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Debates of the Senate (Hansard)

1st Session, 36th Parliament,
Volume 137, Issue 23

Thursday, November 27, 1997
The Honourable Gildas L. Molgat, Speaker


Thursday, November 27, 1997

The Senate met at 2:00 p.m., the Speaker in the Chair.


United Way Campaign

Congratulations to Senate Fund-Raising Team

The Hon. the Speaker: Honourable senators, before I call for "Senators' Statements," I wish to advise the Senate that it was my great pleasure to receive in my chambers, just before lunch today, a number of the Senate's staff, on behalf of all honourable senators. These are the people who worked so hard on the Senate's United Way campaign this year. This group of volunteers achieved 142 per cent of the quota set for the Senate.

Hon. Senators: Hear, hear!

The Hon. the Speaker: I should like to recognize at this time Mr. Serge Gourgue, Director, Senate Protective Services, and campaign chairman within the Senate, and those who worked with him.

Hon. Senators: Hear, hear!

The Hon. the Speaker: I also wish to recognize Mr. Neil McLeod and his team from Health Partners Canada, who looked after the entire United Way campaign within the federal establishment.

Hon. Senators: Hear, hear!

Visitor in the Gallery

The Hon. the Speaker: Honourable senators, if I may be excused a little bit of parochialism - which is, nevertheless, important from a Canadian standpoint - I should like to acknowledge the presence in our gallery of the author of a new book on Barker VC, entitled: The Life of William Barker, Canada's Most Decorated War Hero.

Unfortunately, Mr. Barker is unknown to many Canadians, but had a very distinguished career in the First World War and is the Canadian serviceman who received the greatest number of awards for gallantry. It so happens that he is a Manitoban, and comes from the town of Dauphin, 30 miles from the village of Ste. Rose du Lac where I was born. It also happens that I know his brother, Orville Barker. Be that as it may, I am pleased to recognize the author, Mr. Wayne Ralph.

Hon. Senators: Hear, hear!


State of the Arts in Canada

Hon. Janis Johnson: Honourable senators, as part of my ongoing study into the state of the arts in Canada, I recently attended a number of authors' festivals and I wish to take a moment to share those experiences with you.

Canadian writers are in the news these days. Some of the credit for that must go to federal and provincial arts funding agencies for continuing to support the arts. This is most important in a country such as Canada, inundated as we are with mass-produced cultural programming from the United States.

The federal government, through agencies such as Telefilm and the Canada Council, plays a crucial role in supporting Canadian storytellers. This support is starting to pay off with a growing interest in Canadian writing abroad.

I remember what a remarkable thing it was when our own Michael Ondaatje was nominated for the Booker Prize a number of years ago. This was such an honour - a Canadian vying for the most coveted literary prize in the world! Only a few years have passed since that time, and now Canadians are routinely nominated for the Booker, the Orange Prize, and other prestigious international awards. My fellow Winnipegger Carol Shields recently won the Pulitzer Prize, and just last year Mr. Ondaatje's story, The English Patient, made Hollywood history. Agents from Germany and England now fly to Toronto and snap up the rights to our domestic books, and famous American writers like John Irving and Richard Ford frankly confess admiration for our cultural environment.

In other words, federal support for the arts is paying off. We are well on our way to becoming exporters rather than importers of culture. Although this is all good news, we must continue our strong support for agencies such as the Canada Council, now that Canada has finally developed a literary industry that is the envy of the rest of the world.

One of the best markers of our growing success is the phenomenon of the authors' festival. Nowadays, approximately 20 authors' festivals take place across the country, and no other country in the world plays host to so many international authors. I recently visited the 18th annual Harbourfront Festival in Toronto, and witnessed enormous crowds gathering every evening just to hear stories read on stage by their favourite authors, many of whom are Canadian. At the first annual Winnipeg Writers' Festival, hundreds of first-time attendees showed up to listen to readings by Al Purdy, James Houston, Nino Ricci, and other Canadian authors with whom honourable senators would be familiar.

Private industry is also getting involved in the promotion of Canadian writing. Several weeks ago, Thunder Bay held its first writers' festival, and the Paterson Grain Company donated the funds for it. We can be thankful that the business community, too, is beginning to appreciate the power of the written word, as a means of both strengthening our national fabric and advancing our uniquely Canadian values and ideas abroad.


I should mention also that the Thunder Bay Festival will operate, year-round school workshops where real, live authors will encourage children to write about their own lives and tell their own stories, and perhaps become the next generation of little "Alice Munros" and "Michael Ondaatjes." Thunder Bay will also feature outreach programs in rural communities and libraries, places where support for the arts is often fanatical. These are both, to my mind, excellent ideas that should be picked up by other organizations.

It is conventional wisdom among travelling writers that the smaller the community, the larger the audience. It is quite an experience to attend a small reading in Gimly or Kenora and find that it is standing room only. You cannot witness one of these events without being touched.

Canadians do support Canadian culture, and our task is to support the authors, publishers, and arts festival organizers who deliver it to them. In the coming weeks, I will be coming to you with a more detailed report on the state of our cultural industries. At that time, I will sketch out some of the problems confronting the book industry, authors, publishers, and retailers, and how those problems relate to us as legislators.

In the meantime, I congratulate you for your ongoing support of Canadian arts and culture. The next time you are in a bookstore, do not forget to buy a Canadian novel.


Incident at Verdun

Hon. Dalia Wood: Honourable senators, I am increasingly troubled by the inaction of the Quebec authorities regarding the behaviour of Raymond Villeneuve, the former FLQ terrorist.

Once again, the media reported an incident in Verdun between Villeneuve's Mouvement national de libération du Québec and a group of Quebec citizens asking for the adoption of a unity resolution. About 40 Villeneuve supporters gathered at Verdun city hall. They burned the Canadian flag and harassed the citizens wanting to gain entry to the council meeting. The Montreal Urban Community tactical squad had to be called in to protect the citizens as they came out of the meeting.

Yesterday's Montreal Gazette illustrates the level of violence and intimidation:

One 63-year-old man had his head smashed against the door by a group of Villeneuve's screaming supporters...


...they ganged up on a couple of elderly women entering city hall, shouting into their faces and elbowing them:

Go home. You won't get an inch of our country.
Honourable senators, it is intolerable that such a situation is allowed to persist. Mr. Villeneuve is not practising his right to freedom of speech; he is impeding other citizen's rights to express their views in a public forum. The Gazette reported that Villeneuve is blaming unity supporters for his actions. They quote him as saying:

We have to defend the Quebec people against the militarization of the federal movement. History shows that these kinds of (partitionist) movements bring people to civil war, to bloodshed and confrontation. I've said, "If you want war, you'll get it."

I would hope that the Government of Quebec would act when they see such situations developing. Everyone within the province of Quebec should be free to think as they choose. However, their method of expression should be controlled. I urge the Quebec authorities to act.


Commission of Inquiry on the Blood System in Canada

Final Report Tabled

On Tabling of Documents:

Hon. Sharon Carstairs (Deputy Leader of the Government): Honourable senators, I have the honour to table the final report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Blood System in Canada, chaired by the Honourable Mr. Justice Horace Krever, Commissioner, dated November, 1997.


Committee of Selection

Fourth Report Presented

Hon. Jacques Hébert, Chairman of the Committee of Selection, presented the following report:

Thursday, November 27, 1997

The Committee of Selection has the honour to present its


Pursuant to Rule 85(1)(b) of the Rules of the Senate, your committee submits herewith the list of Senators nominated by it to serve on the Special Joint Committee on Child Custody and Access.

The Honourable Senators Bosa, Cohen, Cools, DeWare, Ferretti Barth, Jessiman and Pearson

Your committee recommends that a message be sent to the House of Commons informing that House of the names of the Honourable Senators appointed to serve on the part of the Senate on this committee.

Respectfully submitted,


The Hon. the Speaker: When shall this report be taken into consideration?

On motion of Senator Hébert, report placed on the Orders of the Day for consideration at the next sitting of the Senate.


Anti-Personnel Mines Convention Implementation Bill

Report of Committee

Hon. John B. Stewart, Chairman of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, presented the following report:

Thursday, November 27, 1997

The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs has the honour to present its


Your committee, to which was referred the Bill C-22, An Act to implement the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, has examined the said bill in obedience to its Order of Reference dated, Wednesday, November 26, 1997, and now reports the same without amendment.

Respectfully submitted,


The Hon. the Speaker: Honourable senators, when shall this bill be read the third time?

Hon. Eymard G. Corbin: Honourable senators, with leave of the Senate and notwithstanding rule 58(1)(b), I move that the bill be placed on the Orders of the Day for third reading later this day.

The Hon. the Speaker: Is leave granted?

Some Hon. Senators: Agreed.

Hon. Herbert O. Sparrow: Leave is denied.

The Hon. the Speaker: Honourable senators, leave is not granted.

On motion of Senator Corbin, bill placed on the Orders of the Day for third reading at the next sitting of the Senate.

Senate Delegation to People's Republic of China

Report Tabled

Hon. Sharon Carstairs (Deputy Leader of the Government): Honourable senators, I have the honour to table a report on the visit of a Senate delegation to the People's Republic of China from October 8 to 16, 1996.

Legal and Constitutional Affairs

Notice of Motion to Authorize Committee to Meet During Sitting of the Senate

Hon. Lorna Milne: Honourable senators, I give notice that on Tuesday next, December 2, 1997, I will move:

That the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs have power to sit at 3:15 p.m., Wednesday, December 3, 1997, even though the Senate may then be sitting and that rule 95(4) be suspended in relation thereto.


Transport and Communications

Notice of Motion to Authorize Committee to Meet During Sitting of the Senate

Hon. Lise Bacon: Honourable senators, I give notice that on Tuesday next, December 2, 1997, I will move:

That the Standing Senate Committee on Transport and Communications have power to sit at 4:00 p.m. on Tuesday December 2, 1997, for its study of Bill S-4, An Act to amend the Canada Shipping Act (maritime liability), even though the Senate may then be sitting, and that Rule 95(4) be suspended in relation thereto.



Customs Tariff

Second Reading

On the Order:

Resuming debate on the motion of the Honourable Senator Kirby, seconded by the Honourable Senator Whelan, P.C., for the second reading of Bill C-11, respecting the imposition of duties of customs and other charges, to give effect to the International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, to provide relief against the imposition of certain duties of customs or other charges, to provide for other related matters and to amend or repeal certain Acts in consequence thereof.

Hon. Michael A. Meighen: Honourable senators, I am pleased to join the debate on second reading of Bill C-11, to simplify and update the Customs Tariff. Since my colleague Senator Kirby outlined yesterday the purpose of this bill, which is to overhaul and simplify Canada's system of customs tariffs, I will not go over those same points today.

I will say that Bill C-11 is the culmination of about three years of review of the Customs Tariff and related regulations to simplify our tariff regime. Senators will understand me when I say that only in Ottawa can we talk about achieving simplification when we receive legislation and accompanying schedules measuring about 30 centimetres when stacked together.

Indeed, Bill C-11 simplifies by updating, streamlining and consolidating customs tariffs into a single tariff schedule. No doubt, this will assist both importers and exporters, as argued by the Canadian Importers Association, the Canadian Chamber of Commerce and the Alliance & Manufacturers and Exporters of Canada. Savings to businesses and consumers are estimated to be approximately $90 million.

Specifically, Bill C-11 consolidates current tariff provisions into a single tariff schedule, by implementing on January 1 most of the final Uruguay Round reductions currently scheduled for January 1, 1999; eliminating most tariff rates under 2 per cent, commonly referred to as nuisance rates; rounding down most decimal rates to the nearest half percentage point; harmonizing rates of certain competing products; rectifying certain tariff anomalies and amalgamating a large number of tariff items.

Bill C-11 has not been without its critics, however. In the first place, customs brokers are concerned that they will not have enough time to fully update their importing systems for the January 1, 1998 implementation date. Although the government claims that the importing community itself is split on the issue, since many of the brokers and importers have prepared themselves for the new code, it seems that concerns are also shared by the Alliance of Manufacturers and Exporters, who said, as reported in The Financial Post of September 20:

It's a scary exercise. There is very little time to do the programming we need.

It will, therefore, be incumbent upon the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce to assess the situation and, if necessary, to seek assurances from Revenue Canada officials, or through an amendment, that administrative tolerance, including a moratorium on penalties, be exercised during a specific period of adjustment, for example, six months.

Second, as outlined in a letter circulated to Banking Committee members, if not to all senators, the Canadian Vehicle Manufacturers' Association, including Chrysler Canada Ltd., Ford Motor Company of Canada, and General Motors of Canada Limited, oppose the passage of Bill C-11 in its current form. The issue of contention is duty rate, namely zero, applicable to imported parts used in the manufacture of automobiles by non-Auto Pact manufacturers.

The association, and others, believe that unilaterally giving away the parts tariff provides no benefit whatsoever to Canada, and diminishes our ability to negotiate foreign market access for Canadian-built vehicles and parts. Furthermore, it serves to undermine the value of the Auto Pact by conferring an Auto Pact benefit on manufacturers that have not made a commitment to Auto Pact production and sourcing requirements, by providing an incentive for transplant manufacturers to source parts from overseas as opposed to purchasing them from Canadian suppliers, by putting Canada out of step with our major trading partner, the United States, which continues to maintain the imposition of a tariff on automotive parts of 2.5 per cent. Finally, it prejudges a comprehensive review of the automotive sector undertaken by Industry Canada, and to be completed early next year.

I would also like to remind senators that in 1994, for non-Auto Pact companies, tariffs were eliminated or reduced to 2.5 per cent on certain auto parts under Canada's World Trade Organization tariff offer. Today, however, the government claims that the elimination of the 2.5 per cent tariff on certain auto parts represents no change from existing policy. This appears to me to be out of line with the Auto Pact agreement, and was undertaken unilaterally without consultation with an industry in which 97 per cent oppose this policy change; an industry that directly represents some 700,000 workers.

Add to this, honourable senators, the depreciation of the Japanese yen over the last two years as compared with the Canadian dollar, which makes the concerns raised by auto and parts manufacturers that much more critical.

The assertions made by the association representing a key sector of the Canadian economy are strong and deserve proper investigation. Other trade organizations, such as the steel producers, may wish to make representations before our committee. However, given the inherent expertise of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs on matters relating to trade policy, specifically the Auto Pact and NAFTA, perhaps it would be prudent for that committee to study the provisions, at least informally, and render an opinion. Senator Stewart, as Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee and as a member of the Banking Committee, would be in a position to act as both a knowledgeable and informed conduit for such an opinion. I seek the advice of all honourable senators on that matter.

Honourable senators, prima facie, this bill will achieve tariff simplification and, in that way, enhance industry competitiveness, help ease the administrative burden and generally achieve a simpler rate structure and overall, a simpler and more transparent system.

The Banking Committee faces strong concerns raised on at least two fronts, and thus the bill requires thorough investigation by members of that committee. I, personally, look forward to giving Bill C-11 a proper review before our committee.

Hon. Michael Kirby: Honourable senators, may I ask a question of Senator Meighen?

Senator Meighen: Of course.

Senator Kirby: Honourable senators, just before coming to the chamber today, I heard about Senator Meighen's suggestion regarding the Foreign Affairs Committee. May I suggest a way to deal with his procedural approach that I think will meet his concern while, at the same time, being a simpler solution?

As the honourable senator said, Senator Stewart is a member of our committee. However, I think the members of our committee wish to understand the issue as well. Therefore, can we invite the members of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs to attend a meeting of our committee? In effect, we would have what amounts to a joint committee hearing of the two committees when we hear from the representatives of the automobile sector.

Would that solve the honourable senator's problem while simplifying the process?

Senator Meighen: Honourable senators, Senator Kirby puts forward an ingenious suggestion. So long as members of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, including in particular Senator Stewart, can attend our meeting and we can have the benefit of their expertise, which is what I am seeking, then that would be satisfactory to me.

Senator Kirby: I believe that will work. However, the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee scheduled for next week will have as its witness the Foreign Minister of Australia. Therefore, they cannot deal with the issue next week. As senators know, the Banking Committee is likely to be tied up with another piece of legislation the following week. If it is agreeable to the honourable senator, we will invite immediately all members of the Foreign Affairs Committee to attend the meeting of the Banking Committee next week.

Senator Meighen: If Senator Stewart knows of some members of his committee with particular expertise in the matter who cannot attend our meeting, perhaps he can canvass their opinions and convey the results to us.

Senator Kirby: Senator Stewart is indicating that he will do that.

The Hon. the Speaker: Is it your pleasure, honourable senators, to adopt the motion?

Motion agreed to and bill read second time.

Referred to Committee

The Hon. the Speaker: Honourable senators, when shall this bill be read the third time?

On motion of Senator Kirby, bill referred to the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce.


Criminal Code
Interpretation Act

Bill to Amend-Second Reading-Motion in Amendment-Debate Adjourned to Await Ruling of the Speaker

On the Order:

Resuming debate on the motion of the Honourable Senator Moore, seconded by the Honourable Senator Ferretti Barth, for the second reading of Bill C-16, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Interpretation Act (powers to arrest and enter dwellings).

Hon. Pierre Claude Nolin: Honourable senators, I am pleased to rise in the debate on Bill C-16 at second reading. I do not intend to repeat what Senator Moore said in his speech about this bill. There are, however, some observations I should like to make.

Honourable senators, the government in its wisdom decided to put before Parliament Bill C-16, which proposes amendments to the Criminal Code and the Interpretation Act by setting out the rules, which until now have been established solely by the courts, for making arrests and entering dwellings.

That decision by the government originates from a May 22 ruling by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Feeney case.

I will begin by discussing this Supreme Court ruling and then I will briefly go over certain provisions of the bill.

The late Justice Sopinka, speaking on behalf of the majority of the Court, presented the circumstances of this case as follows:

This appeal concerns a number of alleged violations of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms during the police investigation of the beating death of Frank Boyle in Likely, British Columbia in June, 1991. Acting on tips, the police without permission entered the appellant's dwelling house, an equipment trailer he occupied by arrangement with his sister and her spouse equivalent, detained the appellant, searched his clothing and, upon seeing blood on his shirt, arrested him. Following a caution with respect to the right to counsel, which the appellant submitted was inadequate, the police asked the appellant a couple of questions which he answered. The appellant's shirt was seized and he was taken to the Williams Lake RCMP detachment where, before the appellant had consulted with counsel, further statements and the appellant's fingerprints were taken.

The appellant argued that the police violated ss. 7, 8, 9 and 10(b) of the Charter. In my view, the police indeed violated ss. 8 and 10(b) and the evidence gathered as a result of these violations should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

Before going further, honourable senators, I should like to establish that I do not believe - and not because I have taken this from the judgment by Justice Sopinka on the facts surrounding the case - that it falls within our jurisdiction as a House of Parliament to judge an appeal from a Supreme Court decision. We must, nevertheless, know all the details of the case to fully appreciate the law as declared by the court in this instance.

The late Justice Sopinka, speaking on behalf of the majority, found in paragraph 51, which I feel is the keynote paragraph of this ruling, that, and I quote:

To summarize, in general, the following requirements must be met before an arrest for an indictable offence in a private dwelling is legal: a warrant must be obtained on the basis of reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and to believe the person sought is within the premises in question; and proper announcement must be made before entering.

Justice Sopinka reviewed the applicable law before the Charter came into effect and concluded in paragraph 24:

A warrantless arrest following a forced entry into private premises is legal if: (a) the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person sought is within the premises; (b) proper announcement is made; (c) the officer believes reasonable grounds for the arrest exist; and (d) objectively speaking, reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest exist.

Justice Sopinka concludes in paragraph 37, and I quote:

Thus, the arrest was unlawful and could not support the entry into the appellant's dwelling irrespective of the effect of the Charter on the right to enter dwellings for the purpose of arrest.

Introducing his second theme of discussion, the Charter incidence, he found, again in paragraph 37:

In any event, even if the police met the standards of Landry and the other cases, a warrantless arrest in the circumstances of the case at bar following a forcible entry is no longer lawful in light of the Charter.

He then proceeded to explain his reasoning, and I quote from paragraph 42:

In my view, the conditions set out in Landry for warrantless arrests are overly expansive in the era of the Charter. As noted, Landry was largely based on a balance between privacy and the effectiveness of police protection, but in the Charter era, as I will presently seek to demonstrate, the emphasis on privacy in Canada has gained considerable importance. Consequently, the test in Landry must be adjusted to comport with Charter values.

Here I am deliberately omitting the conditions set out in Landry; there will be ample time to consider them in committee shortly.

Continuing his analysis, he made what strikes me as a fundamental distinction between the principles of law applicable before and after the Charter era. In paragraph 44 of his decision, he wrote:

The analysis in Landry was based on a balance between the individual's privacy interest in the dwelling house and society's interest in effective police protection. This Court held that the latter interest prevailed and warrantless arrests in dwelling houses were permissible in certain circumstances. While such a conclusion was debatable at the time, in my view, the increased protection of the privacy of the home in the era of the Charter changes the analysis in favour of the former interest: in general, the privacy interest outweighs the interest of the police and warrantless arrests in dwelling houses are prohibited.

As to whether this rule admitted of exceptions, he wrote in paragraph 47, and I quote:

In my view ... there is an exception to the general rule that warrantless arrests in private dwellings are prohibited. In cases of hot pursuit, the privacy interest must give way to the interest of society in ensuring adequate police protection.

He added:

In cases of hot pursuit, society's interest in effective law enforcement takes precedence over the privacy interest and the police may enter a dwelling to make an arrest without a warrant. However, the additional burden on the police to obtain a warrant before forcibly entering a private dwelling to arrest, while not justified in a case of hot pursuit, is, in general, well worth the additional protection to the privacy interest in dwelling houses that it brings.

I leave for another day the question of whether exigent circumstances other than hot pursuit may justify a warrantless entry in order to arrest. I do not agree with my colleague L'Heureux-Dubé J. that exigent circumstances generally necessarily justify a warrantless entry - in my view, it is an open question.

Justice Sopinka then asked whether or not the type of arrest warrant currently provided for in our Criminal Code would be enough to enter a dwelling house in order to make an arrest. In response to this question, he clearly stated the following at paragraph 48 of his decision, and I quote:

While I have decided that a warrant is required prior to entering a dwelling house to make an arrest, I have not yet set out the type of warrant that is required. In my view, an arrest warrant alone is insufficient protection of the privacy rights of the suspect. I agree with Dickson C.J. when he stated in Landry at p. 162 that it was questionable whether an arrest warrant would be useful in safeguarding privacy...

He added:

Dickson C.J. concluded that since an arrest warrant would not be useful in safeguarding privacy, and since there was (and is) no provision in the Code authorizing a search for persons, warrantless arrests in dwelling houses were permissible; otherwise suspects could take permanent refuge in a dwelling house. While I agree that an arrest warrant fails to safeguard privacy adequately, I disagree that since the Code is silent on prior authorization of a search for persons, warrantless searches for persons are permissible. In my view, privacy rights under the Charter demand that the police, in general, obtain prior judicial authorization of entry into the dwelling house in order to arrest the person. If the Code currently fails to provide specifically for a warrant containing such prior authorization, such a provision should be read in. While the absence of such a provision could have a profound influence on the common law power of arrest, its absence cannot defeat a constitutional right of the individual. Once a procedure to obtain such prior authorization is created, the concern that suspects may find permanent sanctuary in a dwelling house disappears.

Justice Sopinka continues in paragraph 49:

In my view, then, warrantless arrests in dwelling houses are in general prohibited. Prior to such an arrest, it is incumbent on the police officer to obtain judicial authorization for the arrest by obtaining a warrant to enter the dwelling house for the purpose of arrest. Such a warrant will only be authorized if there are reasonable grounds for the arrest, and reasonable grounds to believe that the person will be found at the address named, thus providing individuals' privacy interests in an arrest situation with the protection Hunter required with respect to searches and seizures. Requiring a warrant prior to arrest avoids the ex post facto analysis of the reasonableness of an intrusion that Hunter held should be avoided under the Charter; invasive arrests without a basis of reasonable and probable grounds are prevented, rather than remedied after the fact.

Honourable senators, to be sure, the late Justice Sopinka left us a landmark decision. It is now our responsibility to use it to set a general legislative standard that is objective, reasonable and respectful of the Canadian constitutional framework.

I should like to discuss certain elements of the bill as such. Bill C-16 was introduced in the other place on October 30 after what I would call a brief review in committee - the committee needed only one sitting to approve the legislation - and it received third reading on November 7, a little over a week after it was introduced in the House of Commons. Several members of Parliament complained that not enough time had been provided for an in-depth review of such an important measure in the day-to-day administration of Canadian criminal law. Some draft amendments were tabled during the debate at third reading, but were rejected without due consideration.

I should point out that, when the bill was being considered in the other House, the Supreme Court had postponed its decision only until November 22. I should also point out that the Court had initially agreed to postpone the application of its decision of May 22 for a period of six months.

Only later, at the end of November, when the government realized that Parliament could not make the appropriate amendments to the Criminal Code and the Interpretation Act and that the bill would not pass through all stages before November 22, did it decide to ask the Supreme Court for additional time, which was granted. This is why we have until December 19 to decide whether we want to amend the Criminal Code as the government would like.

Honourable senators, I support the amendment, although I have some questions, which we will raise in committee as is appropriate. I agree fundamentally with the aim of the government, which is to introduce, codify and, as the government puts it in the preamble to the bill, provide a legislative framework for a practice that, up to now, was strictly a construct of jurisprudence.

In reading documentation on the subject, I thought it appropriate to draw your attention to the origin of the inviolability of a dwelling-house. This is nothing new for scholarly exegetes, but for a neophyte like me it most certainly was.

Verses 10 and 11 of chapter 24 of the Book of Deuteronomy in the Bible say:

When thou dost lend thy brother any thing, thou shalt not go into his house to fetch his pledge. Thou shalt stand abroad and the man to whom thou dost lend shall bring out the pledge abroad unto thee.

Honourable senators, the inviolability of the dwelling-house goes back a long way. British courts have, on a number of occasions, enshrined the inviolability of the dwelling-house. It was often described as an inviolable castle.

We will have time to examine the bill in committee, as I said earlier. I would draw your attention to the preamble of the bill, which, in my opinion, provides the essence of the government's intention.

I will not quote the text to you, since you all have it in front of you. It is, however, important to establish first of all, as the government has in the preamble, that this bill is intended to be consistent with the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and, in particular, the right to a reasonable expectation of privacy within one's dwelling-house. It must be pointed out that such a reference to dwelling-house is not contained in our Charter. Until now, it has merely been a construct of jurisprudence. Today we are being asked to codify, legislate and introduce into our legislative corpus this fundamental principle.

Second, the preamble acknowledges the importance of legislating or consecrating in a text of law this legislative framework and framework of law regulating the entry of peace officers into dwelling-houses.

Third, it states that the police must have every means available to them in order to be effective. And in order to be effective, they must have the power to enter dwelling-houses in order to arrest criminals.

Fourth, entry into a dwelling-house must be preceded by a judicial authorization. Justice Sopinka declared the right to this in a fundamental and significant way. He attached a great deal of importance to an examination a priori of the subjective and objective conditions giving rise to the entry into a dwelling-house, rather than an examination a posteriori; this is still within the goal of protecting the fundamental rights of Canadians, since the Charter of Rights and Freedoms took effect in 1982.

We also must examine the preamble in committee, along with the experts, to see whether we can proceed with such an amendment - particularly after carefully examining Justice Sopinka's judgment - as to whether peace officers must respond to urgent calls for help. The preamble even cites the example of domestic violence. We are all in agreement that the police need to be given this power in order to prevent a criminal act. Have we had this power since the May 22 judgment? This facet of the bill needs to be examined.

I will now deal with the last two "whereas" clauses of the preamble. The first one reads as follows:

Whereas the Parliament of Canada declares that nothing in this Act is intended to limit or restrict the circumstances under which peace officers may be justified in entering a dwelling-house for the purposes of arrest or apprehension in the absence of prior judicial authorization, under this or any other Act or law, including the common law; ...

This creates problems. When he delivered his judgment, Justice Sopinka established a rule of law that applies to all Canadian legislation. He said that peace officers may no longer enter a dwelling-house without a warrant - and the Feeney ruling refers only to a situation of hot pursuit - but did not extend his ruling to other urgent situations, as does Justice L'Heureux-Dubé in her dissenting opinion. Therefore, if the Canadian legislation includes acts that provide such rights, the question that comes to mind is whether or not such authorizations can be maintained in Canadian law.

The last "whereas" refers to a similar right, which is the right to enter a dwelling-house without a warrant.

Honourable senators, I fully agree with the government's decision to introduce Bill C-16. It is an important measure. This legislation became necessary following the majority - but not unanimous - ruling of the Court. I invite my colleagues to read the dissenting opinion, which was primarily written by Justice L'Heureux-Dubé and which includes some very interesting comments.

I agree in principle with the bill, which deserves an in-depth review. In my opinion, there are elements of Bill C-16 that cannot be legislated, given Justice Sopinka's decision, unless we invoke section 1 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The experts may help us find a way to achieve the bill's objective.


Hon. Anne C. Cools: Honourable senators, I rise to speak to the second reading debate. On November 20 last, I raised a point of order asserting that Bill C-16 was out of order because it contravened the inherent and ancient laws, customs and usages of the Senate, the lex parliamenti, the law of Parliament. I asserted that Bill C-16, and its companion November 22 - now December 19, 1997 - deadline for enactment, were an order of the Supreme Court of Canada and that the ancient lex parliamenti prohibits consideration and vote on any order from any other court. For those who claim that Bill C-16 is not an order of the Supreme Court, I shall read from the order itself, dated November 19, 1997:

The motion is granted. The stay of the judgment ordered by this Court on June 27, 1997 is extended to December 19, 1997 or, in the alternative, to the day Bill C-16 (An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Interpretation Act (powers to arrest and enter dwellings)) receives Royal Assent if this occurs prior to December 19, 1997.

Bill C-16 is indisputably, incontrovertibly named in the court order. It is a part of the court order of the Supreme Court of Canada. I had also asserted that Bill C16, and the Supreme Court judgment in R. v. Feeney, was a new and aggressive leap in judicial activism, and an assumption of legislative power by the courts. I asserted that judicial legislative assumption is subverting parliamentary democracy in Canada. Some deny that the Supreme Court's actions in R. v. Feeney are not judicial legislative action. Well, last June, the Attorney General of British Columbia said it was. In seeking the six-month stay, which ended November 22, now renewed to December 19 by the order just quoted, the application of the B.C. Attorney General to the Supreme Court, under its heading "Desirability of Allowing Parliament Time to Act," argued that it was, saying:

First, there is the general point that in a Parliamentary democracy, the responsibility of legislating is and should be in the hands of the elected legislators.

In my point of order, I had cited that, in its 1993 Donahoe judgment, the Supreme Court of Canada had ruled that Parliament's exercise of its privileges and proceedings in Parliament were not subject to judicial Charter review, that only the legislative product - that is, legislation - is subject to Charter review. I also cited the Senate's and then Senate Speaker Guy Charbonneau's position before the Supreme Court in Donahoe. Both the Donahoe judgment and the Senate upheld Parliament's exclusivity in the proceedings in Parliament, and the court's lawful duty to take judicial notice of this. I assert again that the Supreme Court's new order extending the deadline to December 19, 1997, also does not conform to Canada's constitutional practice, or parliamentary practice. Further, I assert that the Supreme Court has no legal or constitutional authority or jurisdiction to rule and order as it did. The Supreme Court initiative in the Feeney case is not that it struck down any statute of this Parliament, but rather that it ruled that this Parliament must pass a statute.

Senator Nolin, a few moments ago, stated that the justices declared a right.


Honourable senators, I move now to judicial activism. Judicial activism is the assumption by judges of parliaments' and legislatures' legislative functions and powers. This activism is a terrible politicization of Canada's judiciary. It is a pressing social problem in Canada and is attracting public debate as Canadians express opposition to judges' political activities in reshaping Canada's public policies. Many judges are themselves resisting this politicized activism, asserting that their judicial role is to adjudicate laws and not to engage in political or social activism. One such judge is Justice John Wesley McClung of Alberta's Court of Appeal. He has ruled that his role is judicial and not legislative. In February 1996, he ruled in the case of Vriend v. Alberta. In this case, Mr. Vriend had asked the court to order sexual orientation included in Alberta's legislation, despite the fact the Alberta legislature considered and rejected to do so in its legislation. Justice McClung, in his judgment, wrote about the need for judicial restraint. He ruled that:

With due deference, Canada's judges would do well to observe similar restraint in their own work, Charter or otherwise. When considering the assumption of legislative initiatives:

...the court must be conscious of its proper role in the constitutional makeup of our form of democratic government and not seek to make fundamental changes to long-standing policy on the basis of general constitutional principles and its own view of the wisdom of legislation. On the other hand, the court has not only the power but the duty to deal with this question if it appears that the Charter has been violated.... The principles of fundamental justice leave a great deal of scope for personal judgment and the court must be careful that they do not become principles which are of fundamental justice in the eye of the beholder only.

Justice McClung identified judicial activism:

It applies with equal, if not more, force when legisceptical Canadian judges decide to strike down constitutionally assembled laws in favour of their own, substituting their vision of the ideal statute in place of that which has been democratically endorsed by the electors.

Justice McClung's judgment addressed various species of judicial activism. About courts ordering legislatures to perform as per the courts' vision, he wrote:

Such a new judicial mandamus, lordly directed to autonomous, co-equal branches of government (legislatures), as if they were some inferior tribunal, releases fresh and limitless concepts which undermine the compartmental theorems that support present Canadian constitutional practice.

Justice McClung described crusading judicial activists:

The Order Paper of the Alberta Legislature is not to be dictated, even incidentally, by federally appointed judges brandishing the Charter. While any legislative product touching governmental activity is, of course, now subject to Charter scrutiny under its ss.32 and 52 [Constitution Act, 1982], the practice of judicially upgrading that product should be strictly disciplined. This is because of the spectre of constitutionally hyperactive judges in the future pronouncing all of our emerging rights laws and according to their own values; judicial appetites, too, grow with the eating.

Justice McClung ruled that the legislative calendar must be determined by the elected representatives elected by citizens, not by outside agencies or by the courts, saying:

The ideals of the process of legislation include discoverability, clarity, balanced application and the accountability of both legislators and their legislation. Judges castigating legislatures for what they fail to produce is an impatience that is difficult to reconcile with those ideals.

He declared:

Yet we judges insist on mechanically invading the legislative arena because human rights may be involved. Seemingly the nobility of the occasion now expiates the old judicial sin of repealing, even amending, legislation under the cloak of merely interpreting it.

Upholding that the Charter of Rights may judicially review legislative products, legislation, but only after they are proclaimed in force, Justice McClung said:

Legislative inactivity is hardly law; statutes become law only when they are proclaimed, not before....But legislative silence remains an imperative of choice for the provincial legislatures.

He continued:

...but to me it is an extravagant exercise for any s.96 judge to use the enormous review power of his or her office in this way in order to wean competent legislatures from their `errors'.

He wrote that judges must follow the statute:

The vast majority of Canadians obey the laws that are imposed upon them by their chosen representatives. In short, they keep to the statutes and they are entitled to expect that their judges will do so too.

Mr. Justice McClung added:

We cannot look on with indifference and allow the superior courts of this country to descend into collegial bodies that meet regularly to promulgate "desirable" legislation.

He wrote about courts undermining Parliament and the presumption of constitutionality:

Yet we seem to be moving, incrementally but steadily, from the role of parliamentary defenders to that of its nemesis. In this, the court should not summarily dismiss the value of the presumption of constitutionality when reviewing a challenged statute. Even within the everyday business of interpreting ordinary statutes, the approaches we adopt can directly undermine the statute's unmistakable purpose and in the process utterly frustrate the remedies that the lawmakers conscientiously believed were necessary including solutions they may have been elected to implement.

About this guiding principle, the presumption of constitutionality in judicial review, Professor Peter Hogg, in his Constitutional Law of Canada, Second Edition, stated:

It seems to me, however, that the lack of democratic accountability, coupled with the limitations inherent in the adversarial judicial process, dictates that the appropriate posture for the courts in constitutional cases is one of restraint: the legislative decision should always receive the benefit of a reasonable doubt, and should be overridden only where its invalidity is clear. There should be, in other words a presumption of constitutionality. In this way a proper respect is paid to the legislators, and the danger of covert (albeit unconscious) imposition of judicial policy preference is minimized.

Justice McClung's judgment in Vriend v. Alberta ruled on the judiciary's and court's arrogation of legislative powers, upholding the principle that judges should remain co-servants with the lawmakers in representative, responsible governance, that is, constitutional comity.

Honourable senators, before us are the consequences of the Supreme Court of Canada May 22, 1997 judgment in R. v. Feeney. The issues are arrest warrants, and the new, additional dwelling house warrant to effect an arrest warrant, and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. A warrant is an order of the Sovereign to compel arrest of a person, search or seizure of things. An arrest warrant is a command of the Sovereign, compelling attendance to answer charges. The issuer of the warrant, on the Sovereign's behalf, was traditionally a Justice of the Peace, or a Police Magistrate, now renamed Provincial Court Judge. The authority was Her Majesty's command as the fount of justice. An arrest warrant, as prescribed in the Criminal Code of Canada, Form 7, is worded:

This is, therefore, to command you, in Her Majesty's name, forthwith to arrest the said accused and to bring him before (state court, judge or justice) to be dealt with according to law.

Honourable senators, Canadian criminal justice and enforcement, like the British and Australian models, were clearly distinguished from the American in areas of the right to counsel, to police search and seizure procedures, to rules governing police questioning of suspects, and admission and exclusion of evidence. Canadian practice adhered to the Canadian constitutional model of criminal law as the preservation of the peace, and stressed crime suppression. It upheld practical capability in the detection, apprehension and punishment for criminal activity, all in accordance with law and the rule of law. This Canadian practice and the law were upheld, even affirmed by the Supreme Court's 1986 decision in R. v. Paul Landry. The police and the judiciary in British Columbia followed the law, both the Criminal Code and the common law, as it was, and as it was supported in the Landry decision. The Supreme Court of British Columbia's Justice Leggatt, with jury, and the British Columbia Court of Appeal's Justice Lambert both found Michael Feeney guilty of second degree murder for the very brutal slaying of 85-year-old Mr. Frank Boyle.

Honourable senators, the Supreme Court has caused an enormous disruption, even disarray to law enforcement and to policing in Canada with very serious consequences to this nation in respect of criminal justice, law enforcement and the security of community from criminal violence, and to the ability of law enforcement agencies and our police forces to function. Police officers are described historically as peace officers. The historical language of law enforcement defined the role of law enforcement as maintaining the peace. The Canadian Law Dictionary defines "peace" as:

A state of repose and security and of public order and decorum. Public tranquillity and obedience to law.

The lexicon includes the terms "peace bonds," "recognisance to keep the peace," "disturbing the peace," "breach of the peace," "Justice of the Peace," et cetera. The peace is Her Majesty's peace and the peace and security of all Her subjects. Historically, it has always been competent for a peace officer, and even for a private individual, to suppress a breach of the peace committed in his presence, as well as to arrest the persons committing it. Sir James Stephen - who by the way was the author of the original Criminal Code - in his famous 1883 work A History of The Criminal Law of England, Volume I, defined the peace of the criminal law, saying:

The foundation of the whole system of criminal procedure was the prerogative of keeping the peace, which is as old as the monarchy itself, and which was, as it still is, embodied in the expression, "The King's Peace," the legal name of the normal state of society. This prerogative was exercised at all times through officers collectively described as the Conservators of the Peace. The King and certain great officers (the chancellor, the constable, the marshal, the steward, and the judges of the King's Bench) were conservators of the peace throughout England, but the ordinary conservators of the peace were the sheriff, the coroner, the justices of the peace, the constable, each in his own district.


The primary purpose of Canada's Constitution, and the Charter of Rights, is the keeping of Her Majesty's peace.

Honourable senators, Bill C-16 inherently undermines and subverts the laws, customs, and conventions of this Parliament. We have been compelled to consider Bill C-16 because of judicial excess, a judicial extravagance on the part of the Supreme Court of Canada in the name of Charter rights. I recall former Supreme Court Justice McIntyre's words:

...the Charter should not be regarded as an empty vessel to be filled with whatever meaning we might wish from time to time.

This judicial excess has caused a disruption in the equilibrium of law enforcement in this country as shown by the 2,757 jeopardized arrest cases in British Columbia alone.

The Hon. the Speaker: Honourable Senator Cools, I regret to have to interrupt you, but your 15 minute speaking period is completed. Is leave granted to continue?

Hon. Senators: Agreed.

Senator Cools: I contend that the actions of the Supreme Court and their consequential destabilizing of law enforcement and policing in this country are irresponsible, and are in themselves a breach of the peace. The Supreme Court by its orders granting relief to Michael Feeney - a convicted murderer who no doubt was guilty - stigmatizing police officers for doing their job, and ordering the Parliament of Canada to legitimate its actions, are all breaches of the peace. I cannot support Bill C-16, because Bill C-16 and its origins in a Supreme Court of Canada Order are disloyal to my constitutional obligation and oath under the Constitution Act 1867, section 91, which commands me to pass laws for the "Peace, Order and good Government of Canada."

Motion in Amendment

Hon. Anne C. Cools: Therefore, honourable senators, I move, seconded by the Honourable Senator Sparrow:

That the motion be amended by deleting all the words after "That" and substituting the following therefor:

"Bill C-16, an Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Interpretation Act (powers to arrest and enter dwellings), be not now read a second time because

(a) the Senate is opposed to the principle of a bill which has been placed before Parliament as a result of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada of May 22, 1997 and of the Court's Orders of June 27 and November 19, 1997;

(b) the Senate finds it repugnant that the Supreme Court is infringing on the sovereign rights of Parliament to enact legislation and is failing to respect the constitutional comity between the courts and Parliament; and

(c) the Court is in effect coercing Parliament by threatening chaotic consequences respecting law enforcement and arrests if Parliament does not pass this bill."

The Hon. the Speaker: Honourable senators, this amendment is not the usual sort of amendment that is introduced in the Senate. It is, I suppose, what might be called a reasoned amendment. Therefore, unless others wish to express an opinion, I propose to withhold judgment on this matter until I have had a chance to read the amendment more carefully, along with the rule books, to see if it is in order.

Hon. Pierre Claude Nolin: Is the honourable senator suggesting that as a Parliament we cannot take knowledge from what the Supreme Court has decided?

Senator Cools: Honourable senators, I am not suggesting that at all. We can take knowledge, information, counsel, research, whatever, from anyone we see fit. What we do not do is take orders from the Supreme Court of Canada or from any other court of the land.

Senator Nolin: I am sure the honourable senator is not suggesting that we should be appealing a decision of the Supreme Court. As the Supreme Court is the last level of the judiciary in Canada, all the proclamations that we make, by that I mean every decision or act that we pass in this Parliament, are subject to examination by the Supreme Court. So, at the end of the day, who is in charge of deciding what is respectful of the Charter and what is not respectful of the Charter?

By the way, the Charter is here to stay. Fifteen years ago we could have questioned the wisdom of having a Charter, but that debate is over. We have a Charter, and the Supreme Court is there to decide if the laws we pass infringe on the Charter of Rights.

Senator Cools: Honourable senators, with your indulgence, I agree. I do not question the Charter. The Charter was initiated by my party, and I do not question the Charter. I also must tell you that I sincerely believe in the supremacy and sovereignty of Parliament. I also believe that Canadian constitutional practice and history has shown for 130 years that in Canada the notion of parliamentary supremacy has coexisted with the notion of judicial review. Judicial review is not new to Canada. We have known it for a long time. However, what we have to be clear on - which is the point that I am making, and it is a subtle one - is that the Charter review applies to legislation, and in the Supreme Court instance of the order that we are being asked to obey, there is no legislation in question.

The justices have decided that, although for hundreds of years a particular arrest warrant was a mighty and powerful enough instrument to command a person's arrest, suddenly, for reasons unknown to us, that warrant is insufficient. Even though the Criminal Code of Canada is silent on this practice and has no provision for such a warrant, the judges have said that does not matter, that what they decide should be the law. That is the issue I quarrel with. The Supreme Court of Canada cannot adjudicate on our silence or inactivity. If Parliament in its wisdom over the past many years, or if the Attorney General or any of the responsible ministers or any member of Parliament, had decided to bring forward legislation to change the Criminal Code in this regard, I would have happily supported it.


However, in point of fact, the Parliament of Canada and all the responsible ministers and all the members of Parliament have not seen fit in their wisdom to bring forth legislation requiring such a warrant. As far as I am concerned, that was good enough for me. I resist, and will continue to resist any judge in any court, by order - especially an order under threat - placing in jeopardy perhaps 10,000 arrests of suspects in this country. I will continue to resist because a judge is supposed to be a responsible citizen of the world and is supposed to exist in a state of constitutional comity with Parliament.

Honourable senators, we have to be aware that there is an enormous battle going on among the judges of this country. Certain judges fall into one group, such as the stance of Mr. Justice McClung, and other judges fall into a group called political activists, judicial activists and judicial interventionists. We must take notice of this extremely profound issue, because the majority of the citizens in this country are unaware of what is happening.

Honourable senators, just two days ago, there were articles in the newspapers with a headline asking, in effect, "Who governs this country and who rules this country - governments or judges?" There is an intense debate going on in this country. I merely wanted you to know that the debate is among the judges themselves as well, and that the bench is divided.

To be quite clear on this particular issue, no law was struck down. Bill C-16 is before us because the Supreme Court in Feeney adjudicated on the issue, someone made a judgment on the fact, that we had not passed a law, saying that we had better get to work and pass a law quickly before they jeopardize the arrest of 3,000 to 10,000 arrested individuals. I have a lot of trouble with that. I submit that the majority of Canadians would have a lot of trouble with that. The evidence in the Feeney case is objectionable and repugnant to the average Canadian. Feeney was arrested, still splattered in blood, just a few hours after he had killed an 85-year-old man. As keepers of the law, we have a duty to understand that those policemen are operating under very real, very difficult and very stressful circumstances. The police were not approaching just any private dwelling. Feeney was sleeping in an equipment trailer. When the police approach a door believing that someone inside has killed, and they are afraid that that person may kill them, we have to understand that, in the old words of the old judges, the machinery of government in law enforcement needs a little room to move.

Point of Order

Hon. Noël A. Kinsella (Acting Deputy Leader of the Opposition): Honourable senators, I rise on a point of order. His Honour rose and advised us that he was not sure whether there was some novelty to this motion.

Rule 18 of the Rules of the Senate states that it is the role of the Speaker to preserve order, to decide points of order and, when asked, questions of privilege.

Rule 18(1) states, in part:

Furthermore, the Speaker shall be authorized to act on his or her own initiative... to enforce the Rules of the Senate.

Honourable senators, my point of order is that I am not able to find the rule of the Senate that needs to be enforced here by the intervention of His Honour.

Second, I did not hear any honourable senator rise on a point of order with reference to Senator Cools' motion. I am therefore of the view that His Honour is out of order, unless he can advise me of what rule he is enforcing.

I have another problem, and that is that His Honour will be the one ruling on my point of order about his actions.

I have nothing but the greatest of respect for our present Speaker. Perhaps he was relying on a rule in making his intervention with reference to the novel nature of the motion by Senator Cools.

Hon. Anne C. Cools: Honourable senators, obviously we wish to put questions to His Honour. I am not sure how we should resolve this matter.

I wish to augment what Senator Kinsella has said. When I made my motion, I made it in accordance with all the Rules of the Senate. I followed very carefully the rules as laid out in Beauchesne and the other authorities. I must admit that I, too, was a little startled when His Honour rose and indicated his intention.

I am not clear on how we determine whether His Honour is in order. I am not sure how that determination is made.

When I finished speaking, I heard no one rise on a point of order, and I heard no one ask His Honour to seek counsel or give opinion on the issue. It would have been quite satisfactory for the debate to proceed. Perhaps one of my colleagues, or His Honour, could give me guidance as to how and why he intervened and took the matter into his cognizance.

The Hon. the Speaker: A point of order has been raised. Do other honourable senators wish to speak to the point of order?

If not, honourable senators, I would refer you to rule 18(1), to which the Honourable Senator Kinsella referred. I read from the middle of rule 18(1), which states:

Furthermore, the Speaker shall be authorized to act on his or her own initiative to interrupt any debate to restore order or to enforce the Rules of the Senate.

Obviously there is no question of order, but there is a question of the Rules of the Senate. Was the proposal that was made in order and within the Rules of the Senate of Canada?

I questioned whether it was within the Rules of the Senate. My comment was that this was a rather unusual proposal, one that we have not heard before. I am not sure whether it is within the Rules of the Senate. Under rule 18(1), I am authorized to review the matter. That is the responsibility assigned to me, and that is what I was assuming.

Of course, honourable senators are always in control of what happens in the Senate. I was operating under the instructions in the rule book, rule 18(1).

On that basis, unless honourable senators wish to overrule me, I maintain that I must look into this proposal to see if it is within the Rules of the Senate.

There is no need to adjourn the debate. If honourable senators are agreed, the matter is under advisement, and I will return to you when I have looked at the question.

I repeat that the Senate is the master of its own rules. If it is the wish of honourable senators at this time to say they want to proceed, that is perfectly in order. My suggestion is that we follow the Rules of the Senate.

Hon. Senators: Agreed.

Debate adjourned to await Speaker's ruling.

Business of the Senate

Hon. Eymard G. Corbin: Honourable senators, I seek leave of the Senate to proceed with third reading of Bill C-22.

The Hon. the Speaker: Is leave granted, honourable senators?

Hon. Senators: Agreed.

Anti-Personnel Mines Convention Implementation Bill

Third Reading

Hon. Eymard G. Corbin moved the third reading of Bill C-22, to implement the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction.


Honourable senators, before ending debate at third reading, I wish to thank all the honourable senators here in the Senate who so kindly worked together on passage of this bill. I want to mention Senator Spivak, among others, for her excellent speech and her support, which, I have reason to believe, reflected the support of all of my colleagues opposite, as well as the other senators who, either in this chamber or in committee, worked to get the bill passed. So next week, subject to Royal Assent of course, Canada can sign and ratify the anti-personnel mines convention. I thank you, honourable senators.

The Hon. the Speaker: Honourable senators, the Honourable Senator Corbin has moved, seconded by the Honourable Senator Lucier, that the bill be now read the third time. Is it your pleasure, honourable senators, to adopt the motion?

Hon. Senators: Agreed.

Motion agreed to and bill read third time and passed.

Royal Assent


The Hon. the Speaker informed the Senate that the following communication had been received:


27 November 1997


I have the honour to inform you that The Honourable Peter deC. Cory, Puisne Judge of the Supreme Court of Canada, in his capacity as Deputy Governor General, will proceed to the Senate Chamber today, the 27th day of November 1997, at 4 p.m., for the purpose of giving Royal Assent to certain Bills.

Yours sincerely,

Judith A. LaRocque
Secretary to the Governor General

The Honourable
    The Speaker of the Senate


Linguistic School Boards-Amendment to Section 93 of Constitution-Report of Special Joint Committee-Debate Continued

On the Order:

Resuming debate on the motion of the Honourable Senator Pépin, seconded by the Honourable Senator Lucier, for the adoption of the report of the Special Joint Committee to Amend Section 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867, concerning the Quebec School System, deposited with the Clerk of the Senate on November 7, 1997.

Hon. Dalia Wood: Honourable senators, I rise to speak to the report of the Special Joint Committee to amend Section 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867, concerning the Quebec school system. In particular, I rise to draw your attention to my dissident opinion, which is on page 37 of the report. That I felt compelled to write such an opinion speaks to the severity of the issues before us, and to the intensity of my feelings on these issues.

Today, I will limit my remarks to the committee proceedings, to the evidence that was heard, to the evidence that was not heard, and to the conclusion that can be drawn or inferred from this testimony. My thoughts on the resolution and its merits will be presented during the debate on the resolution itself.

Honourable senators, I have serious concerns about how the joint committee proceeded to fulfil its mandate. The committee had barely three weeks to get organized, to hear witnesses, and to decide whether to recommend that a constitutional amendment be made - an amendment that will affect the citizens of the province of Quebec every day for the rest of their lives. It seemed, however, that the importance of its task was overshadowed by the November 7 deadline.

The committee did not travel because it was administratively inconvenient for the House of Commons members to do so. In addition, the committee did not advertise. I found that to be particularly hard to "accept." Everyone knows that the committee is hearing witnesses, we were told. However, did everyone feel welcome to come and testify? Did everyone know to whom they should be submitting their requests to testify? Did everyone know by which date those requests should be submitted? The answers to these questions are "No," "No," and "No."

A small Quebec citizens group that had written to my office expressing opposition to the resolution felt that the committee had more important people to hear from, and that with its deadline the committee would not have time to hear them. If that is an example of how people were feeling, it is no wonder that we did not have half the province of Quebec at our door, asking to be heard.

Finally, many people only realized that the committee was hearing witnesses when newspapers started reporting what had been said. Honourable senators, that is no way to proceed to a constitutional amendment.

Everything was done in a rush. The committee sat almost non-stop from October 21 to November 4. The committee members had difficulty determining who would be appearing from one day to the next. Many witnesses only received positive confirmation the night before they were to appear, even if their appearance was scheduled for the next morning.

I had to fight to have reinstated many witnesses who had been dropped from the list. Unfortunately, I was not successful for everyone. Many witnesses could not provide us with their material ahead of time, let alone provide us with a bilingual copy of their document. A meaningful exchange with the witnesses was difficult, at best, since the committee acted like an assembly line, pausing only long enough to determine whether or not the piece in front of it fit properly. I repeat: This was no way to conduct hearings on something as important as a constitutional amendment.

Honourable senators, I asked to be a member of the special joint committee because Quebec is my province. I lived there for most of my life, and dedicated many hours to its public debates. I was also actively interested in the education system in Quebec, having fought to have one of my children educated in French. This was before Bill-101, when English-speaking children were not welcomed in French schools. The administration thought that English-speaking children might contaminate the French school environment. I was so adamant about the situation that the school had to shut down for one day because I had people picketing the school. My voice was heard then, and I hope it will be heard once again.

Honourable senators, this whole debate is about voices - those who were heard, those who were not heard, and what these different voices were talking about. Throughout the entire debate on the Quebec school system, be it in the National Assembly, in the joint committee's hearings or in the House of Commons, the following statement was often repeated: "We in Quebec have been talking about it for 30 years." The meaning of this sentence is crucial to our understanding of the situation in the province of Quebec surrounding this constitutional amendment. I propose that we analyze this sentence, not only in light of the testimony heard before the committee but also in light of the voices that have not yet been officially heard.

Let us first consider the meaning of "we." This "we" is a complex one. We are told by the Government of Quebec, by the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, and by certain senators in this chamber, that there was a unanimous vote in the National Assembly. If the vote was unanimous, surely there is a consensus in Quebec. This implies that the "we" involves most of the population of the province of Quebec. I do not believe this is true, and I will give you an example.

The Coalition pour la confessionnalité scolaire, an organization that now has the support of 645,000 people in the province of Quebec, asked to be heard at the provincial level. They had a petition that was supported by 245,000 Quebec citizens. The petition asked that confessional school boards be maintained and linguistic school boards be implemented for those who wanted them. That petition was never tabled, and I will tell you why.

On February 7, they wrote to Lucien Bouchard, asking for a meeting to prove that there was not a large consensus in Quebec. Mr. Bouchard's office wrote back stating that he was too busy, and that they should write to the Minister of Education, Pauline Marois.

On February 20, they wrote to Pauline Marois's office, asking for a meeting. She wrote back stating that she was too busy to meet, but that she had read their letter. Since they were getting nowhere with their government, they turned to the official opposition.

On February 26, they wrote to Daniel Johnson and asked to be heard and to submit their petition. One month later, Johnson wrote back stating that the Liberal Party of Quebec supported the change to linguistic school boards and the amendment to section 93. He did not say why he would not meet with them. He simply referred them to education critic François Ouimet. I guess he, like Bouchard and Marois, had better things to do than listen to the concerns of the members of the public who had voted them into office.

Discouraged and unheard, the coalition then abandoned their battle at the provincial level. They testified before the joint committee, bringing to our attention that they had not been part of the "we" that seemed to be deciding the fate of education in Quebec. If 645,000 people had difficulty being heard by anyone in the National Assembly, how can we say that the unanimous vote of that house is proof of a consensus?


Honourable senators, this is but an example of the struggle that many groups have gone through to be heard on this issue. As a member of the committee, I had to study vigilantly the witness list to ensure that witnesses were not dropped. Time and again, I heard of witnesses who had been given a spot and then, a few days later, were told that they would not be appearing at all. Many witnesses were refused a spot.

The Association des parents catholiques du Québec, an association representing 45,000 people in Quebec, was not allowed to testify. Gary Caldwell, a former member of the Estates General on Education, was not allowed to testify. I am aware of 19 individuals or groups who made written requests and were not heard, and that is not counting the telephone requests that we received. There was no steering committee.

I know of these groups and individuals because I persistently asked about that situation. I made a promise in this chamber that I would ensure that everyone was heard. It appears that I did not fully succeed in my task.

Even the testimony presented to the committee invalidates the theory that the population of Quebec has been consulted on this issue. Many of the parents who testified before the committee used their five minutes to say that they had been forced to come to Ottawa to be heard. Mr. Charles Ward, a father whose children will be affected by the changes, stated the following:

No one at the provincial level ever asked me for my opinion, and they didn't want to hear it when I offered it. One School Commissioner in the Protestant Board, who was appointed, told me we had to trust the government's good intentions and hope the Minister would not abuse her new powers, which effectively leave management and existence of the Boards at the discretion of the Minister.

He continued:

I also spoke to two members of the Catholic School Board. One, a parent rep was to return my call ... I never heard from her... The second one agreed we probably should have had a referendum, as in hind sight, this government was not logical or trustworthy. But too many things had been agreed to now, with too many compromises going their way. It was too late, it was law. I pointed out it wasn't law until the Canadian Parliament passed an amendment. She was to get back to me also but didn't.

In her presentation, Mrs. Denise LeMay, a mother of three, also mentioned the resistance she had encountered when she tried to have section 93 put on the agenda for the meeting of her school board. She received intimidating responses and got nowhere. She told us of an incident with a member of her school board. She had asked if the schools would inform parents about the proposed changes to section 93 and their potential effect. I quote from her brief, where she states:

When I told him that I was calling him on the subject of section 93, he replied at once, without knowing on which side I stood, that everything was under control and that all the structures were already in place for the creation of linguistic school boards.

Many school board associations appeared before the committee. They supported the amendment to section 93 because it would make the implementation of linguistic school boards easy and efficient. They said that they had the support of the parents. If the two accounts I just related are any example of how parental support was gauged, their consultation process is very imaginative. I honestly do not think they represent the views of parents.

Even the consultation process within the school board associations is questionable, at best. Take the testimony of Michel Pallascio, President of the Montreal Catholic School Board. This school board is a member of the Federation of Quebec School Boards, and yet Mr. Pallascio, at the time of his testimony, had just learned that the federation would testify. He had no idea what the federation's position would be because his school board, the largest school board in the province, had not been consulted.

Honourable senators, if the biggest school board in Quebec had not been consulted, how can we assume that the ordinary citizen of Quebec has been consulted?

In my dissident opinion, I mentioned that I had been receiving letters opposing the amendment of section 93. To date, I have received 1,200 letters - and this despite a postal strike. I am expecting another 400 from the Montreal area shortly. All of these people are opposed.

I will leave honourable senators to ponder on the identity of "we." I have come to the conclusion that the "we" in the sentence "we in Quebec have been discussing it for 30 years" does not include the people of Quebec. It does, however, include those who have an interest in making governance as simple and as unfettered as possible.

During our discussion of who constitutes "we," we discovered what "discussing" meant. Basically, it meant saying that decisions had already been made and that the public's opinion did not really matter. "Discussing" also seems to have meant discounting the fears that a good number of Quebec citizens have concerning the disappearance of their denominational school rights. I would say that all those who testified are supportive of linguistic school boards. Those who oppose the resolution realize that not all parents want their children to attend denominational schools, and that these parents should have the right to choose an alternative school system. However, they do not understand why their government is extinguishing their denominational rights to create this alternative. Those opposed to the amendment are well aware of the consequences of removing section 93.

Every single expert who came before the committee agreed that, if section 93 is amended, publicly-funded Catholic and Protestant schools are as good as gone. Without the use of a notwithstanding clause, the current Bill 109 provisions could be easily challenged, and deemed unconstitutional. Many experts cited Supreme Court judgments whereby many Ontario schools would no longer exist were it not for the protection of section 93. These schools would have been in violation of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Those opposed to the resolution came to us for reassurances; they wanted linguistic school boards with confessional guarantees. They walked away with nothing. They are gently being "discussed" out of their rights.

Before I leave the area of "discussed," I must set the record straight concerning the position of the Roman Catholic bishops. During his first appearance before the joint committee, Minister Dion tabled a letter from Bishop Pierre Morisette, the head of the Assembly of Quebec Bishops. Throughout the committee's proceedings, that letter was partially quoted to intimate that the bishops were in agreement with the government. I should like to read into the record the pertinent parts of this letter, which is dated September 30, 1997.

...our assembly has never argued in favour of repealing section 93. ... our assembly did not oppose the choice to amend section 93. It has always been our conviction that the choice of means is the responsibility of the political authorities.

Our approval for changing the status of school boards has always been accompanied by one condition: that the denominational guarantees established by Bill 107 be maintained. The rights clearly recognized under that legislation are at the heart of our historic heritage.

Honourable senators, it is clear that the bishops are not opposed to linguistic school boards. They have expressed their support on many occasions. However, when I read this letter, it is also clear that the bishops still demand denominational guarantees as a condition to agreeing to the change. They are getting no such guarantees. I want to make that clear.

If we proceed with the analysis of our sentence, the next section is "it." The Province of Quebec has been discussing "it" for 30 years. This is also a very important and contentious issue. My understanding is that educational reform, in one form or another, has been the focus of "discussion" in the Province of Quebec for approximately 30 years - since the Parent commission. However, I further understand that the removal of denominational protections has never been publicly discussed in Quebec.

Mr. Gary Caldwell, who was not allowed to testify before the joint committee, sat on the Estates General on Education, one of the many studies that are mentioned to prove that the public was consulted. Mr. Caldwell wrote a dissident report that clearly showed that the issue of denomination has not been settled. He wrote that approximately 63 per cent of the briefs presented to the Estates General were in favour of denominational schools.

When I spoke to Mr. Caldwell, he confirmed that there was no discussion regarding any amendment to section 93 during the Estates General's study of the education system in Quebec, or at any other time in the history of discussions surrounding educational reform.

As I said in my dissident opinion, Quebec's Minister of Education admitted that the debate on denomination has not occurred. Quebec's Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, Jacques Brassard, also clearly stated that the debate on the issue has not occurred. He said that the Government of Quebec could not promise that the notwithstanding clause would be used to safeguard the Education Act, which, as currently drafted, provides denominational education rights to Catholics and Protestants.

Honourable senators, I am convinced that the consensus on linguistic school boards was secured because the Government of Quebec promised that denominational schools would continue to exist. Were it not for these assurances, there would be no consensus for the switch from denominational to linguistic school boards. I believe that even the Catholic bishops were swayed into keeping silent because of the assurances of the Government of Quebec.

Honourable senators, even though I was not satisfied with the committee's study, it did hear from constitutional experts who exposed the Quebec government's assurances for what they are - empty shells. On October 28, 1997, Colin Irving and Professor Patrick Monahan testified before the joint committee. They clarified the situation beautifully. Mr. Irving, answering a question about the continuance of denominational education, stated:

...if the Quebec government wants to have the right to allow the continuance of Catholic or whatever kinds of schools, then they would be very well advised to have the amendment altered to give them that right specifically, because otherwise they are not going to have it and are going to be obliged to use the notwithstanding clause all the time.

When I asked Professor Patrick Monahan what would happen if the National Assembly did not use the notwithstanding clause to protect the provisions of Bill 109, he answered:

If they do not use the notwithstanding clause they will not be able to have denominational schools or education, not even confessional schools. You will not be able to offer religious classes in the schools that are of an indoctrinal nature, ...


There you have it, honourable senators. The amendment that the Government of Quebec wants does not allow them to keep the promises they have made to the people of their province. The very ground upon which the "consensus" for linguistic school boards was built is now crumbling.

Honourable senators, I have before me a crucial document that I am willing to table. The Catholic Committee of the Superior Council of Education, an advisory board to the Government of Quebec, has submitted an opinion on the matter to Quebec's Education Minister. This opinion, dated November, 1997, considers the evidence heard by the joint committee during its deliberations.

In light of this evidence, the Catholic Committee of the Superior Council of Education is now urging the Minister of Education to find a solution, constitutional or legislative, that will allow it to establish a balance between its Charter obligations and the reasonable expectations of the citizens of Quebec. The committee fears the public's unfavourable reaction once people realize that they have been swindled into giving up their rights because the complexity and the brevity of the debate on the constitutional amendment did not allow them to understand the long-term implications. The Catholic committee even considers this constitutional amendment to be a time bomb that will eventually go off unless the Government of Quebec acts to retain its authority to legislate with regard to denominational education.

Honourable senators, even the Quebec Minister of Education's own advisory board is suggesting that the means that it has chosen to arrive at its goal, the implementation of linguistic school boards, is wrong. This advisory board is, in fact, confirming what I stated in my dissident opinion: That the people of Quebec have no idea what they are being asked to approve.

I am even more convinced as I stand before you today, honourable senators, that my recommendation to this chamber is correct: We must not proceed with this constitutional amendment before a proper debate has taken place in Quebec.

The Hon. the Speaker: Honourable senators, in accordance with the Royal Assent Notice, the Senate will now adjourn during pleasure.

Debate on the Order was suspended, pursuant to rule 135(8), and the Senate adjourned during pleasure.


Royal Assent

The Honourable Peter deC. Cory, Puisne Judge of the Supreme Court of Canada, in his capacity as Deputy Governor General, having come and being seated at the foot of the Throne, and the House of Commons having been summoned, and being come with their Deputy Speaker, the Honourable the Deputy Governor General was pleased to give the Royal Assent to the following bills:

An Act to amend the Parliament of Canada Act (Bill C-13, Chapter 32, 1997)

An Act to implement the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Bill C-22, Chapter 33, 1997)

The House of Commons withdrew.


The Honourable the Deputy Governor General was pleased to retire.

The sitting of the Senate was resumed.



Linguistic School Boards-Amendment to Section 93 of Constitution-Report of Special Joint Committee-Debate Continued

On the Order:

Resuming debate on the motion of the Honourable Senator Pépin, seconded by the Honourable Senator Lucier, for the adoption of the report of the Special Joint Committee to Amend Section 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867, concerning the Quebec School System, deposited with the Clerk of the Senate on November 7, 1997.

Hon. Jean B. Forest: Honourable senators, I, too, rise to address the issue of the amendment that would exempt Quebec from the provisions of section 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867. I do so in order to express my grave concern over the implications of this change. During the debate on the establishment of the joint committee, I spoke of my concern about the short time frame that was given to committee members to hold public hearings, reflect upon what they had heard and draw up their report.

At this time, I wish to commend and thank them for their hard work and the very long hours they sat in order to discharge their duties. I should like also to thank the committee joint chair, Senator Pépin, for sending me summaries of the interventions made at the hearings which I was unable to attend.

In reviewing all these submissions, along with the final report, which included the minutes of meeting number 18, I realized that I had good reason to be concerned about the time constraints under which members were required to do their work. The minutes of that last meeting, which adjourned at 9:10 p.m. on the evening of November 5, ended with the note that dissenting opinions not exceed two pages and be provided to the joint clerks in both official languages before 11 a.m. on Thursday, November 6, 1997, that being the following morning. This was made necessary by the fact that the final report had to be tabled on November 7.

While commending and thanking committee members for the diligence with which they performed their task, I must say that I think it unfortunate that members of the Senate are required to work under these kinds of time constraints when dealing with complicated constitutional matters, which certainly require sober second thought.

I once again remind honourable senators that in Canada's short history our country has established, at home and abroad, an enviable record with respect to the protection and preservation of the rights of minorities. I also remind my honourable friends that, should this amendment pass, it will be the first time in history that the Canadian Parliament has passed an act to diminish or eliminate the constitutionally guaranteed rights of minorities, and I believe that no such action should be undertaken without due consideration being given to all its implications.

My concern about constitutional amendments with respect to education stems in part from having lived all my life in two western provinces, Manitoba and Alberta, both of which entered Confederation on the condition that minority rights with respect to language and denominational schools, in place at the time, would be guaranteed under the federal Constitution.

In Alberta, these guarantees remain intact. In Manitoba, they were repealed by provincial statute just 20 years after Manitoba became a province. Having spent many years in both provinces being involved in education and human rights issues, I know all too well of the difference that has made. There were times in Manitoba schools in the early days when French books had to be hidden before an inspector's visit. Many years later, a ruling by the Supreme Court of Canada, on a complaint laid by Manitoban George Forest, resulted in linguistic rights being partially restored. Actions by successive provincial governments have made some amends with respect to school funding, but in some quarters within the province, among some Franco-Manitobans, the original sense of betrayal and bitterness lingers to this day.

In Alberta, by contrast, the right to denominational schools, which had been enshrined in the ordinances of the Northwest Territories, has been continued under the protection of section 93 of the Constitution Act of 1867, which still applies to our province.

In Alberta, we have two publicly supported school systems, public and separate, which can be either Protestant or Catholic, depending upon which makes up the minority group. Within both these school systems, francophone schools have been established, and in the system that I chaired, a Ukrainian school was also established and programs were established in other languages, such as German, Polish and Italian. They are even talking about Mandarin these days.

Outside these jurisdictions, non-denominational francophone school boards have been established, and have set up their own schools. Charter schools have also been established in response to the wishes of other parents. While the system is not without its problems, on the whole there has developed between the various school jurisdictions a climate of healthy competition in such areas as program development and per pupil costs. There is also, for the most part, good cooperation in areas such as special needs education where resources must be pooled.


I recognize that the situation in Quebec is quite different from that in Alberta. The point I wish to make is that, in our province, these needed changes have been achieved without resorting to a constitutional amendment that would bestow linguistic rights at the expense of religious rights. The constitutional guarantees have been preserved and, for the most part, members of the minorities feel that they have been fairly treated.

In my experience, in education and human rights, when people feel that they are being fairly treated, that brings out the best in them as individuals and as contributing members of society. This would be my hope for all people of Quebec.

My reading of the situation in Quebec would indicate that members of the minority as well as those of the majority favour the establishment of linguistic schools. I am concerned, however, that there does not appear to exist the same consensus with respect to the dismantling of the denominational schools. My concern is that, in giving up their constitutional guarantees and relying upon the provincial government to preserve them, Quebecers may one day find themselves in the same situation as did Manitobans many years ago.

I am also concerned that exempting the Province of Quebec from the provisions of section 93 of the Constitution Act will set a precedent that puts at risk the denominational schools in other provinces that rely upon section 93 for protection.

Finally, I am disappointed that the act of passing this amendment has been linked to the issue of national unity. Many Canadians, including myself, who feel very deeply and have worked very hard over these past many years to promote the unity of our country, also care very deeply about Canada's reputation as a nation of integrity that protects the rights of all Canadians, including the members of the minority groups. This is surely as important to Quebecers as to other Canadians. Quebecers should know that, regardless of their view on this particular issue, Canadians from other parts of Canada want for them, as they do for themselves, a country of which we can all be proud.

Speaking for myself on this issue, as on others which we face each day in this chamber, that is the bottom line. I am sure that that is also the bottom line for all honourable friends on both sides of this house. I am pleased that a free vote has been called on this amendment, so that each one of us can feel free to vote according to his or her own convictions.

My convictions make it impossible for me to support this amendment.

On motion of Senator DeWare, for Senator Bolduc, debate adjourned.

Internal Economy, Budgets and Administration

Fifth Report of Committee Adopted

The Senate proceeded to consideration of the fifth report of the Standing Committee on Internal Economy, Budgets and Administration (budgets-certain committees), presented in the Senate on November 20, 1997.

Hon. Sharon Carstairs (Deputy Leader of the Government): Honourable senators, I move the adoption of the report standing in the name of the Honourable Senator Rompkey.

The Hon. the Speaker: Is it your pleasure, honourable senators, to adopt the motion?

Hon. Senators: Agreed.

Motion agreed to and report adopted.


Leave having been given to revert to Government Notices of Motions:

Hon. Sharon Carstairs (Deputy Leader of the Government): Honourable senators, with leave of the Senate and notwithstanding rule 58(1)(h), I move:

That when the Senate adjourns today, it do stand adjourned to Tuesday next, December 2, 1997, at 2:00 p.m.

The Hon. the Speaker: Honourable senators, is leave granted?

Hon. Senators: Agreed.

Motion agreed to.

The Senate adjourned until Tuesday, December 2, 1997, at 2 p.m.