Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Issue 19 - Evidence - Meeting of February 7, 2013
OTTAWA, Thursday, February 7, 2013
The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met this day at 10:30 a.m. to study economic and political developments in the Republic of Turkey, their regional and global influences, the implications for Canadian interests and opportunities, and other related matters.
Senator A. Raynell Andreychuk (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade is continuing to study the economic and political developments in the Republic of Turkey, their regional and global influences, the implications for Canadian interests and opportunities, and other related matters.
In our first session, appearing by video conference from Doha, we are very pleased to welcome Dr. Ahmet Kuru, Associate Professor of Political Science at San Diego State University, who is currently a visiting fellow at the Brookings Doha Center.
Dr. Kuru, I understand that our video link is not the best at this time but hopefully your voice will come through and that you will hear us.
Welcome to Ottawa via video conference. Please make your opening remarks and the senators will have questions for you. Welcome to the committee.
Ahmet T. Kuru, Associate Professor of Political Science, San Diego State University and Visiting Fellow, Brookings Doha Center, as an individual: Thank you for giving me the opportunity to share my thoughts about Turkish politics and the economy. I would like to start with the recent events in the Middle East, which have made Turkey even more important.
I was in Cairo recently, spending 11 days on research, and I realized the political disorder there. When we look at the countries that have experienced the so-called Arab Spring, we realize that Turkey can play a major role on many grounds.
One issue that I have worked on is Islam and secularism. In a book I published comparing Turkey, France and the United States, I dealt with two types of seculars. One is passive secularism that we see in the United States, Canada, Netherlands and India, where the state is supposed to be passive and neutral vis-à-vis religious and secular activities and discourses. There is a second type of secularism that I call ``assertive secularism'' that was dominant in Turkey and also in some other countries, like France and Mexico. Recently Turkey has transformed from the French type of assertive secularism to the American type of passive secularism.
By this transformation, Turkey has become more relevant to other Muslim countries, especially Arab countries in the Middle East, because the former perception of Turkey was that it had nothing to do with Islam; it is too radical and secular. Right now, with the pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party in power, Arabs and even Arab Islamists are taking Turkey more seriously.
The question for the Arab Spring is in fact whether Arab countries will follow the Iranian model of a semi- theocracy, where religious bodies have superior powers over elected institutions, or move toward a Turkish model, a more passive, tolerant, liberal understanding of secularism where Muslims can represent their ideas and can reflect their religious values, while at the same time the state remains neutral. This is the debate and question now in the Middle East and Turkey.
Definitely, Turkey itself has many problems that limit its ability to be a model for Arab countries. For example, in terms of democracy, for the last 10 years Turkey has experienced major progress because there were two main barriers against democratization in Turkey. One was the civil-military relations. As you know very well, the Turkish military staged in coups d'état in 1960, 1971, 1980 and recently in 1997. However, very recently there has been a major transformation in Turkey. Military generals are now persecuted. There are many court cases against them about planning coups d'état. Right now, out of over 300 generals and admirals in Turkey, about 10 per cent are in prison for planning alleged coups d'état against the political regime. There are some critics of these court cases, but eventually what this did was end the untouchable image of the military. Therefore the military is no longer untouchable. There is no longer a military tutelage over the democratic regime in Turkey.
The second problem was the Kurdish question. Fifteen per cent of the population in Turkey is Kurdish and for a long time their cultural rights were denied, but now there is also a new process. For the last 10 years martial law has been abolished, the restriction over the use of the Kurdish language has been lifted, there is now a public TV channel broadcasting 24 hours in Kurdish. The Turkish government is negotiating with the leader of PKK, the Kurdistan Workers' Party, Abdullah Öcalan, and these negotiations hopefully will lead Turkey to a much more peaceful understanding, a pluralistic society and polity. If Turkey can solve this Kurdish problem, and already has almost solved the military problem, then it can become the model for other Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East.
Also, the economic progress of Turkey has succeeded recently in making it a more interesting model for Middle Eastern countries. For the last 10 years, GDP per capita in Turkey increased from about $4,000 to about $12,000. For an average of 10 years, the annual growth rate, despite the world economic crisis, is 5.1 per cent. That is a major success because if there had been no global financial crisis it could have become 8 per cent, or so, on average.
Another major change in the Turkish economy is in exporting, especially toward the Middle East countries. Turkey's exports have increased by 600 per cent for the last 10 years. Behind this successful economic enterprise is the conservative bourgeoisie, which is called the Anatolian Tigers. They are socially Muslim, practising Muslim conservatives, but in terms of economic perspective they are very open to globalization and the idea of westernization. One symbol of this new bourgeoisie is Gülen movement, the movement led by Fethullah Gülen. This movement is open to Christians, Jews and all other members of faith or belief systems. They have opened schools, starting in Central Asia, then Europe and now in the United States, and they engage in different activities that show a more moderate understanding of Islam. This Turkish version of modern Islam is very different from the radical interpretations of Islam.
Let me conclude by saying that the relationship between Canada and Turkey is also very important for Turkey in terms of trade and civil society relations because both countries are members of NATO and there is a certain level of military cooperation. However, the relationship is sometimes under the shadow of the Turkey-U.S. relationship.
Turkey tries to multiply its network of friendships and connections. Therefore, in the future I think relations between Turkey and Canada will be more important. If Canada would like to play a more active role in the Middle East, Turkey can help, or Canada can help Turkey in terms of its relationship with Western countries.
I will be happy to answer questions.
The Chair: Thank you, Dr. Kuru. I do have a list of questioners, starting with Senator Johnson.
Senator Johnson: Good morning. I want to talk about the elections in 2014. In particular, there is a big focus on the changing of the parliamentary system to a presidential one. Do you think they agree or disagree with the level of concern expressed for Turkey's political situation? What possible developments regarding Turkey's political situation and constitutional reform merit particular attention?
Mr. Kuru: Thank you for this important question. The perception about the presidential system keeps changing in Turkey. Five years ago there were many groups who supported the idea of the presidential system because they wanted the military to be controlled and thought that the parliamentary regime was not enough to keep the military under control; but right now there is no such concern. The military is almost depoliticized to a certain degree. Therefore, there are many opponents of the presidential system because they are concerned about Prime Minister Erdogan's personal leadership charisma, that he is a bit too dominant.
The debate is ongoing. My personal prediction is that the presidential system cannot become the new regime in Turkey. That is because only Prime Minister Erdogan and his followers in the ruling Justice and Development Party support this cause, but there is no major crisis that makes it necessary because the parliamentary regime right now is working. For a substantial change, it reminds me of France, for example. They moved from a parliamentary to a semi- presidential system during the Algerian war and debate. There were officers planning a coup d'état threat. There was a crisis and the substantial regime changes happened mostly under crisis circumstances. We do not have those in Turkey right now.
My prediction is that Turkey will remain parliamentary. If I am wrong and there is a move to a presidential regime, I would not be concerned too much because right now the prime minister is extremely powerful. A presidential regime may bring a better balance of power. No one is sure at this point.
Senator Johnson: To what extent do you think Turkey's economic situation will figure in the election campaign? There are so many things going on, but how about that one?
Mr. Kuru: The longevity of the current government and the Justice and Development Party is based on its economic success, as I tried to emphasize. While doing so, they also tried to keep a balance between free market economy and social welfare policies. There is universal health care and the poor people especially are happy with the new health system in Turkey that has been implemented for the last 10 years. There is also some educational support and the government has been successful to keep free market privatization policies. In academia, some of my friends have called the ruling party the leftist party. I disagree, but it shows something. However, if the economy is not doing well, definitely we will see a decline in the vote share of the ruling party. That is one thing.
The other thing is whether politics will affect the economy or not. Turkey has been very much stabilized in terms of its economic system because Turkey had major financial crises in 2000 and 2001. Then Kemal Dervis came to Turkey from the United States, from the World Bank, to be the coordinating minister, and he really designed the new laws and legislation. Right now the banking system is very successful, very stable. Even if there is a new government, even if the ruling party loses the election, I am not expecting it to shake the economy. The economy will remain stable even under the leadership of other prime ministers, et cetera.
Senator Downe: Could the witness comment on the commercial priorities of Turkey and in which sectors?
Mr. Kuru: Regarding North America, textiles were a major problem. It would be more correct to say regarding the United States because I do not know the relationship between Turkey and Canada in terms of textiles. With respect to U.S. relations, a quota limits Turkish exports of textile manufactured goods to the United States and Turkey has tried to lift it.
Regarding other industrial technology, there are particular issues, such as television set production. Turkey is very successful in exporting to Europe.
The current government is very ambitious. They want heavy industry, such as manufacturing cars, and even trying to be successful in military industries.
One major problem emerges because energy is very expensive in Turkey. Turkey is importing natural gas from Russia and Iran and is almost dependent on these two countries for natural gas. There is limited oil, which is not sufficient; therefore, Turkey is also importing oil. It makes for costly production in terms of energy.
In terms of labour, it is still cheaper than Europe — I am talking the average in general — and there is a young generation of highly skilled people. Some people are coming from Germany right now. Previously, Turks were going to Europe but now some of them are coming back, bringing new skilled labour to Turkey, because the Turkish economy is doing better than some European countries.
These are the basic things on the agenda right now.
Senator Downe: Could you expand and advise the committee what Turkey is doing to diversify its energy dependency? Is it working with countries such as Azerbaijan, for example? Is it doing any solar or wind energy in its own country?
Mr. Kuru: It is hard to talk about solar or other green energy, but one issue is nuclear energy. The current government is very much dedicated to have it because it is very new. They are starting from scratch. They have an agreement with Russia now to build a nuclear reactor in Turkey. Some leftist intellectuals are opposing it. They do not want Turkey to have nuclear energy, but the government seems to be dedicated on this issue.
Previously, the courts cancelled bids concerning nuclear or other kinds of governmental projects, but right now most of the courts are in alliance with the government in terms of politics; therefore, I do not see that there is any judicial problem for Turkey to be a nuclear power in terms of energy, not in terms of military power.
Another major project is to have pipelines. As you mentioned, from Azerbaijan there is now Baku-Ceyhan pipeline bringing Azeri oil to the Mediterranean Sea. Turkey tried to add a new pipeline to also carry Kazakh oil and Azeri natural gas. There was also a project to bring Turkmen natural gas from Turkmenistan, but the status of the Caspian Sea is unknown; therefore, the pipeline through the Caspian Sea right now does not seem feasible.
Turkey also has major pipeline projects with Russia to carry Russian gas to Europe and it will also help Turkey to get gas at a lower price.
Senator Dawson: One of the subjects you did not mention was tourism. There is one extraordinary first-class success for Turkey, which has gone as a tourism destination from fifteenth place to the seventh or sixth most-visited country in the world. The numbers are something like from 6 million tourists to 33 million tourists in about 10 years.
From the political perspective, having political calm and security certainly encourages tourism, but the government has made major investments in trying to create that tourism. I would like your comments on that.
Mr. Kuru: You are absolutely right, and thank you for reminding me of this important issue.
For the last 10 years especially, the number of tourists coming to Turkey has increased. One source of tourism is the Middle East. Initially there was a certain level of tension between Turkey and Arab countries. The leader of Turkey, Süleyman Demirel, had to leave the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation in 1997 because Arabs were criticizing Turkey for having an alliance only with Israel in the Middle East. Right now, the President of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation is a Turkish citizen, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu.
Turkey is engaging with Arab countries and other similar countries and many people are coming from them, but it is definitely not limited to that. Europeans are also coming; Americans and Canadians are coming. Why is that?
One issue right now is the ability for foreigners to buy land. The government and the Parliament passed many laws to make it possible for foreigners to buy property — land, houses, et cetera — in Turkey. The second thing is transportation technology. The number of people using airplanes in Turkey has increased substantially and the number of airports has also substantially increased. In addition to this government project, there are many private companies helping to build new ventures like renting a car. You are right; there is a booming tourism industry.
Another factor is Turkish airlines. Maybe you have seen the TV ad where they bring together the soccer player Lionel Messi with the NBA basketball player Kobe Bryant. It is a good ad which shows how ambitious the Turkish airlines are.
Senator Dawson: I wear another hat because I am Chair of the Transport Committee that is studying airlines and transportation. We would have a lot to do in exchanging best practices between Turkey and Canada. At the same time you have gone from fifteenth to sixth and we have gone from ninth to eighteenth in tourism, so we would have a lot to learn as we encourage more exchanges and commercial trade between Turkey and Canada. We may have the opportunity to tell ministers who are travelling to Turkey about the good example of the way Turkey runs and promotes its airlines. Getting tourists into Turkey is an example Canada should look up to.
Senator Finley: I was intrigued by your opening summary, which was very valuable but extremely compact. I want to ask a couple of questions to have you expand on what you said at the beginning.
Could you give me a brief resumé of the military power in Turkey? What caused it to rise and what appears, to me anyway, to seem like a decline in their military power? Why is the military declining in power? Is this because of other factions coming into play, the fears of other communities, or what? Could you perhaps elucidate a little on that?
Mr. Kuru: I really appreciate the question because I had an article that was published with the exact title The Rise and Fall of Military Tutelage in Turkey. Let me touch on the important points.
I argue the reason the Turkish military was politically very powerful was because of the support it received from particular civilian groups. Especially in political parties there is the Republican People's Party that called itself Kemalist Party, referring to the leader Kemal Atatürk. Then, in addition to the party, there were some important supreme courts, high-level judges and prosecutors who also depended on the military role in politics; and finally was the media. The important TV channels and newspapers wanted to chip military into politics.
The question is why. Why do politicians, judges and media members want to see a military tutelage over the system? In a nutshell, the answer is because they fear three things: Islamism, Kurdism and communism. The fear of Islamism and Kurdism started with the foundation of the republic throughout the 1920s and 1930s when Turkey had the Kemalist reforms. The two pillars of the reforms were nationalism and assertive secularism because the new republic was supposed to be different from the old Ottoman Empire, which was more religious and multi-ethnic. The new republic became secular and nationalist. Therefore, it regarded practising Muslims as threats, potential Islamists; and Kurds as threats, potential separatists and Kurdish nationals. In the 1970s a new threat was added to the list: communism. That was a system where military sometimes emphasized these threats to make its supporters alert.
However, why did the military decline? The groups — Islamic groups, Kurds and leftists — came together. They made a coalition — I call it conservative liberal coalition — and became successful and powerful in the media, in the judiciary and in the politics and they also bring power from the European membership process. They say if Turkey is to become a member of the European Union, they cannot have this semi-military political regime.
In 2007, 2008 and 2009, this coalition of conservatives and liberals who are fed up with the military interventions attacked some officers, not military in general, in the media; and there were court cases which ended up with the arrest and imprisonment of some officers and changed the image of the military in Turkey.
I have made a comparison with Latin America. As you know, Latin American countries in 1979, 75 per cent of them were military regimes, and military was justified and supported by some right wing civilians because of the idea of communist threat. If military is not in, the communists will come. However, in 1990 all Latin American military regimes disappeared because the communist threat has disappeared.
The same thing happened in Turkey. Communism is passé. Islamists are marginally in Turkey. Most Turks, 92 per cent of Turks are one secular state. The debate is whether it will be French-type assertive secularism or American-type passive secularism. Most of the people want American-type passive secularism, and therefore they do not want the military or an Islamic threat in Turkey.
Now the only justification of the military is the Kurdish question, and with the new negotiations and new opening with Kurdish rights, the military also loses its ground regarding the Kurdish question. Already over 40,000 people died and most Turks are now fed up with imposing assimilation on the Kurds, which is not humane or democratic and technically impossible. Therefore Turkey is going toward a more democratic way to solve the Kurdish problem which further eliminates the military's role in politics.
If we link it to the earlier question about tourism, the more the Kurdish problem is solved, it becomes a safer country for the foreigners and visitors, even more will come, and democracy will prosper in Turkey. There is a strong link between the decline of military tutelage and the rise of democratization.
Senator Finley: I am very encouraged by what you are saying. Of course we in the West tend to have many ideas and many opinions, probably ill-founded, on the subject of Islam. As time goes forward, how big a role or how cooperative a role do you see Islam having in the democracy of Turkey? Will it be a major player? I can only look at shift and adapt. Maybe someone else has to shift and adapt. Can you give me an idea, because it will always be an issue. When Canadians, for example, discuss any part of that region, Islam will be part of the discussion. Could you project forward as to how Islam might adjust or cause others to adjust to play a key role for the democratization of Turkey?
Mr. Kuru: This is now the question that people everywhere in the Muslim world are discussing because there is no one single Islam. As with Christianity, Judaism and all other religions, there are interpretations and the political interpretations of Islam is what people make of it. People interpret the book. The book itself does not have a clear image. It is all based on people's perception.
In the case of Turkey right now, the major Islamic groups like the pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party — Prime Minister Erdogan's party — and also the Gülen group, which is also a successful and very strong social movement, both oppose the idea of an Islamic state and both agree on the principles of a democratic regime where Muslims can reflect their ideas in Parliament. If you are a Muslim, conservative, whatever, you can be a parliamentarian and participate in the law-making process. This process, if it is open to dialogue, discussion, debate and critics, eventually changes everyone who takes part in it.
I think the problem in the Muslim world is there is a vicious circle of poverty, economic underdevelopment and political disorders. I am always telling my students in the United States that if Afghanistan had been an atheist country, we would not have seen less suicide bombing, maybe more. Why? Perhaps under those circumstances, whatever ideology or religion you put in would be understood in a radical way. However, the more Turkey becomes economically prosperous, part of the West, and democracy shapes its own trajectory, then the understanding of Islam will be very moderate and Turkey will transmit its ideas to the other parts of the Muslim world.
Senator Finley: I am very encouraged. Thank you very much.
[Translation]
Senator Fortin-Duplessis: Professor Kuru, I want to congratulate you on all your publications. You are the first person to talk to us about secularism, but that is not what my question is about.
Some of the analysts who have appeared before our committee have told us that the Kurdish minority has not benefitted from Turkey's economic growth as much as the Turkish majority has.
Can you tell us about the situation of Turkey's Kurdish minority in the context of the country's recent economic growth?
[English]
Mr. Kuru: You are right in that the mostly Kurdish populated areas in Turkey are economically underdeveloped, but the major reason for this is geography. It is like Southern Italy and Northern Italy or differences in any other country. More than Kurds, the Turks are complaining about it because they say that we pay tax in Istanbul, Ankara and other parts of Turkey and the government spends money in the southeast part of Turkey, which is mostly mountain areas. It is landlocked and there are no ports except the Mediterranean West, so historically the economy is not developed.
There are now Kurds moving, migrating to the western part of Turkey and I think there is almost equal opportunity for them because many famous artists, singers, movie stars and some politicians in Turkey are Kurds. A famous president of Turkey, Özal, had some Kurdish ancestors. There are two things to keep in mind. On the one hand, yes, the Turkish state imposed an assimilationist policy against Kurds for a long time, from the 1920s until recently. That is a fact. The Kurdish language was banned, et cetera. However, on the other hand, in terms of economy, the major problem is that the area where Kurds live was geographically underprivileged and in a disadvantaged condition, but right now there is no discrimination on the economic ground.
I have many Kurdish friends in academia. They are very successful professors and it is really hard to distinguish because in Turkey there is always marriage between Kurds and Turks. The problem in Turkey is that Sunni Kurds or Turks have a hard time getting married to Alevi Turks and Kurds. It is more religious, but ethnicity is not a problem for marriage. Turks and Kurds always get married and other than cultural rights we do not have economic discrimination, or at least none that is clearly visible.
[Translation]
Senator Fortin-Duplessis: Turkey is now going from being a recipient of aid to being a donor. Turkey received over US$1 billion in official development assistance in 2010, but from 2001 to 2010, it increased its foreign aid from $64.1 million to $967 million. That is almost $1 billion, which represents 0.13 per cent of its gross national income.
Turkey's official development agency — Turkish cooperation and development agency — has offices in Africa, Asia and the Balkans. What countries do you think receive assistance from Turkey?
Do you know whether any of the money Turkey receives from rich countries goes to the Kurds?
[English]
Mr. Kuru: Definitely. The biggest economic investment in the history of the Turkish republic is called GAP in Turkish, which is the Southeastern Anatolian Project. It started in the 1980s and has continued until today. It is a big project to build dams in southern Anatolia, to change the climate, make the land arable, to produce electricity and to change the economic structure of the areas where Kurds live.
The Turkish government has consistently spent and invested money for this, not only for economic reasons but also ideological reasons. Why? For a long time — not today — they thought that the Kurdish problem was mostly economic, not cultural. They thought if they make Kurds rich, there would not be any cultural demands. Therefore, they heavily invested in southeast Anatolia. However, they now understand that it is not only economic, but also cultural. In this regard, making Kurds rich was an ideological orientation of the Turkish state for a long time.
[Translation]
Senator Fortin-Duplessis: Why does Turkey provide official development assistance to other nations while continuing to receive money from donor countries?
[English]
Mr. Kuru: One reason is that Turkey is planning to have a global role. Its foreign policy is ambitious. It wants to play a global role, therefore it wants international supporters, and you can think of it as being of self-interest too.
For example, right now Turkey is donating $1 billion to Egypt. However, it is not a simple sacrifice; it is a long-term project. If you build a friendship with Egypt today, one day they will pay you back. One day you will have good friends and you prosper together. I think that is the reason they donate to other countries.
Senator Wallace: Professor, I am wondering what your thoughts might be concerning the current circumstances in Turkey and its appeal to foreign investors. There has been increased foreign investment in Turkey and they have aggressively pursued it, as I understand it. When you look at the changes that continue to evolve within Turkey and what is happening in the countries surrounding Turkey and its relationship with its neighbours — not the least of which its relationship with Israel — what would your thoughts be on the attractiveness of Israel as a source of foreign investment today as compared to where it has been over the last few years? Do you see a change occurring?
Mr. Kuru: Thank you for this important question. First, there are major business conglomerates in Turkey, run by Turkish Jewish citizens. Üzeyir Garih was one of them, and there are some others. The Jews played an important role in the Turkish economy. Therefore, there is no cultural barrier if someone is a Turkish citizen.
For outsiders, recently the Turkish government was primarily focusing on the petrodollars. The price of oil increased from around $30 per barrel, before the invasion of Iraq, to today $100 per barrel. I am in Qatar right now and see how the oil and gas money changed things. They have plenty of money, especially in a time of financial crisis. It really helped Russia and Iran also, to be more authoritarian at home for Putin, and in Iran, and be more aggressive in foreign policy because they have oil money.
Turkey tried to attract this oil money as foreign investment. However, the perception that Turkey only cares about Israel in the Middle East was a problem because Arabs then would say that Turkey is not a friendly country. In 1997, as I mentioned, the Turkish president had to leave The Organization of the Islamic Conference summit because the Arabs criticized Turkey heavily.
Turkey's response about this complex relationship was saying that, ``Okay, we are going to play an intermediary role between Israel and Arab countries, and we will play a third party role between Israel and Syria.'' It somehow was working, and Turkey was happy with this new role. However, when Israel attacked Gaza, I think in 2007, without informing the prime minister, Prime Minister Erdogan made it his personal problem. He thought that Israel did not want Turkey to be an intermediary. Then Turkey was really losing its ground.
The second explanation that Turkey was providing to Arab countries was the peace process. Turkey was telling them that there is a peace process; it is good to be friendly with Israel; we are helping you in this process. However, for the last ten years there is no peace process, and it has become really difficult for Turkey to defend these conditions if there is no peace process.
That being said, there are many controversies and disagreements in Turkey. For example, when the Mavi Marmara incident happened, some in Turkey took a hardline position, saying, ``We should cut relations with Israel militarily, even diplomatically.'' However, others said, ``No. Be prudent. Do not be radical.''
For example, as I mentioned, a Muslim scholar criticized the government for making relations with Israel worse. He asked people to calm down and keep certain a level of good relations with Israel.
Therefore, a debate is going on in Turkey. I think that in the long run, Turkey and Israel will find their way of solving the current problem.
Senator Wallace: Thank you for that, professor. Just thinking of the relationship that exists and has continued to exist between Turkey and the United States, and the move towards democratization of Turkey and the importance that has in its relationship with the United States, when you look at what is occurring currently in that region within Turkey itself, do you see major changes in the relationship between the United States and Turkey in a political or economic sense, or is it pretty much business as usual, that the relationship is continuing to unfold as it has over the past few years? These circumstances we find today, do you sense it is about to lurch in one direction or another in a significant way?
Mr. Kuru: I am expecting a major change. Why? Because ten years ago there was no organized Turkish diaspora in the United States. In the 1970s, when the Turkish Prime Minister, Ecevit, was talking to Henry Kissinger about the Cyprus issue, Kissinger asked him to send 1 million to 2 million Turks to the United States. They would become a lobby group and then Turkey would have a stronger hand. Ecevit thought it was a joke and he just laughed. However, I think it was not a joke, that Kissinger was emphasizing an important point, because everyone in the U.S. has some lobbies — Greek lobby, Armenian lobby, Jewish lobby — but there was no Turkish lobby. Despite the NATO relationship, it was a historical relationship between the United States and Turkey.
Right now there is an emerging well-educated Turkish population in the United States, and they are also getting better and better organized to contribute to American society and to U.S.-Turkey relations. I think it will be definitely effective in the long run.
The Chair: I just have one question. I hope you can answer quickly, as we have run out of time.
When these coups occurred in Turkey and there was a public reaction, and judicial and parliamentary involvement sidelined some of the generals, is it not a fact that in the early 1980s it was also strategically a movement by the government of the day to integrate military, who would be soon retired or were retired, into a military establishment? Is that how their very effective military component, which contributes to their economy, gained relevance and brought some stability within the military? If I may say, they saw a future and they contributed to a lot of the equipment that they now produce, which can compete on a world basis.
Mr. Kuru: You are right that there is definitely an economic dimension, and we call it in Turkish ``OYAK'' which is a military trust fund. However, I think that, rather than contributing to the Turkish economy, this mutual trust fund is mostly contributing to the future of the generals because it is against the free market. They have certain privileges. Sometimes they act as a public company, with tax exemption, but otherwise they aggressively act as a private company. For example, this mutual trust fund sold its bank to ING for over $2 billion. Why is the military producing cement and tomato paste? It does not make sense.
In the long run, the more Turkey becomes democratic I think the more these economic privileges of the military will be eliminated. It will be a model for Egypt too, because right now over 30 per cent of the Egyptian economy is under military control. I do not think it will be effective. Privatization of state structures makes them more effective and of military structures definitely will make them more effective.
If you will let me also add one point to the earlier question about the relationship between the U.S. and Turkey, I forgot to mention three important recent issues that make relations between the West in general, and the U.S. in particular, better with Turkey. One issue is the deployment of the NATO radar system. It is also good for Israel that Turkey accepts to deploy the radar against Iranian missiles to its own soil.
The second thing is that when Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan visited Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, he called on Arab countries to embrace a secular state. It was really a bold move in an environment where the term ``secularism'' is regarded very pejoratively. However, when he did it, it was really accepted and celebrated in the western media.
The last thing is that the United States really needs Turkey right now because in the Middle East you cannot work with Egypt, only because Egypt has its own problems. Israel definitely is not welcomed by Arabs, so then Turkey is an opportunity for the U.S. to work with the Middle East right now after the Arab Spring.
The Chair: We have run out of time, Dr. Kuru. Thank you for answering so many broad questions on all aspects of our foreign policy vis-à-vis Turkey. You have given us a lot of information and we are very grateful for it. It will certainly help us in our study.
Honourable senators, we are now very pleased to welcome, by video conference from Canton, New York, Howard Eissenstat, Assistant Professor of Middle Eastern History at St. Lawrence University.
Professor Eissenstat, we are pleased to receive your opening remarks. As senators, we really enjoy the dialogue through questions and answers, so if you start with your opening remarks we will then turn to questions. Welcome to the committee.
Howard Eissenstat, Assistant Professor, Middle Eastern History, St. Lawrence University, as an individual: Thank you very much. I am pleased to speak to you today about conditions in Turkey, a country that has moved from the periphery to the centre of world events. Prime Minister Erdogan once said he wanted Turkey to become a regional power and a global player. It has clearly done so.
These radical transformations are evident both in its foreign and domestic policy. Internally, these transformations have been accompanied by economic and political liberalization and an increasing role of Islam in the public sphere. They began actually before the AKP, starting perhaps in 1989 under the leadership of Turgut Özal, but since 2002 they have picked up.
I am happy to speak of any aspect of these transformations, but in these preliminary comments I would like to centre on the issue of human rights in Turkey. I do so not only because the issues that I will raise are extremely serious, but because I believe that Turkey's Western allies have a vital role to play in addressing them.
The AKP has done some very positive things with regard to human rights, particularly in its first three or four years in office. It has brought the military fully under civilian control. It has transformed public opinion so that today there is a general assumption in Turkey that power is gained only through democratic elections. In this region it is worth noting that there is a consensus on democracy in Turkey.
It has slowed, though not necessarily eradicated, prosecutions of freedom of expression under Articles 301 and 318. The result has been a broadening of intellectual life in Turkey. A decade ago discussion of the Armenian genocide, for example, often resulted in prosecutions. Such prosecutions are virtually unheard of today.
Some non-Muslim communities have had properties returned to them and have gained a greater degree of autonomy. The AKP has lowered, though not eradicated, issues of torture and ill treatment. Torture has not been eliminated, but certainly the cases of alleged torture have gone down. There have been, first, tentative steps in addressing issues of impunity, and then there is the issue of Syrian refugees.
Turkey is one of several countries that has borne a tremendous burden of feeding, housing and protecting hundreds of thousands of refugees from the conflict in Syria. It is important that we recognize and highlight that the AKP has done these things because there is so much more to be done.
In fact, it is disappointing for someone who has followed Turkey for so long to see that, having gotten off with such a powerful start, conditions in Turkey have in many ways become worse rather than better since 2005 or so. My sense is that advocates for human rights in Turkey have seldom felt more depressed at their prospects, and this is in part a reflection of both realities on the ground and of how high hopes had gotten during those first years.
Some of the problems are long-standing Turkish problems; some of these problems I think are based in the AKP's remarkable electoral success. It has not only won successive elections but has maintained effective control of government at all levels for a decade, and like any political party without a viable opposition, it has moved toward hubris.
The more basic problem, though, is that Turkey is really an illiberal democracy. It is a country that has embraced democratic institutions but not liberal values. The strength and tone of Turkish nationalism, the feel of it, is really more something of the 1930s than of the 21st century.
Hate speech and hate crimes are commonplace, and the general tone of illiberalism has brought an acceptance of the heavy-handed use of state violence and the fundamental intolerance of difference.
Broadly I will talk about two types of issues regarding human rights. One is about diversity and the other is about freedom of expression, of association and of the press.
Clearly the most important problem facing Turkey is the Kurdish issue. The AKP knows this and has worked to address it, but I think that they are really constrained by their own sense of what Turkey needs to be. They have been tempted to use a carrot and stick approach, offering important reforms but at the same time using increasingly intensive military and police action. An attempt to broker a deal in 2009 failed in large part because Turkey was unwilling to separate itself from its own traditions of Turkish nationalism and general assumptions about how Turkish society should look.
The situation for non-Muslims in many ways has improved, but the reality is that the non-Muslim population of Turkey is infinitesimally small and widely believed to be an enemy within. There has been a continuing process of hate crimes addressed to them. They are routinely vilified in the press and Parliament, and the truth is that non-Muslim populations are unlikely to survive as communities past this century.
There have also been attacks on other types of religious minorities. Non-belief has been subjected to attacks. In particular, one can look at the case of Fazil Say. He is a famous pianist who tweeted a message perceived as disparaging of Islam. He was prosecuted on that basis and is still in the process of being prosecuted.
Moreover, there is a large Muslim syncretic group called the Alevi in Turkey. For the AKP, the Alevi has proven to be a particular problem in a number of ways. The first is that while the AKP has a way of conceptualizing non-Muslim difference, they do not have a very good way of conceptualizing Muslim difference.
Alevi religious institutions are not recognized as such; state officials will not attend Alevi funerals, including Alevi soldiers who have been killed in active duty; and Alevi beliefs are not treated in compulsory education. This is a very large population of maybe 15 million people who are pushed to the outside of society and often disparaged.
Finally, I should note LGBT issues in this regard. The LGBT community is not only vilified but subjected to discriminatory prosecution and has been under continuous pressure.
This intolerance of difference is in part what is behind the attacks on freedom of association, of expression and of the press. The recent bombing by the DHKPC of the American embassy highlights for Western observers that terror is a real problem in Turkey. There really is something that the Turks need to worry about and address. The problem is that so much of Turkey's anti-terrorism activity has been used with an excessively wide net. Political enemies have been targeted; individuals who have expressed interest in Kurdish identity, who have expressed support for assertions of Kurdish identity have been treated as criminals; and membership in Kurdish parties has often been taken as evidence of terrorist intent.
More than 10,000 people have been arrested in the last decade on these sorts of issues, with many held for extremely lengthy periods in pretrial detention. These people include children, students and teachers, hundreds of journalists, lawyers, including lawyers active in human rights cases, and human rights activists and politicians.
The conviction of Pinar Selek only a couple of weeks ago on a terrorism charge using extremely shoddy evidence after multiple acquittals is good evidence of this. She was sentenced to life imprisonment, and every observer agrees that the evidence was terribly weak.
I will try to keep my comments brief, but I would like to highlight that although the AKP has done some really useful things with regard to human rights, and although the AKP sees itself as a democratic movement, in fact human rights conditions in Turkey have gotten worse. I think this should be a priority for its Western allies, and I believe that for three reasons.
First, internal checks on the AKP's power are too limited due to the fact that the party has been such an effective political machine. Second, the AKP can be approached on these issues in several ways. They see themselves as a democratic movement and so they take criticism seriously on these issues, particularly when it comes from the Western press and allies. Second, the AKP believes in international institutions, and when cases are brought up in the European Court of Human Rights, for instance, those have a real effect on how Turkey does business.
I would encourage Canada and the United States to not be overly concerned about giving offence. Turkey views its Western allies as partners and not friends. It does not believe that its Western allies have Turkey's best interests in mind, necessarily. It does believe there are good, practical reasons in the short and medium term to keep those alliances strong. Due to that, they care what we think.
They also care very much about reputation, and public criticism stings and has an effect. We can look at the decrease in prosecutions under Article 301 as evidence of that. It was particularly the flood of criticisms from international organizations, Western media and Western governments about the 301 prosecutions that forced Turkey to act, and act it did.
I will stop there. I look forward to your questions.
Senator D. Smith: I cannot resist pointing out to you that one of our distinguished senators for many years was a graduate of St. Lawrence, and that was the late Senator Pitfield. He did get an honorary doctorate in 1979.
With regard to human rights, I want to get back to the Kurdish issue. However, I might point out there is a pattern here. In a way it is kind of frustrating because if you go back to the days of Kemal Atatürk when he tried to have a secularized government, it was almost a role model in terms of secularizing it.
With regard to minorities, there was the Armenian situation. I was in Armenia about 10 years ago and attended the genocide museum, and there is not much doubt about the terrible things that happened. However, to have a dialogue with them about it, they will say that bad things did happen, but they cannot cope with the word ``genocide.''
What is so frustrating is that when you are in Turkey, sometimes you will see a picture of Kemal Atatürk on the wall of every room. It was like it used to be with Mao in China; he was the king of secularization.
We heard this morning from the previous witness about initiatives that have recently occurred vis-à-vis the Kurds in terms of infrastructure and dams and trying to eliminate the extreme poverty in Southeast Turkey where there is a concentration of Kurds. Are they bona fide or is it a veneer? Do you have a view on that?
Mr. Eissenstat: The economic efforts with regard to the Kurds are very real and long-standing. For many years, particularly under the secularists, the assumption was that we do not have a nationalism problem with the Kurds; we have a lack of economic development. Therefore, development will be the way to solve this.
The Justice and Development Party was first of all more flexible with regard to Kurdish identity but also, because it has been so successful economically, it has been able to promote tremendous infrastructure improvements in the southeast and the east. That is very real.
I think that the Justice and Development Party is in many respects more serious than any previous party about addressing Kurdish cultural identity issues. The problem is that there is a powerful taboo around anything that threatens the unitary nature of the republic. Discussions of autonomy or the Kurdish at the primary school level are things that are absolutely off the table. I think the AKP badly wants to deal with this, and I think the AKP would like if it was simply a matter of allowing Kurdish radio and festivals. That would be one thing.
I am not sure they can take the leap of imagination to redefine what ``Turkish'' means in the way that Canada, for example, has redefined in the last century what ``Canadian'' is.
Senator Johnson: Following up on your remarks, you wrote recently that ``in Turkey, it is not 'publish or perish' that scholars must fear. It is prison.'' As you said in your remarks, there was a perception out there for some time that the Turkish government was leaning the other way, but it seems now that the AKP, which you also mentioned, seems to have reservation about academic freedom.
Can you enlighten us further on what controls are being exerted in particular, how the students are faring with this increasing environment of intolerance and, given military's role in government that you mentioned, which has broken down, how it is being asked to respond?
Mr. Eissenstat: Thank you so much for this question; it is something that I have been interested in for a long time.
Universities are being targeted in three ways. The first stems from the fact that the AKP is so powerful. It is effectively a democratically-elected single party state. This has meant that, at all levels of bureaucracy for 10 years, they have been filling positions with their people. Increasingly, they have lost the sense that party interests and institutional interests need to be separate. Therefore, deans on university campuses have increasingly seen themselves as advocates for the party and for party interests. Therefore, there is that institutional level.
The second level has to do with certain scholarly issues. Elite universities, as I suggested, have enjoyed much greater freedom. It is by no means unusual for an elite university to have a serious discussion of the Armenian genocide, but at less elite universities, political controls are much tighter and discussions of identity or even of Darwinism seem to be truncated.
The third and largest point I would make is that the type of political activism that one associates with intellectual freedom — the type of political activism that is part of any university environment — has been seen in the context of the crackdown on Kurdish identity and has pulled the university in. When I talk about a thousand students being arrested, what they are largely being arrested for are issues of affiliation or speaking on behalf of Kurdish rights.
The last point you made was about the military. The military, of course, is under direct control of the civilian government, as it should be. When the military had a greater influence on Turkish society, things were not necessarily too much better for the universities, but the Justice and Development Party has been very promiscuous in its use of police in enforcing control. There was a relatively small protest at Turkey's most elite technical university about a month ago. Prime Minister Erdogan was visiting a campus for something related to a satellite, and the police presence was not only overwhelming, with armoured personnel carriers and a thousand officers, but also extraordinarily and unnecessarily aggressive with many students injured and dozens arrested.
Senator Johnson: I am fascinated. I did not realize the creationist movement in Turkey was strong. Is the government asserting control over every aspect of science now? What is the status of that movement?
Mr. Eissenstat: Like everything else, the basic institutions are coming under the control of the party, so they are also coming under the control of the party. There is a strong creationist movement in Turkey that has often taken its cue — in fact, it has often translated documents produced in the United States. It is not just parallel; it is actually borrowing from American creationism, and it seems to be having an effect. There have been recent reports that the government is no longer sponsoring publication of texts dedicated to Darwinism. In 2009, the editor of an official scientific journal that had a cover story on Darwin's centenary was fired and the journal was pulled back from the press. It is there.
Senator Finley: Professor, you have very much concentrated on human rights. I have many more colleagues who are probably better at asking such questions than I, so I would like to shift gears for a moment.
In previous papers you have produced — for example, one, A tale of two flotillas, I think was translated — you talk quite extensively about the ending of the alliance with Israel. It talks about Prime Minister Erdogan increasing ties with both Hamas and Hezbollah. We have heard of numbers worth up to perhaps $300 million in aid flowing from the Turkish government to Hamas and Hezbollah.
Our previous witness seemed to have identified that, yes, this was certainly an issue but there was some overarching strategic view on how Turkey might deal with Israel. Could I have your opinion on what you see as the current and future state of play with Turkey and Israel?
Mr. Eissenstat: A helpful way to start is to recall that the close alliance between Israel and Turkey was actually relatively short historically. It was an innovation of the 1990s and was driven as much by domestic Turkish politics as by international calculations. It probably was going to become weaker over time regardless.
It is also worth noting that although the relationship between Israel and Turkey now might be referred to as a cold peace, it is a good deal warmer than the cold peace between Egypt and Israel. Turkey still invests in Israel and Israel still invests in Turkey. There are still levels of diplomatic and military cooperation. It has not gone.
That said, it is certainly not as strong as Israel would like it to be and probably not as strong as Turkey should like it to be. I think Turkey would benefit from closer relationships.
That said, I do not see a breakthrough as long as Erdogan is the central figure in Turkey and Netanyahu is the central figure in Israel. I think that we will have to live with things working at that lower level.
[Translation]
Senator Fortin-Duplessis: Professor, it is a pleasure to hear from you. I will try to keep my questions very brief. You mentioned that human rights conditions in Turkey have deteriorated instead of improving.
You are an expert on Turkey for Amnesty International. You have told us about an opposition party that is against students who are applying pressure, but could you elaborate on that? Do you anticipate any improvements over the next few years?
[English]
Mr. Eissenstat: I should say that although I do in fact work occasionally for Amnesty International, nothing I say here today should be construed as an Amnesty statement. I am speaking purely as a private individual.
The situation in Turkey with regard to freedom of expression, with regard to arrest, has become significantly worse since 2009. In part because of international pressure, I think there is an opening for some improvement. I do not think that we are going to go back to the heady days of 2005, but when you are working for human rights, you are working for incremental improvements over a long period.
In particular, Turkey has voiced an understanding that its promiscuous use of arrest has caused too much push- back. It has created too much of a stir in the West. I think it is likely in the next year that we will see legislation that will not end those types of arrests but will reduce them. It speaks to that last point that I was making during my preliminary talk, which is that pressure works on Turkey. There are countries in the world in which we talk about human rights in the hope that some day they will matter. In Turkey, one can work toward human rights and expect in our lifetimes, in the relatively short period of time, that things can make a difference. That is another reason for concentrating on those issues.
[Translation]
Senator Fortin-Duplessis: I have a question about the economic aspect. Since the European Union is Turkey's largest trading partner, how much is the euro crisis affecting Turkey's economic situation and how much do the human rights violations influence that situation? What has more of an impact, the human rights violations or EU's economic situation?
[English]
Mr. Eissenstat: I do not think that there is a direct tie between economics and human rights in this regard. However, I think it has made European advocacy of human rights less effective than perhaps North American advocacy of human rights.
There are two big issues at work with the Euro crisis in Turkey. First, it has given Turkey one more piece of evidence that it needs to think in multiple directions rather than simply putting all of its eggs in the European basket. Second, it has reduced the amount of investment from Europe that goes into Turkey. You can think about the Turkish economy as a translator, in effect, taking Western and Gulf investment, reproducing it and then investing and having industry and services in less developed countries.
Senator Wallace: Professor, you spoke at length, and with passion, about the human rights situation in Turkey. I could not help but think when I was listening to you that in the Western world, in Canada and certainly the United States, we do not have to guess what our human rights are or what our rights and freedoms are; it is part of the law. It is clearly established and it eliminates arbitrariness on the part of officials as to how we will be dealt with.
How would you compare our situation in Canada and the United States and the way in which we have defined those rights, freedoms and human rights to what exists in Turkey today?
Mr. Eissenstat: There are two basic issues. I apologize, because living 16 miles from the Canadian border, I should know more about the Canadian system. However, the constitutional system in the United States certainly puts a priority on rights first and on state interest as an auxiliary to that. In Turkey, that is really reversed. The survival of the state and the state's interests are really central to the law. Human rights are simply not as fully protected.
Just as bad is the fact that the Turkish judicial system does not have a strong history of judicial independence. It did not have a strong history of judicial independence before the AKP and it has not gotten any better under the AKP. We often have judges thinking first about what the state wants. When a judge fails to come up with the proper judgment, the prosecutor simply appeals and appeals until they find a judge that does come up with the proper judgment.
Senator Wallace: The second question I was going to ask you was about your comment on the independence of the judiciary in Turkey. Coming back once again to the issue of human rights, you said the rights of the state seem to trump the individual rights and freedoms of citizens. However, are those rights and freedoms defined in the law in Turkey? Can you at least look and determine what those individual rights are, regardless of how far the judiciary decides to deal with them?
Mr. Eissenstat: Yes. They are defined by law and by international agreement. They are defined both in Turkish law and by Turkey's agreements in larger international organizations. The international organizations and their rulings have an effect on how Turkish rule is adjudicated.
The Chair: I will ask one question on the human rights and the situation with respect to women. There are some well educated, articulate women who are well placed in society. However, when you look at the broader community within Turkey, there are many issues facing women, including marriage, honour killings, et cetera. Can you comment what this government is doing and how it is addressing that issue?
Mr. Eissenstat: Absolutely. Turkey was the first signatory to the Council of Europe's convention against domestic violence and violence against women. At one level, they recognized it is a problem. They recognized there are responsibilities of the state in this regard. However, both in rhetoric and in practice they have not been doing nearly as much as they could. Turkey is, after all, an extremely patriarchal society overall.
That type of rhetoric does very well politically, and in particular Erdogan has embraced that sort of grand patriarch persona as part of his persona. Some of the rhetoric regarding his roles in the family and the workplace have been appalling.
On the level of violence, there has been a question of whether honour killings have been prosecuted as fully as other types of murder, and there is a real issue with women's shelters. The government is bound by international agreements to provide shelters for women, and it has produced far too few for far too many people. There is just not enough being done.
The Chair: You said earlier that there was less investment from Europe because of their human rights record. Would it not be the case that there is less investment because of the European economic situation, the Euro crisis?
Second, when we talk about China and some other countries, we say that investment and trade with these countries will ultimately lead to the improvement of their human rights record. They will be more integrated in the international community. Do you say it is the same with Turkey, that it is a place to invest and we could be part of the necessary incremental changes needed within the country to bring about greater adherence to human rights?
Mr. Eissenstat: To take the first point, if I indeed said that European investment had diminished because of human rights then I misspoke. I hope I did not say that, but if I did, I apologize. I meant to say that because of decreasing investment, European concerns about human rights had become less important to the Turkish government and that they were more concerned with what North American countries said than previously.
There are good reasons to invest internationally and I think there are good reasons to invest in Turkey. It is an educated public. There are opportunities there and I assume that investment's primary goal would be economic.
It may well be that in some incremental way, economic investment improves standards of living and raises human rights.
The larger issue is that countries with which Turkey does regular business — political, military, economic — have an influence over how Turkey deals with human rights. That is one of the great pressures on Turkey when thinking about human rights.
The Chair: One thing you have not raised is the issue of corruption. Do you see it as a significant factor within Turkey or, in comparison with the neighbourhood, that it is doing reasonably well and is it addressing that issue?
Mr. Eissenstat: There is still corruption in Turkey. The type of corruption that we see is the use of investment as a way of rewarding political friends and punishing political enemies. You can see that particularly in the press. That said, petty day-to-day corruption by someone who wants to make an investment in their business at the municipal level has more or less been eradicated. Actually, I think that is something that we should acknowledge that the AKP has done right. Petty corruption in day-to-day life is not a big factor in Turkey anymore.
The Chair: You have given us a different dimension than our other witnesses on the state of Turkey today and we appreciate it. We hope some of your comments will resonate. I appreciate your clarification on the European human rights issue. Thank you for being with us this morning.
Senators, we will adjourn until next week. I am waiting for one more whip. One has responded positively on our visit, and we will then circulate whether you will be attending or not. We will identify the time and we will have a rather quick turnaround to have you respond to be part of the visitation.
(The committee adjourned.)