REPORT ON AIR SAFETY AND SECURITY
Report of the Subcommittee on Transportation Safety
of the
Standing Senate Committee on Transport and Communications
Chair of the Subcommittee: The Honourable J. Michael Forrestall
Deputy Chair : The Honourable Willie Adams
June 2000
COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP
Membership 36th Parliament – First Session
Special Senate Committee on Transportation Safety and Security
Chairman:
Senator J. Michael Forrestall
Deputy Chairman:
Senator Willie Adams
Members:
Senator Alasdair B. Graham (or Senator Sharon Carstairs)*
Senator John Lynch-Staunton (or Eric A. Berntson)*
Senator Fernand Roberge
Senator Mira Spivak
Other senators who participated in this study :
Senator Lise Bacon
Senator Sister Peggy Butts
Senator Thelma Chalifoux
Senator Eymard G. Corbin
Senator Ross D. Fitzpatrick
Senator Janis G. Johnson
Senator Léonce Mercier
*Ex-Officio Members
Membership 36th Parliament – Second Session
Subcommittee on Transportation Safety
Chairman:
Senator J. Michael Forrestall
Deputy Chairman:
Senator Willie Adams
Members:
Senator Catherine Callbeck
Senator Raymond Perrault, P.C.
Senator Fernand Roberge
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION
1.
Origin of the Subcommittee
2. Review of Interim
Report and its Recommendations
3.
Overview of the Subcommittee’s Report on Air Safety and Security
CHAPTER 2 - A CULTURE OF SAFETY
1. The Air Community in Canada
2. Safety Aspects of Economic
Deregulation
CHAPTER 3 - THE TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
1. Introduction
2. Post-Accident Medicals
3. Staffing Levels, Training,
Remuneration
4. Collection and Analysis of Data
5. Family Assistance Program
6. Flight Recorders
7. Investigation of Military Air
Accidents
CHAPTER 4 - SPECIFIC SAFETY ISSUES AFFECTING AIRLINE TRAVEL
1. Introduction
2. Controlled Flight Into Terrain
(CFIT)
3. Training
4. Automated Weather
Observation Systems (AWOS)
5. Fatigue
6. Sharing Information
7. Drug and Alcohol Testing
8. Air Rage/Disruptive Passengers
9. Dangerous Goods
10. Ultra-Light Aircraft
11. Ageing Aircraft
12. Plane Design
CHAPTER 5 - SPECIFIC SAFETY ISSUES AFFECTING
AIRPORT SAFETY AND SECURITY
1. Introduction
2. Access to Sterile Areas
3.
Airport Security Personnel as Peace Officers
4. Emergency Planning
5.
Firefighting Capabilities at Airports
6. NAV CANADA
7. Airport
Infrastructure Improvement
CHAPTER 6 - OUR REGULATORY SYSTEM
1. The Regulatory
Process
2. Air
Regulations in Northern Canada
3. A New
Aeronautics Act for Canada
CHAPTER 7 - CANADA’S INTERNATIONAL
OBLIGATIONS FOR AIR SAFETY
1.
Our Commitment to the Safety of Canadian Travelling Around the World
CHAPTER 8 - THE FUTURE: THE WAY AHEAD
APPENDIX I - QUESTIONS
Answers to questions submitted to the Committee by Transport Canada following the
appearance of Officials from Transport Canada before the Special Senate Committee on
Transportation Safety and Security
APPENDIX II - Letter of July 8, 1999 from Air Canada Pilots Association
APPENDIX III - Witnesses
APPENDIX IV - Field Trips
APPENDIX V - Document tabled with Committee by Boeing Commercial Airplane Group
Extract from the Journals of the Senate of Tuesday, March 21, 2000:
The Honourable Senator Bacon moved, seconded by the Honourable Senator Joyal, P.C.:
THAT the Standing Senate Committee on Transport and Communications be authorized to examine and make recommendations upon the state of transportation safety and security in Canada and to complete a comparative review of technical issues and legal and regulatory structures with a view to ensuring that transportation safety and security in Canada are of such high quality as to meet the needs of Canada and Canadians in the twenty-first century; and
THAT the papers and evidence received and taken on the subject and the work accomplished by the Special Senate Committee on Transportation Safety and Security during the First Session of the Thirty-sixth Parliament be referred to the Committee; and
THAT the Committee submit its final report no later than December 31, 2000.
The question being put on the motion, it was adopted.
Paul C. Bélisle
Clerk of the Senate
------------------
Extract from the Minutes of the Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Transport and Communications of May 2, 2000:
THAT a Subcommittee on Transportation Safety be established to study matters relating to transportation safety which may be referred to it from time to time by the Committee;
THAT the Subcommittee consist of five (5) members, three (3) of whom shall constitute a quorum;
THAT the initial membership of the Subcommittee on Transportation Safety be as follows: the Honourable Senators Adams, Callbeck, Forrestall, Perrault, P.C. and Roberge; and
THAT a substitution in membership be communicated to the Clerk of the Subcommittee;
THAT the Subcommittee be authorized to send for persons, papers and records, whenever required, and to print from day to day such papers and evidence as may be ordered by it;
THAT the Committee’s power to permit coverage by electronic media of meetings be conferred on the Subcommittee;
THAT the study on upon the state of transportation safety and security in Canada and to complete a comparative review of technical issues and legal and regulatory structures, referred to the Committee by the Senate on March 21, 2000 be referred to the Senate Subcommittee on Transportation Safety for consideration and report pursuant to the Rules of the Senate.
Michel Patrice
Clerk of the Committee
We recommend that federal and provincial governments and those involved in the transportation industry in Canada work together through education, research and advertising programs to promote a culture of safety in all aspects of the air industry among all Canadians.
- We recommend that Transport Canada review annually its supervisory role in the safety aspects of aircraft manufacture, maintenance and design to ensure that no party is sacrificing safety on the altar of the economic bottom line.
- We recommend that the government be required to respond to recommendations of the Transportation Safety Board within 90 days of their publication and that these responses be tabled in the Senate and in the House of Commons.
- We recommend that the Transportation Safety Board be given the authority to conduct post-accident medicals.
- We recommend that the government allocate the necessary resources to the Transportation Safety Board to ensure that the Board’s investigators have the opportunity to receive training on the most technologically advanced equipment.
- We recommend that the Transportation Safety Board be given jurisdiction over the implementation of family and victim assistance in Canada for all transportation modes under the jurisdiction of the Board.
- We recommend that the jurisdiction of the Transportation Safety Board be expanded to include the investigation of military accidents and that the Board be resourced accordingly. Should a civilian be injured or killed, the Transportation Safety Board would be the primary investigating authority.
- We recommend that the Transportation Safety Board be adequately resourced to carry out all of these functions.
- We recommend that, under the direction of Transport Canada, all aircraft which are designed to transport more than 40 passengers be required to be equipped with Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning Systems and that a date for compliance be established that is reasonable for compliance by the airlines.
- We recommend that Transport Canada establish regulations requiring all new aircraft manufactured in Canada and designed to transport more than 40 passengers be required to be equipped with Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning Systems.
- We recommend that when AWOS systems are installed they operate alongside a staffed weather station for a minimum of two years to determine the accuracy of the information produced by the AWOS system.
- We recommend that, in the remote areas of Canada’s north, NAV CANADA and Environment Canada be encouraged through the provision of sufficient resources to maintain or enhance the weather reporting services in these areas, which are so vital to maintaining safe air service.
- We recommend that the government give consideration to an amendment to the Aeronautics Act to protect from legal liability those who furnish safety related information, to protect the privacy of such information, and to save harmless those corporations and their employees who furnish such information.
- We recommend that the Government of Canada develop a concerted approach to the problem of disruptive passengers.
- We recommend that changes be brought to the Criminal Code to facilitate the work of enforcement officers when dealing with disruptive passengers who are not Canadian citizens.
- We recommend changes to the Canadian Aviation Regulations to permit carriers to deny boarding to those whom the carrier believes present a potential threat to safety.
- We recommend that ICAO begin the process of developing an international treaty that will give authority and jurisdiction to the international air community to take necessary actions to deal with unruly passengers in order to protect the safety of passengers and air crew.
- We recommend that the Security Directors of the Airport Authorities in Canada serving more than 200,000 passengers per year seriously study the security systems in place at the major European Airports such as Heathrow and De Gaulle and develop a systematic plan for the implementation of similar security screening methods in their airports.
- We recommend that Transport Canada review its interpretation of Section 4(3) of the Aerodome Security Regulations to give more flexibility to airports to limit access to restricted areas.
- We recommend that Transport Canada allow spot searches to be conducted of persons belonging to the airport community when they enter a sterile area, notwithstanding the fact they possess a restricted area pass.
- We recommend that Transport Canada consider designating a certain number of airport security personnel as "peace officers" on an experimental basis.
- We recommend that Transport Canada reconsider its decision to reduce firefighting
requirements at Canada’s major airports and make available sufficient resources or
through linkages with adjacent municipalities to ensure crash response units are available
at all airports, major, regional and local.
- We recommend that the federal government establish a fund for airport rehabilitation by setting aside a portion of the excise tax imposed on aviation fuel.
- We recommend that Transport Canada refrain from using the "regulation by exemption" provisions of the Aeronautics Act in cases which relate in any way to safety.
- We recommend that sufficient resources be supplied to Transport Canada so that it can further develop regulations establishing design standards for the construction of aeroplanes.
- We recommend that Transport Canada revisit the duty time regulations for air crew and develop criteria which respond to the unique conditions of northern Canada, provided, always, that safety is not compromised.
- We recommend that the government initiate a comprehensive review of the Aeronautics Act and its attendant regulations.
- We recommend that, upon completion of this departmental review, the matter be referred to the Standing Senate Committee on Transport and Communications prior to the drafting of the new Act and Regulations.
- We recommend that the government, after the Senate review, cause a new Act and Regulations to be drafted and introduced in the Senate for review.
- We recommend that Transport Canada explore the possibility of becoming involved as a member of the International Commercial Aviation Safety Team as explained to us by Boeing.
- We recommend that Transport Canada ensure the continuance with its practice of mandatory safety audits of countries that wish to have their planes fly into Canada as well as security audits of air terminals from which planes depart to Canada, and that these audits take the form of due diligence in that Transport Canada would not only review the regulations of the country but would also carry out complete on-site inspections to ensure safety and security compliance.
- We recommend that Transport Canada mandate and then ensure that Crew Resource Management
Training, or as Dr. Heuttner calls it "collegiality on the flight deck", be
incorporated into flight instruction so that it becomes as accepted as teaching such
aspects of flight instruction as meteorology and aerodynamics.
- We recommend that the Government of Canada through Transport Canada give consideration to the establishment of funding of centres of excellence for air safety studies in conjunction with certain universities in Canada.
1. Origin of the Subcommittee on Transportation Safety and Security
The study of transportation safety in Canada grew out of an idea proposed by then Senator Keith Davey in the early 1990s to do a comprehensive study on highway transportation safety. Senator Davey was concerned at the time, and the concern still is with the Subcommittee, that with the increase in truck traffic on our roads as well as deteriorating road conditions across Canada, we were creating, virtually through neglect, an unsafe environment for highway travel in Canada.
Using this idea for a Senate study as a base, a Subcommittee of the Senate Standing Committee on Transport and Communications was established on October 2, 1996. Its mandate was much broader than the one envisaged by Senator Davey. The Special Committee on Transportation Safety and Security, which heard the evidence considered in this report, was established by the Senate on June 18, 1998. Its existence stems directly from the work done by the Subcommittee. Both the Subcommittee and the Special Committee had similar broad mandates to hold hearings for the purpose of making recommendations upon the state of safety and security throughout all the modes of transportation in Canada. To accomplish this the Special Committee was charged to review technical, legal and regulatory structures with a "view to ensuring that transportation safety and security in Canada are of such high quality as to meet the needs of Canada and Canadians in the twenty-first century." However, with the end of the first session of this Parliament, the Special Committee died. Its work has been given to the present Subcommittee on Transportation Safety in order to complete the task of studying and reporting on Transportation Safety and Security in Canada.
The purpose of this report is to review all the evidence heard by both the original Subcommittee and the Special Committee on the matter of Air Safety and Security and make recommendations thereon. It should be noted that the Interim Report of the Special Committee completed in January 1999, which deals with safety issues affecting all modes of transportation contains four chapters of particular importance in relation to air safety. These are the chapters entitled "Safety issues of concern which affect all modes of transportation, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada, Lighthouse Safety Issues, and Air Safety and Security."
Of necessity, some of the issues raised in the Interim Report will again be raised in this report, which deals solely with Air Safety and Security.
It is the intention of the Subcommittee to complete its work by the end of this year and issue reports on the safety aspects of other major modes of transportation in Canada: Highway, Rail and Marine.
2. Review of Interim Report and its Recommendations
The Interim Report of the Special Committee dealt in a number of areas with air safety and security. Its recommendations represented the culmination of all of the work done by the original Subcommittee on Transportation and Security as well as the hearings held by the Special Committee until the late fall of 1998.
Specifically in relation to air safety and security the Interim Report contained the following recommendations:
We recommend that Transport Canada reconsider its position and we urge the government to proceed to permit mandatory random drug and alcohol testing in the transportation industry, similar to United States legislation.
We recommend that the Transportation Safety Board be given jurisdiction over the implementation of family and victim assistance in Canada for all transportation modes under the jurisdiction of the Board.
We recommend that all airlines operating within Canada be required to record the full name of each Canadian citizen travelling on flights to and from Canada and to request a contact name and a phone number from those passengers.
We will expand further on these recommendations in this report we did appreciate receiving the comments of various witnesses on these recommendations, especially the very thorough analysis and commentary presented by the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA).
As well as the recommendations noted above, the Interim Report addressed possible safety issues that might arise out of further de-staffing of lighthouses on Canada’s West Coast (Chapter VI). It also referred to the need expressed by witnesses appearing before the Committee in northern Canada for a different set of air regulations to cover those who fly north of 60. Airport security was another major topic of discussion in the Interim Report, which went into the security measures currently in place at London’s Heathrow and Paris’ de Gaulle. This discussion will be expanded in this report.
The major safety issues raised in the subsection of the Interim Report entitled Airline Safety in General, such as flight deck management, controlled flight into terrain, fatigue and the sharing of information in relation to accidents and incidents, are all dealt with in considerably more detail in this report.
3. Overview of the Subcommittee’s Report on Air Safety and Security
This report is built upon all of the evidence received on the subject of air safety and security since this process began with public hearings in the fall of 1996. Since the publication of the Interim Report, the Chair of the then Special Committee, Senator
J. Michael Forrestall, the Deputy Chair, Senator Willie Adams, and the Library of Parliament researcher assigned to the then Special Committee, John Christopher, have attended the 1999 week-long annual conference on transportation in Washington, D.C.
The Special Committee also undertook a fact-finding trip to western Canada and an extensive visit to the Boeing Aircraft manufacturing plant in Seattle, Washington. As well, fact-finding visits to both Lester B. Pearson International Airport in Toronto and Dorval Airport in Montreal have been completed. Finally, the Special Committee visited the Bombardier Aeroplane manufacturing plant in St. Laurent, Quebec, and met with safety officials from Bombardier.
We wish to express our gratitude to all those who gave so generously of their time and for the forthright manner in which questions were both received and answered by all witnesses appearing before the then Special Committee in Ottawa and during the fact-finding visits.
This report sets out the views of the Subcommittee on the importance of developing and maintaining a culture of safety in Canada. The Subcommittee is impressed with the
work of the Transportation Safety Board. This report sets out the latest evidence
received from the Board and some new directions for the Board’s mandate should the financial resources it so desperately needs be made available.
The Subcommittee then goes on to discuss, under various headings, safety-related issues for air travel and airport security. We then review the statutory system currently in place for air travel. This includes comments on both the Aeronautics Act and the regulatory process that now governs the making of Canada’s Air Regulations (CARS).
The last two chapters deal with Canada’s obligations in the international flight community. The Subcommittee endorses the view of the Special Committee, attended the Second World Congress on Safety in Delft, the Netherlands, that Canada has an international obligation to ensure that its citizens travelling abroad are as safe as possible. Alternatively, Canadians should be aware of areas that might be less safe so that they can make informed choices as to both destinations and carriers.
Part of the mandate of the Subcommittee is to look at the future of air safety and security to determine what advice could be given to prepare governments and all those involved in the air transport industry for the challenges it faces over the next fifteen to twenty years. A discussion of the future takes place in our concluding chapter.
A CULTURE OF SAFETY
1. The Air Community in Canada
Canada has the world’s second-largest air system in terms of numbers, second only to the United States. As Mr. Ron Jackson, ADM Safety and Security, Transport Canada, pointed out in his evidence, "we are a major aviation player." There are 62,250 pilot licences and permits issued in Canada, with 38 percent commercial and the balance private. There are 28,000 aircraft registered in Canada and of that number 22 percent are commercially owned, 77 percent owned by private interests and the balance of one percent owned by governments. There are over 2,000 air operators in Canada.
As Mr. Jackson explained, sales of Canadian aerospace products in Canada amounted to more than $14.5 billion in 1998, and we export close to $11 billion worth of aeronautics products. Canada is a major world player in aeronautical product design and manufacturing. Bombardier Inc. is now the third largest aircraft manufacturer in the world after Boeing and Airbus.
In addition there are 10,600 licensed aircraft engineers in Canada. They hold licences issued by Transport Canada and Transport Canada retains oversight on this community to ensure it is operating within Transport Canada regulations.
Given the size of the domestic aircraft community in Canada, the Subcommittee was especially concerned about the predicted rise in accident rates forecast by the year 2010. As Dr. Gerald Marsters, a noted expert in aviation safety, stated, "...that presently we are experiencing somewhere in the neighbourhood of 50 major fatal accidents per year worldwide, killing about 1,200 to 1,500 people. Between now and 2010 the number of air departures will increase from roughly where they are now to about 30 million departures." (See Table 1). If the rate of accidents remains constant at the present level, the number of accidents will double. This suggests to Marsters that "... on a worldwide basis, there will be a major accident every 12 to 15 days rather than approximately one a month."
This has resulted in a major commitment by the United States to combat the potential of these statistics. In the Interim Report the development and pursuit of a "Culture of Safety" in Canada was discussed. It was the belief then, and we reiterate it here, that Canadians deserve to travel, and have their goods transported, safely and securely. While we believe that safety in all modes of transport is uppermost in the minds of all participants in the industry, we are pleased that the federal Minister of Transport has adopted the phrase "culture of safety" in Transport Canada’s "Strategic Plan for Transportation and Security." He writes:
"A new safety culture
Continue building a new safety culture by:
collaborating with industry and other interested parties in the development of systems and programs to encourage the adoption and reinforcement of safe practices;
TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF CIVIL AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS WORLDWIDE: 1982 TO 1999
(DATA COLLECTED FROM FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL)
| YEAR | NO. OF ACCIDENTS | NO. OF FATALITIES |
| 1982 | 33 | 1012 |
| 1983 | 34 | 1202 |
| 1984 | 29 | 451 |
| 1985 | 39 | 1800 |
| 1986 | 31 | 607 |
| 1987 | 29 | 944 |
| 1988 | 54 | 1007 |
| 1989 | 51 | 1450 |
| 1990 | 35 | 611 |
| 1991 | 44 | 1090 |
| 1992 | 45 | 1422 |
| 1993 | 48 | 1109 |
| 1994 | 47 | 1385 |
| 1995 | 57 | 1215 |
| 1996 | 57 | 1840 |
| 1997 | 51 | 1306 |
| 1998 | 48 | 1244 |
| 1999 | 48 | 730 |
| Decade ave. | 48 | 1195 |
Note 1: Prior to the early 1990’, data from the former Soviet Union was
incomplete.
Note 2: Events due to terrorism, hijacking or hostilities are not included.
Safety is not a responsibility of Transport Canada alone – we all share responsibility for safety. However, we can play a key role in promoting and nurturing a stronger safety culture."
Canada is not the only country concerned about the state of safety in the airline sector. In Great Britain, the 14th Report of the Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Committee, released on July 21, 1999, expressed concern over the complacent attitude of witnesses from the airline industry as they relied on their past record of safety and ignored the challenges of the future. In Australia, a study of regional airline safety by the Bureau of Air Safety Investigation commissioned by the Standing Committee on Transport in the Australian House of Representatives revealed numerous safety problems. And the United States National Transportation Board has convened a one-year review of the practices associated with aviation maintenance work performed by those to whom repairs are contracted out.
As Dr. Marsters pointed out, "Aviation is not inherently safe. It is safe, it is extraordinarily safe compared to other means of getting around", and that is why we must continue working a culture of safety that will pervade every part of the aviation community.
Dr. Marsters explained safety culture as being required now more than ever as we move into increased traffic situations.
"...To me, probably the most important thing that we can do as we move into increased traffic situations is to ensure that a safety culture is thoroughly embedded in all operational aviation situations. Professor Weiner, who is at the University of Florida, I believe it is, presented this notion of the four Ps.
The idea here is that the operating company must develop a philosophy that is safety-based. It is not good enough for the President of Air Canada to say, "We are going to have safe aeroplanes" and then go off and play golf somewhere. He has to impose that, live it, breathe it, and make sure that everybody understands that that is his personal philosophy.
This then translates into policies that the people who work at the next level generate for operating the aircraft, which then translates into procedures, and finally into practices, which are the things that happen on the flight deck and the things that happen on the flight line."
Recommendation 1
We recommend that federal and provincial governments and those involved in the transportation industry in Canada work together through education, research and advertising programs to promote a culture of safety in all aspects of the air industry among all Canadians.
2. Safety Aspects of Economic Deregulation
Perhaps more than any other sector of the transportation sector, the airline industry has been the subject of continuous change for the past fifteen years. It has experienced economic deregulation, open skies, the introduction of local ownership of airports, increased competition, increased passenger volume and the privatization of Canada’s air navigation system.
We are concerned with what could be the competing forces of economic deregulation and increased competition, and their overall effect on safety. It has been argued by the union representing approximately 95 percent of the flight attendants in Canada (Canadian Union of Public Employees - Airline Division) that economic deregulation has had a negative impact on airline safety.
In its appearance the union stressed what it believed to be the "least-cost approach to safety". It accused Transport Canada of embracing this least-cost approach by knuckling under to the dictates of the industry.
This evidence flies in the face of evidence from the Air Transport Association of Canada, Air Canada and Canadian Airlines. It also contradicts the whole theory of allowing private operators to experiment using their entrepreneurial acumen to determine what is effective in a highly competitive environment. For example, the evidence given to the original Subcommittee in 1996 by the Calgary Airport Authority was to the effect that with government getting out of the business of running airports, he and his Board of Directors had made the Calgary Airport Authority a thriving competitive business.
While this analysis is not exact, it demonstrates the results that economic deregulation can spawn in a competitive market place.
It is the evidence of Transport Canada that "the safety data does not show any link to deregulation and reduced safety. In fact the safety record has steadily improved since deregulation."
In its written submission, which is appended to this report as Appendix I, Transport Canada details its role in ensuring the highest possible level of safety in both the construction of aircraft in Canada and their maintenance.
While we are impressed with the work done by the employees of Transport Canada and the evidence given by the airlines, we are concerned that the level of safety oversight by Transport Canada not be diminished.
Recommendation 2
We recommend that Transport Canada review annually its supervisory role in the safety aspects of aircraft manufacture and maintenance and design to ensure that no party is sacrificing safety on the altar of the economic bottom line.
THE TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Your Subcommittee has the highest regard for the women and men who direct and staff the Transportation Safety Board of Canada. Their reputation for hard work, efficiency, and perseverence in getting at the most obscure detail involved in an investigation for the sake of furthering the cause of safety is of the highest magnitude, world wide.
In the Interim Report, an entire chapter was devoted to the work of the Board, as well as comparing it to other similar Boards in the United States and abroad.
We reiterate the concern of the Special Committee here about the timeliness of government action in response to the recommendations of the Transportation Safety Board. We recognize the time that it takes to complete an in-depth investigation of a complex air accident. We also recognize and appreciate the care the Board takes to ensure that all those concerned have an opportunity to comment on the Board’s report and recommendations prior to their being made public.
However, once the recommendations have been made public and submitted to Transport Canada, we believe it is important that Transport Canada react quickly and decisively. In its response, we believe that Transport Canada should involve Parliament and therefore we repeat the recommendation from the Interim Report regarding responses from Transport Canada:
Recommendation 3
We recommend that the government be required to respond to recommendations of the Transportation Safety Board within 90 days of their publication and that these responses be tabled in the Senate and in the House of Commons.
We would be remiss if we did not commend the Transportation Safety Board for its work on the crash of Swissair flight 111, which occurred approximately a year ago. While the Board is not yet ready to release its final report on this tragedy, it has issued interim recommendations. This investigation is the largest ever undertaken by the Transportation Safety Board and we believe it to be of the highest professional quality, conducted with extreme thoroughness and with great compassion and understanding shown towards the families and loved ones of those who perished in this disaster.
In the Transportation Safety Board’s appearance before the Special Committee, Mr. Ken Johnson outlined a number of areas he believes that the Board may wish to pursue in the future, and we set them out here with our recommendations.
The Board would like to see its mandate broadened so that it would have the authority to conduct "post-accident medicals that would involve things like the drawing of blood".
Mr. Johnson explained that it would be helpful for the Board in reaching its conclusions as to causation, if it could determine what was inside people’s bodies. This could range from over-the-counter or prescription medicine, to fumes from a cockpit. He made it clear that this authority, if given, would not involve the Board in the policing business of determining whether people involved in an accident were impaired.
3. Staffing Levels, Training, Remuneration
The most important aspect of the work of the Board, its recommendations, depend upon investigations carried out by extremely competent, well-trained investigators "willing to stand their ground when they are challenged by very large manufacturers or very large carriers". But they also must be sufficiently confident in their own abilities to be able to change their minds about a matter, if the need and evidence arise.
They must also be trained to analyse the most complex technology, and do it quickly and accurately. As Ken Johnson stated, "in a country as small as Canada, it is difficult to find people who are expert enough to add value to the kinds of investigations we do." As well, the training of investigators to be familiar with the latest technology is very expensive. The Safety Board has traditionally spent a great deal of its budget on training and must continue to do so if it is to perform its job competently.
The Safety Board is also committed around the world to help with other investigations. As Ken Johnson explains, this is only practical as he believes Canada’s involvement will result in superior investigations. And as he says:
"A competent investigation needs to find out what the safety problems are, and a competent investigation must be done to ensure that a Canadian manufacturer does not take a bad rap as a result of a rotten investigation. We feel that is an important part of our work."
4. Collection and Analysis of Data
Canada, unlike virtually all other countries, has a confidential reporting system so that people who encounter safety problems can report them in confidence to the Board. Information collected by the Board is analysed and submitted to Transport Canada, if the Board determines that Transport Canada needs to be involved so that regulatory action may be taken.
However, while the data obtained and acted upon by the Board may be of the highest quality, this is not true of data collected and stored elsewhere around the world. To improve safety in aviation it is vitally necessary that as much consistent data as possible be collected and shared by all those involved in the aviation industry.
Canada should become a world leader in the collection, organization and dissemination of incident and accident data throughout the world.
In the Interim Report action was recommended on a family assistance program to aid the families and loved ones of those who are the victims of an air accident. Since that time we have had the experience of the Swissair Flight 111 and the remarkable work done to aid the families of victims.
At the present time jurisdiction over family assistance is shared among a number of actors in the aviation industry. In his evidence, Ken Johnson made it clear that the Board could play a major role in family assistance as long as it was not responsible for enforcing compliance with a plan. As he said, "we could, with appropriate resources, do the coordinating and the planning."
This Subcommittee believes that between the Transportation Safety Board and the National Transportation Agency, family assistance could be organized, delineated and enforced.
With the Swissair Flight 111 disaster, problems with flight data and voice recorders have received much publicity. It was work done by the Transportation Safety Board that perfected the "black box" flight recorder. We believe the Safety Board should be encouraged to continue its work in this area, especially its response to the problems raised by the Swissair flight recorder failure.
7. Investigation of Military Air Accidents
The Subcommittee is gravely concerned that there is the potential for a conflict of interest with the military investigating its own air accidents. When asked if the Transportation Safety Board would consider taking on this matter as part of an expanded mandate,
Mr. Johnson responded:
"... I will preface my answer by saying that we are not seeking to expand our mandate to include the military.
However, should the government ask us to do that, and if they were to give us the required resources, there is no question that we could do it.
They have an arrangement like that in the United Kingdom. I am a little uncertain of the facts, but my recollection is that the Air Accidents Investigation Branch, which is the civilian air accident investigation authority, conducts the technical portion of the investigation, and the military does the operational part. That is how one country has resolved this problem.
We can do the investigation independently, either agency could do it all, or there could be some blending. It could be worked out. Most of our air investigators were originally from the military."
Recommendation 4
We recommend that the Transportation Safety Board be given the authority to conduct post-accident medicals.
We recommend that the government allocate the necessary resources to the Transportation Safety Board to ensure that the Board’s investigators have the opportunity to receive training on the most technologically advanced equipment.
We recommend that the Transportation Safety Board be given jurisdiction over the implementation of family and victim assistance in Canada for all transportation modes under the jurisdiction of the Board.
We recommend that the jurisdiction of the Transportation Safety Board be expanded to include the investigation of military accidents and that the Board be resourced accordingly. Should a civilian be injured or killed, the Transportation Safety Board would be the primary investigating authority.
We recommend that the Transportation Safety Board be adequately resourced to carry out all of these functions.
SPECIFIC SAFETY ISSUES AFFECTING AIRLINE TRAVEL
1. Introduction
As Dr. Marsters stated in his appearance before the Subcommittee, air flight is safe, but it is not inherently safe. This mode of travel is not without safety problems, even though statistics from the Transportation Safety Board illustrate a gradual decline in air accidents in Canada since 1988. Ken Johnson from the Transportation Safety Board stated that safety in aviation was very much dependent on "understanding the new technologies and dealing with the human performance issues". He is concerned that new aircraft being built now are not as forgiving of pilot error as they could be. He stated :
"In aviation, understanding the new technologies and dealing with the human performance issues is a very important factor. The aircraft are sophisticated and they are fast. They require good, alert, very highly-trained crews, and if everything works well, it works well. If it does not, there are problems. I am not sure all of the designs accommodate the kinds of errors that should be expected of competent well-trained people, trying to do their best, but still making errors. If the design were to accommodate those errors, we would have fewer accidents."
TABLE 2
Strategy for achieving our goal:
50% reduction in the world-wide accident rate by 2007
- Focus on CFIT, LOC and Approach and Landing accident rate reduction
- Promote implementation of available interventions through:
- Worldwide leaders
- Regional programs
- Participate in development of new high leverage intervention through:
- CAST – JSATs and JSITs for CFIT, LOC, ALAR
- Regional programs
- Promote better utilization of features already on our products
- Identify, develop and apply accident prevention features on our products
Boeing Commercial Airplanes Group
Transport Canada indicated in its written response to questions given to it by the committee that "safety management practices, technology and safety oversight around the world" were the three main safety concerns (see Appendix I).
Dr. Marsters believes the safety issues he has identified will be with us into the future. He has identified the problems of Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT), training and the shortage of experienced crews, the need to equip planes with ADS-B systems to allow planes to "see" each other while flying miles apart, the proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles and the need to further develop a safety culture in the air industry in Canada as the most pressing safety problems facing us today.
During the visit to Boeing in Seattle, Mr. Ronald H. Robinson, Director of the Boeing Commercial Airplanes Group, confirmed the concern over CFIT, pilot loss of control, and approach and landing issues as their main safety concerns.
Other witnesses focused on matters such as fatigue as a major safety concern. All witnesses expressed a great willingness to work together to address all of these issues in order to make air flight even safer than it is today.
The following points raised in this chapter concern many of the safety issues that were raised during the course of the hearings of the Special Committee. It is not our intention here to duplicate work that is on-going, conducted by the Transportation Safety Board or indeed comment directly upon its findings, except in certain areas to urge the government to implement the recommendations advanced by the Board.
It is our intention, though, in this chapter to call the attention of the government to certain matters that we believe merit the close attention of Transport Canada. In most cases our comments are accompanied by recommendations. However, the absence of recommendations should not in any way detract from the seriousness of the issues raised.
2. Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT)
Virtually all witnesses identified CFIT as one of the, if not, the major safety issue facing air navigation, both today and into the future. As Dr. Marsters posed the questions: "one might wonder why anybody would fly into terrain in a controlled fashion, but it happens on a regular basis. In fact, CFIT has been identified as the largest major killer of people in aviation over the past two or three decades."
The problem simply results from the increasing complexity of aircraft systems: with more and more of the systems being operated by computers without the intimate involvement of the crew on the flight deck it becomes easier to lose "situational awareness", just knowing where the plane actually is in relation to the ground.
The Boeing Aircraft Company stated during meetings with its representatives that focus must be on CFIT as a major part of the strategy to achieve the goal of cutting the accident rate in half by 2007. In order to do this, airline training and awareness procedures must include CFIT prevention programs.
Transport Canada and Boeing have identified the Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) as well as developed by Allied Signal as being at least part of the solution to the CFIT problem. The EGPWS provide a pictorial display in the cockpit that identifies rising terrain ahead of the aircraft and alerts the crew to potential conflicts with the terrain.
Mr. Richard Sowden, Chair, Technical and Safety Division of the Air Canada Pilots Association, believes that we must rely on more than advanced technology to deal effectively with CFIT. He stated:
"To rely on technology to eliminate the "controlled flight into terrain" issue would be somewhat nearsighted. CFIT is a complex issue that involves enhancements to regulations, technology changes and training. There are several things that can be done. We can provide better technological approaches to landing aids for aircraft. For instance, precision approaches that provide both a vertical path and a horizontal path to a runway have a significantly lower rate of CFIT accidents. Non-precision approaches that do not have the vertical component have a much higher rate. Therefore, provide more precision approaches.
The other way is to use the current technology when doing non-precision approaches, as we call them, with no vertical guidance and getting NAV CANADA and Transport Canada to embrace the idea of providing a constant descent angle to the runway.
The current process involves a series of steps with various altitudes. It is misreading of those altitudes, perhaps through a fatigued pilot setting the wrong altitude, that leads to those types of accidents."
TABLE 3
ICAO Strategy
2.Strategic Objectives*
2.1The objectives of this Strategic Action Plan are to further the safety, security and efficiency of international civil aviation and promote the principles enshrined in the Convention on International Civil Aviation.... To this effect, the International Civil Aviation Organization will:
- Foster the implementation of ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices to the greatest extent possible world-wide.
- Develop and adopt new or amended Standards, Recommended practices and associated documents in a timely manner to meet changing needs."
*from ICAO
TABLE 4
ICAO Actions - CFIT
- Developed Standards and Recommended Practices
- GPWS requirement for all turbine and piston aircraft
- GPWS with Predictive Terrain Hazard Warning requirements (Proposed SARP)
- MSAW (Annex 11 Proposal)
- Criteria established for GNSS non-precision approaches for aircraft with flight-management systems which incorporate VNAV
- Stabilized Approaches (PAN-OPS)
- Defined Operations Manual Contents for CFIT Avoidance and Stabilized Approaches (includes outline for airline SOP)
- Distributed CFIT Education and Training Aid
TABLE 5
World-wide Implementation is the Biggest Challenge
- Significant interventions are available:
- CFIT:
- Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning Systems (EGPWS) - production and retrofit
- Precision-like approaches (LNAV/VNAV, RNAV/RNP, GPS, etc.)
- Crew Resource management
- Minimum Safe Altitude Warning Systems (MSAWs)
- Controlled Flight into Terrain Training Aid
- Loss of Control:
- Airplane Upset Recovery Training aid
- Crew Resource Management
- Airplane modifications - thrust reversers, pylons
- Approach and Landing:
- Precision-like approaches (LNAV/VNAV, RNAV/RNP, GPS, etc.)
- Crew Resource Management
- Human Factors:
- Maintenance Error Decision Aid (MEDA)
- Procedural Event Analysis Tool (PEAT) available soon
- Other:
- Flight Operations Quality Assurance Programs (FOQA)
- Mode C/TCAS
- Airline Model Safety Program/Model Maintenance Safety Program
- Regulators have opportunities for key contributions
Boeing Commercial Airplanes Group
Recommendation 5
We recommend that, under the direction of Transport Canada, all aircraft which are designed to transport more than 40 passengers be required to be equipped with Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning Systems and that a date for compliance be established that is reasonable for compliance by the airlines.
We recommend that Transport Canada establish regulations requiring all new aircraft manufactured in Canada, designed to transport more than 40 passengers be required to be equipped with Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning Systems.
Witnesses have identified the need for training of those involved in the air industry as one of the most important factors for enhanced safety. The Transportation Safety Board expressed concern over the need for sophisticated training for their investigators if they are to be able to effectively analyse the complex parts of aeroplanes involved in accidents. The Board also pointed out the need for "very, highly trained crews" in order to master the complex equipment installed in aircraft, especially at times when all does not go according to plan.
Dr. Marsters tied the issue of training to the shortage of experienced air crews. He stated that "we do train people very effectively in dealing with unusual altitudes in aircraft. It seems clear that pilots who have not had the pleasure of turning an aeroplane over, possibly even doing aerobatics, are not well equipped to deal with unusual altitudes." He concluded this part of his testimony by stating, "In my view, the shortage of well trained and experienced pilots is a major problem and a big challenge for the future."
His views are borne out by the Transportation Safety Board’s Report on the Fredericton Airport crash of an Air Canada Canadair Jet on December 10, 1997. The Board’s Aviation Occurrence Report, under the heading Conclusions: Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors, states:
- Neither Bombardier Inc., nor Transport Canada, nor Air Canada ensured that the regulations, manuals, and training programs prepared flight crews to successfully and consistently transition to visual flight for a landing or to go-around in the conditions that existed during this flight, especially considering the energy state of the aircraft when the go-around was commenced.
Under the heading "Other Findings" it states:
- The flight crew did not receive practical training on the operation of any emergency exits during their initial training program, even though this was required by regulation.
- Air Canada’s initial training program for flight crews did not include practical training in the operation of over-wing exits or the flight deck escape hatch.
- Air Canada’s annual emergency procedures training for flight crew regarding the operation and use of emergency exits did not include practical training every third year, as required. Annual emergency exit training was done by demonstration only.
We understand that these training deficiencies have been addressed, but this accident and the Board Report illustrate how important proper training is to the safety of passengers.
We also understand that training is an area that can be contracted out by airline companies. We urge Transport Canada to remain vigilant in this area so that standards of training in Canada remain of the highest order. Perhaps Transport Canada in conjunction with the airline industry could explore the composition of standardized training.
4. Automated Weather Observation Systems (AWOS)
The Interim Report of the Special Committee devoted an entire chapter to the AWOS issue and its relation to the de-staffing of lighthouses on Canada’s West Coast. It was concluded at that time that "the moratorium on the further de-staffing of light-stations be extended until such time as it can be demonstrated that the automated weather detection systems are consistently reliable, especially in inclement weather".
We are also aware of the Report of the Ad Hoc Parliamentary Committee on Light-Stations chaired by Senator Pat Carney, P.C., of British Columbia and its two reports on the subject of light-stations and AWOS.
The Air Line Pilots Association took the position before the Special Committee that as AWOS sensing technology is still at a very early stage it has accuracy problems especially in relation to visibility. They concluded their analysis of AWOS technology by stating:
"It is our position that such technology, in its present form, should not form the primary system of weather observation. Human observation, with all the subtleties and accuracies that it includes, should, for now, remain the mainstay of the system."
As well, the Canadian Owners and Pilots Association (COPA) opposes AWOS as the sole means of reporting the weather. It is their position that it does not meet the safety needs of the users. COPA went on to discuss the fact that radar and satellite photos are delayed from Internet briefing sites so they may be sold to users who are willing to pay.
This is of great concern in remote areas where weather reporting is sparse and there are few navigational aids. These are areas which are generally only serviced by small aircraft that fly at low altitudes. COPA is concerned that in an effort to reduce costs, NAV CANADA in conjunction with Environment Canada may shrink the already unravelling weather reporting safety net heavily relied upon by pilots of small planes serving remote areas in this vast country.
NAV CANADA in its evidence referred to the fact that Transport Canada removed the moratorium on the installation of AWOS systems in 1998. However, NAV CANADA stated clearly:
"Our position is that we will not implement AWOS as a stand-alone weather-observing facility unless our customers want it. Even then, we would only do so subject to an aeronautical study like the one that I mentioned – one that looks at all of the safety impacts. In addition, it would be subject to a climatological study, which would be done by Environment Canada."
Recommendation 6
We recommend that when AWOS systems are installed they operate alongside a staffed weather station for a minimum of two years to determine the accuracy of the information produced by the AWOS system.
We recommend that, in the remote areas of Canada’s north, that NAV CANADA and Environment Canada be encouraged through the provision of sufficient resources to maintain or enhance the weather reporting services in these areas, which are so vital to maintaining safe air service.
Fatigue was raised as a possible safety issue. A tired air crew is obviously not an alert crew, and with lack of alertness may come lack of attention and consequently an unsafe flying environment.
Transport Canada recognizes the problems associated with fatigue at both the pilot and the flight attendant levels. We note that regulations are presently being developed that will address the issues of flight and duty times for air flight attendants.
Boeing as well as Transport Canada referred to the NASA studies on fatigue and the recommendations developed for, and the effectiveness of, "Controlled Rest on the Flight Deck".
Detailed explanations were given by the Air Canada Pilots Association of the effect of a by-the-letter application of the existing CARS on a pilot’s ability to gain the proper amount of rest required to alertly and therefore safely fly an aeroplane. It was their evidence that the current Canadian Aviation Regulations "ignore much of the scientific research and perpetuate our out-dated and unsafe flight crew duty limitations."
The Special Committee heard from the Canadian Union of Public Employees on the issue of flight and duty times that could affect air flight attendants. We were given to understand that the CARS that are being developed to cover air flight attendants are "totally unacceptable."
We understand the necessity of regulating flight and duty times to the point where the travelling public can be assured of an alert crew at all times. The Air Line Pilots Association had an interesting solution to the problem:
"It is the Air Line Pilots Association’s position that consideration should be given to a graduated system of duty period regulations, with reductions in duty time tied to the start of the duty period, as well as the number and type of sectors to be operated. Such systems are in place in other states and are advocated by IFALPA. Crew augmentation programs should be enhanced on long-haul flights to ensure proper rest facilities exist before increased duty periods are considered. Standards governing reserve crews need to be carefully looked at in order to allow proper identified rest periods and ensure that we are not creating a window of opportunity for an accident to happen."
We urge that all of those involved in the air industry work together to find appropriate limitations on flight and duty time for all air crew. In order to facilitate these on-going discussions we have appended to this report a comparative summary prepared for us by the Air Canada Pilots Association (see Appendix II). We believe the comparables presented by the United Kingdom and the United States to be important parts of the on-going dialogue on the subject of fatigue.
The Interim Report stressed the necessity for the exchange of information on safety related matters in the air industry. It is only through the study of incidents and accidents that recommendations can be made and adopted by regulatory authorities that will result in safer air travel. However, those regulations can only be developed if all incidents and occurrences are reported. The Transportation Safety Board’s method of receiving information and then acting upon it, while keeping the source anonymous, is an important initiative in this area.
At the Second World Conference on Transportation Safety held in Delft, the Netherlands, it was suggested that ICAO be charged with collecting and processing accident and incident information from member states.
NAV CANADA has instituted a non-punitive reporting system. There is an obligation on NAV CANADA by the CARS to record and report all incidents and occurrences to Transport Canada for analysis. NAV CANADA also stated that it was trying to institute the sharing of information across the industry to improve safety.
However, the legal issues involved in reporting incidents, occurrences or accidents were outlined in great detail by the Air Canada Pilots Association.
"One of the big issues here is information liability. There is grave concern in the industry that the dissemination of information will create potential liability for the operator – that is, that it will be used against them in a court of law.
We have seen cases south of the border, specifically the American Airlines accident at Cali, Columbia, where during litigation counsel was aggressively pursuing safety-related data from a program that American Airlines was operating called ASAP.
There is a way to fix this. Our association has been trying to achieve, in cooperation with our company, not just policy assurance from Transport Canada, but legal or legislative documentation to protect the privacy of safety-related information.
We are gravely concerned, if we are going to be involved in programs that collect and disseminate data, that this data may be used against our corporation and our members. That is the crux of the problem: information liability. If we can find a legal means to protect it – and it would have to be included in the Aeronautics Act – then we can address the issue.
If I might add to how significant this is, if you look at the statistical tree or pyramid of information that we use to enhance flight safety, we have traditionally based it on accidents and incidents. The cynics amongst us call it "tombstone methodology". We are recovering only about 5 to 10 per cent of the data. We are missing anywhere from 80 to 90 per cent of the available data on the close calls. Those close calls are important, since they contain vital information that can help us to enhance the safety system."
Recommendation 7
We recommend that the government give consideration to an amendment to the Aeronautics Act to protect from legal liability those who furnish safety related information, to protect the privacy of such information, and to save harmless those corporations and their employees who furnish such information.
The Interim Report contained a thorough analysis of the issue of drug and alcohol abuse as it relates to the transportation industry. Items recommended that Transport Canada reconsider its position and proceed to permit mandatory random drug and alcohol testing in the transportation industry.
We have concluded that such action is not necessary for the air industry in Canada. While we say this with regard to random, mandatory testing, we still believe the Transportation Safety Board should be given the authority to conduct post-accident medicals.
We are concerned with the effect that "over-the-counter" medicines and prescription drugs may have on performance. We urge Transport Canada to study the effects of these drugs on the alertness of those who are employed in safety-related positions in the air industry in Canada.
8. Air Rage/Disruptive Passengers
Issues surrounding what to do with unruly passengers now confront the air industry in Canada. We are pleased to learn that all sectors of the industry are participating in a working group with Transport Canada with a view to arriving at recommendations to address this problem.
The problem arises to the greatest extent on international flights. Mr. Sowden of the Air Canada Pilots Association explained this situation to us:
"One issue associated with security has been the subject of much discussion, and that is disruptive passengers, or air rage. It is very serious. I have been the captain on the aeroplane when we have had disruptive passengers. The issue is not only more present in the media; I can tell you that the occurrence rate is statistically higher, although I do not have the figures.
There are also legal problems in dealing with that. We have had difficulties. For instance, we had a flight out of Jamaica that had to be diverted to Miami because of a disruptive passenger. When we landed, our pilot said, "Take this individual off, charge him, do something." The pilot was told there was nothing they could do about it. It was a Canadian-registered aircraft; the passenger was not an American citizen; he did not hurt an American citizen; it did not occur over American airspace. They said, "Sorry, it is not our problem." There needs to be a world-wide concerted effort to develop a means to prosecute individuals who are disruptive and endanger flights.
If we had a problem with a Canadian passenger between Toronto and Fredericton, we could deal with that. It could get a little stickier if the person were from the United States or Mexico or Greece or somewhere else. It is a difficult issue. There needs to be a concerted effort to develop legislation and protocol that would ensure that these people are prosecuted, because right now they are not being prosecuted."
We support those who are seeking a legislated solution to this problem. It is intolerable to think that those who serve the travelling public should be subjected to such forms of abuse. We support the use of handcuffs on planes if that is the appropriate means to subdue unruly passengers.
Recommendation 8
We recommend that the Government of Canada develop a concerted approach to the problem of disruptive passengers.
We recommend that changes be brought to the Criminal Code to facilitate the work of enforcement officers when dealing with disruptive passengers who are not Canadian citizens.
We recommend changes to the Canadian Aviation Regulations to permit carriers to deny boarding to those whom the carrier believes present a potential threat to safety.
We recommend that ICAO begin the process of developing an international treaty that will give authority and jurisdiction to the international air community to take necessary actions to deal with unruly passengers in order to protect the safety of passengers and air crew.
The transportation of dangerous goods was dealt with briefly in the Interim Report in relation to highway transport and the unique cargo carrying requirements of the residents and air carriers in northern Canada.
The subject of the carriage by air of dangerous goods is crucial to air safety as evidenced by the Valu Jet crash in the Florida Everglades caused by the improper storage of cylinders of oxygen in the cargo hold in a plane that did not have fire suppression capabilities in its cargo hold.
The solution to problems in this area may be as simple as that suggested by the Air Canada Pilots Association:
"If the aircraft is not appropriately equipped, then you need to examine what dangerous goods you are carrying, especially ones that may present a combustion hazard. If they do not have the appropriate equipment on the aircraft to deal with that, then the only safe option is not to carry them. There are a large number of U.S. carriers, by the way, that do not carry dangerous goods, period."
In Canada, Transport Canada is responsible for ensuring the administration and enforcement of Canadian regulations governing the transport of dangerous goods by air. The report by ICAO of the results of its safety oversight assessment of Transport Canada was particularly complementary as to the work done by Transport Canada in relation to the carriage of dangerous goods.
Also, Boeing informed the Special Committee of the precautions it advises airlines to use in the carriage of dangerous goods. We note that it is a legal requirement for anyone handling, offering for transport or transporting dangerous goods to be trained or work under the direct supervision of someone who is trained in the handling of such goods.
We note further that Transport Canada has incorporated liner fire penetration and the fire detection/suppression criteria in the design standards for new transport category aeroplane type designs. As well, it is in the process of implementing regulations that will require, within three years of promulgation, that these liners and detection/suppression devices be installed in the majority of planes operated under Part VII of the Canadian Aeronautics Regulations.
We urge Transport Canada to continue with this initiative and, if possible, to shorten the time frame for the retro-fitting of existing aircraft.
In the Interim Report we dealt briefly with the issue of ultra-light aircraft being equipped with a parachute. It was discovered during meetings in the United States that 82 ultra-light aircraft had crashed last year, with no injuries because of the deployment of parachutes attached to the plane.
This issue was raised with Transport Canada and various witnesses. These parachutes or ballistic recovery systems (BRS) are available for use on aircraft.
There is concern that while the BRS may save some lives, it must be installed properly and deployed only if the "right" emergency situation is encountered. Transport Canada explained that a BRS could offer safety advantages in cases where no landing area is available or as a "last resort" measure for in-flight structural failure.
Ultra-light aeroplane manufacturers and operators seem to prefer to increase safety by using stronger and more effective components to enhance the overall structure of the aircraft, rather than add weight to the plane in the form of a BRS which may be helpful in only a limited number of situations.
The ultra-light community is requesting permission from Transport Canada to allow passengers to be carried in an ultra-light with an ultra-light permit.
In their evidence the Canadian Owners and Pilots Association told the Special Committee that the most recent light aircraft to be certified in the United States, the Cirrus aircraft, comes with a standard deployable parachute. It is designed to work when everything else goes wrong. However, it is costly, representing about 15 percent of the cost of the plane.
The Association stated that it would be virtually impossible to retrofit an ultra-light plane with a parachute. This would necessitate pulling the plane apart and putting it back together, a process which would probably detract from, rather than enhance, safety.
The FAA in the United States is monitoring the Cirrus experiment with a deployable parachute very carefully to determine the success of, or whether there are problems with, the technology.
We urge Transport Canada to monitor this situation as well, as we believe that lives could be saved by a requirement that ultra-light planes be required to be equipped with a parachute capable of being deployed in extreme emergency situations.
It is acknowledged that many planes are still in service beyond the number of years originally envisaged that they would be capable of serving. This had led Boeing to initiate a worldwide program to survey regularly the condition of ageing aeroplane structures and all systems. In addition, it has used fatigue testing and tear-down of selected aeroplanes to supplement the data collected.
In the United States, the FAA has established the Ageing Transport Systems Rule- Making Advisory Committee. In Canada, Transport Canada monitors the safety of Canadian aircraft through inspections and approved company maintenance programs. Transport Canada inspectors and engineers inspect aircraft on a random basis as they undergo major inspections.
As a result of numerous recent wiring problems and high profile accidents, the FAA has expanded its ageing aircraft programs to include electrical, pneumatic and hydraulic systems.
We understand that Transport Canada is actively involved in all of these initiatives and is in contact with all Canadian fleet operators in order to monitor this issue and correct any problems before they become safety hazards.
We urge Transport Canada to continue to monitor ageing aircraft in Canada to ensure the safety of passengers and to make public its findings as to issues involved in ageing aircraft on an annual basis.
During the visit to Bombardier, the Special Committee learned of the problems and delays experienced by Bombardier in receiving approval for the design of new aircraft from Transport Canada. Such delays can be costly in a highly competative environment. The Special Committee was lead to believe that the problem originated because of a lack of resources at Transport Canada. Transport Canada must be adequately resourced in this area, if Canada is to be competetive on a world-wide basis in the design and manufacture of aircraft.