Proceedings of the Special Senate Committee on
Transportation Safety
and Security
Issue 4 - Evidence
OTTAWA, Thursday, June 3, 1999
The Special Senate Committee on Transportation Safety and Security met this day at 11:00 a.m. to study the state of transportation safety and security in Canada.
Senator J. Michael Forrestall (Chairman) in the Chair.
[English]
The Chairman: The Special Senate Committee on Transportation Safety and Security is looking into the state of transportation safety in Canada. We are reviewing where we are, where we have been, where we are going, and where should we be in 15 or 20 years.
Our witnesses today are from the Airline Division of CUPE: Denise Hill, division president, and Richard Balnis.
We welcome you, Ms Hill and Mr. Balnis. This is obviously not your first appearance before a parliamentary committee, but it is the first time that we have the opportunity to hear from you. I would invite you to be as open and frank with us as you can or want to be. We need to understand the degree of difficulties that you face in your workplace and we wish to hear of ways of improving your situation. Safety is what this is all about, particularly the development of the culture of safety.
Please proceed.
Ms Denise Hill, Division President, Airline Division of CUPE: Thank you for the opportunity to be frank and open, although that has not usually been one of our problems, as you will understand by the end of our brief.
We are before you today to give you our views on the state of aviation safety in Canada and we hope that our comments will help you make recommendations to ensure a high level of safety as we move into the next millennium. We believe that this is work that is necessary and timely.
The Airline Division currently represents about 9,000 flight attendants at ten different airlines: Air Alliance, Air Canada, Air Nova, Air Ontario, Air Transat, Calm Air, Canadian Airlines, Canadian Regional Airlines, First Air and Inter-Canadian. We have applied for the certification of approximately 1,200 more flight attendants at Royal Airlines, Canada 3000 and the Vancouver base of Cathay Pacific. With these new certificates, we would represent about 95 per cent of the flight attendants in Canada.
First, I should like to put forward my union's views on the question of economic deregulation and aviation safety. We disagree with the cheery view put forward by the representatives of the Air Transport Association of Canada, Air Canada and Canadian Airlines that economic deregulation has had no impact on safety regulations in this country.
In our July 22, 1987 submission to the then Senate Committee on Transportation studying Bills C-18 and C-19, deregulating Canada's airline industry, we offered this assessment:
Despite the federal government's rhetorical commitment to the maintenance of adequate safety standards, we believe Canadian safety will be compromised under deregulation. Regardless of the number of safety rules that government may enact and even attempt to enforce, air safety has always depended upon a financially stable industry that could afford levels of maintenance spending, crew training and equipment replacement above minimum standards. The economic imperative of deregulation and the search for squeezing costs will likely result in decreased levels of spending in these areas to the detriment of airline safety.
Where carriers were once able to operate above the minimums demanded by Transport Canada under economic regulation, cost-cutting measures brought by economic deregulation have forced airlines to operate more closely to the marginal line of safety permitted by the enforcement agencies.
Our position was repeated in a March 1997 presentation to the then Minister of Transport David Anderson in a submission jointly submitted by the Canadian Auto Workers, the International Association of Machinists and Teamsters Canada.
I will not read through these quotes, but I would encourage the senators to read them. I will pick out a few sentences that we believe are most crucial.
Mr. Justice Moshansky, in his comments during the Dryden crash investigation, said that the lack of resources combined with inexperienced management at Air Ontario, which still had the backing of the larger Air Canada, had produced a "bending the letter of the law operational environment" that may have "encouraged" a pilot "to encroach upon the margin of safety," leading to the deaths of 24 people, including three crew members.
Mr. Justice Moshansky offered this assessment of the linkage between airline deregulation, the government policy of deficit reduction and Canadian aviation safety:
The effect of Economic Regulatory Reform, combined with deficit reduction, created a synergy that, in my opinion based on the evidence before this Commission, had an adverse impact on the effective application of safety standards.
We wholeheartedly agree with that statement.
The commission also commented quite harshly about how Transport Canada's primary role of protecting the travelling public is thwarted by what may be described only as a bureaucratic lassitude and pliancy on the part of certain sections of Transport Canada. The commission then made some of its strongest comments ever about this potentially dangerous problem.
Transport Canada's senior managers appeared in some instances to be most susceptible to the demands of industry to overturn safety-related regulatory amendments, in spite of advice to the contrary from their own Transport Canada technical specialists. Transport Canada officials responsible for the development and implementation of such rule changes must, therefore, be vigilant to ensure that the safety component of the legislation is not effectively diluted or neutralized as a result of industry pressure.
Our direct experience in dealing with Transport Canada after the release of Mr. Justice Moshansky's report, first with the Dryden Commission Implementation Project and then with the Canadian Aviation Regulation Advisory Council, has confirmed our worst fears about safety in Canada. Simply put, we lack confidence in the future of Canadian aviation at this time, unless corrective action is taken.
I should like to illustrate our conclusions by citing briefly the top ten safety concerns of Canada's flight attendants. In this regard, we draw on the example of the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board, which has published an annual list of the ten "most wanted" safety enhancements since 1990.
First is the least-cost approach to safety. Despite its high-sounding vision and mission statements, Transport Canada has embraced a least cost approach to aviation safety under pressure from the airline industry, led primarily by its lobby group, ATAC.
Transport Canada explicitly harmonizes its safety downward to the lowest common denominator, often after only a cursory study or analysis, and sometimes even below ICAO minimum standards -- for example, fuel requirements -- and this is only to save the carriers money.
The entire development of the Canadian aviation regulations, spearheaded by the former director general of aviation regulations, Don Spruston, a subsequent applicant for the job of ATAC president, was characterized by a lack of comparative-data analysis, information and proper cost-benefit analysis. Our experience directly contradicts the testimony of Air Canada before you that, since the introduction of economic deregulation in Canada, there has been no change in or dilution of the stringent regulatory framework that should exist with respect to airline safety.
Second is the regulator captured by the regulated. The CARAC process, under the guise of industry consultation, has become the perfect vehicle for airline lobbyists to "capture" the regulator. In meetings dominated by the airlines, regulations and standards are rewritten routinely, again with the objective of least-cost harmonization.
Opposition to these initiatives in the form of dissents is decided by senior Transport Canada bureaucrats in closed meetings of the Regulatory Committee. The reasons for the Regulatory Committee decisions, including the rejection of dissents, are sketchy, if they appear at all, and when they do it is often only a year later in the minutes of meetings.
Third is the Canadian Aviation Regulations, or CARs. The new CARs have been praised by Air Canada as being an improvement in overall air safety management. Transport Canada extols the CARs as the modern performance-based regulations. While the CARs are an important step forward, codifying the jumble of pre-existing Air Navigation Orders and Air Regulations, they often lack meaningful performance objectives. An example of that is the survival equipment on board our aircraft.
The CARs have also made greater use of "enabled standards," documents that contain regulatory material that is now controlled exclusively by Transport Canada outside the Canada Gazette process. These standards are then amended through the airline-dominated CARAC process. Since October 1996, when the CARs were first promulgated, about 750 amendments have been initiated to amend these standards through the CARAC process.
Fourth is regulation by exemption. Whereas the CARs were originally intended to consolidate and codify all the industry practices in order to create a level safety playing field, Transport Canada continues to use its sweeping powers under section 4.9(2) of the Aeronautics Act to regulate by exemption. Under this section, an exemption may be granted by the minister with mitigating conditions if it is in the public interest and is not likely to affect aviation safety. Such exemptions have been used routinely by delegated Transport Canada officials to reduce the number of flight attendants on board aircraft, to allow aircraft to leave with an inoperative door/slide, to remove life preservers for a particular route to an island and to reduce survival equipment on board -- often with no meaningful or mitigating conditions.
Fifth is the "1 in 50" rule. Behind closed doors, Transport Canada and the airlines met as the Air Carrier Inspection Task Force during 1991 to reduce the number of flight attendants on board all Canadian aircraft. The then current rule was one flight attendant for 40 passengers; that was reduced to one per 50 seats.
On December 17, 1993, Transport Canada proposed a global exemption, which, in effect, repealed the Canadian "1 in 40" regulation. A working group consisting of Transport Canada, the airlines and CUPE was created to examine the impact of this change; however, before the working group could even meet, Transport Canada exempted the Air Canada Regional Jet on June 24, 1994, and on July 28, 1994, they exempted the Dash 8 and the ATR-42 and allowed those aircraft to operate with only one flight attendant for 50 passengers, subject to certain operational restrictions.
After a spirited public campaign was initiated by CUPE in 1995 involving MPs and senators, the global exemption approach was dropped by Transport Canada, but a closed meeting of the Regulatory Committee retained the exemption for 50 seat aircraft and incorporated it into the new CARs. The Regulatory Committee was chaired by Don Spruston. Since then, a conflict within the CARs has removed the mitigating conditions attached to the original exemption, because there is a minimum-equipment-list override on operative PA/interphone systems and the functioning flight attendant jumpseat.
Contrary to the evidence provided to you by the Air Canada representatives, there is a chilling parallel with a U.S. accident that led to needless loss of life because there was only one flight attendant on the smaller aircraft. On June 7, 1971, an Allegheny Convair 580 crashed in New Haven, Connecticut, killing 28 passengers, including two infants who were on board, and the only flight attendant. An extensive fire broke out after impact, leaving only one exit, the aft door, available for evacuation. However, the aft door was not opened because the passengers could not figure out how to open it. Although that aircraft had a seating capacity of 50 seats and the FAA rule then required one flight attendant for every 44 passenger seats at that time -- it subsequently changed to 50 seats in 1972 -- the flight was able to operate with only one flight attendant because of an FAA exemption.
The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board, in concluding its investigation, noted that the possibility for a greater number of survivors would have existed had a second cabin attendant been aboard that flight. That conclusion was elaborated further in the April 6, 1981 testimony of U.S. NTSB Chair, James B. King, before the Government Activities and Transportation Subcommittee on Government Operations of the U.S. House of Representatives study "Aircraft Cabin Safety Staffing Standards."
The investigation revealed that the air carrier had been authorized to operate that aircraft with only one flight attendant pursuant to Exemption No. 1108B, allowing only one instead of two flight attendants required by 14 CFR 121.391. The investigation established that the flight attendant probably received incapacitating impact injuries precluding her from operating the exit door in the rear of the aircraft. Most of the non-surviving aircraft occupants were found near the rear service door. It is a haunting fact that 15 of the 28 non-surviving passengers died of asphyxiation and thermal injuries in an otherwise survivable accident.
Sixth is inoperative aircraft door/slides. A global door/slide inoperative relief was granted by Transport Canada in 1994 for a period of two years on a trial basis for narrow-bodied aircraft in this country. This relief is not allowed in the United States for narrow-bodied aircraft but only for certain wide-bodied aircraft. Despite the evidence that carriers were abusing the original intent of this relief, which was only to return an aircraft to maintenance station for repairs, this relief continues today.
CUPE's request for further information, up to the Transport deputy minister level, has been denied, citing proprietary concerns of manufacturers and airlines. The request has also been revealed that Transport Canada is granting the relief to carriers inconsistently across the country. Transport Canada now wants to make this unprecedented door/slide relief a permanent feature of the CARs.
Let me explain inoperative door exemption. When you get on an aircraft, the door is mechanical; if there is a problem with the slide that is packed inside the door, the aircraft are nevertheless allowed to take off and depart with passengers on board. All they have to do is tape off the door. There is no briefing to passengers telling them that that door is inoperable.
One of our major concerns is that, when accidents occur, and this is a known fact, at least 50 per cent of the doors are always out of use because of an accident. Those of you who saw the news last night concerning American Airlines are aware that only one door was operable in that accident last night.
Senator Roberge: But you said that in the U.S.A. an aircraft is not allowed to leave with an inoperable door.
Ms Hill: Correct. However, for wide-bodied aircraft it is allowed in Canada. It was a narrow-bodied plane that crashed last night. If it had been flying with an inoperative door, that could have been the door that was the only usable door in the accident.
Seventh is air quality. Poor air quality on aircraft remains an ongoing issue with flight attendants in Canada and around the world. For flight attendants, it is a matter of occupational safety and health. It is also a matter of concern for passengers, especially frequent flyers. An attempt to study air quality on board aircraft in Canada was killed in 1990 by the air carriers, who convinced Don Spruston to drop the project.
They are now vigorously resisting the latest attempt to do a scientific study as part of an aviation occupational safety and health working group, despite mounting scientific evidence that there are hazards associated with poor air quality on board aircraft. It is unknown at this point what Transport Canada will do next in the face of the airline opposition.
Eighth is cuts in airport firefighting. In 1994, ATAC proposed that only 28 airports in Canada have on-site airport firefighters. That was below the U.S. standard, but Transport Canada agreed with the initiative.
Non-designated airports are now allowed to rely on firefighters off the site, perhaps using municipal contingents that are up to 30 kilometres away. Given that the first few minutes of a crash are key for the survival of aircraft occupants, the current CARs rules are clearly unsafe. Moreover, these smaller airports that would not have the crash-fire-rescue services are the very airports that are now also facing the reduction of flight attendants on board the aircraft. It is mostly the smaller aircraft that are flying into these airports -- the Dash 8s and the Regional Jets -- so that, if there is an incapacitated flight attendant, the passengers are on their own, and as it has been shown they are just not able to open doors in a severe emergency.
But the diminution of these requirements had to happen if these airports were to be successfully offloaded by Transport Canada to cash-strapped local authorities.
Ninth is flight- and duty-time regulations. Unlike the case for pilots, there are no safety rules limiting the hours that a flight attendant may be on duty. While an amendment to the Aeronautics Act was passed in 1991 giving Transport Canada the authority to regulate this area, a working group is now deadlocked on developing these limits for flight attendants.
The latest "straw man" proposal on the table was drafted by Transport Canada and supported by ATAC. It calls for the following conditions:
First, no monthly, quarterly or annual limits on flight time for flight attendants, unlike the pilots' regulation.
Second, up to 292 days of 12-hour duty days or 3,504 duty hours annually. By way of a comparison, 52 weeks of 40 hours per week would total 2,080 hours annually.
Third, up to 1,750 flight hours, which is about 50 per cent more than the pilots' rule of 1,200 hours annually, which is already the most permissive in the world.
Fourth, authority to operate 17 consecutive duty days of 12 hours before being eligible for three days off. That would give the authority for a flight attendant to operate Toronto-Heathrow-New Delhi, with only an economy seat for a crew rest, and then be deadheaded home.
This working group has not met again since this totally unacceptable regulatory initiative was tabled in May of 1998.
Tenth is the flight attendant training standard. One of the recommendations arising out of the Moshansky Inquiry into the Air Ontario crash in Dryden was to improve flight attendant training. That was done in the face of concerted airline opposition, at least at first. Canada's training standard is now being used by regulatory authorities around the world as a model to develop their own rules for training flight attendants.
At the insistence of the airlines, Transport Canada has now convened a working group and declared open season on the training standard. Any diminution of this training standard is unacceptable and is a genuine threat to our role as safety professionals on board.
I regret being the bearer of such a pessimistic view of Canadian aviation safety, but it is a reality that we face every day. We will continue our fight to maintain and improve all levels in all of these areas. We may even need your help on specific issues, such as effective limits for carry-on baggage and unruly passengers. In the meantime, we hope that we have enlightened senators and given you areas to include in your deliberations as you strive to make recommendations for high quality transportation safety in Canada.
The Chairman: We appreciate very much the frankness in your brief. Incidentally, I am amazed that you limited yourself to the two words "unruly passengers," because when we were dealing with that subject last night in respect of the adequacy of the laws, we told of a rather severe case. To recite it very briefly, a passenger who boarded in Jamaica was making such a nuisance of himself that they had to land in Miami, only to be told to carry on because the alleged intervenor was not an American citizen, the incident had not occurred in American airspace and the plane was not American registered, but was only en route. Presumably they had to take off with that person still on board. Whether or not he was put into restrictive custody, using the plastic cuffs you have available, I do not know.
I have been using the airlines for about 40 years now. I was frankly looking forward to hearing something a little more positive, and not just about the laws, but about the training required to handle unruly passengers. People do not generally become unruly from what they have to drink on board the plane. It is usually what they had to drink before they came to the plane. Perhaps not enough attention is paid to that.
In any event, those were some of my concerns. We appreciated very much hearing your brief and we certainly do have questions.
Ms Hill: I should like to comment on the unruly passenger issue. We have been participating in a working group on that with Transport Canada and the carriers for about 14 months now. We are actually quite happy with the direction in which the working group is going. We met for two days this week, concluding yesterday with a number of recommendations that our union is happy with and can live with, including changes to the Criminal Code to make it easier for enforcement officers to deal with unruly people who are not Canadian citizens, and changes to the Canadian Aviation Regulations that would allow a carrier to deny boarding.
One of the concerns raised by the carriers is that, if a passenger abuses a flight attendant on an outbound flight, does the carrier, because of the passenger's right of carriage, have to take that passenger home, thus subjecting the flight attendant once again, or another crew entirely, to that passenger's abusive behaviour. We came to an agreement yesterday that there should be a regulation allowing the carriers to refuse travel if there is a potential threat to safety; in such a case the carriers could then deny boarding to a passenger for a certain length of time depending on the incident. For instance, it could be 24 hours until somebody sobers up or, in the case of a serious incident, it could be a lifelong ban.
At the moment, there is nothing anywhere that would give the carriers that opportunity to deny boarding. The carriers have done it. Air Canada has done it and Canadian has done it, and they have not been successfully sued; but Canada 3000 did it and was successfully sued. So the carriers were really looking for a hook that would legally allow them to do it without having the repercussions of a lawsuit. We are confident that that change will help the carriers and, consequently, the flight attendants.
The Chairman: It is certainly a difficult question. I do not envy the carriers their problem of having to abandon somebody, for whatever reason, in a foreign country. That will not be an easy problem to solve, and sooner or later the carrier will be stuck with having to take that passenger on to the destination suggested on his ticket or his boarding document.
In any event, we want to have as much of your views as possible to satisfy our interests as a committee that is national in scope with members who are, we hope, caring and feeling with respect to transportation safety.
Senator Maloney: We have covered a lot of ground on the subject of unruly passengers. I would like to ask you a question about carry-on baggage, because I object to all the carry-on baggage I see being stowed overhead, and often improperly. I know that from experience, because one of the bins opened and a bag fell on my arm.
There are gadgets in the airports now for judging whether your bag is the right size for carrying on board; you are supposed to fit the bag into them to see. Everyone should have to fit their carry-on baggage into one of those. How many bags should you be allowed to carry on? I have seen people boarding with four carry-on bags. I do not know how the carrier can judge the weight of the flight, with all the luggage that is being carried on. I object to that strenuously. Is there anything we can do about that?
Ms Hill: In fact, that has been one of our major concerns. One of the biggest problems is that there is at present a carry-on baggage rule in Canada and the carriers have to live with it; so they have come up with a policy to manage carry-on baggage. The problem is that it is not being applied consistently.
You are absolutely right that they are not using the "sizer" cages at the airports. We are finding that passengers coming in from the U.S., because there has been laxity in the rules there, come on board with four bags; the flight attendant tells them, "I am sorry, but you cannot bring that luggage on. Under the Canadian rules it has to be stowed in the hold; we cannot stow it here." The passenger says, "But, you know, I brought it on the last time. They allowed me to bring it on. I had lots of space to stow it." Then we run into an unruly passenger.
The cabin baggage problem actually is one of the major problems that cause unruliness and abusiveness towards the flight attendants; it is an issue that we have been working on as a union for a number of years. We are going to be reviewing the rule that is there presently. The commitment that we had from Transport Canada was that we would look at the rule and assess it after it was in place for two years. Our assessment is that it is not working. You are absolutely correct.
Senator Maloney: You talked about the Dryden crash, which I am quite familiar with. Were you happy with the change in the training for flight attendants after that crash? I know that one of the great objections was that the attendants were not trained properly.
Ms Hill: Absolutely. We were extremely pleased with the new training standard. Even the Minister of Transport at the time praised it. As a matter of fact they went to ICAO as the bearers of the great role of flight attendants in this wonderful training standard. The problem now is that the carriers want to cut the standard because they say it is too costly to implement since it takes three days now for recurrent training. So instead of taking the view that we now have one of the best trained flight attendant forces in the world and people are therefore flying with the safest safety professionals anywhere, they are saying that they do not want to train them to that level, but want to cut back on the training.
We are adamantly fighting right now with Transport Canada and the employers and a working group that is vicious, because it is cost cutting more than anything. Years ago, when people used to buy cars, they wanted the sleekest and the fastest car, but now it is the safest car with the best airbags. That is what the airlines in this country are missing. They should be touting high professional safety on board the aircraft as opposed to saying they want to reduce it.
Senator Maloney: Is there a list of the airports that do not have on-site airport firefighters?
Ms Hill: Yes, there is, and it is all but 28 airports.
Senator Maloney: People can have access to that list, if they wish?
Ms Hill: Absolutely. It is in the Canadian Aviation Regulations. If you required, we would be happy to provide you with a copy of that list.
Senator Roberge: By the tone of your presentation, I get the feeling that since 1989 there has not been any improvement in the safety record of airlines flying in Canada. Am I right or wrong?
Ms Hill: A number of issues were improved on, and we were confident that they were improved on, but now, as we are moving into actually using the Canadian Aviation Regulations -- and the training standard is a good example -- the carriers are discovering that it is a little bit more costly to have a higher level of safety. So they are fighting it. So we are not happy with the direction things are going in right now.
Senator Roberge: Do you participate in or have you ever been invited to participate in discussions pertaining to regulations?
Ms Hill: We are on the committee of the Canadian Aviation Regulatory Advisory Council. The great frustration is that we are the only voice on the opposite side speaking to the interests of public safety. The carriers are always talking about the lowest common denominator and, quite frankly, so is Transport Canada. Every time we put dissents forward, they disappear and we never find out what happened to them or why they were rejected.
Senator Roberge: What about the other unions? What about the pilots' union, do they not sit in on the regulation discussions, and are they on the other side of the table to yours?
Ms Hill: The pilots on most occasions are with us. They do not always attend on all of the issues, but for the most part the pilots have been very supportive, as we have been very supportive of them on their new rules of flight- and duty-time regulations.
Senator Roberge: I want to return to the issue of the doors. Are you telling us that there are planes leaving the airports with doors that are inoperative?
Ms Hill: Only one door can be inoperative. They could not go with more than one.
Senator Roberge: It is the small aircraft that you mean?
Ms Hill: The smallest aircraft that can have an exemption is one with 100 seats.
Senator Roberge: Why would they be inoperative, in your opinion?
Ms Hill: It could be for any number of reasons, such as slide malfunction, or a mechanical problem with the door. When they had the exemption, the intention was that, if it happened on an away station you could tape off the door and take the aircraft home to maintenance for repair. However, we are finding that aircraft are coming back to maintenance for repairs and going out again without being repaired. For example, an Air Canada flight, in particular, flew for three days with an inoperable door, even though it had returned to a maintenance base.
Senator Roberge: What is the problem with air quality? Is it a problem with radiation?
Ms Hill: It is not radiation, but radiation is a problem that we are looking at as well. For air quality the problem is with ventilation and contaminants in the air at this time.
Senator Roberge: What type of contaminants are you referring to?
Mr. Richard Balnis, Research Officer, Airline Division of CUPE: Most of the newer aircraft use recirculated air. The older aircraft used to take in entirely fresh air from outside, but to save money and fuel they now recirculate the air and it is recirculated through compressors near the engine. So the contaminants can be a variety of bi-products from the oil contained in the engine getting into the compressors and staying in the aircraft. There are also fluorocarbons and a variety of other contaminants, such as high carbon dioxide levels in the aircraft. One of the suggestions we have offered is to increase the flow rate up to 20 cubic feet per minute, which would help to dissipate these contaminants.
We are participating internationally with the International Transport Workers Federation. We are also on a committee of ASHR, which is the American Society of Heating and Refrigeration, which is looking into this whole issue to develop a standard with our sister unions in the United States. But right now it is the contaminants and ventilation.
At the last meeting of the working group, we brought in Dr. Doug Walkenshaw, who over the years has developed an expertise. He submitted a 45-page analysis of the problems of the air. The employer's representative was the company doctor of Air Canada, and he simply dismissed entirely all of our concerns and was unwilling to implement a scientific study on aircraft in this country to determine exactly what are the contaminant levels and what are the difficulties.
That is the usual position of the carriers. They just do not want to know. Unfortunately, for flight attendants, who may be flying on aircraft for 25 to 30 years during their life, and for frequent flyers, who may be flying once a week, the impact of the various factors related to cabin air quality need to be known.
The low humidity and the partial pressure of oxygen are other technical concerns that we want explored, but right now it is flow rates and contaminants in the air.
Senator Roberge: You are saying that nothing has been proven yet, but you want an advance study on it in order to ensure that these contaminants are not detrimental to human health?
Mr. Balnis: Actually, Dr. Walkenshaw has been able to get on aircraft and has been testing aircraft, and they are discovering --
Senator Roberge: That is one expert.
Mr. Balnis: He is one expert, yes, and he is saying, "Let us do it systematically. Human Resources Development has the air testing equipment. They are quite willing to do it. We just want them to establish the proper scientific protocol." However, the carriers are saying, "We are not interested. Go away."
Senator Roberge: Are you satisfied with the safety and security at the airports? I refer, for example, to the flight caterers and security aspects. Have you given some thought to that?
Ms Hill: It is an area that we have participated in and have tried to comment on. It is an area that has been difficult for us to comment on with respect to a number of different issues, because there is a lot of proprietary information that we are not able to have. Therefore, it is hard for us to judge.
When they talked about changing the metal detectors to raise their sensitivity to a certain level in order to pick up different metals, we asked what kind of information they would pick up? They said that information was proprietary, that it was high levels of safety. We have not followed up on that, and it is probably our fault that we have let down on that area.
The Chairman: That is absolute nonsense. Don't let them off the hook.
Ms Hill: If we meet with them privately, they are prepared to give us the information, but we have not had the opportunity to do that yet. There is some rewriting of regulations right now, and we will be following up on it.
The Chairman: Don't let them off the hook. I have a right to know that, and so do you.
Ms Hill: They are saying that it is not public information.
Senator Adams: I believe you mentioned that flight attendants look after 40 passengers each. Is that right? Sometimes I sit next to the escape exit on the wings, but the flight attendants do not explain to us how to open the main doors or escape exits if something happens to them.
I most often fly First Air, 737s and 727s, where the door is at the rear. That is a big door. Most of the time the attendants explain that there is an exit at the wing. Is that the main exit where you are able to escape? You mentioned about some people trying to get out the door at the back, but they are trapped and not able to get out. Do those doors operate with hydraulics so that as soon as the plane stops nothing works?
Ms Hill: In many cases the doors are often mangled. There is a hand crank for those kinds of doors, but you would not be able to use one of those in an accident. You are right that they would most likely have to rely on the over-wing exits, and we are now briefing passengers on how to use those. That regulation was implemented about two years ago. Has it been successful? We do not know yet.
One problem that we do have, though, is that, once we brief the passengers, they, like most people would, have a great curiosity about whether they would be able to open the door. There have been several occasions when passengers have attempted to open the over-wing exit during taxiing, so that the aircraft has had to turn around and go back. In fact, flights have been cancelled because those doors have to go back in a certain way, otherwise they would just blow out on takeoff. However, there is obviously a concern, especially for an accident situation, when the doors are all crushed, about how the passengers are going to get out.
Senator Adams: You are talking about one flight attendant looking after the safety of 40 or 50 passengers. Is there too much work for them to do in having to serve coffee and whatnot? In the old days, we did not have coffee. Now every time we take off we have to have coffee or soft drinks. What are you mostly concerned about?
Ms Hill: Our concern is mostly with safety. Quite frankly, we do not care if you do not get your coffee. We are more concerned that we can save your life in the event of an accident. Our main role on board an aircraft is safety. We are highly trained individuals. We go through six weeks of training when we are hired by our employer and every year our job is on the line to perform those safety duties. We have to go through a recurrent training program every year. Every three years we have to go through a firefighting program, as well as a first aid program.
Our concern with the reduction of flight attendants is that, prior to the exemption, which is consequently now the rule, we used to have on an ATR-42 or on a Dash 8-300 two flight attendants; if there were more than 40 passengers on board the aircraft, there would then be two flight attendants.
I will speak from my experience, because I worked on an ATR-42. We had an exit at the back, which was the main exit, and we had a front over-wing exit; well, it was really not an over-wing, but it was a front-exit window. When there was a second flight attendant on board with a full load of passengers, which is 50 passengers, you now had flight attendants opening exits at the front of the aircraft and at the back of the aircraft, and directing the flow of traffic. In other words, if one door had been mangled, or there was a crack in the fuselage, you would now have a second flight attendant being able to direct the flow of traffic. Our commands are shouted loudly and very firmly so that passengers automatically will follow.
We no longer have that situation. On the ATR-42 and on the Dash 8 there is now only one flight attendant for 50 passengers, directing the flow of traffic in one direction. If that direction is blocked or if that flight attendant is incapacitated, the passengers are very confused; they do not know where to go. Passengers are not as used to the aircraft environment as is a flight attendant. Because we are on the aircraft so often, we know in darkness where all the doors are and where all the emergency equipment is; but having that second flight attendant and that second opportunity for directing the flow of traffic has now disappeared.
Senator Adams: Do you have a set regulations as to how many hours you can fly on the aircraft with 40 or 50 passengers and only one flight attendant?
Ms Hill: There are no hours of work regulated for a flight attendant. The only hours of work designated would be in a collective agreement. So those flight attendants who are not covered by a collective agreement can, theoretically, fly forever.
Under our rules, under our collective agreements, we have flight attendants that are working 12 to 13 hours, with up to eight landings in a day. That is a long day. It is a tiring day when there is only the one flight attendant, because not only are we serving you your coffee and your meals, but we are constantly making sure that everything in the cabin is safe and secure and that there is nothing unusual happening. We must always have the awareness that there is something strange going on, if indeed there is.
Senator Adams: You spoke about air quality. When I fly in the North, I find that quite often the plane overheats. There is a vent above us, but we are still sweating. Do you not have a control that determines the temperature or do you have to tell the pilot to turn the heat down?
Ms Hill: In most cases for temperature control, the pilots have that control, not the flight attendants. Richard can give you more detail on the flow rates on the Airbus. The flight attendants often have to ask for more oxygen or more flow on board the aircraft and often it is denied to us. There is not an automatic response. They do not have to give it. Well, Air Canada now does. There is a directive out from the company that, if a flight attendant asks for more airflow, the pilots must turn the packs up, but we know that they are turned up for usually a short period of time and then turned down again.
Richard can give you more specifics.
Mr. Balnis: Denise touched on the two aspects. One is on the temperature controlled by the pilots, and the flow rate through the air packs is controlled by the pilots as well, with either a two- or three-level setting. However, turning up the packs increases fuel consumption, which is more costly, and despite the directives from Air Canada, it is only on complaint that it is turned up. Otherwise they operate on low. Today we are flying at 35,000 or 40,000 feet, and that is higher than it used to be five or ten years ago. Flight attendants who have been flying for 25 years are saying that they get up to 39,000 feet and then the plane is getting close to maximum altitude. The higher you go, the less air resistance there is, but you begin to feel it in the aircraft.
A senator asked about how we deal with pilots. On some issues we disagree. Unfortunately, some of the pilots are turning it down to maintain the shareholder value in the company. There are incentive programs for pilots to economize on fuel and we have a conflict on that particular issue. If they were here, we would tell them to their faces that we disagree on this issue.
The general rule with the carriers is, if a passenger complains, faints, or is dizzy or has to be administered oxygen, the flight attendant will go to the cockpit and the pilots will turn it up. However, that will only be for a period of time because their minimum fuel levels are so low, the extra burn may prevent them from getting to their primary destination. That happens even in North America.
Senator Maloney: I want to ask you about the detectors that we go through at an airport. Are they all set at different levels or are they supposed to be the same? I still find it very strange that when I take a flight from Toronto and I am wearing 14 bracelets and 12 necklaces, nothing happens when I go through. However, at another time, I might be wearing one bracelet and the machine goes crazy.
Ms Hill: You are right; different detectors are set at different levels across the country.
We took issue with the fact that security and detectors were removed from the airports in northern communities. We asked for the rationale for that. They said that we do not need it in smaller communities, where there have never been any problems except at two airports. I asked what the problem was and was told that someone had been caught with a gun going through one of the detectors at Fort Frances. Yet Fort Frances was on the list to lose the detectors. There was no rationale behind it.
I have no idea why they are set at different levels, although I have found the same thing myself. Sometimes you go through with keys and they do not ring, and other times everything rings when you have nothing.
Senator Maloney: My husband has a metal plate in his hip and flies at least twice a week. The only time that the machine ever went off was in London, England. I thought I had lost him for good because he disappeared and they had him in this room trying to find out what was setting the machine off. However, no other machine in the world had ever detected that metal plate and that frightens me.
Ms Hill: A number of airports around the world have higher levels of security than we do. On my way here I was reading in Aviation Daily that the U.S. is spending millions and millions of dollars to upgrade the security at a number of airports, a lot of it prompted by the TWA crash. It was interesting. The article stated that even though they are saying it was an explosion in the tanks, there was still some rumour, or whatever they wanted to call it, that it was a missile or a bomb on board. So they are stepping up their security and spending hundreds of millions of dollars to do it.
The Chairman: I would like to talk about enhancement of the safety of Canadians on board aircraft. In casting about in our minds as to how we might address passenger safety, we come fairly quickly to Third World countries or other countries outside of Western Europe, United States, Canada, and perhaps Japan and a few other areas. Then you get very quickly into some pretty dicey areas, particularly with respect to air traffic control and similar issues.
Do you have any views on flying in these other parts of the world, either from your own perspective as employees of a company or from the perspective of your carrier charges, the passengers? Is this matter discussed from time to time?
Ms Hill: It is. We often have discussions about flying into different parts of the world. We watch very closely when flight attendants are flying into areas where there is, for example, political tension. We do not represent the flight attendants of Royal, although they have applied for certification, but they recently did 28 flights into Kosovo contracted by the government and received no briefing on potential medical issues. They were not asked if they were immunized. Those kinds of things concern us and we tried to work as best we could with the flight attendants. We talked to occupational health and safety inspectors, who in turn talked to the companies, and of course they said there was no problem.
Over the years, we have flown into different areas of political tension. For example, the Canadian Airlines flight attendants used to fly into Lima, Peru. We ended up having the carrier pulled out of there because there was a safety concern.
As we move into the next millennium and everybody is worried about the Y2K bug, interestingly enough, we are less worried about some of the countries that are not as advanced in air navigation because they are doing it manually anyway. They are not going to have a computer crash. As we talk to the different flight attendants around the world, they are all saying the same thing -- that it is the very advanced countries that rely strictly on computer systems that we are most concerned about. We will fly into an area that is still doing it by hand and the system is not going to crash, so that people will be able to land safely.
The Chairman: We hear a lot about "least cost" and "lowest denominator." You cited the fuel issue in what I consider to be a fairly serious charge. You suggest that Transport Canada explicitly harmonizes safety standards downwards to the lowest common denominator, sometimes even below ICAO minimums, and often with only a cursory study or analysis. You cite fuel requirements designed to save the carrier money. Could you give the committee an example?
Mr. Balnis: I will give you an example, although the best person to comment on this area, and I do not know if he has appeared before you, is Captain Peter Foreman of ALPA Canada, who has spoken vigorously on this issue.
The question of fuel requirement deals specifically with the amount of extra fuel an aircraft needs if it has to divert. The specific example discussed by Transport Canada at a committee chaired by Merlin Preuss, now the director of commercial business, aircraft and aviation, and attended by the airlines, was to cut the amount of extra fuel you would have for, say, flying down to Mexico City. This was vociferously resisted by Peter and myself. Peter said, "I fly there and I need that extra fuel". They were able to do that even though we read the ICAO standard to the meeting. The response was, we will file a difference with ICAO. I have the notes from that meeting, which I attended. It took about a year, but they put it through. Since the carriers did not understand the rule, at one point in the meeting Mr. Preuss said, "I m giving you the rule you want." I looked at him and said, "That is an incredible statement, sir."
In other cases, such as when we get into discussions of safety equipment affecting flight attendants, Transport Canada will find the lowest standard. Even though, for example, the European standards or the existing Canadian rules are higher, they will say, "The United States has it." We say, "Well, why? What is the safety impact?" They say, "Well, the U.S. is okay, isn't it?" That is what we mean by "cursory."
I personally was on the Dryden Commission Implementation Project for three years and I have also, with Denise and other representatives of the airline division of CUPE, sat on CARAC since its inception in 1995. On average, until last year, we attended between three and six days of meetings with Transport Canada. I have a three-draw filing cabinet of notes that I have taken at these meetings and I have told Transport Canada officials that at the next crash inquiry -- you had Dubin in 1981, Moshansky in 1990, and we are due for another one -- I am going to bring all my notes and I am going to tell everything that I have seen at these meetings. Quite frankly, I believe they are operating below professional standards of evaluation and often simply catering to the airlines.
I know these are harsh statements, sir, but I am quite prepared to take any podium with my notes and reveal all that was said there. I know Transport Canada will read this transcript and that they know who I am. I will defend my statement before them and before the ADMA. I will defend it to Art Laflamme and to Merlin Preuss.
We have had, for example, suggested regulations brought forward that would contain three changes but they would only explain one. I would then point out the other two. They said, "We thought we would change them too?" I said, "What is the explanation?" The reply was, "We do not need to give you one." I said, "Sir, that is objectionable conduct." They still put the changes through.
We find our allies where we can, and sometimes it is the pilots. However, when you are looking at lobbyists who are getting paid $150,000 to $200,000, and who are former Transport Canada officials, it is a tough slog. We do not have the resources to be sitting there every day at the public meetings, but we know of other meetings where the deal is cooked before the public ones take place.
During the last seven years that we have watched this process, we have become disillusioned, but we keep going back every day because we know if we were not there, it would actually be worse. If we had not been there in March 1994, they would have reduced the number of flight attendants on board all aircraft with one piece of paper. We objected to it, took it to a working group. We came to the MPs, we came to the senators, and we forced them to back off. However, if we had not been there that day, the number of flight attendants would have been reduced on every aircraft type in Canada except one.
So we are committed, but it is a tough fight. We decided to make a very forthright statement here to the senators because we read the previous testimony. We read what ATAC said; we read what Air Canada said, Jeff Elliott, in particular. We read what Mr. Jackson and Mr. Laflamme said. We know you left them with a whole list of questions to respond to, and we would be happy to look at their answers because we would like to rebut a lot of their stuff, if they ever do respond. I think those questions were asked on March 4. We are prepared to defend every word on this issue in a court of law or before any committee. This has been our experience.
The Chairman: We treat the reality of the evidence of growth in the number of flights with the highest priority. The President of the United States has now committed some $250 million or $260 million, up from an initial $40 million two years ago, and there is no end to the amount of money that will be spent to avoid a major carrier at the end of a runway once a week somewhere in the world. As we grow, if we stay with existing procedures, we are going to have more accidents. We have made great strides -- I am sure you will agree with that -- but we have not gone far enough.
The suggestion, for example, of withholding information from you is hypocritical. It defies description. What kind of secret does it contain?
Mr. Balnis: Just on that matter of equipment, we asked for the drawings of the aircraft showing the evacuation patterns so we could evaluate whether the door inoperative rule, as developed by the manufacturer and the carrier and approved by Transport, worked, but they all said it was secret. They pointed to each other, until one forthright official admitted to me, "We looked at the charts and discovered that we are approving it differently for different carriers in different parts of the country." That was four months ago. I am not ever going to see those charts and we will not be able to reply. A letter from Ms Bloodworth, the deputy minister, promised us the material, but it is not forthcoming.
They would draw an aircraft with its doors and say that if this door is inoperative or blocked, let us look at the flow rates to the other doors so that in fact we have an equivalent level of safety. We take strong exception to their methodology. We have discovered that when you look at the charts and at where the flight attendants and their safety equipment are located, the Transport Canada people missed the fact that they will not be able to direct the flows of passengers, as Denise emphasized.
We were able to point this out when we looked at the number of flight attendants on board aircraft. We produced full-scale, coloured charts to show them what it would mean if you had fewer flight attendants. They know they cannot give those charts back to us again because we will be able to criticize them again. We work on those planes and we know what it means when you are not able to get to your emergency equipment because you are not at your door or whatever.
Mr. Keith Miller, Transport Consultant to the Committee: Following up on the subject of flows during an emergency, could you tell the committee where the flight attendant is located on a Dash 8-300 and an ATR-42, that is to say, the front or the rear of the airplane? In the case of an emergency, would the flight attendant direct the flow to the rear or forward of the airplane, or what is your procedure?
Ms Hill: On an ATR, the flight attendant is beside the primary exit, which is the rear entry door. It would depend on the accident as to where we would direct the passengers to go. If it had crashed to the left, we would have people go out the right. If it is an inadvertent water landing or we purposely have to land in the water, we usually use the over wing exits so that people are higher up. The flight attendants are trained to react instantly and know where to direct the flow of traffic.
On the Dash 8 it is by the primary entry door. On the Dash 8-300, you board at the front of the aircraft, so that is where the flight attendant sits. We have a grave concern as to whether the passengers at the back of the aircraft would be able to get out. I am sure you have been on a Dash 8-300; it is a very long aircraft.
Mr. Miller: Are we to conclude that 50 passengers would be moving in the same direction in order to evacuate the airplane?
Ms Hill: It would depend on the crash. Generally, under the old rule, with 50 passengers, you would have had two flight attendants directing the traffic, one from the front of the aircraft and one from the back, to create a better flow of traffic.
Mr. Miller: That is the old rule.
Ms Hill: That is the old rule. Under the new rule, we would have one flight attendant directing traffic. If passengers were sitting in the other emergency exit windows, they would have been briefed on how to open the exits. If we have time, if we know we are going to have a crash landing or an emergency landing and we know emergency exits have to be opened, we move able-bodied passengers to those exits and brief them on how to open the door. Then we just cross our fingers and hope and pray that they do it and do not panic. We ask them to direct the flow of traffic. If we do not have the time, we hope that the passengers sitting near those exits will open the windows and help people out.
Mr. Miller: Would I be correct in assuming that you submitted to this committee your opinion that the evacuation would be far more efficient with two flight attendants, one operating from the front and one from the rear of the aircraft?
Ms Hill: Absolutely. We have submitted stacks and stacks of paper to the working group. It would not necessarily always be at the back of the aircraft. A flight attendant could be positioned at an over wing exit, which still permits the two flows of traffic, so the people at the back of the aircraft would have a shorter way to go. The ATR, in particular, just happens to be one at the front and one at the back. But we have presented data after data after data that we were able to find.
Richard, in particular, did an enormous amount of research on it. We looked at just about every crash there has ever been. In many of the crashes where there were no fatalities, we discovered that there were extra crew members on board. The same is true of the U.S. A higher number of crew members on board ensured that there were no fatalities because the doors were all opened and people were able to get out.
Mr. Miller: I would like to return to the question of air quality. You said that the airline managements are against undertaking any scientific study of this subject, but obviously you would like to have that studied. Have there been any studies made in other countries to which you or we could have access?
Mr. Balnis: There have been two studies. I believe one was done for the Department of Transport by a consulting firm, but the protocol was not sufficiently extensive to look at all the contaminants that we would have liked. There was a recent study done by ASHR itself that involved the Boeing 777 only, and it also had an inadequate protocol.
When we retained our expert, Dr. Doug Walkenshaw, he prepared a protocol for looking at additional substances, but also for looking at the "pea soup" effect of different contaminants combining. I could send you a copy of the presentation he made at the ASHR working group about three weeks ago. He is an engineer by training, but he explains an issue of air quality in a way that I can understand and his document reflects that very clearly. I would be happy to commit to sending it to the clerk or to the senators if you wish. He outlines what is a proper protocol for a proper study, unlike the previous studies that did not look at all the issues. That is not proprietary, and he is happy to share it.
Mr. Miller: The committee would appreciate it if you would send the doctor's material along to the clerk of the committee, and also the other two reports if they are in your possession.
Ms Hill: We would be happy to provide our material, the accident data and the aircraft data that we were able to come up with. We actually put together what we called the "pizza box." We made a video where we interviewed flight attendants who had been involved in accidents. That was pretty frightening for the people who saw it.
Mr. Miller: I would like to turn to another subject that we have discussed with the pilots' associations and that is the problem of unruly passengers. The chairman referred to an incident on a flight between Jamaica and Montreal that diverted to Miami. The United States law enforcement officials did not wish to become involved in it.
Is it your opinion that if the Government of Canada took a rigorous stand at ICAO, we could develop regulations that would enhance the solution to this unruly passenger problem on international flights?
Ms Hill: Absolutely. I have been appointed to the ICAO study group on this issue through our affiliation with the International Transport Workers' Federation. I will be representing flight attendants worldwide on that study group.
It is our position that only through ICAO and the foresight of the Canadian government will we get that rule that allows local enforcement officers, when we land in foreign countries, to take these passengers off and charge them, or do whatever they have to do. We are confident at this point that the Canadian government is going to play a key role in that area. They can be proud of playing that role because flight attendants around the world are facing this problem.
From the discussions that I have had with different people around the world, they really are looking to the Canadian government right now to take that lead. We are pushing as hard as we can, including yesterday, to ensure that they change their rules, and then hopefully if the Canadian government can do it, why not the U.S. or British governments? We are working on that area vehemently.
Mr. Miller: I noticed in section 9 of your submission on flight and duty time regulations that the numbers are theoretical, and I do not mean that in a critical sense. They represent what could happen if the regulations of this country were followed to the extreme.
The committee would be more interested in knowing what your current collective agreements dictate with respect to flight and duty time regulations for your members; that is to say, how many hours a month and the other details that go into these agreements.
Ms Hill: There are a number of fairly large carriers in this country that are not unionized and so the flight attendants would fall under this rule. Presently, we know that some flight attendants at one charter carrier have worked up to 24 hours, had a few hours rest, and gone back and done it again. We do know of an incident where the flight attendant worked a 20-hour duty day. The flight landed in Calgary and they slept for four hours on the airplane and had to fly into Toronto. The only reason they stopped in Calgary was that they could not fly straight to Toronto because of the midnight rule.
Our current collective agreements vary, but it is anywhere from 65 guaranteed hours a month, which are pay hours, up to about 90 hours.
Mr. Balnis: Those are flight hours, when the aircraft is under its own power and moving. The general rule that we apply is that one flight hour equals, on average, two hours at work, which would reflect the time you check in. So 75 to 90 flight hours would be about 150 to 180 duty hours, which is in excess of four 40-hour work weeks.
Flight attendants can be expected to work 12 hours without a break on a daily basis. There is no legislation requiring that, and in most collective agreements, we have been unsuccessful in getting breaks. There usually are on-board breaks, but we are talking about a break where you are actually away from work. You work 12, 13, 14 hours, and as high as 16 consecutive hours on long-range flights -- for example, from Toronto to the Orient. In those instances, we seek extra crew members and bunk facilities so that people can take an on-board rest of up to three hours, but the carriers are resisting that. Why? A bunk facility will take away revenue-producing seats for passengers. The pilots will have their bunks up by the cockpit but we will be sitting in business or economy seats. It is a very difficult struggle. For those long-range flights, it is something up to 16 duty hours. I think 16:15 is the longest one we now have in the industry.
For flight attendants at regional carriers, it is 12 to 13 hours with eight takeoffs and landings. Toronto-London, London-Ottawa, et cetera, is a typical day for them.
Most collective agreements require the carrier to provide between 10 and 13 days off per month. The 13 days are for those people who are on reserve and on call. They tend to get the extra time off because they could be working in the morning and then doing an all-nighter. That is generally the daily and monthly schedules and the days off. I think those are the major features.
Mr. Miller: Are there flight time credits for overnighting away from base in these collective agreements, and if so, what are they? For example, is it one in four or one in five or one in two? What is the average?
Mr. Balnis: The standard is one in four. There is only one carrier that we represent that does not have that yet. Everyone else has a one in four trip hour guaranteed. If I am away from home for 24 hours, I am given six flight credits. It forces the carriers to be more efficient and not have our people essentially at the behest of an employer while not being paid. We also have a one- and two-hour duty period guarantee. If you are on duty 12 hours, you get a minimum six hours flight credits that way. It is on a daily basis, but also on a trip basis.
Mr. Miller: You referred to reserve time. That is a serious issue to at least one pilot association in this country, but I notice that on page 9 you do not raise any concern about reserves. Am I to assume that you have no problem with the reserve procedures in most of your collective agreements?
Mr. Balnis: The fact that someone is available from 12:01 in the morning and can be called out at 7:00 p.m. that night for a 14-hour duty period is a problem and there are various ways to address it. The pilots have been more successful in their collective agreements than we have by trying to create either an advance notice, or trying to schedule a day and a night reserve so that at least you can plan your sleep. If you know you are going to be flying tonight, you should be sleeping during the day, as hard as it may be. The pilots' regulation that is being considered is a model for us in that area. They have made improvements in reserve, but not great improvements. Transport Canada is willing to apply that part of the rule to us but the carriers are not happy with it.
Our concern with section 9 is those items under (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e), where we are not getting what the pilots got, and that makes that whole regulation a non-starter. There will be no monthly or annual limits, we will just work 292 12-hour days. When I told them that, they just looked at me. Yes, it is theoretical, but the potential is there. This is a safety regulation and a safety regulation should not be the ceiling. As you can see, that is 50 per cent more than the pilots. We have asked the question: What scientific evidence does Transport or the air carriers have that a flight attendant's physiology is such that she can work 50 per cent longer than a pilot and not be subject to fatigue? They looked at us as if we had fallen out of the sky. They have no answer, but they do not care.
Mr. Miller: In trying to understand this problem, it appears to me that it revolves around the number of hours advance warning that reserve flight attendants are given before they are to fly. Is that where the problem lies?
Mr. Balnis: That is one way to deal with the problem. There is always the problem that arises when the airline phones you at 3:00 a.m. to say, "Go back to sleep. We don't need you until 2:00 p.m." That is a problem.
However, if I have notice that I am going to be operating in the afternoon through the evening, I can plan my rest accordingly. That makes eminent sense. That is the shift workers' schedule and you try to adjust your body clock accordingly. When you have had no notice, have been up all day, and are called out at 7:00 p.m. to do an all-nighter, you are at risk when you come back the next morning. One of the features of the pilots' rule is pre-planning and giving advance notice, or creating an A and B reserve. Those are all good ways to mitigate the problems you are raising.
Mr. Miller: You have raised some fascinating issues, and with the Chairman's permission, I will ask one more question.
The committee is very familiar with the 40-passenger or 50-passenger, one flight attendant/two flight attendants problem. However, the incident, or the unfortunate accident, to be more precise, at Mirabel was in an airplane that I believe has approximately 10 seats, a Metroliner. It raises the question that has been asked of me by some committee members: How many seats are there supposed to be on an airplane before it requires a flight attendant? I do not see any argument with between 40 and 50, but what about 15, 20, or 30?
Ms Hill: When an aircraft has 19 seats or more, they are required to have a flight attendant.
The Chairman: Is that an industry standard?
Ms Hill: It is a Department of Transport regulation.
Mr. Bruce Carson, Senior Advisor to the Committee: Since we started this odyssey a long time ago, the chairman has raised with numerous witnesses the need for a new Aeronautics Act. We have been told time and again, certainly by industry representatives, that they do not care about the Aeronautics Act because they are so happy with the regulations.
It would seem from your testimony this morning -- and it is an endemic problem with regulations -- that regulations can be changed simply by Governor in Council orders; statutes cannot. We have heard the best evidence this morning as to why we need a comprehensive Aeronautics Act that would nail down a lot of the stuff that is in the regulations in a concrete way, and if somebody wants to change it, then they have to come back to Parliament rather than going through the back door of ministerial committees. I would like to hear your views on that.
Mr. Balnis: Just two points. You made the distinction between statutes and coming back to Parliament, and regulations through Governor in Council. We believe that what Transport Canada has done with the CARs, in creating CARs standards, has stripped material from regulations and put it into standards that they can change in this room here and not even publish in The Canada Gazette any more.
If you could fix section 4.9 of the Aeronautics Act on the regulation by exemption, and also the section there about enabling standards, we would be forever grateful. That Aeronautics Act is a bare bones document that gives so much power to the minister and his delegated Transport Canada folks, through the CARs, to change things in a room by having yourself on a mailing list. It would make your head spin.
I would ask you to look at section 4.9 and fix that up, or at least talk to your colleagues on the Joint Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations and find out why they let this scheme go forward. It violates all the provisions of notice and due process. Transport Canada loves it because any bureaucrat can go through a process and issue a notice of a proposed amendment of NPA. It will go out to people on a mailing list and they will consider it. If it is a standard, it is changed and goes into force then. It does not even go through The Canada Gazette and parliamentarians are not involved in any way.
The Chairman: On the issue of statutory instruments and other regulations, they probably have not even seen it yet because they are so far behind. I hope that is an incorrect statement.
Mr. Balnis: They have, sir.
The Chairman: They have not studied it yet, have they?
Mr. Balnis: My understanding is that the new structure of enabled standards has gone through the Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations. They have blessed it, and I shake my head over why they did. Parliament, and, for that matter, the Governor in Council, have lost control of over 60 to 70 per cent of rule-making activities in Transport Canada. It is now down to delegated Transport Canada officials and I do not know why this has happened.
I know Transport Canada likes it that way, but I am not sure that the public interest is being served.
Senator Roberge: Do you have any comments to make about NAV CANADA as it pertains to safety?
Mr. Balnis: We have certain areas of expertise that we comment on, but NAV CANADA would be a stretch at this point in time. You may want to talk to the representatives of CATCA. They know their workers best, so we will not presume to speak for them. We will not take a position that has not been thought through.
Senator Roberge: What is your position on mandatory drug and substance testing?
Ms Hill: We are absolutely opposed.
Senator Roberge: If you are so concerned about safety and security for yourselves and your passengers, why are you so opposed?
Mr. Balnis: Having read your interim report, I expected this question to come up. When it was originally proposed back in 1990 by Transport Canada, we were one of the unions that actively fought against it, presenting evidence refuting Barb Butler's studies. We used examples from flight attendants in the United States, and our own experience, to show that random drug testing was not the way to solve substance abuse problems in our industry. We have not been convinced otherwise.
I do not want to jeopardize the support we have received from you today on other issues, but I was disappointed to read that in your report. I do not think you took into account the body of evidence that was available when Transport Canada considered and rejected the idea. It was not only for privacy concerns.
The Chairman: We have reviewed the evidence.
Mr. Balnis: I would be happy to send in our position paper on that issue for you to consider. It is from 1994, and we will let that speak for us. I am quite happy to add that to our job jar here.
The Chairman: I thank you very much.
The committee adjourned.