Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
Defence and Security

Issue 7 - Evidence

The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met this day at 6:00 p.m. to conduct an introductory survey of the major security and defence issues facing Canada with a view to preparing a detailed work plan for future comprehensive studies.

Senator Colin Kenny (Chairman) in the Chair.

[English]

The Chairman: Honourable senators, it is my pleasure to welcome you to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, whether you are here in the room, watching on television or following us on the Internet.

This evening we continue our study on major security and defence issues. My name is Colin Kenny. I am a senator from Ontario and I chair this committee. On my right is Senator Forrestall from Nova Scotia, who is deputy chair of the committee. On my far right is Senator Tommy Banks from Alberta. Beside him is Senator Norman Atkins from Ontario. Beside him is Senator Jack Wiebe from Saskatchewan. On my far left is Senator Joe Day from New Brunswick; and beside him is Senator Cordy from Nova Scotia.

Our committee is the first permanent Senate committee with a mandate to examine subjects on security and defence. Today, we continue our survey of major issues facing Canada. We will be reporting to the Senate at the end of February.

During the past week, our committee has conducted a fact-finding visit to the West where we visited military bases in Esquimalt and in Winnipeg to see our forces where they work, train and live. This evening we are focussing our attention on defence policy and how the Department of National Defence implements defence policy of the federal government.

Our witness is Dr. Kenneth J. Calder, Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy, Department of National Defence. He received his undergraduate training at the University of Saskatchewan and his doctorate from the London School of Economics and Political Science.

A career public servant, Dr. Calder has worked in various positions at DND, as well as serving as councillor for the Canadian delegation to NATO.

In August 1991, he was appointed to his current position as Assistant Deputy Minister. He is the principal source of defence policy advice to the Deputy Minister of National Defence and the Chief of Defence Staff.

Welcome, Dr. Calder. The floor is yours.

Dr. Kenneth J. Calder, Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy, Department of National Defence: Honourable senators, good evening. I circulated in advance some brief speaking notes, which, for the sake of brevity, I will not go through. I will highlight a few points in the notes and then make some additional comments about where we are with policy at this point in the Department of National Defence.

To begin with, policy is the direction that the government gives the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces on the roles and missions they are to carry out, the objectives they are to achieve, and, in broad terms, the means they will use to achieve those objectives.

Policy is not made by me. It is not made by bureaucrats. It is not made by the military. It is made by the government. It is not departmental policy or Canadian Forces policy - it is government policy. The government decides when to have a policy review and how that policy review will be conducted.

One of the major aspects of the last policy review, as some of you will recall, is the question of consulting Parliament and the public. Traditionally, and by that I mean before 1987, it was not the practice prior to the initiation of a policy to have extensive parliamentary or public consultations.

In the lead up to the 1987 white paper, there were limited public consultations for the first time in the policy-making process and I believe at that time there were also some parliamentary committee hearings on the subject that lead up to the publication of the white paper in June of 1987.

In 1994, we had the most thorough parliamentary and public consultations on defence policy in the history of the making of defence policy. I know some of you participated in that process. By the standards of our friends and allies elsewhere in the world, they were precedent-setting in the degree to which the public was consulted on defence policy. Our example was later followed both in the case of the U.K. and Australia in their policy reviews.

My role in policy is to provide the government during the process of making policy with an analysis of the domestic environment that policy must address and to analyze the international environment and to identify for the government the key factors that should go towards determining defence policy. I am also responsible - working obviously within the department - for framing options for the government and identifying the implications of any of the options it chooses. It is for the cabinet to decide which options satisfy government priorities; when that is done, we issue the policy, either in the form of a white paper or a policy statement.

In the second part of my notes, I attempted to lay out some of the things that are the same today as they were in 1994, and of course some of the things that have changed in the last seven years, that are relevant to the status of defence policy. I will not go through that in great detail, but I would like to highlight the point that many of the conditions that pertained in 1994 still exist today. There is an enormous amount of continuity in the situation in which we find ourselves.

For example, a major global war between the great powers, as we had twice in the last century, is extremely unlikely. I would say even less likely than it was in 1994. If you look globally among the major power blocks in the world - United States, Europe, Russia, China, India and Japan - there is an almost unprecedented degree of positive relations between those power blocks. There is also, as in 1994, no direct military threat to Canada. Nevertheless, the world remains a highly unstable, unpredictable and dangerous place.

Domestically, of course, Canadians and Canadian governments want Canada to play a role in the world contributing to international peace and security through peace enforcement, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, arms control, and in a variety of other fashions. At the same time, historically, defence policy is seldom high on the list of public policy priorities. Of course, resources are finite and limited.

I pointed out a number of the things that have changed since 1994, and I will take those as read. I will make a few comments about our current position with respect to the making or changing of defence policy.

My organization tracks both the domestic and international environment on a constant basis to try to identify factors that will impinge upon or affect defence policy. We also periodically, inside the department, review the existing defence policy and question whether it is still valid. When we do that, we look at the roles and missions of the Canadian Forces, and we ask whether anything should be added or deleted. Should changes be made sufficient that it would require a major policy review or indeed a white paper?

Up to now, every time over the last few years that we have reviewed or re-examined the defence policy, we have concluded that it remains sound within the prevailing international and domestic environment.

As you probably noticed in statements of defence policy, certainly since 1987 and the various white papers we have produced, they are both policy statements and program statements. At the beginning of every white paper you have general statements on policy and at the end you have the program that at that point in time is laid out by the government to implement that policy.

Policy tends to have a longer shelf-life than program. The program, as conditions change and as it is in fact implemented, needs to be corrected from time to time so you may have a valid policy but a program that needs to be updated. We have, on occasion since 1984, made changes in the program or altered the program, or changed, for example, the priorities in the capital program. For example, in 1998, following a program review, we reduced the number of CF-18s to bring the fleet in line with the recommendation originally made by the joint committee of the Senate and the Commons. We also reduced the number of maritime patrol aircraft. From time to time, without changing the policy, we actually go into the program and make changes.

Around the beginning of this year, we started another program review. We started with the assumption that the current policy was still valid and that we had the resources to do what was set out in the white paper. That said, we also recognized that we had a funding challenge. The funding challenge was to strike the right balance between the money needed to support current operations and to invest in the future. There is no doubt that money is tight in the department. It requires careful management and careful balancing of priorities to manage to use that budget intelligently. The task in this review was to look at our priorities and programs and determine how best we could spend scarce resources.

We were involved, but not very far long, I must say, in that process on September 11. The tragic events of September 11 have now called all of that work into question. They have raised the question of whether we should still assume the policy is valid and continue to work on making the program workable, or should we have a full-blown review of defence policy. If we do have a full-blown review of defence policy, how should that proceed? What form should it take, and what should it encompass? These are issues which are now currently on the table, and decisions have not yet been made by the government on how we should proceed.

You have probably heard the minister say that a defence review is in order, but not yet. That is the most definitive statement so far. The issues are under review, and as I said at the beginning of my comments, the decisions as to whether there will be a review and how it will be done and the scope of it are entirely in the hands of the government.

I would, on my own part, suggest that if we wrote a new defence policy today, it would in fact retain many if not all of the main elements of the current policy. Indeed, if you look at it, September 11 proved we were right when we said the world was unstable, unpredictable and dangerous. We were also right when we concluded, I would suggest, that we needed multi-purpose, combat-capable forces and that we had to maintain the capability to respond to terrorist incidents.

That said, I would also suggest that when the next policy is drafted, while we will have many of the same elements, we would probably see changes in emphasis and priority. With that, Mr. Chairman, I turn it over to questions.

Senator Forrestall: Welcome. We were pleasantly surprised you had time to come and with be with us, and we are grateful for it.

The question that seems to be paramount in your remarks this evening is in fact the policy review process. It might seem fair to suggest that by whatever name the review might from time to time wear, the fact remains that it is steps towards the development of the new white paper. You have said some things that might indicate that we do not necessarily need a new defence policy. Do we need a new White Paper on Defence, or perhaps a more comprehensive white paper on the whole question of national security?

Mr. Calder: That is an interesting question, senator. My own view is that we could have a White Paper on Defence. It would allow us to update our assessment of the domestic and international environment and it would allow us to give a course correction to where we are right now. On the other hand, frankly, I think we can continue with the existing policy for some period because, as I said, in many respects I personally believe that it remains valid.

This is perhaps where the minister is coming from when he says "not quite yet." I am not convinced that this is exactly the best opportunity to launch a policy review, given the campaign that is underway against terrorism and given the campaign in Afghanistan.

I recall that we were in the process of a major review of defence policy in 1990 and when the situation in Oka arose, quickly followed by the Gulf War, we concluded that it was not a good thing to wage war and write policy at the same time.

I am not saying we are at war now. We are in a campaign. I think the conclusions at that time were valid because we learned a great deal in both of those experiences, which resulted in a policy statement that came out in 1992. I would suggest that we may well be in a similar condition. I expect we will learn a great deal from the campaign that is currently underway. We will certainly learn not only just in defence area but - as you have alluded to in the broader national security area - I think we will also learn lessons that we would want to capture in a policy.

I think we will learn from the experience the Americans are having in Afghanistan. It will give us an indication of the types of forces that are particularly useful, and other types of forces and capabilities that are perhaps less useful. I think we will learn that. In fact, I was listening to Secretary Rumsfeld today commenting on what he calls a "low-density, high-demand capability." I believe that is the terminology for the specialist types of forces. We may learn lessons.

As to whether we expand that into a national security review, I think the government can decide to review these things together or separately. That is really a choice for the government, not for a bureaucrat. I would say, however, that just as when we reviewed defence policy and foreign policy at the same time - which was a process I thought worked quite well - in all of these areas you need to have intensive consultation between the various pieces of the puzzle to make sure the resulting government policy is consistent and mutually supporting.

Senator Forrestall: I heard earlier today the question posed: "If we are to secure Canada will we not be enjoying a police state?"

Could you elaborate on this question of security in the broader international context of the future in regard to NATO, NORAD, the United Nations, the United States particularly, and perhaps because it is vitally important although less apparent, the Pacific?

Mr. Calder: In the case of NATO, there have been interesting developments recently. NATO in the days of the Cold War was essentially a planning organization designed to coordinate efforts to defend against Soviet aggression. In the post-war environment, with the problems in the Balkans, NATO has transformed itself into not just a planning organization but also a peacekeeping operation. It is doing that quite well. I think this has actually strengthened the alliance.

We also have the question of NATO enlargement with the three new members and the prospective joining of others, which will also strengthen the alliance. Therefore, I believe the alliance is in good shape, and its health is fundamentally important to Canada because it is our link with questions of European security.

I think NORAD sometimes is forgotten in the shadow of United Nations and NATO, but I think NORAD proved its worth at least to some extent in the reaction to September 11. It was the one organization that was up and running cross-border security and air defence, and there may be lessons to learn from that in future.

The United Nations is still the pre-eminent organization in the world on questions of international peace and security. It has legal authorities that put it in the position of authority with questions of war and peace and the use of force in international affairs. It is fair to say, as some of the witnesses in front of this committee have suggested, that the UN has not worked as well in the recent past as we would have liked. That is true, but the onus is on us to work to make the United Nations a more effective organization. We do not have a choice. Support of the United Nations is a fundamental aspect of the foreign and defence policies of every Canadian government and I would be surprised if that were to change.

With respect to the United States, of course, the events of September 11 have underlined the importance of Canada-U.S. relations across the board - not only in defence but also in security, underlying the importance of our commercial relations, the border, internal security and so forth. For the Department of National Defence, Canada-U.S. defence relations are one of those items on the agenda that will be very important in the future.

With respect to the Pacific, as you probably recall, the 1994 white paper said that we would pay more attention to the Pacific. Within the resources that we have available we have been doing that. We have established close cooperation with the Japanese. We have frequent business back and forth and staff talks, and we have a positive relationship with the Japanese. They are on the Golan Heights with us in the UN Gulf Operation, which is quite successful. We are gradually re-establishing normal defence-to-defence relations with China and that is coming along. We also play elsewhere within the limit of our abilities in Asia-Pacific, but of course it is a big area of the world and we have limited resources.

Senator Banks: Dr. Calder, you have been very informative. The 1994 white paper was the last one and is the one under which I presume we now operate; is that correct?

Mr. Calder: That is right.

Senator Banks: You mentioned that when you undertook a review a little while ago and went with the assumption that the present policy is still applicable. Is that a good place to begin a review of a policy, with that assumption? Did you do something first to say, "We have determined that it is still valid"?

Mr. Calder: We periodically review the policy ourselves and say, "In light of changes, is it still valid?" We have satisfied ourselves that, up until September 11, that was the case.

I was referring to the program. The program refers to where we spend our money within the force structure, what capital projects we would pursue, what is the priority and sequence. For example, do we go for strategic airlift or strategic sealift? In what sequence do we upgrade the CF-18s or the Auroras. Those are the program issues - essentially the nuts and bolts of where the money goes within the force structure of the future. At the beginning of the year, we started with the assumption that the policy was still valid and looked at the program. There are now larger questions out there because of September 11.

Senator Banks: Yes, but many things you said still obtain. People have told us that the policy set out in the 1994 white paper and the capability that we are assumed to have under it is not one that actually presently exists. If I recall correctly, the 1994 white paper said that we would be able to field a brigade group some place. We have heard that given the present complement and resources and reasonable rotation, that we could not field a brigade group.

Second, we all remember the difficulty of getting some of our materiel back in ships that we had to rent from someone because we did not have any. You mentioned the airlift and sealift. I know that there area some plans for ships that would do that job admirably.

However, if we wanted to send the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry to Afghanistan, or anywhere, we would be almost beholden or reliant on someone else to get them there. Certainly, if we wanted to put them into some place in the Middle East through the Mediterranean we would be dependant on someone because we do not have ships capable of doing that.

Mr. Calder: Senator, you are correct that we are dependent when we deploy abroad on sealift, which is normally leased from commercial carriers. We are dependent on airlift, which we get either from the United States or we would lease. That is something that normally happens.

In most cases, we do not have difficulty with that arrangement. We did have difficulty in the case of the GTS Katie, which we all remember quite well. We can have difficulties in periods when the crisis is so severe that everyone else in the world wants the airlift at the same time. In the present situation, with the action in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf, obviously strategic airlift is in high demand. There is much more surplus sealift capacity out there to lease than there is aircraft. There is a small and finite number of large-bodied aircraft.

The 1994 white paper did not make any provision for that type of lift. We did look at that issue in 1994 in the lead up to the white paper and we concluded that, given the budget that we had, we did not have the resources to have the airlift and the sea lift that you are talking about in addition to everything else that was in the white paper. In other words, we made a conscious decision to invest the money into the size of the forces and other equipment in the forces and to rely upon leasing for airlift.

Future policy might change that decision, and there are good reasons why you might want to do that. As honourable senators know, the department is examining the issue of airlift and sealift as part of the capital program. That was not something that we ever said we would have in the 1994 white paper. The absence of that does not invalidate the paper.

With respect to capabilities, I realize there is a discussion out there on capabilities. You will appreciate that the white paper can be interpreted. It is not an absolutely precise document. It can be interpreted in a variety of ways. You can have a maximalist and minimalist interpretation of what is in the white paper. I believe we have the resources today to implement what we said in the white paper. It will not be easy.

Senator Banks: That is to say a brigade group; is that correct?

Mr. Calder: Yes, I will go through that. In the white paper, we said that we would be able to deploy abroad something called the "vanguard." The vanguard would be deployed at short notice and could be sustained abroad indefinitely.

We said in the vanguard that we would have one ship. It turned out that because we have two coasts, we ended up saying essentially one ship on each coast, or two ships. At present, in our deployments abroad, we now have three frigates, one destroyer and one supply ship deployed with the operation in the Indian Ocean. We have one frigate with the standing Naval Force Atlantic or about to go there.

We now have deployed not only more than the vanguard force, but we have actually deployed more than the main contingency force. What that shows is that we have more capability than we said in the white paper.

The Chairman: How long can you sustain that force?

Mr. Calder: In the white paper we stated that the main contingency force was sustainable for six months. If we manage to sustain them longer than six months that would show, once again, that we are actually doing better than some of our critics would suggest.

The vanguard, the one ship on each coast, we can sustain indefinitely as set out in the white paper. The main contingency force will be a challenge. As we said in the white paper, we can only keep it out there for six months. I do not think that is impossible, but navy is examining that right.

With respect to the army, we said that in the vanguard that we would deploy a battle group of 1,200 people and an infantry battalion of 1,000. At present, we have a battle group of more than 1,500 in Bosnia and we made available a battalion of 1,000 PPCLI for operations in Afghanistan. They are still in Canada, but we clearly had the capability to field those. We have now committed something larger than the vanguard.

For the air force, we included in the vanguard two maritime helicopters, a squadron of CF-18 aircraft and a flight of tactical transport aircraft. We have now committed six maritime helicopters in the gulf, which is above that level; three Hercules aircraft, an airbus and two Auroras, plus we have Griffon helicopters in Bosnia. We have met or exceeded all of those, with the exception of a squadron of CF-18s that have not been deployed, but the operation in Kosovo showed that we could do that.

With respect to the brigade group, in our current situation we cannot deploy more than we have already committed. We cannot deploy a brigade group and we never said that we could. We said that if the vanguard is not deployed abroad, as it now is, we would be able to deploy a brigade group within 90 days.

It is my understanding that if all those forces were back in Canada for sufficient time for the necessary turnaround, we would be able to deploy a brigade group. By my reading of those figures, we are able to do what we said we could do in the 1994 white paper.

I am not saying this would be easy to do. We were saying that this is the maximum level. It would not be easy and it might not even be pretty, but I think we could do that.

Senator Cordy: You said that if there were to be a major policy review process, you felt that the framework would remain the same - that there may be changes in emphasis or in priority, but basically, it would remain the same. When we were on the West Coast last week, we heard of personnel in charge having to change or balance their priorities because of the lack of resources, equipment and personnel.

I am wondering about the change of policy with regard to peacekeeping missions. As a civilian, I think of peacekeeping missions in terms of short-term missions. However, that has not been the case. We have been in Cyprus and Bosnia for far longer than anyone would have liked. We have found it difficult to leave and, as a result, it has used up much of our resources.

Can you foresee the amount of time spent on peacekeeping missions becoming a policy change?

Mr. Calder: I am not sure that that is a policy problem, but it is certainly a problem. I do not think we have ever started a peacekeeping operation with a desire to stay for a great length of time. We went into Cyprus in 1964, I believe. It is my sense that the hope was that the problem would be resolved quickly and we would be out in a very short time. Of course, the United Nations, with a small contribution from us, is still in Cyprus more than 30 years later.

The same is true with respect to Bosnia and Kosovo. We have been involved in operations in Bosnia for about 10 years. We did not go in with a desire to stay for a prolonged time. The concern is that by pulling, out you will make the situation worse.

We periodically review these operations to determine whether we can reduce the amount of personnel involved or make it more efficient. In many cases, the consequences of pulling people out are too serious to allow us to do that. We would not want to pull out Canadian Forces if, as a result, the operation became untenable or collapsed, or fighting began again. When we go in, we hope that we can resolve the problem quickly, but sometimes life is not like that.

Senator Cordy: Therefore, you cannot develop a policy on this. You can just hope that we are in for the short haul.

Mr. Calder: The minister has called this "early in, early out." In some areas, we can deploy very high quality, capable troops faster than other countries. It is our hope that in some of these operations we could get in early, help establish the communications, logistics and so forth, and then be replaced by someone else. That is sometimes harder than it looks.

Senator Cordy: You spoke very positively about NATO. You spoke about how NATO has changed over the years. Certainly Canada's role in NATO has changed as well over the years.

September 11 was a surprise to just about everyone, because it happened on North American soil. Was the expectation of NATO that Canada and the U.S. would go to help other countries rather than others having to come to North America? Article 5 was invoked almost immediately by NATO, that being that an attack on one member of NATO, the U.S., was an attack on all.

What is the view of the department on the role that NATO has played post-September 11?

Mr. Calder: We were as surprised as everyone else. You are right. For most of its existence, NATO was seen by many of its members as an organization devoted to European security, where the threat was, and that North Americans would assist in the defence of Europe. Therefore, it was interesting and unique that Article 5 was declared with respect to an attack on North America.

We were pleased that it was because it showed how responsive and flexible NATO could be in responding to such a situation. We are involved, however, in a campaign in which NATO can assist to some extent. I am sure that every member of NATO has individually offered some assistance to America. That is offered under the authority of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

It is very difficult, however, for NATO as an organization to itself play a part in this campaign because it is very much a campaign led by the United States through what is known as "Central Command," operating out of Tampa. I would suggest that NATO is in a support role - albeit an important support role - and we may see more involvement over time. Obviously, we are only in the first step of this campaign against terrorism. As many ministers have pointed out, this is not merely a military campaign. It is political, diplomatic, fiscal and so forth. There are more chapters in this story to be written. We assume that NATO will contribute whatever it can to the campaign.

Senator Cordy: What do you think our relationship will be with the European alliance that is developing?

Mr. Calder: As you probably know, the Europeans have been working for a number of years on something called the European Security and Defence Program. They are trying to coordinate their own defence efforts much more effectively in order to get greater military capability, because Europe, of course, has a number of militaries of varying sizes spread out geographically. There are real benefits to be derived. More central planning of those military resources would give the Europeans greater capability. We are in full support of European efforts in that respect.

The Europeans are also looking to working together to have a certain degree of autonomy, not because they would necessarily disagree with us or the United States, but in order to have a degree of autonomy so that if a security issue arose in Europe while the Unites States was occupied elsewhere, or when the NATO alliance as a whole did not wish to act, they would have the capability to operate together to solve that problem. This could be the case in various countries in the Balkans where you might need to have an additional peacekeeping operation. The Europeans are looking for a certain degree of autonomy, which we also fully support.

We are, of course, concerned about the impact these developments will have on NATO. NATO is our primary security framework in Europe. It is our most important military alliance. We are concerned that nothing happen with respect to European efforts that could undercut or weaken NATO. We are watching that fairly closely. From time to time our ministers express their views to their European colleagues on the subject.

A lot will depend on the details of how Europe comes together with respect to defence. Those details are still in the making. As I say, we watch it fairly closely. Generally speaking, we are quite supportive of European efforts.

Senator Wiebe: As I am sure all of you know, ever since Saskatchewan became a province it has had a unique ability to produce some individuals who have made quite a contribution to our country. I would be remiss if I did not mention again that not only was Dr. Calder born in Moose Jaw, he was raised and educated in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan.

This may be a tough question for you to answer, and it might be one that might be best answered by the minister. You are the principal source of defence policy advice to the Deputy Minister. When you look at the increased costs in the type of technology and equipment needed to defend the country, it will be difficult for Canada to afford to purchase it in the event that we are called upon to do so. After all, as large as our country is, it has a small population of 30 million.

Going back to Senator Cordy's question, with the introduction of Article 5, is it important for us, as a country, to pay serious attention to our obligations to NATO, in the event there is a serious attack on our country? Can we rely on them to help provide us to defend it as we are now doing?

Mr. Calder: The answer, Senator Wiebe, is yes. We have undertaken commitments to NATO in the white paper. Those commitments are translated into detailed force proposals that are communicated to the NATO alliance. They go into some significant detail as to what we would provide, under what conditions, how quickly, with what states of readiness and so forth. This is all provided to NATO in an enormous amount of detail every year.

We are able to do what we tell NATO we can do. We can say that we can live up to our existing commitments to the alliance.

Senator Wiebe: I realize that. I know that, over the years, Canada has done an excellent job in fulfilling our responsibilities to NATO. In terms of defence, we have not had to defend our country since the late 1800s. Yet, we have, in some instances, played the role of the aggressor rather than the role of the defender. By doing so, we are basically living up to our commitment to NATO. In return, we expect NATO to live up to their commitment in the event they are called upon to defend our country. Is that a correct assumption?

Mr. Calder: Yes.

Senator Wiebe: My next question deals with Canada's increasing role of peacekeeping. Over the last number of years, we have spent a disproportionate amount of money in regard to new equipment for the navy and the air force. We have not spent a similar amount of money on re-equipping our ground troops. When you look at our role as a peacekeeper, 90 per cent of that work falls on the shoulders of our army. Is there some move to changing the direction of capital expenditures in regard to equipment for our ground troops?

Mr. Calder: Senator, I am not sure of the numbers with respect to how much we spend on each of the services. I suspect you are right. Obviously, high-performance aircraft and ships cost a lot of money - more than the types of things we buy for the army.

In defence of the program, we have acquired a great deal of significant equipment for the army over the last decade. We have the new light-armoured reconnaissance vehicles. We have Eryx anti-tank weapons and Howitzers. We are upgrading the Leopard. I will not go through my long list of equipment, but there are a significant number of things that have been done for the army.

It is acknowledged within the department that the army is probably the area that is under the greatest strain because of peacekeeping operations. The army is deployed abroad the most. The soldiers are bearing the brunt of the peacekeeping operations. I think there is a determination to do what needs to be done to make them as effective as possible.

Senator Wiebe: My last question is about a favourite subject of mine. I refer to the policy formation in regard to our reservists. As far as NATO is concerned, we are one of the few NATO countries that does not have a mandatory policy that requires employers to give reservists time off to serve in peacekeeping or other duties. Is there a policy review currently taking place in that regard? Is that something that the reservists may look forward to in regard to our policy concerning their employment?

Mr. Calder: Over time, we have often looked at the question of job protection legislation. There are mixed views on the subject.

You are probably aware that in the most recent legislation tabled in the House there is a provision for job protection pertaining to specific emergencies declared by the government. If that legislation passes as is, there will be a measure of job protection as to when reservists are called out for significant emergencies, which I would think would be something like the ice storm, the Manitoba flood and that type of thing.

My understanding is that provision does not extend to reservists on peacekeeping operations. It is not an across-the-board provision. This legislation is certainly a step in that direction. As I understand from our reserve experts, it is a most welcome step.

Senator Wiebe: What would also be important in that legislation is a provision for time off to train - which is a very important component of our reservists. They are basically training on weekends. Some of the courses now are such that more time will be required.

Senator Day: I have been sitting here trying to formulate the question I want to ask you. I will confess that I do not fully understand the planning process. Perhaps you could take me back to Planning 101, and we will work from there.

As I understand the presentation you have made, the white paper is government policy in relation to defence. That was the white paper of 1994 and previously. Can you explain to me these other terms you have used - programs, priorities, goals and objectives, defence mission, and Strategy 2020 - and how they fit in and what flows from what? If there is a split among the Chief of Defence Staff and the military side and the civilian side within the Defence Department, the deputy minister, can you tell me where that split starts, if there is one?

Mr. Calder: This is a subject that confuses many people, Senator Day.

Essentially, I am responsible to the Chief of the Defence Staff and the deputy minister and to the minister for the work that is done inside the department on policy. Of course, policy does not actually get you anywhere if you do not combine that with people, money, and a program to put that all together.

The Vice Chief of the Defence Staff is responsible for the planning part of our organization. He is the resource manager within the department. He is the one who looks at the demands from the Army, the Navy and the Air Force and from all other parts of the department to ensure they are consistent with the policy that is set out and the priorities and he puts together a program that will deliver a certain force capability in all the three services. He takes his guidance from what we do in policy.

Essentially, in the department, a policy review is done under the leadership of the minister, usually with a lot of direction and involvement from the minister. It is done under the Chief of the Defence Staff and the DM who work together, so there is not a split there. They work together, and they are complementary. At the next level down, you have the Vice Chief and myself. I work on policy, and the Vice Chief works on the program, with the support of other senior managers with respect to money, policy and so forth. When the system works well, we work as a team. I do not know if I answered your question.

Senator Day: You are getting there.

If there has to be some implication, and there obviously has to be, of other activities going on in the world and within government, how does the input come in, say from Foreign Affairs if there is a change in foreign policy? Does that come through your side of things, or does that come down some other way into the planning process?

Mr. Calder: Any policy review will involve a significant number of other government departments. Foreign Affairs and CIDA are involved with respect to the activities of the Canadian Forces outside of the countries, such as humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, NATO, and United Nations, but also in any sort of defence review. The Finance Department plays a significant role, Treasury Board, and the PCO. My responsibility is dealing with CIDA, Foreign Affairs and PCO. The Vice Chief and our Assistant Deputy Minister for Finance will deal with Treasury Board and the Finance Department.

Other government departments may be involved as well. There are very often implications. If we have changed some aspect of Canadian defence policy, it could impact Industry Canada or the Department of the Environment, depending what we do with various bases. In any sort of policy review, you will have a significant level of interdepartmental consultation.

In 1994, when we had a foreign policy, an aid policy and a defence policy review all going in parallel, we had meetings at my level between the three departments on a constant basis to ensure there was a certain amount of coherence among the three departments.

Senator Day: There is a long-term planning process or a mid-term planning process that goes on under the overall policy, and then there is a short-term process, like an annual business plan. You call it programs and priorities. Where in that planning process does a dramatic event like September 11 impact?

Mr. Calder: That is a good question. It could impact by forcing or encouraging us into a policy review. It could, and probably would, impact on the short term, on the business plans of the various parts of the department, as resources have to be shifted because we are responding to the immediate situation.

The Vice Chief works out the long-term plans, and they might be eventually incorporated there as well, although that would take a longer period of time. Certainly there are short-term implications, I would think almost immediately, of some major event like that.

You did, by the way, ask about Strategy 2020. The white paper is a government document, or a government direction to the department. It is the policy document. Strategy 2020 is a departmental document that is a derivative of the policy. It is a document that starts off from the policy, entirely consistent with the policy, and elaborates on things that we did not put in the policy in 1994 but needed to be on the record. Strategy 2020 is guidance in greater detail within the department on the direction of the way ahead, but it has no policy standing on its own.

If the government declared tomorrow that the white paper was no longer valid, it would, in effect, be declaring that Strategy 2020 was no longer valid either. A new policy document could well be to 2030 by that time. Strategy, as I say, is a document derivative of policy, and certainly we worked very closely with the authors of that to make sure that it is entirely, in our view, consistent with the policy.

Senator Day: You say you worked closely with the authors. Is it driven primarily by the uniform side of the department?

Mr. Calder: By the Vice Chief's side.

The Chairman: You had a question from Senator Day about September 11 and it being a possible trigger point for changes in policy. Can you give us some examples of what changes have taken place in the department as a result of September 11?

Mr. Calder: At this point, the changes are essentially the operations. What has changed is the response to the campaign in the Indian Ocean, the deployment of the forces and the readiness to deploy other forces.

As you know, the department has participated in a series of activities at the government level with respect to legislation and more funds - CSIS and CSE, for example. The department has had a lot of input into the interdepartmental process.

Within the department itself, I would think at this point in time the changes are primarily with respect to the conduct of the operations and responding to the immediate crisis.

The Chairman: Is it really too soon to be looking at policy questions at this point?

Mr. Calder: I would say yes and no. This is my own personal opinion. I think it is premature to try to come to definitive conclusions about what September 11 means to us. You can hear this in the public debate. There are those who suggest that, in fact, the world has fundamentally changed because of September 11. Other people are suggesting that very little has changed.

There is a legitimate and important debate as to exactly what this means. I feel it is too early to try to come to definitive judgments on that. Much depends on what happens in the next few months with respect to Afghanistan and with respect to the overall campaign against terror. What is the nature of this world in which we live? It is not clear to me certainly.

I do think there are some initial conclusions one can draw. Certainly it has been pointed out that September 11 did not make Canada more vulnerable. We were always vulnerable. It is clearly true that September 11 has taught us a great deal about our existing vulnerability. Canada's vulnerability to threats from abroad - which was highlighted by September 11 - is something that will be reflected in the next defence policy or the next national security policy because this is something we will have to address. The events of September 11 sent us the message that this country is vulnerable to threats from abroad.

There is no doubt in my mind that it will have an effect on Canada-U.S. relations, as I said, in response to an earlier question. I think that it has underlined the importance of our relationship with the Americans. It has underlined the importance of the indivisibility of the continent. It has underlined the fact that an attack on one is an attack on the other and that we are so closely related that one is impacted automatically.

That will have impact on our defence policy. It could have impact on NORAD, it could have impact with respect to ballistic missile defence, and it could have impact on planning in a number of areas. I am not sure exactly what the impacts will be, but I believe there will be those impacts.

After this campaign is over or even before then, after the campaign has gone on for some period of time, this will cause us to reflect on our capabilities and whether we have the right types of capabilities, or should we be thinking of increasing certain capabilities to respond to these types of incidents.

The Chairman: Mr. Calder, in your paper, when you were commenting on the same matter, your first observation was that a major global war between the great powers is extremely unlikely. Then on the fifth page you commented on the growing tensions in volatile parts of the world. You referred to the Arab-Israeli conflict, China-Taiwan and India-Pakistan. What is your assessment of a major war along religious lines?

Mr. Calder: Maybe it is a lack of imagination, but I do not see the basis. The United States, Europe, Russia, China, Japan and India are the major power blocks in the world. A major war of the type that was fought in the last century would have to involve at least two of those, one against the other, and maybe more than just two. I do not see an interest, a desire or an inclination for any of those to get into a war with one of those other the power blocks.

Accidents can and do happen in history. From time to time, one has to observe carefully, for example, the situation in Korea or in Taiwan or the situation with India and Pakistan. My sense is that a major war would involve those and, frankly, I do not see what the religious divisions are there that would cause us to have a religious war.

The Chairman: Do you not see any likelihood of a coalition that would be Muslim-based given the fact that we are currently focussing on a country that is Muslim?

Mr. Calder: We are not talking about a conflict between religions. We are talking here about a conflict between people who are fundamentalist and terrorists against those who are cosmopolitan, democratic, pluralist and believe in universal human rights. That is the conflict.

I suggest you will find terrorists and fundamentalists in many places in the world - not just in Islamic countries. I do not accept the proposition that this is a clash of civilizations. Many Muslims have pointed that out themselves.

The Chairman: I think they have and from a domestic point of view, it is obviously very important. Having said that, you must also see linkages. In the event that the current war is broadened to include other countries, which we hear speculated about regularly, the likelihood of there being linkages increases, do they not?

Mr. Calder: That is possible. I would think we would be well to avoid moving in that direction.

Senator Banks: You just mentioned there were some Muslim countries that are democratically ruled with which we will not have problems. Which countries did you have in mind?

Mr. Calder: No, what I said was that in my characterization of the conflict in which we are involved is a conflict between people who are on one side terrorists and fundamentalists and on the other side people who are cosmopolitan, democratic and supporters of human rights.

Senator Banks: Were you not referring to Muslim countries?

Mr. Calder: No, this is a more universal statement of the nature of the conflict. As I said, I do not think this is a conflict with Muslim countries or in any way with their people or their religion.

Senator Banks: We must hope not.

It is a convention. You said there is a question as to whether or not things have changed a whole lot since September 11. I think most people think they have, but there have been many other things that have changed since 1994 as well. You did an excellent job of reassuring us that with respect to the policy as it is set out in the 1994 white paper, we are capable of not only meeting it but also exceeding it.

Since a lot of things have changed since 1994 - including the fact that we did not think we were going to be in Cyprus for 30 years and we did not think we would be in the Balkans for 10 years - those things perhaps do not apply any more. Maybe they just do not obtain any more.

I think it is fair to say there is a feeling abroad in some parts of the land that we are not bellying up to the bar when it comes to our military capabilities, our military commitment, our military capacity and our military willingness. We have certainly seen statistics that seem irrefutably to say that in comparison with Luxembourg we do not do very well and that we are at the bottom of the heap in our percentage of GDP, by whatever means one wants to measure it; that we are punching below what ought to be our weight. This is a criticism that is levelled widely. I am sure you must have heard it and I am interested in hearing your response.

Mr. Calder: Thank you, Senator Banks. I am vaguely aware of these criticisms.

It depends on what figures you take to measure. It varies sometimes depending on exchange rates, but we are the sixth or seventh largest spender in NATO. We are the sixteenth largest spender in the world. The other 15 include places like United States, Great Britain, France, Germany and so forth. There is good reason for those countries to be ahead of us. Sixteenth in the world for defence expenditures does not seem to be a bad place, given the number of countries in the world. By that measurement, we are not doing badly.

The real issue here is: "How much is enough?" As long as defence departments and armies have existed, people have asked how much should be put into defence.

The critics to whom you refer argue that more money should be spent on defence. God bless them, who would not want more money? The government must look at a finite amount of money to spend on various programs. They must look at the demand from the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, but they must also look at the demand for other areas of national security such as the Solicitor General, the RCMP, the Coast Guard, Health Canada, Industry Canada, and all of those areas. They must also look at other government departments. If you went around town, you would discover that almost every government department could put up a case - perhaps as valid as our case - for more spending in those areas.

There are also the broad priorities that Canadians support with respect to spending on health, education and so forth. The issue comes down to a question of "how much is enough" in the defence budget and that is a subjective judgment. The government has been reasonably satisfied with the amount that it has given us.

When honourable senators hear witnesses who say that more money should be spent on defence, you should ask them on what. If we ask the Minister of Finance for $1 billion more for the defence budget, he will expect us to lay down in clear terms how we will spend the money; otherwise, we will not get a nickel.

Your witnesses should be asked the same question. If they think more money should be spent, where should it be spent? What is the capability that should be bought with that money? We must understand that this is a zero-sum game; money spent on one thing will not be spent elsewhere.

Senator Banks: Some witnesses have taken the position that the figure should be enough to ensure that when they go to multilateral military meetings to discuss policy commitment and plans, they do not have the distinct feeling that everyone else at the table is saying, "Here come the Canadian freeloaders." They have also suggested that we spend a percentage of our GDP or dollars, which would be roughly equivalent to the per capita ratio spent by the United States, the United Kingdom, France or Germany. We do not do that.

Mr. Calder: I go to many international meetings. I go to many NATO meetings. Others in the department - some of whom you will have before you as witnesses - attend these meetings as well. I do not have that feeling that we are considered to be freeloaders. In addition, I do not consider that to be a valid reason to ask for more money.

We need to have a legitimate need for more funds in certain areas. The minister has said he would like to have more funds, he has said that he will speak to Mr. Martin about that. However, we need to have a better explanation for the Canadian taxpayer than "bureaucrats feel better when they go to international meetings."

Senator Forrestall: It is one proposition to engage in a war with another democratic state that has the advantage of force of civility and so on. The war begins and there is something that happens to make it end. However, when you have a group of people who do not have the protection that democracy offers - law and order, the rule of law, et cetera - how do you end that war? How do you end your participation in that war?

Mr. Calder: That is a very good question. I must begin by saying that we are not involved in a war; we are involved in a campaign against terrorism.

Senator Forrestall: With all due respect, when someone shoots someone, I do not care what you call it.

Mr. Calder: I say that not only because my minister characterizes it as a campaign, but also because to call this a war gives more to the opponent than he deserves. In this case, the opponent is a common criminal who should be brought to justice. To call this a war gives a certain amount of legitimacy to the opponent that he does not deserve.

The other problem with using the term "war" is that we fall into the trap that you have posed. When we think of war, we think of victory or defeat. We think of a settlement at the end, a peace treaty, and then we have peace.

Unfortunately, in the current situation, we are in a campaign against terrorism. It is a campaign that will last as long as any of us do. I do not think there will be a victory. I do not think there will be an end to this. This is something like the war on drugs, organized crime or poverty.

We are dealing with something that is fundamental and will be with us for as long as we are around. It is important that we fight against it by all means available. In the long term, the military will only be a small portion of the equation. The process will include cutting off terrorists' funds, using the police and all the methods that one uses to deal with criminals.

We are seeing the military side now, because of events in Afghanistan. However, the military is only a small part of the overall equation.

Senator Forrestall: Did you ever believe that we would have five years, more or less, warning prior to a major conflict?

Mr. Calder: I did believe that. I still believe it - not in the sense of what we are doing at the moment, but in the sense of a major conflict - we talk about World War I, World War II, and World War III. That type of conflict would require mobilization, organization, a considerable national effort and expenditure of funds, as in 1914 and 1939. That is what I meant by a major conflict. I still think we have that warning.

As a number of commentators have recently pointed out, Bin Laden has had the effect of showing many people in the world their shared interest. We saw, for example, with the meeting of President Putin and President Bush, the remarkable coming together of Russia and the United States, which we can only welcome. We see that the Russians being much more positive with respect to NATO and Europe. There is a remarkable degree of good relations between the major power blocs at the moment, which suggests to me that we do have that five years.

Senator Forrestall: Do I gather from the current state of privation of money, manpower and equipment - either through benign neglect or some deliberate means - that conventional wisdom does not see us even in the first of that five-year warning? In other words, that there is not a potential for a world war out there so we are not about to spend too much money at this point.

Mr. Calder: Senator, I do not accept the proposition.

Senator Forrestall: I am not trying to put words in your mouth.

Mr. Calder: I do not accept the proposition. I grant that we have decreased the numbers. We have gone down to 60,000.

Senator Forrestall: I doubt if we have written 60,000 paycheques in any one month for some considerable period of time.

Mr. Calder: I do not know the up-to-date figures, but I am told that it will go above 60,000. The numbers have been lowered, but I do not accept the proposition that the forces are run down. Both the existing CDS and the previous CDS are on record, in their own military judgment, saying that. I would be a very brave civilian to argue with them on the subject of military capability. I believe that the Canadian Forces today are in better shape than they were 10 years ago. They are smaller, but in better shape. Quality is, in many respects, more important than quantity.

Senator Forrestall: Is the Sea King in better shape today than it was 10 years ago?

Mr. Calder: Nothing is perfect, senator.

Senator Forrestall: Why is it that over the past weekend we could only fly three Hercules? We currently have 28 to 30 Hercules and only three are operational. Although it is not really important, these are items that come to our attention and we are expected to deal with them. It is a little difficult.

Canada 21 has suggested a revolution in military affairs. They have suggested that Canada might do better with a specialized niche such as paramilitary police. Do you have a view on that view expressed by Canada 21?

Mr. Calder: Before commenting on that, I would like to comment on the subject of capability. I suggest that if you ask serving members of the Army, Navy and Air Force whether they are happy with the current condition or would prefer to return to 1990 conditions, they would all prefer current conditions.

Senator Forrestall: That is not what we are talking about. Are you telling me the Sea King is a safer and better piece of equipment today than it was 10 years ago?

Mr. Calder: I am talking about overall capability, senator. The Armed Forces will never have all new equipment in every area. You can always cite one piece of equipment.

Senator Forrestall: What about the Hercules? When are we going to renew it? When will we get on with some of these programs?

We have recently talked to reservists, among whom there are many bright, intelligent, interested young women. In the final analysis, their complaint was that they are issued with men's trousers. This complaint has been ongoing for 10 years and we have not yet done anything about it.

I am not sure that we are better off today than we were 10 years ago, but we might be.

Finally, does the concept in the 1994 defence paper remain valid in the sense that we should maintain a highly mobile combat ready force, or is the scenario changing?

Mr. Calder: As you will recall, in 1994 there was an issue before the joint committee and the department as to the importance of combat capability and so forth. Everything that we have seen since 1994 in Bosnia, Kosovo and now in Afghanistan has validated the fact we do need multi-purpose, combat capable forces.

This brings me back to your previous question from which I diverted you. You asked me about niches. I am not in favour of niche forces. Desmond Morton, the well-known historian, has always said that the Department of National Defence is very bad at predicting the future. I must admit that he is largely correct.

Going down the road of niche forces requires identifying now the type of niche that will be important in 10 years and the investment of money in that at the expense of more general capability. I am extremely dubious about that. I am not confident that we would pick the niche that will be important in 10 years. I would much rather position the Canadian Forces in the middle of the spectrum of capability where they are not highly specialized in any area but are generally capable. that will give us flexibility over the longer period of time as well as the ability to expand the forces in a crisis. I have never liked the idea of niche forces.

Senator Forrestall: We are in agreement on that.

You are the guru. Sooner or later, you will have to decide that it is time to put stuff on paper. Will parliamentarians - particularly the elected members of the House of Commons, but the senators as well - be given an opportunity to participate in the development of your ideas?

Mr. Calder: My guess would be that you will come out with a report before we come out with a new white paper. In fact, you may come out with many reports before we come out with a new white paper.

Certainly, you would have the opportunity to make a significant input through reports, which, of course, the government would have to take into consideration in any new policy development.

Senator Forrestall: I asked the question because we had what I thought was a fairly good report. The day before our report came out, the government's white paper appeared, so we felt as though our work had been merely window dressing.

However, it did afford us an opportunity to involve Canadians in this suggestion. I would hope that when the next round comes, there would be an opportunity for government, or the appropriate authorities, to consider the merits of a report.

I rather enjoyed the work of the joint committee in this respect.

Thank you for coming before the committee today.

Mr. Calder: You will recall, Senator Forrestall, that policy review, in which you and the Chairman were involved, actually took about one year from start to finish. These things are not usually completed quickly, although I may be surprised tomorrow when I receive instructions otherwise.

Senator Forrestall: It is for you to suggest that the bare bones are not already there and it would be difficult for me to accept. I am certain that you are working very hard in that direction. I wish you well and our prayers in that respect go with you. It is an extremely difficult task ahead.

The Chairman: For the record, the report of the joint committee came out several months in advance of the white paper. From my perspective, the white paper adopted close to 90 per cent of the recommendations of the joint committee. That is from my perspective.

Senator Forrestall: I agree with that. However, it was not that long in advance - as a matter of fact, it was the day after.

The Chairman: No, it was not the day after.

In any event, Dr. Calder, thank you for appearing before us. You have added significantly to our base of knowledge. This committee meeting has been part of our survey of major security and defence matters facing Canada, and this evening we have focussed on the implementation of defence policy.

Before I close, I ask permission of the committee that the following items be filed as exhibits for the committee: "Caught in the Middle," by the Conference of Defence Associations; "A Wake-up Call for Canada," by the Royal Canadian Military Institute; "To Secure a Nation," by the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century; and a summary of evidence presented to the Special Senate Committee on the Subject Matter of Bill C-36.

Honourable senators, are you in agreement that those documents be attached as exhibits?

Hon. Senators: Agreed.

The meeting continued in camera.