Proceedings of the Subcommittee on
Transportation Safety
Standing Senate Committee on
Transport and Communications
Issue 7 - Evidence for February 18, 1997 (Morning sitting)
MONTREAL, Tuesday, February 18, 1997
The Subcommittee on Transportation Safety of the Standing Senate Committee on Transport and Communications met this day at 9:33 a.m. to study the state of transportation safety and security in Canada.
Senator J. Michael Forrestall (Chairman) in the Chair.
[English]
The Chairman: We are pleased to have with us this morning, representing Canadian National, Mr. McBain, Senior Vice-President, Operations, and Mr. Bob Dolan, Vice-President, Human Resources.
Please proceed, Mr. McBain.
Mr. Jack McBain, Vice-President, Operations, Canadian National: Thank you for providing us this opportunity to present to you this morning.
This presentation will cover an overview of our business, some of our safety trends, some of the safety programs that we have developed in the last while, as well as some regulatory issues.
To begin with, our business: We are a pure railway play, as we have said to the outside world over the last couple of years. Our prime responsibility is to provide superior transportation services to our customers; our goal is to make CN the best North American railway.
We have a transcontinental network. In fact, we are the only railway in North America to be completely transcontinental. Part of our legacy is that we are able to serve all of the natural resource industries in Northern Canada, as well as all of the industrial centres. As well, we are strategically connected with the U.S. carriers, primarily through Chicago.
First and foremost, we have tried, over the past couple of years, at CN to become cost-competitive; second, to deliver on our service commitments to our customers; and then, by concentrating on those two areas, to grow the business. The foundation for all of that is safety, and I hope to emphasize that throughout this presentation.
I will show you a number of charts that will show trends in rail accidents in the transportation of dangerous goods, employee injuries, and in and trespasser accidents.
To begin with, safety trends: CN has been equal to or better than the U.S. class I railway average for main track accidents since at least 1990. The U.S. railways are closing the gap, but we continue to be equal to or better than them. You will see a slight upward trend in the 1996 results, and I hope to explain that in more detail as I go through this presentation.
This is another way of depicting our position relative to the U.S. railways. We have consistently been the second or third best railway in terms of rail accidents in North America.
C.S.X. and N.S. railways have, for the last couple of years, been leading the pack, and we have used those railways as a benchmark to help to bring us up to the same level that they currently enjoy.
In terms of the transportation of dangerous goods incidents as a ratio of dangerous goods cars that have been transported, you can see that the trend is downward. There has been a 26-per-cent improvement, in fact, in the number of incidents as a percentage of the total cars that have been transported.
In fact, if you look at it another way, 99.92 per cent of all shipments of dangerous goods are incident free. There has been a dramatic increase, as shown by the solid line, in the number of shipments that we have handled. In fact, in this time period, there has been a 48-per-cent increase in the number of dangerous goods cars that we have transported, comparing 1996 to 1992.
Employee safety: We are quite proud of the record that we have achieved since 1989. We have a 59-per-cent improvement in the number of lost-time injuries since 1989. The trend, however, has flattened out since 1992. We are accelerating our efforts in that area, to achieve further improvements as we go forward. We have enjoyed a slight improvement since 1994.
To compare personal injuries, not only for CN, but also for the railway industry, to other transportation modes: In terms of employee injuries, of the four modes of transportation, the rail industry is leading the pack.
In terms of crossing accidents, we have, throughout time, been better than the U.S. railways. CN itself has been better than the U.S. railways in terms of the number of accidents at crossings per million train miles. You will notice, however, that the gap is closing. Our trend is relatively flat and the U.S. railways are, as I say, closing that gap.
The major reason for that is that they have an extensive program with the federal government and with the states to consolidate and close crossings. I would like to speak to that a little bit later, in terms of what we would like to see in the future for us to begin to have a downward trend in the number of accidents at crossings.
Looking at the ratio of crossing accidents per million miles for CN versus the U.S. railways, we are equal to or better than any of the U.S. railways. You might think that one of the reasons for that is that they have far more crossings than CN has in Canada, but in fact, that is not so. There are two crossings per mile in the U.S. and 1.9 crossings per mile in Canada. Hence, the number of crossings per mile is very similar, yet we continue to lead the pack in that area.
Looking at it from just one more angle, in pure numbers, the number of accidents: There has been a 44-per-cent reduction in the number accidents since 1984; in CN it is been relatively flat, however, since 1990. What is disturbing is that the number of fatalities have remained steady throughout that entire period.
Last year, however, we had 29 nine fatalities, the lowest number since 1990, so that there is a slight positive trend in the last five years. Some interesting statistics that I can add to this are that 50 per cent of these crossing accidents occur at crossings where we have automatic warning devices, so that is not always the answer to safety at crossings; 40 per cent of these accidents involve trucks, while trucks make up only 20 per cent of the total road population. And finally, crossing accidents make up only one 1 per cent of the total road accidents in Canada. It is for that reason that I think we are having a very difficult time convincing municipalities and provinces that this is a very serious situation and that they must work with us in order to drive down these accidents at these crossings. It is just not a priority when you think of it as only 1 per cent of all the road accidents that they have in the various provinces.
This is, by far, the worst trend. Most of our other trends are trending downward, but with respect to trespasser accidents, there has been a 71-per-cent increase since 1984. Even more disturbing is that the number of fatalities from trespasser accidents has doubled since 1984.
Now, you could say that -- and we do say -- that a number of these are pure and simply suicides; in fact, coroners' reports indicate that about 40 per cent of these fatalities are suicides. However, having said that, a lot of work has to be done to minimize the trespassing on our property, to minimize the incidents that occur when trespassers are on our property, and definitely to reduce the fatalities. I would like to speak about some recommendations in this area later on in the presentation.
When you think of trespassers, think of not only pedestrians, but also of cross-country skiers and people on all-terrain vehicles, which includes skidoos. The use of all-terrain vehicles is increasing dramatically, a fact which contributes to the dramatic increase in the number of incidents. It also helps us to focus on those areas in terms of preventing future accidents.
In summary, our conclusion -- and I think the statistics bear this out -- is that rail transportation in North America is safe. CN is amongst the safest of the North American railways. However, 1996 was a difficult year, primarily due to severe winter conditions.
I will spend a few minutes reviewing with you the analysis that we went through after 1996, to ensure that we return to the normal level of incidents that we have enjoyed in the past.
Although some detail is involved, I thought it was important to cover off some of the trend analysis that we conducted on our 1996 accidents. The primary causes of accidents on our main tracks were, as shown on the screen, track defects, rail defects, and bearing failures on locomotives and cars. Our response was to increase the level of training for our field forces, to increase the track inspections that we do with our ultrasonic equipment.
In terms of rail defects, the number of ultrasonic rail tests that we do on our rail in winter has increased dramatically. In fact, we are now doing 50 per cent of our total rail inspection with ultrasonic equipment in the four winter months. I might digress for a moment by saying that in the winter, when the road bed is frozen, any slight imperfection in the wheels, or any slight imperfection that might have been rolled into the rail when it was manufactured, manifests itself into a rail break during those winter conditions. Hence, for that reason, and as a result of the analysis that we did after last winter, 50 per cent of our ultrasonic testing is done in the four winter months, and that has caused a dramatic reduction in the number of rail failures.
In fact, we have had more than a 50-per-cent reduction in in-service rail failures on our main line corridor in January and February of this year, versus last year, through these procedures that we have put in place.
Wheel impact load detectors: We are the leading North American railway in the use and development of wheel impact load detectors, and you might ask how this relates to rail defects. Well, you can imagine that a wheel defect, in cold winter conditions, virtually hammers on the rail and accelerates any problem that may have been rolled into the steel to start with. Therefore, it is for that reason that we developed, and now have in place, 11 of these impact detectors. These impact detectors are strategically located across the country. Where they are located, the results of every car and every wheel that passes over those impact detectors are fed into a central computer system. We analyse the data, and in some cases take immediate action to take a car off of a train; in other cases, where there is not readily a danger, we move the car to the next terminal and then remove it and do the necessary repair work. This action, in addition, has resulted in a major reduction in the number of rail failures that we have had on our line this winter.
In terms of bearing failures, we have a series of what we call hot box detectors, or bearing detectors, that are beside the track, roughly every 25 to 30 miles. Through the analysis that we conducted last winter, we concluded that it was necessary to increase the spacing of our hot box detectors. Thus, last summer we installed 11 additional detectors, most of them in Northern Ontario, and we are embarking on a $7-million program, this year and next, of additional detectors.
Our plan, in key corridors across Canada, is to reduce the spacing of our hot box detectors by one-half, the result of which, we believe, will be a reduction in rail accidents cased by bearing failures. As well, we are replacing 60 per cent of our high horsepower locomotive fleet. The older fleet had a suspension bearing issue that we have been able to minimize through maintenance practices, but the real solution is to replace that older fleet. We have a program in place and have already replaced more than 25 per cent of that fleet. As I say, we plan to replace 60 per cent of that fleet in the near future.
Yard accidents: In this case, rule infractions more than equipment and material failure are responsible, as you saw, for our main track accidents. Therefore, side collisions in yards, switch-handling accidents, improper securement of equipment, among others, cause cars to move in an uncontrolled fashion.
Our reaction to that was to increase the level of instruction to our employees in our yards, to improve on our training programs, and to do a number of audit performance reviews. We have local audit teams and a system audit team moving across the country to verify that the processes in our yards are sufficient to support an improvement in these three critical areas.
What are the results of all this? In five of the six areas that were a problem last year, we have had substantial improvement; in fact, if you look at our main track accidents in total, up to this point of the year, we have a 20-per-cent reduction in our main track accidents and an 18-per-cent reduction in our yard accidents. Hence, we believe that while we did have a surge in accidents last winter, we have properly analysed the trends, and we have action plans in place that are already showing results. And we are not stopping here; we are working on a number of other areas.
CN has one of the top methodologies for testing our track geometry. We have two test cars which use ultrasonic. We have one that works in Eastern Canada, one Western Canada, and we run them on a continual basis, primarily on our main line. In fact, our main line territory sees these cars four to five times a year. These cars, through ultrasonic and electronic means, detect any geometric conditions in the track. Unlike most other railways, we do it under dynamic conditions.
Our equipment has the capability of loading up to the axle loads that we actually handle on our trains, and through that process we believe --
The Chairman: Full axle load on your test car?
Mr. McBain: Exactly. We have various standards, depending on whether we run our trains on our main line corridor or on our secondary branch lines. Some of our lower-density branch lines have lighter axle loads, so when we use this car on those territories we reduce the total load in this test car and test it at actual conditions. On our main track, we increase the total ballast that we handle in this test car, to bring it up to the total axle loads of our actual cars. As a result, we believe that we are testing our track under real conditions, even though it is just a two-car consist that we pull behind a locomotive when we do this testing.
This testing, of course, takes place only four or five times a year. It serves as a complement, an addition, to our visual inspections. Under regulation, qualified personnel test our main line visually at least twice a week. This test car is primarily a maintenance tool; however, it has the capability to print out, instantaneously, any defects that might cause an unsafe condition that have to be repaired immediately. In this regard, troops are deployed immediately behind this car. They are able either to slow down the trains, where we see an unsafe condition, or to make a repair in order to run our trains at track speed; so we think this is a very effective tool.
We bring Transport Canada and Transport Safety Board officials on this car on a regular basis, so they are fully aware of the capabilities of the cars and the results that we draw from it. I think that is all I need to say about our test car, unless there are questions at the end.
You might have heard a little bit about beltpack operation. We have pioneered the use of beltpacks, remote control devices, in our yards. A number of railways -- CP is now using the beltpack device that we developed in CN. Essentially, it is a remote control device that our employees use in the yard to operate the yard engines while standing on the ground.
The main responsibility of these employees is to handle the switches and to couple the cars. While we implemented this as a productivity initiative, an improvement in safety has been realized; the individual on the ground is actually the one who is controlling the locomotive. As a result, we are not relying on hand signals or radio communication in order to ensure that we do not have any incidents. The result of this is that it has done everything that we have asked of it, in terms of productivity, with the additional benefit of improving safety in our yards.
Last year, we embarked, with CP and VIA, on a pilot project which we called Canalert. I believe it was the first scientific approach to fatigue that has been taken in any North American railway. The results of our pilot test have been very encouraging and have caused us to develop a plan which will see full implementation throughout our system in 1997.
I will say, also, that the results were so encouraging that the entire U.S. railway system is now embarking on a similar process -- to understand the biological problems in trying to work in a twenty-four hour time period, such as we do with our main track operation. The pilot project determined that there were at least four key areas where we could counter fatigue in our running trade employees, and the primary change that we have to make is in work scheduling.
Providing a predictable work schedule for our running trades or for our train crew employees is key to reducing fatigue. Also important is lifestyle training -- what employees can do at home to better prepare them to come to work in a fit condition. Changing the ergonomics in our cab, for example; providing head phones and speakers so that the extraneous noises of the locomotive are minimized, to allow them to concentrate on their job and to be able to converse more easily between each other in the locomotive cab; and finally, to provide better rest facilities for our employees, so that when they do have an opportunity to get some rest, either before they come to work or at the end of a run, the atmosphere would be conducive to getting the eight or ten hours of rest that they might require.
This is a very major change in railway culture. In fact, the irony here is that it is such a major change in culture, that we are running into a few roadblocks with some of our employees and with some of our unions. Those employees who participated in the pilot project are begging me to have this implemented right across the country.
Almost all of our employees who have been involved, even remotely, in this program realize that it has huge benefits, not only while they are work, but also in terms of their social life. This whole idea of work scheduling is such a dramatic change that we do have a few issues with some employees and some union leaders in this area. I do not want to pretend to you that this is all smooth sailing, but I am stating categorically that this is the solution to minimizing fatigue in the railway industry in North America.
We have embarked on quite an extensive monitor program, an analysis program. We have, as I described earlier, audit teams, that are made up, in some local yards, of local employees and front line supervisors. As well, we have supplemented that with system audit teams that go across the country to ensure that procedures and processes are being carried out in the manner that we have established in our written procedural guides.
We have also stepped up the field observations that are required by our supervisors, in order to force them to get out on the property and talk to employees about processes and actions. We are into root-cause analysis in a very detailed way, to ensure that we understand completely the root cause of any one of our main track or yard accidents. We do a lot of work on trend analysis, in order to determine areas where there are weaknesses, some of which I have described already.
We are ensuring accountability at all of our supervisory levels. We are, as I say, forcing additional personal contact. Zero tolerance is a phrase that you will hear from both CN and from our unions. There is a lot of misunderstanding about our meaning of zero tolerance. I will take a few seconds here to say that zero tolerance, for us, means that a supervisor, any one of us in CN, is responsible, whenever we observe something that we believe or know is unsafe, to correct it and to talk to employees about why it is unsafe and what should be done to change it.
That concept of zero tolerance is quite difference from the one that some of our union leaders are conjuring up. To them, it means instant dismissal. That is not what we are about at all. We are into correction, training, guidance and coaching. Oftentimes, the blame in the past has been on the part of our supervision, who have possibly turned a blind eye to something. For that reason, we are asking our supervisors to focus on zero tolerance, even if they are not sure of an issue; to stop to talk to employees to make sure that between them they have an understanding of the safe way to conduct an operation.
We do not do enough competency and efficiency testing. This is an area that we are going to expand this year. We have done, however, a fair amount of skills training for our supervisors, primarily in the area of communication and how to do a better job of coaching in the area of safety. We have done an awful lot to revise and revisit our operating practices, where necessary.
We spend $50 million a year on training, 80,000 hours per year; 80 per cent of that is either directly or indirectly related to safety. Most of our safety training is based on practical demonstrations; a lot of practice and a lot of performance testing takes place in our training programs. In fact, we have won several North American railway awards for outstanding training packages.
The success of our safety program, particularly in the area of personal injuries, in my view, is primarily due to the involvement of our safety and health committees. We have 80 safety and health committees throughout our system, made up of front-line supervisors and employees. We encourage these committees to work together, to do their own local trend analysis, to provide their own initiatives on methods to improve safety, and then we encourage our supervisors to support and implement ideas that come from those safety and health committees.
We have a number of meetings, tailgate meetings, or activities which we do on a daily basis when we start the work day. We have incentive programs to encourage employees to think on the job and off the job about safety. I believe that we are the only railway in North America to have an ombudsman, something this we established several months ago. The purpose of the ombudsman is that if an employee is frustrated about not being able to get solutions to workplace concerns or issues, he has another avenue that he can use to explore issues and to have concerns taken care of.
In terms of the transportation of dangerous goods, since 1988, we have had a TransCaer program, which goes a long way to working with communities and first responders as to methods to respond better to incidents involving dangerous goods.
We have safe handling awards that we issue to our customers. You can think of dangerous goods incidents as accidents caused by derailments, but there is also the issue of leaking valves and manhole covers on these cars not being properly attached. That activity is done by our customers, and we have an excellent program with our customers to ensure that they follow the proper processes, so that we do not have leaks and spills.
We use a computer risk model to try to minimize the level or risk through some key corridors. In British Columbia, we have recently embarked on a pilot project entitled Operation Respond, which is really a subset, in my view, of TransCaer. TransCaer provides, within about 30 minutes, all of the information that first responders might need to react to a dangerous goods accident. First operation respond, as I see it, as it is working to this point, provides a more immediate number to somebody who, although he may be first on the scene, might not be a typical fire department or police department first responder. It enables the first person on the scene to get some information about the goods that may be involved in the accident. We are not very far down the road in this pilot project, but we are encouraging by what we see today.
On crossing safety, CN is represented on the deputy minister's task force. Together, we have a goal of reducing accidents by 50 per cent over ten years. We have pioneered the use of an 1-800 emergency number at our crossings. A number is posted at these crossings so that a person on the scene can call us if, for instance, a vehicle is stranded on the crossing. This give us an excellent opportunity to provide an immediate response -- to stop trains, if necessary. The CN police have spent a lot of time in the schools and in the communities in an effort to educate people about the dangers of unsafe practices at crossings. As well, we are promoting, along with Transport Canada -- although this is an area that I would like to pursue even more -- the closing and consolidation of crossings as another means to minimize the number of accidents that we have at our crossings in Canada.
The number one issue -- I am doing this in reverse order -- is trespassers and trespasser accidents, as you saw from the previous graphs. We have been working with local police forces to develop strategies to minimize the number of trespassers that are on our property. We have put up billboards in locations where we know there is a higher frequency of trespassers. We have done some work, through our CN police force, with snowmobile clubs and cross-country ski clubs, to impress upon them the dangers of operating their vehicles on our right-of-way, and we are a very major participant in Operation Lifesaver.
I will introduce this slide by saying that, along with my other responsibilities at CN, I am the co-chairman of a senior advisory committee on drugs and alcohol. My co-chairman is a senior union official. This committee is made up of senior unit officials, as well as senior company officials. Our primary responsibility is to ensure that employees' concerns are being addressed and that our Employee and Family Assistance Program is meeting the needs of all of our employees.
We meet twice a year. It is a very effective way for us, as management, to work with unions, to ensure that we have a proactive program. I can inform you, in more details, of the questions and answers that we get into, if you like, but I believe that ours is one of the most effective programs of any industry in North America, not just the railway industry.
Having said that, there is still an issue that concerns us, relative to our overall safety program. It is for that reason that we developed a new and improved drug and alcohol policy. That policy is being put into effect in mid-March. The emphasis in this new policy is still on prevention, still on referral to our EFAP programs, however we are stepping up, if you like, the testing provisions. We are making it very clear in this policy, we are making it very clear to our employees and to our supervisors, that there is going to be more testing. We will ensure and insist that there is a rigorous new application in the future. This is a new thrust. Although it does not do everything we would like, we are embarking on it as of the March 15.
The Railway Safety Act: We believe that it is very progressive, in that it allows the industry to manage safety while at the same time ensuring that Transport Canada monitors and enforces compliance in all of the things that we say that we will do. Union consultation is required whenever we have new rule making or new regulations. The RSA review committee, which concluded in 1994, confirmed that railway safety performance in Canada is good. In that regard, I conclude here by saying that we are very satisfied with the Railway Safety Act as it now stands.
In the area of regulatory issues, we would like to see a more analytical approach to safety. We would like to ensure that more assessment is done of the relative risks, through the benchmarking and analysis of the statistics. We would like to see a better allocation of resources, where they can provide the best payback for safety.
There is a lot of good work in this area now, but I think by being a little more analytical and assessing the cost benefit of the various initiatives, we can be even more effective in improving safety in Canadian railways.
Harmonizing the U.S. and Canadian regulatory differences is becoming more and more of an issue because 35 per cent of our traffic flows north-south; it interchanges with U.S. railways. Therefore, we are definitely promoting increased harmonization of the regulations and the practices in the Canadian and U.S. industry.
In terms of modal differences, we would like to see more consistency between the truck and the rail industry, particularly in the area of reporting. The Transportation Safety Board does a excellent job of gathering and producing statistics on railway incidents and accidents, but we do not feel that it is anywhere near as rigorous on the trucking side. Thus, it is very difficult for us to do any of the necessary benchmarking to compare ourselves with our primary competitor in Canada.
Responsibilities at road crossings: We would like see some improvement in this area, some higher recognition, I guess, as I mentioned earlier, by the municipalities and by the provincial governments of the importance of crossing accidents and the importance of improving safety at those crossings. Finally, we think there could be, in the area of trespassing primarily, an improved and more shared responsibility between the railways, the municipalities, and the provinces.
Take the area of ticketing and policing, as an example. CN police and CP police can issue a summons under the Railway Safety Act. In Ontario and B.C., some of our railway officers area able to issue tickets under the provincial highway act. As a result, prosecuting trespassers through the provincial courts becomes easier.
In fact, in most cases, when issued with a ticket, the trespasser simply pays up. We would like some consideration given to allowing CN and CP police to ticket, resulting in a reduced administrative process in the provincial courts for processing these tickets for trespassers. This is an area where we think there can be improvements in our attempts to minimize trespassers on our property.
On the regulatory side, moneys are provided by the federal government for hardware; in terms of crossings, automatic crossing protection, and in terms of grade separations. Those moneys are all targeted at hardware. We believe that more money should be provided in the area of education and research.
I have talked about crossing closures and consolidations. There has been a very successful program with the FRA, in the U.S., working with the U.S. railways. Transport Canada has been working in this area, but we feel that together, if we concentrate in this area, we can make some dramatic improvements in crossing accidents, all of which is part of the process that we are involved in on the deputy minister's task force.
Shared information: We have to ensure that we have consistent information within the railways, within Transport Canada, and within the Transportation Safety Board. We must develop processes and procedures that ensure that we are all working off the same song sheet.
The Chairman, that concludes my overview. I am now prepared to answer any questions you might have.
The Chairman: We heard the other day from the union side. They make a lot of interesting points, but they make one point that is very close to my heart for a variety of reasons. I will quote you what one union rep had to say, and I invite your comment. He said that the diligence of the workers at the work place cannot be underestimated; that if workers had the power to shut down unsafe equipment without fear of reprisal from their employer, both their safety and the safety of the public would be enhanced; and that changes to structure are needed to give workers the power to act in their own and in the public interest.
We are all aware of what is contained in our National Labour Code and our various provincial statutes with respect to safety at the work place. Could you comment on this, because it is sometimes perception that makes some of your other programs all the more importan?
Mr. McBain: We have worked very hard to ensure that communication links are in place to provide employees opportunities to bring forth unsafe conditions. The health and safety committees are an excellent example, where we are openly promoting the review of any unsafe conditions and recommendations that they might bring forward. We are putting a lot of pressure on our supervisors to respond to those concerns.
Also, through the safety congresses that we are holding in our six districts across the country, we encourage union leaders, as well as employees, to work with supervisors on concerns that they have. Finally, our 1-800 number to the safety ombudsman is there to ensure that, in fact, the various supervisory levels in our company are filtering out the concerns that are raised by our employees.
The ombudsman reports directly to the president of the company on issues where they have concerns about safety or health on the property. Although we did an awful lot in the past, I think we have increased the ability of the employees, through these latest initiatives, to bring to our attention any concerns that they have.
The Chairman: I appreciate that, Mr. McBain, but I think you are missing the union's side point. If the operator of a winch, in connection with the performance of a duty, has some reason to believe that the winch is not safe, does he have a right to shut that winch down, and to bring the job to a halt, until it is corrected to somebody's satisfaction without fear of any reprisal? That was their point.
Mr. McBain: Well, under the labour code they do have that right where they have a concern for safety.
The Chairman: But do they have it with respect to the company?
Mr. McBain: Certainly as far as I am concerned they --
The Chairman: If the foreman says, "Oh, for God's sake, get on with it, there is nothing wrong with that winch; we have been using it for a month. It just does not look good to you, but it is perfectly safe," and the fellow says, "No, I am not going to operate the winch," what then is the employee's position?
Mr. McBain: The employee then has the opportunity to go immediately to his health and safety committee.
The Chairman: Will the piece of equipment remain shut down while he goes to do something?
Mr. McBain: If he has a legitimate concern, it will be shut down. We will bring out some representatives of the health and safety committee, which will include both unionized members and supervisory members, and they will work together with that employee. If they agree that, in fact, there is a concern, they will continue to have that equipment shut down until it is repaired.
The Chairman: Who decides, because this underlies the observation, whether the operator had a legitimate concern: the company or the union or the company and the union?
Mr. McBain: Oftentimes this is not an issue because when we have the union representative, the representatives of the health and safety committee on the property, often they find a solution on the spot that is appropriate to all. However, if we are still in disagreement, then Labour Canada is brought in to adjudicate. There are a number of levels that an employee can go through to get solutions, and he can insist that he has an unsafe condition and that the operation that he is working on be shut down in the meantime.
[Translation]
Senator Rivest: First of all, I must say that I am rather impressed by the overall measures that CN has taken to improve safety. Thank you for a very thorough presentation. I have two questions concerning numbers. Naturally, you are presenting CN's position relative to other rail companies and indeed I think that all committee members have noted CN's exceptional performance and the fact that it leads the way in most areas. However, could you tell me how many victims you have recorded so we can get an idea of the scope of the problem? How many deaths or injuries have been recorded, involving the public as well as employees? Who exactly are we referring to when we talk about injuries sustained in the field of rail transportation?
[English]
Mr. McBain: I will get the precise numbers, but I can give you the order of magnitude at this time. In terms of fatalities, five to fifteen fatalities would be the range.
Senator Rivest: Across Canada?
Mr. McBain: In CN across Canada.
The Chairman: Annually?
Mr. McBain: Annually. As well, there are two to three hundred personal injuries, a range, but I will provide specific numbers to the committee.
[Translation]
Senator Rivest: And how many employees are included in this figure?
[English]
Mr. McBain: I am referring specifically to employees. If you were asking about fatalities at crossings --
Mr. Rivest: Yes.
Mr. McBain: As I mentioned earlier, in 1996 there were, I think, 29 fatalities at crossings.
[Translation]
Senator Rivest: You explained to us in your presentation the initiatives that CN has taken to improve rail safety. CN has trimmed its payroll considerably in recent years in the name of rationalization and cost-efficiency. In your opinion, how have these cutbacks affected the safety enhancement measures in place?
[English]
Mr. McBain: Let me start by saying that a number of procedures and technologies, as well as training, were put in place prior to any of the downsizing. As an example, the impact detectors that I talked about, the eleven that we have throughout Canada; we have instituted a program where our hot box detectors would double in number on key corridors; also, we provide training to our employees. As well, in terms of technology, our track structure has the very latest in rail technology.
We were the first to use concrete ties in North America. The equipment that we use for doing our maintenance work and our construction work is the latest high-production equipment that we can secure in North America.
Much of the downsizing was done in the office environment. We all know how computer technology has enabled us to do far more on the administrative side than we could ever do before. It is through technologies like this that we have been able to make substantial reductions in the number of employees while at the same time keeping equal, or in fact improving, the safety of our plant and our equipment. Therefore, the statistics show that through dramatic downsizing, over the last ten years in CN, we have managed to continue a downward trend in the number of accidents and personal injuries, and certainly that compares very favourably, as you have seen on the charts, with the U.S. railway community.
Personally, I am very satisfied that with technology, training, materials and computers we have been able to do this downsizing without impacting safety.
[Translation]
Senator Rivest: You also referred to problems and to the rather significant number of accidents occurring at level crossings. I have a specific question regarding truck traffic on provincially controlled highways. Has CN made or is it planning to make recommendations to provincial legislative authorities aimed at increasing safety in the trucking industry and in particular at addressing the problem of level crossing accidents?
[English]
Mr. McBain: I think the best way that I can describe this is to say that we are working through the Railway Association of Canada; thus it is an all-rail-industry approach to this issue. In fact, the RAC will address you sometime later today, at which time they can give you a more complete answer on all the things that are on going. However, through this process we are analysing trends. We are putting out publications; we are working with the provincial government authorities, as well as federal authorities, to raise our concerns and issues. Hence, it is through this industry approach, through the RAC, that we are addressing this issue. I would encourage you to ask Bob Ballantyne, the President of the RAC, when he comes later, to describe that in more detail.
Senator Rivest: Thank you.
[Translation]
Senator Bacon: Mr. Chairman, the UTU states the following in its brief:
It would appear that railways in Canada operate according to the principal whereby it is more economical to wait until an accident happens instead of spending money right away to avoid one.
What do you think would make the union say such a thing and where does the problem lie? You describe in your brief various programs that you have implemented. Why would the union say such a thing?
[English]
Mr. McBain: I really cannot speak on behalf of the unions, but with the programs that we have in place and with the success that we have shown, I believe it is apparent that we are not taking a wait-and-see approach at all. I do not know why they would make that statement.
Senator Bacon: Does your drug and alcohol program include a zero tolerance policy? What happens if an employee is found to be using alcohol or drugs while on the job -- would that employee be fired; would he or she be put in a rehabilitation program; or would the employee be given a second chance?
Mr. McBain: I will refer initially to our old policy. We have two types of employees as it relates to drug and alcohol. We have those employees who are in risk-sensitive positions and all the other employees in the company. An employee who is in a risk-sensitive position would be dismissed if found to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol while on the property. That has been a long-standing policy. We call it "Rule G" in our rule book. Of course, this would be subject to a review with the unions, through grievance procedures, and so on. So, an employee is dismissed if he is in a risk-sensitive job.
An employee does have an opportunity to rehabilitate himself, however. In fact, we have a rehabilitation program and a reinstatement program, where an employee who is successfully able to rehabilitate himself or herself could possibly, within one year, be reinstated back in the company. But our policy is dismissal if you are in a risk-sensitive position.
Senator Bacon: Does Rule G allow the railway to fire employees with substance abuse problems?
Mr. McBain: If the employee is under the influence or using on the job, yes, it does.
Senator Bacon: And is Rule G sufficient to deal with alcohol and drug use by employees, or do you require new federal legislation in this area?
Mr. McBain: Well, this gets into the area of testing legislation, I believe.
Senator Bacon: Yes.
Mr. McBain: CN has been a strong supporter of additional legislation to allow testing. In fact, I think in 1992 we worked on a draft recommendation with Transport Canada to support random testing of employees. We believe that the statistics in the U.S. railway industry, where the FRA mandate random testing, show that there has been a dramatic improvement in safety as a result of random testing. So we have a new policy that we are implementing, but it does not -- because we do not have the legislation to enable us to do it -- include random testing at this time. Our approach in the up-coming year will be to work not only with other railroads in Canada, but also other transportation modes in Canada, to see if together we can develop a common front that we can present to the legislators in an effort to encourage new legislation that would allow random testing in the future.
Senator Bacon: What about the Charter of Rights; do you feel comfortable with that?
Mr. McBain: We are concerned about the privacy and confidentiality of the employees, and we think our programs go a long way towards at least protecting confidentiality. However, what we are trying to do is to balance the needs of the individual for privacy against the needs of fellow employees, who must be able to demand the right to work in a safe environment, and the right of our customers and the general public to have a railway system in Canada that operates safely. So it is that fine balance between the rights of the individual and the rights of the employees and the community at large that we are trying to balance, and I think on balance, that calls for random testing.
Mr. Bob Dolan, Vice-President, Human Resources: I would supplement Mr. McBain's comments by saying that there seems to be a natural inclination to focus on the intrusiveness and on the punishment end of drug and alcohol programs. Just for clarity, and I think it was alluded to earlier, we are embarking on a very key program of training our supervisors. We have 1,250 first-line supervisors, who have direct links to about 19,000 people in the work force. The whole thrust of that is that we have, as mentioned earlier, an employee assistance program that probably was one of the pioneers. The link to that program is the first-line supervisor; and the link to prevention is the first-line supervisor.
There was some skepticism in the company initially about the program that we are piloting right now: Would we really need eight hours to train our first line supervisors? Frankly, our problem is that we are having to contain the course to the eight hours.
The cornerstones of this: a policy that is much clearer than previously; very clear guidelines; people with professional accreditation train our supervisors to understand how to bridge the employees into the assistance program. So it is supplementary. There is natural inclination to deal on the punitive end of the policy, as opposed to the prevention and support of it, and I wanted to augment Jack's comments.
The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Dolman.
If the necessary legislation were in place, Mr. McBain, would Canadian National institute a system of random testing?
Mr. McBain: Yes, absolutely, we would.
Senator Adams: What is the best material, in terms of track maintenance and in view of our winters, that you at CN can purchase?
Mr. McBain: We are certainly tied into all of the manufacturers of rail, worldwide, and we are buying the best technology that is available. Whether it is alloy additives or heat-treated rail, our standard is as high as any North American railway. As such, we are buying the best rail produced, either by the Japanese or by the British or French, or, in some cases, Cisco Rail in Nova Scotia. Hence, we are quite confident. In fact, it is a major advantage to us, not only in terms of safety, but also in terms of maintenance cost, to buy the best technology that we can possibly find, even if the initial cost is higher than other rails might be, because when you look at the life cycle cost of that rail, it is much cheaper to spend more initially. So we have the latest technology, not only in rail, but also in ties and in the whole railway structure.
Senator Adams: My concern about you buying from other countries lies in the fact that we live in a cold weather climate; as such, is the steel that you are buying tested for cold weather use?
Mr. McBain: Absolutely, it has been. We have been buying this rail for years, so we know, not only from the tests that we have conducted before it is installed but also by using it under real life conditions, in extreme cold weather conditions, that this rail is rolled without any defects in it, to start with, and with heat treating or special alloy additives, will definitely stand up better than traditional carbon steel in cold weather conditions in Canada.
Senator Adams: My second question has to do with maintenance. Since you have cut back maintenance in Montreal, is your maintenance adequate across the country?
Mr. McBain: The statistics show that the shop consolidation programs have not had a negative impact on safety. The reason for that is that we had all of the technology, primarily the wayside-detection technology, in place before we embarked on those consolidation programs.
Senator Adams: Do you have any control trucks on the highway, besides the CN in traffic? You know, you have a trucking company besides railway?
Mr. McBain: We do not. For our intermodal business, we use external trucking companies to handle the traffic from our intermodal terminals to the final destination; primarily, that is within the city limits.
Senator Adams: We have a lot of trucks on the highway losing their tires and so on. Is there some that CN could handle the trucking business?
Mr. McBain: That is much more difficult to do in short distances; it is just not economical within about a 700-mile range. However, beyond 700 miles, we have been very successful in forming alliances with trucking companies to promote exactly what you are mentioning: to promote trucking companies to handle that traffic up to the point of our intermodal terminal, allowing us to handle it long-distance across the country, and then they do the final delivery.
We have an alliance with J.B. Hunt, for example, who is one of the biggest trucking outfits in North American, and Snyder, and a number of other trucking companies. We are working very closely with them. We think this is a business opportunity, and we think it is a way that trucks and the railways can, in fact, work together to promote safe handling of goods in Canada.
Senator Adams: You spend $50 million a year for training. Most of the time, you hired people who did not have training. You spend over $50 million a year to train some of the staff workers.
Mr. McBain: I will begin, and then Bob can elaborate. A fair amount of our training is relative to technology, ensuring that our employees, on a regular basis, are retrained in specific rules. So although we do some training for new employees, our primary emphasis is on existing employees -- upgrading skills or refreshing skills or training in new areas, such as drug and alcohol.
Mr. Dolan: The proportion that we are spending on development of new training has been going up consistently over the last two or three years, and will increase for the next couple, because we have to retool the training to fit the reality of the business, partly as a result of a downsized company.
[Translation]
Senator Rivest: CN must comply with the provisions of the Official Languages Act. Can francophone workers and locomotive engineers work in French at CN? In your opinion, does this create problems in terms of safety?
[English]
Mr. McBain: In areas where we have a higher level of francophone employees, for example, our dispatch office here in Montreal, we have complete bilingual capabilities. We have complete bilingual capabilities in our customer support centre in Winnipeg. So virtually any area where we have a density of francophone employees, we have the capability to work.
[Translation]
Senator Rivest: Then workers can work in French without any problem?
Mr. McBain: Oui.
Senator Rivest: How many complaints did you receive last year from employees regarding the use of French at CN?
[English]
Mr. Dolan: I am not sure I could answer as to exactly how many complaints, but I do know that the number that actually came up to the corporate level for some kind of resolution was absolutely minimal, two or three. Most of these are worked out at a regional level quite easily. I would also add that in relation to the training, all materials, all instructions, and all our practices are done in both languages.
The Chairman: I was interested to hear Mr. McBain talk about the authorization under which CN police are able to operate. Broadly speaking, I guess, whether they operate as policemen or as peace officers, they are subject to the provincial statutes that are relevant. Am I correct that you now have a homogeneous police force across the nation, common training, common grounds of pursuit and common procedures?
Mr. McBain: Yes, that is exactly true.
The Chairman: What would happen if we were to suggest that you align yourself more closely with the provincial bodies of law and enforcement? Would there not be a danger of you winding up with ten police forces?
Mr. McBain: That is a very good question. As it stands now, even though it is only in B.C. and Ontario where we have these rights to swear in our police as provincial police officers, we still have a need to have a clear understanding of the provincial regulations, even with our nationally trained police force. We are not talking about being knowledgeable in all aspects of provincial policing; we are talking about those areas that are relative to the railway in the area of trespassing.
The Chairman: Have you had conversations on this question with ports police, for example?
Mr. McBain: With ports police?
The Chairman: Yes.
Mr. McBain: We have good working relationship with ports police.
The Chairman: Yes, I know, but CN operates under more of a national umbrella than they do, in respect to the various provinces in which their jurisdiction is located. The question, for example, of pursuit off CN property with respect to a theft differs from province to province; that is, whether you have to call the city police or the RCMP, or some other jurisdiction, is always a problem, and it affects security. And security is part of safety. It is not a major problem, but it is one, I gather, that you would like to see corrected.
Mr. McBain: I would like to see it corrected specifically in the area of ticketing for trespassers. In most other areas, we have an excellent working relationship with the provincial police forces. Hence, if we do get into an activity of pursuit beyond our property, or a broader investigation for a major theft, we already have excellent working relationships; they will bring in their forces with their level of expertise to help us. So that has not been a major issue.
But the one area where we have had difficulties is with respect to the provincial police force getting involved with trespassers on our property, because it is obviously not a very high priority. So the alternate solution for us, in that specific area, is for the CN police to do the ticketing, and then work through the provincial court system.
The Chairman: Going back to something you said a bit earlier, how quickly can a bearing fail, either time or distance? Can it fail in five kilometres?
Mr. McBain: For the longest time, we felt that 25 miles was a proper distance, but as a result of the trend analysis that we have done over the past couple of years, we have come to realize that under certain circumstances, maybe in an area of higher speed, it could be as low as 12 to 15 miles. For that reason, in certain corridors, we are reducing our spacing in half. We will have twelve- to fifteen-mile spacing, and we believe that that will minimize, will eliminate, 99 per cent of the incidents of bearing failure.
The Chairman: Do you contract out any of this type of safety work, for example with your test car, or do you do it all in-house?
Mr. McBain: We have a combination of in-house and external activities. For example, our ultrasonic rail testing is done, and has been done for many years, by outside contractors.
The Chairman: Who generally, in your experience, is the first on the scene of an accident, apart from some poor fellow who gets involved?
Mr. McBain: Generally, it is a local police force.
The Chairman: A local police force.
Mr. McBain: Yes. Fire departments perhaps would be second in line.
The Chairman: I am thinking in terms of the collection and dissemination of information with respect to dangerous goods that may or may not be part of the make-up of the car. There have been suggestions that perhaps we should look one at one of the health safety centres, such as exists in Ontario or elsewhere. I am interested to know whether or not the present system, in your view, is adequate -- not only adequate, because adequacy is not enough. Could you comment on where information should go first for dissemination?
Mr. McBain: As part of our TransCaer program, we have worked with all the communities, municipalities and provinces right across the country to ensure that we have a clear understanding of who should be contacted first. In this respect, and we have a complete and up-to-date list of the telephone numbers of all of those first responders, and that is continually updated. I have not heard any concerns expressed vis-à-vis our ability, first of all, to contact the appropriate people and, second, to provide them with all of the adequate information that they had need, insofar as the type of dangerous commodity that we might be handling.
The only issue that I am now actively looking at is whether or not there might be some, as you described it, unlucky soul who might be first on the scene, prior to a police force or prior to a fire department. In that case, there might be a gap of 15, 20 minutes. We need to find a better way to provide information in that regard. Really, all we would be doing is providing information to stay away, if in fact that was the major concern. That is the only area in which there has been any concern over the past time period.
I think the system is working very well, and those that we associate with in the municipalities and provinces have not led us to believe anything different.
The Chairman: You have had no experience that you can relate to us of an unidentified dangerous substance being carried on one of your trains that was involved in a crash; and that, because of a breakdown in communications, like proper identification or labelling, or whatever, you did not know of for a significant period of time?
Mr. McBain: I am sure there have been; in fact, I know of one or two situations over the years where we have had some improper information in the initial response, but that is double-checked, and very often, within a short period of time. We are talking less than 1 per cent of the time where we might have an inaccurate piece of information; the occasions where that has been that case are very few and far between.
The Chairman: On behalf of the committee, thank you very much. Our appetite has been whetted; we may ask you to return at some time in the future.
In the meantime, we are grateful to you.
Our next witnesses are from the airports of Montreal. Please proceed.
Mr. Gilles St-Pierre, Director of Policies and Airport Coordination for Montreal Airports: I am the Director of Policies and Airport Coordination for Montreal Airports.
The Chairman: Do you have a brief that you wish to present?
[Translation]
Mr. St-Pierre: My brief is in French only. I apologize to those committee members who do not read French. First off, I would like to thank the members of the committee for inviting the Montreal Airport Authority to participate in this forum and to share its views and concerns about the very important issue of safety.
My focus will be on aviation safety, more specifically airport safety. I would like to begin by reading to you a short brief that we have prepared and subsequently, I will be available to answer any questions you may have.
Maintaining and improving aviation safety is an on-going concern for the Montreal Airport Authority or ADM. Moreover, it should be noted that this objective is an integral part of our organization's mission which is to provide safe and efficient services to airport users and to ensure that such services are provided by a dynamic and skilled workforce committed to excellence and the economic development of the greater Montreal area.
As a local airport authority, ADM has a mandate to manage, operate and develop Montreal's airport system. It is responsible for maintaining the following airport infrastructure and services which have a direct bearing on aviation safety; first, visual navigation aids; second, runways and corresponding taxiways; third, aprons; fourth, apron management; fifth, emergency response services; and last, bird activity control.
Visual navigation aids consist primarily of approach lighting systems, visual approach slope indicator systems, runway identification lights, runway edge lights and finally, taxiway and apron edge lights.
The design and technical operation of these aids is tightly regulated by the International Civil Aviation Organization, the ICAO, as well as by the Transport Canada Aviation Group.
In this regard, there is no need to suggest any new initiative to improve aviation safety.
Runways and corresponding taxiways are used for aircraft takeoffs, landings and taxying. Here again, design and maintenance requirements are strictly regulated by the ICAO as well as by Transport Canada.
Aside from winter maintenance which always poses a challenge for us, maintenance of these services, in accordance with the above mentioned standards, does not present any kind of problem. Despite the trying weather conditions that we must contend with in winter, ADM is recognized by air carriers as one of, if not the most efficient organizations when it comes to snow removal and de-icing.
Nevertheless, we hope that research will lead to the discovery of a de-icing product which works more effectively at lower temperatures and which is also less costly than the various non-corrosive products currently available on the market. Using salt on the airport apron is definitely out of the question.
Aircraft use the aprons during passenger boarding and disembarkation, for loading or off-loading of mail or freight and for refuelling, parking and maintenance purposes.
Unlike the runways and lighting systems I spoke of earlier, there are no specific ICAO or Transport Canada recommendations or directives regarding the operational requirements associated with the use of these services by aircraft as well as by the various providers of ground services. By providers of grounds services, I mean refuelling operators, in-flight catering services and so forth.
Where basically the same ground indicators and procedures are used by all ICAO member countries in the case of runways and taxiways, such is not the case with aprons. Countries do not follow uniform procedures when it comes to the use of airport aprons. For that matter, international airports within the same country do not follow the same procedures either.
In an effort to rectify this situation and thus improve airport safety, ADM is actively involved in an international committee working under the auspices of the International Airports Council. The committee's initial goal is to standardize marking and procedures governing apron use by member airports.
Moreover, the committee has recently drafted and released the second edition of the "Apron Safety Handbook". The handbook was published solely in English. I am a member of this committee and we are currently looking into the possibility of releasing two other versions, one in French and one in Spanish.
The committee works closely with the International Air Transport Administration or IATA, the counterpart of the International Airports Council, which supports in principal all of the recommendations contained in the said handbook. During the next phase scheduled for early 1998, the International Airports Council as well as the IATA will call upon the ICAO to endorse these recommendations.
Recently, I attended an international meeting on apron safety and heard the following criticism directed toward us by the International Airline Pilots Association: We travel everywhere throughout the world. We use airways, air navigation aids, landing instruments and we have come to expect the same type of information, the same type of runway signals and the same type of marking systems. However, as soon as we leave the taxiways, the situation becomes chaotic.
As I mentioned earlier, there are no two airports in the world or in the same country for that matter who use the same type of marking systems.
The objective of the apron management service is to control the movement of aircraft, vehicles and pedestrians on aprons and thereby reduce the risk of collisions between aircraft and between aircraft and obstacles or vehicles. Control is exercised using radio communications and permanent instructions assisted by surface markers and various regulatory, directional and information signs.
At major international airports such as Dorval and Mirabel, there is a great deal of movement on the aprons involving a large number of aircraft, service vehicles and pedestrians performing tasks where time is a major factor. To give you an example of this hectic pace, Dorval airport, which handles approximately 200,000 aircraft movements per year, issued about 500 vehicle permits and 2,000 operator permits, and that was strictly for the passenger terminal apron.
Given the complex apron environment and the incessant comings and goings of aircraft, vehicles and pedestrians, safety must and is our overriding priority.
In order to control in an orderly fashion these various movements within a rather confined space and during peak periods, in early 1995, ADM set up an apron management service at Dorval airport. This service designed to monitor airport aprons is also currently in place at Mirabel and has been since the opening of this airport in October 1975. Toronto also has a similar service in place.
Along with Toronto, Montreal airports are the only major airports in Canada that offer a positive apron control system. All other airports are equipped with an air traffic control service and provide only a consultation service. This means that instead of hearing: "You are authorized to proceed from point A to point B". You hear: "Proceed at your own discretion". Of course, if the control tower sees a particular obstacle on the tarmac, it will advise the pilot, but this is not a positive control system like the one in place in Toronto, Mirabel and Dorval.
Furthermore, since operating a vehicle on an airport apron is quite different from driving on a roadway, operators are required to have an airside operator's permit. Before they are issued this permit, vehicle operators must demonstrate that they have acquired the necessary skills and that they have attended the training program for airside vehicle operators.
The airport protection branch of ADM ensures that each operator undergoes a theoretical and practical test. Furthermore, operators are required to undergo further testing after a number of years have passed.
The primary objective of the emergency response service is to prevent, control and extinguish fires involving an aircraft so as to preserve the integrity of the fuselage and provide and evacuation route for passengers.
The ICAO and Transport Canada also regulate the level of protection that must be provided based on the airport category, the number of rescue and fire-fighting vehicles, the minimum quantity of usable fire extinguishing agents, the response time and training.
By virtue of these regulations, Mirabel airport is classified as a category 9 facility because it handles larger air carriers. It is therefore required to have on hand three fire-fighting vehicles capable of transporting 24,300 litres of fire extinguishing agents, whereas Dorval airport is a category 8 facility with three response vehicles capable of carrying 18,200 litres of fire extinguishing agents.
Canadian regulations governing emergency response services are currently being reviewed by Transport Canada as part of the process of drafting new Canadian aviation regulations in consultation with the Canadian Aviation Regulation Advisory Council established in 1993.
Transport Canada is continuing with the comprehensive review process undertaken in 1993,1994 and 1995. The objective is to simplify and standardize air transportation regulations. Reviewing emergency response services regulations is part of this ongoing process.
We hope that this review will not focus too much on the processes themselves, but rather on meeting the objectives sought.
Bird-control measures are aimed, on the one hand, at making airport lands less attractive to birds and on the other hand, at creating an environment in which birds will feel threatened.
The threat of a collision between an aircraft and a flock of birds has long been a problem for the aviation industry. However, in the past when aircraft were propelled by internal combustion engines, the pilot could often take evasive action at the last minute to avoid a collision. Furthermore, the deafening noise produced by certain first-generation turbo engine aircraft such as DC-8s, BAC-111s and DC7s, was often enough to scare away flocks of birds. Modern aircraft have a much faster cruising speed, their numbers have soared tremendously and the noise produced by third- generation reactors is much less deafening. These aircraft are simply too quick and too silent for birds to notice or avoid them or conversely, for the flight crew to take evasive action. As a result, collisions between aircraft and birds frequently occur and can prove to be extremely dangerous.
While it may be impossible to transform an airport site to keep all birds away, ADM has developed a series of passive measures, such as the use of pesticides and herbicides, as well as active ones such as audio and visual deterrents which combine to limit the bird population as much a possible.
Authorities of municipalities in close proximity to an airport must be advised of the danger to aircraft posed by the presence of a dump with food waste. No dump should be located within a 13-km radius of an airport.
Still with a view to improving airport safety, we are currently putting the final touches on an agreement with third parties working on airport lands whose duties may affect airport safety.
This document or non-exclusive licence agreement is a compilation of the various safety regulations or directives enforced at Dorval and Mirabel airports. Among other things, it refers to the directives on vehicle traffic and the refuelling of aircraft, fire prevention, safety programs, aircraft de-icing, physical or visual interference and finally, hazardous products.
This type of agreement, which is unique to Canada, goes one step further in that it asks employers to provide assurances that their employees have the required skills to perform the duties that have been assigned to them, which necessarily means that they must have received training or taken a training program.
Furthermore, the owner of a vehicle or fleet of vehicles used airside must be able to certify that each vehicle meets the safety standards of the Société d'assurance automobile du Québec and that the operator of these vehicles also holds a valid driver's licence issued by the said Société.
While 1996 was a difficult year for the air transportation industry, a major component of which is airports, this mode of mass transportation remains the safest in the world. There were very few fatal accidents recorded and when these occurred, rarely were they due to a defect in the facilities under the control of the local airport authorities.
For example, the International Airports Council surveyed its members for the month of November 1995 -- the data was for the month of November only, although this survey is conducted every year -- and found that for 245 airports that responded, only 14 major incidents/accidents occurred and no deaths were reported, out of a total of 1.5 million aircraft movements. This is a very high volume. Over the course of 1995, a total of 19 incidents/accidents, all minor, occurred at Dorval airport which handled nearly 200,000 aircraft movements.
Airports dedicated to handling carrier traffic are highly regulated, on the one hand by the ICAO to which most countries in the world, including Canada, belong and, on the other hand, by the countries themselves which are free to impose even more stringent regulations and directives.
We wholeheartedly support the consultation program implemented by Transport Canada involving local airport authorities leading up to the drafting of new Canadian aviation regulations and any subsequent amendment. As mentioned earlier, we favour regulations which focus much more on the results than on the processes themselves. Finally, we would like the industry to be consulted on any proposed changes to the ICAO directives or recommendations respecting airport facilities or operations before our country adopts a stand vis-à-vis this organization.
Senator Bacon: Thank you, Mr. St-Pierre, for your presentation. We have visited Vancouver Airport and I will not compare it with Montreal. We know that security measures are in place for airport employees and that the latter must comply with these measures. However, in the case of in-flight catering services or food delivery personnel, how do we know that these people do not represent a threat once they have passed through the security checkpoint and boarded the aircraft? Are the security measures in place in Montreal absolutely foolproof, that is are we absolutely certain that employees cannot carry anything with them onto the aircraft when they make their deliveries?
Mr. St-Pierre: You are talking more about security than about safety.
Senator Bacon: The safety of the aircraft is at issue nevertheless.
Mr. St-Pierre: Yes, but you are talking about preventive action, that is preventing people from boarding an aircraft or from taking steps to --
Senator Bacon: To blow up an aircraft?
Mr. St-Pierre: To blow up an aircraft. This is a matter for airport security personnel. Before being granted airside access, these persons must pass through a gate and present papers attesting to the fact that in the normal course of their duties, they are allowed or must have airside access. Also, the supervisor or security personnel posted at this gate can, if he harbours any kind of doubts, search a person or ask for more information about his comings and goings.
Senator Bacon: Can he also search the person's belongings?
Mr. St-Pierre: Someone else would have to be brought in to do this. If he has any kind of doubt whatsoever, then he can initiate search procedures.
Senator Bacon: This is a safety issue.
Mr. St-Pierre: What I was referring to earlier on was operational safety procedures. In this case, you are talking about airport security measures, that is searching passengers and controlling access to certain areas. This relates to airport security.
Senator Bacon: Is ADM not responsible for airport security?
Mr. St-Pierre: Yes, of course we are. Our organization issues security passes and each person granted airside access is investigated by the RCMP. This agency delves into that person's past, depending on the sensitive nature of the area to which he will have access and issues recommendations.
Senator Bacon: What of that person's movements within the airport? Once that person has passed through the checkpoint using the pass issued to him, is he free to go anywhere he likes?
Mr. St-Pierre: Not necessarily. There are two types of passes issued: one grants a person access only to the aprons. I failed to explain earlier on what an apron was. For those who might not know, an apron is the area where aircraft park for passenger boarding or disembarkation. A pass bearing a specific colour is issued and must be worn continually. It gives persons access solely to the apron. The pass includes a driver's licence. It reflects the fact that the holder has undergone specific tests and training in order to access this area.
Taxiways and runways are more dangerous areas and the accidents that can occur there have far more tragic consequences. Access to these areas is secured by means of a permit which is almost never issued to third parties, aside from ADM employees who perform maintenance operations. And of course, these permit holders receive far more advanced training and must undergo more difficult testing because of the danger involved. Police also patrol the apron around the clock.
Senator Bacon: Which police force patrols this area?
Mr. St-Pierre: The RCMP patrols the apron on an ongoing basis and verifies compliance with directives and instructions, among other things, those pertaining to speed and vehicle corridors. Are vehicles stopping at the appropriate locations? The RCMP patrols this area on an on-going basis and issues fines, where necessary.
Senator Bacon: Regardless of the type of equipment that may be put in place to ensure passenger safety, if employees can move about freely, how does this make it safer for passengers? It boils down to this. Regardless of the security measures in place to protect airport passengers who must go through all types of security devices, if certain employees can move about easily, does this not affect the security of passengers?
Mr. St-Pierre: However, these employees are known to us. The RCMP has already conducted background checks on them.
Senator Bacon: We were told the very same thing in Vancouver.
Mr. St-Pierre: Not all doors and gates provide airside access. There are only a limited number that do. As I stated earlier, if there is any doubt whatsoever, our security staff posted at these locations can...
Senator Bacon: Initiate procedures immediately.
Mr. St-Pierre: That is correct. That person can be stopped and asked to provide certain information. Moreover, to pass through a door where there is no security guard in attendance, a sensor will read the magnetic strip on the pass and advise us once again as to who is trying to move through this area, what the time of day is and if the pass is still valid. It may be that the holder, for some reason, no longer works for an airline or for us and that his pass has been deactivated. We would then know if that person is trying to gain unauthorized airside access.
Senator Bacon: I do not wish to trouble you, Mr. St-Pierre, but I would like to do an objective comparison of the security features of Dorval and Mirabel airports. A while ago, you referred to 24,300 litres for --
Mr. St-Pierre: For a category 9 airport.
Senator Bacon: And to 18,200 litres for a category 8 facility. Does this mean that in emergency situations, Mirabel is a safer airport than Dorval?
Mr. St-Pierre: No, this simply means that the ICAO has established a standard, a world standard, with which Canada complies. This means that if you handle aircraft of a certain size, and handle over 700 movements during a three-month period, you are required to have on hand trucks with a capacity of 24,300 litres of fire extinguishing agents. This does not mean that Dorval cannot handle 747s, but the difference between Dorval and Mirabel is the traffic volume. When a facility handles 700 movements during a three-month period, it becomes a category 9 facility while fewer movements place it in category 8.
Senator Bacon: And Mirabel and Dorval airports have similar security measures in place at the present time?
Mr. St-Pierre: Yes, that is correct.
Senator Bacon: Those that were discussed earlier.
Mr. St-Pierre: Yes, emergency response services are strictly regulated.
Senator Bacon: Along with access.
Mr. St-Pierre: Yes, the same applies with respect to access.
Senator Rivest: If ever the services of Mirabel and Dorval airports were to merge or be integrated, as things now stand, have your security services upgraded almost all standards to ensure that they are compatible with the nature of the carriers currently handled at Mirabel? Has this work been done?
Mr. St-Pierre: To answer your question, I can give you an example. Take El Al airline which currently flies in and out of Mirabel airport. It is no secret that El Al is a highly vulnerable and targeted airline and that special security measures are in place to deal with this airline. I will spare you that details. Other airlines which at some point in time, for political or other reasons, may find themselves targeted stand to benefit from the measures currently in place at Mirabel.
Senator Rivest: In terms of integrating procedures and all security functions, is ADM prepared to shift these functions to Dorval, at least insofar as the trucks are concerned?
Mr. St-Pierre: Yes.
Senator Rivest: Do you have any figures for us in terms of ground safety? Have there been any accidents or injuries in recent years? What kind of numbers are we talking about?
Mr. St-Pierre: I gave you the numbers earlier for Dorval airport. I believe I mentioned that in 1995, 14 or 15 incidents, all minor in nature, occurred. No fatalities were reported. In the field of aviation, it is difficult to draw a distinction between a minor and a major accident because from the moment an aircraft is affected in any way, it is always major. Not only are repair costs enormous, but so too are the costs associated with keeping an aircraft out of service for any length of time.
Senator Rivest: I have one final question, with your permission. Obviously, in the Montreal area, in the past two years people have become aware of the Air Maroc incident in which two employees lost their lives. What measures have been taken in the area of communications? Apparently -- I do not know if the matter has been settled in court or elsewhere -- there was a communication problem between the flight crew and the ground crew. Have you substantially improved or even revised procedures in an effort to avoid a repeat of this unfortunate incident?
Mr. St-Pierre: I think that in a case such as this, de-icing per se is not the responsibility of ADM. It is the responsibility of the carriers or of the third parties that do this type of work. We are involved in this operation because of our apron control service at Mirabel and further to the investigational report, it was determined that we were not in any way at fault and that the work carried out by our employees was beyond reproach.
Senator Rivest: Are you saying then that certain aspects of employee or passenger safety are not within ADM's control, but rather within the control of the carriers or of other persons?
Mr. St-Pierre: We have to try and draw some distinction here. Obviously, the movement of the aircraft between the apron -- where it is parked for passenger boarding -- and the de-icing area is controlled by our services. If the aircraft must cross a runway or a taxiway, then it is controlled by the air traffic control agency. Once the aircraft is in position in that area and employees of the airline company or a third party proceed to de-ice it, then we are not involved in these operations to any great extent.
Senator Rivest: Who is responsible specifically for de-icing the aircraft? Is it the air carrier or the airport?
Mr. St-Pierre: The federal government's Aviation Group has regulations in place respecting aircraft de-icing, this following the infamous incident in Dryden, Ontario. Local airport authorities identify specific areas and attempt to facilitate de-icing procedures. Why are attempts being made to have all de-icing operations carried out in one area? Primarily for environmental reasons. We must comply with environmental and pollution control standards which dictate that there can be no more than 100 parts per million of de-icing agents in runoff. However, as I stated earlier, we control this process to some extent and we have taken certain initiatives. I refer to these in my presentation.
I pointed out that all safety and security measures affecting airside operations have been combined in one single volume. Among other things, I mentioned vehicle operation and safety and security directives. We tried to get involved by telling employers that they must ensure, before assigning a particular task, that the employee in question has received the required training. This is not something that we are going to verify. We do not have the personnel to check out each employee to ensure that he has the required training. However, this initiative is unique and is not being done anywhere else.
Senator Rivest: What responsibility does Transport Canada have in this case?
Mr. St-Pierre: Could you be more specific?
Senator Rivest: I am referring to ground safety, de-icing and so forth. For example, you say that enquiries are made as to whether the employee has received some training, but that the ADM is not in a position, nor is it its responsibility to verify whether the employee is competent. Who checks into this matter? Does Transport Canada have regulations in place? Is some kind of control exercised?
Mr. St-Pierre: Transport Canada does have regulations concerning de-icing, but as to how specific they are, I cannot say. Of course, they pertain to ice and frost on aircraft. I would assume -- and I am only guessing as I do not have this information -- that these regulations stipulate that the aircraft must be de-iced. As for the procedure followed, the skills required and the operation of vehicles in the vicinity of the aircraft, I do not know. I do not believe that these activities are regulated.
Senator Rivest: Then no one verifies these procedures? There are no authorities who check into this?
Mr. St-Pierre: We verify procedures to a certain extent. Consider for example aircraft parked near gates or near a passenger boarding or disembarkation area. A ground-marking system is used to ensure that an aircraft parks within a particular area. No vehicles are permitted to circulate within this area other than aircraft service vehicles. This is a local directive on traffic, a directive issued by ADM, and if someone fails to comply with it, he is fined.
Senator Rivest: With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to get back to the subject of de-icing. Suppose a plane is set to take off and needs to be de-iced. Who carries out this operation? Is it a private company? Is that company accredited? Do we check to see that the company employees are properly trained? Is the work supervised by aircraft personnel? Basically, who handles de-icing operations?
Mr. St-Pierre: There are two possible situations: on the one hand, the aircraft can be de-iced by employees working for the airline and in this case, the employer must ensure that these people have been trained and know what they are doing because an aircraft is not a toy, but rather a machine that can carry upward of 300 passengers. On the other hand, a third party may be hired by the airline to carry out the de-icing operations.
Senator Rivest: Then, the carrier demands the same standards of its employees who de-ice the aircrafts as it does from its flight crew?
Mr. St-Pierre: Yes, except as I said earlier, we are trying something different. This is not yet finalized. We do not think that this will go over smoothly, because no one, regardless of the field, likes to be regulated or to be subject to regulations that could imply a certain degree of responsibility. What we are saying here is that if you do the de-icing, you must provide us with assurances that your employees have been trained according to the rules. This may not seem like a great deal, but this is not being done anywhere else in the country.
Senator Rivest: Only in Montreal?
Mr. St-Pierre: Yes, because elsewhere airport authorities operate with leasing agreements. An airline leases space from us and its employees operate the vehicles. They undergo testing and receive training, but aside from this, in so far as dictating the specific duties that they carry out on the grounds which belong and are controlled by the local airport authority, that is not done. We are taking this one step further and saying to them: "In signing this agreement, you must provide assurances that your employees have all been trained to operate vehicles or to perform the tasks assigned to them." This agreement has not yet been finalized. However, we do have a draft agreement ready to be submitted.
Senator Bacon: Do similar agreements exist in the United States?
Mr. St-Pierre: I could not say. I know that there are no such agreements elsewhere in Canada.
Senator Rivest: Thank you, Mr. St-Pierre.
[English]
Senator Adams: First, I want to focus on the area of security. I have flown quite a bit. I am concerned about the Transport Canada staff who walk around the air terminal. Very often, they either meet with individuals in the terminal or sit down for a coffee. I know these people have had security training, but my concern is with the people on the other side of the security gate. Are they properly trained in security matters?
Mr. St-Pierre: First, even though you are in possession of a security pass to be on the air side or with the travelling public who have has already gone through security checkpoint, you are not allowed, if you are not on duty, to use that security pass to go to meet a friend or your mother or your fiancée on the air side. So those staff who you see when you take the aircraft are in the normal course of their duty and are allowed to be there; that is their job.
These people are very well informed of what is going on in an airport. This is their main area of work. They have been there, most of them, for many years, and they know what could be dangerous for the security of the travelling public.
Senator Adams: The second area I want to touch on is catering. Are there any security measures with respect to the catering? Is there any regulation at Transport Canada vis-à-vis the catering aspect of the airline business? Can the airlines choose any kind of catering they want to serve food in the plane? How do they go about getting catered food on the airplane?
Mr. St-Pierre: Most of the catering services for airplanes, the flight kitchens, are situated on the airport itself, so it is not an unknown organization. It is an organization that is renting space from the local airport authority; we know the owner or the operator of these facilities. Most of these flight kitchens are situated on the ground side, so that is that if somebody wants to go from the kitchen to the aircraft, they have to go through a security checkpoint.
Again, it is not a procedure to search each and every vehicle that goes through that security checkpoint; it never has been. It would cause flight delays. But if there is any doubt on the part of the security personnel at the checkpoint for vehicles, that vehicle will be stopped. Also, the driver of that vehicle must have a security pass; also, if there is another person in the truck, that person must have a security pass. Those people have been security cleared in order to get that pass; their risk has been assessed. We know their past; we know they are not former criminals or persons that would tend to do the kinds of things that could be dangerous for the flight safety, and so on. Otherwise, they would not be hired.
Senator Adams: Yes, those that are catering the food might be honest people; however, my concern is whether or not, before the food leaves the kitchen area and is loaded on to a truck for delivery to an aircraft, there is any checkpoint that those food trays must go through.
Mr. St-Pierre: Some of the flight kitchens are situated right on the border between the public side and the air side; and in these flight kitchens, there is a checkpoint whereby before loading a vehicle everybody has to go through a kind of a checkpoint.
Now, as to whether somebody checks every individual meal that is loaded on to an aircraft, I do not know. My guess is no. But again, they all have supervisory personnel who look on employees, and if there is any doubt, no doubt something would be done to correct that. Again, these vehicles have to go through our own security checkpoint. However, there is no systematic procedure to ensure that each and every individual wrapped meal on board an aircraft is totally clean. I do not believe that a system such as that exists.
Senator Adams: You were talking about de-icing. Sometimes we have a problem with ice on the runway and the apron. What material are you using on the runways and the apron in the de-icing procedure?
Mr. St-Pierre: I must tell you that we wish we could use salt, but we cannot; it is forbidden. You would lose your job tomorrow morning for using salt as a de-icer. What we use is urea; it is a fertilizer. One of its properties is that it lowers the freezing point of water. If you have ice, it does not work very well. Urea has a property that lowers the freezing level of the water to twenty-six degrees. Below twenty-six degrees it does not work. There is no way whatsoever you can do anything with that, so it is very limited, from twenty-six to about thirty-two degrees. As well, urea is very, very expensive. The last time I checked, it cost about $300 a tonne. If you can imagine a runway 12,000 feet long by 200 feet wide, you are using tons of material. So it expensive and not very efficient. If somebody were to discover something as efficient as salt, but non-corrosive, he would make a fortune tomorrow morning.
The Chairman: They have, sir. One of the greatest discoveries in western civilization is in Ottawa right now; it involves a little patch of concrete sitting at the back of the National Research Counsel. They have now discovered how to pass electricity through concrete. It has been sitting there all winter -- and this has been a very severe winter -- and there is no ice and no snow on it. They have found a way for electricity to flow through concrete. Hence, when you repave your runways -- perhaps I am being a little facetious.
Mr. St-Pierre: I did not know that National Research Counsel did that. However, I must tell you, with respect to the Dorval Airport, which opened in 1962, that the elevated way was installed, as you say, with electric cables to heat it. However, we realized over time that it was just too expensive to run that, very expensive to maintain. Finally, we abandoned the system.
The Chairman: On another topic, are there any spot checks done with respect to in-flight meal preparation. I know there are for sanitary reasons, because there are provincial health standards that must be adhered to; however, they have nothing to do with security.
My concern is the capacity for somebody to put, say, automatic machine guns in the trays, in the compartments that hold the individual trays. Is there no way of checking that, no way of checking it at all, and no way of denying access to somebody who is determined to carry out that deception? I think that was our concern. There appears to be a major gap in trying to provide a sterile environment.
As you know, we built fences around airports 35 or 40 years ago to protect planes from people; now, we want to protect people from planes. There is a fair difference there. Are there any spot checks if flight service meals, security spot checks, to your knowledge, carried out from time to time?
Mr. St-Pierre: Very regularly, we verify that the installations that are on the line between the air side and the ground side are not accessible by the public, or anyone. We make sure that the doors are closed and locked at all times and that only those who need to go gain access have a key or a magnetic card, whatever it might be, to gain access. However, we do not check the equipment as such. We do not check what they are putting in the big tray that goes into the aircraft; we are not checking that.
The Chairman: I will now jump, just for a minute, to the question of fire services. In your experience, how often have the fire services at either Dorval or Mirabel been used? How many times a year would they be called upon?
Mr. St-Pierre: Very often. They are not only called in case of a crash, but also in the case of apprehended difficulties. For example, if an aircraft is coming in for a landing and the pilot notices that the green light is not on the carriage, he will call the emergency service to be ready, just in case. There are all kinds of situations like that. They are called also if, on landing, a wheel or a brake malfunctions or overheats. They are called also to stand-by whenever there is fuel spill, when they have to pick it up. A fuel spill below the wing of an aircraft that is being refuelled can be very dangerous. There is a specialized material that is put down to absorb the fuel; they then take it away and dispose of it. They are called, to stand by, when an aircraft with passengers on board is being refuelled. At Dorval and Mirabel, our firefighters are also called in for first aid purposes, in case of medical difficulties. They are called to respond if a passenger has difficulties; they do the primary check. If there is a need to evacuate to a more specialized facility, they will call the proper authorities to do that. So they are call upon continuously.
They also train airline personnel on the use of fire extinguishers: what to use, what type to use, and what type not to use. They verify all power systems within all buildings that belong to the airport authority. Therefore, they are called very often, but fortunately for minor things.
The Chairman: So they are there in a preventative sense, a comfort blanket.
Mr. St-Pierre: Yes, they are a comfort blanket; however, they are also the first responder at the airport if we have a fire. They are the closest.
The Chairman: If you have a fire in the terminal --
Mr. St-Pierre: That is what I mean.
The Chairman: Are they the responder?
Mr. St-Pierre: Yes. They are the first responder, until such time as a municipal firefighter comes in, at which time the they take over the responsibility.
The Chairman: Security, other than the general traffic associated with the operation of an airport, is not really your responsibility. It is the responsibility of the airlines; correct?
Mr. St-Pierre: The aircraft itself, of course, is the responsibility of the airline. To make sure that the passengers that are transported by an airline are secure is an airline's responsibility; to man and operate the security checkpoint is the responsibility of an airline. The people who conduct a search of your person and any hand luggage aircraft work for the airline. That is a contract that is run by an airline, on behalf of all the other airlines, and these people have been trained to search, what to search for.
That training is regulated by Transport Canada. Inspectors from Transport Canada are continuously in the air terminal buildings at Dorval and Mirabel, as well as other major terminals in the country, to ensure that the local airport authority is meeting all of Transport Canada's regulations in the matter of security.
Two of our regulations are entitled Règlement sur la sécurité des aéroports and Règlement sur la sécurité des transporteurs. Those regulation very precisely govern what we have to do to protect the air side against any intruder who do some damage or hijack an aircraft; something like that.
The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. St-Pierre. It has been interesting.
Mr. St-Pierre: Mr. Chairman, I did not fully answer your earlier question. I said earlier that we use urea, but that it is not very efficient in certain circumstances. We also use sand, but a special grade of sand. It is a crushed rock that is very hot. Hence, when the urea is inappropriate for a particular ice condition, we throw this hot rock on the ice. And something else -- which may surprise you -- we use for ice are the big mechanical brooms that I am sure you have all seen at the airport, a giant rotating broom with wire mesh. These are used in the winter to wear out the ice. These brooms are fifteen feet wide and, with the speed of rotation, they wear out the ice. It takes a long time, but, again, you cannot use salt.
The Chairman: You get a hold of those fellows over at the National Research Counsel and ask them for some data on heating concrete. If it works, it will answer a lot of prayers. Thank you, once again, for your presentation.
I will now call upon the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers to present their presentation.
Mr. Thomas G. Hucker, Vice-President and National Legislative Representative, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers: My colleague Mr. Houston is retiring from his duties with the union, and so this morning I am going to give him the distinct pleasure of presenting our position to this committee. This will be his last opportunity, as a union officer, to appear before a government body.
The Chairman: How long have you been with the union?
Mr. J. H. Houston, Provincial Legislative Board Chairman for Ontario, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers: Almost thirty-eight years on the railroad, and I have been a union officer for about twenty-five.
The Chairman: That is wonderful. May I congratulate you on your contribution and on your longevity. Please go ahead, sir.
Mr. Houston: We thank the committee for allowing us to appear today. I will begin by reading a written brief. Following that, we will be prepared to take questions.
The effect of deregulation on safety: For many years, the railways in Canada lobbied the federal government for less regulation in their industry. Primarily, the railways contended that the degree of regulation in effect at the time inhibited their ability to compete in the transportation marketplace. In the case of CN, the position was that as a crown corporation they were somewhat more regulated than their major competitors.
Further, it was the consensus of opinion of the two major railways that their ability to operate was restricted by outdated and numerous regulations. Under various pieces of legislation, the railways felt that they were being restricted in the area of fair competition.
All through this seemingly never ending process of lobbying, the railway market-share and competition was, in their minds, suffering.
However, it would appear that during that process there was little consideration given to the aspect of safety in railway operations. Finally, in 1988, the long awaited deregulation process commenced. The whole premise during the process, as indicated by the railways, was that safety would not be compromised. Unfortunately, that was not the case.
Several factors relative to safety entered the picture at this point and continued to be predominant from that time to the present. The introduction of Manual Block System operation, which did away with many of the checks and balances, accounted for many instances of invasion of maintenance of way working limits, exceeding limits of authority through unfamiliarity with the system. Elimination of wayside operators, unfamiliarity with the new system on the part of Rail Traffic Controllers, Maintenance of Way, and engineering personnel all contributed to the problem. In actual fact, overload on the part of operating crews was found to have been the underlying reason for a number of the aforementioned violations.
The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, in 1993, participated in a national joint management-labour study relative to, what is known in the industry as, "forty rules" violations -- protection of maintenance of way equipment rules. With the Railway Association of Canada, a study was commissioned to determine why there was such a marked increase in violations of the aforementioned rules. The time frame for the study was approximately two years previous to the date of that meeting. The findings of the study indicated that a major reason for some of the violations of the forty rules was "operating crews overload."
In so many words, the crew overload was "too many things going on at the same time." I personally can attest to a case of a crew overload on a VIA Rail Canada passenger train from Windsor to Toronto in May of 1992. That instant case was used as an example of crew overload in the study of the forty rules violations. On the trip to which I refer, the other locomotive engineer and myself copied fifteen manual block system clearances while moving in a distance of 148 miles at speeds up to 80 miles an hour.
These clearances involved operating through work limits, Rule 42 limits, protecting against opposing trains, to name a few. This was in addition to the observance of other operating rules, permanent speed restrictions, operation of the locomotive and train, as well as safe train handling.
Unfortunately, I have not been made aware of any of the changes that resulted from the study of the forty rules. In fact, the same problem still exists to some degree as we present this submission.
The introduction of technology and its rapid deployment, prior to and during interface with continuing deregulation, placed additional stresses on a system comprised of vast amounts of specialized equipment, specialized human resources, and its related training. The impact of deregulation can only be measured and assessed by statistics, by comparison with regulation prior to deregulation, and by how it relates to the types and frequency of railway occurrences.
Changes to the Transportation of Hazardous Goods Act, the Railway Act, the Canadian Railway Operating Rules, Cabooseless Train Decision, Remote Control Locomotive Operation, known as Beltpack, and the expanded use of radio controlled train movement have collectively impacted human ability to respond. The explosion of change and transmission of information has placed added dimensions of stress on operating crews, as we have indicated previously. The railway industry was first to recognize a human factors aspect and initiated a safety partner program in the early 1990s in an attempt to understand and reduce the risk of occurrences. The risk factor continued to escalate and further studies ensued.
Canadian National initiated a root-cause analysis program. This system was designed as a peer program, wherein the root-cause analysis was determined, and while no discipline usually was assessed to the offending employee, he was, as a result of an investigation into the matter at hand, required to explain to his fellow workers the error of his ways and/or the root cause of the incident that was being investigated.
Investigations by regulatory agencies at this point in time broadened in scope and depth; issues heretofore never considered, such as family, social, health, economic, rest, as well as sleep disorders, were all addressed. This came as a result of a joint effort by Canadian National Railways, Canadian Pacific Railways, and VIA Rail Incorporated, in association with the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers.
Some of the information garnered as a result of that study indicated that in the operations of trains, certain factors such as minute-by-minute changes in instructions, clearances, method of delivery, various complex regulations, as well as changes in legislation and operating rules, combined with irregular hours of work, often resulted in family strain, lack of rest, and ultimately a lack of concentration, which resulted in poor workplace performance.
Unsecured rolling stock is leading to an increase in runaway equipment. This type of problem has resulted in the deaths of railway employees and incidents such as Edson, Alberta.
In order to compete in the global economy, to counter the anticipated effects of NAFTA, with reduced rail revenue, reduced traffic on branch lines and short lines, it could be stated that the railways placed themselves in a position of operating a lean and mean operation. Consequently, the workforce has suffered; and understandably, when the workforce suffers, so does performance and productivity.
It will be interesting to observe, in the immediate future, the continuing effects of deregulation on safety. Will all of the efforts on the part of management and labour in programs such as the Canalert fatigue counter measure program be allowed to evaporate in the face of continuing deregulation and have safety comprised? It is our sincere hope that this does not become a reality. However, based upon passed performance on the railways, one cannot be optimistic.
There are many other occurrences which indicated that deregulation has impacted safe rail operation. Canadian Railway Operating Rules under the authority of the Minister of Transport and the Railway Safety Act came into effect January 16, 1990. The revised rules had provisions facilitating the railways to expand on the use of technological change; in general, streamlining, as has been outlined previously in this submission.
There are examples, however, which could lead to unsafe consequences. Main track switches can be lined and locked in the reverse position -- in other words, lined for siding. The purpose of this change was to facilitate the departure of a cabooseless train from a siding adjacent to the main track without taking the time to restore the switch at the rear of the train, which has led to unsafe consequences in several instances.
Further, to facilitate the operation of cabooseless trains, it was agreed that if a train is equipped with a Digitair end-of-train information system, with a rear train emergency braking feature, and a red flashing marker light operated by a light activated sensitive cell, et cetera, that train could then operate without a caboose. The provisions go on to state that dangerous commodities would not be marshalled within 2,000 feet of the rear of the train.
Although there were other provisions, two important were noted: a "flashing red marker to the rear"; and dangerous commodities were not to be at the rear of the train. The railways applied for and received permission from the regulator, Transport Canada, to replace the red flashing light at the rear of the train with a highly visible marker known as an HVM. On an approaching train, if you can see the marker in inclement weather, for lack of a better description, you are too close and thereby too late.
It has been my personal experience as a locomotive engineer that compliance with the marshalling of dangerous goods at the rear of the trains is by no means being complied with on a daily basis. If a rear collision were to occur involving the above combined factors, the potential consequences could be catastrophic.
These are a few examples of the many deregulation changes, which we feel have laid dormant over the years but have catastrophic potential. If the regulator, Transport Canada, were to concede change to the railways, then such changes and decisions should be based on trends and statistics; and in-the-field experience and the implementation of recommendations by the Transportation Safety Board should have also been taken into consideration.
We further feel that input from the Brotherhood should be considered in and during the process of Transportation Safety Board investigations and the preparation of final reports. This method of cooperation between labour and management as well as the regulator and the investigator was proposed through the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers Safety Task Force. This did not become a reality. The proposed system would be similar to the National Transportation Safety Board legislation in the U.S.
Have government cutbacks on expenditures affected safety over the years?
When one considers the amount of subsidies to which railways were entitled in the past, it is our position that they were in direct correlation to the degree of safety in effect at the time.
In our view, deregulation, combined with shrinking market share, increased implementation of technology, and reduction of experienced employees during the downsizing process in all departments of the railways resulted in a drastic change in required experiences and knowledge within the railways.
Here again, it is our position that in order to bring about a lean, mean, downsized operation, as a result of fewer subsidies, the railways have utilized experienced staff reductions in order not to reach their downsized objectives. The argument for change within the structure is presented, and it is statistically proven that the total system has and continues to be weakened. The present experience in all departments and functions of the railway have led to a "hurry up to keep up approach."
Established practices have been and continue to be eroded. Established methods and levels of control were replaced to service a wider span of control. Since 1992, CN has reduced its employee payroll by a further 14,000 employees. The hands-off approach of the regulator, based on the Railway Safety Act, and the effects of deregulation have weakened the railways and placed their employees in peril. Downsizing has also been experienced at Canadian Pacific. With the downsizing of the employee population, an example of the loss of experience, was revealed with the Edson accident investigation. Canadian National was not aware of the date or the instructions that were issued, which resulted in the removal of the derails at the east end of Edson yard.
How is safety monitored?
Safety in the railway industry is monitored through the efforts of Transport Canada, which is the regulator of the rail industry. It is the duty of Transport Canada to ensure that all safety- and railway-related legislation is complied with by the railways, by their employees, and by management. The task of accident investigation is delegated to the Transportation Safety Board, to investigate and determine the cause of railway accidents and/or incidents, and to recommend to the regulator, Transport Canada, steps that should be taken and/or might be taken to prevent the investigated occurrences from repeating themselves.
The Transportation Safety Board, for lack of a better description, may be described as a "toothless tiger." The reason for making that observation is that many recommendations are made as a result of investigations conducted by the Transportation Safety Board, however few are implemented by the regulator, Transport Canada. The many pieces of regulation and legislation covering railway operation in Canada is voluminous in nature. The Railway Safety Act, Transportation of Hazardous Goods Act, Canadian Railway operating rules, general operating instruction of the various railways, cabooseless train operation legislation, remote control locomotive operation, commonly referred to as beltpack, while not a legislated document, encourages the expanded use of radio control train movement without the human factor.
The above noted pieces of legislation and/or regulation seem to be a result of the failure of the various agencies, both railway and government, to work cohesively for the attainment of safety for the public, for the railways' employees, and the image of Canadian transportation systems as a whole. There is a lack of dedicated resolve.
Public awareness of media reports, unions representing employees, and railways conducting studies with respect to alertness assurance all stem from a clear indication on the part of government agencies of a reluctance to address human factors in railway operation. All accidents or risks thereof stem from supervision, training, knowledge, experience, or lack thereof, and who does what and when.
In a recent case, the Goderich and Exeter Railway, a short line railway in Southwestern Ontario, part of the U.S. conglomerate, Railtex, had a derailment of fourteen cars; these cars were not inspected after they were re-railed and before they were interchanged with Canadian National. The Goderich and Exeter railway did not notify any of the regulatory bodies of the accident, nor did they notify Canadian National of the accident.
This instant case was only brought to light when the Brotherhood approached Transport Canada about the accident. One can only imagine the catastrophic events that were possible had these cars been allowed to continue in railway operations. The Goderich Exeter Railway was more concerned with the bottom line than safety. Clearly this is an example of where lack of inspection and regulatory involvement have deteriorated within the industry.
Are there spot checks by industry, and are they effective? Most certainly there are spot checks by industry, and in order to operate a safe and viable operation, the Brotherhood is in total agreement that they must continue. We must vehemently disagree, however, with management by intimidation. There are instances wherein the members of the Brotherhood, as well as other organizations charged with the responsibility of compliance with Canadian Railway operating rules and relevant legislative regulations, have been threatened with removal from service, their livelihood and that of their family threatened, when they attempted to inform railway operating officers of violations of certain pieces of legislation.
Today's locomotive engineer is a highly professional, experienced, knowledgeable and capable employee. Railway operating officers in management would be well advised to give today's railway employees credit for knowledge, not only of the railway operating rules, but also of the required and relative legislation that must be observed in order to operate safe and viable railways. The locomotive engineer is the employee with the ultimate responsibility for the safe movement and operation of railway motive power equipment.
How has the increase in large truck traffic in the last 20 years affected safety? Well, the operation of trucks is not within the confines of our expertise. In light of the fact that trucks are a direct competition with railways, and the fact that the railways provide a livelihood for our membership, we feel that we must comment. One only has to read in the newspapers and hear television reports of the many truck accidents that have occurred on provincial highways, that is 401, 402, 403, 404 and 400, wherein people have lost their lives as a result of truck tires becoming disengaged from trailers and truck tires crossing the median, et cetera.
It is quite obvious that there must be concerted and more frequent inspections of the operation and safe practices relative to trucking operations, not only in Ontario, but also across all of Canada. At the risk of being accused of being partial, one manner in which such incidents could be prevented would be the shipment of those trailers on railway flat cars.
Are you satisfied with the effectiveness of safety enforcement? Without going into a more detailed explanation, it would appear from the previous remarks made in our submission that this organization and its membership are by no means satisfied with the effectiveness of safety enforcement. We feel that anything further that we may say in this regard would be repetitious. We would, therefore, ask that the committee please consider what has already been submitted in this regard, as we feel it provides a very explicit explanation of our feelings with regard to the effectiveness of safety enforcement.
Are you satisfied with the regulations governing the transportation of hazardous goods? This issue has been a source of great debate over the years, since the Mississauga derailment. As a result of that derailment, regulations relative to the transportation of hazardous goods were implemented. One of the regulations that resulted was a speed restriction of 35 miles an hour on certain portions of the railway in populated areas while handling dangerous commodities. Conversely, I would suggest that the members of the committee observe the operation of trucks carrying dangerous commodities -- propane, gasoline, vinyl chloride, hydrochloric acid, various other acids of a very corrosive nature, as well as other corrosive materials: those trucks, while carrying said materials, often pass other traffic at speeds in excess of 120 kilometres per hour.
The transportation of hazardous goods by truck should by all means be reassessed and steps should be taken to ensure that the cavalier and arrogant operation of trucks, while carrying dangerous commodities, is not allowed. Enforcement with regard to these type of operations seems to be non-existent, if indeed there is any regulations covering the transportation of dangerous goods by truck on provincial highways.
We further feel that a reassessment of the regulations covering the transportation of hazardous goods by rail should be undertaken. At the time that the present regulations were instituted, some degree of paranoia, we feel, was present, and there have been speed restrictions placed on certain subdivisions of the railways in Canada, wherein they are not necessary.
We feel that a reassessment of the regulations would assist in a more expeditious movement of trains to their destinations. And while we certainly agree that some form of regulation should be in effect relative to the transportation of dangerous commodities, we feel that the expeditious movement of freight in a safe manner can be accomplished even with the reassessment of said regulations.
In conclusion, clearly other presentations will use the U.S. railway statistics to verify the safety of Canadian operation. The committee needs to look at Canadian operation statistics separately. The Transportation Safety Board has just published its 1996 preliminary transportation occurrence statistics, and the committee should use those figure to determine where the industry now stands. We have included those documents as Appendix A and Appendix B to this submission.
The Class 1 carriers under federal jurisdiction have only instituted some programs because they are required by statute. Committees, such as the health and safety committees and safety audit committees, are on the properties only because the legislation requires it. The railways companies have not broken new ground in this respect.
Programs such as crossing safety, trespasser prevention, and Operation Lifesaver are ongoing through the involvement and efforts of the railway companies, the government regulatory bodies and the Brotherhood. The companies do approach these programs in a positive nature, to everyone's benefit. The Brotherhood is the major labour partner in these programs.
The new drug and alcohol policies of Canadian National and Canadian Pacific were brought about by a management's realization that a family assistance program, known as the EFAP, would effect the company's bottom line. The information provided by professionals in this field indicates that every $1 spent on Employment Family Assistance Program brings $10 in return.
EFAP programs also provide employees and their families with the consultation of professionals, to overcome their personal and family problems. The railway should be commended for their policies. However, before they implemented these groundbreaking programs, there was a great deal of hard-nosed discussions between labour and management.
New switching technologies, which have removed the locomotive engineer from the cab, have not proven to be as productive as first envisioned. Work-related injuries have been sustained, and property damage has occurred as a result of the operation of this technology. Whether this results from a lack of training, an unfamiliarity with the technology, or initial operational problems remains a question. Productivity, in some instances, has decreased to the point of having to reinstate the locomotive engineer into the cab in order to catch up with the workload and remain competitive with the other modes of transport as a means of retaining market share.
The reduction of staff that formerly addressed the instances of trespassing has not assisted in resolving this continuing problem. Incidents of trespassing, wherein lives are lost by accident or the person's own misfortune, continue to occur.
The Near Miss program which is in effect on Canadian railways is not working. If charges can be laid under the photo radar technology, then why is it necessary for a locomotive engineer to be able to visually identify the violators of statutes relative to the disobeying of railway crossing protection?
The proposed harmonization of U.S.-Canadian regulatory regimes should not be a lowering of the Canadian regulatory standards to that of the U.S. As an International Vice-President and Legislative Representative of the Brotherhood, Mr. Hucker has firsthand knowledge and experience of how the lower U.S. standards have effected the American locomotive engineers. The two-way telemetry equipment train braking information system, known as TIBS, which Canadian locomotive engineers have enjoyed for the last 10 years, has not yet been proclaimed in a lot of the American states.
Under harmonization, would Canadian locomotive engineers have to accept the lower U.S. standards on TIBS equipment? In fact, many Class 1 carriers in the U.S. are still fighting to have the U.S. regulations not reflect Canadian standards. Locomotive engineers in Canada have higher certification standards that in the U.S. Under harmonization, would the certification level of Canadian locomotive engineers be lower? One can only wonder if this proposal will lead to a safer railway operation in Canada.
We would ask that the subcommittee please consider the elements which we have outlined in our submission. We feel that the deregulation has certainly had an effect on safety and the overall operation of railways in Canada since its inception.
Notwithstanding all of these facts, we feel that an overall assessment of safety and the transportation of dangerous goods, as well as the manner in which they are monitored, should certainly be undertaken.
We would like to thank the committee for taking the time to allow our submission to be heard. Should you have any questions, we would be only too pleased to answer then.
Senator Bacon: What have you lost with the closure of major maintenance shops and inspections along the route you operate? Have you lost something with the closing?
Mr. Houston: In my own instance, I worked out of Sarnia, Ontario, the entry point of a lot of traffic from the United States. Our repair track has been shut down. The inspections that they receive now are just visual inspections. There is no walking of the train, because most of the trains now operate on a change-off basis. Rather than the train being torn apart at each terminal, one crew gets on, the other gets off. If you look at the statistics indicated by Transport Canada, that there seems to be a rise in bearing failures. I would suggest that that is probably as a result of reduced inspection.
We have cars now that are probably not inspected in a detailed manner, probably from Chicago to Toronto or maybe Chicago to Montreal, the contention being that the equipment of today is supposed to be able to operate. However, for an industry that depended on checks and balances so drastically up until deregulation, we now seem to be loosey-goosey.
Senator Bacon: Main track derailments have increased in the past two years. CP Rail attributed most of this to inclement weather conditions. However, union members, we have heard, believe that these derailments are caused by a failure to maintain track and safety standards.
May I have your comments on that, please.
Mr. Houston: It used to be that a section foreman had 20 miles and a gang of four to five men to assist him to maintain that piece of track. Now, in many cases, the section foreman has a pick-up truck, and he inspects a section that can run from 65, 75, or 100 miles in length.
Mr. Hucker: Running a railway in the winter time is not a new experience in this country.
Senator Bacon: It has always existed.
Mr. Hucker: To operate in -35 or -40 degree weather, while rail does become brittle, is not a new phenomenon. Some of their actions, you may agree with them, are due to rail failures and/or wheel failures in the cold weather, but I would suggest to you that it is a very small part of what has actually happened. In many cases, as Jim said, it is a lack of inspection of the track.
Senator Bacon: Not enough.
Mr. Hucker: Not enough. At one time, individuals would go out in the spring time to take a look at beaver dams, to see what the level of water was. They do not do that any longer; they do not have the time to do it. As a result, we get the runoff in the spring, and the beaver dams overflow and take the track out with it. You keep your fingers crossed that there is not a train in the block when the track lets go.
We have had a number of incidents over the years where that has actually happened; most recently, two years ago, when we lost some people. We had one in the mountains, in the Nelson area. Again, track inspection is a real problem. It is not possible to properly inspect track by expecting people to cover as much as 100 miles on a given day; it is just not possible to do the same kind of job. At one time, road masters would climb on the train, almost on a biweekly basis, to see, as the trains moved across, what the track was like. It is been a long time since I have heard of anybody doing that on a regular basis. They just do not have the time.
Senator Bacon: CN told us about the ombudsman service that they have put in place. In your evaluation of that, does it work? Have there been any complaints or have the complaints been acted upon?
Mr. Hucker:I am not familiar with it. This is the first time that I have heard of it.
Senator Bacon: You are aware of that program?
Mr. Hucker: That is right, I am not aware of it. I have not seen any correspondence cross my desk. As the National Representative handling legislation and having involvement with collective bargaining, I have not yet seen this one cross my desk. I will have to ask about it when I get back to Ottawa -- or before I leave here, I will ask about it, put it that way.
Senator Rivest: Is there a lot that can be settled at the level of your collective agreements for the security of your people?
Mr. Hucker: Not safety.
Senator Rivest: Not safety at all?
Mr. Hucker: Safety is not part of the collective bargaining relationship. In fact, the codes in many cases are specific that they are not collective bargaining related. Health and safety committees are not part of the collective bargaining relationship; at least on the operating side, it has not been there.
Senator Adams: You talked about beaver dams. There is a test car that runs checks on the rails; I believe that that test car only runs four and five times a year. How long does it take a beaver to build a dam? Do you know?
Mr. Hucker: As a kid on a farm, it seems to me that it took only a couple of hours for the beavers to reconstruct their dams. And I do not think the beavers have changed that much since I was a kid, to be able to rebuild dams.
Senator Adams: It seems to me that there are no maintenance men in cars going up and down the railway -- as I used to see when I lived in Churchill -- checking the ties on the railway. Today, it is just all hi-tech equipment, and so on. You do not have any more maintenance men checking the ties on the railway.
Mr. Hucker: Not to the extent that they once had. It has been a while since I operated a locomotive, but I remember having a road foreman who knew the location of almost every dip in the track on my route. I operated a train around Northern Ontario, Thunder Bay, and as we would be moving along, the engine would, from time to time, go down as we went across, say, a piece of muskeg, and he would say, "Oh, it is time to come back in and start shimming up the track again." He knew the track inside out.
I suggest to you that that experience is long gone, that we now rely on hi-tech equipment to do what a pair of eyes can do a lot better.
Senator Adams: Do you have any idea how CN paid for that equipment?
Mr. Hucker: How they paid for it?
Senator Adams: I mean how much it cost.
Mr. Hucker: I could not even estimate the cost, but I suggest that you and I paid quite a bit for it.
Senator Adams: With respect to safety, trucking regulations are mostly a provincial matter, I believe. The regulations that guide the railways are set by the federal authorities. Do you think, with respect to the trucking companies, who can transport between provinces that may have different trucking regulations, that there should be one set of regulations for the trucking companies? What is your opinion on that, from a safety perspective, in order to improve safety on the highways?
Mr. Hucker: I would suggest to you that it should be a single regulation. However, the problem would come in getting the other regulatory bodies to agree to the regulations, in my opinion. I suggest to you that it would not happen.
As far as road safety is concerned, the Brotherhood is part of an organization called Crash that is looking into the problems in the trucking industry. This is not strictly a self-serving issue on the part of a locomotive engineer or a member of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers.
I travel the 417, the 40, and the 20, on a regular basis. I travel the 401 to Toronto on a regular basis. I am concerned about the number of truck accidents on those highways.
I am not necessarily in favour of more regulation; I think more sensible regulation is where we should put our efforts. If we are going to deregulate this industry, and are going to continue to deregulate all the industries in transportation, it is time that we took a long hard look at what we are doing, as opposed to having five or six agencies looking at safety. As we said in our brief, the Transportation Safety Board investigates and makes recommendations, yet Transport Canada does not necessarily respond to the recommendations in a particular report.
Short lines is the future of this industry. I have said that I hope that in the year 2023, my kids do not have to put the railway back together again, like we did in 1923. In any event, we are not against less regulations; it is more pertinent regulations that we want to see in our industry.
Senator Adams: In the meantime, is some maintenance being done in the United States -- problems with wheels that have bearings on them? Do you know?
Mr. Hucker: There are a lot of maintenance shops here. As to what exactly goes across the border, I could not tell you; that is not my field of expertise. However, we have had instances of bearing failures that have failed only 15 minutes after passing in front of a track side scanner. It is just by the grace of God that they have been discovered. This has happened within the past two weeks.
Mr. Houston: Gurwood, Ontario; second time in 14 months.
Senator Adams: Some of the short runs are bought by companies that are not unionized. In terms of safety, I think this presents more dangers. What is your opinion on that?
Mr. Houston: Well, the short line industry would like, or does, consider their employees to be composite employees. Hence, today you might be a conductor, tomorrow you might be the yard clerk, tomorrow or the next day you might be the locomotive engineer, and the day after that you might be laying track. We have one short line operation in Ontario, about which we have already spoken, whose level and consciousness of safety can be determined by the fact that they keep back the fourteen cars they derailed, without reporting it.
As a member of a union for 30-odd years, I would suggest that the organizations assist the companies in having a conscience in a lot of areas strictly because we are there. I would suggest that a unionized workplace is safer than a non-unionized workplace.
The short lines, because of a lower overhead, paying less wages, and so on, can operate a leaner, meaner operation. They are not as big as the Class 1s; they run only 75 to 100 miles.
Mr. Hucker: On this point, my union, people from CP, and others involved in human resources put together a two-year project to look into the short line industry, both in the U.S. and Canada, to see what drove the industry, why the short line industry could do things that the Class 1s could not do. That report came out in October of last year, I believe. Since then, we have negotiated with Canadian Pacific, too, in terms of short line agreements, where we took 30 percent out of the operating budget of those two short lines, and never reduced the wages at all.
Senator, we believe that a unionized work force is better work force. That is a philosophy I grew up with; it comes from my father. We have unionized the smaller operations, but there have been classic differences in the collective bargaining relationship with the short line. We just finished the TransOntario Railway, which is part of the central western operation out of Smith Falls into North Bay. We have unionized them. Goderich and Exeter, we have unionized them.
The Chairman: Did you people participate, your unions, in the prevention or safe choice policy guideline, which will come into place on March 17, a policy to prevent work place alcohol and drug problems; did you participate in that?
Mr. Hucker: I did not, but my union did, yes.
The Chairman: Did you participate extensively?
Mr. Hucker: Yes, we did.
The Chairman: Could I ask you how you feel about it, because it seems to be quite a document?
Mr. Hucker: I have a problems with some of the provisions that are in there. My expertise was with the Canadian Pacific Railway employee assistance program, which we started seven or eight years ago.
We in the transportation industry are no different from the rest of the employee population out there; we have all the same problems. Albeit, we are sometimes operating very heavy equipment. Some of the fallacies that we found out -- and it goes back to the Chase Maryland accident in the United States, just after the Hinton accident where we killed twenty-three people.
The testimony indicated that there were extreme drug and alcohol abuse problems in the industry. Unfortunately, the locomotive engineer in that accident perjured himself in his testimony. He did not have a problem with cocaine, as he testified.
Having said that, the damage had been done; the regulators in the United States, the FRA, thought there was a problem and went ahead with drug testing.
I suggest to you that it is very expensive to test people. Also, the testing results thus far have not borne out the suspicion there is a huge problem in the industry. In actual fact, a very small number of the people in the industry have tested positive for drug and alcohol abuse.
However, in general, it is a good program. As I said, in any good program I have a few problems with some of things that are there.
The Chairman: Gentlemen, I thank you very much.
Honourable colleagues, we will return to this place at 2:00, at which time we will hear the Railway Association of Canada and the Rubber Association of Canada.
The committee adjourned.