changes mean to anti-terrorism contingencies, plans and initiatives; how integrated the analytical capacity is as employed by CSIS, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, Communications Security Establishment Canada, RCMP, and the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre with respect to analyzing these differences; whether barriers exist, either bureaucratic or turf that are impediments that, in some way, dilute our anti-terrorism agility; and how real the link is between terrorism and organized crime.
We are fortunate to have senior officials with us this afternoon who I am sure have very crowded agendas in their day-to-day work. We will begin with their testimony and ask them to proceed in the following order: Mr. Bisson from CSIS, Ms. Beauregard from the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre, Mr. Michaud from the RCMP, and Ms. Goldthorp from National Defence. After they are finished, we will have an opportunity for questions.
Charles Bisson, Deputy Director, Operations, Canadian Security Intelligence Service: Thank you and good afternoon. It is a pleasure for me to be here with you. I would like to state up front, on behalf of CSIS, that the director and I appreciate the interest this committee has so far shown in anti-terrorism policy and practice in this country. I know that many members of this committee were involved in the review of the Anti-terrorism Act, which reported to Parliament in 2007. It is commendable that this committee has been reconstituted to continue studying these important matters.
[Translation]
The threats that Canada faces are real, fluid and constantly evolving. And yet too often, these important matters are discussed only during times of crisis or as a response to a controversial newspaper headline.
The director of CSIS, Mr. Fadden, has often expressed concern with what he sees as somewhat of an imbalance in the discussions on terrorism and national security in Canada, and has called for a more nuanced debate worthy of a G8 country.
[English]
We believe that the reconstitution of this committee represents a positive development in this regard, and we look forward to working with you in the interest of advancing this important discussion in a manner that is balanced and that studies both the nature of the threats we face and the measures used by the Government of Canada to counter and defeat these threats.
CSIS is Canada's security intelligence service. Our role, duties and functions are defined in section 12 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, which provides us the mandate to collect, analyze and retain information and intelligence with respect to activities that can reasonably be suspected of being security threats to Canada. We report to and advise the Government of Canada on that intelligence.
Based on the authority provided by section 12 of that act, CSIS collects intelligence on a variety of specific threats to Canada, as defined in section 2 of the act, particularly terrorism, espionage and foreign-influenced activities.
Of these threats, it will be a surprise to no one to hear that terrorism remains the service's number one priority. In particular, CSIS remains most concerned with al Qaeda, its affiliates and its adherents. Naturally, we are most concerned with those within Canada who ascribe to such movements and who advocate violence as a means to achieve their ends.
In recent years, the phenomenon that is known broadly as radicalization and home-grown extremism have emerged as particularly worrisome and challenging threats confronting our national security. Although there are similarities in the steps that individuals take along the path of radicalization, the trigger that leads a person to move from fundamentalism to violent extremism is not fully understood. However, we know with certainty that the threat is real. The recent convictions of members of the Toronto 18 and Momin Khawaja, as well as a flurry of arrests of American citizens planning attacks in the United States, demonstrate the ends to which some individuals will go to do harm to their fellow citizens.
I would encourage anyone with an interest in this area to read the publicly available documentation from court proceedings in these cases.
The determination with which these individuals conducted their activities, the zeal with which they communicated their hatred of the targets and the level of sophistication that they demonstrated in their planning should give us all reasons to pay special attention.
The threat of violence from home-grown extremists is itself worrisome. The various challenges that distinguish it from the threat posed by international terrorism makes it all the more so.
First, home-grown extremists are, by definition, already in Canada and tend to be citizens or permanent residents. They are usually well integrated and comfortable navigating the trappings of popular culture, technology, language, customs and laws. The activities of these individuals cannot always be disrupted through traditional means of countering terrorism, such as at the border or using visa controls.
Additionally, the emergence of the Internet has served as a force multiplier in facilitating planning, recruiting, organizing and fundraising to the point where travel to a terrorist training camp abroad is no longer an essential step in terrorist training processes. Whereas there might once have been many opportunities along the path toward planning terrorist attacks that security agencies could detect, interdict and disrupt the planning, in many cases, today's home- grown threats have significantly reduced the time frame within which security agencies must act. In other words, the threat moves more quickly today than it did in the past. Therefore, our efforts to confront it must also move more quickly.
[Translation]
It is for this reason, among others, that CSIS and its partners must work together concertedly to confront the threats to our national security.
In this regard, the government has made great strides in recent years to ensure that the right information is shared with the right people at the right time.
For its specific part, CSIS has the legislative mandate to share information on threat-related activities directly with specific departments and agencies of the Government of Canada when it relates to their respective mandates, including law enforcement, immigration and transportation security.
And I would say that through hard work brought on by both necessity and common cause, the relationship between CSIS and its national security partners has never been better than it is today.
[English]
I mentioned the Toronto 18 and Momin Khawaja cases earlier as real life examples of the types of modern threats that Canada faces. They are also good examples to show how working together with our security partners provided recent successes.
These successful prosecutions have presented new challenges to which we must be alert. Those wishing to do harm to Canadians have been schooled on the methods and crafts used by law enforcement and security agencies through necessary disclosure provisions in the criminal justice system. Therefore, security organizations must continually adapt their operational methodology and explore creative and innovative investigative approaches and solutions to gain an edge over those we target. It is critical that CSIS and law enforcement agencies are able to exploit an ever-growing range of investigative options and techniques, always subject to the necessary safeguards and review mechanisms.
[Translation]
While there is, and always will be, room for improvement, the government has put in place a variety of structural and policy mechanisms among the agencies. A prime example is the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre, which my colleague, Ms. Beauregard, will speak to in more detail later.
Briefly, I would also like to address the committee's interest in exploring links between terrorism and organized crime. From the service's perspective, organized criminal activity is exactly that — criminal — meaning that it has already crossed a threshold where it has entered the realm and responsibility of law enforcement authorities.
This is not to say that CSIS is unaware of the public safety threat posed by organized criminal activity. Indeed, if there is a link to the threats outlined in section 2 of our act — espionage, terrorism, foreign-influenced activity — CSIS can investigate it and, under the act, disclose information to law enforcement agencies, which can initiate prosecution related to an alleged contravention of any law of Canada or a province.
The current reality, however, is that although CSIS has investigated organized crime at the strategic level in the past, the current threat environment has compelled us to shift significant resources toward the fight against terrorism.
In closing, I would simply like to reiterate the service's belief that this is an important forum for engaging in the type of discussions that we believe need to take place in this country. It is important in any democracy, no less so for Canada, that security services maintain the confidence and trust of the citizenry and that they serve the elected representatives.
I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you in support of that effort. I look forward to taking any questions you may have.
Monik Beauregard, Director, Integrated Threat Assessment Centre: Mr. Chair, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee and speak to the role of the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre, or ITAC.
In the next few minutes, I will discuss the mandate and organization of ITAC, and the evolution of the terrorist threat internationally over the last five years and its implications for Canada; finally, I will briefly provide a response to the question on the organized crime/terrorism nexus.
[English]
To begin, the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre, ITAC, was born out of the 2004 national security policy entitled Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy. The policy recognized that the key element to provide greater security for Canadians and to get the most from our expenditures was to coordinate and better integrate our efforts. The policy called for the creation of an integrated assessment centre to ensure that all threat-related information would be effectively compiled and analyzed, and that resultant assessments would reach all those who need them in a timely and effective manner. Therefore, the centre's primary purpose is to produce integrated, comprehensive and timely assessments of the terrorist threat to Canadian interests, both at home and abroad.
The mandate of ITAC has been revised and broadened three times since its creation in 2004. ITAC now produces threat warnings that include coverage of potential use of serious violence against persons or property to achieve a political objective. In 2007, ITAC's threat coverage was expanded by the National Security Advisor to include terrorist threats to Canadian critical infrastructure, again, both in Canada and abroad. ITAC also plays a role as a primary assessor of threats from terrorism and threats involving serious violence to people and infrastructure during special events. An example of this is the recent Olympic Winter Games and the G8 and G20 meetings next month.
ITAC was set up as a community-wide resource. Its staff is composed of analysts seconded from across government. Though ITAC serves as a prime example of a whole-of-government approach, the centre requires a secure facility. Therefore, a decision was made in the early stages that ITAC would be housed in CSIS and operate as a functional branch of the service.
ITAC involves, on the one hand, the wider intelligence community committing to second analysts to ITAC and, on the other hand, CSIS providing the necessary support to enable ITAC to function properly. This dual relationship needed to be translated into an inclusive governance process and to ensure that all those with a stake in ITAC have a voice in its strategic direction.
The ITAC director reports directly to the CSIS director who, in turn, provides advice to the National Security Advisor, NSA. The CSIS director and National Security Advisor co-chair a committee of deputy ministers called the ITAC Management Board. Its mandate is to review ITAC's performance and provide advice on the centre's strategic orientation, including short- or long-term changes in focus or mandate.
[Translation]
I have already alluded to the fact that ITAC is based on an integrated model for sharing and analyzing information and intelligence relating to the threat of terrorism.
What this means in practice is that the centre analyzes intelligence and information it receives from collection agencies and various other partners. It is crucial to understand the difference here that ITAC is an assessment shop and can analyze only the information that is collected by others and shared with the centre.
Information sharing is critical to ITAC's ability to carry out its mandate. For this reason, each analyst seconded to ITAC from a partner institution maintains direct connectivity to the databases of his or her home organization.
[English]
ITAC was also established to improve Canada's capacity to contribute more significantly to international counterterrorism efforts. In this regard, ITAC works closely with foreign fusion centres of Canada's key intelligence partners, including the U.S., the U.K., Australia and New Zealand. We also have relationships with a number of European fusion centres.
[Translation]
Now that I have provided what I hope is a clearer understanding of ITAC's purpose, I will turn to the question foremost on your mind: what are the threats facing Canada?
The terrorist threats Canada faces emanate from what we could loosely call four different types of actors.
First, there is Islamist extremism, so al Qaeda and its affiliates. Second, there is home-grown Islamist extremism influenced by al Qaeda ideology. Third, there are international terrorist groups other than al Qaeda. And fourth, there is domestic extremism.
For the sake of time, however, and since Mr. Bisson has already addressed the threat of home-grown extremism, I will limit my remarks to Islamist extremism as practiced by al Qaeda and its affiliates, which remains the pre-eminent terrorist threat to western countries, including Canada.
As you know, al Qaeda has, on more than one occasion, specifically identified Canada as a viable target, and while sustained international counterterrorism efforts have indeed eroded al Qaeda leadership and hampered funding and recruitment efforts, al Qaeda does remain a threat to Canada and Canadian interests abroad.
[English]
Al Qaeda messaging repeatedly reiterates the group's anti-Western and anti-Israeli ideology. Given the intense pressure al Qaeda is under in its safe haven in Pakistan's tribal areas, operational activities are increasingly shifting to its affiliates in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, the Maghreb and Sahel regions, Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula. Although the affiliates have been primarily focused on regional objectives and operations, the recent events of Christmas Day and, last month, the attempted bombing in Times Square indicate a worrisome new willingness and a certain degree of capability on the part of affiliates to mount attacks outside of their regions.
The failed Christmas Day attempt also denotes a new evolution in the strategy of al Qaeda and its affiliates, from well-planned and coordinated attacks to smaller opportunistic ones. The specific incident is an example of how planning was completed fairly rapidly and was focused on the skills of the recruit and his ability to travel.
Recent web postings and al Qaeda propaganda applaud and encourage opportunistic and relatively uncomplicated attacks, such as the one carried out by Major Hasan at Fort Hood, and officially sanctioned acts of individual jihad, raising the spectre of jihadi lone wolves. These recent trends, in concert with the added concerns generated by a number of recent cases of home-grown extremism, illustrate that the threat from terrorism clearly is becoming more diverse.
Finally, I will turn to your question on the nexus between organized crime and terrorism. There is a prevailing mistrust on the part of organized crime groups toward terrorist groups, whose operational activities are religiously and ideologically motivated and can often have a significant negative impact on economic interests. In contrast, organized crime groups are generally focused on maximizing profit and ensuring the continuation of illicit business activities.
Terrorists, as well, have generally sought to limit their exposure to criminal organizations. However, necessity has sometimes compelled them to engage in illicit transactions with criminal groups to obtain illicit commodities and for services in which criminal organizations possess specialized knowledge, such as human smuggling.
Numerous terrorist groups have undertaken criminal activities to directly support operations and as a means to generate funds. Terrorist groups have routinely engaged in activities such as human smuggling, illegal weapons procurement and the use and possession of fraudulent identity documents to support operations. To obtain funds, terrorists have resorted to crimes such as fraud, kidnapping, commodity smuggling and drug trafficking. The complexity of these criminal operations ranges from short-term, low-level offences to more highly structured and organized activities.
[Translation]
That said, however, the factors I just mentioned limit the potential of organized crime groups and terrorist organizations to form strong, long-term alliances. Serious organized crime groups are motivated by maximizing profit and will typically not jeopardize those interests and call unwanted attention to themselves by cooperating with terrorist organizations.
To summarize, global counterterrorism efforts have eroded al Qaeda's leadership, funding and operational capability, and that has prompted an increase in the operational tempo of al Qaeda affiliates. Al Qaeda, nonetheless, remains a resilient organization whose determination to mount attacks against the west cannot be underestimated. Terrorists and extremists are making greater and more sophisticated use of the Internet for the distribution of propaganda, radicalization, recruitment, fundraising and operational planning; and their operations and tactics are becoming more technologically advanced, as shown by the failed Christmas Day plot, which was successful in penetrating aviation security.
I hope I have been able to convey that there is closer cooperation between intelligence partners than ever before, both domestically and internationally, and that ITAC is a prime example of that cooperation. Fusion centres have been established in Canada and many western countries, specifically to facilitate the coordination of counterterrorism efforts.
The Chair: I would now ask Assistant Commissioner Michaud, of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, to kindly make his presentation.
[English]
Assistant Commissioner Gilles Michaud, National Security Criminal Investigations, Royal Canadian Mounted Police: Good afternoon and thank you Mr. Chair and members of the committee. I welcome your establishment of this important committee as a means to help us inform decision makers and the Canadian public on the efforts made by law enforcement and security agencies in keeping Canada and Canadians safe from harm by terrorists, either here in Canada or abroad.
[Translation]
This public engagement is not something we have always done well, but it is something we are making efforts to improve upon. I provided to the clerk of the committee examples of two such recent efforts: our commissioner's speech in October 2009 before the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies, and a June 2009 discussion paper we drafted entitled Radicalization — A Guide for the Perplexed. Both documents are available on the RCMP's website.
[English]
As you have heard from my counterparts from ITAC and the CSIS, the threat is real. It exists within and outside our borders. It is also worth noting that we are seeing Canadians travel abroad to receive training in terrorist warfare, who subsequently engage in violent criminal activities in support of their extremist views. For example, we have heard of young people from the Somalian community in Toronto who allegedly travelled to Somalia to fight with al Shabaab, which is a listed terrorist entity here in Canada.
In fact, terrorists are criminals; and in Canada, it is the responsibility of law enforcement to investigate criminal activities and gather the evidence to prosecute them for their actions. As such, I will take the next few minutes to talk about the role of the RCMP in countering terrorism, the integrated approach to policing terrorist activity, some of the enhancements to the National Security Criminal Investigations over the last few years, our challenges and, finally, the nexus between organized crime and terrorist groups.
The passage of the CSIS Act in 1984 shifted responsibility for security intelligence from the RCMP to CSIS. At the same time, the Security Offences Act legislated primary responsibility to the RCMP for investigating criminal offences that may constitute a threat to the security of Canada.
In 2001, the Anti-terrorism Act further defined the role of law enforcement in neutralizing terrorist threats by creating Criminal Code offences specific to terrorism. In recent years, we have seen a number of successful prosecutions under the Anti-terrorism Act. I would point out that it is through the collection of evidence and the criminal justice process that we maximize transparency, oversight and public accountability for actions taken, while respecting the rights and freedoms of individuals.
That being said, national security criminal enforcement is a difficult and complicated undertaking. Why is that? One of the biggest reasons is the scope of the threat environment itself, as so ably outlined earlier by my colleagues.
Spurred on by rapidly advancing technology, globalization and increasingly borderless societies, threats are multi- faceted, originating from more locations and with more diverse motives than ever before.
Thus, it is important to capitalize on assets, experience, expertise and legislated mandates from various agencies in Canada to protect the Canadian public. As you have heard, ITAC is an example of this integration; while from a law enforcement perspective, we have four Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams in Montreal, Toronto, Ottawa and Vancouver. These, under the guidance of the RCMP, include personnel from various Canadian law enforcement agencies, CSIS and the Public Prosecution Service of Canada. The effectiveness of these units is best demonstrated by recent successful prosecutions of individuals, such as Momin Khawaja in Ottawa, Saïd Namouh in Quebec, Prapaharan Thambithurai in Vancouver and individuals in the Toronto 18 case. The prosecution of these cases has also helped the interpretation of the Anti-terrorism Act and, through court decisions, has provided guidance to criminal investigators across the country.
[Translation]
Recommendations from Justice O'Connor, as well as from this committee through your February 2007 report, have further guided positive changes to how the RCMP exercises its mandate in national security. As examples, we have enhanced the training for investigators involved in national security criminal investigations by adding a cultural awareness session for all our employees.
In addition, our operations are now centrally controlled from my office in Ottawa, an arrangement which affords better oversight and consistency over high-risk activities such as information sharing with foreign partners and investigative activities around sensitive sectors such as academia and religion.
As alluded to earlier, the mandates of the various government departments and agencies charged with national security responsibilities in Canada are distinct from, and complementary to, one another. Cooperation between the Canadian security, intelligence and law enforcement communities is crucial. I echo the comments of my counterpart from CSIS that the relationship between agencies is better than ever. I know you probably hear that and wonder if we would really tell you if it was not. I can assure you it truly is.
The RCMP and CSIS, for example, have renewed the memorandum of understanding that outlines our working relationship. We also now hold joint training sessions for our investigators, who have increased awareness and understanding of our respective mandates.
I further note that the RCMP's priorities in national security criminal investigations are informed by CSIS's priorities and the manner in which CSIS sees the threat. More detailed information on what the RCMP has specifically done to respond to Justice O'Connor's recommendations can be found in the 20-page annex that was publicly released to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security in June 2009.
But challenges still exist — and if we are honest with ourselves — they always will. That said, we have to and need to continue to look for solutions. As a prime example, the challenge of using intelligence as evidence is front and centre for the RCMP and CSIS, and there is still work to be done on this unresolved issue. The upcoming release of Justice Major's report into the investigation of the bombing of Air India flight 182 may provide us with some helpful guidance on this complicated problem.
[English]
Fulfilling our role in national security is becoming more difficult as the nature of the threat evolves and our mandated responsibilities in criminal enforcement are increasing — all the while bearing the responsibility that only law enforcement has — that is, the disruption of terrorist criminal activities. Hence, we are not allowed to fail because of the dire consequences to public safety.
This means we must process an extraordinary amount of threat information on a daily basis and run to ground all pieces of information that we receive, whether from the public, through our national security information line, from our private sector critical infrastructure partners, through our suspicious incident reporting system, from our domestic partners such as CSIS and ITAC, or from individual partners such as the FBI. Any credible threat that is brought to our attention from whatever the source gets full attention and resources of the RCMP.
As you can imagine, this places a huge strain on our resources, and as more RCMP internal capacity goes to the national security program it consequentially puts pressure on other programs within the force.
I cannot stress enough, however, that the RCMP is doing everything it can to protect the public, disrupt terrorist threats and prosecute criminals whenever possible.
Last, the nexus between transnational organized crime and terrorism is also problematic. Although we do know that in places such as Afghanistan close linkages exist between extremist elements and the drug trade, this is an area we are working to understand more fully and which speaks to the increasing complexity of the threat environment. We are aware of criminal organizations that conduct criminal activities in support of terrorist groups or individuals. However, the line is blurred as to whether this is done with their full knowledge.
In conclusion, I believe that the only way to protect our rights and freedoms without sacrificing security is through the criminalization of the terrorist threat to Canadians. The law enforcement approach works, and it works well, as long as we work together with our partners and make the most of our capacity to keep Canadians safe and secure.
Our commissioner stated the following before the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies, CASIS, in the speech of October 2009 to which I referred earlier:
As an effective and democratic deterrent to criminality, as a bridge-builder, and as a focal point to all our efforts in protecting Canadians in a complex threat environment, I believe the time has come to step up law enforcement in closing the loop on national security.
Linda Goldthorp, Director General, Director General Intelligence Production, National Defence: Mr. Chair, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for the opportunity to provide an opening statement to your committee this afternoon. As Director General of Intelligence Production, I report to the Chief of Defence Intelligence within Canadian Forces and National Defence, currently Major-General Matthew Macdonald. The Chief of Defence Intelligence, CDI, is responsible for providing full spectrum intelligence support to National Defence and the Canadian Forces, with a focus on supporting Canadian Forces operations and fulfilling the strategic defence intelligence requirements of the department and the Canadian Forces. This can and does include providing defence intelligence to other government departments.
CDI's role in providing intelligence concerning terrorist threats in Canada and internationally is quite limited. We retain a very small capability to monitor and assess international terrorism trends, but this effort is directed primarily at terrorism threats in areas of deployed Canadian Forces operations.
We do augment this capability when required to support an authorized Canadian special forces mission, for example, in relation to the kidnapping of Canadians abroad.
Domestically, our mandate is also quite limited, and it is specific to supporting Canadian Forces or National Defence requirements. A few examples include providing threat assessments to support the safe shipment of Canadian Forces' weapons and equipment within Canada, and drawing on the work of our colleagues here, CSIS, ITAC and others, to provide situational awareness, assisting with ministerially authorized Canadian Forces missions. Some examples of this include helping the Canadian Forces in relation to a major event in Canada or in aiding an authorized law enforcement operation.
I should add a word about the specific role of the Canadian Forces National Counter-Intelligence Unit, CFNCIU, a unit that reports directly to the Chief of Defence Intelligence. The CFNCIU is responsible for conducting security intelligence and counter-intelligence services in support of the department and the Canadian Forces, to identify and counter threats to the security of National Defence and the Canadian Forces posed by foreign intelligence services or by individuals or groups engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion, terrorism, extremism or criminal activities. In supporting its mandate, the CFNCIU is responsible for operating both domestically and in support of operations deployed by the Canadian Forces.
Within the context of the mandate roles and responsibilities of Chief of Defence Intelligence, I would be pleased to answer any questions that the committee may wish to pose.
The Chair: Thank you very much. We have a list of senators who do wish to ask questions. Let me defer if I may to Senator Joyal, who is the deputy chair of the committee, and who has sat with Senator Smith on this committee in its previous iterations, to see if he wishes to pose questions to the panel.
Senator Joyal: My first question will be addressed to Mr. Bisson or Mr. Michaud. What initiatives have you taken to try to link your objective of making Canadians more aware or to involve citizens? I feel we are secure if we can maintain a relationship with citizens or groups in Canada that might be helpful to ease your work.
In your presentation, none of you touched on that aspect, which I think is essential, in the overall approach that we must have in maintaining security in the country.
In other words, I do not accept the perception that security is the affair of the police, CSIS and the RCMP, and the rest of Canada can go on with its usual preoccupation because it is well kept by you. I have no doubt of that, but I think it is not sufficient to maintain a secure country. Could you expand more on this?
Mr. Michaud: That is a good question. Basically, we do engage communities in assisting us in keeping Canadians safe. We have an outreach program in various communities that is based on the community policing strategy that the RCMP has had in place for over 130 years now. Through these initiatives, we try to engage the communities by explaining to them what our role is, build some credibility with them, and make them accountable for the threat that they may see next door. In other words, by informing them of our role and how we do our business, we are asking them to engage in assisting us to keep Canadians safe.
The other aspect, which is directed more broadly to the Canadian public, is that we have a tip line that I referred to in my speech. It is accessible on the RCMP website. They can call in if they want to provide any information either to us or to CSIS. That tip line has coverage 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Any information passed on through that line can be kept anonymous and will be shared with the RCMP national security program and with CSIS. Those are the two ways with which we engage the community.
On the last piece, I would like to make a link to the incident in New York City. A vigilant individual from the public saw something that did not seem right to him. He is the person who called in with that piece of information that led to the incident as we know it now. That is the type of vigilance that we are asking of the Canadian public. Rest assured that any piece of information, credible or not, will be looked at and taken seriously.
Senator Joyal: Is it institutionalized through a consultative committee or through directive relationships that you develop and enhance, for instance, with different cultural groups in Canada? We know from all of your presentations — and, you list the four most important groups — that you keep under surveillance Islam extremism. Is there a way to help the Islamic community to better understand the systems that you share? How do you do that?
Mr. Bisson: We do participate in outreach programs with the Muslim community as well. Each opportunity that we have to sit down in different fora, we do so to alert them of the threat.
A good example would be the Toronto 18 case, where we briefed the community, before the press coverage, as to what would transpire at the press coverage. Since then, we received advice from the community when they were concerned about individuals who were part of the radicalization or were about to leave Canada. It has worked. We try to maintain dialogue at different levels, including academia and other levels, with the public.
Mr. Michaud: If I can add, the outreach with these communities is done through the leaders of the communities and through young people in the communities as well. We have different programs in place that explain to young people what policing is all about, what we do and how we do it. Hopefully, through that, we educate them on the role of the police here in Canada, which might be different from the way that police exercise their duties in their own countries. It is to build trust and credibility throughout that spectrum of communities.
Senator Joyal: My colleagues might want to pursue that question, but my question would be more centred to Ms. Goldthorp.
In your presentations, none of you have referred to the international context. In the last five years or so, I feel that the situation has changed. That might have an impact on the way that the security issues in Canada present themselves now.
Would you comment on that? From your background, Ms. Goldthorp, you seem to be more at ease with that issue, but any of you could add something. I feel that we cannot just figure out security with an Osama bin Laden figure and that is it. In my opinion, it has changed. I would like to hear from you who are the experts and who keep an eye on that daily.
Ms. Goldthorp: Certainly, few borders exist when it comes to assessing issues related to international terrorism. We know that very well in relation to our work as members of the intelligence community. Whether or not you can attribute a direct link between — and this is, perhaps, where your question was leading us — Canadian Forces engagements overseas and our domestic security environment is not something on which I would care to comment.
Clearly, when you deploy Canadian Forces, you put them in harm's way. You need to be cognizant of risks, for example, terrorism risks, insurgent-specific risks, piracy-specific risks, espionage-related risks and health-related risks. There is a gamut of risks out there. Where the decision of the Government of Canada is to deploy Canadian Forces, we need to take account of all of those risks.
As I indicated in my opening statement, we do not specifically focus on terrorism; we look at the broad spectrum of risks associated with deploying Canadian Forces abroad.
Mr. Michaud: If I can add to that, maybe you are not aware, but since 2005, over 20 incidents have taken place overseas where either Canadians or Canadian assets were victims of terrorist incidents. We can just refer to the Mumbai attacks and the number of kidnappings of Canadian citizens overseas that speak to the reality that exists today; before 2005, we did not see as much.
That has a direct impact on the security of Canadians not only abroad but also here because it diverts our posture and our resources toward these threats on Canadians abroad. We have limited resources to do that. When we are trying to balance where we should put our resources, either domestically or abroad, at the end, a Canadian is a Canadian, and we owe it to them to keep them safe. It has an impact on our operations.
[Translation]
Mr. Bisson: What is happening internationally does indeed influence how we respond domestically. We have al Qaeda in Afghanistan and al Qaeda in Iraq, which have become catalysts, driving forces behind the radicalization I mentioned earlier. We need to keep a close eye on the situations in Iraq, Iran and Pakistan because they act as catalysts for events that occur within Canada.
Furthermore, my colleague discussed the threat posed by al Qaeda and its affiliates in the Arabian Peninsula, the threat posed by al Shabaab, which has certain ties to al Qaeda in Somalia, and what is happening with al Qaeda in the Maghreb region. So the international threat does dictate how we respond domestically.
In that same vein, I want to point out that is one of the reasons why CSIS has sent more agents abroad, in order to push back frontiers and be on the lookout for the catalysts driving those individuals we need to focus on.
In short, it is the international context that dictates CSIS's response and priorities on the domestic front.
Ms. Beauregard: As a result of the pressure that has been put on al Qaeda in the territories of Pakistan, the group has taken a new approach. Their affiliates are now stepping in. Two years ago, we would not have expected some of these affiliates to mount attacks outside their region. Al Qaeda is directly linked to last year's failed Christmas Day attacks in the Arabian Peninsula.
There is growing concern over the increased capability and will of affiliates to mount attacks against the west, outside their region. Last year's Christmas Day plot in the Arabian Peninsula clearly showed their capability for striking outside their region.
We need to identify the Canadian interests abroad that are at risk. I would point out al Qaeda's presence in the Maghreb region, which poses a specific risk to Canadian interests there.
We also need to examine how the threat has evolved against not only the West, but also other regions, and determine what kind of threat they represent to Canadian interests abroad. That is an area we are focusing on more and more.
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Senator Wallin: I have two questions, but I will combine them because I think they are related. The first one popped into relief with Assistant Commissioner Michaud's comments.
Is intelligence evidence, and is the standard different in a criminal act versus a terrorist act? Related to that, do we have the right tools to fight or pre-empt or quell terrorism? I would like to hear some specifics on that, maybe the top two or three measures you would like to see, whether it is the C-17s or changes in immigration or transportation or the State Immunity Act, et cetera. Could each of you provide your selected highlights?
Mr. Michaud: I will address the first part of your question as to whether intelligence is evidence. At the end of day, intelligence can be evidence, but a certain threshold needs to be met for us to bring the intelligence before the criminal courts. Just because we have the information does not mean we can necessarily present it. There are always considerations with respect to protecting national security assets, as well as third-party rules that apply to some of this information. We have challenges because sometimes we have knowledge, but we cannot bring it before the courts, for whatever reasons that are bigger than the court process itself. That is where we see the challenge.
What is the solution to this? Right now, basically it is the enhanced relationship among CSIS, the RCMP and other law enforcement in trying to work around some of the gaps. However, that alone will not suffice. On solutions, as I said in my speech, we are awaiting recommendations that may come from Justice Major's report in June.
Mr. Bisson: I agree with my colleague. Intelligence could become evidence, but intelligence is not always evidence. We are facing what we call the intelligence-to-evidence dilemma. A committee in the Department of Justice Canada is looking at this, together with all the partners, to try to find solutions to overcome that particular problem.
We receive information or intelligence from different sources, including foreign sources, and that forms the basis of our investigation. At some point in our threshold, we find that it is no longer an intelligence investigation but has become a criminal investigation, at which point we need to transfer the file, or the lead, to the RCMP.
The lead that we transfer must be enough for the RCMP for enforcement purposes. Therefore, we negotiate with the RCMP which intelligence we can use as evidence. That is what we have done in most cases, including those of Khawaja and the Toronto 18. We have been able to manoeuvre with the RCMP to satisfy the need to transfer intelligence into evidence. However, we still have a long way to go to resolve the issue.
Senator Wallin: Are there legislative answers to this? I know you are awaiting the outcome, but there are other matters before Parliament and perhaps other measures you could propose to make that easier. We know about specific restrictions in the Toronto 18 case with respect to the Young Offenders Act, for example. I am looking for a couple of real examples.
Mr. Bisson: At the moment we are working with the Department of Justice Canada to make recommendations to our minister in relation to intelligence to evidence. A great deal of time and effort has been put into this, but no easy solution exists to resolve this issue.
Senator Smith: This is sort of a philosophical question. It may not be your favourite question of the day, but it is certainly not a partisan question.
By way of background, the formation of this committee was triggered by 9/11. It is still a special committee that has had several lives, but it is not a standing committee. The existence of this committee is related to the fact that legislation was passed post-9/11 that imposed some intrusions into people's civil and human rights. We all accepted that this had to be done, but we want to have a balance.
We have the security community here. I am not asking you about the G20 summit, but the billion-dollar figure totally blew me away because it is not just a 25 per cent or 50 per cent increase.
We go back to the rationale for the existence of this committee of trying to balance human civil rights. There are all sorts of things that could be done, for reasons I will not go into, going back to the 1960s. I had a number of occasions to be in Iron Curtain countries and crossing the border at Checkpoint Charlie many times. That is long since gone, but who needs the sort of environment of states such as that?
I want to get a feel for your thinking because of the possibility of the G20 dollar figure as a benchmark of the thinking of the security committee and the government. I am not picking on the government because they say that they asked them what they need, and they outlined what they need.
How do you balance this with what Canadians think about how public dollars should be spent? There are all sorts of things you can do, but I think you get the gist of my question. I would be interested in any response you may have.
The Chair: For purposes of context, as I recall, Kananaskis, Alberta, hosted a G8 meeting. We are about to host a G8 and a G20 in two different locations. The numbers are roughly double what they were in Kananaskis, which may or may not be appropriate; I leave that to others to sort out. I just wanted to put that in context for our witnesses, in the same non- partisan way. I will invite our guests on the panel to respond to that thoughtful question.
Mr. Michaud: I am not fully aware of all the details around the G8 and G20 summits. However, from what I know, the G8 and G20 involve two major events happening at the same time. Kananaskis was one event. We have the G8 north of Toronto; and the same weekend, or the day after, we have the G20. This in itself poses significant challenges for security. When looking at costs, in addition to threats, one must consider location and timing. Those factors may increase the costs.
I do not want to put words into the minister's mouth, but I believe that the costs related to the G8 and G20 summits will be discussed in the house tomorrow. Further details can be obtained then.
Senator Jaffer: Thank you for your very informative presentations.
I have been a member of this committee since 9/11. At that time, we had some challenges with who the members of CSIS and the RCMP are. I feel that it is sometimes forgotten that people who look like me are Canadians as well. I believe that you succeeded with the group of 18 because you had good intelligence gathering within the community.
Will you each tell me what percentage of visible minorities your groups include?
Mr. Bisson: For CSIS, 13 per cent of our population are visible minorities. We work hard to recruit visible minorities. We need their language skills and culture to help achieve our mandate.
Ms. Beauregard: For ITAC, the percentage is a little less than that, but we are currently trying to increase that number. Our work is analysis, which is essentially sifting through a large amount of information. It is not the operational activities that CSIS and the RCMP do. However, having the right representation allows us to have a much better cultural understanding of the countries where some of these groups operate. We are looking for more language skills as well as situational awareness.
Of 30 analysts, I have three who are visible minorities.
Mr. Michaud: Unfortunately, I do not have that data with me, but I will provide you with those statistics.
The issue that you have highlighted is a challenge for us. I spoke earlier about our outreach to various communities by talking to young people to build trust and understanding about police work. Our objective is to recruit individuals from various communities to join our organization. It is a challenge to have the language skills required to follow the information that we receive.
We have a gap there. I will provide you with the statistics you requested about the RCMP and the national security program.
Ms. Goldthorp: I do not have the statistics with me also, but I can provide them later.
Senator Jaffer: Currently almost 17 per cent of the population of Canada is visible minorities. I must congratulate CSIS because when we started this committee in 2001, there was much work to be done. From the numbers you have given, I must say that you have done a great job. Thank you for that. Communities feel safer when they are included, and you get better intelligence.
I no longer hear much about the round tables that you implemented with the communities. When Jim Judd was in charge, I heard about the many round tables that he held with Muslim communities. Being a Muslim myself, I know that because of the actions of a certain percentage, we are all painted with the same brush. I commend you for informing the community before the press conference. That is very respectful, and I thank you for that.
What other steps are you all taking to make the community feel Canadian?
Mr. Bisson: We try to participate in all the outreach events to which we are invited, although we do not necessarily organize them. We also attend round tables when invited. My regional managers participate in those as much as they can. I am not sure whether we do enough. In the future, our communications branch will be as open as possible to communicate our message.
Senator Jaffer: Under Jim Judd, CSIS organized round tables. I understand from what you are saying that you are no longer doing that, although you may be doing different types of outreach. I am not faulting you; I am simply asking.
Mr. Bisson: I do not recall that we used to organize public outreach. That was usually a community effort among ourselves, the RCMP and Public Safety Canada. It was driven more by Public Safety Canada than by CSIS.
The Chair: It is my recollection that the 2004 National Security Policy, to the credit of the previous administration, established a multi-ethnic advisory group from across the spectrum that could be part of a consultative process. Does that group no longer meet, or does it meet but separate from the outreach activities that Mr. Bisson referenced?
Mr. Michaud: It still meets, and is meeting on June 12 and 13 in Halifax, and I will be participating in that. That is in addition to other outreach initiatives in CSIS and in the RCMP.
I talked about outreach activities that exist at the national and the local level. We also use the strategies of community police forces to reach out to various communities.
Finally, in my opening remarks, I spoke of the training that we provide to our employees on cultural awareness. That training is given by people from the community who come in to speak to our employees. That is another way in which we engage the various communities.
Senator Jaffer: In a presentation that CSIS made to the Foreign Affairs Committee, we learned that you keep a special eye on certain countries, that there was country profiling. The countries that were mentioned were all Muslim countries. Are you still profiling only Muslim countries, or have you widened your country profile?
Mr. Bisson: We do not profile particular countries. World events dictate what countries are of concern to us. Sri Lanka was and still is a concern to us with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, LTTE, and the fighting that happened there last year. The future of the LTTE remains a concern for us.
We have concerns about what is happening in Africa with the kidnapping of Mr. Fowler and Mr. Guay, and other kidnappings that have taken place in Somalia. The Arabian Peninsula is of concern. World events dictate which countries become of interest to us.
Ms. Beauregard: ITAC looks at where Canadian interests are located abroad, beyond embassies. We look at where Canadian business interests are and do a threat assessment in those countries.
Mr. Michaud: From the RCMP perspective, I would like to echo Mr. Bisson's comments. We do not target countries or communities. We target criminals. That is who we investigate. It does not matter which country or community; we target criminals.
Ms. Goldthorp: From a National Defence perspective, our first priority is to monitor events in countries where Canadian Forces are deployed. We will also monitor situations in countries that we call countries with enduring concern or interest — in other words, where significant military capabilities could potentially come to be a concern from a Canadian national perspective. We monitor other nations where security situations could potentially lead to events that would cause a Canadian Forces operation — a peace-stability operation or possible operation to support an evacuation of non-combatants. Finally, we monitor nations that we are aware are pursuing or holding weapons of mass destruction programs that are of concern from a Canadian perspective.
Senator Tkachuk: Welcome, and thank you. What accounts for the home-grown terrorist threat and how do you explain it and the radicalization of people who have lived here most or all of their lives?
Mr. Bisson: As I alluded to in my opening comments, there is no one road but many phenomena to radicalization. Many scholars have looked at that. I mentioned world events and the Internet in terms of fighting in Afghanistan, in Iraq and the perception of the persecution of Muslim environment, and some very agile clerics trying to leverage this, in particular on the Internet and other venues.
The phenomenon that we have seen also in Toronto is that the radicalization starts very young. In the case of a certain Toronto leader, they started in high school having discussions, after-school meetings. Some youth have difficulty adapting to Canada, and some people feel disenfranchised. There are a number of reasons but no one reason or recipe that brings someone to radicalization.
Mr. Michaud: If I had the answer to that question, I would probably be rich. We are trying to understand that not just here in Canada but also in the U.S. and the U.K. We do have indications, as Mr. Bisson explained. However, the most important piece of it is trying to understand what brings a radicalized individual to then want to espouse and use violence. That is the piece that is of interest to us. A person who is radicalized is not an issue. It is the one who is radicalized and then wants to use violence to express his or her views. That is the trigger that we have yet to fully understand.
Senator Tkachuk: With the terrorists such as al Qaeda, we do not often hear it called an act of war, but according to what they believe and their websites, they are at war with us. That is what they say. People who become radicalized are assisting the war effort, as far as I am concerned, and others may see it differently, but it seems to me they are.
No one has used the word ``treason.'' These acts are against the state, to destabilize the state, so as far-fetched as these nut bars are, their objective is to take over the Western world. That is what they say. That is what they say, prophesize and write on their website. They make no bones about it. To assist them, even though it is not a state, it is an ideology.
We had spies and communist infiltrators that were domestic in the past. Probably the greatest terrorist organization in the world ever was the communists. What is the difference? Why are they not tried for treason? Why are they not considered treasonists? Why give them the idea that they are terrorists, which is sort of more Hollywood-like than the word ``treasonist,'' which is a traitor to your own country? Why are they not dealt with in that way?
Mr. Michaud: I cannot answer that question, unfortunately. It is more from a legal perspective, and I do not have the knowledge to be able to talk about the difference between treason and any type of terrorist charge that exists under the Criminal Code.
Senator Tkachuk: How would you identify a person who commits treason then if you do not know?
Mr. Michaud: I cannot explain. I would have to look at the Criminal Code and try to analyze it to make that difference.
Senator Tkachuk: Does anyone else know? Help me out here. You are dealing with treasonous people. That is what these home-grown terrorists are, are they not?
Mr. Bisson: That is the first time I have engaged in a dialogue about that. The CSIS Act does not talk about treason. It talks about espionage, terrorism and foreign influence. This is what I investigate.
In 2001, the Anti-terrorism Act addressed a number of shortcomings in the Criminal Code, which are yet to be fully used, in my opinion. We also advise — and that is our role as a community — our minister on what types of legislation we think would reinforce the activities of CSIS and the activities of law enforcement. I have no comments about how treason would fit in. The issue is to try to push hatred toward the community.
Senator Wallin: I just want to go back to my initial question about the legal tools that exist. You have now suggested that tools exist that are not fully used. Is that what I just heard you say?
Mr. Bisson: When one looks at the Anti-terrorism Act, one needs to ask oneself what it takes to meet the threshold. I think with the court findings, I find the judgments to be enlightening in terms of what the judges are saying. Could we push this legislation to people who are trained abroad? Would that be covered under the legislation? This has not been tested yet.
We are aware of young Canadians — and it has been made public — who found their way to training camps overseas. Unfortunately, we sometimes lose track of those individuals, and we do not know when they are coming back, nor do we know about the training they receive and the intent when they come back. Those are the types of legislation of which we need to assess the merit.
Senator Tkachuk: Let us ask the other question, then, about criminals versus terrorists. Terrorists, to me, would be those who fit into what I would call a treasonous capacity, those people trying to destabilize the state by killing as many civilians as possible to help a foreign entity of some sort.
Then we have the criminal, the person who is robbing the 7-Eleven store or perhaps dealing drugs. You call them criminals, and no doubt they are that, but is there an elevation? Do you consider it a higher priority to deal with a terrorist? How do you sort all that out at the RCMP?
The Chair: If I could add precision, we do have legislation in Canada that criminalizes certain motorcycle gang activities and, by extension, criminalizes linkages that they would normatively have to accountants, lawyers, landlords and the rest. If I understand my colleague's question, is there a linkage on the road to enhanced criminal status for those who, as in organized crime, might also be involved in supporting criminal terrorist networks because terrorism is seen as a serious infraction in terms of our society?
Mr. Michaud: I will answer that question twofold.
First is how we would prioritize our investigations within the RCMP. We investigate criminals, and the reason I use the term ``criminal'' to qualify terrorism is because it is now in our Criminal Code. People who are convicted of infractions of the Criminal Code are called criminals. I would like to state that.
Second, how we prioritize our files is based on the threat to life. You made references to different types of criminals and linkages to terrorism. Any type of information about an individual who poses a threat to life is the number one priority of the RCMP. When you compare that to, for example, a fraud, if we have resources that we need to balance off, we will put our resources toward that threat to life, and if its imminent, we will put even more resources toward it. That is where we qualify the difference between what you would refer to as the criminal and the terrorist. The terrorist, as someone who poses a threat to life, we will treat as a priority before other types of criminality.
Senator Furey: Mr. Bisson, in your opening remarks you referred to the fact that it is critical that CSIS and law enforcement agents be able to exploit an ever-growing range of investigative options and techniques. Can you share with the committee some examples of what you mean by that?
Mr. Bisson: For example, as you know, the domain of the Internet and information technology is growing rapidly. New methods are being used by people who we investigate. Therefore, we need to develop technology that will enable us to do the interceptions.
Legislation called lawful access was also tabled at one point, which would be of great importance to an organization such as mine and in law enforcement.
When people employ new techniques of operations, we have the chance to ask the Federal Court for new investigative techniques needed for of our intercepts. We always need to adapt to the environment.
Senator Furey: Are you telling the committee that the way to do this is with support of legislation? Is that what I am hearing you say?
Mr. Bisson: In terms of lawful access, it is important to have supportive legislation.
Senator Furey: Mr. Michaud, you talked about the criminalization of terrorist threats to Canadians. What do you recommend this committee promotes as a way to achieve that as quickly as possible?
Mr. Michaud: What is that with respect to?
Senator Furey: In your opening remarks, you said that the only way to protect our rights and freedoms without sacrificing security is through the criminalization of the terrorist threat to Canadians. How do you want us to do that?
Mr. Michaud: It is a recognition that the criminal process does work and any type of threat that exists, if we can bring it to that level where we can criminalize it, it will allow us at the end of the day in this democratic country to speak for our actions and be accountable to the Canadian public through the court system. That is what I meant by those comments.
The Chair: I want to understand because this is a substantial and important point. Are you saying that, from your perspective, dealing with the terrorist threats through the normal procedures of the criminal law, in terms of investigation, evidentiary levels and the system of due process in our court, is the best way to respect your duties to protect Canadians from the terrorist threat and the general obligation to protect the rights of all citizens, the presumption of innocence and transparency in the system? I want to be clear because it is an important point for further discussions that we will have about certain pieces of legislation.
If that is your advice to us, and I am not misstating it, your indication of that would be of great value. If I have it wrong, please restate it in a way that is more helpful.
Mr. Michaud: That is right. That is exactly what I am saying.
Senator Furey: Ms. Beauregard, how does the flow of information between agencies work now? What, in your opinion, is perhaps the single worst impediment to that flow of information?
Ms. Beauregard: How it works in practice is that every seconded analyst physically located in ITAC has direct access. They bring their IT equipment with them and are connected to their databases. Whether they are with, for example, the Canada Border Services Agency, RCMP, National Defence or Privy Council Office — we have 14 partners — physically collocated in our offices, they have direct access to their home databases. They have access to everything that is populated in those databases by the home organization.
We also have access to situational awareness information. For example, if CSIS or the RCMP is conducting an investigation, they will share the information with us. However, we will not be able to publish it, in order not to prejudice any of the operations that they are conducting. We have that situational awareness, and we are ready whenever we receive a green light to use that information.
In general terms, I am quite satisfied with the flow of information. I am quite satisfied that we are tapping into all different sources of information. We also have access to the raw information of our allies as well. All that brought together does, at the end of the day, produce a comprehensive assessment.
Senator Furey: Does it work in a similar fashion on the international scene?
Ms. Beauregard: On the international scene, our four closest allies are the four I mentioned. Specifically, in the U.S., it is the National Counterterrorism Center, NCTC. In the U.K. it is the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, JTAC. In Australia, it is the National Threat Assessment Centre, NTAC. In New Zealand, it is the Combined Threat Assessment Group, CTAG. We are, again, connected through an IT system where the analysts themselves can email one another.
We share finished assessment products. We are the means also by which to redistribute finished products from our four partners to our other domestic partners, for them to also have access to those finished products.
We have also further IT technology. We have secure video conferencing with our allies, where we can gather analysts into one room, and they can brainstorm a particular issue. The main impediment there is the time differences, but we have been extremely good at getting together on issues of mutual concern.
Senator Furey: As a civilian, I do not know if it is fact or fiction, but sometimes you will hear talk about there being difficulty getting information from one organization to another because they jealously guard what they know. Do you find that with our own Canadian groups, or is there a free and efficient flow of information?
Ms. Beauregard: I am quite satisfied with the flow of information.
Senator Marshall: Could you speak to the issue of people's privacy and our rights as Canadians? Reports on terrorism or any criminal activity always have something about people's rights and whether their rights have been eroded. Do you find this an impediment? How does this affect the job you are trying to do? When you compare what is happening in Canada to what is happening in the United States with the reaction to terrorism, the Americans seem to be more aggressive in taking corrective action. Could you speak to that? It seems as if Canada is more middle-of-the- road. We are more reserved about trampling on people's rights and try to preserve them, but it does not seem to be that way in the United States. Could you speak to that issue?
Ms. Beauregard: The assessments that we produce for a wider distribution will not have any specific names mentioned in them. Going back to information that we have received that is not yet releasable information, we have not received a green light for disclosure on that information, so we will not be writing on those particular issues.
We will be producing, for example, papers that look at some upcoming events. For example, if I am looking at the G8 and the G20, we will be producing papers that are mostly meant for local law enforcement, municipal, private sector and first responders to provide them with a sense of what could develop in a protest that is scheduled, if there are some radical elements that might be present in that particular protest and whether or not the protest might turn violent in some way. Again, no names are specifically mentioned. We do that for situational awareness to provide the information.
Senator Marshall: I was thinking more in terms of specific cases where someone has been arrested. What evidence can you use? How can you gather your information? How do you prosecute them? It seems as though the concern is more about the person's rights as opposed to the safety of the state. From my own perception, it seems that there is a greater concern for the individual's rights in Canada when compared to the American style, which seems as though the concern is more for the safety of the state and the safety of the citizens.
My question was focused primarily on whether we have gone too far with preserving people's rights. Is this an impediment now to the work that you are trying to do? Parliamentarians would be interested to know whether the laws that we have enacted are a big impediment to preserving the safety of our communities. That was the purpose of my question.
Ms. Beauregard: For ITAC, its mandate is to provide assessments of potential threats.
Senator Marshall: Would anyone else on the panel be able to answer that question? I would be interested to know whether my perception of the American situation and the Canadian situation is correct. Am I off base? Is the Canadian situation closer to that in Australia and New Zealand? Where are we in the group?
Mr. Bisson: There might be a bit of perception because the privacy of citizens in the United States is very important to them. It is sometimes a lengthy time before we receive information on the citizens of the United States because that information must be cleared at a certain level.
If you go back to the incident of December 25 and to the Heatley incident, where he was arrested — and a number of Americans have been put under arrest — it has been getting coverage in the paper. Once someone is charged, it becomes open. It is not a question of privacy; it becomes a matter of public record.
In Canada, in the Toronto case, for instance, there was an order of non-publication. The decision that was made probably prevented us from knowing the full story as it unfolded. However, the judgments have been made public. I do not think there is an issue of more or less privacy in terms of U.S. and Canada in that regard.
Mr. Michaud: I have to agree with Mr. Bisson's comments. To compare ourselves to other countries may lead us down a path that we do not want to go. That is why I spoke in my opening comments about balancing security and the rights and freedoms of individuals.
We are bound by the Privacy Act; the way that we share information is based on that. We do not voluntarily provide any specific data about the identification of the individual unless the individual is charged and it is public. Does that sometimes feed rumours or feed misperception or misconceptions? Probably, but at the end of the day the system is working for us in that respect.
The Chair: I want to take the chair's prerogative and ask a question about the isolation and radicalization phenomena that we have seen throughout the countries in the West; that is, our British allies, our American allies, our Australian allies, and our French allies have been looking at ways to get ahead of the curve, to understand the cycle of radicalization and isolation amongst various groups.
Are you comfortable that we are where we should be in terms of that work in Canada? Should we be doing more in that respect?
Mr. Michaud: We are doing more. We are working with our allies to try to get to the bottom of this phenomenon. Basically, we are learning from our counterparts. We are in touch with the U.S., Australia and the U.K., and we are reaching out to other countries to try to better understand and seek their experiences to assist us. There are different ongoing initiatives when we speak about radicalization led by the Public Safety Canada with their counterparts in the U.S. from a bilateral perspective to try to get a better understanding and find solutions to that issue.
Ms. Beauregard: We have seen quite a number of them now south of the border, most recently with the attack on Fort Hood last November. We have also seen events in other allied and Western countries. We have adopted a proactive approach to it not only in the security clearance processes involving existing upgrades and updates to Canadian Forces members and National Defence employees but also to new recruits. We are doing proactive work in the analytical area on this issue as well because we want to ensure that that never comes back to haunt us in this country.
Senator Jaffer: We have been asking you what you are doing in your work. Is there anything specific that you think we, as parliamentarians, could do to help prevent radicalization?
The Chair: If you want to reflect on that question, that is fine.
Mr. Michaud: I think that is a good question that I am not prepared to answer at this time.
Ms. Goldthorp: It will not surprise you to hear from the defence representative that we think we can do many things very well that we are required to do in a pretty high-tempo operational environment. We have been doing amazing work over the last couple of years. However, I do not think any public servant would tell you that capacity is what it needs to be.
When you look at the range of potential threats we, as Canadians, are facing, there is always a requirement to think ahead and to think about new areas of expertise that we need to be developing. For example, in the area of emerging technology, we are very much au fait with cyber threats; we need to think more about some of the expertise. As an intelligence community, we need to be able to address cyber threats. We also need to have some residual capacity to be able to think strategically about other emerging technologies. We all deal with emerging technologies in our day-to-day life, for example, laptop computers, new-generation cellphones, and so on. All those technologies can be used either for good or for evil. Some residual capacity to be able to think ahead to next-generation threats is something that we need to have some ability to do.
Senator Joyal: I would like to come back to Ms. Beauregard. In your presentation you mentioned that Canada partners with fusion centres in the U.K., the U.S., Australia and New Zealand. I understand that we do not partner with France. European fusion centres focus on issues and not on an institutional basis, as I understand the others do.
Considering that the Maghreb population and some countries of Western Africa are very important elements of the French demography and considering that you have identified Maghreb as a source of potential threat, why does Canada not have a wider base of institutional cooperation with France?
[Translation]
Ms. Beauregard: There are two parts to my answer. First of all, the fusion centre in France takes a much more tactical approach, while ours is more strategic. We also carry out a threat detection function. UCLAT, our French counterpart, has a much more tactical role. So, in terms of a relationship, our roles are not the same.
However, there is more coordination among fusion centres in Europe. France and Spain are leading the way in that regard. In January of this year, they took steps to coordinate their cooperation efforts, using Madrid as a base.
France and Spain have good intelligence on the Maghreb region. Further to our bilateral relationships, we can share certain intelligence through liaison officers working in those countries. There is a certain degree of information sharing. But more work needs to be done to further strengthen those relationships.
The Chair: In terms of institutional cooperation, ITAC works rather closely with New Zealand, Australia, the United States and Great Britain. But, despite sharing information on a regular basis, we do not have an institutional relationship with our French allies.
Ms. Beauregard: That is somewhat true. I would say, up front, that cooperation with our close allies, in particular, is much easier thanks to technology. We have to use more conventional methods when it comes to our other allies.
Mr. Bisson: We have a very strong and fluid relationship with French agencies. We meet frequently and share a considerable amount of intelligence. They know our area of expertise, and we know theirs, and, as a result, there is a lot of cooperation between the French agencies and our service.
Senator Joyal: My next question has to do with the Official Secrets Act.
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I have read many comments that the act is outdated and should be reviewed and revamped. Can you comment on the priority we should give to that?
Mr. Michaud: No, I cannot.
Ms. Beauregard: Neither can I.
Mr. Bisson: I thought the act had been changed. I believe the Security of Information Act has replaced the Official Secrets Act.
Senator Joyal: To be more specific, a court case took place in Ontario in which the court interpreted the act in a more restrictive way than CSIS thought it should be.
Can you comment on that?
Mr. Bisson: I am not familiar with that case.
Mr. Michaud: I am familiar with the case, but I am not in a position to comment on it.
Senator Joyal: When the Government of Canada takes a step at the international level in its relations with a foreign country that you believe might impact Canadian interests in that or other countries, are you consulted before the decision, or are you faced with the decision? Are you part and parcel of the pre-study of the decision, or do you deal with it once the horse is out of the barn?
Mr. Bisson: Our role is to provide intelligence to the Government of Canada, and we hope that this intelligence will help shape policy, but it is for the government to decide on its policies.
Mr. Michaud: We are consulted on policy matters, but the decisions rest with the government.
Ms. Goldthorp: Typically governments take decisions to which we respond. However, on certain occasions, such as when we are providing support to Canadian Forces from a logistics perspective, we have been consulted on processes related to the threat environment we would face in relation to those decisions. We would typically respond, but there are occasions when we are consulted.
Senator Joyal: There does not seem to be a definite policy. No one would question that the government has the responsibility to make policy decisions. However, it seems fair to expect that when the government is making a decision that will affect the safety and security of Canadians and Canadian interests abroad, it would seek your advice on possible impacts so that it would have a clear understanding of the implications of its decisions. Maybe I am too rational; perhaps that is not how it happens.
You did say, Ms. Goldthorp, if I understood correctly, that if the Government of Canada decided to send Canadian troops to the Congo, it would consult with National Defence to know whether enough people and materiel are ready to send there. I can understand that. However, generally speaking, in terms of relationships with foreign states and the enhanced relationship that the government might want to pursue, I want to understand the extent to which your services are involved before the decision is made.
The Chair: I will add a small caveat. Our colleagues in the United Kingdom have decided to structure a more horizontal national security group involving the heads of all the services. While I do not question that our colleagues in the Privy Council Office or elsewhere analyze the information they receive from different sources and make them available in some fashion to the Prime Minister and the ministers of the day, it is nevertheless a stove-pipe relationship in Canada. Each service responds in a sense through its minister, and, in some cases, they respond to the same minister simply because of the way the government is organized.
Other countries — classically our American friends, and most recently the new administration in the United Kingdom — have taken a more horizontal approach. Any advice you can give the committee on what I think is the purport of my colleague's question would be of great value.
Mr. Bisson: I do not think we work in stove pipes. The Privy Council Office has a number of committees at the assistant deputy minister level that look at issues that are then raised to the deputy ministers, who are all members of the intelligence community and sitting around the same table. It is the role of the National Security Advisor to look at those issues and be well informed in order to inform the decision makers; ongoing dialogue happens. This is not ad hoc. It happens on a regular basis with agenda items on issues that may affect the Government of Canada.
Ms. Beauregard: Further to what Mr. Bisson said, the Privy Council Office has machinery that allows them to coordinate the intelligence community. On an annual basis, they set intelligence priorities. One would assume that the priorities are set according to the policy agenda.
From an assessment perspective, we take these intelligence priorities and write to the priorities. We ensure that what we write will be pertinent to these priorities because they will inform policy-making.
Mr. Michaud: I have no additional comments to add to my counterparts.
Ms. Goldthorp: As I have indicated, understanding the threat environment into which Canadian Forces members are being deployed is our core business. That is what the Chief of Defence Intelligence does first and foremost above anything else we do.
Sometimes that is a deliberate process as, for example, in the area where I indicated to you that we have been engaged early on in establishing what the threat environment would be in relation to potentially establishing logistics bases in support of Canadian Forces overseas. Sometimes that is not a deliberate process, for example, when the Government of Canada made the decision a number of years ago to support a non-combatant evacuation operation in Lebanon. Clearly force of circumstances was uppermost in the minds of the decision makers of the Government of Canada when that operation was launched.
When an operation was launched to support earthquake victims in Haiti, similarly the process was much less deliberate. However, part of the process before any Canadian Forces members deploy is always to conduct a threat assessment, which we do in support of Canadian Forces. Those threat assessments look at the broad range: medical issues, environmental issues, public-health-related issues, terrorism-related threats, espionage threats and so on. It is quite a deliberate process, whether it begins early on or somewhat later, and a decision by the Canadian government is dependent on force of circumstances.
Senator Joyal: Mr. Michaud, if you think you had escaped, I have one more question for you.
On the second page of your brief, you say the following:
But challenges still exist — and if we are honest with ourselves — they always will. That said, we have to and need to continue to look for solutions. As a prime example, the challenge of using intelligence as evidence is front and centre for the RCMP and CSIS, and there is still work to be done on this unresolved issue.
You are talking about this issue specifically and other issues. Could you speak to that one and to the other one, quickly?
Mr. Michaud: I spoke earlier on the issue of intelligence to evidence and what we are doing in relation to trying to work with CSIS to ensure that we can use as much of their information as we can from an evidence perspective.
Other issues that arise are things such as information technology, which we have spoken about, and how that is being used by the different groups to communicate and broadcast their messages. That is one big challenge for us as well.
Another challenge is complacency. That is why I am glad to see that this committee has been revamped. I get the feeling that, as we move further away from 9/11, complacency is setting in, from my perspective, not just with decision makers but also with the Canadian public.
Yes, we have been successful, and finally we have been able to tell our story through the court system. We had files initially from the media that were basically broadcast as not being a real threat. However, as the evidence was presented and became public, one realized the extent of the threat that exists here. Hence, when I talk about complacency, it exists not just with decision makers but with the Canadian public.
However, we must be careful to balance the threat and what you have heard today and not be alarmist. We work hard and all the agencies work well together. I firmly believe that we have control of what we know. The other challenge is the unknown.
We talked about home-grown terrorists, how we are going from cell-based threats to individuals who self-radicalize and decide to do things on their own. It is hard to monitor and be aware of these individuals. They will not broadcast their intent publicly; hence, those are issues or challenges that we face. How do we draw them out and ensure that we know where the threat really lies?
The Chair: Thank you very much. On that last point that Assistant Commissioner Michaud referenced, clearly in the overall operation of criminal intelligence and normal police work, activities are undertaken — sometimes by undercover officers — so as to zero in on the threat and better establish groups and individuals who might be prone to becoming involved in an activity that may end up being criminal activity, for which they are then, based on the evidentiary base, prosecuted before the courts.
As I understand the proceedings with respect to the Toronto 18, that was, in fact, one of the instruments used by our security and police forces together to help prevent what might have been a very serious series of acts against Canadians.
Can this committee and the people who we work for be comfortable that there is no diminution of the type of undercover work that is necessary to maintain that measure of protection, and that, as Senator Jaffer pointed out, those who represent the full face of Canada in all its many colours, hues and ethnicities are, to the extent it is possible and probable, being involved in that work so as to maximize the sources of information you have — legitimately and legally — to do the work necessary on a preventive basis with respect to the terrorist threat as it now exists in Canada?
Mr. Michaud: First, gathering intelligence on terrorism is the responsibility of CSIS. The RCMP has not been in that business since 1984.
The Chair: I understand.
Mr. Michaud: However, rest assured that all of our resources and capacity is put to ensuring we can, once the information is brought to our attention, work toward preventing that threat. The worst thing that could happen in Canada is basically that we miss one part or some information and something goes wrong. That is what we are trying to avoid.
Mr. Bisson: It is important to say that the role of CSIS is to get there before the threat materializes. Obviously, we have a number of techniques to investigate, and using agents is certainly one of those. It is certainly what we and our intelligence officers do.
Senator Tkachuk: I agree with you on the complacency. It was complacency that led to 9/11 in the first place. Those terrorist acts were taking place for more than a decade previous to that, including an attempt on the World Trade Center in 1993. We also had the USS Cole incident. These acts of violence have been with us for a long time.
I am not sure which one of you talked about the diminishing acts of terrorism in the sense that it is a lone person, an individual, rather than the large-scale acts such as 9/11. Is that the result of policies instituted by Western nations to combat terrorism? In other words, have they lost their ability to mount those large-scale acts and have been forced to do the smaller acts that have been in the papers recently — they have been stymied at those as well — or is it a deliberate change of policy on their part?
Mr. Bisson: I do not think it is a deliberate change of policy on their part. Core al Qaeda has been affected, so the command and control operations such as 9/11 are more difficult to execute right now, given their reduced capacity. However, the incidents of December 25, which were prepared in a very short period of time, and the fact that they had access to people with clean passports who could travel, makes it just as spectacular, to a certain degree, had they been successful, with much less investment to carry out that operation. Yes, they have been forced to move into smaller types of operations, using any opportunities they can.
Senator Smith: Chair, I do not really have a question, but I wanted to get on the list to speak to where we go from here. Some questions and responses make the background for the committee pretty clear in my mind as to some of the next few witnesses we might have.
The Chair: That is helpful. We will come back to that once we are finished with our distinguished guests.
Senator Wallin: I understand your argument about trying to put the responses, legal and otherwise, to terrorist activities into the Criminal Code so that you respond in that way. Hence, the use of the word ``criminal'' is almost interchangeable with ``terrorist,'' which has other problems in keeping the public awareness up and with the complacency you talk about. Is that the best strategy that you come to because that is what will happen? We obviously have legislation aimed at terrorism, but it is mostly about modifying existing laws. Is that the most efficient way, or is that just the way we will have to deal with it? Would it be helpful if we had some specific measures that were outside and specifically designed to capture a terrorist threat as opposed to criminal activity?
Mr. Bisson: A number of the investigations of CSIS do not go to criminal prosecution. Something that might be perceived as a threat at one time might be sort of a disruption to interviews and so on. There is also what we call ``pushing their border,'' which is trying to prevent people from entering Canada who are found to be inadmissible. We also had the security certificate process, which has challenges and that we are trying to work out, which is a way to try to deport people who otherwise might not be admissible. We need to look at a number of ways and laws.
Mr. Michaud: To add to that, is it the best way? It is the best way if we are looking at ensuring that we are transparent because that always seems to be the case when people challenge. Whenever we hold court processes that are in a classified environment and the people are not allowed to hear the evidence and information, it always seems to have that aura that the government is hiding something, which we are not. The best way I see to ensure that we balance that with being accountable and transparent with what we are doing is through criminalization, where we can prosecute. However, it should not be the only way.
Senator Furey: What is your biggest concern about the Internet? Is it the use of it to proselytize or disseminate and share information, or is it the use of it to create havoc?
Ms. Beauregard: At this time, it is the use to proselytize, and especially the indications that we are seeing of English- speaking radicalizers online. They need the Internet to communicate and recruit. The cyber threat is more state- sponsored right now than it is terrorism-based.
Senator Joyal: Could you give an example?
Ms. Beauregard: We have had some public examples of attacks on the Estonia websites by Russia, for example. Many examples can be found in the media of state-sponsored cyber attacks on other countries, to deface their systems.
The Chair: Could I ask, as a supplementary, whether cyber security and protection are in the context of the work you do to protect Canadians from terrorism? One of the panel members referred to protecting Canadians' fundamental infrastructure as one of the goals that we are now seeking. Is cyber security within the mandate of your organizations per se? It may not be in your particular directorate, but is it within the mandate, or is that pursued somewhere else completely?
Ms. Beauregard: Do you mean the terrorism threats toward our cyber structure?
The Chair: The technology systems fundamental to the operation of governments, banks, the defence department, air traffic control, those types of fundamental systems.
Ms. Beauregard: It is part of ITAC's mandate.
Mr. Bisson: It is for CSIS as well.
The Chair: It is the same for the RCMP and our colleagues in National Defence.
Senator Joyal: Since the publication of the O'Connor report in the Maher Arar case, what has changed in your services considering the recommendation that related to various heads of the agency of which you are a part?
Mr. Bisson: A number of recommendations applied to CSIS, and all the recommendations were put in place.
Mr. Michaud: It is the same from the RCMP perspective. More specifically, what has changed is that basically all our operations are centrally controlled out of Ottawa to ensure consistency and better compliance with policy, especially when it comes to information sharing. Any type of information sharing with foreign partners is now done from Ottawa through my office. Training has been enhanced. We are still awaiting the outcome of the enhanced oversight on national security, so that is something that we are looking forward to. Those are the types of things that have changed over the last three years.
The Chair: Ms. Goldthorp, does your remit extend to the protection, by the use of constructive intelligence, of Canadian Forces bases in Canada and the communities in which they are located? I would not have mentioned Kingston, but I want to thank Senator Smith for mentioning Kingston.
Ms. Goldthorp: The short answer to your question is yes, but with specific caveats around it. For example, we would not be engaged domestically in collection of intelligence. Certainly anything related to threats to Canadian Forces bases would be within our remit, but we would work closely, obviously, with colleagues from around the intelligence communities.
The Chair: Colleagues, if there are no more questions, let me, on your behalf, thank Mr. Michaud, Ms. Beauregard, Mr. Bisson and Ms. Goldthorp for their time. Before we adjourn, we have to discuss Senator Smith's issue, and we also have a small matter of housekeeping as well.
This is Ms. Beauregard's first appearance ever before a Senate committee, and I want to express our appreciation not only for the clarity and precision but also the professionalism she brought to the task. It is reassuring and comfortable to all of us. We hope to see her before Senate committees in a similar constructive fashion for many years to come.
Colleagues, we can continue on the record, but no longer with the benefit of television, to discuss two things. First, is the question raised by Senator Smith. Before we do that, with his indulgence, we need a motion pursuant to rule 104 indicating that a committee must table a report of its expenses during the previous session. Since the Anti-terrorism Committee was not created in either the first or the second session of this Parliament, the report on expenses during the Second Session of the Thirty-ninth Parliament has not yet been tabled. The amount is $12,330 in total. I need a motion that the chair be given authority to table that report in the Senate at the next opportunity. Thank you.
Senator Smith has raised the issue of where we go next. I will tell you what I think you already know about some of the plans, but these are at the disposal of the committee. We have begun scheduling a series of expert witnesses to give us not the police and CSIS perception, which, I think, was extremely helpful and thoughtful on their part, but to give a slightly more granular, academic and research-based analysis of how the terrorism circumstance has changed, what some of the new information data sets are on that, and how that should govern the types of legislative and other instruments that are being considered — not just these specifically, but other ones that may come before us. We have two panels, one on June 7 and one on June 14. We have made no plans beyond that because we have no sense of how long the Senate itself will be sitting in the time available to us. I think that we are in a position to circulate the names of the potential witnesses who have agreed to be available to us, some in person and some by teleconference, over the two sessions. I am glad to do so, and I invite our clerk, Ms. Reynolds, to offer any technical advice to the committee in its discussions.
Senator Smith: It is up to the committee to decide. However, from the questions and the responses today, given the fact that we have quite a few new members who have not heard much of the material that we have heard before, there may be some sense in having a background briefing about the challenges after 9/11 and the legislation that we brought in to try to address that. At that time, a couple of people took matters to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court agreed on a couple of points and told us that we have to do something; the briefing would inform members what we did.
Another issue resulted from Senator Tkachuk's questions, which were good. Maybe we could have the appropriate person from the Department of Justice answer questions on, for example, the subject of murder, attempted murder, and conspiracy to commit murder in a situation of a failed marriage or romance, where someone wants someone else dead compared to the situation being terrorism and whether there is a fundamental difference.
I do not want to be too much of a lawyer here. I am one, but one of the reasons I had a pretty good rapport with many clients is that I would get away from the legalese and put it in everyday language. What is it that we are trying to do? How broad or narrow is our mandate? What are the subjects that we want to focus on? Perhaps we could be given background information such as that.
The Chair: To the credit of the two researchers working with us, we have circulated some documentation that touches upon, but does not fully address, some of the issues raised by Senator Smith. There is the piece entitled ``Definitions of Terrorism in Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, Australia and France: A Comparative Analysis,'' which is from 2006; a piece entitled ``Special Advocates in the United Kingdom,'' done by Jennifer Bird in 2008; an analytical piece entitled ``The USA PATRIOT Act and Canada's Anti-terrorism Act: Key Differences in the Legislative Approach,'' also done by Jennifer Bird; an analysis of Bill C-17, done for our colleagues in the other place; and an analysis of what this committee has done. That includes previous studies of the Special Senate Committee on Anti- terrorism and background information that goes back to 2004; what the bills were that came before us; how they were addressed; what the Supreme Court decisions were on the matter; how we responded to those; what information we sent back to the house and the amendments.
That may not be as fulsome a list as might be addressed, but it is at least a beginning down the road that Senator Smith offered.
Jennifer Bird, Analyst, Library of Parliament: There is another paper that the library prepared when the original anti-terrorism legislation was being considered that explained the key legislative considerations contained in the bill. We can make that paper available to the committee so that you will have an overview of the act and what it was accomplishing at that time.
Senator Joyal: That was when the subject of the act was sent to this committee, was it?
Ms. Bird: Yes, during the pre-study.
Senator Jaffer: First, I agree that we should have the academics. However, in the past, when we had a full circle, we also had the communities affected come in front of us and give their point of view. I am sure Senator Smith has that list because he included a number of them.
Second, we have unfinished business. When we were a committee, we were asked by the then Minister of Public Safety Stockwell Day to do a report on advocates. We never finished that report because we were not a full committee. I am not saying that we should do it, but we need to revisit whether that request is still valid and whether we should do anything on that.
The Chair: We are still very much awaiting the disposition of Bill S-7, which is in the Senate. Should it receive second reading at any point, we would move quickly to the consideration of that bill because government legislation, as a matter of tradition, takes precedence.
Senator Tkachuk: I think Senator Joyal undertook to ask Senator Tardif that question, namely, when you would speak on it. It has been three weeks now or maybe a month; I cannot remember how long.
Senator Joyal: Three weeks maybe; I will check that tomorrow and come back to you on that.
Senator Tkachuk: It is actually a month. You will let us know, will you?
Senator Joyal: Yes, with pleasure.
The Chair: I would recommend, if it is acceptable to colleagues, that we certainly proceed with the first round of experts this coming Monday, and then see where we are at. We may have Bill S-7 by then, and if we have Bill S-7, then that will be a reason to broaden the mainstream of witnesses who might come in to consider it. That could include various community groups that have an interest in the matter. I think that is something to which the steering committee would want to give very serious thought and report back. With this type of analysis of the context, we should also very much have an open mind about how those groups might be involved.
I would like to avoid — and you tell me how best to do this — an engaged debate about who are the good guys and who are the bad guys. That is both unconstructive and un-Canadian. However, I think we do want to find a way to ensure that this committee is open to representations from a series of groups, different types and different backgrounds, who will have strong views on the matter, including people on the civil libertarian side of the mix, of course.
Senator Jaffer: Chair, I do not quite agree with you, if I may say that. I think if we will hear from the government, or at least the people we heard from today, and we will hear from academics, then we need to hear from the community affected outside the bill because that has been our tradition.
Senator Joyal and Senator Smith will support me on this. We have found the community very helpful in what they have presented, so let us not mix apples and oranges, let us not have them under Bill S-7 and have these two in general. I think it would help us. If we will do it, do them the same for all three because they are a part of the triangle. I would like us not to forget that piece of the triangle.
Senator Marshall: Who in government brings all this together? These people must report to someone or some bodies; are we able to hear from them? You have all these players, and we will hear from all the players, but someone higher up brings this together.
The Chair: There was reference to the senior National Security Advisor to the government, and we can absolutely pursue whether that individual would be prepared to appear before us and give us some understanding of how the pieces integrate.
Senator Marshall: Yes, how they come together.
The Chair: That is a very good suggestion.
Senator Smith, I think we have had suggestions now on the table to broaden the base so that we do not finish our hearings without having various community groups participate. You are supportive of that.
Is there anything else further to your initial comment that you would like us to pursue in terms of planning?
Senator Smith: It is maybe more helpful to hear from the new members as to what they would like to hear. I said some of those things in response to the questions of Senator Tkachuk. We will not be able to do a huge amount before we rise, I do not think, but hopefully we will get our priorities straight.
The Chair: A list of prior witnesses has been distributed. I would like to invite colleagues to share with me and with our deputy chair specific witnesses that they would like to see called, either by title or by name, in our hearings either for the remainder of June or in the fall when we reconvene, and the steering committee, plus our very supportive clerk and research support to engage fully on that agenda to be as constructive and fulfilling as possible.
If there are no other matters, do I have a motion for adjournment?
Senator Joyal: So moved.
The Chair: Thank you. The committee is adjourned.
(The committee adjourned.)