Proceedings of the Special
Senate Committee on the Arctic
Issue No. 6 - Evidence - April 16, 2018
OTTAWA, Monday, April 16, 2018
The Special Senate Committee on the Arctic met this day at 6:30 p.m. to consider the significant and rapid changes to the Arctic, and impacts on original inhabitants.
Senator Dennis Glen Patterson (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to this meeting of the Special Senate Committee on the Arctic. I’m Dennis Patterson, and I have the privilege of chairing this committee. I represent Nunavut in the Senate. I would like to welcome everyone in this room with us tonight and viewers across the country. As a reminder to those watching, these committee hearings are open to the public and also available online on the Senate website at sencanada.ca.
I would now like to ask senators around the table to please introduce themselves.
Senator Coyle: I’m Mary Coyle from Nova Scotia.
Senator Pate: I’m Kim Pate from Ontario.
Senator Neufeld: Richard Neufeld from British Columbia.
Senator Eaton: Nicky Eaton, Toronto.
Senator Bovey: Pat Bovey from Manitoba.
The Chair: Thank you, colleagues.
Tonight, we’re continuing our briefings on Arctic issues. For this first panel, I’m very pleased to welcome from Global Affairs Canada, Mr. Alan Kessel, Assistant Deputy Minister Legal Affairs and Legal Adviser; and Alison LeClaire, Senior Arctic Official and Director General, Circumpolar & Eastern European Relations.
Thank you both for joining us. I invite you to proceed with your opening statements, after which we will go to a question-and-answer session.
Alan Kessel, Assistant Deputy Minister Legal Affairs and Legal Adviser, Global Affairs Canada: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It’s a pleasure to be here today to address the committee. Thank you for giving us this opportunity to discuss some of the work we are doing at Global Affairs Canada in relation to the Arctic. My colleague Ms. LeClaire is going to speak to our participation in the Arctic Council and the international elements of the Arctic policy framework. I’m going to hand it over to her before I come back and speak to you about the exercise of sovereignty in Canada’s Arctic and the international legal framework that exists in the Arctic generally.
Alison LeClaire, Senior Arctic Official and Director General, Circumpolar & Eastern European Relations, Global Affairs Canada: Thank you very much, Alan, and thank you, Mr. Chair. It’s really a pleasure to be here. Thank you for the invitation to appear before this committee.
By way of introduction and as a bit of a scene-setter, I’d like to note that we’re seeing new and emerging trends in both Canada’s northern and Arctic regions as well as the circumpolar Arctic. Today, the Arctic is both driving and being driven by tremendous change. Canada’s Arctic is not immune and is witnessing unprecedented levels of accelerated social, economic and environmental transformation. Climate change, the opening of a previously ice-locked Arctic Ocean, reconciliation, and balancing conservation and development are converging trends and demonstrate that past policies need to be adapted to new realities.
At the same time, Arctic as well as non-Arctic states have a keen interest in following Arctic developments and to cooperate in areas such as science, tourism, shipping and fishing, to name a few.
So today, I am delighted to be here to share some of the ways in which Global Affairs Canada is involved in this dynamic region, both through our multilateral and bilateral engagements. We are also very seized by the opportunity to contribute to the development, or “co-development,” to quote the original statement, of a new Arctic policy framework as envisioned by Prime Minister Trudeau to adapt Canada’s foreign policy positions and actions to the new Arctic realities.
First, I would like to give you an overview of the Arctic Council. The Arctic Council is the principle intergovernmental forum that promotes cooperation and coordination on common social, economic and environmental Arctic issues among Arctic states and Arctic communities. Its structure is unique in that there are six Indigenous organizations that sit as permanent participants at the same table as states. Three of these have Canadian constituents. They are the Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada, the Arctic Athabaskan Council and the Gwich’in Council International.
The council has numerous accomplishments. I’ll name just a few. The first is groundbreaking assessments in areas such as socio-economic development; ice and cryosphere states, and changes in both of those; climate change; shipping; and biodiversity.
The second is in developing legally binding agreements, such as on search and rescue, oil pollution preparedness and response, and scientific cooperation, as well as contributions to international conventions such as the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, the Minamata Convention on Mercury and the Polar Code on shipping.
The third and final is the establishment of aspirational goals and implemented frameworks such as on black carbon and methane reductions, and regarding oil pollution prevention.
Canada’s priorities at the Arctic Council are determined in partnership with northerners. We focus on the human dimension, integrating economic development and environmental protection, while providing strong support for continued climate change action.
Canada also champions effective and meaningful participation of Indigenous peoples, notably working to include Indigenous knowledge in the council’s work.
I will give a few examples of what we contribute to the success of the Arctic Council. First, we bring expertise, knowledge, and human and financial resources to advance Canadian priorities; leadership in the council’s working groups and task forces by numerous federal government departments; and, third, the key participation by territorial and provincial governments, and their contribution of important expertise and northern perspectives to the council’s programs and projects.
In return, we see our interests advanced, meaningful circumpolar cooperation with our neighbours, the inclusion of the voice of Arctic Indigenous peoples in the international conversation on the Arctic, a leveraging of public investment through collaborative projects, high-quality science and policy expertise, and support to domestic policy development.
Our participation in the Arctic Council allows us to support broad Government of Canada priorities such as constructive multilateralism, sustainable development, environmental concerns such as climate change, and to advance domestic policies such as the Oceans Protection Plan.
As we look forward, we will continue to use our participation in the Arctic Council to seek engagement and investment in the North, as well as increased resources. We will sustain and expand meaningful engagement in order to promote effective partnership with northerners. Moreover, we will maximize opportunities to leverage council work to advance non-Arctic priorities.
I will turn now to the northern and Arctic policy framework work that is on going now. I know you have already heard from our colleagues at the Department of Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada, Mr. Stephen Van Dine. He spoke to you about the ongoing efforts to co-develop the new Arctic Policy Framework with northerners, territorial and provincial governments, as well as First Nations, Inuit and Metis people. I don’t want to repeat what he said, but I do want to give you a sense of the work we’re doing from the Global Affairs side on the international development.
We’ve been working closely with CIRNA and co-leading with colleagues at National Defence on the international elements of this process with an aim to arrive at an integrated framework, incorporating both domestic and international policy dimensions. We view this new framework as a valuable opportunity to propose new policy priorities and initiatives that position Canada for reinforced global Arctic leadership.
In addition to regional round tables organized by CIRNA on the overarching policy discussion, Global Affairs has organized consultations specifically on international Arctic policy issues to solicit input from territorial, provincial and Indigenous officials, as well as from academics, industry and civil society.
Finally, I will address youth. There is much more that I could cover in terms of what is going on now and what we anticipate in the future. One example is the recently concluded Arctic fisheries agreement as well as our ongoing efforts to build bilateral relations with various international partners in the Arctic.
In the interests of time, I’ll stop at this point. Of course, I’m happy to respond to any of your questions or provide more detail on anything that I have mentioned or that you think I should have mentioned.
Before I close and hand it back over to Mr. Kessel, I did want to flag a document that I brought with me in the hope that it would be of interest to members. I brought maps, but I hear you got them already from Polar Knowledge. So if you want more maps, you have more maps.
The other thing we brought is a one-pager on resources, if you’re interested in signing up for news feeds and Twitter. There’s also a daily media scan of international media that mentions the Arctic, with a focus on the Canadian Arctic. Should you be interested in signing up for that, either for the committee, or each member, we would be happy to add your names to the list.
I’ll stop there and hand it back over to Mr. Kessel. Thank you very much for your attention.
Mr. Kessel: Thank you, Alison.
I would be remiss if I didn’t recognize some of our team that are behind us, who are our support and help us do the work that we do at Global Affairs Canada.
As activity in Canada’s Arctic increases, including in relation to vessel traffic, concerns about pollution, safety and security are often mischaracterized as threats to Canadian sovereignty. The reality, however, is that increased vessel traffic, if conducted properly and in accordance with Canadian law and policy, actually serves to reinforce Canada’s Arctic sovereignty.
No one disputes Canada’s sovereignty over the lands of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, covering in excess of 1.4 million square kilometres and containing more than 36,500 islands. The only exception is 1.3-square-kilometre Hans Island, between Ellesmere Island and Greenland, which is also claimed by Denmark.
Canada has two maritime boundary disputes in the Arctic: one with the U.S., regarding a portion of the Beaufort Sea, 6,250 square nautical miles, and a second with Denmark regarding two small zones in the Lincoln Sea totalling 65 square nautical miles. Each disagreement is well managed and will be resolved peacefully and in due course in accordance with international law.
All waters off Canada’s Arctic Archipelago, including the various waterways commonly known as the Northwest Passage, are internal waters of Canada by virtue of historic title. For greater clarity, Canada drew straight baselines around its Arctic Islands in 1986. All waters landward of the baselines are internal waters, and Canada has an unfettered right to regulate them as it would for land.
Mr. Chair, let me emphasize that no one disputes that Canada has jurisdiction over those waters. There have been some recent transits through Canada’s Arctic waters by foreign ships that have attracted the attention of the media, with some commentators arguing that these transits somehow threaten Canadian sovereignty. These arguments appear to be based on a misunderstanding of the legal situation. Let me give you an example.
This past summer, a Chinese research vessel, the Xue Long, made a rather high-profile transit through Canadian waters in the Arctic. That voyage was conducted with Canada’s consent after a request by the Chinese government, and after we were satisfied that the vessel would comply with all relevant Canadian rules and regulations. It’s important to note that navigation conducted in compliance with Canadian requirements reflects recognition of Canada’s sovereignty over our Arctic waters rather than a challenge to it.
I would also highlight that Canadian scientists were invited to join Chinese researchers on board the ship during the Canadian portion of their expedition. At the recommendation of Transport Canada, the Xue Long also hired the services of a Canadian ice navigator.
Mr. Chair, next month Canada and our Arctic neighbours will mark the tenth anniversary of the Ilulissat Declaration by the five coastal states of the Arctic Ocean. Those states are Canada, the United States, Russia, Norway and Denmark. The declaration recalled that an extensive international legal framework applies to the Arctic Ocean. It emphasized that the Law of the Sea provides for important rights and obligations concerning the delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf, the protection of the marine environment, including ice-covered areas, freedom of navigation, marine scientific research, and other uses of the sea. Canada remains committed to this legal framework and to the orderly settlement of any possible overlapping Arctic claims.
Mr. Chair, the recently concluded negotiations on a legally binding agreement to prevent unregulated commercial fishing on the high seas of the central Arctic Ocean will add another important element to the Arctic’s legal framework. The agreement, negotiated with our Arctic neighbours, along with China, Japan, South Korea and the EU, will effectively prohibit unregulated commercial fishing in the high seas of the central Arctic Ocean for at least its initial 16-year duration or until science shows that a sustainable commercial fishery is possible and the parties have set up a fisheries management regime. The agreement will serve as an important tool for the international management of the fisheries resources of the central Arctic Ocean and positions Canada as a leader in the conservation of these resources.
Mr. Chair, let me conclude by providing an update about Canada’s work on defining the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 miles in the Arctic Ocean. Canada is currently in the final stages of the preparation of its Arctic Ocean submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, the scientific body established by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea to review coastal state continental shelf submissions. All of the scientific data required from the ocean floor and the geology beneath it, which is needed to establish our outer limits pursuant to the provisions of the convention, has been obtained. We are now analyzing the data and drafting the submission. It could be ready to file by the end of 2018 or early 2019.
Once submitted, the commission will review the submission, which will take several years due to the long queue of submissions already filed, and will make recommendations based on the convention’s scientific and legal definitions. The end result of this project will be international recognition for the area over which Canada will exercise its sovereign rights over the seabed and subsoil in the Arctic Ocean, and thereby establish the last line on the map of Canada.
Thank you again for inviting us this evening. I look forward to answering your questions.
The Chair: Thank you very much.
Senator Bovey: I found this very interesting. The material I was reading in preparation for this meeting elicited many questions. I hope I can ask one or two articulately.
I am really encouraged by what you say on the international front with the five states. I’m also very aware of the fact that we have our Indigenous peoples as observers at the Arctic Council, rather than voting participants; is that correct?
Ms. LeClaire: It’s something in between. They are not observers. There are observers to the council and they sit behind. That’s where the observers would be. When I go to an Arctic Council meeting, the Indigenous groups are at the table with us. They are not decision makers. That accountability remains with governments, but they speak on an equal basis at the table with states.
This was really an innovation, and I would say a Canadian innovation because we were central to the formation of the Arctic Council 20 years ago. That particular category, championed by Mary Simon, was called “Permanent Participants.” It meant that the voice is equal but the decision-making accountability remains with governments.
I would say, though, that it is a consensus body, and I have yet to see a decision taken by government that did not take into very serious consideration the views of the Indigenous organizations that are at the table.
Senator Bovey: Then do you feel that the Government of Canada and the Inuit peoples, as we talk about the Arctic, are really working hand in glove and together in the governance and establishment of the sovereignty of the Arctic?
I’m well aware that the Inuit communities are many miles apart. They are small communities scattered across the North. I’ve been trying to get my head around how this comes together to define some of the issues tied in with the questions of sovereignty.
Ms. LeClaire: That just turned what I thought was going to be a fairly straightforward question into something much more complex.
Canada, as a government in the Arctic Council, champions more attention, dialogue, cooperation and programming at the circumpolar level on social and economic issues. We work very closely with the Canadian chapters — the three that are represented of the six permanent participants — to ensure that our positions fully reflect their priorities. To that extent, when we sit at the council, the projects we want to see the council invest in really do reflect the priorities, perspectives and interests of the Indigenous peoples.
I certainly don’t want to speak on their behalf, but what I can say is that that is certainly our aim, and the feedback that I receive is relatively positive.
To tie that to sovereignty, though, is a different question, and I would prefer to leave questions relating to sovereignty to my colleague to the right.
Mr. Kessel: I’m not sure I understood the question because I don’t think there is an issue of sovereignty. What is happening is that the states work very closely with our Indigenous colleagues in a consensus organization to ensure that the socio-economic and other aspects of the Arctic Council work very smoothly together. The question of sovereignty doesn’t really enter the picture.
Senator Bovey: I was encouraged to hear you say that there aren’t issues with sovereignty. Many Canadians are so confused about the Arctic that for them there are huge questions of sovereignty.
Mr. Kessel: I would suggest that just as there is no question of sovereignty in downtown Toronto, there isn’t a question on the lands and the waters of the sovereign ownership of Canada in the Arctic.
Senator Eaton: I would like to pursue the question of China. I read recently, and you can correct me, does Singapore now want observer status on the Arctic Council?
Ms. LeClaire: Singapore has observer status at the Arctic Council.
Senator Eaton: As well as China.
China has also announced an official Arctic policy that encourages infrastructure to support shipping and more investment in resource extraction. When they are sending research ships through, you don’t feel this is a threat to have nations like China, Singapore — and I think this is probably just the beginning — who want to sit on the Arctic Council.
Why are they there? From the Chinese point of view, I can see why they are there. Why do we want them there?
Ms. LeClaire: Our interest in having voices and ears around the table means that they hear, from the governments whose national territory includes the Arctic, what our priorities and expectations are.
Senator Eaton: You can read that in the newspaper.
Ms. LeClaire: But ultimately we’re looking for international cooperation.
Senator Eaton: Aren’t you legitimizing their potential future claim to the Arctic by saying, “Yes, of course, have an observer status. You don’t own any land. You’re not even near us.” And, really, Singapore in the south?
Ms. LeClaire: Just to be clear, Singapore, first of all, is a very big shipping nation. Right now their principal interest is not in the Arctic around Canada but to ship to Europe over the northern sea route north of Russia.
Senator Eaton: Do they need observer status for that?
You’re giving me lovely talking points on them being just interested in finding shipping routes. If a ship goes from here to England, it doesn’t have observer status on the European Council. A shipping route is a shipping route.
The Chinese are slowly encroaching in Africa. And we seem to be legitimizing their stake in the Arctic by giving them observer status when they could find out what was going on. They don’t need observer status. I just want a reason as to why it is to Canada’s benefit that they are there.
Ms. LeClaire: We want to be having a dialogue with them so they know our priorities and expectations. It puts us in a better position to shape China’s and other nations’ inevitable activity in the Arctic and, I would say, legitimate activity. As Mr. Kessel was saying, when they —
Senator Eaton: That’s fine. Cruise ships do the same thing. We give them the route, and we have icebreakers.
We have to disagree because you can’t seem to give me a reason I understand.
Mr. Kessel: Senator Eaton, that’s a super question. Thank you very much for posing it. You have articulated something that a lot of Canadians and others find confusing. We’re here to help —
Senator Eaton: It’s not confusing; we want to understand.
Mr. Kessel: It’s true, but it is a confusing question because why do we want others to hear what we’re saying? Why do we want others to be observers in our organization? For the same reason we want to be observers in other organizations. For instance, we are an observer to the Council of Europe. We aren’t members of the European Union. We aren’t participants in all of their activities, but we want to be there. Canada has benefited tremendously from other organizations which aren’t our backyard, but we want to influence their thinking and learn from them.
The Polar Code was developed in the International Maritime Organization, which is in London, and the Chinese are major players there. We needed to find a consensus of countries that would work with us to create regulations and rules to govern the building of ships and the conduct of vessels in our Arctic. Working with these large countries which have huge shipping interests is a major interest to us.
There is no threat to our sovereignty. This is not a question of sovereignty. As I mentioned in my initial remarks, no state vessel goes through our territory without our permission.
Senator Eaton: Right now.
Mr. Kessel: I don’t know what you mean by that, senator. No, they don’t.
Senator Eaton: I think we live in La La Land. We are a big fat goose waiting to be carved up. We have hardly any icebreakers. We have no submarines that can go under the ice. We have nothing that can fly over there right now with any ease. Anyway, that’s just my opinion.
The Chair: Did you want to add to that, Mr. Kessel?
Mr. Kessel: I couldn’t possibly.
Senator Neufeld: Mr. Kessel, when you say “sovereignty,” no one disputes it. Are you telling me that Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States do not dispute anything? They are on board totally with you that those lines drawn on the map are actually Canada’s land? Do any one of those states say, “No, we don’t agree”? I think there are a couple of little disputes, so I’m not talking about that. Does Russia say, at the table, “Yes, you’re right on; it’s all yours”?
Mr. Kessel: Yes, curiously enough they do. In fact, Russia shares very much our approach to how we deal with our archipelago and with the waters between because they have a very similar setup in their part of the world.
Let me clarify. We do have a series of disputes. One is on the Beaufort Sea with the Americans. There are a couple of others, such as one with Hans Island, which is a little rock between Greenland and Canada. Then there is a line north of Greenland and between Canada where we have resolved the status of the border between us, and we’re looking to find an occasion when we can celebrate by signing an agreement on that.
Hans Island has been an issue for some time. You wouldn’t be surprised to know that Canada and Denmark continue to talk to each other about that.
With respect to the Beaufort Sea, both the Americans and Canada had some mapping to do on that particular territory. Both of us have now completed our bathymetry and geological surveys. In due course, we will be able to talk to each other about how we resolve that matter.
But I think the real story here is about how countries like us use the instruments that we helped create to resolve issues without violence. We will continue to do that; we are certainly committed to doing so under the Ilulissat Declaration.
The Chair: I think what Senator Neufeld is getting at, Mr. Kessel, is this: Do all those states that he mentioned accept that the waters in the archipelago are internal waters, as Canada declared some years ago?
Mr. Kessel: As you mentioned, there’s some disagreement. I alluded to the disagreement we clearly had with the Americans. That was dealt with in the 1988 agreement following the Shamrock Summit, which some of us will recall, where we decided to disagree.
The discussion that we have with our American friends is with respect to the nature of the channels that make up the Northwest Passage and whether that is an international strait. There is no dispute as to ownership of the land or seabed; it’s just an issue as to whether there is a right of transit passage. That remains a discussion that is alive with us and some of our friends.
Senator Neufeld: Are there votes on the council, or is it by consensus?
Ms. LeClaire: It’s a consensus body.
Senator Neufeld: Could you share with us where these Arctic Council countries have agreed with what you say, that there is no question about sovereignty? Is it firm — it’s easy to say, I guess — but when push comes to shove, is it there?
Mr. Kessel: What I said was that there is no question with respect to the lands, the seabed and those waters. The only question we have and that we’re dealing with is an ongoing discussion as to whether there is a right to transit through there. What we have done is make it so that no one has gone through those waters without asking our permission. Asking for permission indicates that you have a right to give permission. Giving permission is an exercise of our sovereignty, and we continue to exercise our sovereignty.
Senator Neufeld: In the interest of time, I will get on with it here because there are other questions. If there is something that says those things, that the people around the table have come to a consensus or there has been some meeting where there has been a consensus regarding the boundaries, I would like you to give it to the clerk of our committee, if you could, so we can see it.
Mr. Kessel: You will find that the Arctic Council doesn’t deal with boundary issues. Those are done by bilaterally.
Senator Neufeld: Okay.
Ms. LeClaire: I would like to clarify. As Mr. Kessel said, the Arctic Council does not deal with boundary issues. It is an intergovernmental forum that focuses on social, economic and environmental issues. It seeks to work where cooperation is possible. The declaration that forms it explicitly excludes military/security as an issue discussed by the council.
Having said that, when we talk about what we can cooperate on as circumpolar partners, there is no discussion of boundary issues. There is a presumption of stewardship over our national territories.
Senator Neufeld: Okay. When Mr. Kessel said there is no dispute about the boundaries, I thought maybe there would have been discussion about the boundaries. I understand now there is none.
The second question I have is a quick one. The ships that go through — for instance, you brought up the Chinese one, so I will dwell on that for a minute. The information that Chinese ship was getting — it was a research ship, I assume — does Canada get that research so that we can, in one way, see what they have done but also learn from what they’ve done? Is that in the agreement, or do we just let all those foreign vessels go through and do whatever they want but we don’t get anything?
Mr. Kessel: So many thoughts there. I understand that the Chinese shared the portion of the research that was in our waters.
Ms. LeClaire: We had a scientist on board.
Mr. Kessel: Yes, we did.
Senator Coyle: Thank you very much, Mr. Kessel and Ms. LeClaire. They were important and interesting presentations. I’m reformulating my question based on what has come out here.
First of all, Mr. Kessel, you do paint a very rosy picture, and I think that’s probably why you’re getting some probes from this committee. I am curious to learn from you what these points of contention are that are being dealt with. I know you told us that sovereignty is clear and people are working well together. What are the points of tension within the Arctic Council and the other bodies that Canada is a party to?
Mr. Kessel: I’m going to hand you over to Alison regarding the Arctic Council and whether there are issues of contention. There are discussions — quite significant ones.
It’s not that I’m painting a rosy picture as much as I’m giving you kind of the legal realities that we deal with on a daily basis and how to separate some of the media hype that you have probably been fed for a good 10-plus years. There are obviously some folks who spend a lot of time building on those questions.
In our daily work, we have to be dealing with whether there is someone challenging our sovereignty. I’ve used an analogy in some of my chats with people. You’re lying in bed at night, and you hear the back door of your garden open. Someone runs through it and then jumps over the fence and goes to the neighbour’s. Is that a breach of your sovereignty? I would say no. It may be a security question, but it’s not a sovereignty question.
If you wake up in the morning and find someone has pitched a tent in your backyard and they’re asking what’s for breakfast, then I think you have a sovereignty question, because they’re right there and doing that.
We don’t have that problem. The way we’ve dealt with the person running through your backyard, we have said, “We’re happy to have come through, as long as you comply with our environmental laws, our shipping regulations and you ask permission.” And we get that. So when I say that I’m content with our sovereignty issues, that is what I’m talking about.
With respect to contention, I think Alison could answer whether there is any in the Arctic Council.
Ms. LeClaire: If you are asking about specific tensions between states, those don’t really manifest themselves in the Arctic Council.
What animates us in the Arctic Council is a shared view that the most imminent threat facing the Arctic comes from climate change and that the Arctic Council needs to demonstrate that it has the wherewithal, the capacity, as the governments that make up the Arctic, to cooperate, to identify where we can adapt to climate change, where we can build resilience to climate change, where we can position ourselves to deal with what is recognized to be the growing accessibility of the Arctic that is prompting much greater interest in the economic potential of the Arctic.
So what do we do with that? What kind of policies and rules as a circumpolar community? When you look at what the Arctic Council has done, some of the agreements around search and rescue, emergency preparedness, oil pollution, this is a manifestation of what we see as the urgent things that we need to do as an Arctic Council, as a group of states, that will fill the stewardship space.
Now, where there is a diversity or a difference of opinion, I would say that Canada, more than the others, is more keenly aware of the impact on communities and on Indigenous communities. Whereas you have countries like Norway, where their source of national wealth is very much reliant on development in the Arctic portion of their country, particularly in oil and gas drilling, and so they really are looking for ways to expand that, while protecting their environment.
We’re very much concerned with how our communities are affected by climate change, how they are adapting to climate change and how they can be empowered to devise and operationalize solutions that incorporate Indigenous knowledge.
For example, we participate in a circumpolar academy on renewable energy, and this brings together members of local communities, Indigenous people, to participate with scientists in building models that offer local solutions in our particular climate.
Other examples relate to building a sustainable economy to provide growth that seeks to maximize the opportunities of what is happening in the Arctic for the people that live there, while minimizing the risks. That relates to economic growth but also some of the very real social challenges of our communities up in the North. The Arctic Council is a place where we champion that, where the reconciliation agenda that animates the government leads to work that we’re doing on Indigenous language preservation, on mental health and wellness, on some of the issues that are domestic priorities, looking at the Arctic Council as a platform where perhaps we can learn from one another and grow solutions to them.
My apologies, Mr. Chair. That’s a long answer, but I hope it gives you a flavour of the work that gets done on the Arctic Council. Our particular perspective in championing local communities, particularly Indigenous communities, shapes some of the work that gets done there.
Senator Pate: Thank you both for being here. I invite you to comment further on what you were just discussing, and then I have another question.
There is some material from the ITK and Mary Simon. In their comments, they state that “Canada’s status as an Arctic nation is strengthened immeasurably by Inuit use and occupancy of Arctic lands and water for thousands of years” but that Canada’s “sovereignty is weakened and compromised internationally because of the unacceptable social and economic imbalance that exists between southern Canada and Inuit communities and regions.” You were talking a bit about that. I’m wondering if you could comment a bit more on that and what actions Global Affairs is taking to try to address the social and economic imbalance in our Inuit communities?
Ms. LeClaire: Perhaps I can speak to you a little bit about the Arctic policy framework discussion that’s ongoing and underscore that in the consultations we have had across Canada, both on the domestic issues and the international issues, that is absolutely what we hear.
That view articulated by Mary Simon has been repeated by northerners who say, “How can you be an international leader when we have these kinds of problems at home?” That is a view we’ve heard many times, and it is very much part of the conversation in informing the policy work that we’re doing. That is of concern both to the national level work and to the international work.
So what, on the international level, are we thinking about? We’re certainly looking at what tools and policies are necessary to support sustainable economic growth. From the international dimension, that would speak to a trade and investment strategy, for example. So how do we support northern business access to international markets? What are the barriers to that access? What tools do we have? At Global Affairs Canada, of course, we have the Trade Commissioner Service. How can the Trade Commissioner Service tools be used to assist northern business? So that, from what we hear, is what northerners want. They don’t want southern solutions. They want to be empowered in terms of their own entrepreneurship and economic activity that is going to take into account the values and interests of the communities that live there, notably Inuit values. They don’t want to sacrifice their culture in order to achieve growth. They want to be empowered so that they can pursue it in ways that will do that.
Another example is that one of the initiatives we championed in our last chairmanship of the Arctic Council was the creation of the Arctic Economic Council. That was created in the Iqaluit Declaration that culminated our chairmanship. It’s now a stand-alone body that is still young but is a private sector body that brings together northern businesses. It is doing advisory reports on economic realities and commercial opportunities in the North. So I think that when we look at the international dimension, that is certainly important.
Another example would be project work in the Arctic Council on mental wellness. We have worked with our circumpolar partners in building a toolkit for suicide prevention. That is bringing together experts from across the circumpolar region, experts on mental health, on suicide, to look hard at what is happening, to identify where there are commonalities, whether it’s Russia and Canada or Canada’s North and Alaska, with the involvement of Indigenous peoples and local communities to come up with not only assessments but tools that ultimately we hope will be of practical use to the communities that live there.
So those are two examples of what has been done and what we’re looking to do more of through the work that’s ongoing now in the Arctic policy framework.
Senator Pate: I noticed as well in some of the materials that I was able to pull out that the first international agreement, the ban on commercial fishing in international waters, did include Inuit traditional knowledge in the decision-making process. I was curious about the process for that, how you incorporate it, how the Inuit were involved in the treaty-making, and what you have learned from that in terms of additional. It hasn’t been mentioned that I heard today, but if I wasn’t listening carefully enough, please correct me. I’m thinking of justice issues, as well as the mental health and social issues that you talked about.
Ms. LeClaire: I was not part of that negotiation. That negotiating team was comprised of colleagues at Fisheries and Oceans and the lawyers.
On Indigenous knowledge, you’re right: It’s a very real accomplishment and is one that was led and championed by Canada.
I apologize that I can’t speak in more detail about that. I would be happy to get you more information.
Mr. Kessel: The only thing I’m aware of is we sought the knowledge and awareness of our Indigenous groups around the fishing areas to determine whether there was more than a sustainable fishery there and whether we were starting to see fish move up from the South. With the warming of waters in the South, fish are finding their way to cooler waters and at some point we’re expecting them to find their way into the Arctic Ocean. That awareness, knowledge and historical information is what we’ve been looking at mostly, and I think they’re now incorporated into the monitoring process. But I would have to find out more detail for you since I wasn’t part of the team.
The Chair: I will ask a supplementary question before turning to Senator Deacon.
The former chair of this committee, Senator Watt, was very concerned that the Inuit had rights in the offshore under international law, being marine peoples who occupied the ice, and that Inuit were left out of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea process, that they could have enhanced Canada’s case.
Would you have any comments on that theory, Mr. Kessel? You may know of some legal opinions developed by Senator Watt in that connection.
Mr. Kessel: I have to say that unfortunately I haven’t followed Senator Watt’s opinions on these, although I’m very familiar with some of the others.
UNCLOS was negotiated some 40 years ago, but I think we were prescient. What Canada did back then, which was rather innovative, because of the Inuit living on water as if it were land, we managed to include in the Convention on the Law of the Sea, I believe in Article 234, that in fact we have the capacity, and Canada is unique in this respect, to treat the ice-covered areas as if they were land. It has allowed Canada to enact legislation which actually covers ice-covered areas. For instance, under the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, it is now out to 200 miles. This is to help the Inuit populations to use that ice-covered area for their livelihood. This was done 40 or 50 years ago before we even understood what was going to be happening with climate change.
I think maybe that goes some way to responding to Senator Watt’s concerns, but fortunately Canadians have been thinking about these things for a long time. Even though we tend not to think of ourselves as doing that, there were many smart, forward-looking Canadians who, when they were trying to build international instruments, thought about all of our country and the most diverse places. We are benefiting from that today.
Senator Deacon: I have a basic question about the actual Arctic Council. How long has it been operating in its present mode?
Ms. LeClaire: It was created in 1996, and so it has just celebrated its twentieth anniversary.
Senator Deacon: That has been a while and I’m sure it has morphed based on your direction and your need.
If you step back, is this Arctic Council working and how do you know if it’s working well?
Ms. LeClaire: That is a very important and timely question. It is one that we are challenging ourselves with at this very moment. It has indeed morphed. It is growing up. It still has a long way to go, I would say.
It was created in 1996, but it was built on a precursor organization called the Arctic Environment Protection Strategy that had not existed for very long, but the Arctic Council really took its structure from that. The precursor organization, as you can tell from its name, was very much oriented to environmental protection, and also to natural science. The principal metamorphosis since then has been the addition of more social and economic work, but I would say it has not yet achieved the aspirations articulated in the Ottawa Declaration that established it in terms of the three pillars of social, economic and environmental working together in an integrated way.
Under the U.S. chair that ended just last year, 2017, a decision was taken for the first time to prepare a strategic plan for the Arctic Council. So when I say it’s growing and maturing but has a way to go, it doesn’t have a strategic plan. It’s still very much a sum of its different parts, which tend to work fairly autonomously. The horizontality is growing, but it hasn’t reached the coherence it needs.
Canada is very much part of that. We convened a two-day workshop in London to bring together the senior Arctic officials and the permanent participants to have an unstructured brainstorming session that tried to envision what we need the Arctic Council to be given everything that is coming at it, so that’s informing that work.
To your pointed question about how we know if it has succeeded, that’s a hard question to answer but I think it’s a hard question to answer for any international organization. Like any international organization, part of a measure of its success is what has not happened. It has maintained cooperation and dialogue in the Arctic. Regardless of the unstable nature of climate change, the international conversations are peaceful and cooperative.
I would say the treaties that it has negotiated is also a measure of its success and its capacity. With everything we are reading about the Arctic, we need to have very serious search and rescue capacity in the circumpolar region. We need coast guards of the five coastal states to be inter-operable, so the Arctic Council has created a coast guard forum and has achieved these treaties. I would say that we can point to clear indicators that it is addressing the needs that we agree are urgent and are there.
We would say, particularly when it comes to the human dimension, that there is a lot of room to grow. I would reflect back on Indigenous knowledge as an area where there isn’t a shared view on its importance and meeting the challenges facing the Arctic. That’s an area that is a priority for us to advance. That’s one example of where more needs to be done.
It’s not a very specific answer to your question, but I hope it gives some sense of where it is working and where it needs to do better.
The Chair: Senator Deacon, following your question, I would like to drill down further.
You’ve talked about legally binding agreements and I want to get a better understanding. We have legal and binding agreements on search and rescue, on oil pollution preparedness. You mentioned the fisheries agreement and the Polar Code regarding shipping. Are these enforceable, legally binding agreements if someone does not do their search and rescue in their sector of the Arctic? Are there consequences for not fulfilling the agreements? Are you using the term “legally binding” in a rigorous way, or are these agreements enforceable?
Mr. Kessel: If I could respond to Senator Deacon, the way I see what has happened over the past 20 years is we have gone from an aspirational discussion forum to a norm-setting body that has produced binding instruments. If you want to look at the progression of growth and level of maturity, you have something which has really become a much more mature organization that has produced these binding agreements.
To go to the point that the chair was making, these are binding agreements at international law, which means that the parties to the agreements commit to each other to carry out their portion of those agreements. To date we have seen them carrying out their portion of the agreements. Certainly, when you meet together with the parties to the agreements, they don’t have a problem pointing out to you if they feel that you need to be living up to the expectations of those.
We are looking very much forward to the fisheries one because that will be extraordinarily important for the livelihood of our northern peoples and also for survival of many of the fish stocks in the Arctic.
The Chair: Is the Polar Code a binding agreement or is it voluntary?
Mr. Kessel: A binding agreement means that the parties who signed onto it are bound by the articles and the precepts in it. In the Polar Code context, it says that we as Canada can say that a vessel cannot enter our territory unless it conforms to the double hulls or the special bilge water provisions in the code. Therefore, if they ask to come into our waters, and we know that they are coming to our waters, and their vessel doesn’t conform, we will say that, no, they cannot come into our waters.
That’s a very stringent capacity to say to another state that they cannot enter our waters. That’s the reason Korea, Singapore and China were very involved in the negotiation of the Polar Code. They are looking out 20 years from now when we, as states, will say to them that we need them to conform to our environmental protection standards, otherwise their vessels can’t come through. They are thinking 20 years from now that they want to use some of these waterways, moving goods from Asia through to Europe and elsewhere. Yes, to them it is extraordinarily important to have Canada as part of an agreement that is binding.
Senator Eaton: How do we check that their boats aren’t conforming to what they said they are? And how would we enforce it if someone just came through?
Mr. Kessel: The standards are being applied to every vessel. We know the vessels. All vessels are registered. The International Maritime Organization is the UN body that keeps track of the standards and how they apply; so we would know what the vessel is, the name of the vessel, what it was, and if it complied.
We have not often seen in international relations where if we have said to a state, no, they cannot come through our territory, that it would ever try to do that. In the world of international diplomacy, it’s very rare that you would find — especially if countries want to do business with us in the future, you don’t waste your energy on those sorts of things.
We are very confident that what we have managed to get out of the Polar Code, together with our other polar partners, is an investment, an insurance scheme for the future, and we’re very proud of that.
The Chair: Is the next step to have approved corridors to prevent ships from going into dangerous or uncharted waters? Is that being worked on?
Mr. Kessel: I can’t speak specifically to that as it would either be Transport Canada or the Coast Guard that could answer your questions. What we do is ask that those vessels either have a specific pilot who knows where they are going, a Canadian pilot, and assists them in getting through the very dangerous channels.
One of the myths we try to dispel is that all the ice is disappearing from the Arctic. What is happening is it is changing. Those who understand how the Arctic gyre works will understand there is a centrifugal force going on in the Arctic Ocean. As the ice changes in shape from multi-year ice to less multi-year ice, many of those places which were free of ice are finding that ice is coming into them. From a safety point of view, we are very keen to make sure that we know where the ice-covered areas are and where shipping is going.
The bottom line is that ships will not be allowed to go into those areas, especially because Lloyd’s insurance will not give them the insurance to go there. Unless Lloyd’s is happy, together with us, that those ships can go without being a liability, they won’t be going there.
Ms. LeClaire: The expert or scientific work on identifying safe shipping corridors is something under discussion in the Arctic Council and in its subsidiary bodies like the Coast Guard forum. At the evidence base or the science work, there is exploration of that going on, and that’s a necessary first step to the establishment of rules and norms.
Senator Bovey: I’m still interested in the observer side of this. I’m aware that Greece, Turkey and Mongolia also want to be observers on the Arctic Council. I’m aware that other organizations like the Association of Oil & Gas Producers and Greenpeace also want to be observers. I’m aware that China is an observer and has been trying to secure and purchase land ports in Iceland so they will have a coast with the members of the Arctic Council.
It’s great that everyone is saying that there is consensus and there are no issues, but the world is changing, and the position of Russia in the world is changing. I find it intriguing that Russia and the United States are in agreement with this, but they don’t seem to be in agreement with too much else at the moment.
Can you talk about this more, overlaying the fact that the House of Commons is now discussing Bill C-55, which relates to ocean protected areas? There are dimensions at home and there are changing dimensions overseas.
When I was talking to some of the Icelandic folks the other day, they were talking about China wanting some of their ports, and I thought, well, this just changes the debate.
Ms. LeClaire: Indeed, that is a very complex set of issues and questions.
In terms of China’s interest, China wants to be a global actor. That includes every part of the world. As one of you noted, they recently published an Arctic strategy, and there was nothing in it that we didn’t know or surprised us. But writing it down and publishing it certainly puts markers down on the table.
Prior to that, they had published or articulated what started out as their One Belt, One Road infrastructure initiative. It has now become the Belt and Road. Their Arctic policy used the term — and it was the first time I saw it — the Polar Silk Road. So they are making their ambitions known.
China, like Russia, is a complicated actor, but we can’t pretend they are not there. We have to deal with them and find ways to engage with them that protect our interests.
You mentioned Russia and the U.S. in the Arctic. That is an interesting dynamic. When the Arctic Council was formed, there was a commitment to cooperation. Also, given the commonality of interests in responding to circumpolar cooperation, there was a commitment in the Arctic Council to buffer, as much as possible, discussions about the Arctic from other geopolitical issues. That commitment has until now been sustained. At Arctic Council meetings, we talk about Arctic cooperation.
Mr. Kessel said earlier that we hold certain positions that are very similar to the positions that Russia holds, because we have very common interests. We’re the two biggest land holders in the Arctic. We face many of the common challenges in responding to climate change around ice and cryosphere, around melting of the permafrost, around infrastructure and economic growth. So we have a lot of common issues and priorities to talk about.
The same is true of Russia and the U.S. They announced at the most recent meeting a project where they are starting to look at safe shipping corridors in the Bering Strait. They are working together where their interests coincide.
The Arctic Council has remained a platform where we really do focus on those common interests and where we can work together.
As far as the wider range of observers is concerned, yes there are more and more who want to join. Their motives are different. The Arctic Council has a set of criteria called the new criteria we use to assess candidacies of our applications for observership. In the last round, only one country applicant was accepted. That was Switzerland. The others were not. They may reapply.
They come at from different directions. For Switzerland, it’s science and what they call the vertical poles. Their mountains are environments that are similar to those in the Arctic, so they see opportunities for sharing best practices.
For others, it is the economic interest. For Mongolia, it was the Indigenous element because of their Indigenous people.
There are diverse views in the council on whether we should have more observers, but many of those concerns are grounded — at least the way they are articulated — in a concern that our commitment to hold Arctic Council meetings in the North would be jeopardized, because the whole organization gets too big.
On the other hand, there is an acknowledgment that what happens in the Arctic, famously, doesn’t stay in the Arctic. There are ramifications around the world, for sea level rises most notably.
The Chair: Thank you. We are drawing to a close, but there is a chance for a brief final question.
Senator Eaton: I’m sure they can answer it quickly.
Ms. LeClaire, you said that on the Arctic Council, the Inuit were there as equals, and you took their opinions into consideration when formulating the government’s answers. I just wondered what they thought. As you know, in April, Donald Trump signed an executive order to reverse Obama-era restrictions on oil drilling. Underneath the Arctic seas, there is a huge capacity for natural gas, oil, as well as diamonds, precious earths, et cetera. How do our Indigenous people feel about the development of natural resources?
Ms. LeClaire: The view I have heard articulated was by the Gwich’in Council International with respect to the American moves around permitting drilling in the ANWR, the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. There are very concerned about it because of the impact on the porcupine caribou herd. For some Native communities in that region, caribou is up to 80 per cent of their diet. It’s very much a food security issue, so they are very concerned. As a bilateral issue, the Canadian government is working — I shouldn’t speak to it in any detail, except I know it forms a Canada-U.S. bilateral issue now. What I have heard from the Gwich’in at an Arctic Council meeting was their serious concerns expressed to the American representatives.
Senator Eaton: Were views expressed about going under the sea, or extracting oil or gas?
Ms. LeClaire: I have not heard any views expressed by them with respect to the offshore or under the sea.
The Chair: I would like to thank the witnesses very much. It’s been very enlightening and helpful.
Senators, we are now pleased to welcome, via video conference from Winnipeg, David Barber, Professor at the University of Manitoba.
I thank you for joining us and I invite you to proceed with your opening statement. You can expect some questions afterwards. Please go ahead.
David Barber, Professor, University of Manitoba, as an individual: Thank you very much. I submitted a handout, which should be in front of you. I’ll just use the slide numbers so that you can follow along with my doc.
The Chair: We have it, yes.
Mr. Barber: I entitled the presentation, “The Global Implications of a Melting Arctic,” and I’m interested in talking with the panel about the consequences of observed melt and climate change that’s going on in the Arctic right now.
I lead a group of researchers at the University of Manitoba. We’re a large group. There are about 135 of us, so, on slide 2, you’ll see a distribution of names there. We’re the largest sea-ice focused research group in the world. We have been doing research in the Arctic for over 35 years now.
On slide 3, you’ll see the names of the major networks within which we work. The international network is the Arctic Science Partnership. This was formed as a merger between the Aarhus University in Denmark, the Greenland Institute of Natural Resources in Greenland, and my lab here at the University of Manitoba. We formed this about seven years ago as part of a Canada Excellence Research Chairs program that we had funded. Since then, we have had several other groups wanting to join this international network, including a Norwegian university, the Alfred Wegener Institute in Germany, the University of Laval in Quebec City, and Fisheries and Oceans Canada. We have discussions ongoing right now with Asian countries, with China and Korea in particular.
The other network we work in is ArcticNet, which I’m sure many in Canada are familiar with. This Networks of Centres of Excellence program has been running for 14 years now. We have been heavily involved in that program.
I want to tell you about some major new programs that we have running. I’m on slide 4 right now. We have been successful in a number of new large-scale programs that I’m just going to touch on. Those are the Churchill Marine Observatory, which is being built in Churchill, Manitoba now.
We were just successful on a new Canada Excellence Research Chairs grant, and a senior Canada 150 chair grant. Both will focus on Arctic-related research.
We’ll be adding about 65 new staff to our facility here at the University of Manitoba. This will include seven new faculty members, several new junior Canada research chairs and three of these super chairs. We’re also developing a new Inuit training program, which I’ll talk about as I go through my statement.
On slide 5 you’ll see the main focus of what we do. We’re interested in working throughout the High Arctic, with a particular interest and emphasis on freshwater-marine coupling. Continental ice is turning into liquid, which is causing sea levels to rise globally but also causing a lot of complications in the marine system as we put this freshwater into the system. You can see that we work throughout the circumpolar Arctic.
We are interested in the large-scale circulation of ice. On slide 6, you’ll see the general pathways of how sea ice moves in the northern hemisphere. You’ll notice a circle at the north end of Greenland and Ellesmere Islands. This is called the sea-ice switch gate, and it is a very important part of how the High Arctic exports ice to the North Atlantic. We have a particular emphasis and concentration of research in that area.
On slide number 7, you’ll see Greenland itself. Our new Canada Excellence Research Chair’s name is Dorthe Dahl-Jensen. She is coming from the Niels Bohr Institute in Copenhagen. She is a specialist on reading the ice cores that come from the Greenland ice sheet. So we recreate past climates that have existed in the northern hemisphere. We are tying an analysis of those past climates to what we see today and how we see the future of the Arctic unfolding. We are using the past to inform us about the future. I can respond to questions about that later if people are interested.
Slide 8 is simply a schematic that shows the system approach to understanding how freshwater is behaving and changing things in the Arctic marine ecosystem. We study all of the different components of what you see there in slide number 8. We work closely with Indigenous communities throughout the circumpolar North, using knowledge that they have generated through many generations of living in close proximity to the land and terrestrial and marine environments in the Arctic, and coupling that information with Western science that looks at the interactions and interconnections of the various parts of that food web.
Slide 9 shows you a schematic about the fact that what goes on in the Arctic doesn’t necessarily stay in the Arctic. We’re finding now very strong connections between what we call Arctic and mid-latitude teleconnections. This is what we believe is responsible for a lot of the unusual weather that we’re getting at lower latitudes of the planet. We’re changing the shape and structure of the polar vortex. That is because we’re losing sea ice in the northern hemisphere. We’re putting a lot more heat into the atmosphere, which changes the pressure patterns and, therefore, changes the polar vortex and our weather and climate at more southerly latitudes.
Slide 10 is a reminder to me about the fact that one of the other connections that goes on between the North and more southerly latitudes has to do with marine ice hazards. Quite often, the marine shipping organization thinks that, because we’re reducing sea ice in the High Arctic, that means it’s easier to ship across those intercontinental transportation corridors you see on slide 10. In fact it’s very complex. So, even as recently as last summer, we were unable to take our research icebreaker past the Newfoundland coast. We were on our way up to Hudson Bay. We got waylaid there because of very severe ice conditions that we then showed were being exported out of the High Arctic. So those little ships that you see above Hudson Bay, those are little crab fishing boats coming out of Newfoundland that were stuck in very thick multi-year sea ice that should not have been there.
Slide 11 is a depiction of our new research base in Churchill. This is the only one of its kind on the planet. It will be a mesocosm to study oil spills in sea ice. We’ve specifically designed this to look at how oil and other transportation-related contaminants can be detected, what their effects will be on the system and how we can clean them up. This program was funded by the Canada Foundation for Innovation and a number of other partners. It will also bring a new ship to our research program. It’s depicted in slide 11. That ship will overwinter in the Churchill estuary and be available for research work there the next year.
Next is slide 12. I wanted to talk a bit about Inuit partnerships. The Inuit have been instrumental in our research programs for many years, and we’re dealing with two very specific ones right now. One is associated with the Pikialasorsuaq Commission report done on the North Water Polynya. This is being organized by the Inuit Circumpolar Council and supported by Oceans North. We are forming a partnership to create a community-based monitoring program. On slide 12 you will see the acronym NOW. That circle is the area of the North Water Polynya. We will be working with the communities on either side to develop this community-based monitoring program. We are hoping that will form the basis for a new Inuit-led marine management area in the North Water Polynya. We’re particularly concerned about how that polynya is evolving.
The slide on the right is called SIKU. This is a reminder for me to tell you about the Hudson Bay Inuit engagement that we have ongoing. We’re working on the southeast side of the Hudson Bay with the Cree and the Inuit of Sanikiluaq on a community-based monitoring program that looks at freshwater coming into the bay and what impacts that has on marine activities in the bay.
The last slide I want to show you is the Baffin Bay observatory, or the Baffin Bay Observing System, BBOS. This is an effort on our part to develop a basin-scale marine observing system that would be joint between Europe and Canada, with a particular partnership between Denmark and Canada through Greenland, where there would be co-management and co-development of a large-scale marine-observing system. It would allow us to address some of the fundamental questions about how the Arctic is affecting more southerly latitudes and what impacts this is having on all kinds of different industrial-type activities in Baffin Bay.
Also built into it is Inuit co-management of this area. We’ve had the Inuit on the Canadian side and the Inuit on the Greenlandic side looking for collaborative ways to develop, run and ultimately maintain this kind of observing system going forward. I’m happy to chat with panel members about that BBOS system if time allows.
That’s all I have as far as prepared notes. I look forward to discussions with the panellists.
The Chair: We’ll go to questions, Professor Barber, starting with our deputy chair.
Senator Bovey: Professor Barber, thank you very much for being with us today. You’re aware that I’ve been following your research for some time, wearing different hats. I’m always impressed with both the depth and breadth of what you’re doing.
For the work we’re doing, perhaps you can fill us in on a few things. First of all, the Churchill marine observatory was to have been built last year. Because of the flooding of the Churchill railway, the equipment couldn’t get up, as I understand it, at least when I was in Churchill last summer. I understand from a conversation you and I had that the materials went up on the ice roads this winter. Will the building be built this coming summer?
Mr. Barber: I will give you an update on that. As you know, the rail line to Churchill was washed out in a large snowstorm that happened in 2017. Our materials for the Churchill Marine Observatory were all sitting in Thompson, Manitoba, and were to go up on the next train north. Then the train land washed out.
Since that time, Omnitrax, the owner of both the rail line and the port, have been in negotiations to sell the port. The rail line has to be repaired before they can actually sell the port and the rail line.
The discussions are progressing quite well, I understand, on a new ownership model for the rail line and the port. The last I heard, and the plans we’re moving toward, is that the rail line will be fixed this summer. We should be able to start reshipping our materials north to Churchill, and they will restart the build project.
We only just started the build. We went up and flattened the area to prepare the pad for it and started some of the basic development for the site. Then we had to stop. It will take over a year to build the facility. We have about an 18-month build period for the facility, and we’re anticipating it will become fully functional in 2020.
Senator Bovey: Regarding the work you’re doing, you’ve outlined the international partners and joint projects. I’m correct that you’re working with the polar institute, the polar research centre, and all across our North as well as the circumpolar areas. What you’re really doing is pulling all sorts of initiatives together as you’re leading into new forms of research.
You mentioned the issues coming south. With the permafrost melting — I appreciate that’s not the sea ice you’re working on, but it’s another aspect of the ice. When we had a brief conversation recently, you said that with the permafrost melting, you’re finding increased levels of mercury in the water. Can you touch on that as you talk about the biodiversity of the North?
Mr. Barber: With the mercury story, it was a bit of a surprise when we uncovered this. We expected mercury in the natural system to go down as we created better regulation of mercury on the industrial sides of the developed word. We expected to see this in the Arctic, just as we did when we reduced lead in gasoline; you can see the reduction of lead in the Arctic cores when we extract them. But in the case of mercury, we found mercury to be going up in the many of the organisms in the marine system.
For a while we couldn’t figure out why that was the case. But recently, it became clear that this was mercury that was stored in permafrost. As the permafrost was melting, that mercury was liberated and following its way down into the watershed and getting into the estuaries and the marine system. Various components of the food web then picked up that mercury and bio-accumulated it in the system.
Right now, mercury continues to be an issue in the Arctic because of the fact that we are liberating a lot of this mercury that used to be sealed up in the permafrost, and we’re putting that into the marine and freshwater systems where it can bio-accumulate.
This is a problem when you think about country foods. The Inuit are very reliant on country foods as a healthy alternative to some of the more processed foods that come at the co-op stores. This is a concern when you start to bio-accumulate, because by the time you get up to the higher tropic levels, these levels of mercury can be a concern from a human health perspective.
There is a lot of research going on in that area in Canada. ArcticNet does a lot of that research work, and there is a lot of that research going on internationally with other circumpolar countries.
The Chair: Dr. Barber, I’d like to ask you about the Baffin Bay Observing System. This sounds like a very significant international effort, recognizing that Arctic waters are shared internationally. Could you tell us a bit more about this project and particularly what its status is as far as the possibility of it being funded? Where is that at?
Mr. Barber: I will start with a short background of the situation.
In Canada, we have something called the Canada Foundation for Innovation, which is our major funding organization for capital infrastructure in the university system. They have an equivalent of this in Europe that looks at capital infrastructure for universities in Europe. The National Science Foundation in the U.S. is an equivalent system as well.
Canada, through our CFI program, started to discuss with the Americans and the Europeans about the possibility for a science endeavour that would be international and large scale in scope in the Arctic. They came to us as a group that is heavily connected internationally and has a large presence in Canada, and asked us, “If you were to design a large-scale science infrastructure program that would address Arctic-related issues, what would it look like?”
So we got a group of people together from coast to coast to coast in Canada and spent about a year and a half designing what the Baffin Bay Observing System would look like. First, we figured that was the best place to do it, for a number of scientific reasons. Then we started discussing the scientific structure that such a large infrastructure would look like and what science it would address. We created a white paper on the scientific rationale and justification for such a major program. We discussed that white paper with our European and American colleagues with the idea of generating a tripartite major science program for the Arctic.
We then submitted that white paper to the Minister of Science federally. She had a look at this document and basically wrote us back a letter saying, “Thank you very much. This is a very interesting program and development, but we’re not sure what we would do with it. We’re not sure how we would fund such a thing or move it forward.” We went back and said let her know that she asked us for our scientific ideas and why we think it would be important. That’s what we produced. If we can generate interest federally in Canada and with our partners in Europe and the United States, we thought we could make something like this work. All the scientific rationale and structure is there for it. What is missing right now is how at a political level we would bring those different organizations and agencies together to develop such a thing.
Towards that end, we decided with the next major project that we had funded, which is this Canada excellence research chair that we’re just starting up now, we would form a partnership at the north end of Baffin Bay. This is where this relationship with the Pikialasorsuaq Commission came from, and we see it as a phased approach to the Baffin Bay Observing System. We’ll start the development of this system at the north end of Baffin Bay and then look to evolve it into other phases for southern Baffin Bay.
So as far as how we will get this thing funded, we’ve already had part of it funded because we now have been funded through the Canada Excellence Research Chairs program. We’re deep into discussions with the Inuit on the Greenland side and on Ellesmere-Baffin sides about how we would develop this partnership for a community-based monitoring program in the North Water Polynya region. We see that as phase one to the Baffin Bay Observing System.
It’s one of those projects where it needs some political will to make something this large happen, and we’ll keep plugging away scientifically on pieces of it.
The Chair: Before I turn to Senator Coyle, you talked about the North Water Polynya and the concept of Inuit involvement in managing these areas. Could you describe how the Inuit would become involved in managing these areas and how that would work? I know that the ICC and other Inuit organizations don’t have vessels or staff or the wherewithal to operate in the Arctic. How will they get there?
Mr. Barber: I can only give you my personal perspective on this, of course. You would have to talk with the Inuit on each of those sides to get more of an on-the-ground perspective.
The way I see it is we’re not going to get very far in the Arctic until we have the ability and capacity of the Inuit to lead and manage a lot of these things on their own. As a scientist in the Canadian system, I believe it’s my role to assist them in doing that. So when they came to me as part of this Pikialasorsuaq Commission report, the report was led from a political level, looking at what needs to be managed, why it would be managed and how they would manage it. Then they came to us and asked, “How can science assist us with this process?” I said we could assist them by providing the scientific instrumentation they would need to collect the data they would require for ongoing management of such a thing. We can provide access to automated stations that can be installed on glaciers and can go out into the marine system. They can provide us with fishing vessels. They are using fishing vessels on a regular basis. We would like to start collecting scientific data from those episodes when they’re out fishing in and around the communities where you fish. There is some commercial activity going on as well on the Greenlandic side of Baffin Bay. In return, we said that we can come and participate in joint projects in this area, where hunting expeditions go out and take equipment with them and measure things that we need scientifically. We can do the training associated with that.
We would also like to see the Inuit manage the data that comes from this. We would like to see a data management system developed that they then maintain, manage and own the data generated from this. This is the SIKU program we’re developing in Hudson Bay. We would like to take it up to the North Water Polynya area and start to have the Inuit up there using the same kind of program that is being used in southern Hudson Bay right now.
There are a number of different actions happening in this partnership, but the fundamental motivating principle is that science needs to assist the North in how they’re to manage these things going forward. It’s a very complicated thing, very expensive, very difficult to do, and I think science can play a big role in helping the Inuit get up to speed on some of the management-related requirements they have.
The last thing I would say about this issue is there is also a lot to be learned from how the Inuit have developed their relationship with science in Greenland relative to how it’s being done in Canada. So there are some things to be learned from Inuit to Inuit in the context of how to engage and collaborate with scientists.
This was also reflected in the Pikialasorsuaq Commission report that was finalized, which is the idea that these were the same Inuit who used to go across the bridge that happened in the north end of Baffin Bay all the time. They’re the same families in many instances, so there are many family connections across that area, which makes for very fertile ground for doing knowledge transfer from Inuit on the Greenland side to Inuit on the Canadian side.
Senator Coyle: Thank you very much for your presentation. I am interested in your slide on freshwater-marine coupling. It’s an area that I don’t know very much about. I was reading your points about consequences, biochemical, geo-chemical, ecological and human. Can you speak more about these consequences?
Mr. Barber: Basically what happens is we’re melting the Arctic. When you melt sea ice, it doesn’t raise sea levels or anything like that because it’s floating in the water; but when you melt the glacier ice,that freshwater goes into the ocean and raises the sea level. That’s the first thing that happens.
There is enough freshwater in the Greenland ice sheet to raise global sea levels, the whole planetary ocean level, by six metres. When you think about how many people live within six metres of sea level, it’s far too many people living in that close proximity.
We are also finding that the Greenland ice sheet in particular is melting much faster than any of our models had predicted. We’re losing mass from the Greenland ice sheet about 600 per cent faster and that is why we’re focusing on it in our next research programs. What’s causing this is that the meltwater on the surface percolates down through the ice and lubricates between the rock at the bottom of the glacier and the ice bottom. That causes less friction and that allows the ice streams to lose mass to the ocean much more quickly.
This creates many problems. A bunch goes out in liquid form and a bunch goes out in the form of icebergs, and these things then cause havoc with marine shipping. So there are many complications to this story as to how we will be able to use the Arctic. Everyone is keen on getting up there and increasing shipping and getting fisheries going, yet we’re having major climatic changes going on which are really impacting the environment. We need to understand those things. That’s why this is a focus for us going forward. Many of our international colleagues are similarly focused on this large-scale problem of what freshwater is doing to the system.
Finally, the main thing it does to the biology is the freshwater floats on top of the ocean and that keeps the nutrients deeper in the water column because they can’t break up through this freshwater. There are actually fewer nutrients at the surface where all the light is, so it also affects the biological activity in the ocean as well. It’s a complicated problem and one we don’t know enough about, so we want to focus on it from a research perspective.
Senator Pate: Thank you very much. What I’m going to ask, without the places for people to live, may become moot. However, I am interested in your involvement with the Inuit in the work that you’re doing. In a very practical way, given what we know are the links between socio-economic status, mental health and the ability to self-actualize, how many Inuit are you able to hire and in what sort of groupings; how many elders, how many young people? It strikes me from what you’re saying that there is everything from the old knowledge, if I can put it that way, or historical knowledge, but there are also many things young people could be doing in observing and gathering information.
Mr. Barber: I first went to the Arctic in 1981. I’ve been working in the Arctic for over 35 years now, and I always worked very closely with the Inuit over those years. We engage in a variety of different ways. The Inuit knowledge that the elders have had, we always make as much use of that as we can.
Over my almost 40 years of working with them, they have a really fantastic concept of the temporal issues, how things change over time. They have a local area where they hunt and gather, and that’s where most of their expertise is, but they have a good understanding of what happens season to season and year to year.
In recent years we have been working a lot more with youth in the Arctic because we see a strong desire by the youth to engage and participate in science. They have learned from their forefathers and parents about the importance of science and how science can help them understand their natural condition, and they are looking to develop careers in these areas.
We ran for many years a program called Schools on Board, which runs on the Amundsen, our research icebreaker. We brought high school students up on that ship, and we ran it for 15 years. Many times we had what’s called a Circumpolar Inuit Schools on Board program where we brought Inuit kids from around the northern hemisphere together and immersed them with scientists on board the ship.
We are just bringing that program to an end this year, and we are morphing into a technical training program for Inuit who live in Northern Canada. So we will use the ship as a way to develop and educate youth in the North who can find employment in the marine sciences.
The idea is to teach them about how to do marine science and get them to bring the knowledge they have in marine science and merge those things together into an accreditation program. We’re working with the colleges in the North to develop an accreditation program, and we see our Churchill Marine Observatory as being one place where these people can go and get employment after they’ve been certified. We’re also in discussions with Fisheries and Oceans Canada about broadening this program throughout the Department of Fisheries and Oceans’ activities and using that as a vehicle to bring people in to be trained to work side by side with scientists.
We’re hoping this has a dual purpose. We’re hoping it provides employment opportunities for kids who want to stay in the North and work at the technical level, but we’re also hoping it will get some kids interested in science, who will then go on to university degrees and higher level degrees, who can go back home with masters degrees and PhDs.
We’re doing this in collaboration with our Greenlandic partners. They started these kinds of programs about 50 years ago. They have come to a point now where, for instance, the head of the Fisheries Research Division at the Greenland Institute of Natural Resources is an Inuit woman with a PhD. She runs their fisheries program.
This is what we need in Canada. We need northerners who can take responsibility for the management of these resources going forward. We have this co-management structure. We need to help on the education and technology side and work with them collaboratively. So we’re putting efforts and energy into doing that specifically.
I would really like to see the Government of Canada be more proactive in that area as well. I’m happy to say that Fisheries and Oceans has approached us about partnering with us in this initiative. I think that would be a wonderful thing. We could even expand it into Environment and Climate Change Canada, INAC and those kinds of things. There are a lot of Inuit who would like to work on the policy front as well, developing the policy frameworks that are necessary going forward.
We’re not going to have any solutions in the Arctic until our northern peoples are part of that solution, and that’s something that will take the whole country to help move in that direction.
Senator Pate: Thank you very much.
Senator Neufeld: Thank you, Mr. Barber, for being here. It’s not that often that we get to listen to people with your knowledge pass some of that on to us who are sitting here looking at these issues.
I have a couple of questions. One might be a little longer than the other one.
What I have seen so far since we’ve had this committee seems to be centred around the eastern Arctic and not the western Arctic. I live in northern British Columbia and spent part of my life in the Far North.
Is there the same kind of work going on in the western Arctic as the kind of work that you’re doing? I look at the universities and countries that are involved with you. I can understand that part because of where they are at. I’m curious to know what’s happening in the western Arctic.
Mr. Barber: The presentation I’ve given you is quite biased toward the eastern Arctic, and it is not a good reflection of what’s actually happening. The western Arctic is probably a busier place from the perspective of research.
My own group spent the last 12 years working in the southern Beaufort Sea, largely driven by the oil and gas exploration that was going on on the Beaufort Sea shelf aspect, the Mackenzie River and how it’s emptying into the southern Beaufort Sea, and a lot of work with Alaska and what’s happening with the Alaskan Arctic and the collaborations between Canada and the U.S. There is a lot of research activity going on in the western High Arctic as well.
The only reason I’m giving you this presentation is we’ve had two major research projects funded that just happened to be in the eastern Arctic. So a lot of our effort is switching over to the east.
But the problems are pretty similar. The level of effort, I would say, is pretty similar across the country. It’s pretty uniform as far as how science is addressing the Canadian context.
There is this issue of the Greenland ice sheet, though, and it is unique because it is such a large mass of water that’s sitting there and has been there so long. As we release that thing into the Arctic, it affects the North Atlantic. The North Atlantic is a big player in the global climate system. So when you think of the global context of the Arctic, there is more going on in the eastern Arctic than there is in the western Arctic in terms of freshwater, and that’s just where our research is going on in the next little while. But there is a lot going on in the western Arctic as well.
Senator Neufeld: Maybe we could think about getting you or someone that you could recommend to come and give us an idea of what’s going on in the western Arctic also, because so far we’ve been dealing with the eastern Arctic.
Mr. Barber: The fellow you want to talk to is at the University of Manitoba. He leads the integrated regional impact study for the western Arctic for ArcticNet. This is an organization that has just done a synthesis and assessment of the environmental issues in the western Arctic from an Inuit, industrial development and a government perspective. His name is Gary Stern, and he’s a professor in my group. I lead the Hudson Bay IRIS of ArcticNet, and he leads the southern Beaufort Sea IRIS of ArcticNet. He would be the guy to talk to for sure.
Senator Neufeld: I appreciate that.
I’m certainly not a scientist, so that’s why it’s great to talk to people like you. We talk a lot about the North, but I don’t hear much about the South Pole. It’s always the Arctic, the northern Arctic, and not the south.
What is the difference? Why are the same things not happening there as are happening in the North? I assume that would be a long answer, but maybe you can give me a short one.
Mr. Barber: I’ll try to give you the short one.
First of all, Canada is so engaged in Arctic research that our Canadian science infrastructure doesn’t have a lot of time for Antarctic research. We have been asked many times to go down there and do Antarctic research, but we’re so busy doing Arctic work that it’s difficult for us to get there.
The scientific questions are also quite different, and that is because the Antarctic is a continent surrounded by an ocean. So you get this southern continent right there covered with this giant glacier and then there is an ocean surrounding it. The Arctic is the opposite. It’s a big ocean surrounded by continents on each side. So the processes that go on in those two poles are very different.
We actually use these differences scientifically to help us understand how the climate system of our planet behaves. We can drill into the Antarctic ice sheet and go back in time by drilling down. The snow accumulates over a long period of time, and we can measure the characteristics of the chemistry in those cores to tell us about temperature and CO2. Then we can drill down through the Greenland ice sheet and do the same thing. That tells us how the northern hemisphere responds relative to the southern hemisphere, whether they are synchronized or asynchronous, whether one goes up and the other goes down.
We’re finding from history they are operate very differently. They are very different systems, and most of it is because one is a continent in the middle of the ocean, which is the southern hemisphere, and the other is an ocean surrounded by continents. So they are very different places.
There is still a lot of work going on in the Antarctic, but most of it is done by the Americans, the Japanese, the Koreans, the Italians, the Australians and the New Zealanders. China and Japan are very involved in it. Canada plays a small role in the Antarctic because we don’t have a base there. Most of the other countries have a base situated right on the Antarctic Peninsula.
The Chair: Dr. Barber, you have talked about ice hazards and marine transportation and showed us how ice from the Arctic can flush out and cause hazards in southern waters. Is an ice-free summer expected to occur in the Canadian Arctic in the future and in the Northwest Passage in particular?
Mr. Barber: Yes. Projections right now for a seasonally ice-free Arctic — so that means down to less than 10 million square kilometres of ice, which is really just trace ice in the High Arctic — are that it will happen somewhere around 2030. It’s a complicated thing to think about, but the way ice moves around the northern hemisphere, if you look at slide 6, you’ll see that most of the arrows are pointing towards the North American side. That means that the Northwest Passage will be the last of those passageways to open up.
I had a map in there. If you look at slide 10, you have three major transportation corridors across the North Pole. The one that goes along the Russian side is called the northern sea route, and it is already open. The Russians are actually using it year-round right now to move natural gas in liquefied form between Asia and Russia.
The over-the-pole route, which is the middle one, has been open since 2010, but only seasonally in the summer.
The green one is the Northwest Passage that goes through our Arctic Islands. It will be the last of those three routes to open.
The red is one is the Murmansk-Manitoba bridge that we talked about that goes into the Port of Churchill in Manitoba, and it can connect to all of those transportation corridors bringing things out of the interior of North America. It’s an important bridge from our Canadian perspective because of the access to the rail system and getting to the interior of North America.
So we’re on a trajectory for a seasonally free ice-free Arctic somewhere around 2030, and the northern sea routes and passages are already opening up. That’s why we have to make sure we’re prepared for the kinds of things that can happen.
To give you one example, even if Canada has closed down oil and gas exploration in Northern Canada, the Russians are developing their oil reserves on their side of the Arctic right now. To give you an idea, Russia generates about 26 per cent of its GDP from the Arctic. We in Canada generate a fraction of 1 per cent of our GDP from our Arctic, yet it’s the same Arctic. It has the same resources and same everything. We just don’t have the built infrastructure to be able to do things in our own Arctic.
From my perspective, we need to develop our Arctic. We need to prepare for the future. It will become much more accessible. Between the Inuit who live there and the scientists who study it, we need to come up with better information so we can manage it better.
The Chair: Excellent summary and an excellent presentation, Dr. Barber. Thank you very much. Qujannamiik.
(The committee adjourned.)