Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on
National Finance

Issue 23 - Evidence

The Standing Senate Committee on National Finance met this day at 9:32 a.m. to examine the Main Estimates laid before Parliament for the fiscal year ending March 31, 2002.

Senator Lowell Murray (Chairman) in the Chair.

[English]

The Chairman: Honourable senators, we have a quorum. We are here this morning for a long-delayed meeting to follow up on our report of June 2000 on Canada's emergency and disaster preparedness. Our witnesses are Margaret Purdy, the Associate Deputy Minister of National Defence, and James Harlick, the Assistant Deputy Minister of National Defence. Ms Purdy has been here previously on this subject.

In our letter of invitation, we asked her to provide an overview of the responsibilities of the new Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness and, if possible, the government's views on the recommendations made by the committee in the June 2000 report.

I mention our letter of invitation because we are all aware that emergency preparedness is very topical these days. There may be a tendency on the part of senators to go a bit far afield in view of the events of September 11. Nevertheless, I wanted to insist, at least for a moment, on the reason for our invitation to Ms Purdy. The Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness was announced by Prime Minister Chrétien, and the appointment of Ms Purdy as associate deputy minister was announced February 5, 2001.

Ms Purdy has held successively more responsible and senior positions in the public service for some considerable time. I dare not call her a veteran of the public service, but she has been in senior positions with the RCMP and CSIS, assistant and deputy clerk of the Privy Council in charge of security and intelligence and, most recently and currently, as I said, Associate Deputy Minister of National Defence.

If we have time after the meeting, we will have an in camera meeting to try to crunch our report on deferred maintenance at Canadian universities. Please stay after we adjourn.

With that, I will invite Ms Purdy to make her opening statement.

Ms Margaret Purdy, Associate Deputy Minister of National Defence, Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and honourable senators. We certainly do welcome this opportunity to appear before you once again today.

I would like to take about 15 minutes to do three things. One is to talk about the role of this new organization, which I refer to as OCIPEP.

Second, I want to briefly tell you what we will be doing in direct response to the events of September 11. It will help to illustrate our roles, and it will also be of interest to you.

Finally, I want to get to the reason you originally invited us here today, and that is to update you on activities we have undertaken since your report and in direct response to your report of June 2000.

First, the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness is a civilian organization within the Department of National Defence. As you know, the Prime Minister created it eight months ago. He assigned us two key mandates. The first, which is really the new part of the mandate, is to provide national leadership on a new, modern and comprehensive approach to protecting this country's critical infrastructure.

What do I mean by "critical infrastructure"? I mean the key physical and cyber - and that is important - components of the energy and utilities sectors, the communications sector, services sector, health, finance, transportation, safety and government sectors. It is the most important part of our infrastructure in this country.

Our second role is to assume the role of an organization you know well, Emergency Preparedness Canada. That organization was folded into our new organization. We are the government's primary agency for civil emergency planning in this country for all types of emergencies and accidents.

This combination is unique in the world, as far as we know. The United States, for example, has several agencies that together encompass the mandate that we have consolidated in OCIPEP. We often refer to ourselves as an all-hazards or all-risks or all-catastrophes agency. That recognizes the fact that vastly different events can have identical or very similar impacts. For example, a key facility in this infrastructure that I have mentioned can suffer identical damage or destruction from a tornado, from a terrorist bomb or from a malicious cyber attack. A massive earthquake could cause physical devastation and mass casualties similar to what we witnessed in New York City on September 11. Indeed, the events of September 11 have reminded us of the importance of preparing for this full range of disasters, and I think that our all-hazards approach positions us well in that regard.

Our overarching objective or mission is to enhance the capacity of individuals, communities, businesses and governments in this country to effectively manage risks to their physical and cyber environments. We do this by acting as a facilitator, a coordinator, a leader and a catalyst, or by filling gaps in the overall risk-management environment in Canada.

Let me take a few minutes to explain how the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness differs from Emergency Preparedness Canada, the organization that you know well from the earlier appearances of our predecessor. The most significant difference stems from our new mandate to provide national leadership on critical infrastructure protection. This new role reflects the fact that the health, safety, security and economic well-being of Canadians depend on the assured availability and reliability of this infrastructure. It also reflects the changing profile or characteristics of critical infrastructure. More and more of it, as you know, relies on information technology, switches, routers, control systems and so on.

With that reliance on information technology comes a whole new set of vulnerabilities that are not relevant to natural disasters. Joining Mother Nature on the list of things to worry about are crackers, hackers and hactivists, the people who will do malicious things in cyberspace.

We in the organization still put a high priority on Canada's readiness to deal with natural disasters, as well as accidents. History shows us that we have to. We have had in this country, in the last five years, 30 major significant disasters in terms of damage or injury to Canadians. While we are doing that, we also have to become a centre of excellence with respect to new threats and vulnerabilities.

Our new mandate also means that we have to reach out to different people in some cases, to new partners. Approximately 90 per cent of this critical infrastructure I have talked about is not within the Government of Canada's control or custody. It is in the private sector, in the provinces or at another level of government.

Our new mandate also demands a more diversified workforce than was the case with EPC. We now need computer security experts as well as staff who can build innovative, constructive and productive relationships with the energy sector, the financial sector, the telecommunications sector, et cetera. At the provincial and territorial level, we sometimes have to expand our relationships beyond emergency measures organizations into some other parts of government.

Our new mandate means that we have to rethink our own public awareness, our education, our financial assistance and our research programs. It has been a fairly dramatic change for the organization that I inherited, and the new organization looks different from the old organization in many ways.

[Translation]

The government has increased my total operating budget from just under $10 million per year to about $21 million.

In addition, as part of the recent package of counter-terrorism investments, I have been allocated an additional $5 million to undertake some key projects immediately. These include enhancing the operational capacity of our headquarters and regional offices, establishing joint ops centres with some of the provinces, and improving our capacity to monitor and analyse intrusions or attacks on government computer networks.

This money will allow us to increase our work force from about 80 to almost 150, here and across the country.

[English]

To illustrate our role and contribution, let me summarize some of the activities of this growing workforce since September 11.

[Translation]

The Office was placed on a heightened state of vigilance immediately after the attacks in the U.S. and we remain there today.

Additional staff were assigned to the Government Emergency Operations Coordination Centre to enhance our existing 24-hour, 7-day monitoring capabilities. Within hours of the attacks, we had compiled an inventory of resources available in Canada for humanitarian assistance to the United States. This information was communicated immediately through our Canadian Ambassador in Washington to the U.S. government.

Working with many others, our Office helped organize the transfer of support and resources to help local authorities in places like Vancouver, Whitehorse, Gander, St. John's and Halifax, accommodate the thousands of passengers diverted to Canada.

[English]

I know your committee was especially interested in seeing the Government of Canada show leadership in promoting and awareness. I think you called it a culture of emergency preparedness. That is what we do in OCIPEP 365 days a year, although we have been particularly active since September 11. For example, we have used our Web site and our well-established, more traditional networks of contacts across the country to issue specific alerts and advisories, as well as more guidance and information. We have been in direct contact with critical infrastructure owners and operators to advise them to exercise increased vigilance, to exchange information and to determine appropriate protective measures.

We have accelerated our work on a national critical infrastructure protection program. The media has shown considerable interest in this program over the last several days, so let me describe it briefly. It is a modern version of the vital points program of the Cold War years. It is also an updating and an expansion of the work the government undertook as part of the Y2K effort. In order to protect Canada's critical infrastructure, we have to understand it and know where it is. We have to know why it is critical. We have to understand the impact of outages in one part of the infrastructure on other parts. For example, what is the impact if telecommunications is down in the province of Saskatchewan? What is the impact on other parts of the infrastructure? What about the cascading effect?

We are updating this program in collaboration with the owners, operators and the regulators across the country, and the end result will be a comprehensive program that not only maps or depicts Canada's critical infrastructure but entails more than that. It entails cooperative efforts to monitor threats, address vulnerabilities, share information nationally, respond to specific incidents, and establish good practices.

The program also has to have an international dimension. Much of our infrastructure in this country is interwoven, often seamlessly, with that of the United States. Later this month, Mr. Harlick and I will go to Washington with colleagues for the third in a series of meetings we have been having over the last year to discuss bilateral cooperation in this protection area.

Since September 11, we have accelerated the collaborative work we are doing with the Solicitor General's department on the Canadian response to chemical, biological or nuclear terrorism. Here I would like to give credit to former senator Bill Kelly and his committee for their 1999 report on counter-terrorism. In response to that report, the government made a commitment to strengthen this country's capacity to respond to those kinds of terrorist threats. Our colleagues in the Solicitor General's department have the lead in developing this new strategy. Earlier this year, in April or May, they distributed a discussion paper to the provinces and territories.

We in OCIPEP are currently crossing the country, co-chairing consultations aimed at ensuring that all jurisdictions work together to maintain the right national response capacity. As of this moment, there is no known specific threat of biological or chemical threat of terrorism in Canada, but that does not mean we should not be concerned or that we can be complacent. We have to act in a way that reflects that the only responsible response, the only effective response, will be one that entails many players, starting with first responders at the local level.

In relation to the current situation involving the anthrax threat, OCIPEP is working closely with Health Canada and others such as Canada Post, to ensure that Canadians are kept well advised of the facts and are provided with clear information on what to do if they encounter a suspicious package or correspondence.

Cyber security also remains a high priority of OCIPEP. Senator Kelly's committee and he personally did a lot of valuable work in this area by drawing attention to it and describing the urgent need for attention in plain language. He continues to do that in retirement.

The cyber threat is real and it is serious. Attacks on Web servers are expected to double in 2001 compared to 2000. Many surveys tell us that. At the same time, individuals, companies and governments are regularly facing infections from worms or viruses or denial of service attacks. When I met with Senator Stratton a while ago, he talked about his computer system having been hit by one of these mischievous worms or viruses. Computer networks are so essential today to our personal and business lives and to the functioning of government that these kinds of disruptions and failures can have a direct economic and social impact. We continue in OCIPEP to monitor potential threats to the cyber infrastructure, especially any new threats associated with terrorism.

Let me move on to update you on activities directly related to your report. As you pointed out, effective disaster emergency management requires a comprehensive approach. It cannot be piecemeal. It has to encompass four key elements, as follows: mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. As you observed, the focus in this country to date has been on preparedness, response and recovery. There has been somewhat less focus on mitigation, that is, the actions that you take over a sustained period to reduce or eliminate the long-term impacts and risks associated with disaster.

This inconsistent approach is no longer viable, as you concluded in your report, because the population and wealth of Canada, indeed, its key infrastructure, are increasingly concentrated in a small number of highly vulnerable areas. Many of those communities are vulnerable to multiple hazards. Think of Vancouver, for example. Second, climate change is likely to result in an increase in both the frequency and the severity of extreme weather in this country. Third, our infrastructure is aging and thus is more susceptible to damage. Fourth, communities are increasingly reliant on advanced technologies, as I have mentioned. Many of those technologies can be disrupted during disasters. The ice storm brought down power and telephone lines. It brought both the new and the old economies to a standstill for days. Finally, the costs are too high. The price tag for the ice storm and the Saguenay and Red River floods was in the billions of dollars.

The government agreed with you that more needs to be done to reduce the risk of death, injury and destruction, and to reduce the economic cost of disasters. Since you tabled your report, one year later, the Minister of National Defence announced two major initiatives to be led by this new organization that Mr. Harlick and I manage. The first is to work toward a national disaster mitigation strategy for this country. The second is to review the disaster financial assistance arrangements.

Let me speak to the disaster mitigation strategy. In June of this year, the minister announced that OCIPEP would lead consultations toward this strategy. The minister said that this initiative is an important step in developing modern disaster prevention and reduction measures that meet the needs and the expectations of Canadians.

As your report pointed out, mitigation measures can be wide-ranging. They can range from providing better personal and public awareness to non-structural activities, such as flood-plain mapping and changing building codes, to more structural and costly measures, such as the building of water diversions or dams.

We will be distributing a discussion paper next month to stimulate discussions and consultations across Canada with provinces and stakeholders like the Insurance Bureau of Canada. We expect the consultation process to begin before the end of this calendar year; indeed, some discussions have already begun. We have recently participated in workshops with the Canadian Association of Firefighters and with the Institute for Catastrophic Loss Reduction. Our goal is to complete these consultations, compile the results and present our proposals for a national strategy to the government next year.

I will not prejudge the outcome of all this work and these consultations, but I do know that the strategy will have to address a wide range of possibilities. How are hazards identified? How are risks assessed? How are research needs determined? What about information-sharing, public awareness and, very important, the incentives and resources that are attached to disaster mitigation?

On the issue of funding, we will be clear throughout the consultations that any funding for a national disaster mitigation strategy will have to be cost-shared and will have to be done over the long term.

Let me move on to the DFAA, the Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements. In the first 26 years after the inception of that program in 1970, the program generated $450 million in payments to the provinces and territories. Then the three events that I mentioned in the 1990s resulted in a total payout of $1.5 billion, so the program went through a tremendous growth period after the floods and ice storm. These arrangements have generally worked well over the years, but a number of questions have arisen concerning their application, administration, and eligibility criteria.

At the same time, socioeconomic conditions have changed. Vulnerabilities and dependencies have changed. Therefore, we are leading a comprehensive review of the DFAA. We are well on our way. We circulated a discussion paper to the provinces in July of this year. I can certainly provide you with copies, if you wish.

Linking back to mitigation, the paper did include an option to provide for mitigative enhancements in the DFAA, something that is not possible now. The current DFAA speaks only to and provides eligibility only to the post-disaster situation, not preventive or mitigative efforts.

We are interested in the provincial and territorial views on cost-sharing, time limitations and eligibility conditions. We have put proposals on the table to extend eligibility to include part-time farmers, for example, and non-profit organizations in some cases. We will receive comments by early next year and move forward to government.

Another key recommendation of your committee was that the government should play a leadership role in cultivating a culture of preparedness in Canada. The events of the past few weeks have illustrated this acutely, the need for public awareness, the need for good communications with Canadians. In these times, it is vital that governments communicate the need for vigilance and preparedness, but to do so in a way that does not engender panic or a siege mentality. As many people have observed, this is precisely the result that those who want to damage our way of life are seeking.

In cooperation with emergency measures organizations across Canada, such as the Red Cross, we continue to broadly distribute self-help pamphlets and checklists on preparing for emergencies of all kinds, such as severe winter weather or something more sinister. We also sponsor every May, in cooperation with many others, Emergency Preparedness Week. This week, we produced a map of natural hazards of Canada with Environment Canada and Natural Resources Canada to help build an awareness of how often natural hazards and natural disasters have occurred in this country.

Other communications activities have focused on building the public profile of our new office - branding ourselves, as they say these days. We have placed a particular emphasis on reaching some of those new stakeholders, those new partners I mentioned, to ensure that they understand our new, broader, all-hazards mandate. We have a new, high quality Web site with extensive information, especially on cyber security, but also on protection related to more traditional contingencies.

We have developed specific materials for the school system. For example, our Web site includes youth activity, quizzes and crossword puzzles, all aimed at building greater awareness among the youth of Canada.

We continue to offer at our college near Arnprior courses on such topics as emergency site management and how to manage public information during a crisis.

We are also providing leadership in research and development related to emergency preparedness. We continue to look at ways to develop innovative partnerships with industry and the private sector. We have worked with Home Depot, for example, to assist them in holding emergency preparedness seminars as part of their Saturday workshops across the country.

All of this is designed to build public awareness and a better understanding of critical infrastructure protection and emergency preparedness and to build and sustain public confidence in the government's ability to respond effectively, appropriately and quickly to emergencies and crises. I would welcome any views you have as a committee or individuals as to how we can do a better job in this awareness effort.

In conclusion, OCIPEP's core mandate is to ensure the health, safety and economic well-being of Canadians. Everything we do is focused on that. Certainly, the new office has broad responsibilities, responsibilities that continue to evolve in this new and changed post-September 11 world. Responsibilities are going to continue to evolve to meet the needs of Canadians.

September 11 reminded us starkly of the need to avoid complacency, to reassess constantly the threats to security and to ensure our readiness to deal with them.

I am sure members of the committee will agree that we all must take emergency preparedness seriously every day in our homes, as individuals in our communities and in our workplaces. This does not mean that we have to live in a constant state of anxiety - quite the opposite, in fact. If a good emergency plan is in place, if it is tested, if there are skilled staff in place to monitor and respond, Canadians can go about their daily lives with confidence and a sense of personal safety. That is essential to the quality of life in this country.

Another key element is that emergency preparedness is a shared responsibility between the federal government, the provinces, industry, non-profit organizations and the private sector, and between countries, especially between Canada and the U.S.

In my view, success does not depend on having a single individual or organization in charge of everything. It depends on excellent planning, a full understanding of each other's roles and accountabilities, and finely tuned and exercised coordination.

We can learn from the last major weather event, and we can learn from the last terrorist act, but emergency planners have to ensure that their plans are flexible enough to deal with the unpredictable and the unthinkable. They have to look ahead and plan ahead. They have to think the unimaginable.

While we are less than a year old at OCIPEP, I am confident that we do have the capacity to help Canadians and Canadian communities with the full range of emergencies. I am confident, particularly with the new investment mentioned earlier, that we can and are making an important contribution to the current counter-terrorism effort in this country.

Let me say in closing that I was struck in preparing for today at how much progress we have made since you tabled your report in June 2000. The government created a whole new organization eight months ago. I mentioned three major initiatives that are well underway. They are as follows: the National Critical Infrastructure Protection Program, the program to look at the national disaster mitigation strategy, and finally a look at our financial assistance programs.

I thank you for giving us the time, and we look forward to your questions.

The Chairman: Our original study on this matter was done at the initiative of Senator Stratton, who maintains a lively interest in the subject. I shall invite him to open questioning.

Senator Stratton: Thank you for attending today. The timing is accidentally very appropriate. Your outline was quite comprehensive. I am amazed at how quickly you have moved into this new field. I congratulate you for that because you have come to the table and given us definite answers with respect to our recommendations.

My only real concern with respect to that report is that, due to the economic downturn and the likely resulting cutbacks, we will have a delay or a lag in carrying out some of these programs. I hearken back to where I come from, the Red River Valley. It is now year 4, going on to year 5, since the 1997 flood. As we know, historically, major floods occur in the valley, on average, every 17 years. However, of the past six years, there have been three of fairly significant levels of water.

We are concerned about the lag in this and the length of time it will take to put something in place, if we recognize that there is a problem with global warming and that there is indeed a problem with water levels in Manitoba increasing on a year-to-year basis. Do you see a slowdown or delay in the putting in place of this critical infrastructure? There have been reports in the press that this likely might occur. It concerns me greatly, because if we are in year 5 since the 1997 flood, the clock is ticking and time is running shorter every year.

Ms Purdy: I share your concerns. Activity is underway on several fronts. You are aware that the International Joint Commission did make recommendations about the impact of floods on the Red River Basin. I know that the Department of Foreign Affairs is in discussion with the United States about how to respond to those recommendations. That work is well underway.

As well, there is activity between the Province of Manitoba and the Government of Canada to identify options for the way ahead and the price tag associated with those options. I know that as we go out to talk in Manitoba and elsewhere across the country, certainly the Saguenay area of Quebec, we will receive recommendations and ideas on how to deal, in the longer term, in a preventive and mitigative way with flooding in this country.

As public servants, we will move our proposals and advice forward. The impact of the current downturn in the economy is for the government to decide. The government has to make investment choices. I know that Minister Duhamel is often in discussion with Minister Eggleton on this particular issue. Minister Eggleton has met several times with Steve Ashton, the responsible minister from the Province of Manitoba. It is not a file that is languishing. There is a high sense of urgency attached to it. I know a number of years have passed, but good work is underway between Canada and the United States and between the Province of Manitoba and the Government of Canada. We will certainly take forward recommendations as part of our national disaster mitigation strategy.

Although that is a peculiar situation, flooding does regularly hit other parts of Canada as well.

Senator Stratton: I know it is more appropriate that I ask the Minister of Finance, but I did want to highlight the urgency of this, the ticking clock. I know you are aware of that.

I note your comprehensive and aggressive attack on the issues that we mentioned in our report, and I thank you for that. We discussed the urgency. I would like to discuss the new issues, the ones since September 11, if I may, briefly, and then I will pass it to the other senators.

The level of anxiety is the issue that is of concern to me, particularly since the news yesterday of two more deaths in Washington at the Brentwood post office. One could sense the anxiety level click higher as a result of that. I was not too concerned prior to yesterday, because I thought the United States was managing the issue fairly well. However, since then, it has, in the minds of Canadians, changed. This is just hearsay, but it is the sense I am getting.

How does one deal with that level of anxiety? We talk about individuals becoming more self-aware, but suddenly the door has been opened to a whole different area, a different kind of warfare. Ordinary citizens are dying because of anthrax. It is only natural to wonder what is next. What other potentials are there? What about smallpox? We have not vaccinated generally since 1972. I received a booster in 1985, but they only last five years, I believe.

What do we tell Canadians? I was astonished to discover, for example, that my wife bought a pair of latex gloves, but that is exactly what she did. I saw them in our vehicle. It reflects her level of anxiety. We may fool ourselves into believing that anxiety levels have not increased, but they have. Seeing those gloves made me aware of increasing anxiety levels.

Ms Purdy: One feels in the air in this country the same anxiety and concern. We address it by the effort we have been making within the public service - and I know ministers are doing the same - to get the facts on the table in the Canadian context. Just as the United States is in a different threat environment than Canada with respect to terrorism of a more traditional kind, so too are we in a different situation with respect to this current series of activities.

We have had plenty of hoaxes. Fire departments and ambulances across the country have been responding to incidents, but to date they have been hoaxes. There is no confirmed case of anthrax in this county. That does not mean that life goes on normally, as you say. It does mean that there is a higher level of concern, and there is a need for a higher level of vigilance.

It is important to remember that we have not had a confirmed case of anthrax here. It is also equally important to get facts out to Canadians - good, reliable information. There was a day or so when there was much misleading information in the public domain. We moved quickly, particularly Health Canada. I would commend Health Canada on the materials it has disseminated to the public. They have also directed special programs to the chief medical officers in the provinces. What is anthrax? What should you do? What are the symptoms? What are the first signs? What do you do if you think you are suffering from those early indicators? Where do you go? What kind of treatment can you expect? What kind of response can you expect?

The quickest way to get to information is through the Health Canada Web site, but information is available in other ways as well. Our Web site has a link to Health Canada, to ensure that anyone who comes to OCIPEP looking for the answers can get them easily and quickly.

Part of reassuring Canadians is to assure them that we do have in place response plans and skilled personnel - for example, police forces, firefighters, Hazmat experts, and hospital and medical staff across the country. As well, we have world-class laboratories able to deal with materials and substances that are suspicious in nature. We do have plans in place.

On the part of the government, again I go back to the work of the Senate committee under Bill Kelly. If you read that particular report, a lot of attention was paid to the chemical and biological threat, pointing out some of the weaknesses and gaps from the committee's perspective. One of the major responses to that report was to launch this effort of looking at our national capacity. It is no good for the Government of Canada to increase its capacity because it is not going to respond to most of the incidents. It is up to the local authorities. That work was underway well before September 11, and it is about to be concluded in the next month or so.

We need to assure Canadians we are taking things seriously. We need to give them information about what to do. We need to support police forces and intelligence agencies and others who are trying to find the perpetrators. The anxiety level will come down when some arrests are made, particularly in response to the recent tragic cases in the United States.

Senator Bolduc: You talked about critical infrastructure. Some of these are federal, some are provincial and some are local. Do you have statistics about the relative proportions of those critical infrastructures?

Ms Purdy: One statistic that we use regularly, as do our colleagues in the United States and the United Kingdom, is that only about 10 per cent of the critical infrastructure is in Government of Canada custody. The rest is spread across the private sector and the provinces. It depends province by province, because some provinces have privatized more of their utilities and other parts of the infrastructure than have others.

Generally, energy, utilities and telecommunications companies are in the private sector. Transportation is a mix. We made a shift in recent years in this country, with more privatization, for example, of air navigation. It is a changing landscape, and it depends on part of the country.

I have not seen the statistics yet - we will get there in our discussions with our American colleagues - on what percentage of the infrastructure is actually bilateral across border or what part is part of a global infrastructure. That is part of what has changed in the late 20th century. More and more of our infrastructure is not geographically and otherwise isolated in a particular city or province. It is linked into a global infrastructure.

Think of banks in this country. They are now linked electronically to banks all over the world, so you can make electronic transactions globally and instantaneously. That was not true when I was growing up. Everything was done by hand and in ledgers, in terms of banking withdrawals and deposits. These environments are changing radically, and they are spread across all levels in this country.

The global relationship brings huge new vulnerabilities. We often say that you are only as safe as the weakest link in whatever chain of dependency you are part of. Discussions must take place with people we do business with, to ask them how safe they are and how seriously they take security. It is a complicated, complex environment.

Senator Bolduc: I know you have not been in your position for very long, but I suspect that you have had some discussions at the provincial, and perhaps the municipal. Do you get the feeling at the provincial level, at least, or the municipal level, that the degree of awareness is comparable to the one in the federal government?

Ms Purdy: I will not say it consistently is at the same level. Some provinces are more advanced. Some sectors are more advanced. I guess I would speak to sectors rather than provinces.

We find that much depends on the experience in Y2K, frankly. The major sectors that I mentioned all took Y2K seriously, as did provinces and municipalities. Some of the sectors kept their Y2K work and understanding and knowledge current, so they are actively engaged in this whole area of infrastructure protection.

Again, the electricity sector in this country is a good example. It is linked seamlessly in many cases to the U.S. electricity grid. We manage electricity in many cases in North America as a North American utility, not a Canadian or U.S. utility. The electricity sector has a very active program of identifying vulnerabilities and threats and of sharing information from one part of the electricity industry to the other, particularly in the area of computer security and information technology security. It has excellent sharing of information about suspicious activity on their computer systems, threats and so on.

Some sectors are extremely active, and some provinces are active. Mr. Harlick was in Calgary recently with colleagues from the federal government and the Alberta government, as well as the oil, gas and electricity sector in the province of Alberta, to talk about how to work better together and how to share more information and ensure that we test our response plans and so on. That province and sector are clearly taking this seriously.

The short answer is that it is mixed across the country. Our job is to get it to a more consistent standard through our discussions and persuasion.

Senator Moore: I would like to know practically what your office did or what your involvement was in Canada in response to the September 11 tragedy. Who would have contacted you? What would have been asked of you? Who do you communicate with? You mentioned a counterpart agency in the United States. Who is that? Could you tell us about that?

Ms Purdy: We have a 24-hour operation centre in OCIPEP. It runs seven days a week. We put it on a higher state of alert. We brought in extra staff to that operation centre because we knew that there would be a high level of activity. We were not sure what it would be, so we became more responsive, so to speak. We have regional offices across the county. Every province has a small office representing OCIPEP. We were in touch with them to ask them to do the same thing.

Our first major initiative was to help get supplies and resources to those cities and those communities that received the diverted flights from the United States. Approximately 30,000 airline passengers unexpectedly showed up in places like Gander. They needed accommodation.

Senator Moore: Did you take the initiative, or were you asked by your counterpart in the United States? Were you told, "We have planes flying with people in them, and we want them to land in your country." Did somebody do that?

Ms Purdy: Practically speaking, the arrival of the planes here was handled by Transport Canada and its colleagues in the United States. Let me step back and explain for senators the way the federal government gets engaged in disasters or humanitarian assistance.

The principle is that the local authorities respond first. If they identify needs that are beyond their ability, they go to the provincial or territorial government for assistance, usually the emergency measures organization, for example. When a province realizes that it cannot meet the needs, it will ask the Government of Canada to provide certain things.

That is exactly what happened. I will speak about the Gander, Newfoundland situation. The first authorities to respond were the Province of Newfoundland and those communities where the planes were to land. They searched for available accommodation. They identified some shortcomings, particularly in terms of beds and blankets. Thousands of people were arriving, and they just could not locate these items quickly. The provincial official in Newfoundland would have talked to our regional director in Newfoundland, as well as our regional director in Nova Scotia, and requested approximately 8,000 beds and blankets. The regional directors then called us.

When neither the community nor the province could meet the demand, we could. Our job was to contact the people who have the beds and blankets, that is Health Canada in their Ottawa warehouse, and also to contact our colleagues in uniform, who have airplanes on which the beds could be loaded. We worked with Canadian Forces and Health Canada, got the bed on trucks and to Trenton, where they were put on planes and sent to Newfoundland.

That is practically how it works. We do not automatically take concrete actions from the moment a disaster strikes, but we get into a high state of alert when we expect to be asked for help. We try to think through what might be asked of us. This was an unpredictable and shocking situation.

Concurrently, when we saw what was happening at ground zero in New York City, we started to receive phone calls from people and institutions that offered help. Throughout the first week, we developed what we called an inventory of Canadian assistance, or support of people, equipment and services that could be made available to U.S. authorities, if and when they were needed. Within hours, we sent the first list of available items and people to the U.S. government through our ambassador in Washington. The ambassador, in turn, conveyed that list to senior officials in Washington.

At the same time, Mr. Harlick's office was working with the Federal Emergency Management Agency in the United States, which is our equivalent on the natural disaster side. We informed them that we had sent this inventory forward and that we were working out the protocol. If they saw anything in that list they wanted or needed, we advised them on how they could make a request. That would have been a country-to-country request and we would have been involved.

I will share one example with you. In the end, there was a request that surfaced for an urban search and rescue team. This is a team that has special equipment and training, as well as dogs and specialized equipment, to go into a site similar to that in Manhattan and move the debris and save lives. We activated the most prepared team in Canada, which was in Vancouver, and again we worked with our colleagues in the Canadian Forces to get air transportation from Vancouver to New York. At the very last minute - I believe the plane was in the air - the U.S. authorities withdrew that request. They took stock of what they had available on the ground in the United States and decided that they did not need us. However, we did mobilize the team, and we would do that again. On a smaller scale, we were asked to identify three or four structural engineers with specific skills to come to New York City to help. We found those people and provided that information.

We did those two things in the very early hours. I mentioned the whole range of partners and stakeholders we have across this country. We contacted some of the critical infrastructure owners and operators in the energy sector and elsewhere to share with them as much expertise as we could.

In these early hours, we had little information. We assumed it was terrorism although it was not confirmed as terrorism. We opened up the lines of communication and told people that if they had any suspicion or concern or questions, they could always call us.

In the hours following, we issued some advisories, which can still be seen on our Web site. They were negative advisories in that we were telling Canadians there was no specific threat to Canadians or to Canadian infrastructure from these events, but that if the situation were to change, we would let them know. We did separate advisories on the cyber security situation because, as you may recall, at the same time the Nimda worm was working its way through some computer systems. There was some worry that these occurrences were linked and that Nimda was terrorist in origin. We put out some advisories via our Web site, as well as through other measures.

Our role has changed over the following weeks. I have mentioned the work we are doing in relation to the anthrax situation, the discussions we had with specific sectors since September 11 and our work with the United States. We are going to the United States next week. It goes from the very specific into a more general review of our planning and cooperation. That is where we are today.

Senator Moore: I must say I am pleased. This was Senator Stratton's issue, as our chairman has mentioned, and I am pleased to see that there has been a detailed and focused response to the recommendations of this committee. Thank you very much.

Senator Mahovlich: On September 27, when I was in Strasbourg, France, I turned the news on early in the morning to hear Peter Jennings make a statement that shocked me: He said that Toronto was the launching pad of many of these terrorists. I was concerned about where he got his information and whether it was true. I did not know.

Approximately a week ago, I was in New York, at one of the airports there, and I noticed every 100 yards or so an armed guard with a machine gun. When I come into the Toronto airport, I do not see an armed guard with a machine gun. Are we lax? Are we not keeping up with the United States? Will we be seeing eventually an armed guard in the airports here in Canada, much like in Europe or in Russia?

Ms Purdy: You are beyond my mandate, Senator Mahovlich, but let me address your question to the extent I can.

In terms of Canada being a source of terrorism, your first point about hearing that Toronto was a launching pad for some of the terrorists, as far as I know government officials have said publicly that there is no known Canadian link to the terrorist events of September 11. Indeed, if you follow the unravelling of the investigation, it has shown that the perpetrators for the most part lived in the United States and had legal status in the United States. They were in the United States for a long period of time. In relation to September 11, there is no known direct link to the events.

With respect to airport security, I am not an expert. I do know that following September 11 not only was our air space closed for a certain period of time but also airport security was enhanced greatly, to the extent that a concern has arisen about the delays in getting on to certain aircraft, with the long line ups and so on. In respect to armed guards, I know the RCMP has a greater presence now in international airports than it had before September 11, but I do not have the details.

If you are interested in airport security, I would suggest that you call Minister Collenette's department, or the RCMP. I hesitate to move into areas that are not mine.

Senator Mahovlich: Is that not under your mandate?

Ms Purdy: No.

The Chairman: Under the Emergencies Act, the government could issue a proclamation declaring that there is a public order emergency, and that is defined, as you know, as an emergency that arises from threats to the security of Canada as defined, in section 2 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, as so serious as to constitute a national emergency. The government might also proclaim that there is an international emergency, which is defined as being one involving Canada and one or more other countries arising from intimidation or coercion, the real or imminent use of force or violence so serious as to be a natural emergency.

Was consideration given - I do not know whether this is a fair question to ask a public servant. Let me ask you whether you were ready for such a declaration by the government and what the implications of that would have been in the circumstances immediately following September 11, either a public order emergency or an international emergency.

Ms Purdy: The Emergencies Act, which was proclaimed in 1988, has never been invoked in this country. As you know, it was the successor legislation to the War Measures Act. As far as I know, it was never under consideration for invocation during the aftermath to the events of September 11. There are some fairly serious restrictions in terms of the scenarios under which you could declare an emergency in this country.

The language is very serious. For example, it has to be a national emergency, it has to be urgent, it has to be critical, and it has to be of a temporary nature. It has to be a situation where lives and health and safety are seriously endangered. It has to be an emergency that is beyond the capacity or the authority of a province to deal with. You can see the number of criteria is growing. It also has to threaten the ability of the government to govern, of Canada to protect territorial sovereignty. The final criterion is that it has to be a situation that cannot be dealt with by using any other law of Canada. Whether it was the Gulf War, Oka or other scenarios that have arisen since the act was invoked, to my knowledge, we have never identified situations that met all the criteria or, if they met the criteria, that we could not deal with them using the Criminal Code, Emergency Preparedness Act, and other pieces of legislation.

It is complex to invoke a declaration of an emergency and keep it in place. If I recall correctly, you have to consult every legislature across the country and every province and territory every 30 days.

Mr. James E. Harlick, Assistant Deputy Minister of National Defence, Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness: It varies by the kind of emergency declared. One consults more frequently the more serious the emergency is, such as public order, international, and less frequently in terms of public welfare and natural disaster emergencies.

Ms Purdy: We have dealt with Y2K, the ice storm, Oka and the war-like situation with the Gulf War, and we never encountered a situation that met the criteria of the Emergencies Act. That is not to say we will not. This one does not meet all of those criteria.

The Chairman: I understand why the government would not have gone that route because both the powers and the process that would be involved in declaring any of those emergencies are both too much and too little for the present circumstances. It is too much because some of them are unnecessary under the present circumstances and too little in that, as I understand it, in some cases, there is an expiry. It has to be temporary. The government went the right route in doing what it did and then bringing in legislation.

If there were a threat, if you decided there were a threat to Canada immediately on September 11, this is the only legislation that you have to invoke.

Ms Purdy: It depends on what actions you want to take. You could close the air space over Canada. You can restrict every flight from flying over the country without invoking the Emergencies Act. You have that available through other pieces of legislation, other authorities. Earlier this week, the president of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission imposed a higher level of security around every nuclear facility in this country. She has done that using the Canadian Nuclear Safety Act. There is a piece of legislation that gives that organization power to regulate nuclear safety in this country.

We have a companion piece of legislation, the Emergency Preparedness Act, which is a shorter piece of legislation and not quite as controversial. It sets out the obligations of the Government of Canada to provide leadership nationally on civil emergency planning. That is the language in the act. It also sets out our authority to enter into financial assistance arrangements of the type that I described. It sets out the mandate of the former organization, Emergency Preparedness Canada.

There is a piece of legislation that ensures at the government level that we take emergency preparedness seriously. We have plans. We can respond. We can deal appropriately with Canadians.

The Chairman: There is another agency that reports to your minister, the Communications Security Establishment. You will know that, for the very first time, that organization's mandate will have a legislative basis with amendments to the National Defence Act that are now before Parliament as part of the omnibus Bill C-36.

I note that in its mandate, for example, it is given the authority to monitor government computer networks and systems to ensure their safety. There is also an international dimension to their work relating to critical infrastructure, telecommunications and that kind of thing. Where does their work end and yours begin, or vice-versa?

Ms Purdy: The Communications Security Establishment has a new role. It has had a role to provide highly technical, highly specialized advice to the government on how to protect its telephone system, its communications system, and now, increasingly, its computer systems. These are engineers and mathematicians, highly specialized advisers. It also has a role to look ahead and to understand where phenomena like the Internet and wireless communication are going, to be our brains in terms of understanding new technologies that present particular security challenges.

The proposed legislation now before Parliament is an effort to give CSE the authority to do some so-called vulnerability testing of Government of Canada computer systems, to ensure they are not being used, hacked into or the subject of malicious attacks. It is intended for situations where there is a suspicion or a threat that computer systems in the government and any department or agency of the government are being attacked or might be attacked.

There is the ability to have CSE work in cooperation with us and the concerned department to do a test of that computer system. There is a methodology called "red teaming," where you play the bad guy and attempt to see how vulnerable the system is and identify the weak spots, so they can be corrected.

The possibility exists, obviously, in the course of testing the system, of coming into possession of information, communications of Canadians and public servants, and this proposed legislation, as I understand it, will give CSE in those very particular circumstances, with conditions that the minister would set down, the authority to do that kind of testing. It cannot be done, without the authority to do it, in an environment where there will be communications of Canadians present. This is an attempt to give them the legal authority.

The Chairman: I understand that, and we are canvassing that at another Senate committee.

My concern is that there is an obvious complement, if not overlap, between your mandate and theirs. I want to hear you say, if you can say it truthfully, that you are working hand-in-hand, side-by-side, shoulder-to-shoulder, arm-in arm and cheek-by-jowl, and that you know what each other is doing in this general area. It seems to me that together you would be much more powerful than apart.

Ms Purdy: It is a complementary relationship, not with just CSE but with CSIS and the RCMP and others who have specific roles to investigate.

I have said many times that our job is not to take over others' responsibilities but to build on them, to know where the expertise is. This work, as reflected partly in this legislative amendment, is an effort to make the overall program we are managing stronger and better by getting us access to those technical experts at CSE and giving them the tools to do the job. It will be done under the umbrella of the critical infrastructure protection program that we manage.

[Translation]

Senator De Bané: I have but one question for Ms Purdy. I hope that it is relevant to the matter at hand.

[English]

I am told that at this moment people can communicate through the Internet and e-mail, using highly sophisticated software to encrypt their correspondence, and that no government can break those encrypted messages in a reasonable period of time because the software is so sophisticated that even if all the computer power of the world were used it would take millions of years before those messages could be broken.

Is that true? You have been in the centre of all the security issues. Do you think we can rest when we know that people can communicate through the Internet by encrypted messages that no one can break? Is that not a great matter for concern?

Ms Purdy: It is a matter for concern. The whole issue of encryption was a difficult one for many countries to grapple with, because it put three lines of interests in play. One was the economic interest. In this country, we have a high-tech industry that often specializes in these kinds of hardware- and software- security methodologies. It also is very important for the protection of the privacy of Canadians, for the privacy and proprietary nature of business communications, that they be protected.

On the other hand, Senator De Bané, very highly sophisticated encryption is available. In many cases, one can download it free of charge on the Internet. There are no controls on it. That makes the work of law enforcement and others difficult in some circumstances.

In coming to a conclusion to this conundrum several years ago, the government's decision was to roll out a policy that recognized all those elements - namely, the need for privacy, for protecting sensitive communication using encryption, the need to support Canadian industry and, finally, the needs of law enforcement. I can assure you that there is activity and there has been investment in the policing and intelligence community, not necessarily to overcome the encryption, but to get access to information in plain language before it is encrypted or after it is decrypted. The government has recognized the need of police agencies to get access to communications, regardless of how they move, encrypted or unencrypted. It is not easy. It does take investment, but the government has moved ahead on that front.

The Chairman: Senator Kelly's third report, in January 1999, indicated that the security and law enforcement people were losing the debate on encryption. Therefore, the considerations you mentioned - privacy, economics, and so on - had won out over considerations of security and law enforcement. You will be aware that the RCMP, CSIS and others have asked for legislative or regulatory authority to give them mandatory access to the keys used to encrypt and decrypt communications and stored data. They have also asked for amendments to the Criminal Code to compel the holder of a cryptographic key or password to give it up in response to a judicial warrant. There are other possibilities that I am sure you understand better than I do.

In the light of recent events, again, are you sympathetic to those recommendations of Senator Kelly's committee?

Ms Purdy: As a public servant, I cannot comment on that sort of thing.

Let me say that I would encourage you, if you are interested in how police and intelligence agencies are keeping up with this technological revolution, to follow the legislative proposals that ministers are taking forward, as well as some of the investments. You will have noticed last week that CSE and CSIS, which are highly dependent on state-of-the-art technology to do the work you described, received substantial investments of new money, as have, in an earlier announcement, the RCMP. Much of that money, if you read the details, is to purchase and acquire new equipment and technology to keep them ahead of the new developments. Thus, a combination of legislative authorities and new investments to find ways to work around some of these daunting technological challenges has been the response of the government to this very complex and challenging technological environment.

Senator Bolduc: I am trying to understand the relationship between your new mandate on matters of cyber-terrorism and the other part of the department concerning communications security. I understand that yours is mostly with the private sector and the other one is with the government sector. Is that generally true?

Ms Purdy: That is not true. The Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness has a national role. Let us just talk about cyber-security, for example.

We certainly have the lead in terms of cyber-security as it affects our critical infrastructure, the kinds of sectors that I have mentioned. We lead the discussions with them about what we can do to help them improve their computer systems, information that would be valuable if they shared with us so we could pass it to law enforcement for investigation. In terms of the critical infrastructure cyber-security, we have the lead. We rely on experts across the government, including in CSE, to help us, to be our expert advisers in this area.

In the Government of Canada as well, we have a lead role. We have the government's only 24-hour computer security incident reporting centre. If a department or agency were to experience a worm or a virus, they would report it to us and we would try to give them immediate help. If we knew where the patch was, where to go get it, we would advise them. If it were something new and different, we would probably ask CSE to look at it and give us advice.

Therefore, we play a lead role in the Government of Canada computer security environment as well as in the national environment. In the government environment, we have to work in close cooperation with colleagues who are managing programs such as those, to put government services on-line.

We have to work shoulder-to-shoulder with them as well as with colleagues in other parts of the government. We have a role in the government area as well as in the national civil area.

It is the sort of expertise that you cannot duplicate in too many places. We do not have very many computer security specialists in this country. That is a huge gap we hope to overcome. We graduate just a handful of people from post-secondary institutions in this country who specialize in the security of computer systems.

In the United States, where billions of dollars have been spent in this area, they graduate fewer than 100 people from their universities and colleges with this specialty. It is a gap we need to work to overcome. We have so few specialists. We have shortages of computer people, let alone computer security people. You cannot duplicate these coordination centres. It is better to have one centre where you can put the best minds, 24 hours a day.

Senator Bolduc: I suspect you work with the British and the Americans.

Ms Purdy: Yes. In the United States, this kind of incident reporting centre is in the FBI, so we work closely with them. In the United Kingdom, it is in another part of government. We certainly seek out and have a network.

Some of you will recall the Code Red scare in the middle of the summer. This was to be the worst virus to attack computer systems worldwide. It had the potential of crippling the Internet. In that instance, we linked immediately for information-sharing purposes to our counterpart agencies in the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia. Information was sketchy, and there was much misinformation out there. We did a lot of very active media work during a two- or three-day period, when there was still the opportunity for people to do the right thing to avoid Code Red. We were active and aggressive with the media and with infrastructure owners in this country and our colleagues internationally.

Senator Bolduc: I felt sceptical when I saw the messages on national TV that finally it had been caught. We then heard that it was in France. We see these things on our televisions at home as they are happening.

Senator Day: I would like you to expand on what you said. You have touched on these points to a degree, but I would like a confirmation as to the mandate of your office in relation to each.

You commented that part of your mandate is to prepare for the unthinkable or the unexpected. You indicated to a question by Senator Bolduc that only 10 per cent of the area that might be of concern is under federal jurisdiction and that you use persuasion in other areas. Would you expand on this issue of persuasion? For example, if you find a province that is not up to other provinces and which indicates that its emergency preparedness is not up to the level of another province because it does not have the funds for it, is financial assistance available for that, or are funds only for a disaster after it has happened?

Ms Purdy: I said in my opening remarks that emergency planners need not plan for yesterday but they need to look ahead and be aware of new things that could strike. It is hard to dedicate resources, when you have so much work to do, to give people the freedom to do that kind of research and to look ahead. We do have a research staff in OCIPEP itself. We do not do all the research related to emergencies and contingencies, but we have incredible networks to universities and organizations that have more money than we do to give grants and contributions to some leading-edge research. We put our money forward for those kinds of endeavours. We try to work with others. I mentioned the Institute for Catastrophic Loss Reduction. It is trying to lessen the impact of disasters, and we work closely with them and identify scientists who can do good work for us in a collaborative way.

We work closely with CSIS, the RCMP and others who are looking at the broader threat environment, not just terrorists, but also organized criminals, spies and a whole range of so-called bad actors who could maliciously affect our infrastructure. It is important that we keep our eye on things like weather as well as on the more malicious activities that can affect Canadians and their personal safety. We try to do that through science, through research and through coordination with those who understand the threat environment better than we do.

When our organization was set up in February, cyber security was the greatest gap in this country. There was no concerted, focussed attention on cyber security. I am proud of the work that OCIPEP has done in that area. We filled a void in that area, and we are leading the national effort to pay attention to cyber security.

As to your second question, about how we bring people along and ensure success when we only have control of the levers of a small portion of the critical infrastructure, it is a challenge. To date, and I do not think I am being naive or overly optimistic, I have been encouraged by the discussions we have had over the past eight months with provinces, with the private sector and with some NGOs across this country. They are keenly interested. When I was first appointed and the office was set up, many of them wrote to the Prime Minister or the minister or to me, saying, "Finally we have someone at the federal level we can deal with and talk to. We are interested. We are doing this, that and the other thing, and we would like to work with you." We made sure we responded quickly to those people.

Our approach to much of the sector work is to work through existing professional organizations or associations, for example, the Canadian Bankers Association, the Canadian Electricity Association, associations of that sort that represent the whole sector. We have terrific relationships with them all.

In terms of what would stimulate them to do the right thing, how they can be persuaded and how we can help those who might need financial help, the motivation for doing the right thing, if you are in the financial sector, the electricity association, providing services to the public, there is a clear economic case to be made, a bottom-line kind of case, that you need to ensure that your infrastructure keeps running and is not susceptible to a range of unnecessary threats. You know what your vulnerabilities are and you are doing something about them. There is a strong economic business case.

As I said earlier, you can no longer, in this very complex, interconnected world, just take care of your own and walk away. You have to make sure the people you do business with and the sectors you are dependent on are also doing the right thing. We can bring sectors together around the table, the banks, the electricity sector, the telecommunications sector, and have a dialogue that has not taken place in this country among the operators of these key services systems.

In the case of provinces, we do have a program, the Joint Emergency Preparedness Program. It is a small program, with less than $5 million. We use it, for example, to help a province that needs help getting set up or getting plans in place. It is meant to be temporary. It is a kick-start financing program. We put it to good use in the past and will continue to do that. Through various forms of program review, for example, if a province's emergency measures organization has not had the profile or investments it needs, we can help in some cases stimulate that work.

Senator Day: The other area of your presentation that I would like you to expand on is in relation to your public relations role or the information management role and just who takes the lead. We heard from Senator Mahovlich in relation to the September 11 attack in the United States about the initial information that Canada was a major launching pad for this terrorism activity. I am not convinced that that has gotten out of the minds of many people that saw that earlier media coverage. You talked about advisories that you send out, your Web site, contacting health ministers, contacting international organizations in relation to computer virus issues, all of which is a different area of managing information than the public perception level. Do you take a lead in relation to the managing of information from a public point of view or from the public media point of view?

The Chairman: Ms Purdy, Senator Day is asking you to expand. I will ask you to just touch on the highlights. I have to convene this committee in camera shortly to discuss a draft report on other matters. I would invite you to reply as succinctly as you can to his question.

Ms Purdy: This area of dealing with Canadians on the whole range of emergencies is a shared responsibility. It is true with respect to public information as well. We cannot do it all. We can do whatever is possible in our mandate. You also are hearing provincial government officials. You are hearing medical officials. I heard the chief medical officer in Ottawa speaking recently about the anthrax threat. All reliable organizations and spokespersons need to step forward in this time of high anxiety to explain what they are doing, to answer questions from the public and to put information in the public domain. It is not a one-stop shopping situation. Everyone at all levels of government needs to be talking to Canadians.

There is no better example than what has happened in New York, where you have the mayor, the governor, the senator, the local fire document and the police department all stepping forward during this time of crisis, talking to New Yorkers, talking to Americans, explaining what is happening. It is a shared responsibility. Among those who are speaking out in the United States are federal government officials, just as we would if it were happening here. Senators have a role to play as well.

The Chairman: Many thanks, Ms Purdy and Mr. Harlick. We greatly appreciate your presence here today. It has been an informative and interesting morning.

This public meeting is now adjourned.

The committee continued in camera.