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Canada's Coastlines:

The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World

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Conclusion

 

When Dr. Thomas Axworthy, Chairman of the Centre for the Study of Democracy, Queen’s University, appeared before the Committee, this keen student of Canadian history pointed out that Canada was unready for the First World War, unready for the Second World War, unready for the Korean War, and even, if you went back far enough, unready for the 1885 rebellion in the northwest.

 

“We have this tradition of unpreparedness.  Ethelred the Unready should be the patron saint of Canada.  At the same time, we have this enormous accelerating rate of threat.”

The Committee could not agree more.  Never has a combined physical and economic threat to the Canadian homeland been more palpable, but rarely have Canadians been more sanguine about their well-being.

 

This Committee is not composed of alarmists.  Many of our earlier proposals have proven to be sound – in some cases, such as the need for a pause in Canada’s military activity abroad, even prescient.

 

Not only are our proposals generally sound, under the circumstances we believe them to be moderate.  We do not expect, nor want, Canada to become a militaristic country.

 

But we must be prepared.  We must defend ourselves.  We must defend our coastlines with more than a handful of RCMP officers.  We must reorganize our security and intelligence apparatus at the centre.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

Chapter Two 

With respect to security SURVEILLANCE on Canada’s coasts, the Committee recommends that:  

2.1                   At least eight and possibly more High Frequency Surface Wave Radar sites be installed to monitor areas of heavy traffic on Canada’s coasts, plus other coastal sites that terrorists might target as alternates to high-traffic ports.  

2.2                   Tactical drones (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)) be introduced as surveillance aids off both coasts.  

2.3                   The government conduct a study to ascertain whether the use of higher-cost strategic drones should be introduced into Canada’s surveillance matrix  in the Arctic, as well as the east and west coasts.  

2.4                   The Department of Transport require all vessels of more than 15 tonnes to be equipped with transponders of at least Class B[1] capacity by 2008.  

2.5                   The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) be designated as the lead police force at all Canadian air and sea ports with adequate funding to combat security breaches caused by the presence of organized crime at those ports.  

2.6                   Canada Customs & Revenue Agency (CCRA) personnel be relocated from the U.S. ports of Newark and Tacoma to major world ports where the likelihood of terror-related embarkations is much more likely.  

2.7                   Significant numbers of Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) personnel be posted to major world ports to gather maritime intelligence.  

2.8                   All cruise ships, ferries and other vessels approaching Canadian ports be required to provide information on passengers and crew comparable to that provided to immigration officials at Canadian airports under the Advance Passenger Information/Personal Name Record Program.  

2.9                   Canada Customs & Revenue Agency (CCRA) ensure that there are adequate trained personnel to operate the new technology introduced at Canadian ports.  

2.10              Goods confiscated by Canada Customs & Revenue Agency (CCRA) and Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in conducting their normal duties be auctioned off and the funds raised be reinvested in the upgrading of policing  capabilities.[2]

 

Chapter Three

In addition to repeating the three recommendations listed above, from our report Defence of North America: a Canadian Responsibility, the Committee recommends that:  

3.1                   The government expand its cadre of intelligence analysts in the wake of reports that too few people have been assigned to do too much critical work. 

3.2                   The government move immediately to upgrade its recruitment of intelligence officers from Canadian universities and other institutions outside the public service and that those universities and institutions make wider use of instructors from outside Canada with insights into other cultures.  

3.3                   The government increase funding for the training of people with the kinds of language and cultural skills that the Canadian intelligence community needs to draw from.  

3.4                   The government treat the quick introduction of the Maritime Information Management & Data Exchange Study (MIMDEX) information-sharing system as a priority.  

3.5                   The government expand information-sharing among departments, agencies, police forces and the military, recognizing some potential limitations required by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms as well as confidentiality guarantees sometimes required by foreign intelligence sources.

 

Chapter Four 

The Committee recommends that:  

4.1.               The federal government take immediate steps to transform the Canadian Coast Guard from an agency that reports to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans to an independent agency responsible to Parliament and carrying out its duties – search and rescue, ice-breaking, navigational aids, buoy tending, boat safety, fisheries and environment protection – plus new responsibilities for national security.  For national security matters, Coast Guard assets would be temporarily directed by coastal operations centres (Trinity and Athena).  

4.2.               The Committee reiterates its recommendation that a public inquiry be struck under the Inquiries Act to look into the vulnerabilities to crime and terrorism at Canada’s ports.  

4.3.               The Committee recommends that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) conduct a risk / threat assessment to determine what personnel, equipment, and financial resources it needs to re-establish the Marine Division and to police the St. Lawrence Seaway, St. Lawrence River, Great Lakes, the Fraser and Skeena Rivers, and inland waterways identified as high risk.  

4.4.               The Committee recommends that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) report its findings to the public by March 31, 2004 and have an operational plan ready for March 31, 2005, and that the Government be prepared to fund the stated requirements.  

In addition to the recommendations in the above text, the Committee recommended in Canadian Security and Military Preparedness (February, 2002) that:  

·          a federal agency be created that will be responsible for selection, training, and supervision of persons and systems responsible for passenger and baggage screening at airports, and that this agency report to the RCMP. (Recommendation #13 page 130)  

On top of the recommendation cited in the text above, the Committee recommended in Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility (September, 2002) that:  

·          The Coordination of all Canadian resources – including Navy, Coast Guard, Air Force, Army, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, police forces and agencies responsible for intelligence and satellite surveillance – to improve defence of Canada’s coastlines. (Recommendation #2 page 14)  

·          New security measures on the Great Lakes including:  

i.                   Mandatory reporting for all vessels (of a displacement to be determined by Canadian regulators) to Canadian authorities 24 hours prior to anticipated entry into Canadian Great Lakes ports;  

ii.                All vessels (of a displacement to be determined by Canadian regulators) intending to operate in the Great Lakes region be equipped with transponders to permit electronic tracking by Canadian authorities. This requirement would have the added benefit of greatly improving the precision of search and rescue;  

iii.             Mandatory daily reporting to Canadian authorities for all vessels (of a displacement to be determined by Canadian regulators) operating in Canadian national waters;  

iv.             Canada’s Great Lakes reporting stations will be responsible for receipt and coordination of these reports and for communication with policing agencies. (Recommendation #8 page 15)  

In The Myth of Security at Canada’s Airports (January, 2003) the Committee recommended:  

·          All airport policing directly related to air travel security be removed from the airport authorities and assigned exclusively to the RCMP under contract to CATSA. [The Committee’s intention was to state that the contracts may be with CATSA, but the RCMP is the sole authority to which it reports.] (Recommendation #VII.1 page 147)  

·          Local police forces and security guards contracted by airport authorities be responsible for criminal offences that are not related to air travel security. (Recommendation #VII.2 page 147)  

·          CATSA should be given the authority to contract the RCMP to supervise all policing at airports as it relates to passenger, cargo, aircraft and airside security. [The Committee’s intention was that the RCMP, through CATSA, should supervise policing at airports.] (Recommendation #VIII.2 page 148)  

 

Chapter Five 

The Committee recommends that:  

5.1.                     The position of Deputy Prime Minister become a permanent component of the federal political structure.  

5.2.                     The Deputy Prime Minister be given permanent responsibility for Canada’s U.S. File, borders, national security issues, natural and man-made disasters and coasts.[3]  

5.3.                     The Deputy Prime Minister be provided with adequate bureaucratic support within a branch of the Privy Council Office to fund and direct a structure for maritime security in addition to other responsibilities listed in 5.2.  

5.4.                     This national security structure containing the following be set up within 60 days:

­         A permanent Cabinet committee chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister

­         The Cabinet Committee would include the following ministers:

o        Foreign Affairs

o        Defence

o        Solicitor General

o        Health

o        Finance

o        Justice

o        Immigration

o        Others as required  

­         An additional Secretary to the Cabinet as its senior official  

­         A permanent Secretariat within PCO dedicated to national security issues  

­         The Secretariat within PCO would include sufficient senior officials who have a good understanding of government capabilities, together with a grasp of issues and interests of importance to Canada.  

­         A restructuring of current procedures to permit this Secretariat to address issues of national security and common US/Canada security issues.  

5.5.                     The permanent secretariat to support the Deputy Prime Minister be formed within two months, and that they set up operations in a temporary government facility until the permanent national operations centres are built.  

5.6.                     A national operations centre complete with a senior level "situation room" be constructed that would permit a permanent secretariat to continuously monitor international and national events that might affect the national security of Canada. This operations centre should be located within easy physical access to the Privy Council Office, with complete and redundant power and national level communications.  

5.7.                     An alternate, mirror image operations centre be designed and constructed utilizing different sources of power and communications than the primary facility.   

5.8.                     The design and construction schedule be such that these operations centres are fully operationally capable by 1 February, 2005.  

Chapter Six 

The Committee recommends that:  

6.1.                Both U.S. and Canadian governments address the work of the planning groups seriously and provide the necessary personnel to do it.  

6.2.                The Government of the United States be invited to place liaison officers at East Coast, West Coast and Great Lakes multi-departmental operations centres where intelligence is fused and analyzed if and when the Government of Canada sees fit to establish those centres.  

6.3.                The Government of Canada enter into reciprocal bilateral agreements with major shipping countries that outline ways that these countries will assist each other on advance information on vessels, crews, cargo and indicators of which cargo items have already been inspected in various ways.  

6.4.                The Government of Canada commission a report on how other countries are upgrading their maritime security, with particular reference to the use of coast guards and anti-crime and anti-terrorism methodology at sea ports and airports.  

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[1] A Class B transponder is able to transmit but not receive. [2] Parks Canada’s revenues for entry fees at Canadian parks went up considerably after it was decided to partially reimburse parks for fees collected. Park wardens had previously been less than vigilant about staffing entry posts, since all revenues went directly to Ottawa. [3] The Committee will prepare, in the future, reports on first responders, the intelligence community and other security matters.  While arguments have been made in this report why coastal defence should be under the Deputy Primer Minister, the argumentation for including first responders and the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP) will be provided in subsequent reports.  

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