THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE
EVIDENCE
OTTAWA, Monday, March 21, 2022
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met with videoconference this day at 2 p.m. [ET] to examine and report on issues relating to security and defence in the Arctic.
Senator Tony Dean (Chair) in the chair.
[English]
The Chair: Welcome to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. I’m Tony Dean, senator from Ontario and the chair of the committee. Those participating virtually are asked to have their microphones muted at all times unless recognized by name by the chair and will be responsible for turning their microphones on and off during the meeting.
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I would now like to introduce the members of the committee who are participating in today’s meeting. First we have the deputy chair of the committee, Jean-Guy Dagenais from Quebec. And our members: Senator Pierre-Hugues Boisvenu, Quebec; Senator Donna Dasko from Ontario; Senator Marty Deacon, Ontario; Senator Mobina Jaffer from British Columbia; Senator Marty Klyne, Saskatchewan; Senator Terry Mercer, Nova Scotia; Senator Victor Oh, Ontario; Senator Ravalia representing Newfoundland; Senator David Richards from New Brunswick; and Senator Hassan Yussuff, Ontario.
Senators, today we begin our study on security and defence in the Arctic including military infrastructure and security capabilities, matters that have taken on evermore importance since we agreed on this study several weeks ago.
We are pleased to welcome today from Global Affairs Canada, Kevin Hamilton, Director General, International Security Policy; Stephen Randall, Director, Oceans, Environmental and Aerospace Law Division; and Heidi Lorraine Kutz, Senior Arctic Official and Director General for Arctic, Eurasian, and European Affairs. From Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada, Wayne Walsh, Director General, Northern Strategic Policy Branch, Northern Affairs Organization. From the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces Major-General M.C. Wright, Commander, Canadian Forces Intelligence Command and Chief of Defence Intelligence; Brigadier-General Pascal Godbout, Commander, Joint Task Force North; and Jonathan Quinn, Director, General Continental Policy.
Thank you all for joining us today by videoconference. We will begin by inviting you to provide your opening remarks which will be followed by questions from our members.
We will open today with remarks from Global Affairs Canada. Mr. Hamilton, the floor is yours.
Kevin Hamilton, Director General, International Security Policy, Global Affairs Canada: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Good afternoon, senators. We welcome the opportunity to join you today to discuss the evolving security environment in the Arctic.
In security terms, Canadians have long benefited from the protection afforded by our geography, and this is particularly true of our Northern approaches, although this factor is changing.
[Translation]
Since the end of the Cold War, the circumpolar Arctic has been referred to as a region of international cooperation and peace. The region remains peaceful to this day. However, Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine shows Russia’s lack of respect for basic international principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity.
These principles are the foundation for cooperation in the Arctic. For these reasons, the like-minded Arctic states must respond in a strong and coordinated manner. This includes suspending their cooperation with Russia in regional forums such as the Arctic Council.
In addition, as climate change makes the region more accessible, we’ve seen increased international activity, including by non-Arctic states.
[English]
Alongside considerable opportunities in international shipping, scientific research, tourism and natural resources come safety and security challenges that must be addressed.
China’s interests and ambitions in the Arctic are both economic and geostrategic and mirror its increasing engagement in global governance more broadly. We understand many of the Chinese activities in and around the Arctic have dual-use purposes and could be used to advance China’s strategic and military interests. China views itself, erroneously, as a “near-Arctic” state and has described the polar regions, alongside the seabed and outer space, as one of the world’s new “strategic frontiers.” Canada’s evolving approach to China acknowledges the complexity of the relationship and the need to challenge, compete and cooperate, for instance, on climate change, and coexist as necessary.
Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy Framework and national defence policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged, outline security challenges and risks faced by Canada in the Arctic.
Key initiatives the Government of Canada is taking to mitigate and address these risks and threats include strengthening Canada’s domain awareness, surveillance and command and control capabilities in the Arctic; working closely with allies and partners on Arctic issues; and strengthening the rules-based international order.
Despite increasing tensions, generally, and in the current context of Ukraine between Russia and the West, a quick scan of the circumpolar map shows that Canada shares the Arctic with a number of like-minded Allies and partners. Of the eight members of the Arctic Council, five are NATO allies, and Finland and Sweden are close NATO partners.
Of course, our partnership with the U.S. is of critical importance to North American security. Last year, Prime Minister Trudeau and President Biden signed the Roadmap for a Renewed U.S.-Canada Partnership, which commits Canada and the U.S. to expanding cooperation on continental defence and in the Arctic, including by modernizing NORAD.
My colleagues at National Defence will expand upon NORAD momentarily, but it’s important for me to note that the view of Global Affairs Canada is that investing in our domestic defence and Arctic capabilities allows us to engage more effectively globally.
Canada is also well served by its membership in NATO. As Secretary General Stoltenberg made clear in his address to the Ottawa Conference on Security and Defence on March 9, NATO “will protect and defend every inch of Allied territory.” This territory, of course, includes the Canadian Arctic.
[Translation]
While geopolitical tensions are the focus of today’s discussions, we must remember that global climate change remains a serious threat to the Arctic and its people, including Indigenous communities.
[English]
In this respect, Canada continues to show leadership on climate issues, including how climate impacts our security. Global Affairs Canada and the Department of National Defence are working together to establish a NATO Centre of Excellence on Climate and Security in Canada, which we hope will be operational by summer 2023, subject to NATO approval processes.
Climate change impacts on the Arctic security environment will be one of the many topics that Canada and our allies will address through this new centre of excellence.
[Translation]
Despite the heightened tensions and competition, like-minded Arctic states must continue to defend and strengthen the rules-based international order in the Arctic in order to address global challenges and seize regional opportunities.
Thank you.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Hamilton. Next, we will hear from the Department of National Defence. Major-General Wright, please proceed if you are ready.
Major-General M.C. Wright, Commander, Canadian Forces Intelligence Command and Chief of Defence Intelligence, Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces: Mr. Chair and senators, thank you very much for the invitation this afternoon to speak on Arctic security issues from a defence intelligence perspective.
I’m the Commander of Canadian Forces Intelligence Command (CFINTCOM) and Chief of Defence Intelligence. In the role of Commander of CFINTCOM, I exercise command and control over the uniformed members in the command on behalf of the Chief of the Defence Staff. I am also double-headed as the Chief of Defence Intelligence, where I am directly accountable to the deputy minister and to the Chief of the Defence Staff for providing oversight, policy direction and integration of the defence intelligence enterprise.
It’s worth highlighting that defence intelligence is the only all-source intelligence enterprise within Canada. This is an important point in the context of the Arctic. For example, some of the defence capabilities, such as geospatial intelligence and technical and scientific intelligence, are the only ones available to the Government of Canada to assess the impact of climate change on Arctic security.
With regard to Arctic security issues, Russia and China are the state actors that pose the greatest threats to Canadian and other Western interests in the Arctic. CFINTCOM has long assessed that Russia views the Arctic as critical to its overall national security and to its economic development and prosperity. As the Chief of the Defence Staff recently stated, the threat of a Russian incursion into Canada’s Arctic is low. However, Russia is militarizing their north. For example, they have reoccupied formerly abandoned Cold War bases, and as we look at the North and the relatively low population density, it is not inconceivable that our sovereignty may be challenged.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine late last month will also undermine the effectiveness of Arctic governance and may lead to heightened security tensions in the Arctic as Russia’s policy goal to maintain the region as a low-tension zone of peace is thrown into question by its escalating military aggression against its neighbour.
To turn to China, China is also developing a foothold in the Arctic region by the need to acquire additional energy and food sources and shortened shipping routes. A self-styled “near-Arctic state,” China has yet to conduct military activities in the Arctic, limiting its deployments to the sub-Arctic waters of the Bering and Baltic Seas. However, China employs a wide range of below-threshold tactics in the Arctic, using all levels of state power while avoiding direct confrontation and assuaging concerns about malicious intent.
Finally, we are seeing the impacts of climate change in the region. With the melting of sea ice, access to the region and associated activities are increasing, and this will have a significant impact on the security situation in the Arctic.
Mr. Chair, this concludes my opening remarks. Along with my fellow colleagues on the panel, I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Major-General. I understand that Brigadier-General Godbout and Mr. Quinn would like to introduce themselves briefly. Brigadier-General Godbout, please go ahead.
Brigadier-General Pascal Godbout, Commander, Joint Task Force North, Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces: Mr. Chair and senators, thank you for this opportunity to speak about Arctic security. I am speaking to you from Sambaa K’e on Chief Drygeese territory in Treaty 8, the traditional home of the Yellowknife Dene and the North Slave Métis. This land is also known as Yellowknife, Northwest Territories.
The role of Joint Task Force North is to lead Canadian Armed Forces Northern operations across all three territories. My responsibilities do not include coordination of NORAD operations or search and rescue, which fall under other organizations.
[Translation]
The permanent presence of the Canadian Armed Forces in the North consists of approximately 340 defence team members and 1,350 Canadian Rangers. Canadian Armed Forces personnel and infrastructure are located in Whitehorse, Yellowknife, Inuvik, Iqaluit, Canadian Forces Station Alert, Resolute, Fort Eureka and Nanisivik. We also have Canadian Rangers in 65 of the 72 northern communities. There are 47 North Warning System sites in Canada.
The activities of Joint Task Force North can be grouped into four roles: the demonstration of a visible and ongoing presence; surveillance and monitoring; support for the people and communities in the North; and cooperation with the government as a whole.
[English]
Partnerships are critical to our success. As such, we routinely collaborate with other federal departments, territorial and Indigenous governments, academia and international partners. We plan and execute deliberate operations throughout the year, which include Operation NANOOK, specifically the following: Op NANOOK NUNALIVUT, demonstrating our ability to project and sustain forces in the High Arctic under the harshest conditions, testing capabilities as well as interoperability with allies; Op NANOOK TATIGIT, a whole-of-government operation focused on cooperation in addressing key threats identified by territorial governments; Op NANOOK NUNAKPUT, which is focused on increasing our presence and surveillance along the Northwest Passage in cooperation with mission partners; and Op NANOOK TUUGAALIK, demonstrating the Royal Canadian Navy’s ability to project and consult surveillance in the North and operate with partners and allies.
Then we have Operation LIMPID to keep a routine watch over Canada’s aerospace, maritime and land domains and Op NEVUS, the annual maintenance of the High Arctic Data Communication System.
[Translation]
We also carry out contingency operations when required. These include Operation LASER, the Canadian Armed Forces’ response to a global pandemic situation; Operation LENTUS, the Canadian Armed Forces’ response to natural disasters in Canada; and support for ground search and rescue operations coordinated by other organizations.
[English]
Finally, as I mentioned, partnerships are critical to our success, and we participate in various forums that advance that collaboration. This includes the Arctic Security Working Group, the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable, Advancing Collaboration in Canada-U.S. Arctic Regional Security, or ACCUSARS, Arctic symposiums and various engagements throughout the year.
Thank you again, Mr. Chair and I’ll be happy to answer questions on these roles and activities.
The Chair: Thank you, brigadier-general.
We move now to Mr. Quinn.
Jonathan Quinn, Director, General Continental Policy, Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces: Thank you very much. Good afternoon, Mr. Chair and honourable senators. Thank you for the opportunity to speak about Arctic security and our current efforts to strengthen continental defence.
My name is Jonathan Quinn, Director, General Continental Policy at the Department of National Defence. My division is responsible for strategic policy development in the areas of continental and Arctic defence, NORAD modernization and the military use of cyberspace and other emerging capabilities.
To help frame this discussion, I’ll speak briefly to the policy direction that’s guiding National Defence’s current efforts in the Arctic, the evolving Arctic security environment, and we’ll also touch very briefly on future plans, in particular with respect to NORAD modernization.
Canada’s defence policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged, released in 2017, provided a strong foundation for Canada’s defence and outlined a number of capability investments supporting domestic and continental defence, including the acquisition of new Arctic and offshore patrol ships, a new fleet of fighter aircraft, remotely piloted aerial systems and space-based surveillance and communications capabilities.
The policy also notes the importance of conducting joint exercises with Arctic allies and partners and enhancing situational awareness and information sharing in the Arctic, including with NATO.
Our work is also informed by the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework, which was released in 2019, and which includes a safety, security and defence chapter that reinforces the guidance and commitments made in Strong, Secure, Engaged and also reiterates the need for the Canadian Armed Forces to enhance its ability to operate in the Arctic.
Importantly, our approach to bolstering our defence capabilities has been grounded in strengthening our partnerships with other government departments and provincial, territorial and Indigenous governments.
In the time since those two guiding policies documents were published, the Arctic security environment has continued to evolve. The Canadian Arctic is warming at three times the global average. This reality is changing the region’s physical and geostrategic landscape, with wide-ranging implications for Canada’s security and defence. From a practical perspective, melting permafrost and coastal erosion creates challenges for northern infrastructure. Increasing activity in the region can be expected to increase demand for Canadian Armed Forces safety and security operations, including search and rescue.
Strategic competitors are actively pursuing interests in the Arctic that run counter to our own, increasing the importance of situational awareness and response capabilities for our military. And we’re also concerned with military threats that can reach North America through the Arctic.
Overall, we view the Arctic to be at an inflection point where strategic competition, climate change, technological advancements and economic interests are coming together in a way that makes this region more strategically important than ever before.
This evolving Arctic landscape is at the root of the commitments made by the Prime Minister with President Biden in February 2021 under the Roadmap for a Renewed U.S.-Canada Partnership, which reinforced the urgency of our work with respect to expanding cooperation with the U.S. on continental defence and in the Arctic.
More recently, the Minister of National Defence and Secretary of Defense issued a joint statement to guide collaboration on the modernization of the North American Aerospace Defense Command and to lay out a series of priority areas for investment. The requirement to modernize NORAD and strengthen Arctic defences also features prominently in Minister Anand’s mandate letter.
We are actively working to fulfill these outstanding commitments and look forward to your questions. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Quinn. We now move to our final speaker, Mr. Wayne Walsh.
Wayne Walsh, Director General, Northern Strategic Policy Branch, Northern Affairs Organization, Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada: Thank you very much. I’m joining you today from the traditional and unceded territory of the Anishinaabe and Algonquin people, from lovely downtown Gatineau.
Following those overviews from the Department of National Defence and Global Affairs, I will provide a brief overview of our department’s role in the Arctic from the safety-security perspective.
Mr. Vandal, the minister responsible for Northern Affairs, has been mandated to work with the Minister of National Defence and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and partners to defend Arctic sovereignty and implement the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework to create a future where Canada’s northern and Arctic residents are thriving, strong and safe.
[Translation]
Released in September 2019, the framework aligns Canada’s national and international policy objectives with the priorities of northerners. It provides overarching direction for the federal government’s priorities, activities and investments in the Arctic until 2030.
[English]
The framework builds on eight overarching themes: people and communities; strong economies; comprehensive infrastructure; environment and biodiversity; science and Indigenous knowledge; global leadership; safety, security and defence; and reconciliation. It is an inclusive approach to the Arctic, with regional and distinction-based lenses, while integrating domestic and international dimensions.
Since its release, the Government of Canada has made significant investments in the area, reflective of both framework priorities and the direct advocacy of framework partners, including investments in housing, northern post-secondary education, transportation infrastructure and climate change and mitigation and adaptation initiatives.
Additionally, the collaborative process used to co-develop the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework continues to inform the implementation of Canada’s Arctic and northern pandemic response measures. Since April 2020, the Government of Canada has made targeted investments of over $850 million towards Arctic and northern communities to support territorial response efforts as well as individuals and businesses.
Building strong relationships, making progress towards reconciliation with northern and Indigenous partners is of paramount importance in all the work we do in the Arctic.
In the Canadian Arctic, reconciliation starts with upholding and full implementation of the collection of modern treaties and self-government agreements that cover the region. These relationships with Arctic-Indigenous people are based on the affirmation of rights, respect, cooperation and partnership.
This measure will complete other work already under way in Canada with Indigenous partners to advance reconciliation and renew the relationship.
For instance, the establishment of the Inuit-Crown Partnership Committee, a bilateral mechanism for advancing work on shared priority areas between the Inuit and the federal government, reflects a shared commitment to a renewed Inuit-Crown relationship and reconciliation based on the affirmation of rights, respect, cooperation and partnership.
[Translation]
Throughout this overview, I’ll show how the department and Canada in general are taking an inclusive approach to integrating northern Indigenous peoples into policy implementation in the Arctic.
[English]
During the co-development phase of the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework, engagements with northerners, and particularly Indigenous northerners, revealed a strong desire to be involved in northern security and defence initiatives, including procurement projects, supporting the Canadian Rangers, and search and rescue efforts as well as increasing situational awareness.
This interest is reflected in goal 7 of the framework that “The Canadian Arctic and North and its people are safe, secure and well defended.”
Internationally, our department plays an important role in the promotion of circumpolar cooperation amongst Arctic nations and advances the Arctic and northern priorities in the framework by participating in the Arctic Council, including through the Sustainable Development Working Group, and the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme.
We at Northern Affairs have a particular interest in ensuring that the Arctic Council remains a strong and effective international forum for northerners and Indigenous peoples and that current strategic pause results in the timely identification of appropriate modalities for continuing to advance the council’s important work.
The most recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report outlines that widespread and rapid climate change has occurred at an unprecedented scale and that human-induced climate change is already affecting many weather and climate extremes. Canada’s Arctic is already warming three times faster than the global average. Northern communities, especially Indigenous and remote communities, are among the most exposed and sensitive to climate change impacts due to their location and the fact that impacts of climate change are layered and amplified by other socio-economic challenges, including the legacy of colonialism, the core infrastructure deficit, lack of adequate housing and high rates of food insecurity.
Climate change compounds existing infrastructure, safety and well-being risks in Northern communities, and concurrent impacts increase the severity of effects. Impacts extend to homes; water quality and quantity; land use; safety; food security; biodiversity; culture and identity; knowledge and understanding; and mental, physical and social health.
Although the loss of sea ice may offer some opportunities for economic self-reliance in the North, many operational difficulties are simultaneously arising just as quickly, in some cases, as the climate changes.
The loss of sea ice also presents challenges and heightens risks by creating additional hazards out on the land and at sea. Challenges include concerns around safety, security, defence, diplomacy and sovereignty.
Indigenous and Northern leaders have been sounding the alarm and identifying priorities for climate action, including the recognition of Indigenous knowledge, capacity building, measures to adapt community and transportation infrastructure, and preparedness efforts to reduce the impacts of fires and floods. Strengthening resiliency to climate impacts across the North will be a key contributor to increased Northern security.
In recent years, we’ve seen an increased international attention and interest in the Arctic as a region, driven in part by increased access due to climate change, as just discussed. We can see this through the growing numbers of updated and new Arctic policies from Arctic and non-Arctic states alike, along with the increased activity, investments and development of capability in the region.
Our department works closely with all our partners in the region, including organizations across the federal government, territorial and municipal governments, and Indigenous partners, on opportunities and challenges associated with this increase in international interest in the region. We have made great strides in recent years in developing and strengthening the existing fora to make progress on all issues affecting our Arctic communities, including through the co-implementation of the framework and the Arctic Council’s Sustainable Development Working Group.
[Translation]
Thank you for your time today.
[English]
I’m available to respond to any questions you may have as they pertain to the CIRNAC’s mandate and the Minister of Northern Affair’s responsibility in this realm. Thank you very much.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Walsh, and thanks to all panellists for their opening statements. We’re now going to proceed to questions. Please note that four minutes will be allocated for each question, including the answer, so I ask that senators keep their questions succinct in an effort to allow as many interventions as possible.
I’d like to offer the first question to our deputy chair.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: My questions are for Brigadier-General Godbout. You know that, in order to effectively protect our territory, we must first be properly equipped. The government has finally — and I mean “finally” — acknowledged what our reports have been saying for years. You’ll appreciate that I’ve been on this committee for 10 years. We believe that we aren’t living up to the expectations of our allies. What equipment do you need to purchase as soon as possible to respond to the new threats that we’re facing now?
BGen. Godbout: Thank you, senator, for your question. I’ll stick to my area of operations, mainly the three territories.
In terms of capabilities, we’re already making investments. Canada has announced the acquisition of multiple capabilities.
First, we have the Arctic and offshore patrol ships. We already have two in service: the Harry DeWolf, the first Navy vessel to cross the Northwest Passage since 1954, and the Margaret Brooke, which will operate with the Harry DeWolf beginning in the summer, starting with Operation NANOOK through the Northwest Passage. We estimate that the sixth ship will be ready in 2025. These are key capabilities to ensure that we can effectively monitor activities in the Northwest Passage.
Next came the announcement of a fleet of new fighter jets, which should be available as early as 2025. We have Canadian warships. We have remotely piloted aircraft systems that will operate in the territories. Lastly, we have space communications and surveillance capabilities, which are also key to showing an understanding of all air, land, sea and space environments. These capabilities, which are already in the process of being acquired, will play a key role in our ability to operate.
Outside my purview, but still affecting the territories, there were the announcements referred to by the Department of National Defence in collaboration with the United States Secretary of Defense in August 2021 regarding the modernization of NORAD. We also have a recent contract announced to maintain the current system at the North Warning sites. These capabilities are very important.
Apart from that, certainly additional investments are needed in infrastructure in the North to ensure that the Canadian Armed Forces can launch and support operations in the entire region. The major challenge is that the territory is huge, comprising 40% of Canada, and it has a widely dispersed population. As a result, we need flexible infrastructure that enables us to send forces wherever they’re needed throughout the three territories. It isn’t necessarily a matter of increasing the number of permanent troops in the region, but rather of having flexible infrastructure with multiple objectives. One ongoing investment concerns the Inuvik airfield, where investments were announced in 2019 to expand and upgrade the airfield. This will affect NORAD operations as much as other Canadian Armed Forces operations.
Thank you.
Senator Dagenais: Do I have time for another question?
[English]
The Chair: We will come back to you on a second round.
Senator Richards: Thank you to the witnesses. This question is for any witness who wishes to respond.
Canadian sovereignty has been challenged for years, sometimes by our NATO partners and sometimes by the United States itself — I remember in NORAD — certainly by Denmark. So we’re facing a far greater crisis with China and Russia.
My question is along the lines of that of Senator Dagenais. I don’t know when we’re going to get equipment up to speed to handle this. We have F-18s from Australia that are pretty well mothballed and our frigate program is behind schedule. We have 1,500 rangers in the North — and I applaud every one of them — but as you know, that’s a huge territory for 1,500 rangers. I’m wondering how and when more personnel and infrastructure are going to be implemented and able to hold our territory. Russia and China do not care for our sovereignty, sirs. That question is for anyone who wishes to answer it.
Mr. Quinn: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. I’ll take a start, and then others may wish to jump in as well. Thank you very much for the question.
I think Brigadier-General Godbout already noted some of the investments in new capabilities that are relevant to the Arctic that are already in train as a result of Strong, Secure, Engaged, but I would point out as well in addition to that, and Minister Anand has recently been quoted at various events to say that she’s very close to making some proposals, announcements related to NORAD modernization and broader investments in northern capabilities to strengthen continental defence. It’s been written in her mandate letter that this is a commitment that the Prime Minister expects her to fulfill. It’s also been mentioned in some of the opening remarks of President Biden and the Prime Minister to the Roadmap for a Renewed U.S.-Canada Partnership, which committed to deepening collaboration to modernizing NORAD.
Without getting into the details about what those announcements in the near future might yield, I would just flag that it certainly recognized that the investments that have been made to date and the announcements made to date are not sufficient to meet the evolving threat environment. There is more that is planned, and we look forward to being able to share more details on those once decisions have been taken.
In the meantime, what I would do, Mr. Chair, is point the committee members to the Joint Statement on Norad Modernization that was released by the former minister and his U.S. counterpart Secretary of Defense Austin back in August, which laid out four key priority areas for shared investment.
This is specific to NORAD, but a lot of the investments from the Canadian perspective that are identified there would be focused in the Arctic, just based on our geography. Those first of the four key priority areas is surveillance, being able to better understand the potential threats that are coming our way in the North. Second is modernizing command and control capabilities so when you have additional information from new sensors, the ability to analyze that quickly using high technology, new technologies like artificial intelligence, machine learning, and so on, to be able to make quicker decisions as the second key priority. The third key priority area, once you have a better sense of what’s coming, and you can make quick decisions, you need to have the capabilities to actually respond, and from Canada’s perspective, some of those announcements have already been made in the form of the new fighter aircraft and Arctic and offshore patrol ships. As has been mentioned by others, improving the Canadian Armed Forces Arctic infrastructure will be a big part of that. The fourth and final priority area for investment that’s laid out in that Joint Statement on Norad Modernization is research and development. We know that, as you mentioned, Russia and China are the principal competitors or potential adversaries in this part of the world. We know that they are investing heavily in modernized capabilities. We need to keep up with them, ideally keep ahead of them, but also keep up with our key allies in terms of the investments they are making in modern capabilities.
I would just leave it there. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Quinn. I’m sure we’ll be returning to this topic.
Senator Ravalia: Thank you to the witnesses.
My question is whether or not the Department of National Defence cooperates with Fisheries and Oceans Canada, or DFO, to ensure that marine life in the Arctic is not adversely impacted by enhanced security measures and Arctic initiatives.
I’ll leave any one of you to answer that question. Thank you.
Mr. Quinn: I suspect Brigadier-General Godbout might have a few additional remarks.
I won’t speak specifically about coordination with DFO, but one of the things I would mention is that we certainly take a keen interest and recognize climate change as one of the key drivers of defence and security interests in the Arctic but also around Canada writ large. And we’re certainly looking to, as we adapt Canadian Armed Forces operations and infrastructure to the changing physical environment, also recognize that mitigating the Canadian Armed Forces’ own impact and contributions to climate change is an equal if not more important aspect of that as well.
So there are other colleagues in the Department of National Defence that would be better placed to speak in specific detail about the measures that the Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces are taking to minimize our carbon footprint, to modernize infrastructure, to reduce our use of fossil fuels, and to achieve net-zero targets. It’s a fairly significant effort, but I would leave that to future sessions and meetings of the committee to respond.
I’m not sure if Brigadier-General Godbout may have more to add to that, Mr. Chair. Thank you.
The Chair: Please go ahead, Brigadier-General, if you’re ready.
BGen. Godbout: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
We do work very closely with the Canadian Coast Guard in the coordination of all our operations. In fact, as part of our Operation NANOOK, the Coast Guard and the Navy operate very closely together.
I can say that the Royal Canadian Navy takes very seriously the topic of welfare of marine mammals and marine life, and there are new technologies I’m aware of being tested to automate detection of maritime life in the area and to ensure that we adhere to the Oceans Protection Plan that is put in place by the federal government.
For additional details, I would have to defer the question to the Royal Canadian Navy to highlight exactly how they coordinate and the measures they have in place to protect marine life.
Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you.
Senator Mercer: Thank you, witnesses, for being here.
I would like to begin by acknowledging that I am joining you from the ancestral and unceded territory of the Mi’kmaq people. I have a whole bunch of questions, so I’ll try to be quick, and I will probably want to go in the second round, chair, if there is a second round.
I want to talk about the benefit of the new Arctic patrol vessels which are being built right here in Halifax. It’s a great program from an employment point of view, but I wonder at the effectiveness of these smaller vessels and what I see as the lack of severe armament on these vessels.
Can we demonstrate that these vessels are the ones that are in service now, the Harry DeWolf and others? Can we demonstrate the effectiveness of those, and is this investment that Canada has made paying off in security in the Arctic?
BGen. Godbout: Mr. Chair, I’m happy to take this question.
With regards to the current threat, as Major-General Wright alluded to, the immediate threat in the North is not in the maritime and land domain. For me, the importance of the Arctic offshore patrol vessels in the North is to demonstrate the ability for us to control access to our internal waters.
The other aspect of this is to be able to respond to any requests for assistance from territorial governments in case of any maritime major disasters that could happen as we see increased activity in various sectors in the Arctic.
They are lightly armed — that is true — but for the type of functions that we expect out of the vessels within the Canadian Arctic, I believe that it is an impressive capability. I had the pleasure to go on board the Harry DeWolf when they sailed through, and the fact that they can carry troops across the vast territory, embark and disembark troops to the various areas where we may need them, and patrol the waters and improve our maritime situational awareness is extremely beneficial. Thank you.
The Chair: Any supplement from any of our other guests?
Senator Mercer: Final question on the Arctic patrol vessels: is there a way for us to speed up construction of the vessels as we go along? The need has now become critical with the activity of Mr. Putin in Ukraine and also the arrival of the Chinese in the Arctic. Is there a way of speeding that up? Of course, we work at a disadvantage because we have no actual port in the Arctic to act as a base. Any comments?
Mr. Quinn: I will say very quickly this is a little bit outside of the lane of the witnesses we have today. Our ADM for procurement and his team would be better placed to answer specific questions about the production schedule for the vessel, and I would turn it over to Brigadier-General Godbout just in case he has anything to add. He’s already mentioned the schedule that’s in place for the six Arctic offshore patrol ships, which would have all six delivered by 2025 — currently one in operation and another accepted back by the Royal Canadian Navy — but I don’t believe, unless I’m mistaken, that any one of the witnesses today can speak to the possibility of speeding up the production schedule, chair.
The Chair: We can come back to that in later sessions if we need to, but thank you very much for now.
Senator Oh: Thank you, witnesses. My question is about our Canadian High Arctic Research Station. I had the honour of travelling with some senators up there a few years ago to visit on the Arctic tour and study, and I happened to be at Cambridge Bay, Nunavut, when this state-of-the-art research facility was just completed and ready for operation.
I was told at the time that Korean scientists and Japanese scientists were invited to do research at the station. Can someone update us on what happened now with the research station, and how does it help to increase our defence, and also, does it work together with the military section of Canada? Thank you.
BGen. Godbout: Mr. Chair, I would be happy to take a first go at this answer.
So a couple of things to clarify. CHARS falls under Polar Knowledge Canada, so I would have to defer to them to answer the progress on their activities. They are not affiliated with the Department of National Defence. However, I can say that we do collaborate with them when we do conduct patrols or operations in Cambridge Bay. We connect with the facility manager and the CEO of Polar Knowledge Canada. In fact, we just had a reconnaissance team that was there last week to coordinate with them how we can ensure mutually beneficial activities as we project across our area of responsibility. Thank you.
Mr. Walsh: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I think the brigadier-general has done a very good job of summarizing what I was going to say, so thank you.
Senator M. Deacon: Thank you for being here this afternoon. I have a couple of questions, but I also think I’ll give National Defence a bit of a break because procurement and combat-ready is really critical and becoming more critical as we proceed. I’m, however, going to come to Global Affairs for this particular question. Again, thank you all for being here.
I’m wondering, as it was touched on earlier, we’ve seen over the years this increasing encroachment of Russia and China, two countries who have made no secret of their Arctic ambitions. On the other hand, there have been a number of conflicts perhaps between Canada and our traditional allies around sovereignty issues in the Northwest Passage and the legal extent of our continental shelf.
As Russia and China draw closer together, is there any movement on our part to take a zero-sum approach to Arctic sovereignty with our traditional allies in the area? Might it be better to present a more united, supranational front in the Arctic in the face of increasing China-Russia cooperation, even if that means there may be a sacrifice of some national sovereignty for the sake of a stronger, united defence posture?
Mr. Hamilton: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I will take a first shot at that and then perhaps turn over to some of my colleagues, Heidi Kutz and Stephen Randall.
The senator is quite correct in that in the past there have been disputes — I certainly wouldn’t call them conflicts — with respect to the Northwest Passage, Hans Island vis-à-vis Greenland and Denmark. I would say in recent years, though, we have come to some accommodations and some understandings with those two countries in particular about how we see our sovereignty in the Arctic. There has been some agreement to disagree, but there’s also been some progress on both of those issues.
With respect to Russia and China, that is a complex relationship, but we’re alive to the fact that there are some areas of cooperation between those two countries, and China may indeed seek to leverage a lot of the new infrastructure that the Russians have built in their High Arctic. We see the two countries as distinct and having distinct interests, but there are areas of convergence that we are concerned about and that issues like NORAD modernization and our enhanced defence and surveillance capability in the North, we hope, will be able to put us in better stead.
I don’t know if one or both of Heidi or Stephen — Stephen is our director of oceans law and has a detailed knowledge of the Northwest Passage — would like to comment as well.
Stephen Randall, Director, Oceans, Environmental and Aerospace Law Division, Global Affairs Canada: I can comment, Kevin. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chair, with respect to the Northwest Passage, we see that in Canada as internal waters by virtue of the historic title, and that is not the same view as the United States. However, it’s a disagreement that’s well managed. We do have an agreement with the United States from 1988, the Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America on Arctic Cooperation, which allows us to manage that particular disagreement.
With respect to the boundary issues, we have only two. We have one with Denmark and Greenland on the eastern side with Hans Island. There is a current task force between the two nations that is working on a settlement for that particular issue. On the western side, there is the disagreement over the Beaufort Sea and how far the Alaska land boundary goes, whether it goes into the maritime areas or whether it then curves off into an equidistant line. That will depend a lot on what happens with the continental shelf which is beyond 200 nautical miles because both countries decided many years ago that they would solve the inside 200 and outside 200 as a package.
So both are quite well managed and both are moving towards a resolution, hopefully soon.
Heidi Lorraine Kutz, Senior Arctic Official and Director General for Arctic, Eurasian, and European Affairs, Global Affairs Canada: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I will leave it at that. I don’t have anything to add on top of my colleagues’ comments.
Senator Dasko: First of all, I’d like to acknowledge that I was a recent guest on the Harry DeWolf, 24 hours on Harry, and I’m very grateful to have been a guest. We did not go to the Arctic. We just went around the bay in Halifax and out to the ocean for 24 hours and then took a tour of the submarine Windsor the following day. I want to acknowledge and say that I was tremendously grateful to be a guest of Vice-Admiral Baines and his colleagues, and I really appreciated that. I felt I learned a great deal, so thank you very much for that opportunity.
I have to say after touring the Windsor submarine, I have to say that Harry is rather palatial compared to the digs on the submarine.
In any case, I want to drill down more about the Ukrainian situation, because when I look at what has happened with the invasion of Ukraine, it seems as if our world has changed. I want to get a sense from you as to whether the events in Ukraine represent some sort of tipping point in the way we are viewing Arctic security issues.
Do you see it as a tipping point where we have to make real changes that would respond to the situation, or, in fact, are the plans that we have made sufficient; and the directions that we are going, are those sufficient to deal with this incredible situation that we find ourselves in?
The Chair: Thank you, Senator Dasko. That’s an absolutely critical question at this point, I think we’d all agree.
Mr. Hamilton: I’m sure my colleagues at National Defence and in the CAF will have something to say about this.
The question as to whether the situation in Ukraine means that something has changed: yes, but geography has not changed. That would be my initial reaction.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine is egregious and illegal — and take whatever other adjective you can imagine — but it is a function of geography as well. Here you have two neighbouring countries that have a long land border and a Russian regime intent on invasion. We don’t have that same situation vis-à-vis Russia in the Arctic. Unlike our NATO ally Norway, we don’t share a land border with Russia. It’s not the same strategic calculation.
I don’t think what is continuing to happen outrageously in Ukraine changes our military analysis, but it does make us have a second thought about Russia’s view of the world and Putin’s intent. He’s made very clear that he is running a regime that is expansionist and that wants to, in his view, right past historical wrongs. So to the extent that he is taking his country in a more militant direction, that is something we have to be worried about, not only in the European context, but with respect to our own Arctic as well.
MGen. Wright: I would like to respond to the question about whether it is a tipping point. That is difficult to say, but since February 24, the world has changed because of the illegal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.
As Chief of the Defence Staff General Eyre said over the weekend on CBC’s “The House,” is this a 1914 moment; is it a 1945 moment? I’ve been in the military for 30 years. I joined as the Cold War was ending. I have been through 9/11. What does this represent for the future?
We can say that Russia has long considered themselves, prior to the invasion of Ukraine, to be in conflict with the West already. When we look at Russia and China, both of those nations seek to work around the established rules-based international order in a way that fits their authoritarian world view and their own national interests.
The Chair: There’s time for one brief comment if anyone would like to add to this. It’s a pretty big question.
Mr. Quinn: The question about whether or not we have what we need to deal with this changing environment and do we have the capabilities we need, I would agree with what others have said about the extent to which what we’re seeing in Ukraine marks a significant real change.
I wanted to add that the efforts to modernize NORAD and to strengthen continental defence that I mentioned a few moments ago would be forthcoming soon.
I won’t say that we predicted that Putin would invade Ukraine in the way that he has, but we certainly, for a number of years now, have been observing trends: the return to kind of strategic competition between major powers, a hardening of positions, a greater willingness by some of our key competitors or potential adversaries to go to fairly extreme lengths to advance their own interests at the expense of ours. All of these observations have been taken into account in the context of the proposals that are going forward, and we’re expecting a decision soon.
We have recognized for some time that the world is changing and new types of capabilities are needed to succeed and to properly defend Canada and Canadian interests in this new environment. We’re hoping to move forward with some of those in the very near future. Thank you.
Senator Dasko: Thank you.
Senator Yussuff: Thank you, witnesses, for being here today. My question is two points. First, the North is changing at a rapid rate that we couldn’t have predicted 10 or 15 years ago with climate change. The strategic interests of the North, of course, are vastly of bigger importance to Canada today than at any time.
Given the speed in which climate change is bringing about change in the North, has the military accelerated its perspective on how we can defend the North, given the speed of climate change, or enhanced our ability to recognize that everything in the North is going to change at a speed we could not have predicted 10 or 15 years ago?
BGen. Godbout: Indeed, climate change and the growing level of activity in the Arctic does increase the risk of both natural and human-caused disasters in the Canadian North. This is where we need to look at beyond traditional military trap in the defence of the Arctic that we’ve been talking about, but really overall Arctic security.
What we’ve been seeing is an increase in both the complexity and the frequency of domestic response operations that have been coordinated by Joint Task Force North in the region. We’ve been preparing for this through various means.
First, the Arctic Security Working Group has provided us a holistic forum for federal, territorial and Indigenous governments to discuss these concerns, alongside with academia, non-government organizations and the northern communities that are affected.
This has enabled us to share observations and best practices to improve our knowledge of how the North is changing and increase our readiness.
Then we transition to things like operation NANOOK TATIGIT, where we have live exercises that provide us an annual opportunity to explore the threats of concern to the territorial emergency management organization and conducting scenario-based live exercises. This has really proved beneficial to us. This was a factor in the success of recent CAF response to request for assistance under Operation LENTUS, that happened successively in the past year. Thank you, senator.
Senator Yussuff: Given the economic interest that will now be part of our strategic interest in the North, for the first time in our history we’re going to have new shipping corridors in the North. Has the military analysis of how we protect that corridor changed in regard to our approach and how we defend the North?
BGen. Godbout: Mr. Chair, I will take this one as well. Obviously for us, surveillance and control of the North is critical. This starts with all-domain situational awareness. We’ve conducted operations throughout the year to really improve our situational awareness, especially with maritime situational awareness. We have had a reprieve in the past few years with the pandemic as there were tight controls with regard to any vessels heading through the Northwest Passage due to concern for the northern communities in exposing them to potential intercommunity transmission of COVID-19.
However, as activities resume, close monitoring of ships will be important. Again, I’m looking at threats other than military vessels. We’re talking about other illicit or undetected activity. This is a whole-of-government effort to see how we respond to this.
However, it is also around legitimate activities: maritime disasters, search and rescue operations that might be required as a result and other environmental disasters might occur.
So I do believe we have explored a variety of scenarios to be prepared to react to this. Pan-government coordination to react to these types of scenarios has been rehearsed, and I believe we are well prepared. Thank you.
Senator Jaffer: Thank you to all of you for your presentations. I’ve learnt a lot.
I had a similar question as Senator Dasko, but mine wasn’t about a tipping point; mine was about a wake-up call. Since what’s happened in Ukraine started, is the focus going to change or is it too early to say? I wanted to have Global Affairs answer.
Mr. Hamilton: Once again, I’m happy to defer to Ms. Kutz if she has any views because she’s responsible not only for the Arctic Council but also bilateral relations with both Russia and Ukraine.
As I said, I think the biggest change and the biggest wake-up call, as the senator characterizes it, is that there can be no going backward to a business-as-usual situation with Russia. Mr. Putin dealt his hand in 2014 when he illegally invaded and annexed Crimea, but there was still — I wouldn’t suggest in Canada — but there was in various capitals around the world still this idea that those nations could still have a somewhat normal relationship with Russia. That is entirely off the table now.
In addition to violating Ukraine, Mr. Putin has discredited his own country. He has pulled his country into major global disrepute. So we will have to adjust our diplomacy, security analysis and, indeed, our military posture as a result of that.
How does that affect the Arctic? Once again I say that the situation in Russia and Ukraine is not analogous from a geographic perspective to the security challenges we face in the Arctic, but it is a factor when it speaks to the psychology of the Russian regime and our need to be very aware of our northern approaches and the fact that Russia is our distant neighbour but a neighbour nonetheless.
Heidi, do you want to add anything?
Ms. Kutz: Sure. Thank you very much. I’ll just add a bit about the Arctic environment and the wake-up call, as it was framed.
In response to the actions that Russia has taken, there has been a significant and unprecedented response by the international community — Canada working with partners across the G7, together with the EU — working on two levels to economically impact the Putin administration to cause it to halt its current activities but also to work to politically isolate the decision that the Putin regime has taken.
It’s in that environment — and I’ll just use the example of the Arctic Council and the decision that was taken within it by Canada, together with the Kingdom of Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Sweden, Norway and the United States, to condemn those actions and to reflect on the impact those actions have on our ability to cooperate and uphold the fundamental aspects of that institution of sovereignty, territorial integrity and international law, given that Russia is the current chair of that body.
That particular organization has undertaken a temporary pause as we assess how we can move forward, not only to advance cooperation but also to protect the institution, the work it does and the people that it serves.
Similar decisions have also been made across international organizations dealing in other parts of the North, the High Arctic and around the world.
Those are just a few comments in terms of the broader aspects of that question.
The Chair: They were very helpful. Thank you.
[Translation]
Senator Boisvenu: I want to thank the people here this afternoon.
I think that the red flag triggered by the Ukraine-Russia conflict a few weeks ago should have been raised several years ago, in 2015 or 2016. We must take stock of our assets for protecting the North, but also for dealing with the people who claim that the North belongs to them. When you look at the current situation, in which NORAD needs a complete overhaul, the Russians have finished building their monitoring base in the Arctic Circle, and our North Warning System and NORAD can’t detect new technology on Russian or other aircraft, it’s cause for concern. We must take stock of the situation. Where does Canada stand in terms of its ability to respond militarily and to extend its authority over this territory?
My question is for Major-General Wright, the commander of intelligence for the Canadian Armed Forces, who must be up to date in terms of the information on the status of our troops. Russia has 30 submarines in the North, and we have none. Russia has a number of aircraft that can patrol the North, and we have almost none. Our aircraft, our F-18s, need a complete overhaul. My question is quite straightforward. For how many years do we need to make investments to catch up with the Russians in terms of their northern capability? How many years will it take, given that we’re talking about billions of dollars in investments — not millions, but billions of dollars? In how many years will we be compared to the people who say that the North belongs to them?
MGen. Wright: The senator is very well informed about the dates and the Russian military personnel in terms of the number of submarines and aircraft.
[English]
It’s not really a defence intelligence responsibility to answer about the capabilities. Canadian Forces Intelligence Command makes sure that our leadership, including the Minister of National Defence, is aware of the capabilities that Russia and other countries have so that plans can be made by policy and by operations to be able to confront those capabilities.
[Translation]
Senator Boisvenu: I have tremendous admiration for the Canadian Armed Forces. When you look at our technical response capability, it’s lacking. Everyone agrees with that. In addition, we’re told that we lack 12,000 military personnel in Canada. We have a technical issue and a human resources issue. Even if we had new planes and new submarines tomorrow morning, who would fly them and pilot them? My question is for Major-General Wright or Brigadier-General Godbout. Is there a practical strategy — not just talk — whereby we can look back in a decade or five years and say that we’ve achieved clear technical and human resources objectives? Brigadier-General Godbout?
BGen. Godbout: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I apologize, because neither of those two components of the question fall under my purview. However, I can at least try to answer the question. The recruitment strategy of the Canadian Armed Forces falls under the purview of the chief of military personnel, who could comment on developments in that area.
In terms of a timeline for the development of future capabilities — a development that Mr. Quinn has already described in detail — the question must be referred to headquarters, unfortunately. I don’t have that information. I apologize.
Senator Boisvenu: I completely understand your response and I sympathize with you.
However, you’re on the ground. At some point, you must tell your high command the following: this is what I need to do my job properly on both a technical and personal level. You’re on the ground. The Minister of National Defence won’t determine the needs. She makes the political decision, but you determine the needs. Is this done to assure us that, when we finish our work, we can have a minimum amount of information to give the government a strategy so that Canada does its job properly in the North?
[English]
The Chair: I’m going to intervene. We’ve run a bit over time on this question. We can come back on second round if there is an interest in doing that.
Senator Klyne: Thank you to our panel guests. China’s characterization of itself as a near-Arctic circle is viewed to be erroneous. Nonetheless, China has designs on expanding its scientific engagement in the region, build nuclear-powered icebreakers which increases Arctic transit by, as they say, Chinese civilians but also military vessels. Russia looks to modernize military infrastructure and has its military presence in the Arctic. While a number of these initiatives can be interpreted or played down as part of the normal modernization of aging military infrastructure and other equipment, it still appears to be an investment in hard-power military capabilities and assets.
NATO members take note of this. They are concerned about changes in Russia’s military capabilities in the Arctic; however, Canada views this threat as very low at this moment but, I would assume, takes nothing for granted and will continue to monitor the situation.
The U.S., on the other side, has of late taken interest in the region. Previous to this, the last three years ago, it had little interest in the region until recently when it began to recognize an increase in geopolitical competition with China and Russia in the last two years and has upped its game.
There was a question earlier around concerns relating to Canada’s Arctic sovereignty, including unresolved territorial and maritime disputes and claims, and Denmark was mentioned as one of those unresolved sovereignty issues. But these disputes and claims are often centred on Canada’s control over its jurisdictional waters and the legal status of the Northwest Passage.
I’d like to know where the real issues are in our sovereignty and unreserved territorial maritime disputes, and what is keeping us up at night there and where do we need to focus on?
Since the mid-2000s, we’ve been rebuilding our capabilities. I know shipbuilding is not on time. It’s over budget in a lot of areas. The Arctic is regaining some prominence in our agendas. However, the country’s conventional military presence and CAF’s operating capabilities in the Arctic continue to appear to be limited. The CAF continues to face significant challenges to effective mobilization.
So with the sovereignty, where are we staying up at nights here? On the issue of mobilization for the CAF, where do we stand on that?
The Chair: We’ve got just over a minute where we stand in one sense of the word. We’ll give you a little bit of extra time because these are important questions.
Mr. Quinn: Maybe I can start, and if there’s any comments from Global Affairs on the specific comments about sovereignty and disputes, I would hand it over to my colleagues at Global Affairs Canada.
In terms of the capabilities that we need, what keeps us up at night, these are certainly the kinds of questions we’ve been asking ourselves for some time. In Strong, Secure, Engaged, our current defence policy, I think we previewed some of the challenges we’re seeing in terms of the return to great power competition, the impacts of climate change, but to some extent we’ve been somewhat surprised at how quickly some of those changes are manifesting themselves. Obviously, the crisis in Ukraine is a recent example, but there are other examples, including some of the things that our competitors have been doing well below the threshold of armed conflict in terms of cyberspace, the interference in the democratic process and other things. We’ve certainly been thinking about these things for some time.
As mentioned, we’re in a bit of a tricky time right now in terms of providing details on the plans, and this goes to the previous question as well to some extent. We’re actively pursuing a decision on what these future investments will look like. I am looking forward to being able to share more details on that soon, but certainly we’re taking all of those factors into consideration. They’re all being taken into account as we look ahead to specific investments in new capabilities to strengthen continental defence as outlined in the minister’s mandate letter. A lot of those, as you can imagine, will be centred in the Arctic and Canada’s north.
The Chair: That was a fulsome answer and a very economic one. We’ll move on to round two.
[Translation]
Senator Dagenais: I have a quick question for Brigadier-General Godbout. How many times have you had to respond in the past few months to repel air intrusions over our Arctic territory? Also, how long does it take to respond when an alert is triggered?
BGen. Godbout: Thank you for the question.
Just to be clear, I’m not responsible for NORAD operations. When you talk about intrusions and responses and the associated timelines, that’s a matter for NORAD command. I can’t answer those questions, unfortunately. I apologize. Thank you.
[English]
Senator Mercer: I’ll be very brief and continue on with my earlier questions about our readiness in the Arctic.
One of the big factors missing, not just from a defence point of view but from a development point of view as well, is our ability for shipping to operate in the Arctic. Yes, we can probably now move through the Arctic Ocean and through the Bering Strait and that gives some advantages to shipping; however, for the growth of the Arctic and for us to grow not just the population but the economic impact that activity in the Arctic can have on us, we need some not just military infrastructure, but infrastructure that supports the military, like a port in the Arctic. Where are we with this? We’ve talked about this for years, and various governments — not just this government but previous governments — have talked about putting a port in. Where do we stand with that?
Mr. Quinn: I can start off if that suits, and then I’m not sure if Brigadier-General Godbout may have more to add.
In terms of infrastructure, you are absolutely right that this is critical to the Canadian Armed Forces’ ability to operate effectively in the North, to respond quickly to any range of contingencies. I don’t have an answer for you on the specific question on the port, but I will say that in the course of our work to identify proposals for NORAD modernization and broader strengthening of National Defence, we have been conducting initial consultations with territorial governments through their intergovernmental affairs services and also with Indigenous leadership groups in the North through the Arctic and Northern Policy framework that all partners table with a view to soliciting advice from them on what they need: what are their key priorities from an infrastructure perspective? So as we are advancing our own plans to enhance Canadian Armed Forces infrastructure and potentially build on the current footprint that we’re seeking out and maximizing opportunities for the wider benefits that you mention, for northern communities, whether it be through airfields or other kinds of infrastructure, including communications infrastructure and so on.
As well, research and development, the Canadian Armed Forces share a lot of the same challenges that northern communities have in the Arctic, for example, for power demands. So we’re doing lots of research and development into green power and alternative energy solutions that could yield benefits for northern communities as well. So you’re absolutely right, and that’s certainly going to remain a prime consideration for us as we seek to pursue some of these initiatives in the near future. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
[Translation]
Senator Boisvenu: Once again, I want to thank the people here to shed some light on our mandate to conduct a study on Canada’s situation in the North.
My first question is for the military personnel or for Ms. Kutz, the senior Arctic official. Will the negotiations with the United States regarding the renewal of the NORAD agreement, which dates back to 1958, if my memory serves me correctly, and the agreement to renew detection radars in the North be completed soon? We know that billions of dollars will be invested.
My second question is the following. If there were a conflict between Canada and Russia, is Canada prepared to handle this type of conflict?
[English]
The Chair: The first is arguably an easier question to answer, I hope. So who wants to deal with the radar question?
Mr. Quinn: A great question. Again, I’ll point to the slightly awkward timing but also to the Joint Statement on Norad Modernization that the previous minister released with the Secretary of Defense back in August.
So we have done a considerable amount of coordination, both on the military side in Colorado Springs at the joint headquarters for NORAD where Canadians and Americans have been working on these questions for some time and trying to identify and basically figure out what the key challenges are from a security and threat perspective, what the gaps are and current capabilities and what the priorities are in terms of solutions. So lots of work has been going on.
I mentioned the joint statement on NORAD modernization, which identifies those four key areas of priority for new investments, and among those, certainly the replacement of the capabilities currently provided by the North Warning System will be critical to that.
I won’t get into details again until we have a clearer signal from government about exactly where we’re heading on this, but what I would say is that we don’t necessarily anticipate a one-for-one replacement of the North Warning System. We are facing new challenges across a number of domains. So what we would likely be looking at is a surveillance system of systems that incorporates various elements to provide adequate warning and tracking of aerospace threats to the continent.
The one last thing I would mention about the Joint Statement on Norad Modernization is one of the key things that document does is define what we mean between us and the United States by NORAD modernization. We’ve come to an agreement between the two countries that we’re not looking to open up and expand the missions that NORAD performs but rather to enhance the capabilities that each country has available to fulfill NORAD’s current missions, which are aerospace warning and control and maritime warning. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chair: Does anybody else want to expand on this in terms of the second part of the question on readiness for conflict?
MGen. Wright: Mr. Chair, I’ll perhaps not respond directly to the question of whether we are ready, but I will point out we spoke earlier about the burgeoning relationship between China and Russia. Yes, there are many areas of convergence, but I would say there are also areas of divergence, and it is an unequal partnership. Russia is very much the junior partner, and that will be increasingly so over the coming years.
That is extremely different from our relationships. What I really want to drive home here is the importance of relationships with our allies with NORAD but also with NATO. Because an attack on a NATO country, such as Canada, would be an attack on NATO. This is really this strength of the rules-based international order and of the allies and partnerships which we have nurtured with our closest allies over the last decades.
Senator Dasko: I have a further question about the Arctic Council.
When I was a member of the Senate Special Committee on the Arctic, that was a couple of years ago, we had some witnesses who came and spoke very enthusiastically about the Arctic Council, its roles, its success and so on.
Other witnesses came to our committee to say that they were less enthusiastic, shall we say, about the council and its abilities and successes and so on and felt that a more muscular approach might be better.
So in the changing situation that we have now, my question is about the future roles of the Arctic Council. Can we still look to this council to achieve some of the outcomes that we did in the past? Or is it going to be a casualty of the new situation? Thank you.
Ms. Kutz: Perhaps I’ll take that question. The wonderful thing about my work is that I often come across individuals who have deep roots in the region and deep background in institutions like the Arctic Council.
The council itself now being 25 years and forming from the Ottawa Declaration is unique in its formation of the Arctic states and six permanent participants representing Indigenous organizations across the circumpolar area.
What I would say to your question is to first point out that the council’s mandate is to advance environmental protection and sustainable development and growth, that council deliberately excludes military and security cooperation. In effect, that one very element probably being a big element of its success over the years because it has enabled a level of cooperation without entering into other areas that can be more sensitive or controversial.
I would argue that the council has been highly productive over its 25 years, and I wish I could find a way to account for the relationships and the linkages that exist across communities, governments, Indigenous organizations that it’s formed. It runs over 100 projects annually of some dimension of circumpolar in nature.
I think the impact and the need, given the current circumstance, that it pause its activities is really about taking a moment in a situation that is extraordinarily fluid. It is done with a view to taking a moment to see how the council can move forward in a healthy and strong way, all current circumstances taken under consideration. So on the first question, when we have more time, I would argue the council has been highly productive.
In answer to the second question, I think the emphasis of the states that have been involved in pausing the activities is really to focus on how to bring forward activities in light of the current circumstance in a way that won’t adversely affect the council; it is to allow the cooperation among the seven states as much as possible.
Senator Dasko: Thank you.
[Translation]
Senator Boisvenu: My question is for Ms. Kutz. Is Russia part of the Arctic Council?
[English]
Ms. Kutz: Yes, Russia is a member of the Arctic Council. The council has eight member states, and by virtue of geographic location, Russia is a member.
The pause that I was speaking to a few minutes ago was the decision of the seven states — Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Iceland, Sweden and the United States — to pause activities in light of Russia’s actions and the impediments those actions pose to cooperating with Russia.
[Translation]
Senator Boisvenu: Are the Arctic Council member countries required to be transparent about their military resources engaged in the Arctic?
[English]
Ms. Kutz: Because the military is explicitly excluded from the mandate of the Arctic Council, that is not an issue that is discussed within the Arctic Council. It’s explicitly excluded.
[Translation]
Senator Boisvenu: Thank you.
Senator Dagenais: I have a question for Mr. Quinn.
You’ll correct me if I’m wrong, but on a political level, I think that you referred to an agreement between Prime Minister Trudeau and President Biden to take stronger action in the Arctic in February 2021. This was well before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Was that agreement followed by some concrete changes in our military operations in the Arctic?
[English]
Mr. Quinn: Thank you for the question. The audio broke out a little bit, but I think I understood the question to be this: Were the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces consulted in advance of the road map that was presented by President Biden and Prime Minister Trudeau? Can I just confirm that I have understood that correctly?
The Chair: Yes, that’s the question.
Mr. Quinn: Thank you very much.
Yes, absolutely. We worked really closely with our colleagues in the Privy Council Office and Global Affairs Canada as preparations were under way for that first substantive meeting between the Prime Minister and President Biden. We provided input and were happy to see that input was reflected.
Our key interest in that statement was to make sure that the defence and security issues were captured in the statement, and we were really pleased with the way they were. The text on defence and security cooperation, NORAD modernization, and deepening collaboration on defence and security issues in the Arctic are obviously just a relatively small part of a much larger agreement and statement that relates to the bilateral relationship writ large, but we were certainly consulted on the defence and security aspects. Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you. Brigadier-General Godbout, did you want to respond?
[Translation]
BGen. Godbout: From a concrete operations perspective, I wanted to emphasize that we encourage our allies and partners inside and outside the Arctic to participate in our combined activities, including Operation NANOOK.
The United States has regularly participated in Operation NANOOK, as have Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Norway and Sweden, and even Iceland.
In addition to Operation NANOOK, we have regularly participated with the United States and other military forces in Arctic operations and exercises that fall outside my mandate, for the Joint Task Force North. We’ve taken part in the Arctic Edge exercise, led by US Alaskan Command; the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center, again led by the American army; the Arctic Eagle-Patriot exercise; the Ice Exercise; and NORAD’s Operation Noble Defender.
This shows the regular and ongoing commitment of the United States and Canada to conduct operations and exercises in the Arctic.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator Dagenais: Mr. Godbout, you spoke about military operations in the Arctic with our allies. I was listening last week to the Minister of National Defence. She said that there are currently operations in the Arctic involving about 30,000 troops, including our allies. We’re told that Canada has sent only 10 troops.
Are our troops busy with other operations or do we not have enough troops available? I must say that I was startled when I heard that 10 Canadian soldiers were deployed out of a total of 30,000 troops, including all our allies.
If you can’t answer my question, could you find the information and send us a written response?
BGen. Godbout: I want to apologize again, because it’s an exercise and I think that it’s Cold Response. It’s a NATO exercise conducted in Norway. About 30,000 people from all over Europe, the United States and Canada are participating in the exercise.
In terms of why our force generators sent only 10 people, I can’t answer that. We can follow-up on the question at National Defence headquarters to determine the level of demand for participation and whether there were any conflicts with other operations in demand. Thank you.
[English]
The Chair: Thank you. That actually brings us to the end of our time together this afternoon. I want to start by thanking my colleagues for insightful questions that, I think it’s fair to say, brought the very best from our witnesses. To our witnesses, I want to say thank you for giving your time, expertise and judgment to us and to Canadians this afternoon. We’re fortunate to have you working on our behalf, and Canadians are very fortunate to have you working on our behalf. Your jobs just got a whole lot tougher recently, so thank you. We may ask some of you to come back, but for the time being, we very much appreciate the time that you’ve spent with us today and your forthrightness in answering our questions. Best wishes to you in the work you do.
I’m going to ask my colleagues to remain for a very short second item on our agenda.
Thanks, everyone.
The item of business, as you know, which is the creation of the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs, and we need to authorize the subcommittee to take on this work on behalf of the committee. We have two motions to be adopted. The first is to establish and empower the committee, and the second is to confer a mandate on it.
The first motion is that the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs be established to study matters which may be referred to it by the committee and that the membership be as follows: the Honourable Senators Anderson, Boisvenu, M. Deacon, Richards, and Yussuff, three of whom shall constitute a quorum, and that the provisions of rule 12(5) for membership changes — shall I dispense with the balance of the motion, or would you like me to read it?
Senator Mercer: Dispense.
Senator Ravalia: Dispense.
The Chair: Is it agreed that the motion be approved? Do I see agreement?
Senator Mercer: Agreed.
The Chair: Let’s move on to motion 2, which is to extend the order of reference given to SECD to the subcommittee, that the following order of reference adopted by the Senate on February 10, 2022, be delegated to the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs, that the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence be authorized to examine and report on — may I dispense, senators?
Senator Mercer: Dispense.
The Chair: Are we in agreement with the motion?
Thank you very much, everyone.
What a terrific start to our study. And thank all of you for your active participation and great questions.
(The committee adjourned.)