Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
National Security and Defence

Issue 8 - Evidence - Morning sitting

The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence met this day at 9:30 a.m. to conduct an introductory survey of the major security and defence issues facing Canada with a view to preparing a detailed work plan for future comprehensive studies.

Senator Colin Kenny (Chairman) in the Chair.

[English]

The Chairman: Welcome to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, whether you are here in the room, watching on television or following us on the Internet. This morning we continue our study on major security and defence issues. My name is Colin Kenny. I am a senator from Ontario and I chair the committee.

On my left is Senator Forrestall, the Deputy Chair of the committee. He is from Nova Scotia. On my far right is Senator Tommy Banks from Alberta. Beside him is Senator Joe Day from New Brunswick. On my far left is Senator Atkins from Ontario, and beside him is Senator Jack Wiebe from Saskatchewan. Some other senators, who are in transit, will join us later in the morning.

Our committee is the first permanent Senate committee with a mandate to examine the subjects of security and defence. We are conducting a survey into the major issues facing Canada, and we will be reporting back to the Senate before the end of February.

Today, we will continue our work by hearing from the chiefs of the three environments - maritime, land and air - who will tell us how operations work today and where their operations will be going over the next five years. Then we will hear from the Chief of Defence Staff on the mission of the Canadian Forces and his plans and priorities.

Two weeks ago, our committee was conducting a fact-finding visit to the West, where we visited military bases in Esquimalt and Winnipeg to see our forces where they work, train and live. Today, we hear will hear views from headquarters.

Before introducing our first witness, I want to say how proud we are of the Canadian Forces and the valuable contribution that they make to preserving democracy. On behalf of the committee members here, and all senators, I say thank you.

Our first witness is Vice-Admiral Ron Buck, Chief of the Maritime Staff. Prior to his current appointment, Admiral Buck was Commander of Maritime Forces Pacific. He has had a distinguished naval career, with a broad range of operational postings throughout the fleet. In addition, he has served in a number of non-seagoing appointments and has had an exchange posting with the Royal Navy.

Admiral Buck is accompanied by Commodore Jacques Gauvin, Acting Assistant Chief of Maritime Staff, and Chief Petty Officer First Class Serge Joncas, Maritime Command Chief Petty Officer.

Welcome. The floor is yours.

Vice-Admiral Ron Buck, Chief of the Maritime Staff, Department of National Defence: Mr. Chairman, distinguished senators, I am happy to be here today to talk to you about Canada's military, and specifically, her navy. I believe this is an excellent opportunity to help Canadians have a better understanding of their military.

I know that you have been provided with my prepared remarks and have asked that I limit my comments to those few key issues that I deem to be important, and I am pleased to comply. I can then answer any questions that you may have.

As you pointed out, I have with me today Commodore Jacques Gauvin, my assistant, and Chief Petty Officer First Class Serge Joncas, the Command Chief Petty Officer, who is the senior enlisted member of Canada's navy.

I know that to date you have heard a great deal about the strategic context within which the Canadian Forces operate. Given this background, I am proud to say that today, the navy meets its operational commitments and is seen as a valuable and credible force by our national and international operational partners. As you mentioned, what makes the navy and the Canadian Forces stand out is the quality and commitment of our men and women, both uniformed and civilian.

The navy is able to respond to events across the full spectrum of conflict; be that domestic surveillance here at home, peacetime search and rescue tasks, high-risk boarding operations in the Northern Arabian Gulf, or combat operations. Perhaps most illustrative of late, the navy is fully capable of meeting its deployment obligations, as seen with the recent departures of the Canadian task group from Halifax and HMCS Vancouver from Esquimalt, both in support of the campaign against terrorism.

The navy is a very credible but small force. It is second to none, in my view, in navies of comparable size. Indeed, it is significant that only Canada has deployed ships that are fully inter-operable with and integrable into U.S. carrier battle groups. The navy is ready, but continuing to maintain this credible and flexible capability presents significant resource challenges.

In part, as a result of these resource constraints, the navy has adopted a tiered level of readiness; that is, some ships are at a lower level of readiness, but they are fully capable of conducting a myriad of routine operations and do so each day.

Others that are deployed for more complex operations, such as the task group deployment, basically receive the full spectrum of sophisticated training and readiness certification. The challenge, of course, is in balancing and matching resources to operational commitments.

I would like to amplify a little the importance of the two task groups we maintain. The task group, in the Canadian naval parlance, consists of a destroyer, with embark commander and staff; a number of frigates, with that number being determined by the mission; a fleet replenishment ship; from time to time, as necessary, a submarine; and the appropriate number of helicopters and supporting maritime patrol aircraft. Thus, the composition of a task group is mission dependent and will not always consist of the same mix of ships and aircraft. The task group provides the capability to command either national or international forces, as was the case in the Gulf War, and now in the Arabian Sea, and it allows for command, control and execution of complex missions. It thus allows for a major contribution, and a distinct Canadian role, that single ships could not otherwise provide.

I believe it important that I also highlight some of the key challenges that the navy and the Canadian Forces face today. Modern naval operations demand sophisticated ships, sensors and weapon systems, and as such, although our ships are high-tech, they need educated, motivated and adaptable personnel. You are no doubt aware that the target audience is shrinking and the navy is competing with an industry that pays well for these very same personnel. Thus, we are faced with the challenge of attracting, recruiting and then retaining suitably trained personnel.

Another challenge arises from the capital-intensive nature of modern naval forces, which while cost-effective once acquired, are expensive to replace. Striking an appropriate balance between sustaining the current fleet and building the next is not easy. It never has been, in fact. However, it is an investment that, over the last century, and even more so today, has allowed Canada flexible and effective options to protect its own interests directly and in combination with our friends and partners.

Over the last few years, the Canadian Forces and Canada's navy have been faced with the reality of resource constraints and reductions. That has caused us to look at everything we do and assess how we do it, what we do not do, and essentially make decisions on where to put that scarce resource. Effectively, today, I can deliver on the essentials and I am doing so. However, to sustain this and to achieve change over the long term will be problematic.

In the final analysis, Canada's navy, as a symbol of the nation, and with technically proficient and operationally credible naval forces, provides the country not only with the ability to take a stand on issues, but to demonstrate its commitment to contribute to the solution.

I am committed to providing a navy that will serve Canada as a multi-purpose, credible, combat-capable, inter-operable force wherever required. Further, I am committed to ensuring that the personnel in Canada's military have the tools, respect and quality of life that they deserve. That is what Canada has consistently required for its navy and that is what I strive to deliver. I am prepared to respond to any of your questions.

The Chairman: Vice-Admiral Buck, we appreciate the short summary of your comments. For those who wish to have them, we are able to provide the details of the vice-admiral's comments.

Senator Wiebe: As a senator from Saskatchewan, I have quite an interest in the navy. While ours may be a land-locked province, it is that flat land and waving wheat that attract so many of our citizens to the navy.

In your comments, you mentioned concerns about attracting, recruiting and retaining individuals to serve in the Armed Forces. As an example, following the events of September 11, CBC aired an interesting program that highlighted the contributions of our Armed Forces in Colorado during that day. A former captain of HMCS Regina played a key role in that.

Is part of the retention problem that some of the highly skilled individuals in the navy will transfer over? Does that occur more with air than with sea transfers?

VAdm. Buck: No, and I will come back to the issue of attracting and retaining personnel. Regarding individuals such as the former captain you mentioned, who are in positions with NORAD, we have an ongoing program whereby people from the army, the navy and the air force undertake field exchange and liaison positions. There are about three naval officers in the NORAD complex, and that is appropriate, because much of the work that we do in the navy is associated with what NORAD does. The technologies are similar.

The broader issue of retention is more prevalent at the technician level. It takes a number of years to train an individual. While we do have what is called "lateral entry," whereby an already skilled individual could arrive in the Armed Forces, effectively, most of our people come in relatively untrained. We then provide significant training to develop their skills in a number of specific technical areas. Generally speaking, it is at about the 8- to 10-year point of that investment that the retention issue kicks in.

We are making a major effort on that by adapting our career profiles to make them more flexible and to give individuals significantly greater options. At the front end, of course, we need to attract people to the type of work that we are doing - the military, if you wish.Indeed, as you are probably aware, we are currently in the midst of a very large recruiting campaign, and I am pleased to report that is going quite well.

Senator Wiebe: Would that group you talked about be mainly NCOs?

VAdm. Buck: By and large, yes they are.

Senator Wiebe: These are questions that we have to ask. Is the pay rate a consideration in the retention of some of these people?

VAdm. Buck: As you know, since the Statement by the Conference of Defence Associations, much work has gone into improving the quality of life of members in the service. This has been a direct result of some of SCONDA's work. I would say that pay is always an issue, but it is not the major issue today. In fact, there are three issues of about equal priority: The first is the relative levels of pay in comparison to the private sector; the second is the operational tempo; and the third relates to family matters. Pay has improved over the last three or four years. Depending on the rank, it has improved by between 20 and 30 per cent.

Senator Wiebe: The navy has done a tremendous job of integrating the reservists with the regular forces personnel throughout its operations, more so than the other two services. Would the kind of skills that individual reservists may have developed in civilian life contribute to their desirability for the armed services? Is that part of the reason?

VAdm. Buck: Yes, it contributes. You are quite right about our naval reserve. The navy took a decision about 10 or 12 years ago to assign a specific mission to its naval reserve, which is currently about 3,800 strong. The mission was maritime coastal defence and surveillance. The Kingston Class ships in our navy are almost exclusively manned by naval reservists. I am pleased to say that those reservists whose training and qualifications match that of the regular force achieve the same standard. In fact, in many ways, the naval reserve is interchangeable with the regular force in terms of a specific skill set.

The stresses and strains on the young men and women in the Canadian Naval Reserve are not necessarily obvious to other Canadians, because, of course, much of what they do is done either at night or on weekends. Indeed, they often put their civilian careers aside to pick up their naval careers. However, it is an absolute success story, and they are extremely competent and capable. I am proud of what they accomplish.

Senator Wiebe: I endorse that. I have had the opportunity to meet many reservists and to sail with them.

Is the current drive to attract and recruit individuals to the services based mainly on the regular army, or does it apply to the reserve as well?

VAdm. Buck: We are doing it for both. In fact, there is even a flow of individuals from the reserve into the regular force and from the regular force into the reserve. The navy is about 17,500 strong, of which approximately 9,000 are regular force and approximately 4,000 are reservists. The balance of personnel is civilian. The reserve is actually one-third of Canada's navy.

Senator Wiebe: Is it difficult for reservists to change their status and apply for regular service?

VAdm. Buck: In a technical sense, no, it is not at all difficult. However, there are some procedural difficulties at the moment that the Canadian Forces are trying to change. It should be, from my perspective, a seamless move from the regular force to the reserve, and vice versa. We are trying to eliminate the bureaucratic difficulties from the system to make the move more effective and less difficult.

Senator Wiebe: I am happy to hear that.

Senator Banks: Gentlemen. I am glad that you brought Chief Petty Officer First Class Joncas with you today, because having had a few minor connections with the forces previously, I know who really runs the show.

VAdm. Buck: Yes, and I know that, too.

Senator Banks: There have been, as you have said, some constraints placed upon the Canadian Forces, and on everything else in this country, over the last few years. That has resulted, out of necessity, in certain efficiencies, and that is good. However, there is a widespread feeling, which is sometimes difficult for senior officers to acknowledge, that we are not where we should be in some respects. You have talked about personnel, their recruitment and retention. Without asking you to be critical of funding policies, I would like to have a direct comparison. There are, among navies, if I understand correctly, standards of steaming days per year for their operational ships, and most particularly for warships.

There was a funny definition published in the newspaper yesterday of "warship." It was "adoration of the navy," which I hope we all have.

How do Canada's navy steaming days per year compare with other NATO countries? To what extent is that number affected by budget constraints?

VAdm. Buck: The number of steaming days is an interesting statistic, in that it sometimes hides other issues. Effectively, for our high-readiness ships, we strive for approximately 120 steaming days. For our normal, or standard readiness ships, we strive for 60 days to 80 days.

If you were to look for similar navies, sometimes a good comparison can be the Australian Navy or the Royal Netherlands Navy. Those are very comparable, but not precisely the same. We believe that to generate the high-readiness capability, approximately 120 steaming days is required.

During those steaming days, a ship is moving and exercising, carrying out readiness and certification processes. That means that the ship is away from home, potentially, up to about six months in a given year, not necessarily all at one time. Given the availability of a ship, the operation of the hull is about two-thirds of its life. That is probably about the right balance.

Those ships, and the task groups they support, are certified to a level and a standard, as I indicated in my remarks, that allows us to integrate into the U.S. carrier battle group. No other navy has done that.

The standard readiness ships do not receive all of that training because my commitments are to maintain some vanguard capability and something that is called the "main contingency force." I maintain one of the two task groups at a very high level of readiness, which allowed us to react as we did after the tragedy of September 11. The other task group is at a lower level of readiness, but is prepared to be brought forward and deployed, which is what we are doing today.

I would suggest that we are comparable with many other navies. It is difficult, however, to compare us directly with the United States Navy because their personnel policies, and many other things, are quite different from ours.

Senator Banks: You have identified exactly the thrust of my question. Due to the accidents of time, history and geography, we are preoccupied with being able to integrate our defence efforts with those of the United States. We are one of the three countries that share this continent.

Whereas the Royal Netherlands Navy and the Royal Australian Navy do not have that immediate, one could say, necessity to integrate. Should we not be closer to the steaming days number of the United States Navy? I am not suggesting that we have not met our commitment, because we have. As has been said, we are very proud of that fact.

When you said that the navy is ready, I was thinking of the man who said, "One thing they cannot take from you, Mr. Churchill, is that the navy was ready at the outbreak of the war." That is often our first line of defence, and we are very proud of that fact.

However, we do have to be integrated with the American navy. Could we not stand to spend more money so that we are able to integrate with them even further in terms of steaming days?

VAdm. Buck: Clearly, if there were interconnect funding, there are other things we could and might well do. Would that necessarily directly translate into incremental steaming days beyond the 120 in particular? Probably not.

I would remind you that we must not only keep up our steaming days, but we also have a very sophisticated series of simulators and systems ashore to try to save money.

Ten years ago, we used a small squadron of a certain class of ship for nothing but training. They had no operational capability. We do not do that any more. We do much of that ashore, using simulators.

Historically, we have been quite comfortable with the rate of 120 sea days per year. Would incremental resources translate into other things? Obviously.

Senator Banks: I have one question regarding capital, if I may.

We have four destroyers, of which three are operational. I believe they are nearing the end of their useful life. As most Canadians will remember, when we needed to bring materiel from the Balkans, we did not have the means to do so and had to rent ships commercially.

We could not now, using sealift capability, quickly vanguard Canadian land forces somewhere in the world. You have looked at some plans for a new design of sealift capability with drive-on, drive-off facilities and troops. What is the navy's priority between those two things? That is to say, what is the priority between replacing the destroyers and enhancing sealift capability? Are they comparable? Would you prioritize them?

VAdm. Buck: The challenge in acquisition is always one of phasing. There are requirements to support the navy, the air force and the army.You always adjust your phasing so that you can achieve an affordable level of capital cost.

As to the replacement for the Tribal class destroyers, there is a project on the books that is designed to replace the command and control and anti-warfare capability of those ships. That capability is of the same technological vintage as the frigates. Those ships were modernized at the same time that the frigates entered service.

My first priority at the moment is to replace the two existing 30-year-old replenishment ships, HMCS Protecteur and HMCS Preserver. In addition to meeting the basic naval replenishment requirement that allows you to deploy your forces, we are looking at building in, incrementally, some sealift capability.

However, I would point out that most nations in the business of lift actually have some strategic airlift and a limited amount of strategic sealift. They contract the rest.

The support concept is high on my list of priorities because of the existing Protector and Preserver.

The Chairman: Admiral Buck, following along on that question, perhaps you could give us a set of specific examples. Of the 12 frigates, how many are at the 120-day level? How many are at the 62-day level? How many are tied up at the dock?

VAdm. Buck: It varies on any given day. At the moment, we have four frigates deployed. They are obviously at the highest level of readiness. Located here in Canada, there are approximately another four frigates that are approximately at the same level. The remaining five frigates are at either normal or extended status; the latter, in naval parlance, means in refit.

At any one time, approximately two-thirds of a fleet should be available and not in a maintenance period. In a normal situation, about half of that two-thirds would be at the highest level of readiness. The remainder would be at the standard level.

The Chairman: Are the constraints a shortage of crew or of money to pay for fuel and operations?

VAdm. Buck: It is a combination of the two. We did our first reductions through the mid 1990s. That did cause a reduction in individuals. As you know, we are now very actively recruiting people. It is a mixture of the two issues.

The Chairman: You are both short of crew and money to operate.

VAdm. Buck: You must use resources to ensure that you can deliver on the capability mandated by the government. Through the tiered level of readiness that we are operating on, I can deliver that. The issue then becomes, in a perfect world, everyone could be at the highest level of readiness, but that could be deemed to be in excess of requirements.

The Chairman: It is also acceptable to say you are short of resources.

VAdm. Buck: I understand that.

Senator Forrestall: We heard a particularly subdued complaint, but very forcefully put, from the reserves on the West Coast. Could I remind the admiral that women's physiology is slightly different from men's, and could we please equip and supply our female reservists onboard ship with clothing that is somewhat more acceptable to them? I do not want an answer on that now, but I make that comment. We heard that from half a dozen people.

VAdm. Buck: The comments have been heard and will be attended to.

Senator Forrestall: You mean to say they preceded me? I would not be a bit surprised.

Admiral, what is the present status of the program to replace the Trump class? Is it your hope or wish that we replace them on a hull-for-hull basis?

VAdm. Buck: As you know, today we work through what is called "capabilities-based defence planning." I clearly see the requirement to replace the command and control and the air defence capability that is in the Tribals. Exactly how we get there is really still at the options analysis stage.

As I indicated earlier, there are clearly options for how you would do it, whether through one-for-one hull replacement or other ways. Would it be a purpose-built design? That is one of the options. Would it be an off-the-shelf design or could we do it some other way? We are still looking at that. To an extent, it will depend on phasing, because the issue is not what you need, but how you phase the acquisition.

Senator Forrestall: I am concerned that you might, in proceeding first with supply replacement vessels, spend your dollars there so that we would have that capacity.

VAdm. Buck: That is an answer to a previous question. My first priority is the replacement of the replenishment ships.

Senator Forrestall: Would you include command and control?

VAdm. Buck: That is one of the options included in the analysis. However, one must be careful about how much capability one puts in one hull, because that would then depend on where you wanted and needed to use it. It could be a potential option.

Senator Forrestall: What is the status of the new logistic ship concept?

VAdm. Buck: At the moment, it is internal to the department. There is a tremendous amount of internal work on the requirement. At this juncture, the replenishment requirement is relatively clear. While we could cost-effectively offer lift with this program, there are some options that we need to work through with the army and the air force on where do we want to move that lift. It is a doctrinal issue. How will you use the army? Where will you take it? Will you take it into commercial ports, which would suggest a roll-on, roll-off requirement? Will you also want to put it into more austere areas, which would suggest a well-deck option? We are doing that analysis at the moment.

Senator Forrestall: The minister has certainly not signed off on it yet. When do you think it might be completed?

VAdm. Buck: In many ways, completion will depend on the priorities facing us post-September 11. You will understand the tremendous amount of capability we have had to deploy. The staff supporting those ships is our first priority. It would be difficult to give you a direct answer. I am hopeful that this project, if it were to receive government approval, could actually proceed quite quickly.

Senator Forrestall: How long did it take to decide to dispatch the HMCS Toronto to replace the Halifax in the standing naval force? When would that decision have been communicated to cabinet?

VAdm. Buck: Government took the decision quickly. The actual decision on when to deploy the ship was more dependent on the role of the Standing Naval Force Atlantic. Halifax was in the line on September 11, but the standing naval force was not directly involved in supporting the campaign against terror. We have phased Toronto's departure such that she will play a more direct role in the campaign against terror. That is really a timing issue.

Senator Forrestall: Was it always in the back of your mind that Toronto would be the vessel?

VAdm. Buck: It was always part of the planning process, through government, that a backfill would be required. At the time, we were actually working ships up in Halifax. The decision as to which ship it would be awaited the completion of that training and certification.

Senator Forrestall: How much money, over and above what you have now, do you need to fulfil your level-one business plan?

VAdm. Buck: It varies from year to year. I can deliver my essential operational capability, but there are other areas for which I need resources as well. There are some optional things that I could do. That is a variable figure.

Senator Forrestall: Can you tell me how valuable the Sea Kings are to you?

VAdm. Buck: The Sea Kings are a very valuable tool. Maritime helicopters have been essential to our navy and will be in the future.

Senator Day: Admiral Buck, my first question relates to the four Iroquois class destroyers that we have. Would you explain to me what factors led you to the conclusion, in the materials that were filed with the committee, that their sustainable lives are almost ended?

VAdm. Buck: In this case, we are not speaking of what is called "command and control" and the weapons system. We are talking about the hull life, the marine engineering plant and things like that.

We do continuous analysis of the capability of our fleet and our ships. At some point, we assess how much money we need to put into a ship to maintain it. That really is the issue. You can maintain a ship for as long as you wish, but you will drive up your resource costs as well.

As you know, the four Iroquois classes entered service in the early 1970s. As we replace the steam destroyers with frigates, we are coming to a stage where we need to look at how long we continue to put that kind of resource into those particular plants.

There is another important issue on the Tribals. The size of the ship's company for the Tribals, which entered service in the 1970s, and the frigates, which entered service in the 1990s and are an early 1980s design, is quite different. It is 225 for the frigate and about 330 in the Iroquois class, although the ships are about the same size. That is a differential of 100 personnel. That is because the technology in those ships, mainly the marine engineering, is more dated.

The goal is to decrease the personnel bill. The same is true of the existing replenishment ships, which have a ship's company of about 265. In the future, we would like to see that cut in half. That is another factor in the timing of the replacement.

Senator Day: That is helpful. The frigates that we have now are world class and perform and operate very well with other navies?

VAdm. Buck: They do.

Senator Day: We do not have aircraft carriers or battleships. There are a number of classes of ships that we do not have, but we function well in an international theatre, often in an interoperable situation. Is there any reason that we could not replace the Tribal class destroyers with more frigates and still have an effective navy?

VAdm. Buck: One of the options we are considering in replacing command and control and warfare capability is how large of a hull is required. The Iroquois or Tribal class uses an SM2 missile system, which has a very large launcher. Therefore, there is also the "real estate" issue.

A frigate-sized hull could accept that kind of capability. The current frigates are about 4,800 tonnes and the Iroquois class are 5,000 tonnes. However, while we are analyzing whether it is possible to put that kind of capability on top of the existing frigate capability, it is probably not.

Senator Day: We did have the technology in the shipyards in Canada. I would assume that to build six more frigates would cost less than to build four destroyers.

VAdm. Buck: It would probably cost about the same.

Senator Day: So six for four?

VAdm. Buck: The cost depends on the capability you put into the hull design. The cost of the steel for a ship is approximately9 per cent of the entire cost.

Senator Day: I also have some questions about the replacement of supply ships. You have touched on this with the afloat logistics and sealift capability proposal. You indicated the current normal, at-sea logistics function of supply ships and potential sealift capability. You talk about aviation support, logistics over shoreline, humanitarian crisis response, and a joint-force headquarters capability. That is command and control, I assume?

VAdm. Buck: Yes, but primarily for our force ashore as opposed to a naval unit.

Senator Day: You mention limited ice capability. Is this utopia, or are you actually planning for a ship that would carry out all of those functions?

VAdm. Buck: Subject to government decisions about where defence services programs will go, the capabilities listed there are not utopian. Those are eminently doable now. Some of them would be added on if required. For example, the headquarters component would be containerized and put on the ship. However, the basic capabilities of the ship - to perform the naval replenishment function, to do sealift and to have limited, first-year ice capability - are fundamental to the design options at which we are looking.

Senator Day: Could those ships be command and control ships?

VAdm. Buck: They could be.

Senator Day: Can a command-control ship function as command control without the air defence capabilities that the Iroquois class currently have?

VAdm. Buck: We have chosen to package that particular capability into the Iroquois class to complement the capability in the frigates. That is a way to do it.

As I have said, we are looking at options. You could, arguably, put the command and control capability in the afloat logistics ship in the future. However, that particular command and control capability does not currently exist in the Tribal class. That capability would be able to support forces, or other things, ashore.

Senator Day: Finally, on the replacement of the supply ships and the Iroquois class destroyers, is the navy able to use modern business-financing techniques, or is that beyond the purview of the Armed Forces and must be a cabinet decision?

I am thinking of this in parallel with your outsourcing for such things as married personnel quarters and athletic support activities.We were made aware of that when we were in the West.

Can you do the same thing in leasing of equipment? You have indicated that one of your constraints is capital cost, which is obviously the case. It must come out of your budget. Can you get it off budget by utilizing financing techniques that commercial airlines and railways use? They lease their equipment rather than purchasing it outright.

VAdm. Buck: The Canadian Forces Housing Agency and the Canadian Forces Personnel Support Agency are still agencies of government and not departments.The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces operate under the rubric and direction of the Financial Administration Act, as do other government departments. What is or is not doable would be a government decision, and ultimately, a Treasury Board decision.

Senator Day: Is the Canadian Forces Housing Agency an agency of the Armed Forces?

VAdm. Buck: No, it is an agency of government.

Senator Day: It is a not-for-profit government agency intended to function on a separate budget?

VAdm. Buck: Essentially, yes. The rules of operation for each agency are probably slightly different.

Senator Day: Perhaps I can get a briefing on that later. I appreciate you flagging that for me.

The Chairman: To follow up on that, when you are talking about replenishment ships or the afloat logistics ship, are you talking about two or three?

VAdm. Buck: I am talking about a number that is sufficient to do the job. We are currently doing an options study to compare the number of vessels we could acquire for through-life costs at baseline with the cost of operating the existing vessels. At the moment, we are looking at a range of from two to four.

The Chairman: Certainly, two vessels, as we now have, does not work.

VAdm. Buck: It makes life challenging.

The Chairman: Miserable?

VAdm. Buck: Challenging. I like opportunities.

Senator Atkins: I was a little surprised by your answer to Senator Forrestall on the Sea Kings. Does it not concern you that replacement helicopters will not be in place for from five to seven, and maybe even ten, years?

VAdm. Buck: The government is aiming to acquire the maritime helicopter replacement by 2005.

Senator Atkins: Can they do it?

VAdm. Buck: That remains to be seen.

Senator Atkins: I will not pursue that line of questioning.

Do you think Canada should have a national security agency?

VAdm. Buck: As that particular question is directly related to Canada's machinery of government and how it operates, it would not be appropriate for me to answer.

Senator Atkins: If government were to decide to establish one, whom do you think should be represented on such an organization?

VAdm. Buck: Again, there are existing mechanisms within the current machinery of government that do work. I would think that, hypothetically speaking, as one looks to what could happen, the players would be reasonably clear.

Senator Atkins: What do you think would be a full complement for the navy in terms of not only active service personnel, but also reservists and civilians? I have the impression that there are more civilians being recruited to supplement some of the navy's requirements.

VAdm. Buck: No, I do not think that is true. The number of 4,500 civilians that I gave you has been historically consistent. In fact, those numbers are also down from their height, but those are jobs in Halifax and Esquimalt in the fleet maintenance facilities and areas like that. We are not replacing military personnel with Defence civilians. In certain key areas, we have contracted out some functions where it did not make any sense for us to do them ourselves.

The current strength of the navy is approximately 9,000 regulars and about 4,000 reserves. When we are up to the full complement, in terms of full, effective strength, our job is eminently doable. The challenge is within those numbers; there will always be some who have not been recruited or have not been adequately or appropriately trained through the system.

Senator Atkins: Finally, where does the navy refit its ships? Are there more than the two, in Halifax and B.C.? Are there other places in Canada?

VAdm. Buck: Effectively, we do what is called our own "first line"; that is, our own onboard maintenance. We do some of our own second-line maintenance in our two maintenance facilities, one in Halifax, one in Victoria. Everything called "third line" or beyond that - more extensive work - is contracted out competitively across the country, and it varies from competition to competition. There are a limited number of shipyards on the West Coast. There are a greater number between the Lakehead and the Maritimes. Refits are competed, and not just refits, but something called "docking work periods."

Senator Atkins: In view of the swift changes in technology, how often is it required that a ship like a frigate be refitted?

VAdm. Buck: The refits, or docking work periods, which is what the frigate receives, are essentially on a periodic basis. We do refits on our older ships such as the Tribals on a three- to four-year cycle. We put the frigates into docking work periods more frequently for a shorter duration.

Senator Meighen: Admiral, forgive me for arriving late. If I ask you a question that has already been asked, please cut me off.

I want to ask you about reservists and to preface my question with an editorial comment. I think many members of this committee, myself included, have come to the conclusion the navy has done a very good job of encouraging reservists and giving them meaningful work within its operational scheme.

That being said, are reservists involved in Apollo, and if so, what percentage from the navy's perspective?

VAdm. Buck: First, to be clear, pre-Apollo, there were approximately 1,000 naval reservists employed full time patrolling both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of Canada. Today there are approximately 200 additional naval reservists involved here in Canada in a variety of functions. Some of it is related to maritime coastal defence vessels, some to port security, and some to what is called "force protection" of our two main operating bases.

Senator Meighen: When we were in Esquimalt, if I remember correctly, and in talking to members of the coastal patrol vessels, who are largely, if not exclusively, reservists, one of the common cries was that it was extremely difficult to transfer from the reserves to the full-time navy. The difficulty seemed to lie principally in a pension issue. Can you shed any light on this and tell me if that is a problem and whether anything is being done about it?

VAdm. Buck: It is a problem. It is not related directly to pensions. It is more related to some bureaucratic hoops that people have to go through. We are addressing it. I believe, as you do - and I did mention it earlier - that a person should be able to move from the reserve to the regular force, and vice versa, rather seamlessly.

Senator Meighen: It has nothing to do with pensions? I was given the impression it related to pensions.

VAdm. Buck: For a reservist joining the regular force, no, it is not pension-related at all. It is more related to some bureaucratic processes.

Going from regular to reserve, undoubtedly, yes, depending on at what point one is in one's career, there could be some pension implications.

Senator Meighen: Would it be all right if I dropped you a note if I find out any more detail on that question?

VAdm. Buck: Absolutely.

Senator Meighen: What are the navy's retention rates of other ranks and the ROTP graduates? Are you doing well in that regard?

VAdm. Buck: By and large, we are doing quite well. Before September 11, our attrition rate was approximately 4 per cent scheduled retirement and 4 per cent "unscheduled," if you wish. I believe that the figure is now approximately 6.5 per cent combined. If you compare some of those figures with the private sector, we are doing quite well.

The challenge, from the navy's perspective, is that there are a number of key technical capabilities where the private sector, certainly in terms of financial remuneration, is more attractive.

Senator Meighen: I suspect the navy is not alone and that your sister services have the same problem.

VAdm. Buck: Yes.

Senator Meighen: Even before Apollo, certainly in other services, there were concerns about the increased tempo, and the navy was not exempt from that. What effect, in your estimation, is it having upon the families of serving personnel, and what is the navy doing about it?

VAdm. Buck: I am very concerned about that particular issue. Before the task group sailed, before Vancouver sailed, I was in Halifax and Esquimalt. I walked the jetties, the ships and the shop floor and spoke to the families. This is a major concern.

I would say to you that with regard to Apollo-related missions, both families and members are steadfast and determined. There is no question in my mind about that.

However, recognizing the need to support families, we have done a tremendous amount of work over the last number of years. I am very pleased to be able to say that. If she were here, my wife would tell you this in spades. When I joined the navy, and she joined the navy - although she did not know she was joining it - it did not provide very much support. Today, we have military family resource centres that are well staffed and have excellent programs. We have flexible ways to support people. I am very pleased with what we have achieved. There is always more that we can do. I very much believe that not only do we have to support members of the forces, but we also have to provide essential support for their families and to understand there are stresses and strains brought on those families by long separations.

Senator Meighen: Finally, admiral, what would be your reaction, and would you articulate any concern, if you were asked to mount another mission when, in your estimation, the crews had not been home for a respectable amount of time and it would really cause untoward stress in the lives of serving personnel?

Would you bring that to the attention of those asking you to mount another mission?

VAdm. Buck: Absolutely. We have a policy of trying to ensure that personnel are not away for more than six months at any given time. From a naval perspective, and as it relates to the planning of Operation Apollo, that guideline remains in effect. We have not changed it. In fact, we may occasionally have to do some minor tweaking of it, which in some cases might mean a ship is away a little more than six months. However, in other cases, ships will be away for less than six months for exactly the same reason. That is one of the planning criteria for everything we are doing - to ensure we can maintain the personnel tempo. Again, it is a significant concern.

Senator Meighen: Admiral, there is another side to the equation. It is all very well to say we will not be away for more than six months, but to come back for two months and go away for another six months does not solve the problem.

VAdm. Buck: That is the issue. In certain cases, ships may be away for less than six months, so we can get the time at home balanced with the time away. That is why, over the following months, as the campaign against terror changes, so will, from time to time, our commitment and what is appropriate.

Senator Meighen: Do you have a rough balance in mind? If I am not mistaken, the army - correct me if am wrong - used to talk about six months away and a year or a year and half at home, which got thrown out of the window with our penchant for accepting any and all peacekeeping missions. What is the balance for the navy that fits the bill?

VAdm. Buck: It is roughly the same order of magnitude, but it comes back to a question I was asked earlier about the 120 days. The point is that in the navy, historically, those ships that are in high readiness have been away for about six months at a time. That is not abnormal for us. The trick is ensuring we do not have to rapidly turn people around to go out and do it again. Ensuring we do not have to do that is very much part of our ongoing planning process.

Senator Meighen: To the extent that it is within your control.

VAdm. Buck: My job is to articulate what capability we have and the impacts of that. That I do, I can assure you.

The Chairman: For the record, admiral, would you tell us in what trades and skills you are having trouble retaining personnel?

VAdm. Buck: The main trades that we are having difficulty with are naval electronics technicians, of which there is a variety called "acoustic communications and tactical." Those are the key areas.

The Chairman: Lots of ship drivers?

VAdm. Buck: Interestingly enough, we have a massive bubble of junior officers in the training system at the moment. In that sense, we are in relatively good shape. The problem with that group of individuals, however, is they are still in the training system. It is partly an attrition issue, but it is more because of what happened previously in the forces reduction program. We let many people go we probably should not have.

Senator LaPierre: With respect to quality of life, we have noticed post-traumatic stress disorder in other services. Are sailors afflicted with that when returning from peacekeeping missions, and what is being done to try to fix that?

VAdm. Buck: We are tracking it. There are stresses in the type of work that the navy has historically done, but what they see in operations at sea is, by definition, more normal than what one might see in some of the other peacekeeping operations. One instance in particular where we have seen it, and are watching very closely, is with our people who were involved in the Swissair effort. The Swissair tragedy triggered quite a few cases of PTSD, both in the ship crews and in our divers. It is an ongoing effort to look for and track those symptoms. We have established clinics in both Halifax and Victoria, within our naval medical facilities, for exactly that reason.

Senator LaPierre: Could a post-traumatic stress disorder be caused by a sailor receiving an e-mail from his wife that one of his children has died or his wife is leaving him or something like that? What does the navy do about that kind of situation? Does it ship the sailor back home as quickly as possible?

VAdm. Buck: Yes, all commanding officers are sensitive to issues such as that. E-mail is a wonderful medium of exchange that has enhanced the quality of life, but certainly, the examples that you have articulated would cause tremendous stress for an individual, and generally speaking, that individual would be repatriated as soon as possible.

Senator LaPierre: I take it for granted there are no longer any problems with the integration of women into the naval forces of our country. It is all resolved now and we are at peace with that?

VAdm. Buck: I am pleased to speak to that particular issue. The navy commenced integrating women into the service in about 1987. At the time, there was considerable discussion about what it would do to our operational capability. I am pleased to report that it has not had any negative impact on our operational capability. In fact, I believe having women serve on all classes of ship has worked quite well. There have been bumps on the road. Human beings will be human beings, but we are quite comfortable that our policies are in place and robust enough to deal with that. As it relates to the navy, it has been a true success story.

Senator LaPierre: What about gays and lesbians? Is there a policy? You do not ask?

Commodore Jacques J. Gauvin, Acting Assistant Chief of the Maritime Staff, Department of National Defence: We do not ask because we do not discriminate against gays or lesbians. They are allowed to serve this country, so there is no systematic means, or desire, to ask a question in order to discriminate. People are free to choose their sexual orientation or preference.

Senator LaPierre: The newspapers reported this morning that the RCMP in New Brunswick ask the question on the grounds of security, because gay and lesbian people are more liable, they say, to be blackmailed. Consequently, they might then be more prone to reveal secrets.

VAdm. Buck: We do not. We have moved beyond that.

Senator LaPierre: I suspect the RCMP will have to also.

You seem to have a large number of civilians working for the navy. They are all screened adequately, and they are all secure?

VAdm. Buck: Yes.

Senator LaPierre: Are you responsible for the quality of life of those non-military members of your service?

VAdm. Buck: In practice, of course, Treasury Board is the employer for all departmental civilians. Those responsibilities are executed through the deputy minister. However, we have an integrated workforce, even here in Ottawa. For example, in Victoria or Winnipeg, the military and civilians work together. While pay scales and such things as that are not handled locally, but nationally, a tremendous amount is done by the local command structures to ensure that the civilian workforce is viewed, and views itself, as part of the team. In fact, certainly in Halifax and Esquimalt, many activities such as learning centres, et cetera, have both the military and civilian component, and many of those initiatives are locally generated, because they certainly relate to the navy. We cannot put our ships to sea without our civilian workforce.

Senator LaPierre: The present nature of the so-called "enemy" in the so-called "war" seems to be of Arab descent or Islamic culture or religion. Does that affect which personnel you send on your missions in that theatre, or do you avoid sending these people for various reasons? If you do, what are the reasons?

VAdm. Buck: The campaign against terrorism is against a regime, not an ethnic group. Canadians in the military, or in this case, the navy, are eligible for service whoever they are.

Senator LaPierre: We heard that during the Gulf War, a person in the navy, if I remember correctly, was not allowed to serve on a ship because he was Jewish. This is no longer the case, I gather?

VAdm. Buck: This is not the case.

Senator LaPierre: Would an Islamic woman who wears the veil be able to join your navy and continue to practise the religious demand of veil-wearing?

VAdm. Buck: We have made tremendous inroads in terms of accommodation. Effectively, where we can accommodate an individual without creating a safety hazard, either to that individual or others, we try to do so.

Senator LaPierre: Is that a safety hazard?

VAdm. Buck: It would depend on the specific circumstances. It depends on her trade. It would depend on the material in the item of clothing. If it were the right material, there probably would be no hazard.

The Chairman: Admiral, the government tells us that the campaign against terrorism will go on for a long time. What is the navy's capability to sustain its forces with Operation Apollo and with the Standing Naval Force Atlantic? How long can you sustain those levels?

VAdm. Buck: In the options work that we are doing in relation to not just the availability of ships but, of course, the personnel tempo that we were discussing earlier, I am comfortable that I can maintain a task group capability out to two years and beyond. That is the current planning window that we are looking at.

The Chairman: What missions previously performed by the fleet have you given up to send those vessels out?

VAdm. Buck: We have not actually given up any missions.

The Chairman: Let me rephrase that. What tasks?

VAdm. Buck: We have not given up any tasks, because in fact, two-thirds of the major warship fleet still remains in Canada. All the maritime coastal defence vessels, or MCDVs, are here. As we speak today, there is a frigate conducting surveillance operations off Halifax and there are some MCDVs doing the same thing off Victoria.

The Chairman: Let me rephrase that then. What would these vessels be doing if they were not with Operation Apollo?

VAdm. Buck: The vessels that are deployed would either be undertaking readiness, some of which could be done while doing surveillance operations, or they would have been engaged in multinational exercises in the Atlantic or in the Pacific. While a component of our work is done in local waters, certifying and preparing the task groups that we have deployed, or are ready to deploy, generally speaking requires working with other navies on a regular basis in major joint/international exercise regimes.

The Chairman: Perhaps I am not phrasing the question properly. Is this not the largest deployment of naval forces that we have seen in decades?

VAdm. Buck: It is, but we are not doing this in an isolated context. There are some international exercises, some of which we would have participated in, which will now just not happen. The NATO one, "Strong Resolve" comes to mind. Next year, there is a large exercise in the Pacific known as "RIMPAC." I would be very surprised if that proceeds. That is not proceeding, not because we are not available, but because, effectively, all the navies who normally participate in that are not available because they are deployed in other operations.

The Chairman: You named two. Are there other activities that are not happening?

VAdm. Buck: Those are the major two in the planning window at the moment.

Senator Banks: I have a few questions of clarification. When you say the navy complement is 14,000, how many of those 14,000 positions are not now filled? That is to say, how many people are actually in the forces? Does the number 14,000 include the civilian component? When you say 14,000, are you talking about service people?

VAdm. Buck: The total component - military, regular reserve and civilian - is actually 17,500. The military component is approximately 9,000 regulars and 4,000 naval reserves; so 13,000 are uniformed. There is a shortage of approximately 300 on the reserve side. On the regular side, there is a shortage of actual individuals of about 200, but a further 700 or so have not yet achieved an effective level of training needed to perform their jobs. They are "in the pipe."

Senator Banks: That is not a horrible percentage.

VAdm. Buck: No, it is not, but there are some key technical areas in which it takes time to develop the individuals.

Senator Banks: I suppose an old salt from the big war, at the end of which we had the third largest navy in the world -

VAdm. Buck: We had 100,000 personnel.

Senator Banks: - would scoff at the idea of being out for six months and back for a year and a half. I presume that if there were a long-term threat or conventional confrontation of some kind, that process and policy would also, per force, go out the window in an emergency situation?

VAdm. Buck: If an emergency were declared, hypothetically speaking, the country would be engaged. We would all be looking at how to deal with business and with that particular problem. It is interesting to note that of those 100,000 personnel, approximately 95,000 were reservists at that time.

Senator Banks: Do they still wear jagged insignia?

VAdm. Buck: I am pleased to report that they do not. We all wear the same rank and uniform.

Senator Banks: Good. Given the modern world, and the present circumstances, is it reasonable, in your view, that we now have a navy that is comprised of just a little more than 10 per cent of the one we had in 1946?

VAdm. Buck: I would have to take you back to 1939, in fact. The pre-war planning in 1939 was for a regular-force navy of 10,000 personnel and a small task group, actually built around carrier in those days, in both the Atlantic and Pacific. In some ways, the navy we have achieved today is the one that has been planned for a very long time. That was the planning figure for the navy before the war. After the war, after those 195,000 personnel were demobilized, the navy was even smaller than it is today. In fact, it had to grow back into a force of about the current size to deal with Korea.

Senator Banks: Things have changed a lot. As the convention says, we do not want to be re-fighting the last war, and I was not suggesting such a thing. I do not know whether you can reasonably answer this question. I will preface it by saying that I am asking it of you as a private citizen. I know how ridiculous that is.

The comfort that we are being offered is that, in your case, the navy is meeting, and even exceeding, the requirements, but requirement is an arbitrary thing. Requirements are set out, I presume, by bureaucrats and politicians, with the advice, I am sure, of experienced and knowledgeable people. Is the requirement realistic? If we have met our requirements in practical terms, it is very nice to be able to say so, but there is this other reality that might not be reflected. That is my question. Is the reality of our situation in the world properly reflected in what you refer to as the "current requirements" of the navy?

VAdm. Buck: Senator, as with all things, Canada has a finite population base and a finite GDP, and Canadians need to make decisions in many areas. Defence is one of those areas. I would say, though, coming back to my previous answer, that in relative terms, the size of the navy today is appropriate to the level of capability that Canadians have asked of it, historically and currently. Could it be more? Yes, but again, those are decisions for others to take.

Senator Banks: In your view, does it need to be more?

VAdm. Buck: I believe that in fleet size, today's capability is just about where we need it to be. The navy has demonstrated a capability that is far greater than it was, for example, 10 years ago.

Senator Wiebe: I would like to return to the question of day-to-day operations. Our destroyers, frigates, and Protecteur, the supply ship, would be involved in training exercises such as RIMPAC. I imagine that the majority of time spent on these three classes of ships would be in training, especially with the advent of the coastal defence vessels and the submarines. What work, besides normal training in relation to Canadian security, would our frigates and destroyers be doing in peacetime, not at a time like this?

VAdm. Buck: With our fleet - frigates, destroyers and maritime coastal defence vessels - we build a rolling program that is a mixture of what are known as "national operations," which is the surveillance component. We would schedule our frigates - generally not the destroyers - and maritime coastal defence vessels to do that. That mix may change slightly as a result of what we are doing.

Until we have an opportunity to assess exactly what we will continue to provide to Operation Apollo, it would be premature to say we are specifically going to be doing less of one thing versus another. We have commitments to other government departments and to patrol the maritime approaches to this country. We are continuing to do that, because those are also key priorities for the navy.

Senator Wiebe: I am sure that many of those sailors deployed for Apollo, because of training exercises such as RIMPAC, have, at least once during their training career, spent six months away from home.

VAdm. Buck: Yes.

Senator Wiebe: This experience of being away from home is nothing new for the sailors or for the families. What may be different, I suppose, and may cause some of the extra concern, is that they are now going into the possibility of an actual combat situation, whereas before it was just a training exercise.

VAdm. Buck: Yes.

Senator Wiebe: These families are accustomed to having a member of the family away on a training mission for six months. That part of it is not new.

VAdm. Buck: That part is not new. I was trying to make that point earlier. What is different is, to a certain extent, the uncertainty that surrounds this particular campaign.

Senator Wiebe: Thank you.

Senator Forrestall: Back to the question of access to e-mail. What is the frequency of access for the crew aboard ships?

VAdm. Buck: Today, daily.

Senator Forrestall: Hourly?

VAdm. Buck: In some cases. It is driven by a number of factors. The first is actual bandwidth; in other words, how big the pipe is and how much of it is being used for operational information. Generally speaking, as long as there is some capability above and beyond the requirement to exchange operational information, e-mails are sent as frequently as individuals have time to send them. What normally happens on most ships is that one individual will bundle them up on a daily basis and then upload them in one go.

Senator Forrestall: No one would have satellite capability?

VAdm. Buck: No. If they did have such capability, I would probably borrow it and put it to work.

Senator Forrestall: We are now into the fourth month since the events that led to this problem. Have we given any thought to the striking of a medal?

VAdm. Buck: The personnel staff are looking at that subject.

Senator Forrestall: That is good. My second question relates to additional perks. There was a complaint raised, probably three weeks ago, that the wherewithal for the little extra dollar or two that we send had not shown up in the family treasury. Was that a problem and is it now straightened out?

VAdm. Buck: First, I do not think what we are talking about here is a perk.

Senator Forrestall: I was grasping for a word.

VAdm. Buck: This is support for families in a period of difficulty. Those particular items are being worked through. There is one area that I know has been dealt with precisely. We have been able to make some provisions so that families can travel over Christmas if they need to, which they might not have planned to do had their spouse been home.

Senator Forrestall: However, it has not happened yet. It is not in place yet. Are you still working on it?

VAdm. Buck: It is not so much a discussion about the various levels, as it is the process of how to define when it starts and what area you need to cover. I think we are getting close.

Senator Forrestall: What is the demarcation? Is it the other end of the Suez Canal?

Cmdre. Gauvin: It is the Red Sea, and going the other way it is the southern tip of Pakistan.

Senator Forrestall: That is interesting. That encompasses it. We are all there, are we not?

VAdm. Buck: We are all there except Vancouver.

Senator Forrestall: It should be there within a few weeks?

VAdm. Buck: Yes.

Senator Forrestall: I would like to ask the Chief a question. When we need professional help for our men and women, do we have that help on the staff of the Maritime Command in the East or do we go outside - I am thinking of psychologists and psychiatrists - for that level of professional help? Do we get it outside or inside the forces?

Chief Petty Officer First Class Serge Joncas, Maritime Command Chief Petty Officer, Department of National Defence: That help is available within the staff. In addition, we have the Canadian Forces Member Assistance Program, which is available to both members and their families, should they have any difficulties. It is open 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. It is there to handle any kind of personnel or professional problems that the family or the member may have. Yes, the services are available.

VAdm. Buck: If I may add to that, we have some of that help on staff at both Halifax and Esquimalt, but we can go outside to supplement it as well. If we do not have the capability on issues that impact on individuals, we will go and get it; however, we do have a resident capability.

Senator Forrestall: I remember when we were still living with boilers that sort of breathed, and when the commander wanted to get alongside in a hurry, some people became a little panic stricken because it scared the hell out of them. Do we still have programs that can give counselling in that type of situation? We do not have that situation any more, but I am thinking of the non-military side. There are a lot of areas where the work is sufficiently dangerous without having to engage in any kind of extra career. Do we pay enough attention to giving help in that area?

VAdm. Buck: We do pay attention to that area and we have that capability. As we said, one of the difficulties is identifying it early, but yes, that is very much a concern.

Senator Forrestall: We hear stories about the Sea Kings being deployed on Operation Apollo without the benefit of the so-called "Half Quick" communication.

Is that a true story? If so, how do we communicate with other members of the coalition?

VAdm. Buck: The Half Quick Radio equipment came to the fore as a result of the Gulf War. There was a plan to fit it in the Sea Kings, but the actual equipment of the day was somewhat dated. In fact, it was superseded by a newer technology and a newer piece of equipment. That has not been installed, because one piece of equipment overtook the other, but the Sea Kings are quite capable of communicating in the theatre. Thus, in this case, it was not an essential requirement that they be fitted before they deployed.

Senator Forrestall: I am pleased to hear that. We have the capability to install the new technology overseas, so that we do not have to bring them home first?

VAdm. Buck: I would ask you to direct that question to their Chief of Staff, because I am not sure if it can be done in theatre or in a periodic maintenance pipeline.

The Chairman: Vice-Admiral, are you saying that the Sea Kings can communicate in a secure manner with other members of the coalition?

VAdm. Buck: No, I am saying that the Sea Kings can communicate with the forces as they need to - the ships and the controllers, and, in this case, Canadian Forces.

The Chairman: If they had the new technology you are talking about, they could then communicate in a secure manner?

VAdm. Buck: They can communicate in a secure manner today, with the Canadian Forces.

The Chairman: But they cannot with the people with whom they are sailing?

VAdm. Buck: In some cases they can, and in some cases, no. There are different capabilities in the coalition - some are those of the United States and some are of other nations. There are rather complex interoperability issues that have to do with different equipment fits by different nations.

The Chairman: Does the absence of Have Quick Radios mean that we can or cannot communicate with the forces in the coalition?

VAdm. Buck: It would depend on what forces you are talking about. By and large, you could not communicate with the U.S. forces.

Senator Day: I have one long-term planning issue, from the financial statement and budgeting point of view, to ask about. We read, a number of years ago, about the possibility that the navy was thinking of outsourcing and divesting itself of its repair yards in Halifax and Victoria. What is the current status of that situation?

VAdm. Buck: There is an internal process called "alternate service delivery" whereby we looked at how we did everything in a given organization. We went through a step called "most effective organization" to ensure that our internal procedures were as cost-effective and businesslike as they could be. Then, following that, an analysis is done to compare the costs and the output of that capability vis-à-vis letting the commercial sector do it. Both of the fleet maintenance facilities continue to be operated internally, and they are operating as efficient and effective organizations.

Senator Day: Do I interpret your answer as meaning that that is a core activity?

VAdm. Buck: We look at our business on an ongoing basis, but certainly, at the moment, on the basis of the cost/benefit analysis, we operate them internally.

Senator Day: Would the majority of those people working in the fleet repair maintenance facilities be in or out of uniform?

VAdm. Buck: The majority are civilians, although we also employ sailors in those facilities.

Senator Day: There are about 4,000 civilians. What percentage would be involved in maintenance?

VAdm. Buck: About one-half of that number, between the two coasts.

Senator Banks: Thank you. I take it, on the basis of the comfort and assurances you have given us today, that the members of this committee can assume correctly that you do not need us to pump, on any urgent basis, for more money for the navy.

VAdm. Buck: The issue, as I have tried to make clear, is that we are doing the essential, but that is all we are capable of doing. Doing the essential means that, on an ongoing basis, we are making decisions about what we do and what we do not do. The long-term ability depends on what Canada and Canadians will be asking of their military in the future. I would say that we need to resource the military to the correct level to do the things that we are asked to do. As I have said, I am doing the essential. I would like to do that in a manner that would allow me more options in my efforts. However, I will assure you of this: my job is to assess risk, because it is Canadian men and women who are under my command; I do not take that lightly; and fundamentally, from a naval perspective, this very much changed for us one year ago, after the USS Cole was hit. At that time, there was a Canadian warship in theatre, so we took careful decisions, and we have changed the way in which we do business to ensure that the men and women in our ships are given the tools to do the job. It is not zero risk, but they must have the tools to mitigate that risk.

Senator Day: Does that mean that when you are tied up in a foreign port, that the men on the ship are now armed?

VAdm. Buck: It depends on the port, but that is potentially one of the changes that occurred.

The Chairman: Vice-Admiral Buck, on behalf of the committee, I thank you for your presentation today. We found it instructive and we appreciate the time and patience you have shown the committee in your answers. I reiterate my earlier comment: this committee has great pride in the men and women of the navy who are currently serving. We want to underline that, and we wish you to carry that message back to them.

We have before us Lieutenant General M.K. Jeffery, Chief of the Land Staff. Born in London, England, LGen Jeffery joined the Royal Canadian Artillery in 1964. He has had a distinguished army career, with a variety of staff positions both in Canada and overseas. He was promoted to his current rank in May 2000 and appointed special assistant to the Chief of Defence Staff for Reserve Restructure. LGen Jeffery is accompanied by Chief Warrant Officer JER Munger, Chief Warrant Officer of Land Force Command.

Before our witnesses begin, I would like to say how proud we are of the men and women of the Canadian army, and how much we appreciate the work they are doing. We would be grateful if you would convey that to them on our behalf.

[Translation]

Lieutenant-General M.K. Jeffery, Chief of the Land Staff, Department of National Defence: It is very much a pleasure to be here to talk to you on the subject of the Army. I have with me Chief Warrant Officer Roger Munger, Chief Warrant Officer of Land Force Command.

[English]

My remarks this morning, Mr. Chairman, will be brief. Colonel Bill Peters, the Director of Land Strategic Planning, appeared before you on July 19, 2001 and provided a general overview of the army, its current capabilities and future challenges. I have provided a complete version of my introductory remarks, but I understand you wish me to address only highlights this morning.

It is my view that despite the demands on it, the army continues to be successful, which is a reflection of the quality of our soldiers and the professional ability of Canadian units to adapt quickly to demanding and changing circumstances. Such qualities are rare and must be husbanded judicially.

This is particularly important, given the challenges we face. The army is in demand, as recent events have shown. It faces limited sustainability, and it must urgently improve its capability through modernization. Above all else, it remains united and focused as it faces these challenges.

Balancing the resource demand against the resources available is, and always has been, an issue for any organization, as needs, or, often, desires, outstrip the available funds. However, recent experience has shown that the demands on the army necessitate careful management of our critical resources as we move forward. This means not only dollars, but also people and time, for today, time is one of our most critically short resources.

This has led me to develop a plan to restructure elements of the army to ensure greater efficiency and to allow us to modernize. This is not, at present, expected to result in major adjustments to the army, but we will see internal structural changes and movement of personnel. In addition to structural changes, we are implementing a more structured approach to the management of readiness, which gives us an improved view of the state of readiness and capability and allows us to adjust that readiness within clearly defined parameters and predictable time frames.

[Translation]

None of these initiatives will solve shortages of resources or, more importantly, time, but they will ensure we use them in the most efficient manner. My expectation is that the beneficiary of this improved approach will be our soldiers, and I intend to see their quality of life improve significantly.

[English]

While sustainability is an issue, the far greater challenge is to achieve new levels of capability and take the army forward into the future. As with all institutions, we cannot stand still, and the army, as part of the Canadian Forces, is developing concepts and plans that will realize a new type of force. We are building this army of tomorrow, as I speak. It will take time, and while elements are coming into place now, that army will not be fully realized for at least another five years, if not longer.

As we have studied the changing nature of conflict, we have recognized that the requirements for military forces, especially armies, are changing. It is not, in my view, as some have argued, an elimination of certain forms of conflict in lieu of others, but rather an expansion of the conflict spectrum, requiring military forces to be able to deal with ever-increasingly diverse threats. The challenge, then, for an army, is how to organize, equip and train to undertake operations in such diverse and complex situations.

There are no easy answers, but we are engaged in determining the answers and are modernizing and restructuring the army to better deal with that reality. We are developing a medium-weight force, with modern command control and surveillance systems, that will possess a high degree of agility and the ability to operate across the full spectrum of capability. It will also be more strategically deployable, permitting it to meet threats early on. Building such a force will take time and require us to undertake significant experimentation to ensure we achieve the capability we require. Much of that experimentation is ongoing, and I am confident that, with the right support, we can achieve the goal. This force will be one that, above all else, can fight and win on the modern battlefield, but equally, will be able to do whatever the evolving security environment demands.

A critical part of the army's evolving capability is its reserve force, and as part of modernization we must address the matter of reserve restructure. The framework for land force reserve restructure is outlined in the LFRR strategic plan approved last year, but the work on the actual structure for the reserves must also be aligned with that of the regular force. I view the reserves as a future-oriented capability, and they must be able to contribute to national security on a day-to-day basis while being ready to mobilize for the worst of future scenarios. The question for all of us is what is the optimum reserve structure that can meet both of those demands. This is not a question that can be answered easily or quickly, but we are engaged with the issue, and we need significant discussion to ensure we get it right.

[Translation]

But the world continues to change and even before the plans for this new army are finished, we face new changes in the security environment, as the events of September 11 have shown.

[English]

As we look at land warfare, we must understand this change and determine how we deal with it. It is my view that we are not seeing the emergence of a new form of warfare as much as we are seeing the expansion of warfare. The emergence of asymmetric threats does not negate the likelihood of conventional state forces engaged in symmetrical or conventional conflict, but we are unlikely to see any conflict that does not include asymmetric threats or attacks. Indeed, there may very well be situations where asymmetric conflict dominates.

In a sense, as I said earlier, we are seeing the expansion of the spectrum of conflict, with the result that the battlefield, or the battle space, is increasingly complex. The issue for us is how to prepare for such a battlefield and what it implies for that evolving army of tomorrow. We do not have all the answers, but I am sure that the army we are building will be better suited to whatever the emerging requirement will be. I think the investment is wise, but we still have much work to do.

To summarize, sustaining and maximizing our capabilities within the resources that we have will increasingly challenge us as we try to adapt to this complex world and meet the growing defence demands. With the right support, I am confident that Canada's army can meet this challenge. We produce some of the best-quality soldiers and units in the world. However, there are real limits. No amount of efficiency or new technology can make up for size or depth, and in the end, it is the government and Canadian society that must determine what they want us to do. Our job is to ensure that, to the best of our ability, we can do it.

Honourable senators, I will gladly answer questions.

Senator Day: General, I wonder if you could expand a little on your prepared notes. You talk about the command support battalion. You indicate that, during this restructuring period that you are currently going through, you will need organizational change within the command support battalion and increased efficiencies elsewhere to achieve that. I assume that means that there are strains on the system from a monetary or personnel point of view. Could you expand on that for us?

LGen. Jeffery: Certainly. You will have all heard people talk about "information warfare." The term is a recognition of the fact that, given the pace of change, most organizations are driven by the power of information. In simple terms, from a soldier's point of view, if the enemy knows where you are faster than you do, that enemy has an advantage. We need to turn it around. We need to ensure that we know what an enemy is doing, and, indeed, know a tremendous amount about the environment of which we speak. By having that information, we can act and adapt much more quickly, and therefore maintain an advantage. That is what information gives you. However, that is not achieved easily. One is required to have the sensors and the ability to collect that information, and then one needs the ability to synthesize it and drag out of that information, the knowledge that commanders need to operate their forces. That is information operations.

We do not have that today. We lack some of the critical surveillance systems. You will be familiar with Coyote, which is a very good system, but it is one dimension of a more complex environment. The army, in conjunction with the other services, is building a joint information surveillance target acquisition and reconnaissance, or as we call it in the vernacular, ISTAR, capability, which will allow us to obtain a lot of that information. We are in the process of putting into place a very complex command control information system to manage that information. As we all know, more data and information do not mean more knowledge. You need to organize it. If we do that, we will have the power that information and the new technologies can bring us.

We are trying to bring the key parts required for this organization for the army, under that broad information operations domain, under one roof. We have a lot of the current capability in different places in the army, and we need to bring it under one roof. It is largely an internal restructuring, but as with all such change, it costs money and requires personnel.

There are additional costs that must be paid from somewhere.

We have been through a period of 10 years of significant turmoil and belt-tightening. Frankly, and with the benefit of hindsight, the implementation of a command support battalion should have occurred years ago; it did not, for whatever reason. Part of that reason, however, was a lack of resource flexibility. The army finds itself in a situation where lack of resource capability can no longer be allowed to halt the implementation of that concept. No matter what the cost, I must find those resources, dollars and people internal to the army, to implement this critical part of modernization.

Senator Day: Do I interpret your comments to mean that the command support battalion would be the army group that synthesizes information coming from elsewhere?

LGen. Jeffery: That is our expectation, plus probably owning some of the sensor package. It is a new concept. We are implementing it as we are developing it. We will learn much from doing this. What it will ultimately end up being is yet to be determined. My expectation is that it will be the organization that will have that ability to synthesize; it will be the focus of information operations within the field army.

Senator Day: Is the army taking the lead for all the armed forces, or are you talking only about the army aspect?

LGen. Jeffery: I am only talking about the army aspect. There are significant initiatives at the joint or Canadian Forces level that will integrate the capabilities of all three services to gain the same sort of power at the national or joint level.

Senator Day: Would each of the branches of the Canadian Forces have its own group to deal specifically with that element?

LGen. Jeffery: Each branch requires the ability to synthesize information to serve respective commanders. However, to the greatest extent possible, we would expect to use the available sensor systems to serve all three, with some limitations. For example, the Coyote surveillance vehicle is a tactical, land-based system that is predominantly there to serve the army. The information it gathers may very well be of interest to the navy, if we are in a coastal region, or perhaps the air force. That information would be integrated into a broader Canadian Forces or joint view, so they get the benefit of that information as well.

Senator Day: I am trying to understand the cooperation level in the group that is above your command support battalion. Is that within the Armed Forces, or does that deal with the Canadian Forces, plus the RCMP, CSIS and other groups that are synthesizing and sending information and intelligence to the various branches?

LGen. Jeffery: The responsibility for that information synthesis in an operational context is with the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff. His staff, at the National Defence Command Centre, would do that. We are in a period of evolution. As we speak, we are in the process of implementing new plans to achieve ISTAR capability at the joint or national level. That is not yet mature. We have the capability to do some of that; we recognize that must happen. It is the DCDS who has that responsibility.

The Deputy Chief would also draw information from other government departments, armies, navies and air forces. That would occur at his level.

Senator Day: Are you aware of whether the Armed Forces are cooperating in a national security agency group or committee that takes not only precise military information, but also other types of security information and brings that all together? Would it be the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff who participates on behalf of the Armed Forces?

LGen. Jeffery: That is principally the mandate of the DCDS. I am loath to speak for the DCDS. I assume that you will speak to him about such issues. There are a number of issues where the questions might get into sensitive areas of security information. However, in the general sense, he does that and pulls that information together from across all levels of government.

Senator Day: You indicate in your prepared notes that you will achieve certain efficiencies by increasing personnel strength at our schools and, in part, by reducing individual training required to maintain skill levels. Would you please elaborate on that?

LGen. Jeffery: The basic equation that I am dealing with is that training demand exceeds training capacity. I need to do more training, both at an individual and collective level, than the army has the capacity to undertake.

There are two levers that I can use. I can move the resource-level lever and put more dollars and people into the equation, or I can reduce the demand. There is no simple or easy solution, but the intent is to do both.

I will give you the context as to why this is so important. As part of the efficiencies of the 1990s, we reduced our training capacity significantly. Under the circumstances, it was considered to be a prudent approach. We were not training many people. We had to do some significant belt-tightening. We pared the army training system down significantly.

We have now recognized that we have perhaps gone too far. As we now have increased demand for training, you will quickly see that that exacerbates the strain on the training system. The solution to that has always been, to some extent, to augment the training system by transferring in personnel from the field force, the fighting troops, on a periodic basis.

It has not been abnormal at all, particularly in the summer months, for a good part of the army field units to send critical leaders, officers and NCOs, to the training centres as instructors. We have done that for as long as we have had an army in Canada. The problem is that the magnitude of that augmentation has now reached unacceptable proportions, to the extent that I am faced with units coming back from operations, having a month or a little longer at home, and then being forced to send critical leaders, NCOs in particular, to Gagetown, or one of the other training centres, as instructors for two or three months. That exacerbates the personnel turmoil. I must cut that down and find a better balance between the field force and the training system, so that, while we may have to do some augmentation, the same magnitude is not ongoing.

I have started to move people from the field force into the training system. One NCO in the training system replaces three augmentees over the course of the year. If I can increase the training system by one NCO, it will mean that three in the field force will not be tasked to a training centre at some stage. That gives you some understanding of the magnitude.

I cannot totally denude the field force to improve that capacity. We have looked hard at whether much of the training we are doing is necessary. Frankly, we have tended to increase individual training to an unnecessary level. There are good reasons for it, but we must discipline ourselves and put it in better balance. There is a dynamic here.

We have not done as much collective training as we would like. Indeed, I would say we have not done as much collective training in the last few years as we need. The long-term effect of that is that you have soldiers, NCOs and officers, who do not have practical experience with certain types of things. In order to shore that up, we increase the amount of individual training. If certain kinds of skills were not addressed in collective training, we will include that in future, advanced courses. We increase the amount of individual training required.

If I can get back to doing collective training, I can reduce the number of courses down to what is necessary, because they will get that experience and training on the job.

In part, we are trying to do more collective training and reduce the amount of individual training in order to reduce that demand.

Another major part of that is the reserve force. We have had an unrealistic idea of how much reservists can be expected to do. Over the last two decades, we have built a reserve training system modelled on the regular force, which would not make a lot of sense to most Canadians. We have professionals who spend their entire working lives learning a job, and then we expect a part-timer, who spends a couple of nights a week or couple of weekends a month and perhaps a couple of weeks every summer, to achieve the same levels. That is not realistic, and we have learned that. This does not mean that the reserves are not valuable - they are critical. However, we are redesigning the training systems for both regular members and reserves so that they are better integrated, but have set a realistic expectation of what reserves can do while still allowing them to progress and become contributing members of the army. We are getting there. We have been at this for three or four years. We have a coherent, conceptual foundation for a new training system that is now being introduced and that will result in a significant reduction in much of the reserve training. I am reducing overall training demand and marginally increasing training capacity to find that better balance.

Senator Day: That is helpful. I want to get into the reserve aspect with my final question.

Just for clarification, what is the distinction between individual and collective training? Would individual training be conducted in the classroom?

LGen. Jeffery: Be it theoretical training in the classroom or practical training in the field, the ability to fire a rifle and survive in the field is individual training. It is training to enable each individual soldier to do his or her job. Collective training is putting the team together; putting the 10 soldiers in an infantry section together and making them into a team; putting the sections in a platoon together to work as a team, and so on with companies, battalions and brigades.

The army is a variety of moving parts. As I remind my naval colleagues on a regular basis, they put all their sailors in one box and move them around. My challenge is that all of my soldiers are moving in loose formation over a wide area. It requires a tremendous amount of collective training to build the skill and cohesion to enable that unit to move as one entity. That is what collective training is all about.

Senator Day: When we met with the naval people, I was surprised to learn of the large number of full-time reservists they have. Does the army have comparable numbers? You said that part-time reservists train for two weekends a month, a couple of nights a week and maybe a couple of weeks in the summer. That was my concept of a reservist who has another job. Do you have a lot of full-time reservists in the army?

LGen. Jeffery: Although I will clarify that in a moment, by design, the army, as currently structured, is largely Class A or part time. Typically, a Class A reservist would train one or two evenings a week, maybe one weekend a month, and a couple of weeks over the course of the summer. Some can do more; some have difficulty achieving even that. However, that is the range we are talking about.

We have a significant number of army reservists in full-time service in operations, often providing critical support, command and control and training to the army at large, but specifically to the reserve. That is not by design, but the practical reality is that we employ many reservists in those sorts of capacities.

For example, I have reservists on my staff, which is very useful, because it is difficult to make the right decisions without the input of the reservists. A significant number of reservists work within our training system as instructors and staff, as well as providing the critical reserve input. Therefore, there are a good number of full-time reservists.

The navy has full-time reserve operational capability. The army does not have that. That is an issue that we must look at as part of reservist restructure. Is that the right model for the army? If so, at what cost? There is a great danger in assuming that that automatically gets you more capability for less money. To my mind, a full-timer is a full-timer. In my view, the strength of the reserve is to provide the ability to sustain activity over a longer term.

However, the world is changing, and we must keep our minds open to many different things. It may well be that the reserves, in this new kind of warfare, will brings skills and capabilities to the institution that we in the regular force cannot sustain. As an example, in the field of information operations, many of the high-tech skills required are difficult to obtain and even more difficult to retain. When we train computer specialists, they usually leave within a couple of years, often within months.

I live in Silicon Valley North, in Kanata. It may be wise to have a reserve command support battalion in that environment. Perhaps with the skills resident in that part of the community, they could achieve higher levels of capability than I can retain in the regular force. That is the kind of thinking that I believe must be done as we look at reserve restructure for the future.

I have tried to give you a sense of where we are, as well as where we need to go. To be frank, the navy is further ahead than we are. They took a different approach to reserves a decade ago and have built their reserves to do specific things. We need to look seriously at that option as we go forward.

Senator Day: Am I correct that you are now in the process of implementing a plan for restructuring your land forces reserves?

LGen. Jeffery: I have approved a strategy for taking reserve restructuring forward. That strategy is in two phases. The first phase is to put money and effort into revitalizing the reserves as it is currently structured. That includes improving its health and improving trust. The process was derailed by a lack of trust between the regular forces and the reserve components. We have worked hard to rebuild that.

The second phase is the more significant undertaking, that being to determine what the reserves need to do, restructure them to meet the new requirement, and ultimately grow them to a larger force. I must stress that that strategy clearly identifies that the resources to achieve phase two did not exist within the army or within the Department of National Defence. The growth, in particular, and indeed to some extent, even the restructuring, is an unfunded activity. While we are implementing phase one, we will not implement phase two until we have a fully developed approach and plan and I have government approval and funding for it.

Senator Day: Are you still in the planning process for the different kind of training that the reserves will receive?

LGen. Jeffery: No, that is in implementation.

Senator Day: Therefore, are the reservists adequately trained to participate in international missions, or will they become niche-type soldiers who will have a role to play in a more limited field, such as national security, rather than international peacekeeping activities?

LGen. Jeffery: It is my expectation that they will be trained to perform the tasks that we will expect of them and to bring their training up to the level that will allow us to send them on operations. It is important to understand the context of that. No training is maintained at a level where soldiers can deploy on a minute's or an hour's notice. It is virtually impossible to do that.

The skills you require have a critical life. Inevitably, there is a skill fade, particularly with some of those collective skills of which I spoke. We maintain them at levels of readiness. Someone on seven days notice to move is very highly trained, but maintaining that level is expensive. Let's put it in context. The bulk of our force would be at 90 days readiness or more. I am not expected to put a brigade in the field with no notice, and indeed I cannot, but 90 days is the expectation. I have 90 days to bring the force up to a level of readiness. That is why change in notice to move is so important. The expectation is to be at 90 days. It is a combination of government decision and military direction that allows them to be brought to shorter notice to move in line with a particular operation. It is our way of cutting down the time delay.

The reserves take longer. Depending on where they actually train, not the theoretical, but the actual level, could be 90 days, and it could be more. As long as we know where it is, we can start the training in advance to bring them up to the requisite level.

I think it is extremely important to use reservists as much as we can, for a wide variety of reasons. It reduces the load on the regular force. It also makes them more complete and credible members of the overall defence team. With that in mind, we have moved toward ensuring a higher, and higher collective, contribution of the army reserve to current operations. We have always sent many augmentees on operations. We have always sent many individual soldiers off with regular force units. The unit that is currently deployed in Bosnia, the third battalion of the Royal Van Doos Regiment, has with it six full reserve infantry sections. That did not happen overnight. We identified them early on, trained them, integrated them into the regular force battalion and sent them off as an integral part of that unit.

The next rotation, the second battalion of the Van Doos, will go with at least one, if not two, full platoons, and the follow-on rotation into Bosnia will go with a full reserve infantry company. That is the use of the system of which I am speaking, that is, recognizing where they are and preparing them to meet that task.

Again, that is a long-winded answer. I am suggesting to you that I cannot, and we cannot, afford to maintain the reserves at the same level of readiness as the regulars. It is too expensive. What I can do, and what we are doing, is build a system in which we know where they are with some precision, and can quickly bring them from that level to the requisite level for meeting our requirements.

In practical terms, it means that for domestic tasks, the reserves will be able to meet the requirements within the time frames we expect. For international tasks, with some exceptions, they would not be used for initial deployment, but they would be, as we always expect them to be, ready for sustaining the operation. The "second wave," if you will, will have a high percentage of reservists. That system will allow us to get there.

Senator Wiebe: I had the opportunity to visit our troops in Bosnia in 1999. Seventeen per cent of the contingent was made up of reservists. Those reservists, along with our regular army personnel, had to go through an intensive, six-month training period before they were sent. In effect, the reservists were brought up to speed. Why was it necessary to bring our regular army personnel up to speed? Are they not ready in a shorter period of time?

The navy, for example, was able to deploy within one month after September 11, and a good portion of that was just outfitting, to make sure the supplies were there. How quickly can we deploy? Do we have to put our regular army personnel through six months training, the same as we do our peacekeepers? I realize we have a special force that we deployed quickly, but that was only a small portion of our land forces. If we are training our regular force personnel for six months alongside our reservists, why can we not incorporate more reservists into that program?

LGen. Jeffery: First, I would be loath to make too many comparisons with the navy in terms of their requirements. I am not sufficiently knowledgeable about their training regime, although I think there is a significant difference, as I said earlier, between training a relatively small ship's crew and something as complex as an infantry mechanized battle group. It is that complexity that adds significantly to the time.

I cannot quote from memory, but the length of training time required to bring the various component parts of a mechanized battalion together is in the order of 100 to 150 days in any one year. It requires a significant effort in order to achieve that.

What I am required to do is to maintain certain units at certain levels of readiness. The highest level of readiness unit is the IRFL - the Immediate Reaction Force Light - which, as you know, is currently 3 PPCLI. On September 11 it was supposed to be at, in theory, 10 days notice to move. It was not. It was at about 21 days notice to move. That was because of the time of year, following the changeover in the summer annual posting cycle, with people departing the unit.

I started the ball rolling on that virtually immediately after September 11 and quickly brought it up to its requisite 10 days notice to move. As soon as we had some indication that it was required, I was directed to bring it up to 48 hours to move, which it was, bearing in mind that some of this training is very much specific to the mission. Preparing a unit to go into Europe or Africa is very different from preparing a unit to go into Afghanistan. Much of that additional training is specific to the environment and to the mission that the unit must go on. While we say we are "multiple purpose," and we are, there are specific kinds of training required for each task.

However, it is the only unit that I maintain at that level. I have other units that are at 21 days notice to move, such as the vanguard battalion, but that battalion is already deployed and committed in Bosnia. The remainder of the force is at 90 days notice to move. I could hold it at a higher level of readiness, but that would have significant implications for affordability. I do not have the resources to maintain it at that level. It has implications for tempo - how long the soldiers can sustain those higher levels of readiness.

I suggest that the question of whether we can send more reservists on these missions is not an issue of readiness or training as much as it is an issue of sustainability. I go back to the issue of what a reserve is. If we want our reservists to be full-timers, then we need to design the army reserve with that in mind. I do not have the exact figures, but we already have in the order of 2,000 reservists on full-time service now. Approximately 500 of those are either on, or just coming back from, current operations. Out of a force that is currently at about 14,700, that is a significant percentage. Indeed, I would suggest the reserves, in that context, are already being very successful. I may want more, but I am not sure that, given the mandate of part-timers, who have other, primary jobs and personal lives, we can sustain a higher percentage of reservists on continued operations in a time of relative peace.

Senator Wiebe: Many of our reservists would fit very well into the army.

Our reservists are truckers, mechanics, electricians, plumbers, lawyers and doctors. I want to be blunt with you: I think the army has dragged its feet on reservists. The air force, and especially the navy, has led the way. We are missing out on a tremendous potential, and I have the feeling that part of the problem may have been the regular army personnel's acceptance of the idea of the reservist.

Let me repeat a comment that I heard from regular army people: "We do not want the weekend soldiers to be playing with our toys." I got the feeling, from visiting with regular army personnel and with reservists, that there is a problem there. Are you doing anything to address that situation?

I also visited with U.S. troops, and did not get the same feeling. They have done an excellent job of combining their regular army personnel together with reservists.

The navy and the air force appear to have done it here, but it does not appear that the army has.

LGen. Jeffery: There is no question that there is a significant cultural issue here. You will recall that I was brought in by the CDS and the minister to develop and oversee a strategy for land force reserve restructure, and my assessment was that one of the biggest issues at play was a total breakdown in trust between the two components. Frankly, the reserves did not trust the regulars, and the same was true the other way around. There were many reasons for that on both sides, some valid and some not, and much misperception at play here. No matter what we have done since then, those problems will not go away overnight.

That is the reason I implemented the strategic plan. The first phase very much focuses on rebuilding health and trust across the two organizations. It is the reason the army leaders and I spend a tremendous amount of our time dealing with reserve issues. We run a totally integrated chain of command. It is not regulars here and reserves over there. They are all part of the same team. They are engaged together on a regular basis, working on the same issues.

It is the reason those six reserve sections are deployed on current operations now and why we will send a couple of platoons, and ultimately a company. We are talking about building confidence. Part of the issue, for the reserves, is a sense of self-worth about whether they can do it. Many reservists have a mythological sense they can do it, but in practical terms, they are not sure they can. I need to prove to them they can. I also need to prove to the regular forces they can. I need to force them to live and work together in an integrated fashion. If I can get them to work together on operations, I can get them to work together anywhere.

I understand the concern, and it is valid. I am not sure I agree that it is as bleak as was implied today, but I cannot ignore the reality of the past. It will continue, probably forever, to be an issue. The very nature of a professional soldier and that of a part-timer will result in friction and differences in perspective. My challenge, and that of the army leadership, is to ensure it does not become an impediment to this one army working together to do the job required. I am confident it can do that.

The Chairman: Does the fact that the navy made a capital investment in coastal patrol vessels and gave the reserves a separate mission have anything to do with what appears to be a better integration?

LGen. Jeffery: Most certainly. As the old saying goes, money does not solve everything, but it does solve many things. We could design some part of the army's task to be done only by the reserve, spend the money to equip it in the same way and have it on some higher level of readiness. However, I go back to my point about not knowing how much we could sustain that over the long term. It will achieve a higher level of capability. I question the degree to which that is necessarily integration. It is a segregated capability that is predominantly reserve focused. That is integration in the broad context, but not in the detailed one.

Senator Forrestall: How important do you think Colonel John Fraser's report will be when it is completed?

LGen. Jeffery: Mr. Fraser and his team, the minister's monitoring committee, have been an integral part of this whole process. He and his team are invited to attend every session we hold on reserve restructure, sessions that, in almost every case, he has personally attended. Therefore, he is intimately aware of what the army is doing and where it is going. He reports to the minister on a regular basis. They are, obviously, his issues described the way he sees it. I think he has a good understanding of the challenge that we face, and I would like to think he has been, by and large, supportive of the efforts and the progress we have made. I am not suggesting we have made progress everywhere - we have not - but I think he has recognized the progress we have made. He also continues to point out the shortfalls, and I have no difficulty with that. That is what he is there to do, and there is no doubt if I do not achieve something, he will tell me.

Senator Forrestall: General, coming back to the PPCLI, are we dispatching the infantry group to Southwest Asia - Afghanistan - on schedule, or has it been put off once again, to perhaps the middle of December?

LGen. Jeffery: At this stage, the third battalion, PPCLI, is on seven days notice to move. It has been moved back from the earlier setting of 48 hours to seven days, primarily because of the uncertainty over what is happening in the operational theatre and the lack of any clear indication of what General Franks and his team want Canada to provide or to be able to do.

Senator Forrestall: You are maintaining them at seven days.

LGen. Jeffery: Seven days notice to move.

Senator Forrestall: There are no plans to extend that to a longer period of time, to stand down from that level?

LGen. Jeffery: Certainly not at this stage. That unit is normally at 10 days notice to move, so I suggest it is rather a moot point.

Senator Forrestall: Ten days is normal, so that is "stand down" in a sense.

LGen. Jeffery: At this stage of the game, no.

Senator Forrestall: Does the army have any current plans to eliminate one full brigade?

LGen. Jeffery: I believe the issue of reductions needs to be looked at in a holistic context.

Senator Forrestall: Is it your intention to eliminate the second battalion of the Royal Canadian Regiment, principally in Gagetown, and to replace it, perhaps, with a training cadre?

LGen. Jeffery: In my written remarks, which I provided before today, I tried to give you some sense of that.

I face three major challenges. I must sustain the army in a significant-resource situation; I must modernize it and move it forward, and, not insignificantly, I must retain a degree of unity and focus in a very large and disparate organization. We just finished speaking about the gulf between reserves and regulars. I must ensure they are pulling together on the same end of the rope. Those are the three major challenges.

I emphasize that because one cannot look at one challenge without understanding the overall context. The sustainability issue is not insignificant. I have said publicly that the army has been living beyond its means. I came into this job with the intention and the expectation of achieving a better balance. It is clear from the white paper and from the government's expectations what the army is to provide. I want to structure the army and to balance it in a way that best meets that requirement. I must also ensure that I have sufficient resources, with sufficient flexibility, to do all that must be done while maintaining and modernizing that army.

That is a fairly delicate balance to strike. I have determined that significant restructuring of the army would not be warranted unless there was a significant increase in resources. I prepared some restructuring plans along that line, which have not been approved. Indeed, there are indications that some of those planned changes may no longer be necessary. I do not yet have any specific response, but there is some indication that my sustainability problems may not be as great in the future as they are right now. With that sort of improvement, I would not need to go as far with some of the restructuring elements.

I do not believe for a minute that I will have enough money to buy new capability. In order to achieve new capability, I must do some restructuring. What does that mean in practical terms? You talked about a brigade. Some of my predecessor's earlier plans looked at a two-brigade model. There are no plans to implement that as I sit here now.

I also looked at reducing the number of manoeuvre units. That is an option, but there are no plans for that now. Overall, the size of the army will stay the same. I do have requirements that I must meet from somewhere. I have talked about the command-support requirement. We are bringing a new generation of weapons-effects simulators into service to significantly improve the way we train, with the intention of establishing, probably in Wainwright, in Western Canada, a Canadian manoeuvre-training centre. It would be a highly instrumented force-on-force range using laser-based targetry to provide the highest level of realistic war simulation that this country's soldiers have ever seen. That project has been approved.

The problem is that I need people to implement that project. I need a support organization, and those people must come from somewhere.

I must restructure this organization to change it. If my pot of gold were bottomless - although I do not expect that ever to be the case - I could keep what I have and buy new. In this day and age, that is unrealistic for all of us, and I am not an unrealistic individual. I expect that I must change the organization in order to get more out of it, but change is uncomfortable for some people. They do not like giving up something they have held dear. To be more capable, though, that must happen.

Parts of this army will change. I intend to make those changes, because, in my professional judgment and in the collective judgment of the senior leadership of the army, they are necessary.

Senator Forrestall: You will not have that brigade. We can lay that question to rest. You will stay with three full brigades?

LGen. Jeffery: I am a soldier. I would like to believe I have as much capability as I need. Decisions to do away with capability are driven by resources, not by my desires. As long as resources allow me to keep capability, I will keep it.

Senator Forrestall: I fully appreciate your desire. I have some degree of understanding of it. I am asking because many people out there do not know what is happening. Many people in the reserves are upset and feeling off balance.

Does it continue to be your intention to eliminate mortars, recce, pioneer platoons and the three jump companies from the infantry battalions? How would you sustain all or some of that capability?

LGen. Jeffery: First, in reverse order, no decisions have been made on the retention of parachute capability. Those three companies still exist.

Senator Forrestall: You phrased that in a strange way.

LGen. Jeffery: No decision has been made.

Senator Forrestall: Is it under active consideration?

LGen. Jeffery: I go back to the question: What capability can we maintain? We are building new capability. Do we drop stuff off the back end? That is one of the issues. No decisions have been made, but I would put it in the category of "serious consideration being given under the circumstances."

The issue of mortar and the pioneer platoon is an interesting one. It is important that you understand the context here. Tough decisions are needed to reshape, modernize and sustain this army. Everything has a cost. I was presented with one option - and this is indicative of the kind of analysis that is done - to significantly reduce the level of readiness of our artillery units. That would effectively, as Senator Wiebe implied, put them in the reserve force. I could save money and increase flexibility by taking all regular force artillery regiments and making them reserves. I would still have to pay for equipment, but the personnel costs would not be as high. Of course, I would have a lower level of readiness, so I would have a problem bringing those people up to speed for any wartime fighting.

Philosophically and professionally, that is a reasonable option. I have some concerns about it, but it is a reasonable option. I asked the staff who put that option in front of me: "Why is it, at the same time we are considering that option, all the infantry battalions are retaining their mortar platoons at a high state of readiness?" From a capability point of view, I had some difficulty understanding the logic there. Short-range, limited-capability mortars are being kept at high readiness, but long-range, high-capacity, high-capability guns would be kept at low readiness. That did not make sense, given that we were talking largely about a resource issue.

I suggested that we reduce the artillery force, in part, and put some into reserves. The remainder of the artillery would take the mortar role away from the infantry. The artillery will do its job, plus mortars, because those two roles require basically the same skill.

That gives a better balance of capability across the board. That does not mean an infantry battalion goes into battle with a mortar platoon, but gets that from somewhere else. The same thing can be said of pioneers - it is that kind of approach, of trying to improve effectiveness and efficiency within our resources. My response to the question is, yes, I intend to go down those roads. That is my expectation, so that we maintain an overall multi-purpose combat capability within this army.

Senator Forrestall: My question is about the officer program that offered an excellent regular-army-based training at university to the reserves' officers. Has that been eliminated, or is that one of the areas where you are seeking cuts?

You talked about failing to see the logic. I fail to see the wisdom in replacing that with reserve officer training programs during the summer months, which might be for two to three weeks, and then expecting those reservists to be as capable as those that graduate from a university program at the end of three years. You might end up with more officers, but they will not necessarily be that well trained.

LGen. Jeffery: That is, in a sense, the fundamental issue. You will recall that I said phase one of LFRR was, in part, to restore health. As I look at the leadership problem in the reserves, I am increasingly concerned, because the reserves are not regenerating enough leadership to keep themselves alive. We are not commissioning enough officers to provide leadership of the army reserve of the future. We are barely producing enough officers to provide leadership for today's army reserve. We have looked at this, as an army, from many perspectives. Yes, RESO is a superb program that produces good quality officers, as it should, because it is effectively the same program that our regular officers take. The only difference is that the regular officers continue on and do one final phase of training that the reserve force counterparts do not do. Other than that, it is identical.

It requires a commitment to four years of training and to the service thereafter. However, when all I can get is, on average, from one to less than two officers per unit per year - in fact it is less than one right now - I am not regenerating the reserve force. That does not mean we have to throw RESO out. The Reserve Entry Scheme for Officers is a good program, but we have to find something to give us the bulk of the officers we need for the army reserve.

We have come up with one that is more flexible. It could be considered as similar to most university programs, in that it is run on a semester basis and can be taken at different times, in different places and by different means. That matches what Canadian men and women need, given their mobility, their jobs, their family pressures, et cetera. That way, we are able to ensure that we can train people, so that is what we are doing.

Yes, in some respects, those officers, in their early years, will have less training and fewer capabilities. However, it is my hope and expectation that we will have many more of them. Their education and training does not stop there, but indeed continues. Over time, they come up to the level of their regular force counterparts, and so we get the best of both worlds. Does it totally preclude a RESO-type activity? No it does not, although the numbers will be reduced, because it goes back to the issue of dollars.

That plan is not being implemented as we speak, although to do otherwise will result in an army reserve with inadequate leaders. As we speak, we are being forced to put more and more regular force officers into command positions of reserve units, because the reserves cannot produce the leadership. That is the desire of the reserve units, not mine.

Senator Forrestall: They cannot produce their own leadership internally, so they have to constantly rely on the regular army?

LGen. Jeffery: That is correct, and I am trying to change that. If only a small percentage of young reserve officers are commissioned each year, the future is not bright, and we have to prevent that.

Senator Forrestall: I hope you can do that.

If you were called upon now to deploy a full brigade with its heavy equipment - one that has trained on a regular basis and in which each member knows the others, including men and women - outside of Canada, could you do it? How long would it take us, as a nation, to respond?

LGen. Jeffery: To answer that question, one has to bear in mind some givens: the first one is that we currently have a large mechanized battle group deployed in taskforce Bosnia-Herzegovina. That battle group is just shy of 2,000, and about 1,500 are from the army. I have an IRF(L) battalion on standby for another theatre. Currently, I am in the order of 1,400 trained soldiers short of my full establishment. Right now, we are in the middle of a modernization program that takes part of the army out of the order of battle - out of its operational readiness level - for a significant period. I have six mechanized infantry battalions, for example. Each one has to be re-equipped with a new LAV 3. One is re-equipped and the others are going through a 3- to 6-month process. Depending on circumstances, that unit is not prepared for operations during that time period, for understandable reasons. All of that has to be considered in the equation.

Can the army deploy a brigade? Yes, it can. However, it cannot be done without significant cost, because of other commitments and the overall sustainability of the army. It will take all of the army to do it, and there will not be much to spare to get that done.

Will they have been trained together? No, we have not done significant brigade training in a good number of years. Is that, all things considered, acceptable? It depends on the circumstances. Assessing risk has to be done in the context of the mission that they are being asked to perform. I cannot give you an assessment of that, and clearly it is a concern.

On the issue of "time is the lever," again, I cannot tell you, without knowing the specific mission, how long it would take. I am required to have a brigade on 90-days so that we meet the white paper commitment. As long as we are talking about a light brigade, similar to the IRF(L) capability, then it can be done. If we are talking about anything heavier than that, given the current state of modernization, it cannot be done.

Senator Forrestall: How critical is sealift to you?

LGen. Jeffery: It is always critical when you are talking about a brigade.

Senator Forrestall: Can you muster up the sealift?

LGen. Jeffery: The short answer is yes. Every nation in the world does the same thing. When our largest and closest ally, the U.S., is moving things by sea, the vast majority of that is done by chartered or leased maritime lift. It is not stuff that they own. We do largely the same.

As you are well aware, we are looking at the potential of both air and sea strategic lift as part of the plan for the future. That is again an issue of risk.

Senator Forrestall: General, I wish we had all day. I must say that I wish there were freedom for men of your stature, honesty and integrity, to address the Canadian public on these issues. I hope that officers of the rank of general will have much more freedom, down the road, to write journals. More importantly than that, I hope that they will speak, well within the confines of propriety, so as to advise Canadians who do have concerns. They may not manifest their interests simply because they are not well informed.

That is part of what we are trying to do, because things are so technical. It is also an obligation of the force, and the body politic, to allow you to do it under certain conditions.

Thank you for what you are doing. The Chair was right in what he said in the opening. We have great pride in what you are doing.

Senator Wiebe: I would like to get back to the restructuring of our reservists. Let me say, general, that I want to thank you for your frankness in answering my previous questions. I appreciate it, but I think one of our concerns is in looking to the future.

During the First World War, Second World War and the Korean War, we could raise an army quickly. Part of the reason was that you only needed to train someone to march and fire a rifle, and that was basically it. The technology today, and the retraining required because of that, means that we cannot raise a force as quickly as we once could.

Everything has a cost. Maybe we as governments, and the people of the country, should be looking at directing some of those costs toward having some highly trained reservists. The cost savings would come, of course, in the yearly pay. This may mean that employers would grant their employees special time off to take training courses to keep them up to snuff.

This approach is similar to that of the U.S. Basically, we have a very small force in this country. If there is ever a crisis, that is the force that we will send in and that is the force that will suffer the first casualties. What have we got to replace them?

It would be easier to bring a highly trained reserve force up to speed to make those replacements. Is that part of your restructuring plan?

LGen. Jeffery: Clearly, the issue of depth in the army is of great concern to all of us. I say "the army," but I believe that I can speak for my colleagues in the navy and air force as well. While we would all say that we are proud of the quality of the force and its capability, the size or depth of it is of concern to us.

You cannot have a force that small and give it the depth that it requires. Quantity has a quality all of its own, as the old saying goes. Clearly, the reserves offer us the potential of increasing that depth. That is the reason they exist.

The question of cost issues aside, and I am not minimizing them, there are other issues that have to be brought to the fore. Your example of teaching soldiers to march and shoot and sending them off to war is appropriate. That was the level that the army maintained in the past. That is not what is required now. It is much more complex.

That leads to the question: What is it reasonable to expect to be able to sustain in a reserve force? It is not merely giving people the individual training, as I said earlier, it is the collective skills and putting it all together. What do we need to ensure, as a nation, is in place to be able to realize that?

There are a number of elements to be considered. Money, of course, is one. Legislation is necessary to ensure that that is possible. That legislation is in fact coming.

There is the broader issue of culture. Notwithstanding the very strong level of support for the Canadian Forces today, the interest of our young people in joining this institution is not high at all. We can attract people with university degrees and those sorts of attributes. Some young militia men and women see the opportunity for part-time employment in uniform to help them put themselves through universities.

It is no accident that we have a 30-per-cent attrition rate every year. The question is not whether we can attract young people, but rather can we keep them. We should be finding out why they leave. How do we keep them?

I do not know all the answers, but it is part of the culture of the nation. We are not a military nation; we are not a military people. Stacey said that we are not a military people. We have been required to have a military, but we have never been a military people.

As a professional soldier, to some extent, I have to accept that. When I look at what we did in World War II, and other conflicts, I cannot help but believe that, at its core, this nation has the ability and the will to do what is required. Why does that not translate on a regular basis into more people being willing to be part-time soldiers and to sacrifice for this nation?

That is the biggest challenge. That is not a soldier's challenge; that is the nation's challenge.

Senator Meighen: If I may be permitted, I would add a comment or two to start. Senator Forrestall's comments are apropos, and tie in with the exchange you had with Senator Wiebe. I realize that it is not a soldier's responsibility to change the situation or figure out why it exists. You do not have large numbers of young people seeking to enter the reserves, let alone the regular force. That may be another question.

I do want to underline what Senator Forrestall said about the necessity and importance of people such as yourself, and those in positions similar to yours, of "getting out there," as we say in the political world, and speaking within the bounds that are allowed. I do not assign fault, but out of sight, out of mind, and the military is largely out of sight in this country, in my view. That can be ameliorated without a huge expenditure of money or changing what is right and proper for serving men and women to do. That may be a discussion, however, for another time, and I leave it with you.

On the question of the reserves, I do not want to go back into the detail you have covered already, but I would like to ask you about what success you may be having, and what programs you are putting in place, in encouraging soldiers to enter the reserves when they leave the regular force. It would seem to me that someone whom we have spent time and money training would be helpful as a member of the reserves. Tied in with that is the question of the transferability of reservists to the regular force.

Earlier, when we were out in Esquimalt, and here again this morning talking to your naval colleagues, it would appear that the big problem is a bureaucratic one. Do you share that view, and who has the authority, in your estimation, to cut through the bureaucracy and rectify the situation, if that is the problem?

LGen. Jeffery: The movement back and forth between the regular and reserve components has improved significantly. In some respects, I have a concern that parts of it are too successful. We are seeing some of the best and brightest within the reserves doing very well, getting a taste for it, and deciding they want to join the regular force. That way, the new leaders within the reserves get siphoned off by the regular force. It is a natural process and we do not influence that. They make their own decisions, but that is the effect.

Senator Meighen: You do not discourage that?

LGen. Jeffery: No, but we do not encourage it either. We want them to be the soldiers they want to be. However, there is similar movement from the regulars to the reserves. I cannot give you a figure, but I believe it is really quite high. When one retires as a compulsory requirement, one cannot go into the reserves. However, many of our soldiers, on leaving the regular force, quickly join the reserves, and we encourage them to do that. When you leave the regular force, you sign a piece of paper that asks you if you are willing to be put on the supplementary reserve list, encouraging you to go to a local reserve unit and enlist. The impediment to that has been a bureaucratic one. That is in the bailiwick of the assistant deputy minister of human resources military, and he is working on streamlining that process. I am not sure why it is taking as long as it is.I think it is, in part, an issue of resources and manpower to be able to achieve that end, but that is where the problem has been.

Senator Meighen: It would not be the Deputy CDS?

LGen. Jeffery: Not to my knowledge. I am not aware of the DCDS being involved. It is a personnel issue. I have heard the same horror stories you and others have heard.

Senator Meighen: It seems we have unanimity of opinion as to the problem, and now we are trying to get agreement on how to solve it.

LGen. Jeffery: It is being worked on. It is part of a broad range of recruiting and retention issues. I have seen remarkable improvement on this the last year. I would not want to leave this on a negative note, because they have done tremendous work. That does not mean there is not room for improvement, but they have moved us down the road to significantly improving recruiting, and hopefully, they will soon be looking at some of the retention issues. We have seen a significant increase in recruiting, specifically including reserve recruiting.

Senator Meighen: Recruiting into the reserves, you mean?

LGen. Jeffery: Yes.

Senator Meighen: Recruiting is on the upswing, but it does not appear that transferability is any easier, at least from the information we have received.

I am interested in how you do three things at the same time, or manage the "three block war" as enunciated by a general from the United States Marine Corp. As I understand that, it means you could be involved simultaneously or consecutively in combat, in stabilization or peace support, and in humanitarian exercises. Do you prepare three different rules of engagement for each of the three blocks, or do you have one approach for all three? How do I know, as a soldier, which rule of engagement I am to pull out of my pocket at which time?

LGen. Jeffery: You have posed the core of the challenge for all of us. What we have today is not unique to this country, but is common to armies around the world. Armies train for a certain kind of operation. We always say armies are flexible, but at the end of day, you have to organize, develop and train an army to do certain kind of things, and that creates a base from which it can then quickly adapt to different environments.

Our default position, historically, has been what we refer to as "manoeuvre warfare" in open and complex terrain. It is what you saw on the Central European Front and, to some extent, in World War II. It is that kind of warfare. That is why army units are structured the way they are. That experience has taught us how to put the army together, and that is the focus of our training.

If we have to move from there to peace support operations, we take that foundation and quickly adapt it, and extra training is required to prepare them for that particular task. It is that approach. In a sense, you train soldiers for their war-fighting mission. You organize them for their war-fighting mission. Then, when you have to go and do something else, you change the organization. You almost change your clothes, change the approach, and go off and do something else.

We can no longer afford to do that. How does one structure and train the army to be able to do all of those things and not have to change the organization significantly, but rather make it inherent within the overall training? While one may have to pull out a different set of rules of engagement or have different limits on what you can do in certain contexts, you can do all those different tasks within the same organization relatively quickly.

There is no easy answer to that, but that is what we are currently trying to develop. That is why we are looking at new organizational structures and new concepts in doctrine, and from that will flow new forms of training. Given that we have so many other parts of the modernization piece to do, such as introducing a whole plethora of new equipment and having new types of demands being put on us, this will take some time. It will not occur overnight.

Senator Meighen: Do I take it, though, that you share the view, which I think is generally held, that in order to do two and three, the peace support and humanitarian aspects, first and foremost you need combat-ready, trained personnel?

LGen. Jeffery: Yes, but I am not clear on whether it is combat in an open or mixed terrain format, as we have seen in the past. That is the default position for organization and training. There are other dimensions to that.

The gentleman from the U.S. Marine Corp who made that remark was actually talking in the context of urban operations. Increasingly, much of the world is what we refer to as "complex terrain," urban, forested, mountainous, those difficult environments, where in fact your traditional, mechanized, open-manoeuvre type force is not very good. Maybe we need to be looking at new structures in terms of how we focus on that.

That is what we are looking at now in terms of what is the default position, what is the common training, and how we take that forward. Those are early thoughts. There is much work yet to be done to determine which way we go.

Senator Meighen: In a place like Afghanistan we have both, do we not?

LGen. Jeffery: Yes, we do.

Senator Meighen: My last question is on the LAV 3. It has been suggested that it cannot be fitted into the Hercules without significant maintenance at departure and arrival airfields. Is that so? If so, what can we do to ameliorate the situation?

LGen. Jeffery: It is true that it takes a lot of preparation, both to put it into a Hercules and to make it operational after removing it. The decision to buy that was made some time ago. Our view was then, and largely is now, that the bulk of the force that we will deploy will deploy by sea. We will use oversized aircraft to lift that which does not deploy by sea.

Senator Meighen: And that does not include the Hercules?

LGen. Jeffery: That does not include the Hercules.

Our American colleagues have just signed a contract for their version of the LAV 3. In order to put it in a J model Hercules, they had to take the turret off. Our LAV 3 has a 25-millimetre chain gun, which their version does not. It has a protected weapon station with a .50 calibre. It is not the same kind of vehicle at all. That is the price they paid for the deployability. Our American colleagues have a bigger arsenal from which to draw. We need ours to be more multi-functional. Therefore, it was our view that it is better to have the big gun and take the risk on deployment.

Senator Banks: May I reiterate that everyone in Canada is very proud of our soldiers and their work. I hope you will take comfort from the fact that the disdain for the army expressed during peacetime, and the levels of adulation to which it is elevated in wartime, is not new or unique. I am reminded of Kipling's poem about the British Tommy:

For it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' "Chuck him out, the brute!" But it's "Saviour of 'is country" when the guns begin to shoot;

That has always been the case; it is not new.

I will take the role of the curmudgeon today and ask whether the idea you were talking about a moment ago, as espoused by the marine general, of an army being capable of being fierce warriors on the one hand, while on the other hand being Boy Scouts and the Red Cross, is not absurd. Is that not a result of political interference and perhaps public pressure that is unrealistic? It is supposed to be an army. Are we asking too much when we want it to be able to turn, the next moment, into an NGO doing public good? Is that realistic? Do we have people with those kinds of capabilities?

LGen. Jeffery: There is no question that the transition back and forth between those roles is a significant issue. Soldiers have always done good things in a war environment.

Senator Banks: That is agreed, but they have been incidental to the main purpose. Our men and women were not sent to Italy with the admonition that they should fight the enemy and at the same time try to do good. The good that was done was, I am sure you will agree, incidental. That is not to say that warriors do not have a heart. I am talking about codifying that as another role for the army. I do not think we have ever done that before. Is it realistic to do it now?

LGen. Jeffery: As has been said, warfare is just politics by another means. We must be clear about the overall strategic or political objective and how to use the forces at our disposal, either as a nation or an alliance, to achieve those ends. The military has significant capability. The question is, given the specific context, how much the military or the army can do.

It is difficult to answer your question in the abstract. In practical terms, taking it to the extreme of asking soldiers who have just been through a tremendous battle on the front lines to become peacemakers between two warring factions or to provide succour to the homeless is absurd. Human nature and human psychology being what they are, we take time to move from one point to another.

However, in the context of whether a military force can perform all those roles at the same time, and whether, given a proper transition from one role to another, specific soldiers can do more than one task, I think the answer is yes, but it requires very careful leadership and management to address the limits and to ensure that our soldiers can make that transition themselves. Some will be capable while others will not.

To play the devil's advocate, at the other extreme, maintaining soldiers to do only what soldiers do is contrary to the historical reality. Every nation in the world has always used its military to do a variety of things. Frankly, that leaves one with the sense that this institution will be maintained for one thing only, when it is the overall security of the nation that is important. I would hope that the security of the nation could be achieved by many means, the last of which is resort to deadly force.

I would like us to increasingly take that approach. That is not to say that we do not need combat capability. To the contrary, we have a great need for it, but we need to be smarter than that and I think we can be.

Senator Banks: You mentioned earlier the possibility that we might face some military threat, as we have in the past. I wonder where, in the long term, you see that coming from.

We are asking our Armed Forces to take on a multi-layered capability, which I suggest is relatively new. Can you assure us that that is not contributing to a reduction in what I still regard as the prime capability of an army? In that respect, would you comment specifically on what General MacKenzie said on May 8 this year? He said:

...if I were an enemy force commander, I would much prefer to fight the Canadian army of today than the Canadian armyof 10 years ago ... I have no doubt that the individual soldiers are up to the task in spite of declining standards in physical fitness and discipline at the altar of individual rights and political correctness.

I think that part of what he was getting at, in respect of political correctness and individual rights, has to do with the nature of the question I was asking.

I do not want us to be barbarians. Canadian soldiers have never been barbarians, I hope. Would you comment on General Mackenzie's remarks?

I am asking you because we have heard often in the last few months, the contention by our military leaders that we are more combat-capable now than we were 10 years ago. General MacKenzie suggests, very directly, that the opposite is true.

LGen. Jeffery: With regard to the issue of sustaining capability, going back now to that three-block war, I did not get from the first part of your question the inference that I get now. There is no question that, as we increasingly focus today on peace support operations and similar activities, and do not put, in my view, sufficient effort into training for war, those war-fighting skills will erode; and they are eroding. I am quite clear about that.

We need to take that in context. When we came out of the Cold War, we saw a significant increase in the tempo of operations. There were demands on the army to do a variety of things, including withdrawing our forces from Europe and undergoing significant downsizing and restructuring. In that context, the army was at a high level of training, as it had been sitting in the Central European front for several decades, focused really just on its own preparation. We were able to manage the transition through much of the 1990s without any serious degradation of our overall capability.

However, over time, our inability to replace those collective war-fighting skills has caused us difficulty. That is the reason why collective training is very high on my list, to get back or reinforce those war-fighter skills, to get them back to where they should be for the future. That is a concern.

When I talk of a philosophical discussion of the three-block war and those elements, I assume that the skills are inherent to be able to do all three. I was really addressing the ability, individually, collectively and psychologically, to make the transition from one to the other. However, it assumes the underlying skills are there. It is a problematic today whether those underlying skills exist.

My friend and colleague, General Lewis MacKenzie, and I have had this discussion and debate at some length, going back to over a year ago at the Conference of Defence Association, when he first asked me a similar question. It is a bit of mug's game, because people are looking for black and white answers to complex questions that can only be answered in shades of grey.

In order to fight, in order to engage in combat, human beings have to be tough. They have to be very well trained, and more important than anything else, they must have very tight cohesion. Having someone fight and die, in a sense, willingly, is a very difficult issue to get your mind around. Notwithstanding what many will say, soldiers fight and die for their friends and their buddies - not for the nation, the flag or any political ideal. That is what creates soldiers who can fight. We have to build that team.We must put them together and keep them together, and give them the mental and physical robustness to do that job. That is what General MacKenzie is talking about. He and I are not at odds on that issue.

What kind of human being, or Canadian citizen, that is at the end of the day is a much more difficult issue. What was acceptable in terms of the fighting soldier in World War II and the soldier we saw in the Central European front is not necessarily so today. Even if the soldier we see today in the army has all those elements, the basic material is different. The expectations of the nation are different. I have no difficulty with that. The challenge for us as a profession is to put that team together from young men and women from Canadian society, with their strong views on human rights and their importance as individuals. We still demand of them, when they sign on the bottom line, that they subordinate their individual rights to the greater good. They are not treated exactly the same as they were out there.

What perhaps we have failed to do, more through lack of opportunity than anything else, is to build that tight team to the extent that we should have, and we must in the future. I understand the basic underlying requirement, but I am not of the view that one can sacrifice what it is to be a Canadian to be a Canadian soldier.

Senator Banks: That is a superb answer. I thank you very much for your forthrightness in telling us that you do, in order to do your job the way you would like to do it, need more resources.

The Chairman: General Jeffery, this has been an extraordinary morning for us. We value your candour. You have gone into considerable detail in describing the complexity of your job and the trade-offs that you face on a daily basis. On behalf of the committee, I want you to know that we are grateful you did that in such a thorough and thoughtful way.

I would like to thank you and your colleague for appearing before us. I wish to reiterate that the committee, and the Senate, is proud of the work that the men and women of the army are doing for Canada.

The committee adjourned.