Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
National Security and Defence
Issue No. 6, Evidence - Meeting of June 20, 2016
OTTAWA, Monday, June 20, 2016
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met this day at 10:02 a.m. to study on issues related to the Defence Policy Review presently being undertaken by the government.
Senator Daniel Lang (Chair) in the chair.
The Chair: Colleagues, welcome to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence for Monday, June 20, 2016.
Before we begin, I would like to introduce the people around the table. My name is Dan Lang, senator for Yukon. On my left is the clerk of the committee, Adam Thompson.
I would like to invite the senators introduce themselves and state the region they represent, starting with the deputy chair.
Senator Jaffer: Mobina Jaffer. I'm from British Columbia.
Senator Raine: Senator Greene Raine from British Columbia. I'm subbing in for Senator Dagenais from Quebec.
Senator Day: Good morning. Senator Joseph Day from New Brunswick.
Senator Beyak: Lynn Beyak from Ontario. Welcome.
The Chair: Today, we will be meeting for five hours to consider issues related to the defence policy review that was initiated by the government. On April 21, 2016, the Senate authorized our committee to examine and report on issues related to the defence policy review presently being undertaken by the government and to table its report no later than December 16, 2016.
We are considering issues around Canada's possible participation in future UN peace support operations as well as other items related to the review.
Prior to introducing our witnesses today, I want to inform members of the committee that it will be our intention to have a meeting on Wednesday to deal with Bill S-205, the bill presented by Senator Moore. At that as well, I would like to discuss the steps forward on the study that we are in the process of, which I just indicated earlier. Time has not been scheduled yet. Hopefully, it will be earlier on Wednesday morning. We have free time and will organize accordingly.
Senator Day: That's the normal time slot for Veterans Affairs. We were hoping to have five or ten minutes of that time to talk about future business as well.
The Chair: Perhaps what we could do, senator, is schedule it earlier in the morning to be flexible on the time. We may not have to do it at 12 o'clock. Perhaps we can do it earlier in the morning, if that's okay with you on steering.
Senator Day: I don't know about caucus.
The Chair: We will have to see our scheduling, but on Wednesday, we would like to get some time to deal with Bill S- 205 and also future plans.
Senator Day: The normal time slot is 10:15 to 12:15.
The Chair: Hopefully we can do it a littler earlier.
I notice Senator Meredith is here. Welcome.
Colleagues, joining us for our first panel of the day are Elinor Sloan, Professor of International Relations, Department of Political Science, Carleton University; and from the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, Colin Robertson, Vice-President and Fellow, School of Public Policy, University of Calgary.
Ms. Sloan, as this is your first visit, as far as I know, to the committee, a special welcome.
Mr. Robertson — who has been here many times — welcome back.
I understand each of you has a statement. We have one hour for this panel. May I request that Ms. Sloan begin, followed by Mr. Robertson.
Elinor Sloan, Professor of International Relations, Department of Political Science, Carleton University, as an individual: Thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before this Senate committee. I did send my testimony in advance yesterday. I know it was not that far in advance, and I realize it's too long. I will leave that with you, and I'll skip to the second part of my testimony. The only part that I will miss is a brief history of Canadian peacekeeping.
Senator Jaffer: Ms. Sloan, thank you for sending this to us. It's not in both languages, so it's difficult for us to distribute it to the members.
I would like to ask the committee to give special permission so that we can have a copy of it, because it's long. We haven't read it; we're just getting it.
Senator Kenny: Is it available in French?
Senator Jaffer: No, but we'll get it translated. I'm asking if members can have a copy. I'm trying to get a copy for you.
Senator Kenny: You are missing my point. You're not letting me finish what I'm trying to say. We never have French copies. It's not like sometimes there are no English copies. We ask for leave every time, and I don't think we should.
Senator Jaffer: I disagree. If I may please ask that you go slowly, because this is really important. We're just getting a copy.
Ms. Sloan: Let me give a shorter version. I point out in my comments that with peacekeeping, over the first 40 years there were 18 missions. Canada participated in all of them to varying degrees, from a few personnel to a full battalion group. There was a huge explosion in the first four and half years of the Cold War period: 23 missions. It was not possible for Canada to be part of all of those missions, but we had our largest ever peacekeeping missions at that time in Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, and I know this committee heard about Rwanda last week.
Starting in 1996, NATO reluctantly entered the peace support operations business, because UNPROFOR, the UN mission, was unable to address the difficult circumstances on the ground. Starting then, at the beginning of 1996, Canada's commitment to peace support operations shifted from the UN to NATO.
The biggest component of missions was security sector reform. I mention in the comments that I've submitted that "security sector reform'' means a process of building or rebuilding a state's security sector, including military and police forces, and it's an important part of peace support operations. Canada was engaged in elements of security sector reform in the Balkans and also in Afghanistan during its period in Kabul, right up until 2014.
I go through the early history of Canada's participation in peace support operations to indicate that while Canada has not been heavily involved in UN-led peace support operations for about 20 years — and that's because, at that time, NATO reluctantly got involved in such missions — Canada has been consistently involved in peace support missions right up to this very day, currently training troops in the Ukraine and, as we know, in northern Iraq, Kurdistan.
With that background in mind, let me make a number of points directly related to what this committee is looking at, which is how to renew Canada's contribution to peace support operations. I have nine points, which I'll try and go through very briefly.
First, Canada should prioritize participation in UN missions that are most directly linked to our security interests, meaning NATO and the Five Eyes. Today this involves limiting the spread of ISIS and stemming the flow of migrants and refugees to Europe. ISIS threatens stability in Libya and also in Mali. If a stabilization mission were to be launched in Libya, Canada could look at playing a key role. Alternatively, it could look at contributing to the mission in Mali, which is seeking to stabilize the northern part of the country so that Islamists cannot establish power.
Second, Canada will want to focus on missions where at least one or more of our traditional allies are operating. This is because of the dangerous nature of the post-Cold War era intrastate — within state — peacekeeping missions. The Netherlands is operating in Mali, and so is Germany. Again, it points perhaps to that mission.
Third, Canada can make its greatest contribution to peace operations in the provision of critical enablers like signals, logistics intelligence, engineering and air transport. These are high-end capabilities which can assist today's largest peacekeeping contributors in terms of force numbers, that is Bangladesh, Ethiopia, India and Pakistan. Certainly it was these types of things we contributed most often during the Cold War.
Four, peacekeepers need to be equipped and trained for war-like circumstances. Peace support operations are distinguished from war fighting on the basis of political intent, impartial intervention rather than defining an enemy, and not on the basis of the intensity of the operation.
An indication of how close peace support can come to outright war was implicit in the UN Under-Secretary- General's testimony here before the committee three weeks ago when he added what Canada can contribute to UN operations. He asked for attack helicopters.
Improvised explosive devices are also a feature of today's most dangerous peace missions. Helicopters for troop transport and unmanned area vehicles for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance are absolutely critical, and no force should be deployed without them. If there is direct fire or improvised explosive device threats, patrolling will require reinforced armored vehicles, protective body armour and lethal firepower.
Five, Canada should focus on security sector reform which is vital to the stabilization of the areas of the world we are looking at. On the military side, this involves a long-term effort to train an indigenous military force to a level approaching the capability and professional standards, including rule of law, to which we are accustomed. Security sector reform is a big part of the answer to the question posed by the Minister of National Defence before this committee three weeks ago on how to turn off recruitment.
Notably it is not even primarily the UN that is engaged in security sector reform. NATO's Operation Resolve in Afghanistan is a security sector reform one, as is the EU mission in the south of Mali. The current non-UN Canadian missions in Ukraine and Iraq are essentially ones of security sector reform. These are important and should be maintained.
Six, it's important not to assess our contribution to the UN solely in terms of numbers of soldiers. Although quantity has a quality all to itself, I read with dismay commentary about where countries rank in UN peacekeeping based on numbers. If tomorrow Canada were to deploy a UN force as large as our biggest missions of the Cold War and early 1990s, we would still rank only between number 20 and 27 on the list of peacekeeping contributors.
The most important measure of any contribution to UN peace support efforts is the effectiveness of the deployed force. The force needs to be cohesive and nationally self-sufficient.
Seven, Canada could consider going back to Cyprus. UN-brokered peace talks are under way to create a unified federal Cyprus, which has been divided since 1974. It is thought the talks could be successful by the end of the year, and Canada could play a major role in this area.
Eight, with regard to the peacekeeping capability readiness system launched by the UN Secretary-General last fall, a valuable Canadian contribution could be to make one of our C-17s available for UN-led peacekeeping missions.
Finally, the Minister of National Defence talked about broader capacity building that would include civil bureaucracy and good governance. He asked in his testimony here, how does the military fit into this? I don't have a well-formed answer to this right now, but I do want to highlight or remind people that a CF-led strategic advisory team operated in Afghanistan from 2005 to 2008 with a specific goal of constructing viable government institutions in Afghanistan, and so this committee might want to engage those involved in the SAT effort. I would be happy to provide guidance on who you might want to approach.
Ladies and gentlemen, those are nine ideas on how we might want to renew our support to UN peace operations. I look forward to your questions and comments.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Ms. Sloan. I appreciate the time and effort that you put into for your presentation and the recommendations.
Colin Robertson, Vice-President, and Fellow, School of Public Policy, University of Calgary, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute: Chair, senators, Dag Hammarskjöld, the second United Nations Secretary-General, once said, "The United Nations was created not to lead mankind to heaven, but to save humanity from hell.'' Hammarskjöld's observation holds true today. It is of particular relevance to this committee in its consideration of how Canada could best respond to UN Secretary-General's Ban Ki-moon's request for more help with peace operations.
For all its faults, the United Nations is still our best vehicle for supplying peacekeepers to separate warring factions in providing food, aid and development, and saving endangered women, children and minorities. But the UN peace operations need our help.
Transparency International and Human Rights Watch have assessed the militaries of the 30 countries, almost all developing nations, which provide the most soldiers and police officers to UN peacekeeping operations. They observe that these militaries are among those most susceptible to corruption and guilty of abuse and crimes against those they are sent to protect. In short, they need better training in operations and in the field. Canada can help, drawing on our acknowledged expertise in successful pluralism and good governance. As a people, we celebrate diversity in our many cultures. We define progressive pluralism, the ability of people of different origins to get along together. Our constitutional commitment to "peace, order and good government'' means that for us governance is a continuous work-in-progress, and we are good at it.
During its two decades of operation, the Pearson Centre trained more than 18,000 people coming from the military police and civilian communities of more than 150 countries. Those graduates went on to contribute to global peace and security operations, and they brought this knowledge and experience back home. Some of the Pearson Centre's work was picked up by the U.S.-based Peace Operations Training Institute. With an international advisory staff, it now provides accessible and affordable self-paced, online, on-demand courses on peace support, humanitarian relief, and security operations, but the Secretary-General argues there is a need for more.
There is a seller's market for peacekeepers given increasing situations involving failed or failing states. Many less developed countries are effectively renting their soldiers as peacekeepers. Today's average peacekeeper — there are 120,000 of them — comes from a country not just poor but also less democratic and institutionally underdeveloped. The training combat experience and relatively high salaries these peacekeepers receive put them in a position to affect politics when they return home. Their training is important, not just for the immediate mission but for the longer term.
In teaching them about peace operations we are also developing and reinforcing habits around good governance that will make a difference when they return home. Colonels and generals often become prime ministers and presidents in later life. I ask this committee to include in its recommendations the re-establishment of a Canadian peace operations training capacity that draws on Canadian expertise.
We should aim to have equal representation of men and women. Our bilingualism is a real asset in our trainers. Thanks to our enlightened immigration policies, we have significant language capacity in our Armed Forces which we can mobilize. Our trainers should also reflect Canadian cultural diversity, including those from the LGBT community. Our training approach would be different from before and likely involve setting up regional centres in other countries. It would draw on the best of what we achieved through the Pearson Centre, but with equal emphasis on immediate stabilization of the situation and sustainability for the longer term.
In teaching the profession of arms in asymmetric warfare conditions, increasingly the essence of contemporary peacekeeping, we would draw on our Afghan experience. We are well placed to develop a UN standard, the equivalent of an ISO 14000. Call it UN blue helmets certified to protect. As an incentive, we could make UN allowances conditional on a set of performance measures. We would draw on other agencies of governments, diplomats, police, intelligence, lawyers, doctors and nurses. There is considerable practical experience in our civil society, for example Doctors Without Borders, Oxfam and the Parliamentary Centre, drawing on their experience in disaster relief, longer- term humanitarian relief and good governance. If we have learned one lesson from traditional peacekeeping, it is that while our blue berets are essential to stabilization of the situation, long-term peace depends on those with experience in policing, diplomacy, development and the re-establishment of law and order.
Having spent much of my professional career abroad as a foreign service officer, I know that we are among the most blessed nations. Canada has talent and experience. To those whom much is given, much is expected. There are many other things we can also do, such as provide lift support and logistics command, but I believe our most useful role would be as trainers for those engaged in peace operations. Inscribed in our peacekeeping monument not far from Parliament Hill are these words:
We need action not only to end the fighting but to make the peace. . . My own government would be glad to recommend Canadian participation in such a United Nations force, a truly international peace and police force.
What Lester B. Pearson said then is still what Canadians expect of their government. Thank you, chair.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Robertson. We will go to questions and start with Senator Jaffer.
Senator Jaffer: Thank you very much to both of you for your presentations, and I certainly appreciated what I heard. Some of the things you touched on are things I am struggling with, so I'm glad you touched on them.
One was the issue of pluralism, and I believe in a defence policy that involves who makes up our defence forces, how we encourage people to be part of our bilingualism and our multiculturalism, who we are and what our values are. All of those are very important things. I have had the pleasure of travelling with men and women in uniform, and I've always felt when they got on the ground they always demonstrated our values, and that was our biggest strength.
I would like both of you to speak about the use of police forces. I find them very effective. Police from our country, for example, help with training in how to do rape investigations and better policing skills, and I'd like both of you to first comment on that.
Ms. Sloan: I believe that police forces are a critical part of security sector reform, and that was half the component in Afghanistan. The Afghan National Army was being trained but also the national police, and it is thought that perhaps the effort to train them did not go far enough or start early enough. We have RCMP in Haiti. Security sector reform within states is extremely important, and normally that's what police do, not military forces, which generally look outside of borders, if you think of the Canadian example. Building police forces that are well trained, not corrupt, that follow rule of law and that can be trusted by the citizens is a very important starting point in the areas of the world we want to stabilize.
Mr. Robertson: Yes, I think police training, just to reiterate what my colleague Dr. Sloan said, is absolutely vital once you stabilize the situation. Inevitably, you have people, particularly now, literally tens of millions, who are refugees in camps, and you do need policing in situations that will have longer-term duration.
We have considerable experience. We've done training of police in Iraq, Jordan, Haiti and in other places, and we have the RCMP, the Sûreté du Québec, the OPP and other police forces. We do have a lot of capacity, and these police forces, as you alluded to, reflect the diversity of Canada, and that's a good signal to send when they see women police officers who speak their language. In some of these countries, that does a lot to reinforce the values we also can bring to peace operations.
Senator Jaffer: When I was in Darfur, our police taught the police there how to do rape investigations, and now when I go back to the region, they say that was the best protocol set up. There is a lot of help we can get from our police force.
I go to the regions a lot, especially in the Middle East, and see war being fought in very different ways from what we've seen before. I'd like your comments on whether you agree with me. I think you will, but the nature of war has changed. Extremism and what we see happening with ISIS — they don't have a lot of equipment, but the way they do is very destructive. I believe that we are going to have to prepare in a different way, and I would appreciate hearing from both of you as to how we can work with the United Nations so that we can use our pluralism and multiculturalism more effectively to fight the war and extremism.
Mr. Robertson: When we first got involved, as Dr. Sloan has alluded to, we were separating basically warring militaries, but now we are dealing with conditions of asymmetric warfare where the bad guys are not far from being bandits in many cases, and the Geneva conventions on warfare do not uphold, so that puts additional pressures on the men and women of our Armed Forces and on peace operations. I think the training for that is different from the traditional training. Again, I don't think that, according to the UN and other organizations that have looked at recent peace operations, those in the military we are employing from other countries have that capacity.
So I think that's an area where we can make a difference, drawing on the experience we have had particularly in Afghanistan during that 10 years there and time in other places where we may have been small in number, but, as Dr. Sloan said, it is not quantity. It's quality. I think what Canada brings is highly qualified experience in peace operations.
Ms. Sloan: The biggest difference between Cold War peacekeeping and current peacekeeping, starting with the Bosnia conflict, is that during the Cold War it was a zone between states, where the government controlled the forces, and there was basically a buffer zone.
Once you moved from interwar to intra-war, like civil war, dealing with civil war became much more dangerous. Peacekeepers could be lightly armed during the Cold War because the states involved controlled their forces. As long as you made sure there were no transgressions, things were fine.
Within states, there is no central authority controlling the people, and so it's much more dangerous. In some ways peacekeepers need to be more heavily armed today than they were during the Cold War because the circumstances are much more dangerous, and that's why the Under-Secretary-General is asking for combat helicopters. That's why I say if our forces are to be deployed, they have to be prepared for warfare. In the big picture, in order to rebuild a society, you first need security, so the military role is to provide that environment. Once that's provided, other institutions can come in and build governance, and, indeed, the police can start to come in and build police forces.
Just as a brief comment, while that sort of warfare continues and has exploded in the post-Cold War era, we are seeing, at the same time, a return to potential conflict between states, and Canada needs to be ready for that as well.
The Chair: Can you expand on the rules of engagement? If we do send troops to be involved in one manner or another, the question of engagement comes in and how they respond if a conflict erupts. What are your observations in that case, because whether or not that's clear must be a concern regarding peacekeeping operations under the United Nations?
Ms. Sloan: Of course, our Chief of the Defence Staff and the militaries would define exactly what the rules of engagement are. But during the Cold War, the three principles were consent of the parties, impartiality and use of force in self-defence. It was only use of force in self-defence during the Cold War. In the post-Cold War era, the missions went beyond that to having to forcibly get humanitarian aid through. The rules of engagement changed to become closer to warfare-like circumstances.
Senator White: Thank you very much to the two witnesses. My question is on the discussion around increasing our role outside and whether or not we have the capacity today to do that, and, if not, have you given much thought to where we would have to go from a manpower perspective?
We need to remember force readiness and the importance of that and some of our other tasks we have. If we are going to increase our peacekeeping role, where do you see us having to go from a financial perspective with the National Defence budgets?
Ms. Sloan: Areas of the world that we should prioritize, is that what you're saying?
Senator White: No, I'm asking what we would have to do as a country, where our budget would be if we were to take on some of the tasks that it's anticipated that you're recommending and others are recommending as well. It's 1.7 percent or 2 per cent of GDP. Do you see those numbers as being important to us?
Ms. Sloan: I believe that defence spending is too low and that it should be increased, and that if the government wants to play the role in the world that it indicates it does, it will need to increase the defence spending. It would be beneficial for Canada to contribute in a major way to UN peace support operations in the areas that I've indicated, security sector reform or certain areas of the world that I've highlighted, but also to participate in the NATO mission that is addressing Russian aggression as well.
Senator White: You're talking about discussions around deploying troops into the Baltic, for example, or into Eastern Europe? Is that what you're referring to?
Ms. Sloan: That's right, yes. I would support that. In the 1970s, the Canadian military was much larger. It basically drew down from World War II up until the Mulroney and Chrétien era. But during the 1970s, we had 5,000 troops in Europe, and we also had 1,200 people in Egypt. The Canadian military, if it's sized and equipped, can definitely sustain those two sorts of operations at one time.
Senator White: Thank you. Mr. Robertson?
Mr. Robertson: If you want to use a standard, as members of NATO, we have committed to 2 per cent defence spending, and our current spending is at 1 per cent, so you can take it from there. The Secretary-General, even as recently as the last couple of days, has encouraged all countries, including Canada, to contribute, as you pointed out, to the operations that NATO is looking for support for in Eastern Europe in the face of Russian aggression. This is a choice for governments as to how far they're going to spend.
But if we are to fulfill our NATO commitment and have the kind of robust involvement in peace operations that the current government is talking about, inevitably you have to cost this through. It will mean larger budgets for the Department of National Defence, but it will probably also mean an examination of what we spend under that umbrella department of Global Affairs in terms of development, because so much of what I'm talking about in terms of peace operations comes from a variety of budgets, not just that of National Defence. But what you're describing, inevitably if we were to do what we are being asked to do as part of our alliance responsibilities and support for the international order by the Secretary-General of the UN, would involve more expenditure.
Senator White: Thank you very much for that response. If I may, Mr. Robertson, we had a little bit of a discussion here on UN peacekeeping, police operations and training. Presently the funding, I understand, for UNCIVPOL and policing flows from Global Affairs to the RCMP.
In reality, though, when we talk about who they're supporting, often it's actually for National Defence when they get there. Would it make more sense for that funding to be reallocated from Global Affairs to National Defence? They work hand in glove in every theatre that I know of.
Mr. Robertson: Senator, yes, that would be a logical response. But my experience is that defence budgets are always under such extreme pressure that it is probably better, if you're looking for an end result, to have those budgets available in other departments and to have other departments also defending the whole concept of peace operations. If you're simply talking about the sharp end, then that is National Defence, but for example, having that policing funding come from a very large government envelope is, bluntly, easier to build political support for. There are advantages to having parcels of money in different departments because then you have different ministers who tend to be broadly supportive.
This is your domain, politics.
Senator White: It's not mine, actually. I wish I was better at it.
Mr. Robertson: But you might have a group of ministers who are broadly supportive of what we'll call peace operations, not just the Minister of National Defence, so that he or she is not the one carrying that to cabinet.
Senator White: Ms. Sloan? It's okay to disagree with me.
Ms. Sloan: Yes, I'm not sure about the budgets. I read the testimony of the Minister of National Defence before this committee three weeks ago. One of the things that he talked about was being able to find countries that are at a tipping point. There's an awful lot of talk about preventive peacekeeping right now and finding areas that will become a problem in the future and going there before the problem arises. It came to mind, when I read that, that critical to that whole preventive component of peace support operations is having diplomats around the world, watching and having intelligence and CSIS, et cetera.
When we talk about revitalizing peace support operations, it's partly a military aspect but also a diplomatic one as well, and we might want to look at revitalizing our foreign service and going to different places around the world. Indeed, that was a big part of the Lester B. Pearson time. We had folks on the ground, diplomats.
[Translation]
Senator Carignan: I have a supplementary question. Mr. Robertson, we often hear about the 2 per cent of GDP. I agree with the principle, but within this 2 per cent of GDP, what are the two or three objectives that Canada should focus on? We cast a wide net with respect to the 2 per cent of GDP; it can go to different sectors. Can you suggest the two or three areas of investment that should be priorities for Canada? Should Canada give priority to defence or peacekeeping operations? What are the areas of investment that would make it possible to achieve this objective?
Mr. Robertson: Thank you for your question; it is a good one. I think you will get a more accurate answer though if you ask the committees examining defence policy.
I can say this much: most government investments go to the defence of Canada, then to the defence of North America and, finally, to its international obligations. Our international obligations help stabilize and maintain peace around the world which, in my opinion, is enshrined in peacekeeping operations.
[English]
Senator Beyak: Thank you both for your exceptional presentations. Your knowledge and understanding of this issue are very impressive. You have answered all of my questions in your presentations, but from a practical side, for those watching at home, National Security and Defence is watched by many Canadians. Should Canada be prioritizing UN-led peacekeeping missions or NATO- and alliance-based? In your opinion, which would be best to do, and why or why not? Am I asking that clearly?
Ms. Sloan: I'm hard of hearing in both languages.
Senator Beyak: In your opinion, would we be best in prioritizing UN-led to support operations or NATO-based, alliance-led missions?
Ms. Sloan: In my view, we should prioritize our NATO commitments. My number one recommendation would be to support the effort to boost military forces in the Baltic region versus Russian aggression. Perhaps we disagree.
I believe that when it comes to stabilizing countries, security sector reform is the most important thing, building credible military forces and police forces. It is not a decision of which organization we should support; it is the function we support, which is security sector reform. What we have seen is that NATO has been heavily engaged in this over the past 20 years. Canada has been part of that effort, and the EU is heavily engaged. Not that we should take part in the EU operations, but there are other organizations than the UN.
Mr. Robertson: Senator, I don't think it's a question of either-or. As a G7 country and the kind of country Canada is, I believe we can and will do both reflecting our respective interests. We have interests in Eastern Europe, so the request from the Secretary General of NATO is indeed something to consider.
At the same time, we are also founding members of the liberal national order represented by the United Nations. Again, we have interests — the kind of police training we have done in Haiti, the stabilization our forces provided after the earthquake in Haiti. That's the kind of thing we can do. We are ambidextrous, but it does underline why we need to be prepared for a variety of situations and challenges ranging from the sharp end to issues involving diplomacy development and longer term development.
Senator Beyak: Do we need to reorganize the spending to do that?
Mr. Robertson: Inevitably, we don't set the international situation, so it's very hard to forecast. The best of forecasters find it very difficult to predict. Who would have predicted 9/11, for example?
What we have learned over time is to be prepared, like the Boy Scout motto "Be Prepared,'' for a variety of situations, and be sure that the capacity that we have can address a variety of situations, which is what the Canadian Forces have been very good at. We're talking particularly of Canadian Forces' ability to react to situations of humanitarian relief but also to be able to perform credibly in situations of warfare, real or asymmetric.
Senator Beyak: Thank you.
Senator Day: Dr. Sloan, I'm going to focus first of all on the United Nations' UNPROFOR in the Balkans and the rather poor show that resulted from the United Nations participation there, and then your quote that the Secretary- General said that neither the Security Council nor the Secretary-General are ready to do the kind of military intervention that's necessary. Given the structure and the veto in the Security Council, can we ever expect that the United Nations would have a role to play that would challenge the role that NATO has been forced into outside of theatre nowadays?
Ms. Sloan: That quote is from 20 years ago. I guess the question is, has the UN come further from that?
It's still a challenge for the United Nations to mount high-intensity peace support operations. I know that sounds like a strange way of putting it, but peace support operations, depending on the circumstances, can be very dangerous. It can still be very challenging for the UN to do that, which means that there is still a role for regional organizations, such as NATO, to undertake these dangerous missions, and it is exactly what happened in Bosnia.
Senator Day: One of you referred to preventive peacekeeping. Was that you, Dr. Sloan?
Ms. Sloan: Yes.
Senator Day: Does that include deterrence as well, the role that NATO is engaging in now to deter Russian intervention in the Baltic nations by showing strength and preparedness to intervene, if necessary?
Ms. Sloan: Preventive peacekeeping would be similar to deterrence in that in both cases you don't know if it's worked. You assume deterrence has worked, but you don't know if something would have happened if you hadn't done anything. They're similar in that vein.
The key distinction between peace support operations and war fighting is, as I indicated in my comments, based on political intent. If the political intent is to intervene, be impartial, stop the killing, then you're basically not a party to the conflict — you just want the killing to stop; you're impartial that way — as opposed to a war-fighting situation where an enemy has been defined and you're against the other side and you're a party to the conflict.
To deter Russian aggression, Canada would be part of NATO and would be looking at Russia, whereas in preventive peacekeeping it would not be a party; it would just be trying to intervene to stop the conflict from starting in the first place.
Senator Day: Thank you. Do you want to put me on round two, then?
The Chair: I don't know if we're going to get to round two. Is it a quick supplementary?
Senator Day: I wanted to make sure we weren't leaving Mr. Robertson out of this.
What was the problem with the Pearson Centre? Did it lose its way, or was it just that we couldn't afford to maintain it? What you are envisaging now is that there will be regional centres around the world. That is not something that Canada could handle on its own, I'm assuming. If you could comment on that briefly, that would be appreciated.
Mr. Robertson: As to what happened at the Pearson peacekeeping centre, it was a combination of factors, but I think budgetary considerations were central to the decision to wind it down.
The conditions were such that it was something that the world admired and used, as indicated by the number of nations, 150, and the number of graduates from different countries. When it was no longer there, it was deeply missed, and it is something that we could resurrect but in a different form.
When I talk about, as you suggest, regional centres, we may well take the lead and provide the trainers but not necessarily finance it. If we did, it would be in cooperation with other countries. I think we wouldn't necessarily have to bring people here, but we could set up regional centres where our trainers could go. Again, there should be some sharing and the host countries, the beneficiaries, could provide funding as well as other parts of the UN. We would probably have to do that.
If we could set this up, it would be quite useful to start training potential trainers for the future from host countries because that would have great long-term value, if we could take the lead in this but then spread this out into other parts of the world.
Senator McCoy: Thank you for coming.
I think you called this operation Blue Helmet. I was quite intrigued in that too. So you're seeing physical structures in other countries, or at least dedicated premises?
Mr. Robertson: Yes, senator. I think you could indeed take peace training in the sense that we have trained abroad. We're training police in Haiti, and we have trained Iraqi police in Jordan and Afghans in Afghanistan. You take the same concept and take it abroad, so you wouldn't have to necessarily have to bring everybody to Canada as we did in the past. Now, with tools and technology, I think it would probably be more cost efficient. Cost is always a big issue and drives, as several senators have suggested, defence diplomacy spending. If you could make efficiencies but at the same time bring it to the host countries where perhaps you are close to the countries, where you have a base in Africa or Asia, for example, I think that would have real value.
Senator McCoy: These institutes would then be set up all over?
Mr. Robertson: We'd have common standards and trainers. It would be like satellite university campuses abroad. That's the principle.
Senator McCoy: How much do we have dedicated to that now?
Mr. Robertson: It's piecemeal, incremental and kind of ad hoc. We don't have that cohesive point of reference we had previously with the Pearson peacekeeping centre. We do some training, of course, in Iraq, but bringing together the various components of government, which would include the longer term, policing, law and order, training judges, for example, and how you run elections. These are all important pieces.
Yes, it is necessary to have our forces stabilize the situation, but what you want is the long-term stabilization of a country, and that involves much more. We know this, and the force would be the first to admit it: It's not just someone in a uniform with a gun; you need policemen, critically, to provide peace and order, but you also need lawyers, judges and a free press.
There's a lot that we can teach, again drawing on our pluralism. That's one of the great values Canada has, and if we can bottle it up and transfer it abroad, that would make a huge contribution to international peace and security.
Senator McCoy: Would you do that under the UN umbrella?
Mr. Robertson: I think the UN umbrella is the most logical place to do it because that is the only international organization — could you do this under NATO? Perhaps, but I think the UN mantle and the blue helmets, their tradition, would make a lot of sense.
Senator McCoy: Professor Sloan talked about security as well. Do you think there should be preconditions before you engage in or dedicate more of our resources — or human resources, for that matter — to UN peace support operations? Should there be any conditions laid down as a prerequisite for our participation?
Ms. Sloan: I believe we need to prioritize based on our security interests. That pertains to our allies and our Five Eyes partners in areas of the world that pose a threat to our allies. I mentioned that stabilizing Northern Mali, for instance, would be very valuable, as would Libya, because of the threat of Islamic terrorism and migrant instability. I believe stabilizing Afghanistan remains important, and our allies have just decided to extend that NATO mission. We need to prioritize the security threat to Canada and its allies.
Then, of course, when it comes to the actual mission, is it viable? Is it well commanded? Are there enough forces? Are the forces properly equipped for the mandate at hand? All of those criteria have to come into play.
Senator Raine: Thank you very much. This is very interesting. I have a simple question, I think. If you go back into the olden days, Cyprus time, we knew who was fighting whom, we had agreements, peacekeepers would come in and there were conditions. Now it seems like the biggest threat — the thing that, as a Canadian, I'm afraid of — is this threat of ISIS. It seems that it can go everywhere and flare up everywhere. Is the United Nations peacekeeping force the best way to deal with the threat of ISIS?
The Chair: That's a loaded question.
Ms. Sloan: I have not looked into the details of the Mali mission, but I believe that they're struggling and that quite a few peacekeepers have been killed, et cetera. It's proving dangerous and difficult for the UN. Germany has recently committed to that operation. The Netherlands is committed to that operation. A country like Canada could make, I think, a good contribution, but other organizations like NATO or U.S.-led coalitions can be very important, as we're seeing in Iraq and also Afghanistan. As the mission gets more and more dangerous, it tends to move toward other organizations. That's not to say that it always has to be that way, but so far that's what we've seen.
Senator Raine: I guess I could say, then, that in some situations it turns out that you're not keeping the peace; you're really making war against this enemy that has surfaced. That's the difference between peacekeeping and —
Ms. Sloan: Yes, there's no peace to keep. In Bosnia, there was something like 34 ceasefires. Oftentimes, ceasefires are sort of negotiated in the fall and broken in the spring, so it can be very difficult because there is no peace to keep and you get caught up in the conflict.
Senator Raine: Yes, it's complicated. Thank you very much for your insight.
[Translation]
Senator Carignan: My comment is in the same vein as Senator Raine's, namely, that we should review the mission or mandate that the UN gives peacekeeping forces. Sometimes, there is no peace to keep. We are in that situation. At other times, however, we can destabilize forces by supporting one group over another or, if we are in self-defence mode, we witness atrocities between the two camps, but are not able to intervene.
How important is defining a mandate and what should our role be based on the definition of that mandate before we commit to a mission?
[English]
Ms. Sloan: I would say that each operation would be different, but in many of the operations that we're seeing now, it's the protection of civilians. If you're going to go in and protect civilians, you have to be well armed to do that. But each mandate will be different.
[Translation]
Mr. Robertson: I agree that the United Nations is sometimes unable to respond to the challenges. That is why we have turned to other organizations, such as NATO, working with special coalitions led by the United States.
Each situation is different but the key is protecting civilians, women and children. That is very important. That is why we are endeavouring to keep this responsibility.
[English]
Ms. Sloan: The big value that the UN brings is a sense of legitimacy. There may be places where NATO could go as well, but it's better if the UN goes. At the end of the day, NATO is seen as a military alliance with a particular perspective, whereas the UN can have a greater sense of legitimacy to the folks on the ground, so to take measures to make UN operations more effective would be very valuable.
[Translation]
Senator Carignan: Has NATO become the UN's police force when the UN is unable to do the job itself?
Mr. Robertson: Sometimes that is preferable. Sometimes NATO is called upon to protect civilians.
[English]
Ms. Sloan: NATO and other regional organizations are part of the UN system; they're part of the UN charter. So to go with a NATO operation, you're not entirely going out of the UN; it's just been delegated to a regional organization.
Senator Meredith: Thank you so much, both of you, for your presentations.
Ms. Sloane, in your discussion of security sector reform, you stressed training, and you talked about Bosnia and Croatia. In fact, I've engaged with some of those officers who were deployed.
You also stressed influence of corruption. What measures are in place to safeguard our officers when they are deployed to these hotspots to ensure that there are no influences of corruption?
Ms. Sloan: I apologize. I don't have an answer to that question.
Senator Meredith: In terms of training, we are being deployed to ensure there is security on the ground, so my question would be around that in terms of influences. You mentioned it twice in your statement with respect to corruption or those individuals who are engaged in activities that could be considered as corrupt.
Ms. Sloan: Our Canadian Forces are well trained and professional and would go into that circumstance trying to pass on those rule-of-law principles that would be ingrained within the soldiers and officers of the Canadian Forces.
Mr. Robertson: You will remember we disbanded a regiment for what we saw as lack of professional conduct in Somalia. Our rules and the code of conduct are extremely rigorous, but that doesn't apply to some of those currently involved. That's something where training should make a difference.
That's why I argued for the certified to protect, and you could condition performance measures for those countries that are currently providing. If their troops don't measure up, they would not be doing so, because they bring disrepute to the whole concept of the blue beret and the United Nations peace operations.
Senator Jaffer: Ms. Sloan, you said UN delegates to NATO. That's not my understanding. NATO goes into areas that it decides; it does not do it under the UN banner. It's not like the UN is telling NATO to go in; NATO is doing this on its own. It's not delegated by the UN.
Ms. Sloan: Let me clarify. Chapter 8 of the UN charter covers regional organizations and says something to the effect that if the Security Council cannot agree, then regional organizations can undertake measures until such time as the Security Council can agree.
Senator Jaffer: I understand that. What I'm saying is it's not like NATO gets permission or is asked by the UN. NATO does it on its own. When it goes under the banner of NATO, it goes with the countries that are part of NATO. It's not doing it under the UN banner.
Ms. Sloan: That's right.
Senator Jaffer: It doesn't have the moral authority of the UN.
Ms. Sloan: That's right.
The Chair: The question of the UN and their legitimacy was questioned when we had the two previous ministers as witnesses last week. As far as our committee is concerned and recommendations going forward to the government, would it be feasible for a recommendation to look toward us working with our normal allies to ensure that when we go into the United Nations and go under their umbrella and do work on behalf of the United Nations, that there is a clear understanding of the rules of how we are going to conduct our business?
I would like to hear your comments on the question of a recommendation that any recommendation that comes out of this for the purpose of this report, that the financial commitments have to be over and above what has already been committed to the Department of National Defence.
Ms. Sloan: Command arrangements have to be transparent, and if Canada is to be part of a UN operation, the methods through which we are going to operate have to be very clear. Basically your first statement I agree with, yes.
On the financial side, the Department of National Defence has a budget, and then operations end up coming out of that budget. It would be very helpful if there was an increment to that budget to cover operations, as I believe is the way in the United States.
Mr. Robertson: I agree with both of your premises. Yes, we should have a clear sense of the rules of engagement and the terms of engagement when we go in. This has been reiterated by former Canadian commanders who participated in UN missions, ranging from Lewis MacKenzie to Romeo Dallaire.
In terms of the budgeting, yes, although it makes sense to have a supplemental budget, but that's very hard to get through. I would argue that we provide our Department of National Defence with sufficient funding at the outset, because otherwise what happens is they end up scalping other parts of the operation because there is never an assurance you will get these second supplementary estimates that are sometimes hard to get.
The Chair: I want to thank the witnesses for their informative presentations; we appreciate the time you have spent with us and answering the questions.
Joining us on the second panel is His Excellency Per Sjögren, Ambassador of Sweden to Canada.
Ambassador, welcome to the committee. We are looking forward to learning more about Sweden's contribution to United Nations peace support operations and gaining some insights and lessons learned.
I understand that you have a statement. We have one hour for the panel. We invite you to begin.
H.E. Per Sjögren, Ambassador, Embassy of Sweden to Canada: Thank you, honourable senators, for inviting me to the committee and to make a presentation on the Swedish experience and participation in international peacekeeping, with a focus on the United Nations.
I will structure my introduction in three parts: First, a more general statement about Swedish defence; then some remarks regarding our policy considerations when it comes to participation in international peace operations; and finally, I will, in more detail, inform the committee about our participation in MINUSMA in Mali, the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan and our engagement in the Global Coalition against Daesh/ISIL.
In terms of introduction, I first would like to say that the task of the Swedish Armed Forces is, naturally, to defend Sweden, its interests and its territorial integrity. It should also be able to participant in operations overseas, as well as support civilian authorities in emergencies. The yearly budget for Swedish defence is almost C$6.6 billion.
In June 2015, a defence bill covering the years 2016 to 2020 was approved by the Parliament, with a broad majority. The security situation in our vicinity has deteriorated, which calls for increased capabilities and deepened multi- and bilateral cooperation. The basis for this defence bill was two reports by the Swedish Parliamentary Defence Commission, one named Choices in a globalized world, and the second, The Defence of Sweden - a stronger defence for uncertain time.
Our military capabilities need, consequently, to be enhanced. The budget will increase to about C$7.7 billion until 2020. The Armed Forces size is 50,000 persons, 22,000 of which are from the Home Guard. In 2010, conscription was dormant and replaced with an all-volunteer force with the majority being part-time soldiers.
Procurement will focus on long-term projects such as the new advanced fighter jet Gripen E and increase its focus on basic material to enhance readiness of our war-fighting units.
Total defence, the organization of civil society to protect citizens and infrastructure, as well as support combat operations, is being revived.
Swedish military non-alignment continues. It contributes to stability in our region. From this standpoint, security is built in cooperation with others.
Defence cooperation is being deepened with Finland, including operational planning. An agreement with the United States was signed a couple of weeks ago at Secretary of Defence level to strengthen defence-related cooperation.
Sweden is also working to develop its partnership with NATO within the Enhanced Opportunities Program, as well as to strengthen ties with Nordic and Baltic Sea countries. Enhancing and demonstrating the ability to act jointly will have a deterrent effect that, in turn, will support stability in the Baltic Sea area.
When it comes to international peace operations, Sweden has a long history in supporting United Nations peace operations. Since 1948, when Sweden sent observers to the very first UN mission, UNTSO, in the Middle East, more than 80,000 Swedish women and men have participated in UN peace operations.
Through the UN, we contribute to conflict prevention, peace and humanitarian efforts, rebuilding of conflict- affected states, disarmament and non-proliferation, poverty reduction and sustainable development. We view this comprehensive policy on international peace operations as an integral part of Swedish foreign and development policy, with, inter alia, participation in peace processes and negotiations in Mali, Afghanistan, Cyprus and elsewhere.
On this point, I would like to say that we would gladly intensify our cooperation with Canada on improving and developing the UN's peace and security agenda. This was, inter alia, discussed at the second Swedish-Canadian-UN dialogue in Stockholm in April, and a symposium or seminar to take this a step further between our countries, both at policy and operation level, will be welcomed on our part.
In 2015, Sweden sent approximately 470 persons to close to 40 civilian and military operations in crisis management. Thirty-eight per cent of the personnel sent to civilian operations were women, which is an increase of 15 per cent compared to the Swedish contribution in 2014.
K1.2 billion — approximately C$200 million — was allocated to international operations in crisis management, and C$50 million of this amount covered expenses for the civilian operations.
The Swedish contribution to cooperation in civilian crisis management has been focused on areas and conflicts to which are given priority in respect of foreign security and development aid policy. The contribution is, consequently, well coordinated with Sweden's policy for global development.
In reference to Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, Sweden actively continues to promote the implementation of this resolution and the following laws. The area of cooperation is also an area where we would like to see closer cooperation with Canada, while this is also a Canadian priority.
The Swedish foreign administration will also continue to promote gender equality perspectives throughout the peace-promoting operations. We will also promote the increase of women in leading the positions. This includes promoting gender equality perspectives as well as gender analysis in research studies concerning conflicts where international organizations operate to promote peace.
A special facility in this regard has been established in Stockholm. It is named the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations. Canada has already sent staff for training at the centre. This is an area where we would like to go further in cooperation with Canada.
I will now turn to three operations where we are active at the moment. We are active in many, but I would like to mention three of them.
First is MINUSMA, in Mali. We are extending our force contribution to MINUSMA until June 2017. Sweden is contributing with an intelligence unit of 250 persons promoting peace and security in Timbuktu and Sector West. We have long-term support to MINUSMA and have decided to further increase our engagement by contributing to a transport aviation unit in cooperation with Norway, Belgium, Denmark and Portugal.
The security threats our peacekeepers face in MINUSMA are serious. MINUSMA has become the most dangerous of all current UN missions, with over 80 casualties. Capacity building for our personnel is key to a successful mandate implementation, as well as to security for our and other international staff.
Sweden is looking forward to the extension of MINUSMA's mandate by the Security Council and pleased by the information from the report of the Secretary-General suggesting an increase of strength of the military component by a bit more than 2,000 persons. It is important that the mission can continue to work to implement its mandate, which is already under challenge, but without getting major additional tasks on its shoulders.
A well-functioning MINUSMA requires good cooperation between the two contributing countries, and the Swedish contingent in Timbuktu has established a good level of cooperation with the other countries serving in Sector West. Our assessment is that MINUSMA brings international and regional actors together, as well as neighbouring countries.
When it comes to the Swedish contribution to Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, our assessment of the worsened security situation in Afghanistan demands a continued military presence. The phasing out there will be pushed forward. We also need to keep the regional spokes while adopting a cable-centric mission.
We are aware that there will be few troops on the ground due to U.S. downsizing, and Sweden plans, for our part, to keep our troops at present level, which is approximately 30, pending a decision in autumn-winter in the Swedish Parliament.
Last, security in Afghanistan can not only build on military presence. A peace process leading to a political settlement is the only viable option to end the conflict.
Sweden's commitment to Afghanistan stands firm. Our collective and long-term engagement in Afghanistan will continue. This also includes a strong UN presence to give the commitment even more credibility.
Creating equal rights for women and children and building an inclusive society in Afghanistan is crucial. The agenda on women, peace and security is one of our top priorities.
Security does not only constitute development. Political and economic reforms must go hand in hand with efforts to build security and establish sustainable, long-term development. It's important to reiterate and remember the link between security and development, and the development cooperation needs a secure environment to fully function.
Sweden has made a long-term commitment for 2012 to 2024 in Afghanistan with an indicative volume of approximately $1.2 billion U.S. in development cooperation. Last year, Sweden received 41,000 asylum seekers from Afghanistan, of which half were unaccompanied minors. Regarding our engagement in the coalition against Daesh/ ISIL, Sweden fully supports efforts to defeat ISIL/Daesh, and we are part of the coalition with approximately 35 troops in the training and education mission in northern Iraq. Our military efforts are part of our wide support to Iraq where we also have a substantial development of cooperation and humanitarian support.
We are also active in working with the EU's engagement in Iraq looking into stabilizing liberated areas. Our engagement in Iraq and northern Syria is there for the long term and we realize the multiple efforts of the military are necessary.
The government's aim is to prolong our contribution to the coalition and also to look at making our mandate more flexible. This is all part of a parliamentary process that will take place in autumn/early winter, so decisions on this are still some months ahead.
Thank you for your attention to my introduction. I am now ready to answer questions as best as I can. I would have liked to have our military attaché, who is based in Washington but also comes to Canada, at my side. He has left, and a new military attaché will arrive in late July. If there are questions on specific military aspects, I would ask the committee's indulgence to come back or follow up later. I will be able to answer questions on a more general basis ahead. Thank you.
Senator Jaffer: Thank you very much for your presentation here today. I had the honour to be a guest of your foreign minister in December when there was the high-level conference in Sweden. One of the things I learned there was that you now have a feminist foreign policy. I was pleased to hear that you have now set up the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations. Could you provide the clerk of the committee with more information on that centre? That would be useful for us.
The government here is looking at a whole-government approach. Are you also looking at foreign policy with a feminist agenda or feminist foreign policy? Are you looking at a feminist defence policy as well?
Mr. Sjögren: Thank you, senator. On the feminist foreign policy, it's important to reiterate and understand it is also linked to security. We would like to see more women engaged in peace negotiations and also peace operations. We have a common concern with Canada when it comes to peace operations. It's a clear priority for Canada. As an example of that, we are supporting women peace negotiators in Syria. We are in contact with a number of women who are active in the peace negotiations locally. We tried to bring women in to participate in the Syrian peace negotiations. The peace feminist foreign policy has a clear security policy link in that regard.
When it comes to our ambition regarding Security Resolution 1325 and the Nordic Centre for Gender in Stockholm, the gender centre has been recognized as the NATO's department for gender training for men and women. I will gladly provide the committee with more information about the gender centre. I'm also glad that Canadian defence is already in contact directly with the centre and has sent Canadian military personnel there for training.
Senator Jaffer: I want to formally thank Sweden for the leadership you have played in bringing Syrian women to the peace table. I hope our government will follow your lead.
We've had speakers who spoke a bit about this earlier. I wanted to expand on it. One of things I admire about your country is that in your peace operations, you look at diplomacy and helping to stabilize efforts, especially in Sri Lanka where you have used your defence, mediation and peacekeeping knowledge in bringing the Sinhalese and Tamil together. Do you see a place for mediation and diplomacy as part of our defence policies?
Mr. Sjögren: Yes. I would like to answer "yes'' to that question. We tried to view international peace capability or peace operation from a comprehensive perspective.
Looking at today's conflicts, one could say after the Cold War, we have few interstate conflicts, and almost all conflicts are internal conflicts with many parts. Just look at the composition of the peace negotiations in Syria; you have a number of parts around the table. This is a very complex situation, and it can't be solved in the traditional way, only with a peacekeeping force standing between two parts. It has to be worked in a much more multi-faceted way.
Military presence is one element of that, but peace negotiations, humanitarian aid, development aid, which also could have a preventive effect, for example, in liberated areas to bring in humanitarian and development aid, we view that as very important. So there is a very comprehensive approach.
We have looked at the Canadian design of peace operations in Syria and Iraq with great interest. As has been explained by the Canadian government, there's a reference to these different elements, as well as receiving refugees in your home country as part of the whole package. This is something characterized by the Swedish model of thinking when it comes to conflict and how conflicts are shaped today.
Senator Jaffer: I'm aware of what Sweden is doing in Iraq because I have Iraqi friends working with your government. You mentioned your presence in Iraq and trying to work against ISIL. With that, have you also employed within the communities a prevention or mediation model, or is it just too early to do that?
Mr. Sjögren: I can't answer in detail exactly how we have employed, but to bring in local and regional capabilities in different forms is part of our approach, and the training and education mission in Northern Iraq is an example of enabling the local population and regional groups to, in different ways, promote peace and peace negotiations. It is clearly a part of it. Exactly how it has been done on the ground in Iraq I'm not in a position to answer. Thank you.
The Chair: To get an understanding of what you're doing on the ground, could you give us an idea of how many people you have deployed or sent there? Are they directly under the UN's mandate, or is this a separate program that you've taken on?
Mr. Sjögren: In Iraq, I think there are 35 at the moment.
The Chair: Is that under the mandate of the United Nations as well?
Mr. Sjögren: Yes, it is under the general mandate of the United Nations but also in agreement with the Iraqi government.
Senator White: Good to have you here today, Mr. Ambassador. My questions will surround the Nordic Baltic discussion right now and relationship with NATO and whether you see a shift for Sweden toward a closer alliance with NATO and maybe even membership. I know the discussion in-country is back and forth and for and against, to be fair, but from an international perspective, Canadians are wondering as well.
Mr. Sjögren: On that point, our policy is clear that we are unaligned with countries, and the membership issue is not on the agenda for a decision in that regard. Non-alignment will prevail. That is the government's clear position. But it is a policy where we increase our cooperation, including with NATO. We also increase our Nordic cooperation, especially with Finland, whether it's a special bilateral deepening cooperation, including operational planning.
As I mentioned, we are working closely with NATO within the enhanced opportunities program, and the Parliament recently decided on the host country agreement with NATO, but membership is not on the agenda.
Senator White: Thank you very much. The requests coming out of Eastern Europe right now are for a number of countries to be more involved on that edge with Russia, to be fair. I think this request is probably the first of many that we will see. I'm just trying to figure out what it looks like next. Sitting in Europe, it looks much different than it does sitting here across the ocean.
Do you see this being the new normal for many countries, and NATO in particular, to go back to where we were in the 1960s, to increasing NATO involvement in Eastern Europe and many countries? Is that what is anticipated?
Mr. Sjögren: It could be seen as a very political question, but I can say that my Prime Minister will participate in Warsaw at the NATO summit in the context that non-members can participate. We follow this closely. The security situation in our vicinity is of grave concern to us, and that also has consequences for our national defence, as I mentioned in my introductory remarks. Exactly how NATO will shape its future presence is not for me or maybe not for my country because we are not members of NATO, but we follow this very closely.
Senator White: We had a couple of witnesses prior to you who talked about a need for Canada to increase the budgets if we want to keep punching up, as many would say we have in the past, and to get into that from 1 per cent to 2 per cent of GDP. Is Sweden facing that same dilemma about increasing their national defence budget to try to keep connected with the demand? Has Sweden levelled their defence budgets out?
Mr. Sjögren: We had a number of years where we decreased our budget. That will not be a change. The present level is $6.6 billion Canadian and in four years' time it will be 7.7.
The Chair: That's per year?
Mr. Sjögren: That's per year, yes. So there is a new trend now, so our capabilities will be strengthened, yes.
Senator White: What would the percentage of GDP be?
Mr. Sjögren: I would have to come back with the exact figure, but it's more than 1 per cent, yes.
Senator White: Thank you.
Senator Raine: Thank you very much. It's interesting to hear how you approach your role internationally with peacekeeping. Could you expand on your approach between military support, police support and civilians, an integrated support when you are protecting civilians as part of UN missions?
Mr. Sjögren: Thank you, senator. This is a bit of what I referred to, that today's conflicts are very complex and multi-dimensional. For us, we firmly believe that we need to have a comprehensive approach, which brings in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, disarmament, to peacebuilding and sustainable development in one comprehensive approach and one comprehensive strategy, including more participation of women.
The early warning system in a conflict situation is very important to assess how you can act in a very early situation. The United Nations has increased its capacity on that but also NATO and EU have improved capability.
We also believe that the link between development and security is very important. National institution-building is critical for lasting peace. Sweden has been sharing in the UN peace-building commission since 2015.
Is that an answer or more of an elaboration of what I said before?
Senator Raine: It is. Are you monitoring situations around the world where democracies or governments are becoming unstable and actively going out to engage, where you can, to help them with their own internal security to prevent conflict? Are you ahead of the game in that circumstance, or are you waiting until it falls apart and things break down?
We know there are countries where the borders were set up by external organizations, and inside those borders there are groups that don't really get along. To me, that's the curious thing about the instability. It's almost predictable. If you look at, for instance, Yugoslavia, it was held together for many years because of a powerful leadership, but when Tito was gone, it went right back to ethnic groups that didn't like each other.
I'm wondering about the ability to look ahead and figure out ways that countries can get together. I look at Canada, and we have in our colonial country two founding nations, and we've managed to work out a way to get along and be very supportive of each other's aspirations. I'm just wondering if you're looking at that.
Mr. Sjögren: Yes. I could say an ultimate goal of Swedish diplomacy and foreign policy is, of course, to prevent conflict in different ways.
For us, we do it nationally through our diplomatic missions and our participation in international organizations. We are also part of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the EU is also working actively on the early warning, preventive policy, and the United Nations. So we do it nationally, and we work together with international organizations closely on that. Prevention is, in a way, the ultimate goal, to prevent outbreak of conflict, and we do it the best we can in different ways.
During the situation in the former Yugoslavia, we were very active in the peace process in addition to our participation in the peacekeeping operations there. It's, of course, very difficult.
What I explained about our view on Afghanistan and MINUSMA, it's also this comprehensive approach to bring in, so prevention, absolutely, as much as we can.
Senator Raine: I think you are in a good position because Sweden has always been non-aligned and neutral where, for instance, Canada was part of the British Empire. If you go back in history, you see the lines drawn on the maps by these old empires. That's part of the problem.
I appreciate what you are doing. Thank you very much for being here.
Senator Meredith: Thank you so much, Your Excellency.
You talked about Mali and MINUSMA with respect to the troops that you have on the ground currently. You indicate that by 2017 you'll be pulling away from that mission. Could you elaborate on that? What's your long-term strategy going forward? We know that situation is still very volatile with respect to ISIS, and we heard from our previous witnesses that they're seeking to ensure that Canada contributes more to that particular UN-led mission. I'd like to hear your viewpoints on going forward on this particular mission.
Mr. Sjögren: Thank you, senator.
We are extending our force contributions to MINUSMA until 2017, but no decision has been taken to withdraw after that. I would rather say that our commitment in MINUSMA is seen from a long-term perspective, and the decision to withdraw or how to change the design of our peace participation in MINUSMA has not been taken. We are extending it now, and we welcome that the UN Secretary-General has proposed an increase of the MINUSMA staff, number of troops, without giving new tasks to the mission. The mission is under stress, and it needs to be secured to fulfill its present mandate. That is our assessment.
At the same time, we would like to bring in regional and national groups to Mali to promote peace. That has to be done in parallel with our military presence.
We consider MINUSMA to be very important. We are not considering any withdrawal at this moment. The decision is taken just for one year ahead.
My military attaché in New York had a dialogue with a Canadian mission one or two weeks ago, and one of the recommendations to Canada was to never withdraw from a mission. If one could stay with very few persons but never withdraw, because you lose knowledge and capability in thinking to return, if you want to do that. Complete withdrawal is not a recommendation from our side. We participate in many operations. We have a small presence.
When I was invited, it was also mentioned if I could come with some recommendations. I mentioned general peacekeeping development in modern peacekeeping and peacekeeping operations and Resolution 1325 and the role of women in peace operations and peace negotiations.
I also note that Canada's Michael Grant chairs the group C34 in New York, which is composed of 151 member states. It is a committee on peacekeeping which maybe rather should be named a committee on peace operations. This committee is, as I've been informed, discussing gender, women, peace and security, protection of civilians, safety and security, strengthening operational capacity, et cetera. Canada sits in a very good position while you chair this committee. If we can be of any support there, we of course would.
I draw your attention to the information I received from my military attaché in New York.
Senator Meredith: Your Excellency, you made a profound statement that there can be no development without security. We know with respect to Afghanistan and Canada's role there. Can you give us a lay in terms of how we go forth as a country, in terms of ensuring that there is security in these hot spots around the world that your government is involved with and how Canada can best participate so that there can be forward-thinking with respect to development and getting these nations back into a secure state?
Mr. Sjögren: Thank you, senator. I think Canada and Sweden are like-minded on this issue. I noted, when the government presented the new mission in Iraq and Syria, it was a presentation of the foreign minister, the defence minister and the minister of development jointly, which is very much in line with our thinking.
I also noted, as part of that presentation, it was mentioned that development should move in gradually when you have liberated areas to provide security, but also to act in favour of prevention. If you have security and development and humanitarian aid, you can prevent an outbreak because you get support from the population. I would gather that is the thinking behind it. I think we are very like-minded in Canada and Sweden on this approach.
Canada has always been a very strong country when it comes to humanitarian assistance. You are one of the top in the world. You have a very important strength. If you look at the Middle East, you are active in all of the countries concerned with the new operations, which also include Jordan and the other countries surrounding Syria. It's a very interesting approach. It's very much the thinking that we also work in line with.
Again, that is the comprehensive approach, in the new multi-faceted, multi-dimensional crisis situations we face today, where we have a number of combatants and always internal, inside countries.
Senator Beyak: It's an honour to have you here, Your Excellency. Thank you for being with us. As chairman of the UN peace-building organizational committee, could you expand on your role and the work your government does in pre- and post-conflict support?
Mr. Sjögren: There are different layers here and things we can do. First, we believe that the UN Security Council should take its responsibility on the political level, when there are crisis situations, to make decisions to prevent but also to be active with mandates, for example, in Syria. It's sad that the Security Council has been blocked during the Syrian conflict, not being able to take those resolutions we would like.
Canada again is one of the fathers of the principle of responsibility to protect. One very interesting UN security resolution from the council is on Libya, where you have the whole setup, very complex decision based on the responsibility to protect. We would like to see that kind of Security Council resolution in crisis situations where you have immense humanitarian suffering. There is a political aspect here, which is very important. Sweden, through the Security Council, would like to cooperate closely with Canada.
When it comes to the peacekeeping department in New York, one has to take into account that the budget for UN peacekeeping, around $10 billion U.S., is relatively small in relation to budget funding that goes into war efforts. The task for the UN peacekeeping is difficult. Another element of being active in New York is to provide more funding, troop contributors and engagement in the UN peacekeeping operations.
The UN is a result of member states, so if member states are not active, the UN can't act on its own. It needs political and financial support.
Again, in relation to the political and military components, it's important to combine these with other agencies within the UN: the WHO on the health sector, the UNDP on development. The UN Secretary-General on a regular basis brings together all heads of the different agencies to have a comprehensive approach in different peace operations. The time when you can have a piecemeal approach is not there anymore.
Senator McCoy: Welcome and thank you for your insights. You mentioned your activity against Daesh in Iraq. Are you also active in Syria?
Mr. Sjögren: No. Our military participation in Daesh is with 35 troops, and they are in northern Iraq. It's within the education and training mission there.
Senator McCoy: To follow up on that last thought of education, the witnesses before you — you may have overheard — were recommending with some enthusiasm a very practical idea, and that is setting up training institutes around the world in critical areas of interest, eventually Syria, but Iraq would obviously be one, training institutes that would be perhaps heavily contributed to by Canada, but reaching out to others to partner with us. It's built on what used to be called the Pearson Institute here, that concept, but globalizing it and taking it to the people rather than having it centred here.
You have your gender centre, which is obviously a centre of excellence. Do you think Sweden would be interested in partnering with Canada in a series of centres of excellence for training around the world?
Mr. Sjögren: Thank you, senator. I know that Stockholm is highly appreciative of the Pearson Centre. I don't personally know the status of the centre, but the idea of training centres for training and education for a conflict or a regional situation in general, I would assume, and my personal view would say it's very interesting and positive. It would be interesting to see the proposal, but in general, Lester Pearson, of course, being one of the fathers of peacekeeping, so the centre is highly regarded in Sweden, and their approach to education and training for specific situations would have our support, yes.
Senator Jaffer: I wanted to follow up on some of the questions. I have understood that one of Sweden's main strengths is its ability to integrate women into the structure of its peace operations. Based on your experience, what are the biggest steps you have taken to accomplish this goal? What benefits has this integration provided and what are some of the challenges?
One of the great things about having military operations abroad is to establish values. I am not trying to be arrogant, but I believe Sweden and Canada have values that they can share with people where it is involved.
What are Sweden's main rationales for contributing to the United Nations peacekeeping force?
Mr. Sjögren: Thank you, senator. The last question on generally why we are so supportive to the United Nations peacekeeping is we believe in the United Nations as a global organization for peace and security. It's important as a member state to involve the United Nations, to be active and supportive. The United Nations is the sum of the member states that support it. If no one supports it, it won't be as effective.
I listened to a bit of the previous witness's testimony here, who referred to Chapter VIII of the UN charter. We have first, of course, Chapter VI and VII, and then VIII. There is a gradual scale of how to engage in a conflict situation. Chapter VIII is important because it refers to cooperation with other regional organizations in different situations.
We have a strong EU/UN dialogue and the cooperation is strong, but the UN also cooperates with the OAU, Organization of African Unity, and the African Union, et cetera. The different regional organizations develop their own capabilities when it comes to peacekeeping, for example, in West Africa, where we have Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS, and its cooperation in peace promotion.
The conflicts are multi-faceted, and the response has to be multi-faceted. When it comes to African peacekeeping, I noted in my documents that the group chaired by Canada, C34, has on its agenda strengthening of African peacekeeping capacity.
There are many reasons why we are engaged so heavily within the UN and so supportive of the United Nations when it comes to peacekeeping. Looking back in history, there are many success stories but also some failures when it comes to international peacekeeping. It was a different situation before the Cold War, when you had interstate conflicts and you could have a troop in between them. That's not the case anymore.
Senator Jaffer: My other question was how to integrate women and the challenges you have faced in that regard.
Mr. Sjögren: There is still a long way to go, I must admit.
My foreign minister took the initiative to create a network — and the senator was part of that Stockholm meeting — for women mediators in peacekeeping. She is in contact with the group. I don't know when it will be convened again, but it is certainly a long-term commitment. She is also in contact with individual peace mediators who are in conflict situations. She is in contact with them in different ways, directly. These are two ways to try to support women in peace operations and negotiations.
It's certainly a long process. We do as much as we can: Resolution 1325, the Nordic Centre in Stockholm, and so on. The response is basically positive, but it takes time, just as equality takes time to build. It is a long-term process.
Senator White: Thanks again for being here, Mr. Ambassador.
As you probably know, in Canada the discussion around arms trade with Saudi Arabia has been kind of simmering for over a year, but certainly in the last few months. About a year ago, Sweden looked at becoming the first country to use democracy criteria for decisions surrounding trade of arms. Could you walk us through what that looked like, if it has actually been passed, so that we can get an understanding of the impact it might have if we were to do something similar?
Mr. Sjögren: Thank you, senator. I don't have this legislation here in front of me, but you are correct; we have democracy criteria when it comes to arms trade. This is also monitored in our internal system. It is, of course, sometimes a difficult task to assess the situation in a country, but our general policy is to look at a country's situation when it comes to democracy, human rights and respect for rule of law and, on the basis of that, take a decision whether arms export is possible or not.
Having said that, there are always situations that are critical and that are difficult to assess. However, we have thorough legislation and a thorough system, and we have public opinion that follows this closely, namely, not to be an exporter to countries that do not fulfill these criteria.
I could provide the committee with the legislation. I was not prepared for exactly that issue today.
Senator White: Thank you very much for that. I would appreciate it. Has it had an impact on arms trade with Saudi Arabia since the legislation was passed?
Mr. Sjögren: As is well known, the situation in Saudi Arabia has been cause for debate in Sweden, and decisions have been made considering the situation there. I can't go into detail here on the exact nature of our trade relations with Saudi Arabia, but it is well known, and it has also been discussed in Sweden.
The Chair: I would like to follow up with one further question. We've had representation in the course of our hearings that with regard to our involvement as a country and how we will maybe become more involved, depending on recommendations and decisions that have yet to be taken, the legitimacy of some elements of the United Nations itself comes into question. I would like to hear whether you share those concerns. This is very important to any contribution that one makes to that organization. Perhaps you could tell us if you've taken steps with any of your other allies to make sure that what you do gets the best value for the dollar that's being put forward for it.
Mr. Sjögren: Thank you, senator. As I mentioned, we are supporters of the United Nations. We are heavily engaged. We are one of the main contributors to many of the programs within the United Nations. At the same time, UN reform and efficiency is also very important. We are trying as best we can.
Before we enter into, for example, a peacekeeping operation, we are in close dialogue with the UN peacekeeping department vis-à-vis the terms of reference and conditions. We also invite the United Nations for so-called assessment and advice services to discuss certain operations, in quite a bit of detail, and also to learn more about the United Nations and how it works in a specific situation. This knowledge building takes place both at the operational and policy levels. Before we take a decision on participation in a UN peacekeeping mission, there is a long dialogue, close cooperation and sharing of knowledge on the specific operation.
Within that frame, we are also assessing whether the operation is as efficient as possible, and that continues throughout the operation. When we are on a field mission, we try to be as efficient as possible in influencing the mission.
It is not that we sit by idly and wait for a decision from Stockholm. There is a long process in advance, involving close dialogue with the United Nations, before we enter into a peace operation. We do that often with our allies, and within the EU as well.
The Chair: Colleagues, I want to thank the ambassador for taking the time and coming before us. We very much appreciate your presentation.
With our third panel, we are continuing our examination of the government's defence policy review and are considering issues related to Canada's possible participation in future UN peace support operations as well as other items represented to the review.
Joining us on this panel are Major-General (Ret'd) Daniel Gosselin, Chair of the Board, Conference of Defence Associations; and as individuals, Colonel (Ret'd) Charles Davies and Colonel (Ret'd) Michael P. Cessford.
Everyone is retired. Must be wonderful.
For the viewers at home, allow me to take a minute to introduce our witnesses' biographies. Major-General Daniel Gosselin has 39 years of experience in the Canadian Armed Forces, having served in several command and staff assignments. He retired as a Major-General in 2011, and his last three tours of service included Commander of the Canadian Defence Academy, Director of International Security Policy in the Policy Group at NDHQ and Chief of Staff of the CF Transformation Team in 2005-06.
Colonel Chuck Davies is a former logistics officer who served for four years as the Strategic Planning Director for the Materiel Group for the Department of National Defence and three years as the Senior Director responsible for Materiel Acquisition and Support Policy in the department. He also formally chaired the NATO Life Cycle Management Group that is responsible for strengthening standardization and interoperability in equipment systems life cycle management among the alliance-member nations and partners. He retired in 2013, following a 42-year military and public service career.
Colonel Michael Cessford retired from the Canadian Army in 2013 after 40 years of service in the regular and reserve service. Colonel Cessford has been deployed on combat, stability and peacekeeping operations on three continents. He had equally extensive operations serving as the Director of NATO, Afghanistan Policy, and as the military adviser seconded to the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan. He has also served on secondment to the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre where he was directly engaged in the preparation of African civilian police and military personnel for service in Darfur. He holds a doctorate in History from Carleton University.
Gentlemen, those are quite the resumes. Welcome to the committee. We look forward to your comments.
Major-General (Ret'd) Daniel Gosselin, Chair of the Board, Conference of Defence Associations Institute: Mr. Chair and honourable senators, good afternoon and thank you for the opportunity to testify and offer you some thoughts for the important work of your committee.
I want to speak to you for a few minutes about the challenges of maintaining strategic coherence when Canada makes the important national decision to participate in overseas operations, be it in a coalition of like-minded nations as we did after 9/11 or as we are currently doing in Iraq, or with a United Nations multi-national force as the government indicated we will do in the coming months and years.
Let me explain what I mean by strategic coherence. Strategic coherence speaks to the link between politics, national policy and strategy — more specifically, military strategy for my purpose today. Politics here for me is meant in the context of national decision-making.
When speaking of military operations or activities, strategic coherence describes the requirement to maintain a clear, shared political and military understanding of the aim and objectives of a military operation, particularly as it evolves over time. At its core, strategic coherence is about the continual alignment between politics and military strategy or, put another way, the need to maintain ends, ways and means aligned in the face of strategic complexities and evolving situations.
This requirement includes the development and the maintenance of a coherent national strategic narrative.
Let me speak about what contributes to strategic incoherence. I have many points I could talk about, but I will speak about four points. The first factor that creates incoherence is not defining with compelling clarity the reasons for Canada's participation in a given overseas mission. When the nation is ambiguous in defining those ends and goals, it makes the development of a military strategy inherently more difficult. It also makes the articulation of a coherent strategic narrative — when speaking to Canadians, allies and to our military — nearly impossible.
Domestic politics, election campaigning and changes of government, to name a few, are all reasons that make it difficult to maintain the strategic clarity and ensure the military strategy and ensuing actions on the ground are always synchronized with the policy objectives.
The direct consequence of 9/11 for many Western nations, including Canada, was to subordinate their strategy and initial operational thinking to the U.S. — there was little incentive or pressure to separate strategy from national policy — and to explore with the rigour required the relationships between means, ways and ends. Many nations paid a heavy price for this intellectual sluggishness.
In short, we cannot confuse ourselves as a nation and confound the public into why we are engaging in demanding, expensive, high-risk operations around the world. The consequences are too serious. We need clarity of thinking in order to make not only the initial decision to participate in deployed forces — which we often do quite well — but especially after the forces have deployed around the world, and we have now turned our attention elsewhere.
A second one, often overlooked, is the evolution of the coalition of multi-national force dynamics. The withdrawal of a nation that is making a significant contribution to the force, and the loss of key force-enablers, such as firepower assets, medical evacuation, intelligence and surveillance assets, can significantly alter the conditions in a theatre of operation, potentially demanding important adjustments to the military strategy but also to our national policy objectives, creating more incoherence.
A third one, which we know well, is the challenge of implementing a whole-of-government effort over time, particularly as the mission mandates, the political military situations on ground, the threats and the regional dynamics evolve. As we have seen during the Afghanistan campaign, it takes significant and constant intellectual effort — political, bureaucratic and military — to maintain national focus and strategic coherence.
The previous government had to launch an important study, the independent panel led by the Honourable John Manley, to take stock and look at Canada's future. It made some important changes to the machinery of government, including a cabinet committee, an inter-departmental task force — all this to enhance national strategic planning, coordination and coherence.
In short, directing and managing the whole-of-government effort that includes the military is a demanding task, particularly when there is a lack of political clarity and direction, and with the departments having their own perspectives on the policy objectives sought by the government.
Finally, a fourth one is the complexity of partnering for peace in today's UN multi-national operations, which I'm sure you've heard a lot about. Most UN chapter 7 missions include the protection of civilians. Several states, including some contributing troops, do not necessarily accept the more ambitious requirements of civilian protection and peacekeeping. So despite those best efforts, for the UN, the troop-contributing nations continue to operate with caveats and take directives from national capitals, particularly when it comes to use of force.
This creates challenges, deep divisions and divergent understandings with the UN about the nature and purpose of peacekeeping. The new missions also challenge the UN principles of consent, impartiality and non-use of force, and often create a gap within the UN between strategic considerations and operational realities.
All those elements will demand from Canada significant intellectual engagement with the UN on many levels to address those to ensure strategic coherence.
In summary, Canada's participation in UN modern peacekeeping — and I'll use "peacekeeping'' here in all senses of the word — can include some idealism, but this idealism needs to be blended with a strong dosage of pragmatism. Without this clear thinking, we risk significant gaps between the political ends that our government is seeking to achieve with participating in UN peacekeeping and the national and military strategy to achieve those.
I will be pleased to amplify on this later.
Colonel (Ret'd) Charles Davies, as an individual: I've been asked to focus my remarks on the subject of peace support operations in the context of the current defence policy review, but before turning to that question, I'd like to take a couple of minutes to look more broadly at the review itself.
Defence policy is not about the missions or tasks the current government assigns to its military. Those decisions are matters for foreign policy or national security policy. The three, along with others, form a broad continuum.
Defence policy is fundamentally about the military capabilities the nation will acquire, maintain or divest, and how they will be resourced. These capabilities can be used for many purposes, ranging from disaster relief, to peacekeeping, to various other peace support missions and combat.
Military capabilities are integrated combinations of four core elements: First, personnel, primarily but not necessarily exclusively military personnel, including their recruitment, training, organization, management and care; second, major defence equipment, such as ships and aircraft, as well as other equipment, information systems, supplies and services needed to conduct operations and trained to be ready for those operations; third, essential defence infrastructure needed for operations readiness and training, such as dockyards, airfields and training facilities; and finally, an intellectual component that I call military doctrine and the professional body of military knowledge that is required to knit the other elements together into effective force elements to plan and command assigned operations, to adapt quickly to changes in operational, technological, geopolitical or other conditions, and to sustain the nation's defence institution into the future.
The four elements have to be present in an appropriate balance and well integrated, readied and supported before a defence capability can be considered operationally effective.
Military capability investments often have time horizons spanning years or decades into the future, so decisions taken by previous governments largely define the options the current government has, and, similarly, the decisions taken by this government will largely define the options future governments have.
It is, therefore, important that this committee, Parliament more widely and the government take a long-term view in defence policy development.
I recently undertook a high-level analysis of the current defence policies for four other Western nations: France, the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States. They all reflect a very disciplined and comprehensive development process, generally moving sequentially through five key steps: First, defining a view of the nation's place in the world and, in broad terms, how the instruments of state power, in particular the defence capabilities, will be used to support a national strategy; second, analysis of the global and regional strategic outlook, including future shock risks, and the military options current and future governments will need in order to face them; third, they define a defence strategy that each nation intends to follow; fourth, they define the defence capabilities that each nation will acquire, maintain or divest and the force structures to be adopted in order to pursue that strategy; and finally, they define the financial means by which those required capabilities will be acquired and sustained.
If we consider the concept of the peace support operations in the context of this analytical process, they clearly merit a mention as an example of the kinds of missions Canada needs its military to be capable of undertaking, but they represent only one area of a very broad spectrum. National responses to events will always require a broad range of options.
Consequently, it would be a profound mistake to give peace support a defining place in the current defence policy review. Any objective analysis of the future security environment would have to conclude that the greatest risks that Canada is likely to face in the next decade or two are of such a nature that peace support operations will not be central to any national response to them. Unlike things such as surveillance and protection of our maritime and air approaches, peace support is not and never will be a no-fail mission for Canada.
At most, peace support is a potentially useful contribution to a foreign policy objective to support international efforts aimed at containing events and improving global security. However, to be effective, those efforts require Western nations like Canada to bring robust, modern capabilities to the table, including the ability to precisely use or to threaten to use controlled lethal force, and this is not new. The 1956 Suez Crisis was not contained by peacekeeping or peace support forces. It was contained by political and diplomatic action, backed up by disciplined, well trained and well equipped military forces, delivered to the scene relatively quickly. The forces were not sent with the intention of engaging in combat, but everyone knew that they could if they had to, and that was an important aspect of mission success.
In closing, therefore, I would urge the committee to view peace support operations in their proper light. They are a sometimes useful response to events in certain circumstances, but they are only one of a range of options current and future governments will always need to consider. Further, peace support has to be viewed as a task. It is not as a defining element of military capability, so it merits no substantive role in defining the future capabilities of the Canadian Armed Forces.
I will be pleased to answer any questions.
Colonel (Ret'd) Michael P. Cessford, as an individual: I would like to speak to you today about the evolution, over the past two decades, of Canadian support to international peace and stability operations, probably offering a bit more of a tactical perspective, if you will, from the contemporary coalface.
My first exposure to peacekeeping was in 1975, with the United Nations in Sinai. I served for six months. I was also in the Golan Heights. That really was my first exposure to classic peacekeeping operations. Later I served in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I observed the evolving nature, the changing face, of peace and stability operations, a very difficult operational theatre. Over the course of my time in the Pearson Centre, I became intimately involved with challenges that the hybrid mission in Darfur was experiencing, the UN/African Union mission. Finally, with two tours in Afghanistan, much of my work was focused on what were really classic peace and stability operations. I, essentially, have worked across a spectrum of operational experience.
I would like to begin by correcting what I believe is a fundamental misunderstanding of Canada's engagement over the past 15 years in global peace and stability operations. There is an enduring perception that Canada abandoned peace and stability operations in the late 1990s, following the debacles in Rwanda, Bosnia and Somalia. For example, to cite but one of many articles, the Toronto Star, in June 2015, published an article entitled "How Canada has abandoned its role as a peacekeeper.'' In my opinion, nothing could be further from the truth.
The fact is that the Canadian military recognized in the mid-1990s that the UN, as it was then, was incapable of effectively responding to the new forms of peace and stability operations that were needed for an increasingly dangerous and complex operational environment. In this, they were joined by virtually every other Western military force.
The first evidence of this transition can be seen in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The UN protection force, deployed in February 1992, had established safe areas but lacked the means to protect them. These safe areas were for the civilian population. These safe areas, however, inadvertently facilitated the committing of war crimes by concentrating vulnerable civilian populations where they were at the mercy of their enemies. Virtually all safe areas came under sustained mortar and artillery attack, which inflicted serious casualties, but the worst atrocity took place in Srebrenica, where over 8,500 Bosnian boys and men were rounded up under the eyes of a small UN battalion and led away to execution.
These acts were the catalyst that saw the transition in the operation from UN command to NATO leadership. On August 30, 1995, NATO initiated Operation Deliberate Force, which began combat operations against the belligerents. Approximately six weeks later, all belligerents accepted a truce, which then led to the signature of the Dayton Peace Accords only a month later.
The point is that the Canadian Forces in the theatre, which, at the stroke of a pen, transitioned from UN to NATO command, did not cease peace operations. Rather, they were integrated within a far more capable force to achieve a strategic effect, in six to eight weeks, that had eluded the UN over the course of almost four years, at a cost of over 100,000 Bosnian dead, about a third of whom were civilians.
The employment of NATO forces on peace and stability operations continued beyond Bosnia. For example, NATO and coalition operations against Kosovo and Libya and, today, in Syria and Iraq are probably the closest we will come to implementing the UN concept of responsibility to protect. This R2P initiative came about after the genocide in Rwanda and supported external engagement and involvement in the sovereign affairs of nations in which genocidal acts were taking place. It was adopted unanimously at a UN-sponsored world summit in 2005. However, in my opinion, mainly for political reasons, this type of mission has little if any chance of ever being executed by UN forces.
Let me conclude by stating that NATO or the UN or other regional entities, such as the African Union, have the potential to initiate and oversee peace and stability operations; but the capabilities and operational constraints that each organization can bring to these types of operations will vary dramatically. In my opinion, the UN is not yet capable of resolving the types of complex and difficult peace and stability operations that we might see, for example, in the near future in Yemen or Syria, a point accepted by many senior officials within the United Nations. For example, the UN report of the high-level independent panel on peace operations published in June 2015 recognizes that the UN could not effectively conduct what were deemed to be counter-terrorist operations or operations against enemies such as ISIL/Daesh and what you would find in Yemen as well.
Given this, care must be taken by the Government of Canada in advance of any commitment of forces to UN operations to assess the potential for mission success and to ensure that the planned operations carry an acceptable level of risk. Shortfalls in UN capabilities and imposed constraints in mission mandates must be critically reviewed to ensure that Canada does not run the risk of mission failure or of seeing the diversion of scarce resources for the achievement of only local, tactical and other transient successes. This is not to say Canada should not commit forces to UN operations but rather that we should support those missions that best make sense.
I would suggest that any analysis of a potential Canadian contribution to a UN mission must answer one fundamental question: Will the commitment of Canadian personnel offer the potential to attain a positive, enduring, strategic outcome within a reasonable period of time at an acceptable level of risk for our personnel? If the answer to this question is no, the government may still choose to commit our women and men to these sorts of missions, but at least they will do so cognizant of the risks.
Thank you very much. I will be happy to answer any questions.
Senator Jaffer: Thank you to all three of you. You have given us so much to think about. It feels like we have to take a day to think about what you said before asking you questions, but we don't have that luxury.
I listened carefully to all three of you on NATO versus UN. You said that to go into the UN, you need to have a positive and strategic alliance and acceptable level of risk. Doesn't that apply to NATO as well? I will have you answer that question later.
I don't have the absolute knowledge that the three of you have, but I believe that NATO's role is very different. When we get involved with the UN, the roles are different because the UN has more mediation and diplomacy and NATO is more specific. I would like the three of you to consider when we should go with NATO and when we should go with the UN. You mentioned the assessment, but I'm look for a bigger picture.
Maj.-Gen. Gosselin: It's a good question because the first position everyone would want to take would be with NATO. I'll go to some of the points I made and let others touch on the operational and tactical ones.
We have been in the NATO alliance for a long time with a number of like-minded people. The doctrine of command and control for NATO has evolved over 50 years. People use a certain terminology. Even with the expansion of new countries, they are adopting it. Immediately we are dealing with a number of people cognizant of risk, command and control and structure, using the same language. There is a comfort level there.
There are also clearly capabilities of NATO countries that many other UN nations don't have. That is important because any nation that participates has to look at how to mitigate the risk. Unless you are the U.S., the U.K., or France, and even then, most will rely on other countries to help mitigate some of the risks or provide enablers to give them leverage.
NATO is the starting point. Even when we say "like-minded countries coalition,'' normally Canada would want to have one or two of the key nations of NATO to be part of that for the same reasons.
The UN is not there. They've had study after study for reasons that are valid. It's not structured in the same way and so on. The UN today deals with the complexity of operations that are the same as in Afghanistan when we talk about Mali and Congo and so on, but they don't have the robust structure and the capability to be able to mitigate the risk. It's a demanding task for the UN.
Senator Jaffer: I have concerns when we say that for us to work with NATO, it's easier because we talk the same language; but the longer we work with NATO, we weaken the UN for exactly the reasons you talked about.
Maj.-Gen. Gosselin: You're right. You could argue that if a number of Western nations had turned to the UN in the 1990s to try to implement more robust capabilities. There were deployable brigades and a number of capabilities, but after 9/11, most nations went elsewhere and left the UN to their own devices in that area. Other nations picked it up, but not at the same level.
Col. Cessford: I don't believe it's a case of either/or. I think that we have almost inevitably a shared objective and shared strategic outcomes that are desired by both the United Nations and NATO. The question is how to go about attaining this shared objective.
Certainly, it may well be that for a period of time the capabilities resident in NATO are more appropriate perhaps to the entry level, but we should be looking at transition soon to a UN operation, particularly when you move from combat operations to what truly are peace and stability operations, engaging ideally other regional partners such as the African Union. This is a transition that makes sense to me. It's important.
Our first point of departure has to be the coherence and synergy in a UN, NATO or other sort of military force engagement. It's never either/or but rather a long continuum.
Senator Jaffer: You mentioned the African Union a number of times. I was the one who went with people that you work with to the African Union to suggest that Canada would work with the African Union. We provided a lot of equipment and were there to support the African Union, and you did the work. I believe that was a very effective way to have the African Union lead, and we were there to support them. What are your comments on that?
Col. Cessford: Just last year we finished supporting the African Union in the conduct of exercise Amani Africa II, which was the operational readiness assessment of the standby brigades. It was an ambitious exercise that had its challenges. I think there is a desire in certain regional economic unions to achieve effect, but it is very difficult. I have great esteem for the African Union and I have many friends in the African Union. I can say that they could use assistance
Senator Jaffer: They can us that help?
Col. Cessford: Absolutely.
Col. Davies: Thank you, senator. That is an excellent question.
To repackage some of the comments of my colleagues, I think it comes down to a question of using the right tool for the right job. The United Nations is primarily an international political body, and it has very weak capacity to manage the application of military force and operations. It is better than it was. I commanded the Canadian contingent on the Golan Heights for a year in 1996 and 1997, and you couldn't even get the telephone answered in New York in that time. They are much further along, but they have nothing approaching the command and control and the force integration capabilities that have been built up many years within NATO.
NATO brings a ready-made and very effective military command and control structure. That's why the UN, in fact, turned to NATO during the Bosnian war, when things were not going well and the UN was beyond its capacity and out of its depth, and mandated NATO to take over the mission and establish the conditions whereby the UN could go back in and do the nation building, peace development and that sort of thing.
The UN's strongest point — and they do it better than almost anyone — is nation building and capacity building within nations. However, in order to put in place a security environment where that can happen, I think someone like NATO really does need to provide the heavy lifting and then create the conditions on the ground whereby the UN can come in and do its thing really well.
[Translation]
Senator Carignan: You answered my first question regarding the distinct roles of the UN and NATO. Thank you.
My next question is specifically for Colonel Davies, but I welcome comments from all the witnesses if they wish to respond.
You told us about various countries that have worked on various aspects — such as expenditures and equipment — in order to develop a long-term vision for their military's commitment and involvement.
In Canada, our system in a sense prevents us from establishing a long-term vision for our military involvement. When a party is in power that believes in that kind of long-term vision, it has about ten years to make it a reality, only to be replaced by another party that does not have the same vision, which will then undo what the first party did, and so forth.
So I would like to understand how other countries go about establishing a true long-term vision. Can you speak to that?
Col. Davies: If you don't mind, I'll speak in English; it will be easier for me.
Senator Carignan: It's a constitutional right. Please go ahead.
[English]
Col. Davies: You hit on a critical point, senator.
The other four countries that I studied all have robust frameworks in place for regularly reviewing and updating their defence policies. Those processes not only engage the party in government but they also engage other parties within the Parliament.
For example, in Australia, there is no national debate about whether they will or will not buy F-35s or the main priorities and the main investments that are required in their defence policy. It's similarly in France and the U.K. In the U.K.'s National Security Council, the Leader of the Opposition is frequently invited to sit at the table when they are having their meetings.
What I think is seriously lacking in Canada is a framework within the political structure for collectively developing a common view of the defence needs of the nation and a defence policy direction that can be sustained over successive governments.
I know it's not easy; sometimes it is more difficult than others, depending on the political dynamics of the day, but as a nation we can't afford to keep doing this. We can't afford to have a government come to power committing us to buy nuclear powered submarines and then turning around a while later and saying no, or a government coming to power to spend $500 million to cancel a contract because they are drawn a political conclusion that this was a bad idea. We are still feeling the effects of that.
I am not pointing at any one party; it is a dynamic that exists no matter where you go.
The first Harper administration had all kinds of ambition to create units around the country, but the resources weren't there, the mission wasn't there and we didn't know what they were going to do.
My plea to this committee — and this committee is as well placed as any part of our national institutions — is to try to find a way to bridge across the parties. There will always be political differences on detail, but we must get the broad thrust of our defence policy right so that it is reasonably stable over 5, 10, 15, 20 or 25 years so that we are not making bad investment decisions or making good investment decisions that someone else wants to criticize and then undo down the road.
That is an excellent question, and I thank you, senator. If you can find that solution or find that road, then I would say this committee should be charging down it.
Senator Raine: Could you put a dollar figure, even if it is a guesstimate, on what we waste by going on with this up- and-down program? It is not just the dollars in terms of outlay, but I am sure it is also the intellectual spinning of wheels. We are not getting at it.
Col. Davies: Absolutely, senator. I would not want to put a number on it, but I will give you some illustrations of the issue.
I was in the business of planning for an element of defence capability at the time the Mulroney government came to power. With broad expectations, we engaged the British in a very detailed discussion about the establishment of a theatre base in Europe to support our NATO mission. Other people were pulling great resources together; other countries were pulling resources together to figure out how we can support Canada in acquiring a nuclear submarine fleet.
We created a Director General Nuclear Safety organization within National Defence and culled resources together to provide the basis for being able to manage a nuclear-powered submarine fleet. Nobody ever put a dollar value, but it was a huge waste of resources across not only our country and the defence institution, but also in other departments in town and other countries.
We know that the EH-101 helicopter cancellation was admitted to be $500 million of wasted money, but it was more than that. The amount of effort in National Defence headquarters that went into trying to come up with a policy framework around the early Harper government's intentions — however well-intentioned they were — and trying to build a rationale and a cost estimate for how and why to do this, caused a lot of wheel-spinning in National Defence and in other departments.
The other impact of it is it causes political paralysis around defence procurement in general. That is one of the reasons why it is so difficult for the government of the day to make a decision on procurement, have it stick and see it through. Realistically, they are looking at what the political cost of doing it is versus that of not doing it and waiting for things to gel to the point that a national consensus of some kind emerges. It is a huge waste of energy and resources across the whole of the institution.
Senator Raine: That's a bit depressing.
Col. Davies: Yes, ma'am.
[Translation]
Senator Carignan: I would also like to hear from the other witnesses on this subject. I noticed that you have an opinion and I would like to hear it.
[English]
Maj.-Gen. Gosselin: There are two points I wanted to make after listening to the question, in particular to the last comment.
This will be the eighth formal defence policy since the Second World War. We had a number of policy statements and so on. In seven years, two of them have been done in a process consulting Canadians like this: 1994 and this one.
You can debate the merits of this, but it speaks to how little we think it is worthwhile investing with Canadians to talk about defence policy issues. A number of the defence policies were written by individuals in a corner, involving the government. I am not debating that, but I am talking about Canadians.
Part of the question is: How do we educate Canadians so that it doesn't become a hot political debate but rather a discussion about what Canada needs and so on? I think better educating Canadians in general is one element to help us possibly have better discussions in the future.
The second element is in terms of structure. I was talking about strategic coherence at the beginning. The difficulty, once we launch, is to keep that coherence. As factors change domestically, internationally, with the force and all that, we end up turning our attention to other issues, and suddenly those that are deployed, the commanders, all the way back to Ottawa, have to deal with changing situations. If we don't have the structure back home, the machinery to deal with it on a continuous basis, be it a cabinet committee or a task force or a parliamentary committee focused on this, then it becomes the military trying to fix the strategy to suit political ends that are not always clear, especially as things evolve.
The way the risk is mitigated is by having robust capability. Then the military essentially has situation change without having to go back to Ottawa all the time. They can adjust, and they will do it tactically and operationally.
If you look at other nations, such as the Americans and the British during Afghanistan and Iraq, they were doing significant adjustments internally. They were still keeping the big political objectives but making tactical adjustments that had strategic implications.
The robustness of the force gives a certain flexibility and allows risk mitigation when we don't have clarity, sometimes, in political objectives. As governments change, domestic politics take over issues and the government is focused on something else. It speaks to having the right structure; otherwise, we don't have the ability to mitigate any risks.
Col. Cessford: For my sins, I served three years as the director of defence analysis at National Defence headquarters, at the strategic level, in which I had to provide the rationale for capabilities requirements. It was not an easy job.
I would offer an observation: Transition or incoherence is not just from one political party to another. The transition from Prime Minister Chrétien to Prime Minister Martin brought a completely different perspective to our operational challenges.
As I think of this incoherence, the transitions, the waves that we go through with each change in government, it strikes me that we lack a strategic culture. We don't think long term. If you speak to any official in the People's Republic of China, you will find they have a long-term vision of where China will be. It is a strategic culture that is in their DNA. Other nations share that.
My one suggestion would be that any defence policy that speaks of a specific type of equipment, such as an F-35 or CF-18; or speaks of a base, Bagotville or Goose Bay; or speaks of a unit, a Territorial Reserve Battalion located here or a Parachute Battalion located there, is fundamentally at the wrong level. It's not policy; it is, potentially, politics. It is certainly catering to an audience other than those who need a defence policy that effectively meets the needs of the nation.
That is my one observation. If a defence policy comes out and I can see names and numbers and very specific equipment types in it, I have concerns. You can speak about nuclear submarines or offensive air or defensive air or combat capabilities, but, again, when you start talking locations, numbers, names, units and equipment types, I think we are at the wrong level.
The Chair: Colleagues, I want to follow this up, if I could. We have 120 years of experience here in front of us, in all various aspects of the military.
What we have been charged with, as you know, is to see if Canada should be involved in peacekeeping with the United Nations, more so than it already is.
My question to you would be in respect of the budget that has been laid before Parliament and your knowledge of the financial commitment that Canada should make to keep our military viable. Is the budget that is before Parliament adequate to meet our responsibilities for the protection of Canada and our responsibilities to North America, to NATO and other responsibilities we have? That is the first question I have: Are we able to meet the demands being put on the military at the present time, from your perspective?
Col. Davies: Peacekeeping and peace support operations are a task. There is nothing about defence capability. The question of whether we should or should not be is not, in my view, a question for defence policy discussion; it is a question for a foreign policy discussion.
In terms of budget and capacity, my view is that this country has very few no-fail tasks, but we have some. I think those include defence of Canada, responding to Canadians' requirements here at home, and the defence of North America in cooperation with our American friends.
North America will be defended. Whether it will be defended by the U.S. alone or by the U.S. and Canada is an important question for us.
My view is that our no-fail tasks should be viewed as including defence of our air approaches and our maritime surface and subsurface approaches. I have a view that our air approaches will be defended by fighter aircraft; our maritime surface approaches will be defended by surface ships and aircraft; and our subsurface approaches will be defended by submarines. The question for the country is: Are they Canadian submarines, Canadian aircraft and Canadian ships, or are they American?
I have my own views on what they should be, but I see the debate around such things as the Victoria-class submarine and other potential investments all being cast in the wrong light by people who do not seem to have thought through the implications from a national sovereignty and national security perspective of having or not having those things.
The budget is probably large enough for us to have the ability to do those no-fail tasks, but not much more. That is one of the main problems I have seen. Certainly the Parliamentary Budget Officer's commentary on the imbalance between budget and force structure is right on.
We are spending close to half our budget on personnel costs. Air and naval systems are very capital intensive. You don't need a lot of people to operate those systems, but you do need a lot of capital equipment.
Land forces, Special Operations Forces, the headquarters and intelligence organizations are important, and they are personnel intensive.
My sense is that we have not got the right balance. I think if we struck the right balance within the budget and if we assume that no party will substantially increase the defence budget, then I think we need to focus the money we do have on the no-fail tasks, and anything else we have left over is the optional stuff that we can do internationally to help the UN or anybody else.
Col. Cessford: I think back to 1994, the defence policy review by Prime Minister Chrétien's government, at which time I was serving at National Defence Headquarters. If we think finances are tight now, they were really tight in that period of time, and for very good reason.
As a Canadian citizen, I understand the rationale behind some of the budget cuts. However, I was struck by how the government of the day, in its defence policy review, articulated the requirement for multi-purpose combat-capable forces — something which, by the way, the last six defence policy reviews have emphasized. We came close to shedding capability that would have cost us, in my opinion, significant blood and treasure in places like Afghanistan.
It's interesting, and people often don't comprehend that every Prime Minister — from Prime Minister Mulroney to, in my opinion, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau — has committed Canadian forces to combat operations — not peace operations, not peacekeeping, but combat operations.
I simply don't have the insight to know whether or not current funding is sufficient. However, what is of concern to me is that if we shed capability with a view to focusing on a niche capability in the interests of financial prudence, if you will, in my opinion you never, ever get the right niche and you never, ever get the war you want.
Maj.-Gen. Gosselin: I would add one point. When Col. Davies was talking about no-fail tasks, if you look back over time at the way we sometimes developed our capability, in the old days it was threat based, so you developed your capability to counter a threat. We went away from this in the 1990s to what was called capability-based planning: an approach where you require capability and it will address certain elements — because we never had an immediate threat except in our commitments, and I will come back to that — and then we used the capability overseas, domestically, whatever would suit us.
In the 1970s and 1980s, we largely had a commitment base. We were committed to NATO, a brigade overseas, NORAD and a number of things. That commits us to certain capability because we have signed up to it.
We are still committed to NATO and NORAD. You can debate how much we want to do with NATO, how much we want to spend and so on, but seldom have we made decisions strictly from a Canadian point of view. I think the decision by the previous government to buy assets to go to the Canadian North is one of the few truly Canadian strategic decisions that was not overly influenced by NATO, NORAD and so on. We tend to devote just enough. We acquire capability, and we do wonders with that capability. It is amazing what the Canadian military can do.
However, sometimes we can't. We didn't go to the first Iraq war because we weren't capable of doing it. There were a number of issues in 1990-91. Nobody has criticized the first year or two we were in Afghanistan, but it wasn't pretty, if you look back at what we were deployed with.
Look at the criticism, for instance, that the British have imposed on their political and military leadership with Iraq and Afghanistan, with the number of people killed in both missions. If you look at Canada, it's surprising that we haven't revisited how poorly prepared we were to go into Afghanistan, and how we adjusted quickly. But perhaps that is a debate for another time.
So we manage. I can't answer about the budget, but I can tell you that those who will assemble the parts, together with the money, will think of all the possibilities in order to try to do the best. At the end, we may not be able to respond, in some situations, to the level we expect. Part of that is an education element, to go back to my earlier themes.
Senator Raine: I would like to follow up. We have heard that NATO is suggesting that 2 per cent of our GDP be spent on military, and I guess we are around 1 per cent now. Do you think it is possible for a country like Canada to do that? Is there the political will? Is it needed? What is your take on it?
Maj.-Gen. Gosselin: I think 2 per cent is probably unrealistic for us. We have never been there. The British just committed to 2 per cent last year. We were there in the past, but not in the recent past.
Senator Kenny: Under the last Trudeau, we were there.
Maj.-Gen. Gosselin: Yes, we were; you are right — but not in the recent past.
The question now is how do you calculate the percentage? Some countries have paramilitary forces that are included and so on. There is a debate in NATO, as you probably know. In fact, your next guest here was at NATO as the Canadian military rep, so he can probably speak to this. There is a significant debate about the percentage. I don't think 2 per cent is realistic in the short term. It would be a great commitment for the future, but I don't think it is realistic.
In order to do what we need to do over the coming years, I don't think we need to double the budget. I don't think that is realistic.
Col. Davies: I saw on your guest list this morning Professor Elinor Sloan. I don't know if she addressed this when she was here this morning, but certainly she has in another forum, and she has published in writing commentary that Canada is not the small player that people try to describe us as.
By population, we are in the top quarter of nations in the world, and we are 10 or 11 in terms of the size of our economy. We are a big nation in the world. We can — and I think should — play a big nation's role. Whether that means 2 per cent, 1.1 per cent or 0.5 per cent of GDP, that is for the nation as a whole and its political leadership to decide.
To use a false narrative to describe Canada in a particular way as a rationale for not spending money on international development, defence and those other things that allow a country to have influence in the world I think is a cop-out. It is simply that we are just cheap; we are not prepared to spend the money.
Senator Beyak: Thank you, gentlemen, for a thorough and conclusive presentation. That was excellent.
General Gosselin, the Canadian public is watching. The National Security and Defence Committee is the most watched in Canada. People are concerned about our security, of course. They are engaging online, too. There is a perception that the media is not telling us the whole story, in spite of the very good media people out there, and Canadians want to know more.
The biggest observation I get from my constituents, or the people who write to me, is why do governments just reverse what the past government did? Regardless of whether it makes common sense or whether it's the right cost analysis, they just do it because they can, and that is governments of all stripes. Thank you for bringing that to our attention.
Finally, the military budget for defence should be the largest in our country. The federal government's role is to protect us and our freedom. Thank you for making that very clear today.
You have answered all my questions on the UN/NATO differences. Thank you.
The Chair: That was quite a question, senator.
Col. Boucher: Yes, it was.
Senator Day: "Spend more money.'' I think I heard that part.
Gentlemen, thank you very much. I will take you back, if I may, to the debate of the standing force of the United Nations versus NATO. Canada plays — and has played for the last number of years — a pretty major role in NATO. I am looking for the sweet spot for our country, given the size of our Armed Forces and the equipment and training that we have.
I look at Libya as an example. After the combat forces have been in and done their job, there is a big need for nation building that has to go on afterwards, as well as in peacekeeping, because you make the peace but you have to keep it afterwards.
It seems to me there has been recognition of that by at least the United Nations, if not all the participants in Afghanistan, but I haven't seen that same commitment with respect to Libya, and Libya is becoming a serious situation again.
Is Canada equipped to do all of these things, or should we be concentrating on one area, such as a combat role, and then sending another thousand troops to the Baltic, as NATO is asking us to do? Or should we keep our powder dry and go in with nation-building and helping out from that point of view?
Col. Cessford: I think Canada, having engaged in operations in Libya, has a responsibility to see the mission through. It is not necessarily a military mission. In fact, as it evolves, it should be less and less a military mission.
The military has one imperative, and that is to establish the security conditions such that other elements engaged to achieve the peace, to win the peace — I'm thinking rule of law, police, corrections, judiciary, cognizant of the fact that the culture is different. I'm thinking governance.
It struck me in Afghanistan that we had dozens of military training centres, but we had no centre for civil governance that taught the Afghans, who had experienced three decades of civil war, how to re-engage in a civil society.
So I absolutely agree. I think that we have to look at this holistically, and we have to transition from a military mindset to one in which the military is fundamentally a supporting actor, particularly having achieved security capability, but where other federal departments, civil organizations and NGOs — police from municipal services to provincial services to the RCMP — engage as they did in Afghanistan and elsewhere. I think having brought that holistic approach, we can achieve that enduring strategic effect, to which I aspire.
Senator Day: Others may wish to comment on this, but let me add a bit to it. I don't think NATO has a lot of appetite for that second phase. They do to a degree when they have to, but it seems the European Union comes in and says, "Okay, we can do this.'' That's for areas of importance to the European Union, but what about Canada and its role? Is there a greater role on the nation-building side of things, or should we try to do both the combat mission role and then carry on?
Col. Cessford: I think as long as we remain cognizant of our imperative to provide for the security of Canada and its citizens, at home and abroad, then we clearly must consider how to establish the conditions to win peace. Ideally you would like to establish conditions to deter a conflict, and I think that requires engagement of military, police and civilian in advance of the fact.
But I don't think this is an either/or situation. We must be prepared to act with different compositions of elements along the spectrum before, during and after the conflict. Some organizations, in my opinion, are better at doing certain things; NATO in one way, the United Nations in another. There are regional actors.
It's determining at which stage. And I don't see this as an either/or situation. It's merely activating and engaging a different range of actors with different priorities at that point in time. I hope that answers the question, senator.
Senator Day: Yes. General or Mr. Davies, do either of you have any further comment?
Maj.-Gen. Gosselin: No. The only thing I would say is that in whatever way Canada is set to engage, I think we need to invest the time at the front end to really understand the scope and complexity. I say "we'' here; it is the politicians, those senior officials advising the government. They have a very important role. Clearly, at the end of the day, as we will see with the Chilcot Inquiry with Iraq and the U.K., the politicians will take a beating because ultimately they are responsible and accountable for the decisions.
I have been doing a lot of reading over the past two or three years about the issues in the U.K., the challenges they have had, and they have been very critical, self-critical. There have been a lot of books and articles written. It is incredible the amount of academic literature on it. The interesting element was how people in uniform, senior officials in jacket and tie and politicians misjudged the complexity of what they were engaging in.
What do we do to make sure that we are better prepared before we drop the puck, notwithstanding which mission we will be in? Before jumping in, we owe it to ourselves to do as much of that thinking and going through the hard scenarios, whether there are good days, bad days or terrible days, and what can happen in six months. Often, by the time we get to six months down the road, the people that were there six months ago are not there any longer but the troops are still deployed.
The Chair: Colleagues, we've gone over time. I want to thank our witnesses. You've brought a wealth of information to us. I'm sure we'll have you here again in the future. We appreciate the time and attention you have given us and the time you have served our country.
Joining us for our fourth panel of the day are Mr. Tony Battista, CEO of the Conference of Defence Associations; Vice-Admiral (Ret'd) Denis Rouleau and Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Jim Cox.
For those at home, I will take a few minutes to review their bios.
Mr. Tony Battista enlisted in the Canadian Armed Forces in 1974 as a private and retired in 2014 at the rank of colonel. He initially served as military police but his staff appointment include personal assistant to the Chief of the Defence Staff and Chief of Staff at the Canadian Defence Academy.
His international appointments and deployment include Germany, United States Joint Forces Command and Canadian Armed Forces engagement in the Multinational Interoperability Council; deputy National Liaison Representative to NATO's Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk, Virginia; and Canadian Defence Attaché to Germany, Austria and Switzerland, two tours in 2006-09 and 2009-10.
Tony also deployed on staff assistant visits to Kosovo and served as the Canadian defence attaché to Afghanistan from August 2011 to August 2012. He subsequently posted to Rome to assume the duties of Canadian defence attaché to Italy, Greece, Albania, Croatia, Slovenia and Malta.
Vice-Admiral Denis Rouleau graduated from the Royal Military College of Canada with a bachelor's degree in engineering and management; and in the fall of 2005 he was selected to the Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 commander's position. Vice-Admiral Rouleau commanded the Multinational NATO Force at sea for one year from January 2006 to January 2007.
On his return to Canada in the spring of 2007, he was promoted to rear admiral and appointed chief of programs at headquarters in Ottawa. In June 2008 he was promoted to the rank of vice-admiral and appointed Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff. Vice-Admiral Rouleau was appointed to serve as Canada's military representative to NATO in Brussels in 2010 and retired in 2012 after 39 years of service.
Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Dr. James Cox completed a 35-year military career, mainly in operationally orientated command and staff positions across Canada and on five continents. Along the way, Mr. Cox completed six operational tours of duty with the United Nations in Cyprus, Central Africa, Somalia and three operational NATO missions in Europe. He holds an MA and a PhD in war studies from the Royal Military College of Canada. After retiring from the Canadian Forces, Jim served as an analyst in the Library of Parliament from 2005 to 2011 supporting various committees, including this committee.
Brigadier-General Cox, Vice-Admiral Rouleau and Mr. Battista, welcome to committee. We look forward to your comments. Mr. Battista, I understand you have an opening statement to make. Please proceed.
[Translation]
Tony Battista, CEO, Conference of Defence Associations: I would like to thank the members of the Committee on National Security and Defence for inviting the six members of the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) and the CDA Institute. You have just heard presentations and testimony from three other members, the Chair of the Board of the CDA Institute, Major-General Gosselin, and two professionals in residence at the Institute, Colonel Charles Davies and Colonel Michael Cessford.
[English]
Together with the President of the Conference of Defence Associations, Vice-Admiral Denis Rouleau, and Brigadier-General Jim Cox, research fellow of the CDA Institute, we wish to thank you for this opportunity. At the Conference of Defence Associations, the CDA Institute, we welcome your very important work and contribution to this major government initiative, a defence policy review with an outcome likely to have major impact on the security and defence of Canada and Canadians for years to come.
We will start with a brief presentation comprising a short preamble followed by five recommendations. We will then be pleased to individually address questions you might have. I might add that you will see that our views, not that we had coordinated with the first group, largely are very similar and in sync.
We note that this defence policy review is being conducted somewhat in a vacuum, without the articulation of a higher-order national security policy framework, a national security grand strategy or an international policy review process in which to nest defence policy, domestic security policy and foreign policy.
It is also a concern that defence policy pronouncements have already been made despite still being in the midst of the public consultation phase of the DPR. We also note that most discussion thus far on the DPR seems to be focused on the Canadian Armed Forces, but a comprehensive and credible defence policy involves much more than the CAF.
As well, peace support operations — which arguably is almost an obsolete term, we should be talking of conflict management and international stabilization operations instead — involve more than simply military forces. If the whole of government is truly whole, then many other departments and agencies should be involved in and committed to the process.
Recommendation No. 1: We recommend that the central piece of the new defence policy for Canada must be based on a clearly articulated argument driven by the national interest. This sounds rather self-evident and simplistic, but articulating a strong, compelling national interest narrative is essential to convince Canadians and other government departments and agencies of the necessity to formulate and support a credible defence policy, and to identify the necessary funds to acquire the needed defence capabilities that will allow the CAF to accomplish its assigned missions and tasks effectively.
Such focus on a well-articulated national interest will also allow the government to prioritize competing defence requirements and to apportion and to commit finite resources to execute the missions and tasks assigned to the Canadian Armed Forces over time.
I can summarize Recommendation No. 1 by saying that defence, like charity, begins at home.
Recommendation No. 2: Cascading directly from Recommendation No. 1 is the need to articulate with sufficient clarity and purpose that the CAF structure must be first and foremost focused on the defence of Canada, including identified and well-structured support to other government departments and agencies so as to lend full credibility to the Canadian government that the Canadian government can and will apply the full range of whole-of-government actions in any given situation at home. This is a no-fail part of the defence policy in any mission that the armed forces are assigned.
The next priority must be the defence of the North American continent in close cooperation with the U.S.A. This requires a clear policy statement along with both organizational and force structures that are more than just compatible with U.S. forces; they must be fully interoperable and, in many cases, integrated in terms of command, control and execution. For this to take hold, Canada must assume it is fair but not necessarily equal share of the defence burden for protecting the North American continent, including air, land, sea, space and cyber approaches to the continent and the Arctic.
Particularly important in our continental defence policy is the role of NORAD, which should remain prioritized for the foreseeable future.
Recommendation No. 3: With a well-articulate national interest and a homeland and continental defence policy and the required force structure and capabilities well defined and resourced, the next priority is to identify in the new policy the essential elements and requirements for Canada to lead and/or contribute to international operations. In doing so, the following must be satisfied:
First, Canada must retain essential sea, land and air combat capabilities fully interoperable with major allies, and I'm talking about NATO, the U.S. and the Five Eyes community. Second, Canada should strengthen and even expand its specialization in cyber and space defence and increase the size of its special forces. These capabilities will act as force multipliers and even create effects of their own. Third, similarly, the defence policy should identify and express the intent to fund, acquire and sustain select specialized capabilities that are sufficiently flexible to insert in any future pre- kinetic, kinetic and post-kinetic scenarios. These specialized capabilities might include engineers, police, medical and other capabilities that allow for effective humanitarian operations and must have integral combat-capable elements to defend the task force, protect those in grave danger and extract itself in extremis.
Recommendation No. 4: The Canadian defence policy should dedicate a chapter on identifying and selecting portions of its force structure to either lead and/or contribute to UN-sanctioned stabilization and peace support operations, including the prospect of being a lead country for training and task organizing.
Intrinsically entrenched in this recommendation is that Canada's participation in these types of UN operations must first and foremost be based on the first recommendation on the national interest and remain largely discretionary so as not to degrade or detract from the force structure and capabilities essential to our first three recommendations.
Finally, Recommendation No. 5: We cannot emphasize enough that whatever new defence policy is eventually approved by the Canadian government, the resources to actuate it must be fully identified, committed and sustained for the full life of the policy.
For example, at present, without a significant increase in the defence spending, it does not look likely that the CAF will be able to proceed successfully with its recapitalization plans, maintain adequate readiness levels, retain its current force structure and pursue its existing defence commitments, to say nothing about the government's new focus on UN peace support operations.
The government, therefore, has two options: increase funding to adequate levels to fulfill these defence requirements, or recalibrate these requirements and the force structure that goes with it to better fit the prospective spending envelope. Neither option will be easy. The first will require the government to substantially and immediately increase the resources allocated to defence, even though such a move may not be politically expedient at a time of larger than expected deficits. The second will also require being highly disciplined in prioritizing defence commitments, making hard choices on the CF core structure, and even then, there are dangers of getting it wrong.
In either case, the government cannot focus too narrowly on parochial, electoral or even politicized service-specific concerns but instead must be guided by something much broader — the national interest and true statesmanship. Anything less will be fraught with challenges, will assuredly increase the capability commitment gap that has long plagued the defence planners and may well be a disservice to Canada and Canadians, thereby creating an even more serious credibility gap.
We thank you for your invitation and your attention. We are happy to take your questions.
Senator Kenny: I have two questions I want to ask. First, does anyone on the panel think that whole-of-government worked well in Afghanistan?
Vice-Admiral (Ret'd) Denis Rouleau, Chair, Conference of Defence Associations: I noticed the first panel here earlier mentioned that it was absent, and I believe that is incorrect. There was a huge effort in Afghanistan, not only on the ground in Afghanistan but even within the NATO headquarters, a huge effort. When I left here in 2010 to go to Brussels, we were using an acronym within the NDHQ here, which was SCR. For us here, the SCR was the strategic capability roadmap, and we may talk about that later on, but when I arrived in Brussels, SCR stood for senior civilian representative. Every meeting we had, every teleconferencing we had with the authorities in Afghanistan on the ground in Afghanistan, with the commanders, always started with the SCR and then moved on to actual military issues on the ground.
There was a huge governance effort on the ground in Afghanistan to reshape the Afghan government, to tell them how to do it because they did not know how, and the SCR. We had our own senior civilian representative there for each deployment in Afghanistan that rotated just like the brigades rotated there. And it was a huge effort.
Senator Kenny: The question was: Do you think it worked well?
Vice-Admiral Rouleau: It worked well until they were left to do it on their own. What I'm getting back is that the lessons learned were not as learned as they should have been, but they did put an awful lot of structured governance in place for them. It was there for them to structure the place. I think we even went through elections with this civilian structure in place to show them how to do proper elections, how to get the people to come and, of course, there was a huge element of security as you may recall of the people taking a real chance to actually line up to vote, and the Taliban was never too far away but they did. To their credit, they did.
They have a government in place right now. Whether it works as well as it should, I think the answer to that is probably no. But it's not because there was no effort to actually bring them up to what they should have been.
Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Jim Cox, as an individual: I play a role that is more provocative in this; I throw out opposing ideas. In my view, this whole idea of the whole of government is largely words on paper. It's a myth. The intent in my mind is that Canada would have a mission as Canada; it isn't only the military or Foreign Affairs or whoever else. It's the Canadian organization on the ground running according to a Canadian agenda, which is very hard to do if you're operating with a pile of actors.
In terms of thinking about it, it's a great idea, I think, but I don't think we have the processes or the mechanisms available in government now in order to achieve the kind of whole-of-government approach — or strategy, I would call it — that is intended. We still have a lot of our own individual players who have their own agendas and departments in the government here are pulling strings either way.
Frankly, I don't see how Canada is capable of a real whole-of-government effort anywhere until we have a contribution that is large enough to attract the confidence of the people or of the framework we are working in. If we showed up a division of military, hundreds of people from Foreign Affairs and actually had an impact and staked out our territory, well, that's a possibility. But as long as we have an approach where, in my view, all we're interested in doing in many ways is showing our flag, as opposed to having a real oomph in the mission, I don't think we'll ever achieve an honest whole-of-government approach.
Mr. Battista: If I may, whole of government is probably the hardest thing to do for any government, but that doesn't mean, as has already been pointed out, that it's not something we should not continue to strive to achieve.
Having spent a full year in Afghanistan and having travelled through 22 of the 34 provinces and having seen our major allies trying to work the multi-dimensional aspect of that particular conflict in a country that arguably was four or five different countries, I would say that, on the ground, whole of government actually worked. When I worked with other elements of our own military or others, development officials, political officers, legal, police, we made it work on the ground. I think this was generally known back home.
What I find unfortunate is that we talk about lessons learned from whole of government, but lessons are never truly learned. They may have been identified, but we haven't actually learned, because as soon as we come back home we went back into our individual stovepipes.
Whatever we actually did there as a whole of government, we haven't capitalized on. That is no reflection on any particular stripe or colour of government; it's just that, unfortunately, departments are task organized vertically. They are promoted vertically and they are funded vertically, and we do not put enough attention to do that horizontally. We do that at the DM level and so forth, but there isn't enough depth to actually work the whole of government at the national level, at the strategic level, the way it works on the ground, at the coalface.
Senator Kenny: I would be interested in the panel's views on a quadrennial military review. What are the benefits for Canada, and what are the liabilities?
Brig.-Gen. Cox: The idea of a review that is regular I think is a great idea. It depends on what is going on, whether the time frame is long or short. I think it has to be embedded in the processes of the government and be a regular one. If we are talking about a policy that is engaging the country and defence of the country, having it reviewed regularly I think helps to involve everybody — all parties and Canadians at large.
It should not be as rigid as it may be interpreted — absolutely at intervals, but approximately. It should also allow for, if you have, all of a sudden, a change in circumstances in the meantime, you do it again. To do it as a regular exercise I think is a great idea.
Vice-Admiral Rouleau: I would support that as well. If we use, as an example, the CFDS, the Canada First Defence Strategy, that was put out in 2008, I retired in 2012, and I was hearing that we were expecting a review of the CFDS. Of course, that never took place, but that would have been under some type of a mandate like this to review, "Okay, did we have it right in 2008 or not? What can be done to review it or to readjust it now?'' I see nothing wrong with that at all. We seem to fall prey to good intentions, followed by a change of focus from a government perspective. If you recall, the Canada First Defence Strategy in 2008 was looking out to 2028. That was a 20-year review that had been done there.
Along with that was what I mentioned before, the strategic capability roadmap. That was basically mapping out every single capability that we had in the Canadian military. It was mapping it out from when it is going to become obsolete in order to avoid a capability gap, when should we start initiating a replacement program, and when should that start to go?
Along with these two was a National Defence investment plan that was created as well in 2008. That was mentioned before here. In fact, it was mentioned by Admiral Norman earlier this week. This is where the SCR would match the actual funding, mapping out all the way to 2028. You would know which ones were funded and when the funding would start.
You actually had a very good picture of the capabilities that the Armed Forces had, and those capabilities were all based on a very rigorous exchange that took place between the military and the government, to say, "What would you like your Armed Forces to be able to do?'' That was the initial start of the CFDS. It went back and forth, and they ended up with six missions that you would like the Armed Forces to be able to do, in many cases simultaneously as well. The military then turned back and said, "Okay, in order for us to be able to do this, this is what we need.'' What we needed was CFDS.
At the time, if you think about shipbuilding, this nation had not been in the shipbuilding business for at least two decades before. The estimates that were there were the best possible estimates but they were estimates. They were low. Of course, they all know that now. It is easier in hindsight to do that. They were low, which is why, in 2012, I was really looking forward to saying, "There is going to be a review here, and we are going to see some adjustments.|
As you know, when I left the vice-chief position to go to Brussels, we had all that in place. I showed up in Brussels. I remember meeting the Croatian ambassador to NATO. Of course, Canada and Croatia were sitting right next to each other at the table alphabetically, and he would tell me, "Admiral, you are one of the 28 countries around the table here who has a really progressive recapitalization plan in place, all the way to 2028.'' Of course, these documents were available. If I were to meet that ambassador today, he would have to ask me, "Denis, what happened?'' Because my successor started to have to face cuts and cuts and cuts again. Therefore, the CFDS became what it is today. It is nonexistent. All of those dates that I mentioned to you on the strategic capability roadmap as to when to start replacement programs and all this are all behind us right now. So now we are trying to play catch up.
If they talk about gaps, recently in the press they are talking about CF-18s and the possible gaps in our NORAD missions. Our strategic and geopolitics have not changed. We are going to remain a member of NORAD. We are going to continue to do that. Now, they talk about gaps there, but nobody is talking about gaps elsewhere. We haven't been able to send our destroyers to sea for a couple of years now. The navy does not have a supply ship to maintain its ships at sea.
These are huge gaps that exist because the SCR and the CFDS were left without the necessary funding. It is nice to have these plans, like we had in 2010, but, if you don't provide the funding, as was mentioned, you are going to fall back, and we are going to see more of those gaps coming up right now.
Now, they are trying to fix them. There is an effort to try to fix them, with the NSBS and all of that and the replacement for the CF-18s. These are just two of them. I have no doubt in my mind that there are teams in National Defence headquarters who know what the SCR was. It is probably under a different name now. They know all the capabilities, what and when they will need to get an answer from government to say, "What is it you would like us to be able to do?''
A nation like Canada should be able to defend itself. I don't think we have a choice. I think it is part of our responsibility to remain with NORAD and to fulfil our commitment. I agree that we cannot be equal partners with our neighbour to the south. It's impossible to do that, but we can do our share without any difficulty if we put the effort and the funding towards that. There is no doubt in my mind.
When it comes to international operations — and we talked about NATO earlier — we were one of the founding nations of NATO. Canada was one of the nations pushing for that. No, we will probably never be at 2 per cent of GDP, but, from my perspective, that is not the critical element. In fact, it is probably a red herring when you think about the fact that, when the call is made, Canada is always at the table. Canada is there, although it is under 1 per cent right now of our GDP.
If we had the forces that the CFDS was going to allocate to this nation, we would be able to play our role the same way we have been playing that role for years and years. There is it no doubt in my mind about that, whether it is in the air, whether it is maritime or land.
In Afghanistan, we had a leading role. Many of our generals were actually there commanding the forces on the ground. It's not just a small contribution; we had a leading role there. It was the same thing with the maritime element, although I was the last commander at sea with the Canadian flag, under Canadian command of the NATO fleet, because we no longer have the command ships to be able to provide that support to a Canadian. We will, eventually, in the future; it is coming up, with the NSBS. But we cannot do that right now. It is impossible to do.
The Chair: Colleagues, we have five senators who want to ask questions. We are at 2:40, so I would ask everyone to be brief with their questions.
[Translation]
Senator Carignan: Thank you. To summarize then, the priority is to protect Canada and our sovereignty, followed by our participation in NATO, and finally our international responsibilities.
From what I understand from previous testimony, it seems that the ultimate objective is to always have the means to back up our principles and ambitions. Depending on the political decision, whether we use our tools or not, we have the ability to do so. If we decide not to use them, that's our political choice. When a political decision is made to use them, we have the tools and don't have to wait four or five years to get them.
I understand that, ideally, that should be our national defence policy. Have I understood correctly?
Vice-Admiral Rouleau: Yes. That is why we asked the government to give us these six missions so we can determine what the armed forces are able to do.
Senator Carignan: There was reference earlier to the structure needed to support this vision and the fact that acquisitions and investments must be made strategically, without being subject to debate. Someone said that, in Australia, there is no debate such as the one about the F35s. Decisions are made and these matters do not become political. A structure is in place. I understand that four or five countries have adopted a structure for the continuity of investments to protect their sovereignty.
What would the ideal structure for Canada be? Have you ever considered that? What would the ideal structure for Canada be, as compared to the way things are done in other countries, which would allow us to support this vision of maintaining Canada's organizational capacity in national defence?
Mr. Battista: That is something we think about regularly. Let us look at your question and Senator Kenny's question. While we regularly review what our national defence policy should be, there is a big difference between what we call using the forces and capabilities we have, and developing these forces. Developing these forces has to be done over the long term. We can't simply make purchases left and right without a second thought.
Developing our military capabilities to defend our country in the way we explained earlier should not be determined by partisanship or politics. We must truly give the country the capability, in the same way the United States has developed its approach. It has the Title Ten policy that protects certain things. A government cannot come along and decide to change the use of its military forces and start development all over again. That is no way to run a country, especially as regards defence.
We could not be clearer. We have said it a number of times and I think it is a considered approach. Military capabilities cannot be developed in three or four years. It must be done over a much longer period. National interests must truly take precedence over political interests.
Senator Carignan: Do you know what structure would be needed?
Mr. Battista: That is a challenge. I think the United States has a good model, but it is a much larger country. We do not have the same resources, but the principles are sound. The two chambers are fully involved and integrated, and they regularly point out the weaknesses or shortcomings in force development. I cannot foresee, for example, that there would be a debate one day as to whether the United States or another government would get rid of their nuclear weapons as a means of dissuasion. So perhaps this is a model we could adapt to our Canadian interests.
[English]
Senator Raine: Thank you, Senator Carignan. You asked the same question that I was going to ask.
One thing that hadn't come up before was our need to integrate into our strategy space and cyber capabilities. Can you expand on that?
Brig.-Gen. Cox: I'd describe it like this: If you think of what we have now, we have elements who are able to engage in combat and conflict in maritime, land and air. In time, that will include space, and now there is that whole area of cyber. Based on that kind of logic, it's part of war, and it's one other area that we will have to operate on.
The extent of our capability in there is a decision that has to be made in time, but as a basic element of war in the future, I think space, if not a battle space, is an important place now because of satellites, radars and imagery and so on. Space is involved and we can't ignore it. As much as there are people who are against it, my personal view is that I think it's about to be a battle space at a point in the future.
Senator White: Thanks to each of you for being here.
One of you referred earlier to Australia; I think it was you, Mr. Battista. I was in Australia last year for a number of months at a think tank, and there were a number of presentations in relation to land force equipment, ships — we know where they are going with ships — and, of course, aircraft. They almost never talked about a product; they almost always talked about benchmarks, goals, targets and future expectations. If I hadn't asked if the F-35 was the aircraft they were choosing, they never would have said F-35, and if I had never asked about where it was being built, they would never have talked about that.
I guess I'm looking for whether or not you believe the same thing as I do: that part of our problem appears to be that we are so focused on what we are buying and where we are buying it — the type of car, type of ship and where it's being built — that it's almost like we ignore our expectations. Nobody talks about what we expect from an F-35 versus an F/A-18 Super Hornet versus an F/A-18 and what the impact will be. It is the same with our ships. It is almost like we are missing the point of our strategy around purchasing equipment in the first place. Don't you agree?
Brig.-Gen. Cox: I have studied this aspect of the structure and relationships of policy, strategy, operations and tactics. In this whole exercise here, my personal view is that I think the problem with the current process is the absence, at the front end, of a comprehensive statement of policy objectives on the part of the government in this area. It isn't only with the military because we are talking of the protection and defence of Canada. This is big stuff. It's more than the military, and all kinds of other people in government and elsewhere in our society have to be engaged and motivated.
In my mind, if policy is expressed properly, it speaks in generalities, and it is a bit abstract even, but it's to be aspirational, inspirational and clarify the kind of objectives and targets that we, as a nation, are trying to achieve. It expresses that, in my mind, in the absence of talking of money, airplanes and ships. I have the documents here of the strategy in the U.S. A specific airplane or ship is not spoken of at all in the document — a number of pages.
The challenge here is to stay at policy. Strategy is where you can argue whether funding is available; the kind of ship in terms of a generic ship — does it float high or low? — and an airplane, does it fly high or low? — but not a make. That is the fundamental challenge in this process of review of policy: It is lack of understanding of what policy is and what strategy is. For all the talent and expertise that has been unleashed in this thing, the discussion, in my mind, is low in the detail.
Vice-Admiral Rouleau: In fact, I keep referring to that document called the strategic capability roadmap. It was called that for that very reason. In that document, you did not have that the CF-18s would drop off at that date and therefore you had to start a replacement program over there. You had the capability for which the CF-18 was being used will drop off there; therefore you have to start a replacement program here. That replacement program did not state it will be the CF-35. We need an aircraft that will do the same capability and to fill the requirement that the CF-18 is doing for Canada, whether it's for our own air sovereignty, for NORAD's sovereignty or to deploy some of those CF-18s as we have done in the past quite a few times successfully. It was the capability that needed to be replaced, not the actual aircraft itself.
Mr. Battista: To add briefly, I think this is a symptom of a greater problem. In the absence of a regular defence discussion and review — because, in this country, it occurs after many years rather than on a more regular basis — it seems like we default to discussions on platforms rather than capabilities and aspirations of the country. It's most unfortunate that we do that. And it's not once or twice; it's repeatedly. We create bow waves because of the absence of this regular defence policy review.
If you put yourself in the shoes of those who are serving and those who are planning, by default more than anything else, they focus on platforms. Then it catches on at the political level, and then it becomes a constant political discussion. Frankly, that is not the way we endear Canadians to support what is needed for their own security and defence.
Senator White: To follow up: How do you fix this? You've identified the problem at least twice in the last 45 minutes. How do we fix this? Do we take it outside of the hands of the politicians? If so, whose hands do you put it into?
A soldier I spoke to a while back said, "We want to win more often than we lose.'' We were talking about aircraft. How difficult is this? With a CF-18 Super Hornet, that may not be true. With an F-18, it won't be true in the future, the fifth generation.
How do you fix this political discussion around the equipment?
Mr. Battista: A quick idea: Recently, someone asked me the same question on defence procurement. I think we were probably at the same conference at the University of Ottawa. I said that, on the defence procurement side, we need to develop in Canada a nonpartisan "Jedi Knight'' capability that transcends all of the bureaucracy and the different roadblocks that exist in any bureaucracy. Governments, by their very nature, are large and bureaucratic.
I think we need the same kind of "Jedi Knight'' capability that transcends any political colour with regard to defence planning so that we focus on capabilities and the aspirations of the nation, as Jim rightly pointed out, rather than platforms. Maybe that resides in part in developing further the office of the NSA, the National Security Adviser, into a more effective organization.
Senator Beyak: Canadians do watch this committee because of stellar witnesses like you. The best thing that has come out of today is that our founders, Canadians and all the panels we have agree that charity begins at home — Canada first.
I must be clear that constituents also tell me we don't need any new tax dollars in the budget; we need to prioritize to the military. We are sending billions of dollars overseas to nations that fund terrorism. That money should be staying at home and going to our military.
My question was answered in your response to Senator White, but do you each of an idea on the UN, NATO and what our priorities should be there?
Brig.-Gen. Cox: What you heard in the panel just ahead of us was great. I sat there as they were talking, and I nodded.
I personally have had experience in a number of those organizations. If you are engaged as a military, I am a fan of NATO every time, all the time, at the start. If you have to deploy a military organization for all the reasons that it ought to be deployed, the principle is to go in, sort out the problem as quickly as you can and do a changeover or transition. The UN, on the other hand, is great at all the other stuff — not in the military arena.
As a principle, I am a plan of NATO if you need the military, transition to all those other experts in the UN if the problem is long-term and in that other area. But, as you heard, the ability of the UN to operate effectively in the military arena is pretty awful.
Senator Kenny: Brig.-Gen. Cox, what about the problems that we saw in NATO and Afghanistan with every member country having a different set of caveats and not being able to participate, participating partially or participating on Tuesdays?
Brig.-Gen. Cox: That is a reality. I have worked in the NATO international staff and been out on their operations. That's a reality.
I should add that Canada had caveats, too. We are one of the members of NATO; we had our caveats. They weren't as restrictive or restraining as others. On the other hand, we had the battle in our area, so I don't know that our caveats appeared as critically as the others appeared in other areas. That is a reality of life. The same exists in the UN, too. The same exists if we were operating in support of the AU or the OSCE. We will always have caveats.
Senator Jaffer: I have a quick supplementary for you, Brig.-Gen. Cox. You say "NATO, NATO,'' but often NATO is reluctant to put boots on the ground. So we can't just have NATO, right?
Brig.-Gen. Cox: Right. The way I would respond to that is that, whether it is the UN or NATO, as Tony said earlier, all of this is predicated on what is the interest of Canada. What is Canada's interest in this operation?
In going through all the planning and strategic planning, making a choice of whether it's NATO or UN is part of that process, but it depends on the interest. In particular, if you have a military problem at the front end, I don't see any other answer than a NATO answer as the first step.
Senator Meredith: Mr. Battista, you mentioned clearly with respect to your perspective in moving and developing the NSA. Do you agree with the previous panels that were here with respect to the four areas of personnel, infrastructure, equipment and capabilities in a comprehensive review policy? Do you agree with those areas as to the fix — as to my colleague Senator White — that Canadians want Canada to be protected, but we see the costs of cancelling a contract of $5 billion and then the additional costs internally to the time and the personnel that has been spent in putting forth ideas. Do you agree with them in respect of this comprehensive policy that needs to come forward in those specific areas as it addresses our military and defence?
Mr. Battista: I do agree with those four areas. I do agree that a comprehensive, non-partisan approach to long-term development of defence capabilities is core and essential to any credible effort to truly develop a defence policy that is pertinent, appropriate for Canada and affordable — one that likely will need regular reviews but not constantly changing course, because you just can't do that. If you look at our history, you'll see that we have been changing course left and right; and you just can't do that.
Vice-Admiral Rouleau: Just imagine if back in 2008 those missions that came from the government had been developed under a non-partisan approach to say we all agree, all parties across the table, that these six missions are what we want our military to do — "our military'' meaning it's everyone's military — and then turn around and put it in a 2008-28 funding envelope, investment plan or capability plan. You're absolutely right about a capability plan changeover. Maybe today we would still have a CFDS in place moving forward without the gaps we talked about, but how to bring that to this level? It has to be completely non-partisan, where people say, "This is our country,'' regardless of the political party they're into. In order to do this or expect this from our military, this is what we need. We're going to do it on a 20-year plan so that every four or six years, whenever you have an election, you do not have to reinvent the wheel again — absolutely correct.
Senator Day: Mr. Battista, I think you listed the five elements when talking about outlining the specialized capabilities in the defence policy. You also talked about needing more special forces and more communications — a lot of those specialized activities. Would you expect a comment in a defence policy review as to a possible role for reservists in relation to some of these specialization areas, for example?
Mr. Battista: I would. When I say increase the size of the special forces, I'm not talking about thousands and thousands of personnel. I'm talking about a modest increase because special forces have an ability to create effects, almost independently of other military capabilities.
In light of the insidious threat that we have been witnessing for a decade if not longer and the continuous morphing of other terrorist groups, we not only need that capability to retain credibility as a partner with other countries as we deal with those issues and problems offshore but also for internal security.
The other specialized capabilities that I spoke of earlier, such as engineering, medical, policing and communications, are force enablers. They allow the government to use those capabilities, as I said earlier, in pre-kinetic, kinetic and post-kinetic operations. If Canada wants to continue to be involved in a meaningful way before we have to call on the fire brigade and do the heavy lifting, we might want to use those capabilities in a more discrete way. They have to be protected and well-supported; and the country has to be behind them. If we want to get into the humanitarian business in a serious way, those capabilities are essential.
Senator Day: As well as stabilization and cyber. Brigadier-General Cox, could reservists perform some of those functions? They are doing this every day.
Brig.-Gen. Cox: It is possible. It is a specialist area, but there are people out there who have those capabilities.
There's a policy issue in cyber. If the policy issue that Canada will adopt is an ability in the cyber arena that is the attack or the offence, then all of a sudden you're into the area of applying violence and force on behalf of the nation abroad. It brings up questions of law as to who the people are that push the buttons. If you close a grid in an area and a hospital is shut off, there are bodies in the hallway. The state is applying the violence. In terms of law now, only the people in the Armed Forces or the profession of arms are the ones who do that. It isn't a kid in a basement who has all kinds of talent at hacking. If you talk of reservists who straddle the boundary of the kid in the basement on Wednesday or on the armory floor on Thursday, there are complications in the cyber area.
The Chair: You make the point, Mr. Battista, in your fifth recommendation that without a significant increase in defence spending, it does not look likely that the Canadian Armed Forces will be able to proceed successfully with its recapitalization plan, maintain adequate readiness levels, retain its current force structure and pursue its existing defence commitments, to say nothing about the government's new focus on UN peace support operations. That's the area we've been asked to review — the possibility of Canada's involvement in UN peace support operations. However, it can't be done in isolation from the rest of the demands put on our armed forces and whether or not we can meet those demands.
We look forward to our report to the Senate. Would you recommend that any involvement with the UN peace support operations would definitely have to be additional with more financing as opposed to being found within the existing envelope of the Defence Department?
Mr. Battista: Yes, indeed. We were relatively clear that if we're going to do all of these things plus recapitalize the armed forces and get involved in peace support operations, stabilization and conflict management under a UN mantle, then first, current resources will definitely not suffice. Second, you can reprioritize, but we've explained the challenges and the potential dangers in doing so. Third, our considered assessment is that these operations are not going to be simple with a rifle and a Jeep as we once thought after the Suez Crisis and blue helmet peacekeeping operations. They are complicated, complex, resource-intense and most often, for the long haul.
The Chair: Colleagues, I thank our witnesses. They have certainly added to the wealth of information that we're trying to accrue on these issues.
Joining us on the final panel of the day is Mr. Dan Ross, Former Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel), National Defence; Major-General (Ret'd) Jim Ferron; and Vice-Admiral (Ret'd) Glenn Davidson. Welcome. Please allow me to take a few minutes to review the bios of our guests.
Major-General Jim Ferron retired in July 2014 after 39 years of service in the Canadian Armed Forces. His final appointment was that of Commander, 1st Canadian Division. Today, he is Vice-President, Capability Development of Carillion Canada Inc.
Vice-Admiral Davidson joined the Naval Reserve in 1970 and transferred to the regular forces in 1974. After a posting to the Canadian embassy in Tokyo, Japan, as a military attaché, in 1995, he was appointed Commander of Maritime Operations Group 2, with command over a fleet including seven frigates and destroyers and an operational support ship. He was promoted to rear admiral in 2000, and, in 2002, he became Commander of the Order of Military Merit.
Between 2002 and 2004, he took command of the Maritime Forces Atlantic, which encompassed all Canadian naval forces in the Atlantic, some 8,000 personnel, and oversaw the deployment of ships to the Persian Gulf as part of Operation Apollo, Canada's contribution to the war in Afghanistan.
In 2004, he was appointed the Canadian military representative to the NATO military committee in NATO headquarters in Brussels.
From 2008 to 2011, Mr. Davidson served as Canada's ambassador to Syria, and, in August 2011, he was appointed Canada's ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.
Mr. Ross was Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel) from May 2005 to December 2012 for the Department of National Defence, As ADM Materiel, he provided leadership and direction to a group of 4,400 military and civilian staff and was responsible for an annual budget of 5 to $6 billion. He oversaw the delivery of the largest re-equipping program for the Canadian Forces since the Korean conflict and, at the same time, led an extensive series of projects to provide Canadian troops in Afghanistan with equipment and capabilities critical to improving soldiers' survivability and operational effectiveness.
Prior to that appointment, he served in various capacities within the government's National Defence and in the Privy Council Office.
Mr. Ross retired from the Canadian Forces in September 2002, after serving in uniform for 34 years and four days, having enrolled at a very young age.
Who has a prepared statement? Who would like to begin?
Major-General (Ret'd) James R. Ferron, Vice-President, Capability Development, Carillion Canada Inc., as an individual: Senator Lang, members of the Senate committee, let me open by thanking you personally for your support of the defence policy review and for the kind invitation to participate in today's discussions.
Today, while there is significant focus on peace support operations and how our Armed Forces could contribute to a renewed commitment to the United Nations, I recognize that this must be done within the context of the overall defence policy review. Consequently, my intent is to share my thoughts regarding the development of defence capabilities to meet the roles and missions of the Canadian Armed Forces, both today and in the foreseeable future.
My approach is that peace support operations should be viewed in light of the entire spectrum of conflict, from traditional peacekeeping through to war fighting operations, with an understanding of the capabilities and capacity required before, during and after the conflict.
While the goal should be conflict prevention, the reality is that peace support operations are often faced with the challenge of rebuilding the social, economic and political fabric of shattered nations. Clearly, these types of operations should not limit their focus to purely military solutions but need to enable the capacity of both national and — I emphasize — international, whole-of-government teams to mitigate the underlying conditions that contribute to the conflict in the first place, essentially, to set the conditions for a negotiated political solution.
To define our defence capability requirements, I believe we must recognize the underlying conditions of conflict to truly understand who the enemy is. Furthermore, I wish to emphasize from the outset that while our focus is on the capability requirements of the Canadian Armed Forces, we must be cognizant of the need to develop capacity within indigenous security forces through education, training and equipment sustainment. Without the ability of a host nation to fend for itself, mission success will not be possible.
So, briefly, what are the conditions that could assist us in defining Canadian Forces' capability requirements, those factors that create and fuel conflict? Let me highlight only a few from our recent history, such as widespread illiteracy; extraordinary unemployment rates that create a cadre of disenfranchised youth; high levels of infant mortality creating desperation within a family unit; rampant criminality; a fundamentalist approach to religion; and, finally, political instability often leading to anarchy.
Therefore, to combat these conditions, whether it is in the context of a peace support or a war fighting operation, the Canadian Armed Forces must have the means to provide or participate in the provision of a secure environment, a so-called bubble of security, normally established initially by a coalition of forces, but with the stated objective to train and then hand over responsibility to indigenous forces.
Throughout all of this, we must be mindful of our responsibility to answer the fundamental question posed by any Canadian service member when faced with a life-threatening operational reality, that being: Why are we here?
Given the demand of time, I would like to shift my focus to the challenge of defining the resources and capabilities needed by the Canadian Armed Forces to carry out its mandate, clearly a daunting task, best begun with an attempt to understand the emerging threat, the threat within a rapidly evolving defence and security environment.
Today, we see a security environment defined by a wide range of threat factors, often characterized as unpredictable and chaotic. There is the newly insurgent Russia, creating a Cold War paradigm in Eastern Europe, not to mention the real menace to Canadian sovereignty in the North; the continued presence of al Qaeda and its offshoot ISIS, both punctuated by domestic terrorism, as recently seen in Orlando; the spectre of rogue states with weapons of mass destruction; the reality of cyber warfare; and the potential advent of space-based conflict, all exacerbated by wide- ranging movements of displaced populations. The reality today is that combatants are diverse, without borders, and, as mentioned, totally unpredictable.
So what is the common thread? The thread here is the inability of Canada and the international community to predict what the future will bring. Which combination of threat factors will place Canada at risk either at home or abroad? The deduction is that whatever direction we choose, we require agility — the ability to rapidly and confidently identify threats through a robust and shared intelligence capability, augmented by the ability to act in a well-timed manner to gain the advantage in any given situation.
This requirement does not lend itself to the notion of Canada's defence forces becoming more specialist or niche-driven. What this situation does reinforce is the need for a multi-purpose, combat-capable force, able to interact in all domains. This involves highly trained and agile regular forces supported by well-resourced reserves and, I would like to emphasize, with capable special forces able to respond in the most demanding of threat environments.
In closing, I would like to reinforce four points: Clearly, we cannot do this alone. Our centre of gravity is the credibility in working within alliances to achieve collective defence. Consequently, a level of interoperability in thought, purpose, and equipment is required with our NORAD, our NATO, our UN and any coalition of forces agreed to by the government.
Second, the Canadian Armed Forces must have the capability to work within a whole-of-government team in order to build capacity, a role in which we have a proven track record.
Third, Canadian industry must be part of the security team, brought into the discussion of capability development from the outset of a defined requirement.
Finally, but many will argue of paramount performance, is the ability of the Canadian Armed Forces to take care of its people and its families, before, during and after the nation has called upon them.
Ladies and gentlemen, I deeply appreciate the opportunity to address the committee here today and look forward to our continued discussion. Thank you.
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Vice-Admiral (retired) Glenn Davidson, Former Ambassador of Canada to Syria and Afghanistan, as an individual: Mr. Chair and members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to appear before you today.
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It's nice to be able to testify as an individual these days, but I feel confident that our government's policy of closer engagement with the United Nations is right for Canada and is also right for the United Nations.
The specific intent to provide greater support for UN peace support operations is one aspect of this overall engagement, and it's a very important one. It is also, in my view, more complex than it may appear at first glance.
It strikes me that there are fundamentally two aspects to the peace support question for Canada. In the simplest terms, which I use for myself, I would categorize these as, firstly, participation with the UN, and secondly, making a difference for the UN, and obviously the two are very much linked.
Participation, of course, can be rushed and achieved relatively quickly, if that's the goal, but there are risks in rushing ahead without a broader, national United Nations game plan.
Making a difference for the United Nations is a longer-term proposition. It requires different engagement from simply placing troops on the ground. Ultimately, it requires Canada to have influence in the United Nations and with other nations involved in the full range of peace operations.
Influence is a key point. If I can register one thing with you this afternoon, it's that: Influence is a key point. We have not been a central player in UN peace operations for some years, and it will take time to re-establish our UN credentials and gain the influence necessary to actually make a difference. This is achievable, in my view, as long as we have a coherent whole-of-government strategy for engaging with the UN and are prepared to invest. This is really the core of my message to the committee.
Let me provide some thoughts on what such a strategy might for Canada. I will be very brief and offer five points for consideration.
The first is that participation in peace support operations is a condition for influence. I will leave specific recommendations on what Canada can best contribute militarily to colleagues at DND who are current with force levels and other commitments.
We will also need to examine how we can best contribute to the non-crisis management peace support roles like mediation and conflict prevention, what expertise from our diplomatic, police, legal and military resources may be available for these roles and where they can best be engaged with the United Nations.
How big a commitment should we make? I do not think that size alone is the issue. With 125,000 troops and police now serving with the UN, and 28 countries each contributing over 1,000 personnel to the UN, and six countries each contributing over 5,000 personnel, Canada needs to focus on quality and impact rather than numbers, and I think that's clear to all of us.
The only observation I would make regarding numbers is that the G7 nations' average for peacekeeping contributions is on the order of 300 to 400 troops and police combined. We are well below this level now, and depending on other commitments for the Canadian Forces, some increase in our contribution toward the G7 average would seem to be a reasonable strategic range for Canada to consider.
My second point is that we should have our eyes wide open with respect to the different levels of military training, experience and performance that exist amongst troop-contributing nations. Some troops will be well-trained and excellent, while others will not, and serious problems with misconduct among some UN troops have been well- documented. Raising the level of performance and competence for troop contributors is an essential UN requirement, but it will take some time. For Canada now, we must understand these risks, choose our partners and position to help the UN address these challenges over the longer term.
The third point for consideration is that we should assess where Canada should broaden our contribution and engagement in important UN committees and organizations, as well as with some key non-UN bodies. Just to illustrate with some examples: Canada made major contributions in the past to the important UN special committee C34, which is a committee on peacekeeping operations. A prominent and influential role in C34 would be a good and logical role for Canada to aspire to in the future.
The UN secretariat, and specifically its operations centre, is at the heart of peace support operations.
If these can be strengthened through the commitment of expert Canadian staff, especially senior officers, civilian experts, bilingual personnel, gender advisers and possibly specialized equipment or designated funding, this would be a very sound strategic investment.
We no longer have a peacekeeping training centre in Canada. However, one of the direct legacies, interestingly, of our own Pearson Peacekeeping Centre is the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres, which is still active. Greater official Canadian engagement with this organization could be a good way to broaden our understanding of the issues affecting training, performance and professionalism and help us assess where we can make a difference. Again, this is all about influence for Canada.
My fourth point goes beyond the traditional aspects of peace support operations. I suggest that as part of our UN engagement strategy, we should determine where Canada may wish to provide candidates for senior UN positions. I think, for example, of the UN special representatives and their deputies in various countries, high commissioners for human rights and refugees and similar posts. These are enormously influential and important positions, and Canada clearly has the talent to fill these and others to great effect. There is a lot of competition, however, and success in accessing these positions will require national engagement and the active support and advocacy of our national leadership. That should be part of our strategy.
Finally, and building on this thought, my fifth point is that development and successful implementation of such a UN strategy really does require a whole-of-government approach. DND, Global Affairs, Public Safety, Justice, Finance, Treasury Board and the PCO will all need to be actively engaged, and there will be a cost associated with this.
With national will, a national strategy and the splendid talent that we have in the Canadian Forces, our diplomatic corps, the police forces and across government, Canada can soon be firmly back on the map at the United Nations where we should be.
Dan Ross, Former Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel), National Defence, as an individual: It is good to be back. I have appeared several times in the past as ADM (Materiel). I currently teach complex project management at the Telfer School of Management at the University of Ottawa.
I would like to address the aspect of providing the members of forces the right equipment to carry out whatever sort of mission they're asked to carry out. I will address two issues, specifically: accountability and schedule. That may not sound like they go together, but they are enormously interrelated.
In the context of these issues, I pose a key question: Is a $5- to $8-billion annual spend on defence materiel worthy of having a uniquely accountable minister? The current accountability paradigm is clear: Everyone is accountable, and no one is accountable. Three central agencies and three departments share accountability but not the consequences; only DND lives with the consequences for the budget, the lives the soldiers and the delivery of effects.
DND manages defence materiel from concept through to disposal with requirements staff, project managers, engineers, in-service maintenance and considerable contracting capacity and expertise. Only the contracting activity under the authority of the Defence Production Act rests with Public Works.
Management is by layers of interdepartmental committees. The greatest risk to any program is navigating through those many layers of committees and the time that entails.
The consequences are always schedule slippage. The consequences of slippage are felt by DND in operational obsolescence or just real gaps in capability, unnecessary maintenance costs, deflated buying power — for service combatants, it's $1 million a day — and an increase in cost, technology and political risks.
As schedules slide and no one applies a sense of urgency, all of these risks that I listed there do occur. The fragmented accountability model drives that schedule slippage.
Project managers must feed the beast of interdepartmental committees at the director-general, ADM, deputy minister and ministerial levels. As an example, the Fixed-Wing Search and Rescue Project has been under way for 14 years. Would the outcome have been different if we had executed a competitive process six years ago?
Since mid-2010, the bottom has fallen out of defence procurement. Finance ministers from two governments have reprofiled billions because "DND couldn't spend it anyway.''
Few projects have achieved a contract award since the Defence Procurement Strategy was announced, and Canadian industry is feeling the impact. It's hard to claim that the Canadian Forces are getting the right equipment or that Canadian industry and companies are better supported.
I would argue — and I become more and more convinced everyday — that there is far too much process in getting to the contract award day.
Clearly, some process is necessary to ensure due diligence in the expenditure of so much public money. The question is how much.
So why has the accountability framework become so fragmented and so uniquely inefficient among our Western allies? It goes back to the issue of trust and accountability.
Is there an urban myth out there that the requirements are always fixed and the SORs should be disciplined by stakeholders other than the military? Yes, that is a common view, often cited by parties who have never experienced a single instance of it. Is there some truth to it? On occasion, yes, there has been, but normally it is a myth.
The military gets to say what they need. You can't come second in combat. Many stakeholders, aside from cabinet ministers, currently have a say in what they don't get.
There is an independent review committee led by Larry Murray. It's working, and project managers tell me they have benefited from the advice, review and guidance from Larry's committee. It adds some time, but it probably saves significant time in the long run.
It's important to let the independent review committee do their job and trust their due diligence. Disagreeing and pressuring the CDS to change his requirements is not the job of Public Works or Industry Canada.
Are there real and emerging threats to Canadians and Canadian Forces, domestically and deployed? If there are, is a defence procurement process that takes 14 years acceptable?
We need to eliminate some process steps and layers, use the independent review committee on requirements, minimize third-party reviews and unnecessary reporting.
We should make a minister with a holistic materiel management staff uniquely accountable this $6- to $8-billion business. It does not have to be an existing institution, but it does have to be closely attuned to the resource management processes of National Defence and to the requirements of the Canadian Armed Forces.
Is the Defence Production Act in the right department? It doesn't have to be where it is today. Is a $5- to $8-billion annual spend on defence materiel worthy of having a uniquely accountable minister?
Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you. We will start questions.
Senator Jaffer: To have you here at the end of the day is like having baked a cake. It's even more than the icing. You have brought things together. I have so many questions, but I will be cut off quickly by the chair.
Major-General Ferron, you spoke about taking care of people before, while they are there and after. There are questions about why we are here, how long we stay and when do we leave. But with "when do we leave,'' sometimes we blame all of you that you left at the wrong time, but you don't make that decision. It's done politically. That's something we'll need to look at. You put that so clearly.
I do have questions, but first, when I work on this committee, I need to go to you, Mr. Ross. Mr. Ross, while you were holding your position, the former Supreme Court Justice Marie Deschamps reported on the sexual misconduct within the Canadian Armed Forces. This led to the systemic effort to try to eliminate its occurrence — known as Op HONOUR. How effective was that program, and can we use it in other places? How can we transport that program?
When I have been in Darfur, I have worked with men and women in uniform who have been very much with our values and put programs in place. With all that's happening — I'm not talking about our forces but outside — how could we transport that?
Mr. Ross: I'm not sure I'm best qualified to answer that. I left in January 2013 from a civilian position. Although I had about 1,500 military members, they were virtually all staff officers at the headquarters here in Ottawa. So I really have —
Senator Jaffer: No problem. We will find out from someone else.
To go to all three of you, when listening to the three of you, I suddenly realized that the decisions are made politically for political reasons, and then you go to various places. Major-General Ferron, you described those regions. I have been there; I know how terrible the situation is. We send our men and women there, sometimes without the proper tools or equipment, and then we expect them to do their best.
Going forward, the big thing that I struggle with when I look at the defence review is that the wars have changed. You may tell me I'm wrong, but I think the wars have changed and the way we fight wars has changed.
Looking at Afghanistan and Iraq, with fundamentalist ideology, are our men and women ready to go to a war like this? I'm sure they are, but what more needs to be done to make them ready?
Maj.-Gen. Ferron: That is an extraordinarily complex question, but I thank you so much for it. It really comes to the hub of the question: Why would a Canadian Armed Forces service member — whether that's navy, army or air force — put their life at risk for their nation?
The reality of it is — and some don't understand this — that the most important thing to a soldier on a battlefield is not the national imperative. It is the fellow on his right, the gal on his left and, most importantly, the person covering his or her six.
The point is that they need to be confident that those people left, right and to the rear have the training and the equipment necessary to do what they have been asked to do. You can ask so much of a soldier, sailor or air person and they will do it as long as they have confidence.
This brings me to my one point about agility; and you have given me the opportunity to hammer that point home: We don't know who the enemy is today.
Senator Jaffer: That is the problem.
Maj.-Gen. Ferron: We do not know, and I defy you to tell me who the enemy will be tomorrow. If you do tell me, then I would like to join in a lottery ticket with you.
When you don't know the future, in the military we leave a larger reserve so we can react to the unexpected. That's agility. That brings me to the point of the multidisciplinary aspect of it. Soldiers will fight for their nation as long as they are confident that the individuals around them are properly trained and equipped to do the job they need to do. Agility is the point I would like to emphasize.
Senator Jaffer: The one thing that you didn't speak to is the values of the men and women in uniform. I was with them in Darfur. The people on the ground said most soldiers go to their barracks in the evening to relax. Canadian soldiers then build orphanages. We bring values wherever we go. We have an important role in this fight against terrorism. I would like you to comment on that.
I may be waving my flag too high, but I believe it is important that we have Canadians out there because we bring more than just the fighting.
Vice-Admiral Davidson: Senator, I couldn't agree with you more. That is absolutely right and precisely why I am confident that some increased Canadian engagement in peacekeeping operations will be greatly welcomed by and valuable for the United Nations. The numbers we can bring to this, however, are quite modest. Therefore, it's doubly important that we identify the right areas where we can contribute specialized capabilities and so on.
In whatever missions we are involved, we will inevitably be supporting other national troops who may have very different skill sets, training and professional competence and are all volunteer — all professional military do. That is part of the challenge that faces us. Yes, Canadians will be in great demand once we are in the business.
The only thing I would add, and perhaps this is intuitive — I think Jim touched on this — is that we should all be clear that greater emphasis on peace support operations doesn't mean a fundamentally changed role for the Canadian Forces. This will be one more thing we're doing. That is important. We will be doing this in addition to all the other obligations we have. The young men and women need the right kit, the support and an exit plan; and they need to know that we are behind them.
Senator Meredith: Thank you so much for your presentations.
Major-General Ferron, you spoke of capacity and indigenous capabilities. Can you elaborate for me more on that with respect to how we transfer our technical expertise to those on the ground — and we have seen what is happening in Mali currently — in terms of the opportunities — and Afghanistan is a classic example — of the training we have done there. One of the previous panelists indicated to us that there can be no development of youth and an education system without security. You spoke of the social and economic impacts that need to be had in these host countries in order for them to have a sense of security and full peace.
Can you elaborate in terms of the capacity and how receptive these host nations are in terms of when we go and deploy, their development and their being able to have the capability of taking over their own security?
Maj.-Gen. Ferron: First, I will lead it from the values point. In every mission that I have been on in my career over 39 years in the military in various different operational theatres, the host nations, the indigenous forces, have always welcomed Canadian Forces and their training because of the values that we impose while we are training. We don't change. We bring what we are and who we are to the battle space and then train in two ways.
One way goes back to my other point. We train with the individuals on our right and our left and behind. That is very much at the tactical level. You have young men and women, 20-year-olds and in some cases teenagers, who are training what they know how to do. With their Canadian values, and an interpreter or two kicking around for good measure, they impose those values and training at the tactical level.
The admiral and I were involved in a more strategic-level training in Afghanistan. I was the Commander of Canadian troops and the Admiral was the ambassador. We were responsible, as part of a coalition, for the training and mentoring of 352,000 police and military. The Canadian Armed Forces played a significant role in the battle space and in formalized schools. On exercises, Canadian Forces personnel with their equipment were integrated into the Afghan forces, in this case. We also did it in Bosnia and in some of our UN cases. We demonstrate, illustrate and exemplify our values, knowledge and our use of technical resources to achieve a win. Hopefully, that helps. I don't want to take too much of the time.
Vice-Admiral Davidson: Major-General Ferron has covered that very well.
One of the challenges is numbers because the need is so vast out there in some of the UN is supporting now in Africa in particular. There are 16 major missions that the UN is running right now. Thousands of troops are involved in some of these. Our ability with a modest Canadian contribution to get in there and be seen to the degree that we were with the Afghan forces will be substantially less than it will be in future UN operations. That is why I made the point repeatedly throughout my presentation that you need to get in there and leverage where you can make broader change.
Senator Meredith: Talk to us a bit about the influence. You talk about Canada not having a seat on the UN Security Council and the fact that we need to have this sort of influence in order to accomplish the objectives that we aspire to as a nation, especially on the international stage. Talk to me a bit about that.
Vice-Admiral Davidson: The way I would characterize it is you can't be in the club if you haven't paid the fee. We have not been a substantial player in the UN on peace support operations for 20 years. Certainly, our broader support for the United Nations has been reduced demonstrably in more recent years. Therefore, my observations have been that the focus on peace support operations is part of a broader agenda to re-energize our engagement with the United Nations. A more active support role in niche areas, whether airlift, logistics, intelligence or medical engineering, can help others do the job. If we target certain things, which our role on the ground will help us with, then we can influence longer term change through the committees where we need to be. You won't command a unit in the field if you don't have troops there. You won't chair an important committee if you aren't actively involved in peace support operations.
Maj.-Gen. Ferron: Mr. Chair, may I give one example? It will take less than 30 seconds. In 2011, I was working in central command, and the commander there was General Petraeus, who is known by many. In that year, Canada announced that we would withdraw from the war fighting operation in Afghanistan and move into a training mode. I was called into the General Petraeus's office. I thought I was going to receive it. You know, "Why is Canada withdrawing from the war fighting?'' I had steeled myself. He sat me down and praised Canada for about the next 30 minutes on the leadership in the role of training. We then received the deputy commander position for the NATO training mission for the entire theatre in Afghanistan, which eventually evolved into the commander. That was influence at the military level that influenced strategic political decisions.
Senator Meredith: Excellent. Chair, I do have a second one, but on round two.
The Chair: Colleagues, just before we leave Senator Meredith's question about the United Nations and influence, I just want to get it clear on the record here. If I am not mistaken, we had witnesses here a number of days ago, and, I believe our commitment on an annual basis to the United Nations is, today, about $800 million. Is that correct, those numbers or ballpark numbers?
Vice-Admiral Davidson: Senator, I would have to say that I am not close to the specifics. I think that the number that I recall for direct support for peace operations is —
The Chair: Not in peace keeping operations, to the United Nations.
Vice-Admiral Davidson: Overall? I can't comment.
The Chair: I just want to get that clarified because the impression is being left that we aren't contributing anything to the United Nations, and I don't think that's true. So we will get that clarified for the record so that we clearly understand that.
Senator Day: Gentlemen, one of the comments made was that the Canadian Armed Forces must take care of its people and their families. Are we doing that now?
Maj.-Gen. Ferron: Sir, that was my point.
Senator Day: Yes, it was.
Maj.-Gen. Ferron: We are doing it now. We have always done it, and we will do it in the future. But it has always been to varying degrees.
In my career, as a young officer, we were always taught to have a little black book in our pocket, and in that little black book you had the names of the wives and the children. I still have the little black book. We took care, in the sixties and the seventies and the eighties, of our people, but it wasn't as out there as it is today.
We have always had post-traumatic stress disorder. This is not new, but it's something that we have focused on. It's higher in the public's eye. We gave it very uncomplimentary terms over the years, and we ostracized our people. What we are doing today is accepting the fact that men and women, when faced with what I called "life-threatening operational situations,'' have different reactions. We are doing our best.
I might add that Operation HONOUR is part of that entire aspect of taking care of the men and women who serve and their families.
Senator, I am absolutely confident that, to the best of our ability, at every rank level, the buddy system is in place, and the men and women look after each other and their families. Could we do it better? Absolutely. We can always do it better. There is always room for improvement.
Senator Meredith: A supplementary, if I could.
The Chair: Senator Day, are you following up on your question?
Senator Day: No, I was going on to another question.
Senator Meredith: Okay, so a quick supplementary on that, chair, if I may.
The Chair: Yes.
Senator Meredith: That was, again, my question, Major General. I see the men and women who have served this great country, and see them, at times, in despair, where they are having to make their cases public. In this defence policy review, how do we ensure that there is a greater emphasis on those who have made this ultimate sacrifice to serve our country in this way? How do we stress that in this policy review? That is an important point, I think, that would resonate with all Canadians and those who are considering a career with our defence force, the Canadian Forces.
The Chair: Senator, do you have a question?
Senator Meredith: No, that was my question. He has the question already.
Maj.-Gen. Ferron: I do. I think that you touched upon the answer in your question. The answer, to me, is transparency. In my career, we have opened doors in so many areas that were not open before. If we can be as transparent as we possibly can to the young men and women who come into the Canadian Armed Forces about what they face, how we will prepare them and what the possible consequences are, I think we are doing the right thing by those men and women. Transparency, sir, I think, is an answer.
Vice-Admiral Davidson: In addition to transparency, there is a need to follow up, especially through doing a better job for those who are injured in the line of duty.
In a previous life, for some sin, I spent five years in military personnel in senior positions and dealt very extensively with this. That is one area that worries me perhaps more than any other — how well we look after those who are injured, who have suffered life-changing injuries.
Senator Day: Maybe it was Vice-Admiral Davidson who mentioned this international association of peacekeeping centres. We heard earlier on that Canada should get out and be doing that, but we shouldn't establish Pearson Peacekeeping Centres around the world if there is already something going on. So can you tell us about that?
Vice-Admiral Davidson: I know little about this first-hand, but the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre was a trendsetter when it was established in 1994. We were way out front with this. The following year, in 1995, I know one of the things that is a lasting legacy from our engagement in this was the fact that this international association was established. Its brings together countries that conduct formalized peacekeeping training operations, that have centres or schools that do this, on an annual basis. They host quite a substantial conference in turn. There is a secretariat that exists.
My point was that we should be engaged officially with this. I believe there is an RCMP inspector who is a member of the board that governs this association, and there is a retired diplomat, as I understand it, who is involved in an ex officio capacity. I think this is a good starting place for us.
I am not advocating that we generate another peacekeeping training centre in Canada. It won't be time for us to do that until we have really gotten back into the business in a serious way. This is good starting point.
Senator Day: I appreciate you letting us know about that. We'll ask our researcher to look this up. The comment was made earlier, and then we had an ambassador in here who thought that the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre was still operating, so the goodwill that is out there is happening beyond its time, which is interesting.
My final question, on this round at least, is 125,000 soldiers who are in various United Nations peacekeeping activities. We hear rumours that they are being paid and that a lot of countries will send soldiers so that they can get paid better than they would get paid at home. That is not like NATO, where each nation that commits pays its own way. Have I got this wrong?
Vice-Admiral Davidson: Your point is exactly right. The United Nations does provide a figure for troop- contributing nations. I believe that figure is in the order of $1,300 per month. This does not necessarily go to the soldiers. You look at the top five troop-contributing nations — and this information is all readily available — to the United Nations, and they have an average per capita GDP of about $3,400. Two of the largest troop contributors have per capita GDPs of less than $2,000. If you put several thousand troops in the field from these countries, you accrue revenue for your country from the UN of millions and millions of dollars per month. It's very important for those countries.
I am not current on this, but, traditionally, in Canada, we always declined to accept the UN pay for our soldiers. We paid the bill.
Senator Day: Certainly, if we are participating in NATO, each nation pays its own go there.
Vice-Admiral Davidson: Exactly. "Costs lie where they fall,'' is the NATO term. That is exactly right.
Senator Day: There is the other term, "burden sharing,'' that we keep hearing.
Vice-Admiral Davidson: There is some common NATO infrastructure, of course, and some funding available to support operations.
Senator Day: The AWACS and that kind of thing. Isn't that a problem that we have to address? Isn't that an issue that we would have to straighten out before we build up our role in the United Nations?
Vice-Admiral Davidson: I am sorry, which role?
Senator Day: The fact that a lot of these soldiers are just mercenaries, for want of a better term. They are in there, and the nations have them in there for the money that they generate as opposed to the more altruistic role that we would like to see in any NATO force.
Vice-Admiral Davidson: I think General Ferron put his finger right on it when he said that regardless of the operation, you look to your left, look to your right and look behind you and make sure you understand who you are working with. Troop quality will vary. You will get some very strong, well trained, disciplined, responsible and ethical soldiers on UN duties and, yes, there is a substantial risk that will not always be the case.
The UN's commitment to higher ethical and performance standards across the board is commendable, but it will take time to implement this. Our government's commitment to helping the UN do this is the right thing, but this is why we need to ensure that we are on the right committees and involved in the right things so we can help address some of these changes.
[Translation]
Senator Carignan: My question is primarily for Mr. Ross. I would like to hear about the main problem you have encountered in your role as regards the impact of there being no defence policy.
Is it the changes in government direction? Is it the changes in government policy? Is it the questions from force members? Is it the bureaucracy?
Can you describe the biggest problem you have encountered in your role and indicate a solution we could consider as part of a national defence policy?
Mr. Ross: Yes, Senator, but I will answer in English.
Senator Carignan: Yes, of course, go ahead.
[English]
Mr. Ross: I think the fundamental problem has not changed from government to government or with defence policies that have come and gone. The fundamental issue has always been uncertainty about who was in charge of and managing that $6 to $8 billion annually. About $2 or $3 billion is for new stuff and about $2.5 to $3 billion annually is to support equipment you have already bought; we call it sustainment.
The Defence Production Act was created shortly after World War II, and it gave power to a minister to acquire defence material, like tanks, airplanes and ships, with which to equip the Canadian Forces. There was a Minister of Defence Production. Then it was assigned to the Minister of Defence, and then to the Minister of Supply and Services Canada, and after that to the Minister of Public Works and Government Services and now it is Public Services and Procurement Canada, although they haven't changed the act legally. It is about contracting authority.
So the business is managed and National Defence is entirely responsible for all the outcomes, but they don't control the key of activity, which is the ability to enter into a contract. An example would be the Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ship. There are about 45 military and DND civilians in that project, and there are two procurement officers from Public Works. The entire agenda is set by the two from Public Works and their chain of command. So every decision is made by interdepartmental committees of directors general, assistant deputy ministers, deputy ministers or, occasionally, ministers.
The decision was made in this town, for example, during the design phase that every task of the design of the patrol ships would go to a third-party review of consultants — each task. So six months at a time, we would ask somebody, "Was that a reasonable task, and was the cost reasonable?'' and we would have our chief financial officers attesting to the costing of that task.
Literally, years go by. Buying power goes down. There is no upside to that schedule. It is almost disastrous to the department and to the Canadian Forces. That is a single example of the excessive over-management and the redundant layers of involvement that go on every day. A project manager's life is extremely frustrating. They will come into a job for three years and not advance their project at all. Now, a typical project manager will say it will take seven years to get out of basic options analysis.
[Translation]
Senator Carignan: I am satisfied with your answer because initially I wanted to ask what your greatest frustration was. I got the answer by asking a different question.
Mr. Ross: Those are the issues and processes.
[English]
Senator Raine: I was going to ask a similar question. When we look at the global budget for National Defence in Canada, it's pretty big, though it is not as big as those of some countries. But obviously, we are wasting a lot of money spinning wheels on some of our procurement on these major items. Could you guess at how much money we are losing in this process, maybe just by a percentage? This is very concerning.
Ms. Ross: That is a very good question. I have 60 students in two courts that go through complex project management courses with me and many of them are active project managers. This is not anecdotal of everything, but I have one project manager who has spent more on the process over the past five years than he will spend on buying equipment. When you think of that and you think of the cost of that schedule slippage and the cost of process, it is in the tens or hundreds of millions annually. All those projects management staff members are paid. The building is heated. The lights are on. The trials and the trips and the conferences all occur, but they can't move forward.
Senator Raine: It is very good for the economy of Ottawa but, as a taxpayer who doesn't live in Ottawa, this is something I think that we should be looking at as we go forward with a new defence strategy. Perfection is the enemy of progress. If we set up a system where you can't take any risk or you will be vilified if something isn't exactly as you promised, then I don't see how we can get out of this logjam.
Ms. Ross: We have the most inefficient governance machinery structure in NATO, not counting the very small countries that are involved in Partnerships for Peace. Our allies and my counterparts in National Armour Directors looked at me said, "You do what?'' They own the contracting process. They have a minister who is accountable for the delivery of that new ship class.
Senator Raine: Is there a country that you could point to from which we could learn a best practice?
Ms. Ross: I think both Australia and the United Kingdom have pretty efficient models. The United States is very complicated. My counterpart was the Deputy Secretary of Accessing Technology and Logistics, which was a pretty global role. The army, navy and air force in the United States do their own procurement, but it is all within the Department of Defence with the Americans. The British and the Australians have fairly efficient procurement processes within their defence departments.
The Australians had a separate defence materiel organization for about eight years, and they just linked it back up recently to their defence department because they felt they got a bit too far from the operational requirement staff. Now it has been brought in tighter and it has a single accountable CEO.
Senator Raine: That is very interesting. I think we should take a look at what Australia is doing because they are a country that has evolved much as Canada has evolved. In terms of our military, are we relatively the same size as Australia?
Ms. Ross: No, we are bigger but they spend almost twice as much on defence. It is almost double. They pursue extremely big and expensive equipment programs.
Senator Raine: Maybe we shouldn't look at them, then.
Senator Beyak: I agree with Senator Raine's questioning.
Your presentations were very thorough and enlightening. It is said in communications and advertising that you have to say something 17 times, and we've heard it enough this afternoon that I hope our Senate committee will be able to write a report that shows the waste, how much more money is needed and where we could be prioritizing.
I've asked this of every other panel: Between NATO and the UN, do you have thoughts on where we should be prioritizing? Can we do both, and is one more important than the other? You covered most of it in your presentations, but do you have any final thoughts?
Vice-Admiral Davidson: Having a vested interest in a previous life in NATO, it's not a question of one or the other. It is clearly for Canada — we are an allied country. We have alliance obligations, we have mutual defence obligations, we're committed to NATO, we're a founding member and NATO has much to offer. It has its wrinkles and inefficiencies, but it's a club we cannot afford not to be a central part of.
We're reengaging now with the United Nations, and I believe that's also important.
It is not one or the other. We need the two things at the same time.
Maj.-Gen. Ferron: My approach would be very similar. It's interoperability, and we cannot afford not to be interoperable. In my opening remarks, it wasn't just with equipment; it was interoperable with the thought process and our training. We cannot choose one over the other.
In my career, I've been in both the United Nations and with NATO. Frankly, we have a priority with NATO, because that's where most of our emphasis is in my lifetime, from the Cold War all the way through the Balkans, into Afghanistan and who knows where we will be next.
I think we can't choose. We need to be part of the team.
Mr. Ross: I spent three years as Deputy Foreign Policy Adviser, and my perspective is that we don't get to choose. When you're a G7 member and part of that big-boys club, when the Prime Minister of the U.K, Australia or the U.S. President calls, you have to do something. It might not be what that person asked on that day, but not participating is not an option when you're in the club.
Senator Day: Interoperability with the other participating and willing members from the United Nations may not be interoperability with the 28 nations of NATO. Do you worry about interoperability having two faces here?
Maj.-Gen. Ferron: That's a great question. Whether it's in a NATO-UN or UN-NATO, you'll see the challenges of interoperability everywhere. My little analogy was about left and right: When you do it nationally, it's work. Oftentimes, I've ended up in an operational theatre where I realized our standard operating procedures were not interoperable. It had nothing to do with equipment or technology; it was everything about how soldiers reacted.
It's hard work, and we need to continue to be consistent. Interoperability is sometimes just thrown out there, but it is a central hub to success in anything that we do, absolutely.
The Chair: Time has passed us by. I would like to thank the witnesses for taking the time to come to present to us. We appreciate what you had to say, and it will be given serious consideration.
I'd like to thank our staff who have been here all day. It has been a long day. I want to say we appreciate the time and effort that has gone into this.
Colleagues, we will adjourn, but I want to forewarn you that we may well have another meeting of the committee later in the week, and you will get a notice if we do.
(The committee adjourned.)